

# **SĀMKHYA METAPHYSICS : SOME PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS**

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## PREFACE

The thesis entitled '*Sāṃkhya Metaphysics: Some Philosophical Problems*' is a sincere and humble attempt to throw some light on the critical issues on Sāṃkhya metaphysics leading to some problems of understanding and conceptual clarity. The Sāṃkhya philosophy has got some peculiarities of its own, which demands some attention of the scholars in the field. First, this is the only system in philosophy, which is taken to be orthodox inspite of the fact that it admits of no role of God in it, though a section of scholars believe that there is a later development of the system which is called *śeśvara Sāṃkhya*. Secondly, it believes in dual realities - Prakṛti and Puruṣa as opposed to the system believing in one reality i.e. Advaita Vedānta. Thirdly, Prakṛti is said to be active and generator of the whole world starting from five *tanmātras*, five elements etc. It is unique to think that the Sāṃkhya is the only system in Indian philosophy which admits the dynamocity of Prakṛti and hence it can create the whole world without depending on any conscious principle. Let us take the case of the origin of the world. There is a debate among the systems of Indian Philosophy regarding this. The Advaitins think that the world is originated from the Conscious Principle i.e. Brahman which is called *Brahmakāraṇatā-vāda*. Again, the Vaiśeṣikas believe in *paramāṇukāraṇatā-vāda* i.e. the world originated from the atoms. Initially the Sāṃkhya would not deny that the conjunction of two atoms makes a dyadic compound (*dvyāṇuka*), then *tryāṇuka* (triadic compound) and in this way


gross objects originated. But it has to be borne in mind that to the Sāṃkhya two atoms are conjoined automatically without depending on the conscious principle, because Prakṛti has an *in-built power* to expand. The Vaiśeṣikas will say that two atoms can be conjoined through some interference of a conscious being, because an unconscious matter can never be conjoined automatically. Two atoms may be conjoined if some conscious being i.e. God intervenes there. In this connection, the Sāṃkhya would argue that matter has got always an inherent power of creation automatically.

These philosophical thoughts have created some controversy, confusion and lack of philosophical clarity among the scholars for a long period of time. An effort will be made to highlight some major aspects of Sāṃkhya metaphysics and a critical evaluation is made after pointing out some of the contributions of Sāṃkhya to the field of Indian philosophy. How far I am successful would be judged by the honourable experts and scholars in the field.

Throughout the discussion, I have made the English-rendering of Sanskrit and Bengali words and sentences for the sake of clarity. This work is divided into six chapters and a bibliography.

Some errors might have crept in here and there, inspite of my best efforts to avoid the same for which I beg apology. I humbly submit this work for discerning judgment of the learned.

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Saheli Basu

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Sāṃkhya is one of the oldest system of Indian Philosophy. Īśvarakṛṣṇa has presented the Sāṃkhya philosophy concisely in seventy two verses in his *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*. One of the significant features of Sāṃkhya philosophy is that it is atheistic.

Sāṃkhya philosophy is an example of metaphysical dualism – the two entities, which explains creation being Puruṣa and Prakṛti which may be translated as the principle of consciousness and unconscious nature. The features of these two principles are diametrically opposite. Nevertheless creation proceeds out of the conjunction of the two principles. As a matter of fact for the Sāṃkhya philosophers the proximity of Puruṣa and Prakṛti results in the disturbance of the elements of Prakṛti which signals the starting point of creation. Prakṛti which is unconscious, but active, is composed of three *guṇa*-s called *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Sattva* is light and the instrument of manifestation, *rajas* is the principle of change and restlessness and *tamas* is the principle of heaviness and inactivity. Prakṛti is the fundamental principle from which the material world springs. The human body is also analysable into the physical and the non-physical – the gross material body and the element of consciousness which is Puruṣa. This, according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, is human bondage. Men are in bondage so long as they confuse between matter and

consciousness - Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Man escapes from bondage when he realises the difference between the unconscious and the conscious - Prakṛti and Puruṣa. This, in brief, is the metaphysical position of the Sāṃkhya system.

The Sāṃkhya system has a very old tradition. The last major figure in the tradition is Vijñānabhikṣu. But the real source of our information regarding Sāṃkhya system is Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*, which still remains the universally accepted classic of the tradition. *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* still remains the complete text of Sāṃkhya philosophy.

The age of the Sāṃkhya system can be ascertained by the fact that we find reference of the system in the writing of Buddhist philosophers like Aśvaghoṣa, in the Mahābhārata and even in the Upaniṣadas – particularly in Kaṭha and Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣadas.

The Sāṃkhya view seems to have grown out of a kind of dualism. The union of the Sun – God and the Earth Goddess are concepts which speaks of two productive forces. One of them is spiritual and the other material. The concepts of Puruṣa and Prakṛti might be the legacy of this dualism. Puruṣa in Sāṃkhya philosophy is the immaterial consciousness and the primordial material principle.

If we trace history, we shall find that there are adequate hints to the effect that there had been different opinions regarding Sāṃkhya philosophy. It is probable from these ancient records that there were many branches of this systems. The yoga system which is otherwise known as *Seśvara* Sāṃkhya, testifies the truth of this remarks. Sāṃkhya which was basically atheistic, gets a new dimension and character in the yoga system.

Kapila is believed to be the father of Sāṃkhya philosophy. Name of other philosophers are also available among whom mention may be made of Āsuri, Pañcaśikha, Varsagaṇya and Vindhyaśins. Āsuri is a prehistoric figure, but Pañcaśikha is a historical one who is believed to be the author of Śaṣṭi-Tantra. Īśvarakṛṣṇa is supposed to live after the period of Gautama of the Nyāya-sūtra and Vasubandhu, the Buddhist philosopher. The *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* consists of a very clear account of Sāṃkhya philosophy contained in seventy-two verses. In this book, there is no reference to the philosophy of other systems. Perhaps Īśvarakṛṣṇa believed that the Sāṃkhya philosophy is acceptable to everybody as the representative of Indian philosophy. This is not just an expectation. As a matter of fact we find reference to Sāṃkhya philosophy in the Upaniṣadas, ancient epics, and in the Yoga system. In fact yoga of Patañjali appears to be a version of Sāṃkhya.

A historical source of the Sāṃkhya system is available in *Yuktidīpikā* composed by a person known as Rājana. The book is

a polemical one and enters into debate with certain metaphysical and epistemological issues considered in other systems of philosophy.<sup>1</sup>

Vācaspati Misra's *Sāṃkhya-Tattvakaumudī* is another important contribution to the Sāṃkhya literature. Vācaspati's commentary on Sāṃkhya philosophy is believed to be unique of all commentators as it is the case with his other bhāṣyas.

Sāṃkhya philosophy begins with the undeniable fact that there is suffering in the world. We are in bondage and consequently we suffer. Freedom from suffering is the ultimate goal of human life. This freedom, however cannot be attained by any empirical means. Even the non-empirical means suggested in the Vedas are of no avail, because liberation from suffering cannot emancipate a man unless it is permanent. Suffering returns after the force of such empirical and non-empirical means comes to an end.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers claim that a clear knowledge of the *tattvas* can only remove suffering from good. The metaphysical structure of the world has been analysed by the Sāṃkhya philosophers into two basic entities out of the proximity or cooperation of which the world springs. These two entities are Puruṣa and Prakṛti which are diametrically opposed to each other. Puruṣa is conscious while Prakṛti is unconscious and inert. Out of

beginningless nescience these two fundamental entities come close to each other. The three *guṇa*-s – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* which compose Prakṛti are originally in a state of equilibrium. The proximity with Puruṣa results in the destruction of the state of equilibrium and evolution begins. The evolutes of Prakṛti are twenty three in number – *Manas*, *Buddhi*, *Ahaṁkāra* etc.

Entire metaphysics of Sāṁkhya philosophy is a consequence of their subscription to the theory of causation known as Satkāryavāda. The theory holds that the effect pre-exists in the cause prior to production. If we hold a contrary view and hold that the effect is non-existent or *asat* before its production, then effectuation would be a mystery. If oil is supposed to be non-existent in its material cause, we cannot explain how the effect comes into existence. Out of nothing comes nothing. Hence, it must be conceded that the effect is *sat* or real in the material cause prior to production. Just as a thousand artists cannot turn blue into yellow similarly no amount effort can make the unreal real.

The following five considerations are used in the argument for the *satkāryavāda* : (a) the non-existent cannot produce anything (given the assumed definition of “existence” as the ability to have some effect); (b) when producing a specific thing, we always need a specific substance as material cause (such as clay for a pot, or milk for curds); (c) otherwise everything (or at least anything) would come into being from anything; (d) the

creative agent (the efficient cause) produces only what is contained in the material cause (a potter cannot make jewelry); (e) the effect is essentially identical with its material cause, and so it has many of its qualities (a pot is still clay, and thus consists of the primary attributes of clay). This last argument is utilized to determine the basic attributes of the imperceptible metaphysical causes of the empirical world: the substrate must have the same fundamental attributes and abilities as the manifest world.

Sāṃkhya philosophers use their theory of causation for proving Prakṛti as the ultimate material stuff of the universe. This in fact is the major argument for proving Prakṛti. It will be agreed on all hands that every material thing of the world is capable of producing threefold feeling in us – the feeling of pleasure, pain and dullness or stupefaction. Rainfall eg. produces the feeling of pleasure or *prīti* in the mind of the ploughman, pain and dissatisfaction in the mind of the person who intends to go to his office and a feeling of dullness in the mind of the lazy man who just idles away time. Since according to *Satkāryavāda* the effect pre-exists in the cause, the three feelings of pleasure, pain and dullness must exist in the object which causes them, of course, not as feelings which are psychological. The threefold feelings exist in the object in the form of three *guṇa*-s – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Since every material object has the potency to produce pleasure etc. they must be composed of three *guṇa*-s. *Sattva* corresponds to pleasure (*prīti*), *rajas* to pain (*apṛīti*) and *tamas* to dullness. If all objects are constituted of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*

there must be a primordial material substance which is composed to the three *guṇa*-s. This material substance is Prakṛti.

In *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa the nature of the three *guṇa*-s has been explained in clear terms. *Sattva* is laghu or light, *rajas* is active and *tamas* is heavy and it obstructs revelation. In modern terms the three *guṇa*-s may be paraphrased as coherence, information, revelation and intelligence (*Sattva*); energy, movement, impulse (*Rajas*); and inertia, mass, passivity, conservation (*Tamas*).

The other category of real is Puruṣa. Puruṣa is the principle of consciousness. It is characterized as the conscious subject, uncaused eternal, all-pervasive, self-sustaining and independent. It is devoid of the *guṇa*-s (*agūṇa*), and therefore inactive and unable to produce. The existence of Puruṣa can be known only from inference. Five arguments are given to prove its existence, (1) All complex structures serve an external purpose, for instance, a bed is for somebody to lie on; so the whole of nature, or more specifically the body – a very complex system – must also serve something different from it, which is the Puruṣa, (2) The three *guṇa*-s give an exhaustive explanation of material phenomena, but in sentient beings we find features that are the direct opposites of the *guṇa*-s (such as consciousness or being strictly private), and thus they need a non-material cause, which is the Puruṣa, (3) The coordinated activity of all the parts of a human being prove that there is something supervising it;

without it, it would fall apart, as we see in a dead body, hence the Puruṣa must exist. (4) Although we cannot perceive ourselves as Puruṣa-s with the senses, we have immediate awareness of ourselves as conscious beings; the “enjoyer”, the experiencing self is the Puruṣa. (5) Liberation, or the separation of soul and matter, would be impossible without their being separate Puruṣa to be liberated. Thus Puruṣa must exist.

Sāṃkhya adduces three arguments to prove that there is a separate Puruṣa for each individual: (1) Birth, death and the personal history of everybody is different (it is determined by the law of *karma*, according to our merits collected to previous lives). If there were one Puruṣa only, all bodies should be identical or at least indistinguishable for the function of the self or Puruṣa is to be a supervisor of the body. But this is clearly not so. Hence, there must be a plurality of distinct Puruṣa-s. (2) If there were only one Puruṣa, everyone would act simultaneously alike, for the Puruṣa is the supervisor of the body. But this is clearly not so. Hence, there must be a plurality of distinct Puruṣa-s. (3) If there were only one Puruṣa, we would all experience the same things. However, it is evident that the opposite is true: our experiences are inherently diverse and private, and they cannot be directly shared. Hence, there must be a separate Puruṣa for us all.

Prakṛti and Puruṣa, through diametrically opposed to each other must be conjoined with one another and this conjunction is responsible for creation. There is an apparent implausibility in this

mechanism of creation. Puruṣa as pure consciousness remains outside the realm of causality. So how the conjunction of Prakṛti and Puruṣa comes about remains a mystery. According to the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* Puruṣa and Prakṛti are like the lame and the blind. If the lame is seated on the shoulder of the blind, the lame can give direction to the blind who makes his way home.

The nature of the relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is highly problematic. Puruṣa being inactive cannot influence matter or Prakṛti. It is said that Prakṛti serves the purpose of Puruṣa. But how can an intelligent substance serve anybody's purpose? Puruṣa is unable to move Prakṛti, but Prakṛti is able to respond to Puruṣa's intentions. This is possible because Prakṛti has *Sattva guṇa* – the intelligent aspect of nature. Milk is unconscious, but it flows from the udder of the cow out of affection for the calf. Similarly, Prakṛti evolves for the purpose of the Puruṣa. In the later texts the problem, how the two principles borrow each others' property is explained in a different way. In those tasks illumination and reflection are the standard models of the connection between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Puruṣa is said to illuminate Prakṛti and Prakṛti reflects the nature of Puruṣa.

In consequence of Prakṛti's connection with the soul, Prakṛti evolves many forms: the twenty-three *tattva-s* (realities) of manifest Prakṛti. The character of this evolution (*pariṇāma*) is somewhat vague. Is this an account of the origin of the cosmos, or of single being? The cosmogenic understanding is probably

older, and it seems to predominate in later accounts as well. In a pantheistic account the two accounts could be harmonized, but pantheism is alien from classical Sankhya. Īśvarakṛṣṇa is again probably intentionally silent on this conflicting issue, but he seems to be inclined to the microcosmic interpretation: otherwise either a single super-Puruṣa's influence would be needed (that is, God's influence) to account for how the universe on the whole comes about, or a coordinated effect of all the Puruṣa-s – together would be required - there seems to be no foundation for either of these views of Sāṃkhya.

The central mechanism of evolution is the complicated interaction of the *guṇa*-s, which is sensitive to the environment, the substrate or locus of the current process. Just as water in different places behaves differently (on the top of the Himalaya Mountain as ice, in a hill creek, in the ocean or as the juice of a fruit) so do the *guṇa*-s. In the various manifestations of nature the dominance of the *guṇa*-s varies - in the highest form *sattva* rules, in the lowest *tamas* covers everything.

The actual order of evolution is as follows: from root – nature first appears intellect (*buddhi*); from it, ego (*ahaṃkāra*) and from the *tanmātras* the elements (*bhūtas*).

The function of the *buddhi* (intellect) is specified as *adhyavasāya* (determination); it can be understood as definite

conceptual knowledge. It has eight forms: virtue, knowledge, dispassion and command, and their opposites. So it seems that on the material plane, *buddhi* is the locus of cognition, emotion, moral judgment and volition. All these may be thought to belong also to consciousness, or the Puruṣa. However, on the Sāṃkhya account, Puruṣa is connected directly only to the intellect, and the latter does all cognitions, mediates all experiences for it. The view of Sāṃkhya appears to be that when *sattva* (quality of goodness, or illumination) predominates in *buddhi* (the intellect), it can act acceptably for Puruṣa, when there is a predominance of *tamas*, it will be weak and insufficient.

The ego or *Ahaṃkāra* (making the I) is explained as *Abhimāna* – thinking of as [mine]. It delineates that part of the world that we consider to be or to belong to ourselves: mind, body perhaps family, property, rank .... It individuates and identifies parts of Prakṛti: by itself nature is one, continuous and unseparated. It communicates the individuality inherent in the Puruṣa-s to the essentially common Prakṛti that comprises the psyche of the individual. So it has a purely cognitive and a material function as well – like so many principles of Sāṃkhya.

The eleven powers (*indriya*) are mind (*manas*), the senses and the “powers of action” (*karmendriya*), the biological faculties. The senses (powers of cognition, *buddhīndriya*) are sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching – they are the abilities, not the physical organs themselves through which they operate.

The crude names of the powers of action are speech, hand, foot, anus and lap. They symbolize the fundamental biological abilities to communicate, to take in or consume, to move, to excrete and to generate.

"*Manas*" (often translated as "mind", though this may be misleading), designates the lowest, almost vegetative part of the central information-processing structure. Its function is *sarṅkalpa* – arranging (literally 'fitting together') or coordinating the *indriya-s*. It functions partly to make a unified picture from sense data, provided by the senses, and partly to translate the commands from the intellect to actual, separate actions of the organs. So, it is both a cognitive power and a power of action. (Later authors take "*manas*" to also designate the will, for *sarṅkalpa* also has this meaning).

Intellect, ego and mind together constitute the *antaḥ-karaṇa* (internal organ), or the material psyche, while the other *indriya-s* (powers) collectively are called the external organs. The internal organ as an inseparable unit is the principle of life (*prāṇa*). In cognition, the internal organ's activity follows upon that of the external, but they are continuously active, so their activity is also simultaneous. The external organ is strictly bound to the present tense, while the psyche is active in the past and future as well (memory, planning, and the grasping of timeless truths).

The material elements are derived from the gross, *tāmasic* aspect of the ego, which yields what Sāṃkhya calls *tanmātra-s* (only that, that is, unmixed). These in turn yield the elements (*bhūta, mahābhūta*). The elements are ether (*ākāśa*), air, fire, water and earth. The *tanmātra-s* seem to be uncompounded sensibilia; perhaps subtle elements or substances, each having only one sensible quality: sound, touch, visibility, taste and smell. The gross elements are probably fixed compounds of the *tanmātra-s*. Ether has only sound, air also touch, fire is also visible, water has in addition taste and earth has all the five qualities. Human beings are a compound of all these. At death we lose the body made up of the five gross elements; the rest (from intellect down to the *tanmātra-s*) make up the transmigrating entity, called *linga or linga-śarīra* (sign-body), often known in English translations as the "subtle body." The Puruṣa itself does not transmigrate; it only watches. Transmigration is compared to an actor putting on different clothes and taking up many roles; it is determined by the law of (efficient) cause and effect, known also as the law of *karma* (action).<sup>2</sup>

Because Prakṛti is essentially changing, nothing is constant in the material world: everything decays and meets its destruction in the end. Therefore as long as the transmigrating entity persists, the suffering of old age and death is unavoidable.

The only way to fight suffering is to leave the circle of transmigration (*samsāra*) for ever. This is the liberation of Puruṣa, in Sāṃkhya, normally called *kaivalya* (isolation). It comes about through loosening the bond between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. This bond was originally produced by the curiosity of the soul, and it is extremely strong because the ego identifies ourselves with our empirical state: the body and the more subtle organs, including the material psyche. Although Puruṣa is not actually bound by any external force, it is an enchanted observer that cannot take his eyes off from the performance.

As all cognition is performed by the intellect for the soul, it is also the intellect that can recognize the very subtle distinction between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. But first the effect of the ego must be neutralized, and this is done by a special kind of meditational praxis. Step by step, starting from the lowest *tattva-s*, the material elements, and gradually reaching the intellect itself, the follower of Sāṃkhya must practice as follows: "the constituent is not me; it is not mine; I am not this." When this has been fully interiorized with regard to all forms of Prakṛti, then arises the absolutely pure knowledge of the metaphysical solitude of Puruṣa; it is *kevala*, (alone), without anything external-material belongings to it.

And as a dancer, after having performed, stops dancing, so does Prakṛti cease to perform for an individual Puruṣa when its task is accomplished. She has always acted for the Puruṣa, and as

he is no longer interested in her (“I have seen her”), she stops forever (“I have already been seen”) – the given subtle body gets dissolved into the root-Prakṛti. This happens only at death, for the gross body (like a potter’s wheel still turning although no longer impelled) due to causally determined karmic tendencies (*saṁskāra-s*) goes on to operate for a little while.

Puruṣa enters into liberation, forever. Although Puruṣa and Prakṛti are physically as much in contact as before-both seem to be all-pervading in extension – there is no purpose of a new start: Puruṣa has experienced all that it wanted.<sup>3</sup>

We may now try to highlight some of the theories of Sāṁkhya as given above.

Of all the books on Sāṁkhya Philosophy, the *Sāṁkhya Kārikā* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa is the most authentic one. Many think that Īśvarakṛṣṇa is the disciple of Pañcaśikha. *The Sāṁkhya Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is also known as *Sāṁkhyasaptati* because it presents the whole of Sāṁkhya system in seventy verses. This kārikā has several excellent commentaries of which the *Tattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra is most important. Besides Gouḍpāda Svāmī also wrote an authentic commentary on the *kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Acārya Sankara also quoted from *Sāṁkhya kārikā* in his Śārīraka Bhāṣya. The account of Sāṁkhya philosophy given by Mādhāvācārya in his Sarvadarśana sangraha follows the same

book by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The commentary by Vācaspati Mīśra called *Tattvakoumudī* is also a very famous treatise.<sup>4</sup>

The *Sāṃkhya sūtra* is divided into six chapters or *adhyāya*. The number of the *sūtras* in the first chapter deals with suffering, its causes, the removal of suffering and the means for its removal. The second chapter contains forty-seven *sūtras*. In this chapter the purpose of creation, its process, the nature of number of created objects have been described. The number of *sūtras* in the third chapter is eighty four. They consider how the five gross elements evolve from five subtle elements. It also considers the varieties of physical bodies, the way in which the subtle body takes another body, because of bondage, the means of liberation, the importance of *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma* etc , the concept of non-attachment, five *viparyayas*, twenty-eight *āsakti*, nine *tuṣhties*, eight *siddhis*, the marks of liberated persons, while embodied etc. Vijñānabhikṣu has given different names of each of the chapters. The first chapter has been named *Viśayādhyāya*, the second chapter *Kāryādhyāya*, the third *Vairāgyadhyāya*, the fourth *Akhyāikādhyāya*, the fifth *parapakṣanirjayādhyāya* and the sixth *tantrādhyāya*.

The word *Sāṃkhya* has been derived from the word *Sāṃkhyā*. The word *Sāṃkhyā* may have again two meanings. It may mean the number of the *tattva* or *padārthas*. Maharṣi Kapila has mentioned twenty-five reals. In his opinion knowledge of these reals leads to liberation. For this reason the philosophy of

Kapila is known as *Sāṃkhya-darśana*. It may be mentioned that for the Nyāya philosophers' knowledge of sixteen categories of reals leads to liberation while for the Vaiśeṣika's liberation proceeds from the knowledge of the six categories. But for this reason the philosophy of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika is not described as Sāṃkhya philosophy. Sāṃkhya philosophy is really a new system. It appears therefore, that the word 'Sāṃkhya' must be taken in another sense. It is said that the word 'Sāṃkhya' means *samyak jñāna* or right knowledge. The philosophy which tells us about the right knowledge is Sāṃkhya philosophy. The philosophy propounded by Kapila deals with the nature, need and means of right knowledge and hence it has been described as Sāṃkhya philosophy. In Kapila's philosophy we come across teaching relating to self knowledge, the like of which is not to be found in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy. In Vedānta philosophy self-knowledge is described as the cause of liberation; the same is true of Sāṃkhya philosophy. But as a matter of fact right knowledge in Sāṃkhya philosophy means knowledge of discrimination between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Right knowledge in Vedānta philosophy is knowledge of Brahman.<sup>5</sup>

According to Gauḍapāda *Tattvasamāsa* is the oldest book on Sāṃkhya philosophy. It contains twenty-two sūtras. In the opinion of Vijñānabhikṣu *Sāṃkhya-Pravacana* is actually the extension of the six chapters of the Sāṃkhya mentioned above and *tattvasamāsa*.



The central purpose of Sāṃkhya philosophers is the cessation of the three kinds of sufferings – *ādhyātmika*, *ādhibhoutika* and *ādhidaivika*. The suffering or misery which springs from ādhi and Vyādhī is known *ādhyātmika* misery. The misery which comes from birds and beasts, insects, reptiles etc is called *ādhibhoutika* misery.

Further the suffering caused by excessive rain, absence of rainfall of nature is called *ādhidaivika*. These sufferings are not eliminated for good by ordinary or Vedic means. It is found that although such means can remove suffering but that is only temporary. The same suffering comes back again.

In the opinion of Īśvarakṛṣṇa there are two kinds of reals – *Avyakta* and *Jñā*. The word *avyakta* stands for cause in which all effects are contained in an unmanifested form. According to *Satkāryavāda*, the theory of causation endorsed by Sāṃkhya philosophy, the effect exists in the cause prior to its production. So the word '*avyakta*' means the material cause otherwise known as Prakṛti. The word '*Jñā*' means consciousness. In Sāṃkhya philosophy it is known as 'Puruṣa'.

Sāṃkhya philosophy divides all entities or real into two – conscious and material or unconscious. Reasons have been given why a principle of consciousness like Puruṣa is to be admitted besides material things. Prakṛti which is constituted by the three

*guṇa-s* – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* has then in a state of equilibrium. When this state of equilibrium of the three *guṇa-s* is destroyed Prakṛti transforms itself into its evolutes. Puruṣa, however, is not subject to change or transformation.<sup>6</sup>

The concept of Prakṛti rests heavily on the doctrine of *satkāryavāda*. This causal theory has been proved with the help of several reasons, e.g. it has been argued that if the cause does not contain the effect in a latent form the effect can not come out of it. This is the reason why we do not get oil from sand, but only from mustered seed. Mustered seed does contain oil in an unmanifested form while sand does not. If it is not admitted then we could have oil from any and every material thing.

*Satkāryavāda* believes in actual transformation of the causal substance. Both cause and effect are real, i.e. they have the same kind of being. However, the Advaitins, although they subscribe to *Satkāryavāda*, believe that the effect does not enjoy being independent of the being of the cause. So it is not reasonable to believe that the cause actually transforms itself into the effect.<sup>7</sup>

On Sāṃkhya philosophy both the difference and identity of the cause and effect has been admitted. The two may be different as entities having different ontological status. For example, Prakṛti and *mahat* are different but Prakṛti being the

material cause it is non-different from *mahat*. It is philosophically correct to endorse only the cause as ontologically real. But in order to agree with the empirical world, the Sāṃkhya philosophers admit of difference and also non-difference of the cause and the effect. This idea is expressed in the following statement – "*Kāraṇakārya vibhāgātabhibhagāt Vaiśyarūpasya*" - it means that there is no complete identity between the cause and the effect, there is no complete difference either.

For the Sāṃkhya philosophers both the cause and effect have been accepted as *sat* or real. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers subscribe to this. They also believe that four kinds of *paramāṇus* are the causes of this world. These *paramāṇus* are eternal or real, and whatever comes from these *paramāṇus* are equally real. Here we find some kind of affinity between Sāṃkhya and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy. But they differ so far as the nature of the effect is concerned. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers, whatever is real is always real. The same thing cannot be sometimes real and sometimes unreal. But for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers the something may be real and unreal at different times.

The conception of Prakṛti in Sāṃkhya philosophy is the conception of a primordial material substance in which the entire material world is contained in an unmanifested form. Creation is the manifestation of the unmanifested. So for this philosopher the world come into being from unconscious material cause. This is a thesis which is analogous to philosophy of creation as we find in

Cārvāka, Bauddha, Jaina, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The Cārvākas believe that four kinds of atoms are the material cause of the world. The Sāṃkhya philosophers however, do not subscribe to *paramāṇukāraṇatāvāda*. They argue that certain gross things may originate from the conjunction of the four kinds of atoms, but there are many subtle entities which cannot come from atomic conjunction. So *paramāṇukāraṇatāvāda* can not explain the origin of everything that composes the universe. The Sāṃkhya philosophers hold that the central cause of the world must be such which can explain the origin of both gross and subtle entities. A cause is always more subtle and pervasive than an effect, clay, for example, is more subtle and pervasive than a pot. Gold is more subtle and more pervasive than the ornament. According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, whatever is the ultimate cause of the world must be more subtle and more pervasive than the things of the world. This most subtle element is Prakṛti. Prakṛti naturally is something that is the cause of everything but is not itself caused by anything.

Sāṃkhya philosophers are dualists. They divide the ultimate reality into two – one is an unconscious principle and the other is a conscious principle. A conscious principle, usually known as the self, is designated by the term Puruṣa in Sāṃkhya philosophy. The fundamental feature of Puruṣa is that it is never an object. Puruṣa is a subject. An object is amenable to perception, but a subject cannot be perceived. This is the reason why perceptual knowledge of Puruṣa is not possible. Nevertheless the existence

of Puruṣa has to be admitted. As a matter of fact, there is nothing which disproves the existence of self. It has been said by Kapila, “*asti hyātmā nāstitva-sādhanābhāvāt*”, which means that since the non-existence of self cannot be proved, the existence of self must be conceded.

In the opinion of the Sāṃkhya Philosophy; the existence of Puruṣa is necessary for explaining the enjoyment and the ultimate liberation of Prakṛti.

In all the arguments which have been given in support of Puruṣa’s existence, there is a central theme. The world which proceeds from Prakṛti must be justified for its existence. The justification is that the world has been created for satisfying certain needs. The concept of need is empty if it is not the need of a conscious principle. This conscious principle is called Puruṣa.

We have seen that the unconscious objects of nature are the medium for satisfying the need of the self. Such objects do not have need of its own. Self is not a means to any end which means that its existence can be justified irrespective of practical necessity. If we consider conscious object, we find that they can not satisfy their needs without the help of a conscious agent, even as the unconscious chariot can not go to a place without being guided by a conscious person. It is proved thus that their

must be a conscious principle besides unconscious Prakṛti or objects of nature.

The conception of self which we find in different systems of Indian Philosophy is not identical. For example, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Prābhākaras self is not of the nature of consciousness; consciousness is an accidental or contingent property of the self. But for the Sāṃkhya philosophers self is conscious. It is held by them that pleasure and pain, happiness and misery do not have any relation with self. This is why in Sāṃkhya system, the self has been described as consciousness and not of the nature of *Ānanda* or bliss.

If we turn to Advaita philosophy, we find that the self for them is one. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers self is many. One should notice that self is admitted to many by the Jainas, but for them self is all – pervading, but it pervades only in the body. In *Sāṃkhya* philosophy although self is admitted to be many each individual self is all-pervading. If there are ten lamps in a room the light emitted by each pervades the entire room. Similarly each self pervades the whole of nature. For the Jainas, the self has infinite knowledge, unending happiness and power. But for the Sāṃkhya philosophers self is devoid of all qualities. Puruṣa is the enjoyer but not an agent. Prakṛti transforms itself for the enjoyment and liberation of Puruṣa. Puruṣa is inactive and remains as consciousness. It does not change or transform itself.

Why do the Sāṃkhya philosophers describe the self as consciousness? It may be argued that there is no reason to consider consciousness as self or Puruṣa. We can think of consciousness as a property of the self in which case such consciousness can reveal Prakṛti. If it is imagined that self and consciousness are different, consciousness can reveal objects. The contention is that consciousness may be admitted for the revelation of unconscious object. But such consciousness may not be considered as self.

In reply to this contention it is said that if consciousness is a property of the self we should believe that self and consciousness are different. Whatever is different from consciousness must be unconscious or material. So if self is different from consciousness then a self should be considered as material. But if the self is unconscious or material it cannot possess consciousness which is diametrically opposite to it. A material substance can not possess something which is not material. Hence, consciousness is not a property of the self but self is of the nature of consciousness.

Prakṛti and Puruṣa are the two fundamental reals which are responsible for creation. Prakṛti has been described as the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇa-s* - *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. Creation demands the destruction of the state of equilibrium. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy such state can be destroyed by the conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Conjunction or co-

operation of these two reals is necessary because Prakṛti or Puruṣa by itself cannot create. Creation involves activities and Puruṣa being inactive cannot create. Similarly, Prakṛti by itself cannot be the cause of creation because it is unconscious. It is possible that Puruṣa can provide what Prakṛti lacks for example, consciousness. Prakṛti similarly provides what Puruṣa lacks namely impact or activity. It shows that the world can be created by the co-operation or conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti.

It is said that, when Prakṛti and Puruṣa are conjoined with each other, equilibrium of Prakṛti is disturbed. Each *guṇa* tries to predominate over the others. As a result this world of variety comes into existence and the objects of the world sometimes display the predominance of *sattva* and sometimes of *rajas* and *tamas*. Sāṃkhya philosophers give us a detailed account of the evolution of the world from *mahat* to the five fundamental elements or *mahābhūtas*.

The transformation of Prakṛti is not for the sake of Prakṛti, but for something else. Prakṛti is unconscious and material. Hence, it cannot create the world for its own benefit. For Sāṃkhya philosophers an unconscious stuff can not have any interest of its own. It is said that the purpose of the transformation of Prakṛti is for the benefit of Puruṣas' enjoyment and liberation.

It is a fact that the world which is created is not purposeless or without any discipline. Nevertheless Sāṃkhya

philosophy does not believe in the intervention of God for this teleological creation. In a similar way although Prakṛti is unconscious it transforms itself spontaneously without the intervention of God. The Sāṃkhya differs from others systems of Indian Philosophy at this particular point. The other theistic philosopher holds that the transformation of Prakṛti does not require a separate conscious agent for guiding the process of creation. In Sāṃkhya philosophy, the proximity of Puruṣa and Prakṛti is enough for creation. Puruṣa is conscious and is responsible for the destruction of the state of equilibrium of Prakṛti. Just as magnet and iron-particles, though they are devoid of motion, can move when there is contact between the two. Similarly, the proximity of Puruṣa with Prakṛti is responsible for evolution.

In the writings of Kapila there is no concept of God as the efficient cause of the transformation of Prakṛti. The proximity of the two reals is enough to explain the creation of the universe. But commentators like Vijñānabhikṣu entertain a different view. They think that Kapila does not clearly deny a divine role in matter of creation. He simply says that the existence of God is not provable. Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that Sāṃkhya philosophy is designed to explain liberation of *jīva*. Consequently, the question of God's existence does not arise. Liberation proceeds from self-knowledge. For this reason, the author of Sāṃkhya philosophy does not say anything regarding God. Vijñānabhikṣu refers to Upaniṣads where it is said that man can attain liberation through

the knowledge of the fundamental reals admitted in Sāṃkhya philosophy.

However, it is difficult to indicate the opinion of Vijñāna-bhikṣu. The simple reason is that Kapila himself has tried to establish atheism which means that the role of God in creation is simply imaginary.

The two reals, Prakṛti and Puruṣa are of fundamentally different character. Nevertheless creation proceeds from the co-operation of these two principles. It is said that when the two principles come in contact with each other Prakṛti evolves into the world. Prakṛti being partless, the transformation of Prakṛti must be total, which means there would remain no part of Prakṛti untransformed. This, in its turn, means that when Prakṛti is transformed, the transformation being total, Prakṛti itself will be eliminated. The reason is that whatever is not amenable to transformation is Prakṛti. This is what is meant by the remark that Prakṛti is *Avikṛti*. In the state of transformation, nothing of Prakṛti remains unchanged which means that there would be no Prakṛti. The above means that Prakṛti is non-eternal or *Anitya*. It goes against the basic contention of Sāṃkhya philosophy. To answer the question of the non-eternity of Prakṛti we should carefully notice the real meaning of *Parīṇāma* or transformation *Parīṇāma* is the state of a thing which does not imply any change of the thing itself. In simple terms the disappearance of a property and the appearance of another property leave the locus of such

property unchanged. The lump of gold changes into an ornament but inspite of change gold remains unchanged. Consequently, although the Sāṃkhya philosophers speak of the transformation of Prakṛti the nature of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* remain unchanged.

Vijñānabhikṣu however, gives a different account in his *Pravacanabhāṣya*. He says that Prakṛti and Puruṣa are all - pervading and eternal. Hence, the transformation of Prakṛti which proceeds from its relation to Puruṣa must be eternal. Consequently, creation must also be supposed to be eternal. But this is contrary to the contention of Sāṃkhya philosophy which speaks of the creation and dissolution of the world. Vijñānabhikṣu says in reply that the three *guṇa*-s of Prakṛti are unlimited. Nevertheless, they become connected with Prakṛti. The conjunction of this principle is eternal and different from the natural conjunction of them. Transformation is two kinds – *Sadrśa* and *Visadrśa*. The natural conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti leads to *Sadrśa Parināma* and it does not cause *Visadrśa Parināma*. In the case of *Sadrśa Parināma* there is no question of the elimination of Prakṛti because in *Sadrśa Parināma* Prakṛti does not really change.

Evolution of the world does not proceed directly from Prakṛti. The first evolute of Prakṛti is *Mahat* which is followed by *aḥmākāra*, the five *tanmātras*, eleven sense-organs and five elements of *mahābhūtas*.

Prakṛti is extremely subtle. But it ultimately transforms itself into the manifested world. It is seen everywhere that something which is originally very small and subtle gradually assumes a gross form. The seed which is small in size produces the great tree. It passes through different stages where we find a gradual change of a seed – a change from subtle stage to the gross one.

Why is Sāṁkhya philosophy written by Kapila? Like most other theistic systems Sāṁkhya philosophy believes that the study of Sāṁkhya philosophy leads to liberation. Men of the world are continuously suffering from these kinds of miseries. It has been claimed that knowledge of the different *tattvas* mentioned in Sāṁkhya philosophy is conducive to salvation. But who is liberated? It is said that Puruṣa is liberated. For how should we understand the liberation of Puruṣa, who is ever liberated. The answer is to be found in the idea of bondage. Bondage is the imposition of *kaṛttva* and *bhokṛttva* on *buddhi* which is accounted by the reflection of Puruṣa. It is this phenomenon which makes Puruṣa *avivekī*. It is held that knowledge of the discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti succeeds in removing Puruṣa's suffering for all time to come.

Since Puruṣa is not amenable to transformation, it suffers no bondage and enjoys no liberation. But this state belongs to Prakṛti. Prakṛti transforms itself for the Puruṣas and so Puruṣa is kept in bondage by Prakṛti.

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## CHAPTER II

### **Sāṃkhya Theory of Causality – The Nature of Satkāryavāda as Pariṇāmavāda**

The Naiyāyikas think that the whole world is created by an agent known as God. To them each and every effect is generated through some agent just as a jar is made by a potter. By virtue of being an effect the whole universe is created by some agent who is no other than God.

The above mentioned argument has not been accepted by other philosophers. They think that an extra ordinary cause can not be inferred for an ordinary effect. The Sāṃkhya philosophers believed that the world can not be created by God, because the existence of God can not be proved. Even if His existence is admitted He can not be called the agent of the world because the term 'God' is technical due to its inclusion under the category self or a particular kind of Puruṣa. The Naiyāyikas also believe God as a form of self. How can a self be an agent of this world? Sāṃkhya will tell that a self can never be an agent because the property of agency (*Kartṛtva*) does not belong to a self or Puruṣa. This property is superimposed on it just as a white marble or crystal becomes red due to the proximity of a red flower. This self, though not agent, essentially considers itself as an agent mistakenly or wrongly. In fact, a self is indifferent, inactive and witness whom we can not call

agent at all not to speak of the agent of the world. So far as the Sāṃkhya view is concerned there is no necessity of admitting an agent behind the creation of the world. Just as a potter makes a pot the world is not made by an experienced agent having direct cognition of the materials for creation. Even the world is not originated through conjunction of atoms. Hence, the world is actually the transformation of the primordial cause, Prakṛti.

Sāṃkhya thinks that all material objects are endowed with happiness, misery and infatuation. As the seen material object is endowed with three qualities their primordial cause must be endowed with these. Can these be admitted? In order to get reply of this we have to look at the relation between a cause and its effect. An effect may be assumed as an existent object as well as non-existent one. Such is the case with a cause also. Then we get four alternatives regarding the relation between an effect and its material cause :-

- (i) a non-existent effect is produced from a non-existent cause;
- (ii) an existent effect is produced from a non-existent cause;
- (iii) a non-existent effect is produced from an existent cause;
- (iv) an existent effect is produced from an existent cause.

The first argument in favour of *Satkāryavāda* runs as follows. The object which is non-existent like hare's horn cannot be produced (*asadakāraṇāt*).<sup>1</sup> Hence any type of effect is to be taken as an existent object on account of the fact that it remains in its material cause prior to its origination.<sup>2</sup> Vācaspati thinks that a blue object cannot be made yellow by any artist. In like manner, an object which is non-existent before its origination cannot be made existent by the effort.<sup>3</sup> If an effect is non-existent before its origination and afterwards if the non-existent jar etc. are originated, why are not hare's horn etc originated? In both the cases the nature of non-existence is the same. As the prior absence (*prāgabhāva*) and posterior absence (*dhvaṁsābhāva*) of a jar is of the same nature due to having the same type of non-existence, the origination of a non-existent jar before its real origination and origination of the non-existent jar after its destruction would have been possible. Hence, an effect cannot remain non-existent in its material cause before its origination.<sup>4</sup>

Secondly, an individual desiring to produce a particular thing wants to have some materials which are conducive to it (*upādānagrahaṇāt*). A man desiring to prepare curd wants to have milk alone, not water. Hence the effects like curd etc remain in their material causes like milk etc as existent.<sup>5</sup> He can produce curd from milk only because it remains in it. If otherwise, he would not have taken milk alone, instead he could have taken water etc. Moreover, if an effect becomes non-existent in its material cause, the function of the cause becomes objectless. For, the effect in the form of

object is non-existent one. The material cause cannot make itself an object, because it would lead to the fallacy of contradiction in respect of subject and object (*kartr-karma-virodha*). It cannot take another object as its content, as it is contradictory to our experience. Hence, a relation between material cause and effect has to be admitted. Due to having such relation it can safely be concluded that the effect remains in its material cause before its origination.<sup>6</sup>

The third argument runs as follows :-

From any object, any object whatever cannot be produced. From this it is known that an effect is related to its material cause. As they are related, an effect is existent in its material cause. A relation remains in two i.e. an effect and its material cause. If both are not present at a time, an effect cannot be said to be related to its material cause. If an effect were not related to its material cause and is produced without being related to its material cause, all material causes were not related to their effects leading to the production of any effect from any cause, which is not possible. It is found that a particular effect comes into being from a particular cause, because they are related with each other, which proves an effect's existence in its material cause.<sup>7</sup>

It may be said that due to the diversity of potency of the material cause, all effects do not come into being from a particular material cause (*śakyasya śakyakaraṇāt*). From this, it follows that

the potent effect (*Śakyakārya*) remains in its material cause prior to its production. If a particular potency is not related to a particular effect, there would not have been the cause and effect relationship. If this relation is admitted, the potent effect must be said to be existent in the cause.<sup>8</sup>

The last argument says that a particular type of effect is originated from that particular type of material cause. As for example, paddy is produced from the seeds of paddy. Between paddy and its seeds there is a similarity. It is not possible to produce barley from the paddy, because they are of different types. Due to their similarity an effect is said to be existent if its material cause is existent, because the complete identity between existence and non-existence cannot be conceived of.<sup>9</sup>

After forwarding the above-mentioned five arguments the Sāṃkhya - philosophers have established *Satkāryavāda*. Had there been no effect in its material cause, the yogins would not have transcendental experience of an object existing in the lap of future. The object of the future can be experienced intuitively due to having its existence in the material cause. A non-existent object can never be realised.

After forwarding some arguments from the common sense level they are showing that such thesis is supported in the *Śruti* text also. A thesis would have been more convincing, if it is supported in

the *Śruti* also. The Chāndagya Upaniṣad says – '*Sadeva Saumyadamagra āsīt*'<sup>10</sup> (O Sauma, this phenomenal world existed even before the origination of the same). It indicates that the origination of the phenomenal world is not a new one, but has eternal existence, which goes in favour of *Satkāryavāda*, the proposed thesis of the Sāṃkhya thinkers. The most convincing argument in favour of this theory is found in the *Bhagavadgītā* – '*nāsāto vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ.*' That is, a positive object can not come into being from the void i.e., non-existent entity and no absent object comes from a positive one. When it is said that a positive entity does not come from a negative entity, it is shown that a positive entity emerges from a positive one, which entity remains in its cause in the non-manifested form.

To the Sāṃkhya thinkers an entity does not come into being a new. Each and every object is not new at the time of origination. A question may be raised in this connection. Does the object remain in its own form in the cause? If the answer is in the positive, it would lead to another question. If it is already in the cause, what is the utility of its origination? It is presumed that an object in the form of a cause cannot serve our purpose. The object remains in its material cause in a subtle state and it comes into being in the gross form through the instrumentality of the causes.<sup>12</sup> This phenomenon is called manifestation. Hence, the origination of an object is nothing but manifestation, which is found in *Satkāryavāda*. Oil remains in the oilseeds in a subtle state and it is manifested through pressing. The rice remaining in paddy comes out through some

external pressure. Before its manifestation an effect remains in the form of a cause. To them cause and effect are not different entities but they are different forms of a single object. When the specific qualities of an object are submerged in the subtle state and remain in an unmanifested state, it is called cause.<sup>13</sup> The transformation of a subtle object into a gross one is called effect.<sup>14</sup> There is no distinction of nature between the cause and effect. In other words, the cause and effect are not different essentially, but they are different from the formal level. Due to having such formal distinction a cloth can provide the service of covering something but thread cannot.

The Naiyāyikas also admit the distinction of the causal efficacy (*arthakriyābheda*) between cause and effect. The causal efficacy of a cause and an effect are different in character. The distinction of designation (*vyapadeśabheda*) also remains in these two, for, one is called a cause and another an effect. Even there is the distinction of cognition of these two (*pratītibheda*). In this case one object is cognised as cloth as for example and another one is as thread. For this reason cause is considered different from effect.<sup>15</sup>

The Sāṃkhya philosophers argue against the Naiyayikas in the following way. To them the distinction in causal efficacy does not indicate the difference of an object. Because an object may have various types of causal efficacy. The bearers of palanquin bears a palanquin collectively, not individually. In like manner it can be said that threads in fact, collectively give rise to a cloth. In the

same way, the distinction of designation (*vyapadesābheda*) and distinction of cognition (*pratītibheda*) do not indicate the difference of an object. It is known from the fact that a tree is not completely different from a forest; but in fact a forest is not other than the trees.<sup>16</sup>

It may be argued that a cause may generate an effect without being connected with the effect. If it is so, then any effect may emerge from any cause. The cause having potentiality of creating a particular effect can generate the same. On account of this jar, cloth, ear-ring etc are originated from earth, cotton, gold respectively. For this reason it can be said that a particular effect is originated from a particular cause. There is no necessity of admitting the fact that a particular effect is hidden within womb of a particular cause. The matter is resolved if a particular power is admitted in a cause. A lump of clay (earth), though not connected with a jar not yet produced can generate a particular jar, having the particular power in it. Any effect cannot be originated from any cause. There is necessity to admit *Satkāryavāda* to indicate that a cause lies hidden in its material cause. From the potency existing in a cause particular cause is known to be originator of as particular effect. Hence, why should we admit that the cause exists in its material cause in a non-manifested way.

In response to the above objection, the Sāṃkhya issues a rejoinder in the following way. They ask whether the potency existing in a cause can produce an effect being connected with non-

produced effect or without being connected to it. If the former is accepted, it would be assumed that it existed before the production of the non-produced effect. Hence, the followers of *asatkāryavāda* cannot admit it. They cannot admit the second alternative as well. Because, if the potency of originating a jar in the soil can produce a jar without being connected with the jar, it is not intelligible why this potency cannot produce cloth etc. in stead of producing a jar etc. It would be difficult to understand why a particular power existing in a particular cause can produce a particular effect.

In fact to the Sāṃkhya, the material cause and effect are identical as they believe that the whole cannot be different from the parts. Hence, a cloth is not different from threads. If they were completely different, they would have been perceived differently. In other words, we would have different perceptions of thread and cloth in two different places, but actually they are found together. Two sheep are seen differently because they have their independent existence. But such case is not found in the cases of cloth, earthen pot etc respectively. We cannot think of a situation that a cloth exists, but not thread. It is also accepted by the Naiyāyikas that a cloth cannot be taken away from the thread and yet they admit them as different. As these two things are cognised simultaneously, they assume a relation called *samavāya* between them. Sāṃkhya cannot admit such relation, because they think that a cloth is not a different object from threads. Had it been different from the other, the properties of thread would not have influenced the properties of cloth.

If the material cause and an effect are the same, why their uses are different? A cloth can help an individual in protecting him from cold, but a thread cannot serve the purpose. Hence, it cannot be said that they are identical.

In reply the Sāṃkhya says that just as all the carriers can carry a palanquin collectively, though not individually, all the threads collectively (though not individually) can remove the cold of an individual. Hence, there is no difference between the material cause and its effect.<sup>17</sup>

Vācaspati Mīśra has justified the Sāṃkhya position by way of forwarding some arguments to prove *tādātmya* or identity relation between the cause and the effect. Cloth is not different from the threads because there is neither conjunction nor disjunction between them. Both conjunction and disjunction are found in objects that are different from one another. There is the conjunction between well and the bucket and there is a disjunction between the Himalayas and the Vindhya. In the case of cloth and thread there is neither conjunction nor disjunction, but there is only *tādātmya* in the sense of identity between them.

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## CHAPTER III

### Prakṛti and its Evolution

For the Sāṃkhya dualist Prakṛti or Pradhāna is the ultimate material cause of the world<sup>1</sup>. As a matter of fact, this world is the modification of this primordial substance. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers the world does not come into existence either from inanimate atoms or from a conscious substance. Atoms cannot be the material cause of *manas*, since it is unconscious and admits of modifications. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers, the primary cause of the world is a material principle which is more subtle than the atoms. This material principle is Prakṛti, otherwise described as the unmanifested. Sāṃkhya believes that Prakṛti is eternal which manifests itself in the form of the world. Since the world remains unmanifested in Prakṛti it is called *Avyakta*, or non-manifest. Prakṛti is described as the primordial cause which means that there is nothing in which it remains unmanifested.<sup>2</sup>

In the *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* one does not find a very explicit definition of Prakṛti. It has been said there that the unmanifested cause is ever inclined to manifest itself in effects and hence by nature Prakṛti is prone to transformation.

*"Kāraṇamasti avyaktam; Pravartatetriguṇataḥ Samudiyācca"*<sup>3</sup>

Hence according to *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* Prakṛti may be described as '*Triguṇātmaka*' i.e. of the nature of the three *guṇa*-s taken

together. Vācaspati Mīśra in his commentary *Tattvakaumudī* has described Prakṛti in the following verse: "*Prakāroti iti Prakṛtiḥ Pradhānam (Tattvakaumudī on Sāṃkhya Kārikā) Sattvarajostamsām Sāmyāvasthā.*" On the basis of this verse it may be said that the state of equilibrium of the three *guṇa*-s - *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* is Prakṛti. The term "Equilibrium" (*Sāmyāvasthā*) means the state in which the three *guṇa*-s are of the same plane, i.e. no *guṇa* either predominates or is subdued. When the three *guṇa*-s do not remain of the same plane i.e. when one of them predominates and other subdued there is *Vikṛti* which infact signals the beginning of creation. The things which enter into a state of *Vikṛti* must have a state which may be described as a state of *avikṛti* *vikṛti* or a state of equilibrium. The point is that any change in the normal condition of the thing is called *vikṛti*. Nothing can have a state of *vikṛti* which does not have a normal state or a state of *avikṛti*. This is why Prakṛti has been described as '*Avikṛti*' in *Sāṃkhya kārikā* – '*Mūla Prakṛtir Avikṛtiḥ (Sāṃkhya Kārikā - 3)*

But the question is: Is the above definition satisfactory? It is held by the Sāṃkhya philosopher that all effects ranging from *mahat* to *pañcamahābhūta* or five elemental substances are the transformation of Prakṛti. Since Prakṛti is subject to transformation, it will no longer be in a state of equilibrium. If again it is not in a state of equilibrium, it cannot be called Prakṛti and it can not be described as eternal. But Prakṛti is taken to be eternal in Sāṃkhya philosophy. There can not be a state in which Prakṛti should loose its state of equilibrium and becomes virtually non-existent. Under

this circumstance, the definition of Prakṛti becomes inconsistent with what is upheld in Sāṃkhya philosophy. This situation is saved by saying that the word '*Sāmyāvasthā*' occurring in the definition of Prakṛti has been used as an adjective of the three *guṇa*-s. It would mean that the three *guṇa*-s which are qualified by being in a state of equilibrium is Prakṛti. Although the term appears to be an adjective or *viśeṣana* it is really an *upalakṣaṇa* i.e. semi-definition.<sup>4</sup>

If Prakṛti is taken as equilibrium of the three *guṇa*-s which is in the form of the situation of non-effect, it may be redefined in the following way: *Akāryam guṇatrayam Prakṛti*,<sup>5</sup> i.e., Prakṛti is nothing but the combination of three *guṇa*-s and an uncaused one, it is to be admitted that the three uncaused *guṇa*-s are the roots of the material world. This view has been endorsed by Vijñānabhikṣu also who has defined Prakṛti as follows: '*Akāryovasthopalakṣitam guṇasāmānyam Prakṛtiḥ (Sāṃkhya – pravacana-bhāṣya on Sāṃkhya-sūtra* 1/61). That is, quality in general is Prakṛti which is indicated by its uncaused nature. This has been taken as a secondary characteristic of Prakṛti.<sup>6</sup> He opines that the *guṇa*-s like *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are actually Prakṛti – the equilibrium of them is its property alone. Vijñānabhikṣu has forwarded a general definition of Prakṛti also which is as follows: '*Tatra Prakṛittvaṃ sākṣāt – paramparayākhilanikāropādatvaṃ*' (*Sāṃkhyasāra*, 3<sup>rd</sup> pariccheda, earlier portion).

Prakṛti is the material cause of all transformed objects through direct and indirect relation. This definition is given in

accordance with the derivative meaning of the term Prakṛti. The primordial Prakṛti is the material cause of *Mahattattva* etc through direct relation. If it is said that Prakṛti alone is the material cause of *mahat* etc, it would lead to over coverage (*ativyāpti*) of the definition of Prakṛti. *Mahat* etc becomes material cause of *aharṅkāra* etc. through direct relationship. If it is admitted, it would lead to the acceptance of the plurality of Prakṛti, which goes against the Sāṃkhya presupposition. Because the Sāṃkhya has already admitted the singularity of Prakṛti as found in the *Kārikā* no.10. In this verse Prakṛti has been admitted as *Avyakta* and having opposite qualities of the *Vyakta*. As *Vyakta* is many in number, while Prakṛti is one. In order to accommodate such idea, the term '*paramparā*' has been inserted in the definition.<sup>7</sup>

Following the definition of Vijñānabhikṣu *Sāṃkhyatattvapradīpaḥ* defines Prakṛti as the material cause of the world '*Jagadupādānakāraṇam Prakṛtiḥ*' (*Sāṃkhyatattvapradīpaḥ, Sāṃkhyasamgraha*, p. 141)

It is the secondary characteristic of Prakṛti just as Vijñānabhikṣu's definition, which is nothing but an echo of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition, which runs as follows. *Avikṛti Sati Mūlaprakṛtitvaṃ Prakṛtitvaṃ*. That is, the primordial Prakṛti having no transformation is real Prakṛti. To Vācaspati the material cause of other *tattvas* is called Prakṛti. As *Mahat* etc. becomes the cause of other *tattvas* like *aharṅkāra* etc., each and every *tattva* can be designated as Prakṛti. The Prakṛti is the form of *Mahat* etc. is

primordial, which cannot be transformed. Hence it cannot be originated from other *tattvas*. It is said in the *Yuktidīpikā* that as *Mahat* etc are the roots of all Prakṛti, the *Prakṛtitattva* itself is in the form of non-transformed situation. For this reason the term '*Mūla Prakṛti*' has been inserted in the definition of Prakṛti.<sup>8</sup>

In connection with the definition of Prakṛti given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, another question can be raised. The question pertains to the need for including the word 'Prakṛti' in the definition. The reason is that as we find in the entire Sāṃkhya and Yoga literature Prakṛti has not been considered as a *tattva* in addition to the three *guṇa*-s. It has been said by the author of Sāṃkhya that Prakṛti is of the nature of three *guṇa*-s and not anything distinct of that. Vijñānabhikṣu has intended to establish with arguments that Prakṛti is not a state of equilibrium of the three *guṇa*-s. That Prakṛti is not different or distinct from the *guṇa*-s is clearly stated by Gouḍapāda and Māṭhara, Gouḍapāda says –

*"Anye guṇāḥ anyat Pradhānam evaṃ vivekatvām na yāte"*  
(Gauḍabhāṣya, *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* - 11) and Māṭhara says '*Idm Pradhānam amī guṇā iti na sakyate Pṛthak Kartum.*'"

(Māṭharavṛtti on *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* - 11)

This non-difference between Prakṛti and there *guṇa*-s has been explained very clearly by Maxmuller. He says that *sattva*, *rajas*

and *tamas* are not certain accidental properties of Prakṛti; rather they are essentially the very nature of Prakṛti. Just as different rivers converge to form a single stream without completely losing their individual peculiarities, similarly the three *guṇa*-s assemble together and form Prakṛti without losing their individual properties. The different rivers after convergence retain their individual colour etc. In a similar way even after the three *guṇa*-s assemble together to compose Prakṛti their individual characters are not destroyed.<sup>9</sup>

The Sāṃkhya philosophers have endorsed only three *guṇa*-s namely *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. The reason behind the admission of only three *guṇa*-s is that they can explain adequately the diversity of the world. Prakṛti transforms itself into different effects on account of its different arrangements. Besides every manifest object displays certain features which result in the feelings of pleasure, pain and stupefaction. It is cleared that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are opposed to each other. Consequently they cannot reside in the same locus. For this reason a triplicity of loci has been admitted *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* are the three loci in which the three feelings pleasure, pain etc. reside.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the twelfth *Kārikā* speaks about the necessity of the three *guṇa*-s *Prakāśa* as manifestation, *Pravṛtṭvi* or mobility and *Niyama* or veiling are said to be the three things which require the three *guṇa*-s. *sattva* is light (*laghu*) , manifesting (*prakāśaka*) *rajas* is mobile or restless (*cañcala*) and *tamas* is heavy (*guru*) and veiling agency (*Āvaraka*). Although the three *guṇa*-s are opposed to

each other, they come together when an effect is produced. Vācaspatimiśra tells us that fire, wick and oil are opposed to each other. If oil is poured on the flame of lamp fire will be extinguished. Fire destroys oil and wick but these things collectively are responsible work and manifest external objects. But fire, oil and wick are not opposed to each other as the three *guṇa*-s. Fire may be opposed to wick and oil, but wick and oil are not mutually opposed or destructive. It seems that the example is not quiet similar to what they are intended to exemplify. This is what Vācaspati has mentioned in another example. *Vāyu (wind)*, bile and phlegm are mutually opposed. Yet they work together for the maintenance of human organism. Similarly, the three *guṇa*-s may be opposed to each other. Yet they co-operate and collectively produce effect. Here we find that the example and the thing exemplified are not dissimilar.<sup>10</sup>

It has been said in the *Yuktidīpikā* that although fire and water are mutually opposed to each other. Yet they help looking through their cooperation. Similarly, the three *guṇa*-s are mutually opposite in character; yet they work in mutual co-operation.<sup>11</sup>

In the twelvth *Kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa says that the three *guṇa*-s *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are of the nature of pleasure, pain and stupefaction. Pleasure, pain and stupefaction are opposed to each other. The Sāṅkhya philosophers intend to prove that everything which composes the world is of the nature of pleasure, pain and dullness. For example the same lady who is a wife of a man is the

cause of the pleasure in the man who is her husband. She is the cause of pain in the second wife. The same lady evolves a feeling of dullness in a person who could not get her inspite of his desire. Thus, the same woman would be the cause of pleasure, pain and dullness. Since the effect exists in the cause of pain, the cause of pleasure, pain and dullness, must be in the woman as she produces such effects as pleasure, pain and dullness. The three *guṇa*-s corresponding to pleasure, etc are *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* respectively. This example shows that every material entity is composed of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.<sup>12</sup> In the *Bhāmati*<sup>13</sup> it has been contended that things like sandal-paste produces different feelings in different seasons. It produces the feeling of pleasure in summer, but it produces the reverse of it in winter. If the explanation of Sāṃkhya philosopher is closely considered we find that such misgiving does not arise. What effect a thing produces depends on the auxiliary cause or *Sahakāri Kāraṇa*. This explains the production of different effect by the same object, the sandle-paste has the capability of producing all the three feelings, but a certain feeling is manifested depending upon the presence of a certain *Sahakāri Kāraṇa*. The thorn produces pleasure in a camel, but camel hood being absent in a man this feeling is not generated in him.

It has been said by Sāṃkhya philosopher that in all objects only one of the three *guṇa*-s predominates; and the other two *guṇa*-s are subordinated. They, being subordinated, become merged into the predominating one and produce the effect.

The three constituents simultaneously influence each other. In like manner, the constituents like earth, ether etc. simultaneously influence their actions like perseverance etc. while originating effect. At the stage of equilibrium the constituents remain in the forms of energy and hence their attributes like manifestation etc. remain indeterminate. On account of this they cannot influence the possessor of the attributes (*dharmi*).<sup>14</sup>

According to Sāṃkhya – Yoga, the three *guṇa*-s are eternal. It has been said in the *Yoga-bhyāṣya* 'Guṇāstu sarvadharmānupātino na Pratyastomayante nopajāyente' [*Yogabhāṣya, Yoga sūtra, 2/19*]. These causal agents or *guṇa*-s get transformed into effects. So, their essence or nature remains the same. Thus in Sāṃkhya *yoga* philosophy the constancy of the transformed is admitted. These *guṇa*-s are so subtle that in Sāṃkhya system they have been described as *Śakti* or power when in the state of equilibrium the three *guṇa*-s get separated, they remain as power. We find in *Yukti-dīpikā* that these *guṇa*-s in their original state cannot be perceived'; we can perceive only the effects of the *guṇa*-s.<sup>15</sup>

It has been said in Sāṃkhya philosophy that the three *guṇa*-s transform themselves into the world for the enjoyment and liberation of Puruṣa. Transformation or *Pariṇāma* is of two kinds – *Sadrśa Pariṇāma* or transformation into similar kind and *visadrśa pariṇāma* or transformation into dissimilar kind. Nothing actually is created when there is transformation into similar kind. But in such a

situation the state of equilibrium is not destroyed. In fact, creation takes place when there is destruction or disturbance of the state of equilibrium in which case the three *guṇa*-s or Prakṛti transforms itself into something dissimilar to it. As a result, Prakṛti is transformed into *mahat*, *mahat* to *Ahaṁkāra*, *Ahaṁkāra* to eleven sense organs and five *tanmātras*. In the opinion of the Sāṁkhya philosophers Prakṛti can not be perceived. But this non-perception is no proof of the non-existence of Prakṛti. As a matter of fact, it is held by the *Sāṁkhya* philosophers that the existence of Prakṛti is proved by inference:- "*Kāryataḥ tadupalabdheḥ*" which means that Prakṛti is inferred or proved by its effect. This kind of inference is called '*Kāryahetukānumāna*'. From *mahat* to the five *mahābhūtas* everything is of a nature of effect of which a cause is Prakṛti.

In the fifteenth *Kārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa presents the following arguments for proving the existence of Prakṛti – "*Bhedānām parimāṇāt, Samanvayāt, śaktiḥ pravṛttesca Kāraṇa-bibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśvarūpasya.*" (*Kārikā* – 15)

If we analyse the above argument we find that the author has mentioned five *hetus* for the existence of Prakṛti - (i) *Bhedānām Parimāṇāt*; (ii) *Śaktiḥ Pravṛtveḥ*; (iii) *Samanvayāt*; (4) *Kāraṇakāryabibhāgāt*; (v) *Vaiśvarūpasya abibhāgāt*.

Commentator Vācaspati Mīśra has established the *hetus* in his own order. He first analyses the fourth and fifth *hetus*.

(i) *Kāraṇakāryabibhāgāt* - The effect comes to be separated from the cause. This means that the effect pre exists in the cause. That what is usually unknown as effectuation is simply the manifestation of what was already latent in the causal substance. The commentators illustrate the point by suggesting that the limbs of the tortoise remain concealed in the body; when they come out they appear to be different from the body of the animal. The gold ornaments similarly come to appear to be different from the lump of gold from which it is produced. Similarly, earth appears to be different from the *tanmātra* in which it was previously contained in an unmanifested form. If we proceed in this direction, we find that Prakṛti must be supposed to be the ultimate causal substance in which all manifested things are contained in an unmanifested form.

(2) Īśvarakṛṣṇa argues that all effects after destruction goes back to their causal substance, the earthen pot after destruction goes back to the lump of clay. Similarly, earth etc after dissolution enter into *tanmātras* which in relation to earth may be called unmanifested. In a similar way, the *tanmātras* dissolve into *ahamkāra* which gets unmanifested in *mahat*. *Mahat* remains in an unmanifested form in Prakṛti.

The suggestion is that the effect is both identical and different from the causal substance. The first two marks or *hetus* therefore necessarily prove the existence of Prakṛti as the unmanifest. The third argument for the existence of Prakṛti refers to

the capacity or potency (*Śakti*) which enables a causal substance to produce a definite effect. It is found that oil is extracted from the oil seed and never from grains of sand. This shows that there must be some causal connection between oilseed and oil. Oil seed must have the *śakti* or capacity or potency to produce oil which is absent in grains of sand. Oil is produced in the presence of this capacity; it is not produced in the absence of the same. This power or capacity which is located in the cause is the unmanifested condition of the effect. The Sāṃkhya philosophers therefore conclude that all categories of the reals must remain in this cause in the form of a capacity or potency. The ultimate locus of such capacity is Prakṛti.

The fourth argument is actually a reply to a possible objection. It may be objected that one can very well speak of the *mahat* as the ultimate material stuff. This would mean that the postulation of Prakṛti as the ultimate material substance is unnecessary.

It has been argued that anything which is of limited magnitude can not be the ultimate cause. The five elements, *tanmātras*, *ahamkāra* and *mahat* are all of limited magnitude. This would mean that the ultimate causal substance must be of unlimited magnitude and this is what is known as Prakṛti. The last argument proving Prakṛti says that every category of substance from the five elements to *mahat* are identical in character. They are identical in the sense that all of them are of the nature of pleasure, pain and dullness. Hence, they must have come from a substance which is of

such a character. We find in our ordinary experience that different earthen things agree in that they are all earthen. This proves that they have been produced from earth. Similarly every category of things admitted by Sāṃkhya philosophers must proceed from an ultimate substance which must be of the nature of the pleasure, pain and dullness - the properties which all things have in common. Such a substance is Prakṛti.

The Sāṃkhya thinkers have forwarded a few more metaphors to explain the triple characters of the *guṇa*-s existing in Prakṛti. The first is metaphor of the constituent of human being, which are called *dhātu*. The three elements *Vāyu* (air), *pitta* (bile) and *Kapha* (phlegm) are called *dhātus* by virtue of the fact that they protect our body, as per the principle *Śarīradhāraṇāt ete dhātavaḥ ucyante*. Human body consists of three elements, which protect our body. If there is an excess of any element among these three, there will be disbalance in the equilibrium. It leads an individual to the realm of sickness as these disturbance fails to protect our body. The disturbance caused by these gives rise to some type of bodily problem. In the same way the excess of bile or cough creates similar problem. This is due to the disbalance of the said factors. The sound and harmonised factors give rise to a sound body. In like manner, the three constituents of Prakṛti, if harmonised, can involve themselves in creation.<sup>16</sup> The state of equilibrium is the true essence of Prakṛti.

For the Sāṃkhya philosophers, Prakṛti is the ultimate cause of universe. The universe lies unmanifested in Prakṛti before creation.

Prakṛti gets transformed into the world. It is held that the world is created or manifested through the contact of Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Since Prakṛti is unconscious, it cannot by itself manifest the world which lies latent in it. Puruṣa alone, again, can not be a cause of creation of the world because Puruṣa is inactive, though conscious. The Sāṃkhya philosophers consequently hold that creation takes place through the combined effort of Prakṛti which is unconscious but active and Puruṣa which is conscious but inactive.

Acārya Vijñānabhikṣu gives us another account of the process of creation. Prakṛti and Puruṣa being ubiquitous and eternal, their transformation through their relation must also be eternal. The Sāṃkhya philosophers hold that creation or transformation requires the relation between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Such a relation between these two fundamental reals is conceived after the relation between the lame and blind. It has been said that Prakṛti displays itself to Puruṣa for its own sake. It seems that Prakṛti needs Puruṣa for its own interest. The relation that takes place is said to be the reason of the enjoyment of Puruṣa. It is also true that Puruṣa requires Prakṛti for its liberation. So it is on account of Puruṣa's need that it gets related to Prakṛti which ultimately makes the creation or manifestation of the world possible. This is contained in the following lines of *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*.<sup>21</sup>

*"Puruṣasya darśanārtham kaivalyārthamtathā Pradhānasya  
Paṅgvadhavad - ubhaya - api saṃyogastatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ".<sup>(17)</sup>*

It may be asked that since Prakṛti is unconscious or inert how could it be responsible for creation; unconscious substance does not endeavour to create. Even if it is granted that unconscious substance creates of its own, the question is how one can explain discipline in effectuation. This world is not indisciplined. How can Prakṛti which is unconscious be the agent of creation?

In the *Brahmasūtra* (2/2/1) the following aphorism raises the same suspicion "*Racanānupapatteśca na anumānam*" It means that Prakṛti being unconscious the creation of this world is not possible. If we look at the construction of the world, which is so complex and designful, we can easily guess that powerful God must be responsible for its creation. Just as the conscious charioteer controls the movement of the chariot similarly, God dominates over Prakṛti and controls its movement.

But the Sāṃkhya philosophers argue that no conscious agent like God is necessary to postulate for accounting for the manifestation of the world. Even something unconscious may be inclined to give rise to an effect. We find that one reason is followed by another reason automatically, that is, without the intervention of any other causal factor. Further, we find that milk flows from udder of the cow for the nourishment of the younger one although milk is unconscious. Similarly, though Prakṛti is unconscious, it may act for the liberation of Puruṣa. Īśvarakṛṣṇa in *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* (57) writes:

*"Vatsavivṛddhinimittam kṣīrasya yathāpravṛttirajñasya  
Puruṣavimokṣanimittam tathā pravṛttiṁ Pradhānasya".*

So it is found that Prakṛti transforms itself into the world without the help or intervention of God. Only the proximity of Puruṣa is needed for the destruction of the equilibrium of Prakṛti which causes its transformation. Puruṣa is devoid of all qualities, inactive, pure consciousness. Nevertheless its bare proximity is enough to destroy the state of equilibrium of Prakṛti which causes transformation of Prakṛti. Just as the magnet, though inactive attracts iron filling towards it and makes it mobile, similarly, the proximity of Puruṣa, and the inactive Prakṛti manifests itself. The author of *Sāṁkhya Sūtra* therefore says that "*Tatsannidhānādadhīṣṭhāṛtvaṁ maṇivat.*" (1/96).

Sāṁkhya philosophy in its original form maintains that God is not in any way connected with the transformation and manifestation of Prakṛti. As a matter of fact God does not find a place in Sāṁkhya metaphysics. But Vijñānabhikṣu and some other systems of Indian philosophy do not describe it as metaphysics without God. Maharṣi Kapila does not actually deny the existence of God. What he says is that the existence of God is not provable – *Īśvarāsiddhiḥ Pramāṇābhāvāt.*"

It may be suspected that if Kapila is not an atheist then why should he remain silent about the existence of God and prepares his aphorism regarding the impossibility of Gods' existence. In reply to

the misgiving Vijñānabhikṣu says that Sāṃkhya philosophy intends to suggest ways of liberation (*Mokṣasādhana*). It is consistent with suggesting the path to be taken by individuals to attain salvation. Naturally there is no reason why the existence of God should be discussed. It has been said by Vijñānabhikṣu again that atheism cannot be entertained by an honest philosopher. One can refer to the *Gītā* which says that atheism is the doctrine of the *asura* and the *pīśāca* or demons. Consequently, Sāṃkhya philosopher cannot afford to be atheistic.

It is doubtful if this explanation of Vijñānabhikṣu can be supported. Sāṃkhya philosophers admit that this world must have been created by an appropriate cause. But this cause is not the Brahman of Vedānta nor is it the God of the Naiyāyikas. For the Vedāntins, Brahman is also the efficient cause of the world apart from its being the material cause of the world. But this Brahman is not subject to transformation (*Apariṇāmī*). Hence, from the Sāṃkhya point of view Brahman can not be the cause of the world. Brahman being eternal and immutable is not subject to change. Hence, Brahman can not be transformed into the world. Those who believe in the existence of God consider Him to be the efficient cause of the universe. This efficient cause is eternal and immutable. If this is true then God will not be subject to change and can not be active either. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers the primary cause is eternal, nevertheless subject to transformation. This eternal substance Prakṛti would transform itself into the world.

It has been held that Prakṛti is unconscious and for this reason it can not produce anything without the help of a conscious substance. It is seen that every unconscious thing produces its effect with the help of a conscious agent. The axe for example is unconscious and so it requires the cooperation of the conscious carpenter for felling trees. So it is very much unlikely that unconscious Prakṛti should create this world without the assistance of a conscious principle. This conscious principle is God.

The Sāṃkhya philosophers concede this position because in their opinion God not being the source of action cannot be the principle governing the transformation of Prakṛti. It is not unreasonable to think that God is to be conceived as being the guiding force of Prakṛti. It should be somewhat active. The other difficulty is that God is concrete or self-sufficient. Why should 'He' be the guiding force behind Prakṛti's transformation? What can be the motive for God's intervention? It can not be said that it is from the motive of removing the suffering of others that God superordinates. This hypothesis would not be quite cogent.

Sāṃkhya philosophers mentioned that Prakṛti is the primordial cause of the origin of the universe. Although Prakṛti is unconscious. It is somehow motivated for the enjoyment and liberation of Puruṣa.

Yoga philosophers, however, maintain a different position. God finds a place in a yoga system. It is held that Prakṛti being

unconscious, it cannot satisfy willfully the interest of Puruṣa. Creation and destruction is the result of the will of God. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers Puruṣa and Prakṛti are distinct although creation is possible only by the conjunction of the two. Yoga philosophy holds that the ever liberated, omniscient Puruṣa or God is responsible for the conjunction of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. If this conjunction is supposed to take place independently of intervention of a third principle, creation would have no end. In the yoga system that disjunction or disassociation of Puruṣa, a Prakṛti is determined by the will of God.<sup>18</sup>

In the state of dissolution (*Pralaya*) the state of equilibrium was destroyed and Prakṛti begins to get transformed into worldly things. Initially *rajas* become active and it activates the other *guṇa*-s. In this way, all these *guṇa*-s get transformed into dissimilar things. Of the three *guṇa*-s one dominates over the other two and thus the world is manifested. It has been held by the Sāṃkhya philosophers that Prakṛti transforms itself into this world. But the world is not the result of direct transformation of Prakṛti. The name of the direct evolute of Prakṛti is *Mahat*. *Mahat* gradually transforms itself into the other evolutes like *Ahaṃkāra*, five *Tanmātras* etc.

So the Sāṃkhya philosophers believe in successive development or evolution of Prakṛti. Although Prakṛti is all pervading it is subtle because it is devoid of parts. The gross world comes from the subtle Prakṛti. Since Prakṛti is subtle, it can manifest itself into the gross world only in stages. When a very small seed

develops into a huge tree we find that it passes through stages. The seed in the first place is transformed into a sprout under the influence of certain auxiliary conditions. It keeps developing continuously till it takes the shape of a huge tree. Everywhere transformation is a gradual process. The effect does not exist in the cause in full form. Hence the Sāṃkhya philosophers have reasons to say that the first evolute of Prakṛti is not the world. These philosophers speak of four successive stages through which evolution passes and leads to the appearance of the gross world.

We have said *Mahat* is the first evolute of Prakṛti which comes into existence as a result of the proximity of Prakṛti with the conscious Puruṣa. Of the three *guṇa*-s *rajas* is active and it must be the chief reason of the transformation of Prakṛti. *Rajas* destroys the original state of equilibrium of Prakṛti and encourages *sattva* to transform itself into the second evolutes.

It is held by Sāṃkhya philosophers that creation or evolution is of two kinds – collective (*samaṣṭi*) and individual (*vyāṣṭi*). Firstly, the world is collectively created and then appears the individuals. Then our difference between these two kinds of creation is that *sattva* predominates in collective creation and the other two *guṇa*-s predominate in the creation of individuals.

The distinguishing feature of *mahat* is *abhimāna* which is otherwise known as *ahaṃkāra*. It is responsible for our knowledge of ourselves as agent and enjoyers. In Sāṃkhya philosophy three

kinds of *ahamkāra* has been recognised. The *ahamkāra* in which *sattva* predominates is called *sāttvika* or *vaikārika ahamkāra*. The *ahamkāra* in which *rajas* predominates is called *taijasa* or *rajas ahamkāra*. Finally, the kind of *ahamkāra* in which *tamas* predominates is called *tāmasika ahamkāra*. In the opinion of Vācaspati Miśra the eleven sense organs proceed from *Sāttvika ahamkāra*. Apart from it the eleven *tanmātras* are created. It only accompanies the *sāttvika* and *tāmasika ahamkāra*. But according to Vijñānabhikṣu five *Karmendriyas* and five *Jñānendriyas* come from *tāmasika ahamkāra*. There is enough influence of *rajas* in the ten organs. But the eleventh sense-organ, viz, *manas* is predominantly *sāttvika*. This is why Vijñānabhikṣu said that only mind comes from *sāttvika ahamkāra*.

The third evolute of Prakṛti is sense-organ and *tanmātra*. This is a transformation of ego or *Ahamkāra* just as both curd and whey come from the same milk. Similarly, from the same *ahamkāra* we have both *indriya* and *tanmātra*. *Indriya* or sense-organs are transparent and of the nature of *Prakāśa* or manifestation. *Tanmātra* is opaque and is not of manifesting nature. Although both *indriya* and *tanmātra* proceed from the same *ahamkāra* nevertheless their characters are different. This difference is only natural. The Sāṃkhya philosophers believed that the sense-organs are not perceptible. Their existence is inferential.

In Sāṃkhya philosophy, mind has been described as '*Ubhaya Indriya*'. The reason is that both *Karmendriya* and *Jñānendriya* are

incapable of performing their functions without the help of their mind. That is why they said, '*ubhayatmakam Mahat*'. Although on Sāṃkhya philosophy the mind is inert or unconscious, it has not been conceived as atomic or eternal like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers mind is not without parts. It is a composite substance (*sāvayava*) and is subject for origin and destruction. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosophers hold the five *Karmendriyas* do not owe their origin in *ahamkāra*. It comes from the *mahābhūtas*. Mind is often described as *antaḥkaraṇa*. Sāṃkhya philosophers mention two types of *Karaṇas* – *Antaḥkaraṇa* and *Vahikaraṇa*. The term '*Karaṇa*' stands for the main instruments of an action. If such instrumental cause comes from without it is called *Vāhya karaṇa*. On the other hand, the cause that operates from within is called *Antaḥkaraṇa Vāhyakaraṇa* is ten in number of which five are *Karmendriyas* and five *Jñānendriyas*. Three kinds of *antaḥkaraṇa* have been mentioned – *manas*, *ahamkāra* and *buddhi*. Thus, we have thirteen *Karaṇas* in all. For the Vedāntins there are four *antaḥkaraṇa* - *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* and *citta*.

So far as, *tanmātras* are concerned, it is said that they are not perceptible; they can only be inferred. But it is possible for the yogīns to have a knowledge of the *tanmātras*. From *śabda tanmātra ākāśa* is created. The same *tanmātra* connected with *sparsā tanmātra* produces *Vāyu* or air. With the addition of *rūpa tanmātra* fire is created. *Rasa tanmātra* in conjunction with the other three creates water. Finally, *gandha tanmātra* conjoined with the four *tanmātras* beginning with *śabda* produces *Prithivī* or earth.

The evolution of things from Prakṛti may be viewed as two types of transformation. The transformation of Prakṛti into Buddhi, *Ahaṅkāra* and eleven sense organs is known as *Pratyaya* or *buddhisarga*. Secondly, the transformation of *tanmātras* and *mahābhūtas* is called *Bhautikasarga*. The five elements or *Pañcabhūtas* is ordinarily perceptible. From these five elements are created pleasure, pain and stupefaction of individual human beings. This is why they are called *viśesa*. *Viśesa* has been divided by Sāṃkhya philosophers into three classes - *Mahābhūta*, *sthūlaśarīra* or gross body and *sūkṣaśarīra* or subtle body. The five elements or *Pañcabhūtas* are the material elements out of which the gross body is created. The subtle body is composed of *buddhi*, *Ahaṅkāra*, eleven sense organs and *Pañcatanmātras*. The component elements of the subtle body namely, the mind, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra* etc. can not exist apart from the subtle body. For this reason the gross body is supposed to be the locus of the the subtle body. According to Vijñānabhikṣu, the subtle body moves from one gross body to another; for this movement the reality of an *adhiṣṭhāna śarīra* has been admitted.

From what is said above it has been found that the total number of reals of *tattva* is twenty-five. The primary material substance or *Mūlaprakṛti* has no origin or destruction. Īśvarakṛṣṇa in *Sāṃkhya kārikā* has devoted the 3<sup>rd</sup> *Kārikā* to the discussion of twenty-five reals. He says in *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* - 3.

“*MulaPrakṛti avikṛtir mahadādyāḥ Prakṛtivilkṛtayah sapta  
Śodaśakas tu vikāro, na Prakṛtir na prakṛtirna vikṛtiḥ Puruṣaḥ*”



According to Sāṃkhya philosophers Prakṛti is never destroyed, it is eternal. This hypothesis is somehow in agreement with western scientist. Herbert Spencer said that the primary element of the world is not subject to origin and destruction. They only get transformed. For the scientist matter is indestructible. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers also reals are not destroyed. They only get transformed. The Sāṃkhya holds that nothing comes out of nothing. That which is unreal does not produce anything, only the unmanifest become manifested. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers, the world did not appear at a particular point of time nor did it end at another point of time. Creation and destruction are eternal physical process.<sup>19</sup>

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## CHAPTER IV

### **The Concept of Puruṣa in Sāṃkhya**

If it is admitted that all movements of Prakṛti are for the sake of experience and liberation of Puruṣa. As such the nature of Puruṣa and its relation to Prakṛti await discussion.

Prakṛti is an unconscious dynamic principle that is capable of being changed and transformed for the creation of the empirical world. On the other hand, there is a consciousness, the contents of which always change and differ. But one conscious principle which can illumine and reveal other objects remains always the same. Though there are a lot of changes and transformations in the universe, there remains a permanent principle of consciousness capable manifesting everything in the phenomenal world. This eternal conscious principle is called Puruṣa in Sāṃkhya philosophy. The world full of happiness and miseries cannot be produced by an unconscious principle. Hence, the existence of a conscious principle called Puruṣa is to be admitted. This Puruṣa may influence the unconscious principle in creation and evolution. Apart from this Prakṛti by virtue of its unconscious nature cannot synthesise the contents of experience or can not organise them into one meaningful object due to not having effort. The unity among different bits of experience can be accounted for if there is a spiritual principle called Puruṣa. Puruṣa is to be admitted in order to justify the creation of this cosmic universe and meaningful

knowledge of its objects. Puruṣa is said to be pure consciousness and hence it is changeless and infinite. As Puruṣa is a transcendental principle, its nature is unknowable by experience. Puruṣa is the logical presupposition of all knowledge. Behind the forms of epistemic knowledge there is a principle which is changeless capable of revealing all mental states and processes by its own power of illumination. This conscious principle is distinct from the ideas and images of knowledge, always pure and its nature is intelligence and non-activity. Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* gives an account of Puruṣa as *atriguṇa* (having no attributes of three types), *vivekī* (having knowledge of discrimination), *cetana* (conscious), *aprasava-dharmī* (having the property of non-extension), *Kevalī* (isolated from Prakṛti), *draṣṭā* (seer), *akartā* (non-doer) etc. All these characteristic features show that Puruṣa is diametrically opposite to Prakṛti. Prakṛti is capable of being changed while Puruṣa is changeless. Both are, however, equally free and fundamental and both lie at the root of the world and its experience.<sup>1</sup>

Puruṣa stands for the second of the two ultimate reals acknowledged in Sāṃkhya philosophy. Puruṣa is opposed to Prakṛti as it is conscious and non-material. It has been said that Prakṛti transforms itself into the world and creates objects for the enjoyment and liberation of some reality, which is opposed to it. This reality is Puruṣa. (*Puruṣasya daśanārtham kaivalyārtham tathā pradhānasya*).<sup>2</sup>

The Sāṃkhya philosophers describe the unconscious matter as something which is capable of serving the need of Puruṣa. The entire world being inanimate thus proves the existence of a conscious reality which is Puruṣa. We have said that the world has been created for satisfying the need of a reality other than itself. Need can be felt only by a conscious principle. If there is no consciousness, there is no question of need. If again, there is no need, no creation is required answering to it. Hence, the principle which feels need and for whom the world is created must be conscious.

Puruṣa is devoid of all sensible properties and for this reason it is not amenable to sense-perception. If Puruṣa were object of perception it would be inanimate and unconscious. It means that since Puruṣa is devoid of all sensible properties, it must be conscious. This, again, is the reason why the existence of Puruṣa cannot be established by perceptual evidence. Hence, the existence of Puruṣa is established by inference.

Here a problem should be solved. In an inference, the *hetu* must be present in the *Pakṣa* so that the *sādhya* can be established with the help of *hetu*. In the inference the existence of Puruṣa must be the *Pakṣa* or the subject of the inference and existence would be the *sādhya* which must be present in the said *Pakṣa*. But the trouble is that the *hetu* intended to prove existence may be present in the *Pakṣa* Puruṣa, because Puruṣa has been described as *asanga* or unrelated and *nirdharmika* that is devoid of all properties. If Puruṣa

is possessed of any property then it must be considered as subject to transformation (*Parināmi*); and that which is subject to transformation is found to be inanimate. Puruṣa being different from what is inanimate has been described as *apariṇāmi*. That which is not subject to transformation must be devoid of properties. In this situation no inference is possible with Puruṣa as the subject which means the existence of Puruṣa cannot be proved with the help of inference. Sāṃkhya philosophers, consequently hold that if no inference is possible with Puruṣa as the subject. One can prove the existence of Puruṣa by an inference having inanimate objects as the subject. The *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* infers the existence of Puruṣa with the help of five *hetus*.

The twenty-five reals admitted by Sāṃkhya philosophers are divided into two kinds – the manifest which are twenty-four in number and unmanifest. These reals are all devoid of consciousness and material. They are constituted by the three *guṇa*-s. As a matter of fact, the reals proceeding from Prakṛti to the five elements are all constituted by the three *guṇa*-s which are present in all matters collectively. In view of this collection, all material things have been characterised as *samghātā* or composite. The reason is essential maniness in every material thing. Literally, the term *samghātā* means collected together. The Sāṃkhya philosophers infer the existence of Puruṣa with this collection or compound as the *hetu*. The inference is of the following form. The unmanifested and the twenty-four manifest entities exist for the sake of something else – such being the nature of a compound substance. It can not really

be denied that everything which is unconscious but a compound exist for something other than itself. Table, chair are examples of such compounds which exist for the sake of others. Such other must be opposite in characteristics to the unconscious compound which means that such entities for which inanimate object exists must be conscious.

The idea is that conscious entities which are of the nature of compounds serve the need of some other substance. Such need is a natural property of whatever is conscious. Such a conscious substance collect materials and assemble them so that a thing is made which is suited to its need. If we analyse a compound, we find that it is necessarily brought into existence for serving the purpose of what is conscious. The first inference thus intends to prove that there must be a conscious substance or Puruṣa which is different from unconscious Prakṛti which is a compound.

Of course, there may be some misgivings regarding the validity of the above inference. It has been argued that everything that is unconscious must exist for the sake of something other than itself, tables, chairs, bed and house are mentioned as examples. The contention is that whatever substance is to be proved as other than the unconscious compound must itself be conscious. It may be suspected that whatever is mentioned as examples is not congruous with the probance of the inference. It is true that the bed or the chair exists for serving the requirement of some other entity (i.e. an embodied in itself). It is really the body of a person which is the

enjoyer of bed and chair. The suggestion is that the self which is the nature of consciousness is not the real enjoyer. It shows clearly that the entity which is other than unconscious material substances is itself unconscious. But the intention of the inference is to prove consciousness as substance other than a compound. It is clear that the example of bed and chair does not serve the purpose of the inference. In Indian logic this defect is known as '*Sādhyaikaladoṣa*', that is to say the example in question does not prove a conscious principle. Bed etc. are said to be *saṁghāta* or compound. This compound is meant for serving the need of the physical body which again is a *saṁghāta* or compound. If this be so than whatever is other than a compound must itself be a compound composed of the three *guṇa*-s. Such a compound must be unconscious. The inference consequently does not prove the existence of Puruṣa as a conscious principle. In reply to this objection it should be said that the example and what it stands for may not be completely similar. In fact, if two things are similar in all respects then they must be practically identical. But there must be some difference between an example and what it is an example of, when two things are qualitatively dissimilar inspite of their differences, one may be used as an example of the other. The face is like the moon. The moon may be referred to as an example of such things as the face but the moon and the face are not completely similar. The face is not dissimilar to moon, though the sweetness, brightness of the face is very much comparable to similar properties of the moon. Hence, it is wrong to say that the example of bed etc given in the first inference fails on account of dissimilarity.

If this is granted then one can infer the existence of something other than the compound, since, a compound necessarily exists for the sake of something else.

One may suspect that this inference partially proves what it is intended to prove. The inference in question simply prove the existence of some entity other than itself. But does it really prove that such substance other than the compound is conscious?

The second inference is intended to prove that whatever entity is other than the compound must be conscious. The second inference says that the substance which must exist as the enjoyer of a compound must be conscious. If the compound exists for the sake of another compound the later compound will also exist for the sake of another compound and this will lead to *infinite regress or anavasthā*. This regress can be avoided only if the substance for which the compound exists is not a compound. If it is not a compound then it may be conscious. The *hetu* used in the second inference proving the existence of Puruṣa is '*traiguṇyādiviparyayāt*'. The term '*Viparyaya*' means absence. So, the absence of the three *guṇa-s* has been used here as the *hetu* of the inference. The inference suggests that Puruṣa is not a compound since there is the absence of three *guṇa-s*. Everything that is composed of the three *guṇa-s* is of the nature of a compound. Puruṣa not being composed of the three *guṇa-s* cannot be a compound, and whatever is not a compound is not material. Puruṣa thus is conscious.

The third inference used by the Sāṃkhya philosophers mention *adhiṣṭhānāt* as the *hetu*. It is said that an unconscious material stuff can not act without being guided by a conscious principle. The unconscious Prakṛti creates this universe not by itself but by the assistance of a conscious principle. According to Sāṃkhya philosophy the proximity of conscious Puruṣa generates all sorts of impact in unconscious Prakṛti. Just as the chariot cannot move without the conscious charioteer similarly Prakṛti can not create or move into action without being assisted by a conscious principle like Puruṣa.

The fourth *hetu* intended to prove the existence of Puruṣa is '*bhokṭṛbhāvāt*'. It means that all the manifest and unmanifest are composed of three *guṇa*-s – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It means that all material things are of the nature of pleasure, pain and dullness. Pleasure or pain are things to be enjoyed. The manifest and the unmanifest can not be described as things to be enjoyed unless there is a *bhokta* or enjoyer. Pleasure or pain is nothing if there is no subject who enjoys it. This enjoyer or *bhoktā* cannot be unconscious. The simple reason in that *bhoga* or enjoyment is the experience of what is conscious. The Sāṃkhya philosophers argue that the assembly of the three *guṇa*-s in a compound proves it to be an object of enjoyment which in its turn proves the existence of a conscious enjoyer or *bhoktā*. This conscious enjoyer is Puruṣa.

Although Puruṣa is conceived as a *bhoktā* or enjoyer this enjoyment is not genuine. The world is perceived by the Puruṣa not actually in the form of *vṛttis*. It only seems that the world is imaged

in the *vr̥tti* of Puruṣa, which is not actually the case. Vācaspati explains this phenomenon of the enjoyment of Puruṣa with his concept of *cicchāyā*. The term '*cicchāyā*' refers to the reflection of consciousness in *buddhi*. It is said by Vācaspati that due to proximity consciousness is reflected in *buddhi* and *buddhi vr̥ttis* change into consciousness. As a consequence there arises a sense of false identity between Puruṣa and *buddhi*. This sense of false identity generates in Puruṣa the feeling that if owns the *buddhivr̥ttis* whereby Puruṣa takes itself as the *bhoktā*, Puruṣa takes itself to be non-different from *buddhi*. This feeling of oneness is false but it is responsible for the *bhoktr̥bhāvā* of Puruṣa. In reality it is simply a case of false appropriation. But how to explain the *sannidhāna* or proximity of Puruṣa and *buddhi*? Vācaspati explains it as the *yogyatā* or capability of Puruṣa to enlighten the states of *buddhi*. This enlightenment gives rise to a false sense of possession. Puruṣa feels that it possess that states of *buddhi*. The spirit appears as the enjoyer or *bhoktā*.

The utility of the concept of *yogyatā* has been questioned by Vijñānabhikṣu. His most important objection is that if *yogyatā* is taken to be in the very nature of Puruṣa then this property will never cease to belong to it and Puruṣa will never be liberated. With this inalienable property of *yogyatā* Puruṣa will continue to have experience.

Vijñānabhikṣu offers his hypothesis of double reflection in place of what Vācaspati said. In the opinion of Vijñānabhikṣu *buddhi*

first of all reflects consciousness of Puruṣa whereby the ahaṁkāra of buddhi is falsely appropriated by Puruṣa. In the second place *parināma* or modification of *buddhi* is reflected back to Puruṣa whereby objects are revealed. Vācaspati explains the whole thing with the help of his theory of single reflection which says that consciousness is reflected in *buddhi* whereby the objects are revealed. Vijñānabhikṣu replaces it with his own account of double reflection.

Puruṣa is fundamentally different from Prakṛti and it evolves. But when the *buddhivṛtti* is reflected in Puruṣa a close relation is established between *buddhi* and Puruṣa. Puruṣa seems to enjoy in the form of various psychological changes. But the enjoyment is not real. Real enjoyment is the prerogative of *buddhi* and not of Puruṣa. Buddhi changes according to the various forms of external object. But Puruṣa or consciousness is immutable. Since it is illuminating by its very nature, it can only reflect the modifications of *buddhi*.

The very concept of *bhokṛtṛbhāva* involves difficulty. Vācaspati explains it with reference to the capacity or *yogyatā* of Puruṣa. Puruṣa has the *yogyatā* for manifestation and appropriation. Puruṣa manifests and appropriates the modifications of *buddhi*. The problem is how does the self or Puruṣa take the benefits of *buddhi*.

Let us remember that Puruṣa is an enjoyer because it has the false idea of ownership. This false idea grows because of *aviveka* or

non-difference. This is at the root of all the experience the self has. It generates in Puruṣa the false sense of ownership referred to above. So long as the Puruṣa is under the spell of beginningless nescience, it becomes the enjoyer of the objects and the experience of pleasure and pain. *Bhoktrbhāva* means for Vācaspati the false idea of ownership which is generated in Puruṣa under the spell of ignorance.

Let us now turn to Vijñānabhikṣu. He holds that his hypothesis of double reflection is better than Vācaspati's account by means of the twin concepts of *Sannidhi* on proximity and *yogyatā* or capacity. In the opinion of Vijñānabhikṣu simply reflection of consciousness or *cichāyā* is not enough explanation of the world-experience of Puruṣa. The enlightened *buddhivṛtti* should be reflected back in Puruṣa. Only then can arise the false sense of ownership in Puruṣa. In the state of liberation Puruṣa does not differ from the feeling of *aviveka* and there is no *buddhivṛtti*. The false sense of ownership that characterised Puruṣa automatically lapses. The difference between Vācaspati and Vijñānabhikṣu is that the former explains this sense of ownership by the concept of *aviveka*, the later explains the same by the hypothesis of double reflection.

Why this difference in explanation? Dr. Anima Sengupta's comment in this regard is highly interesting. She tells us that Vācaspati due to his advaitic bent of mind has explained bondage, liberation and the relation between the soul and the world as

being due solely to ignorance or *aviveka* (just as in the Advaita-Vedānta of Śaṅkara, all these are explained as being due solely to the operation of *māyā*,) but Vijñānabhikṣu, by admitting the relation of double reflection between Puruṣa and *buddhi* in addition to ignorance has succeeded more in providing us with a truly realistic explanation of the bondage and liberation of Puruṣa. Otherwise, for simple understanding of the true meaning of self's enjoyment, both the theories are equally helpful to the readers.<sup>3</sup>

The fifth *hetu* proving the existence of a conscious Puruṣa '*Kaivalyārthaṁ pravṛtteśca*'<sup>4</sup> which means that there are people who has a tendency to terminate suffering and attain liberation. In fact, it has been taught by the sages that human beings who are distressed by three kinds of suffering should try to liberate themselves. Now, this is well known that all entities which are constituted by *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* must be of the nature of pleasure, pain and dullness. It indicates that such entities from Prakṛti to five mahābhutas can not have their suffering terminated for good. The point is that if the existence of a conscious Puruṣa besides the material entities is not acknowledged then the advice of the sages for the termination of the threefold suffering becomes absolutely pointless or futile. The advice of the sages cannot be false because we have seen people having ultimate knowledge of the distinction between self and not self attaining salvation. They stand as examples inspiring other people for the attainment of liberation.

The argument is that if there is no conscious principle besides unconscious matter then the endeavour for the removal of suffering would have no agent. It is simply because there is a conscious principle which is aware of suffering that the termination of suffering and attainment of liberation can be explained.

The five *hetus* mentioned above prove that there is a conscious Puruṣa besides everything that is material and unconscious. One may ask that the *hetus* proving a principle besides matter do not actually prove that such a principle is conscious. This suspicion can not be sustained. It is known that things which are not self-manifesting are unconscious material stuffs. For the Sāṃkhya philosophers everything that is composed of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are unconscious matter. The reason is that such things are not self-manifesting. It is only manifested to a conscious principle. It shows conclusively that a conscious principle besides all the material entities must be postulated which is conscious of things which are material. Such principle by which material entities are revealed must be conscious or self-manifesting. If the principle is in itself unconscious, it would not reveal material things. Darkness, it is said, does not reveal darkness. Darkness is revealed by light, which in fact dispels it. Hence, for the manifestation of material entities, a conscious principle must be admitted and that is Puruṣa.

In Sāṃkhya philosophy Puruṣa is the reality which is opposed to Prakṛti and is of the nature of consciousness. The Sāṃkhya

philosophers proved the existence of Puruṣa with the help of an inference. The question which has drawn attention of the Sāṃkhya philosophers is regarding the number of selves. Is the self one or many? Opinions differ in this respect. The Upaniṣadas describe self in many places as one. The Vedānta also speaks of a unitary self. But the Naiyāyikas believe in its multiplicity – the self is different on account of its relation with bodies which are many. It appears that there is radical difference of opinion regarding the number of selves. The Sāṃkhya philosophers, however, believe in the multiplicity of self. They have presented an argument to prove it which takes the form of an inference. The inference is as follows:-

“Jananamaraṇakaraṇāṇām pratiniyamād ayugapat-pravṛtteśca  
Puruṣabahutvam siddham, traiguṇyaviparyāccaiva”<sup>5</sup>

It means that birth and death are connected with particular individuals, there is absence of endeavor of all beings towards all things and there is difference in the nature of human beings – some are *sāttvika*, some *rājasika* and others are *tāmasika*. These prove that Puruṣa-s must be many. Let us explain the *hetus* employed in this inference which proves the plurality of Puruṣas.

The inference in question contains three *hetus*. The first *hetu* is that people are born at different points of time. They also die not simultaneously but at different point of time. We see that somebody is born at the time when someone is dying. It shows clearly that a person who is born and the person who is dead are different Puruṣas. If we imagine that a person who is yet to be born and the

person who is already born are the same person then the old man must be believed to be a child who is newly born.

What is clear is that birth and death are actually relations of selves with the body, the senses, mind or *manas*, *buddhi* and sense-organs. The suggestion is that self is eternal and is beyond birth and death. This is accepted by all the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy. The self being eternal, there is no real relation between the self and the body. But it must be granted that the body is the means for our experience of the self. The self is understood as the ego and consequently experience of the self depends on the consideration of the body. Ordinarily the self is not experienced without the help of the body, the senses etc.

It is true that in the state of *Asamprajñāta Samādhi* when all *vṛttis* are arrested then the self is manifested in its pure form. But such state cannot be described as the experience of the self. The reason is that experience depends on the *vṛtti* of the antaḥakaraṇa. Since there is no *vṛtti* in the state of *asamprajñāta samādhi* the question of having experience does not arise. When a *vṛtti* becomes subdued and in the aspect of *sattva* the self is reflected. As a result there is experience in which self is known as aham or ego. Consequently, when I know myself as the ahaṃ, I know it as the consciousness reflected in the *vṛtti*. In the ultimate analysis this experience requires a body with the senses. In the absence of antaḥakaraṇa there is no *vṛtti* and no experience of the reflected consciousness or the ego. For this reason birth is explained as birth of the body and death is a dissociation of the body with the self.

The first *hetu* of the inference must be understood in the light of the conception of birth and death.

It is understood that birth is the relation of the self with a body and death is the dissociation of the body with a self. If Puruṣa is one then the birth and death of different individuals at different points of time cannot be explained. For the Sāṅkhya philosophers self is all-pervasive and eternal. Since self is all-pervasive, each self will be in proximity with each antaḥkaraṇa. But the antaḥkaraṇa which is the locus of the enjoyment of the Puruṣa. If Puruṣa is one then through the relation between the Puruṣa and the different antaḥkaraṇas would lead to its enjoyment.

Since every Puruṣa is in proximity with every antaḥkaraṇa, the antaḥkaraṇa in connection with which a Puruṣa has his enjoyment, that very antaḥkaraṇa will be the determinant of the enjoyment of that Puruṣa. Hence, if Puruṣa were one, then this single Puruṣa would enjoy simultaneously everything because it would have relation with all antaḥkaraṇas. It will also follow that when the subtle body will be dissociated from a gross body, all Puruṣa-s enjoying through all antaḥkaraṇas will be destroyed. The Puruṣa and the sum of antaḥkaraṇas being related the destruction of one relata, viz. relation with the sum of relata will mean the destruction of the Puruṣa. Between two relata the destruction of the one would destroy the other. Further, when one antaḥkaraṇa dissolves at the dawn of the knowledge of reality, there will be no collection of antaḥkaraṇas; and the liberation of one Puruṣa would amount to the liberation of all Puruṣa-s.

This is the reason why Puruṣa-s are said to be multiple. If this is not admitted then the birth and death of one Puruṣa would mean birth and death of all. What after all is birth? When the subtle body is related with an antaḥkaraṇa which is conducive to enjoyment or *bhoga* enters into a gross body, then the Puruṣa will be born in a gross body, which will be conducive to its enjoyment. Death will be reverse process. The process however, proves that Puruṣa cannot be one; it must be many.

The same argument applies to the case of the sense-organs. When any body moves, everybody does not; when one is immobile it is not the case that others are also immobile. If Puruṣa were many then the movement or immobility of one Puruṣa would amount to the movement or immobility of all Puruṣa. This will lead to clear absurdity and for this reason Sāṃkhya philosophy admits of the multiplicity of Puruṣa.

The second *hetu* proving the plurality of Puruṣa is that all Puruṣa-s do not have identical activity. We see that when a person is engaged in having his dinner, another person may be engaged in sleep. Clearly two persons are not the same. If all the physical bodies are related to the same Puruṣa then when the body connected with the self is engaged with some actions all bodies will have the same engagement. For example, movement is an action for which the endeavor of an embodied self is needed. No action is possible without some kind of endeavor. The Sāṃkhya philosophers believed that conscious Puruṣa has the physical body as its locus. If

Puruṣa is one then when that Puruṣa endeavors to move then all physical bodies will have the movement. But this is plainly false. Different physical bodies are found to be engaged in different actions at different times. It shows that the Puruṣa which resides in the physical body must be different in different bodies.

The third reason for proving plurality of Puruṣa is '*Traiguṇyaviparyayāt*' which means difference in the predominance of a *guṇa* is each Puruṣa. Human beings have different natures, some soft, some hard, some active, some enthusiastic, others not. No two individuals are identical in nature. The reason for this variation is the predominance of either *sattva* or *rajas* or *tamas*. This explains why some men are *sattvika*, *rājasika* and some *tamosika*. If different antaḥkaraṇas are connected with the same Puruṣa then there would not be variation in the nature of human beings. If Puruṣa were one then the conduct of the *sattvika* person would not be different from the conduct of individuals having a different nature.

The Sāṃkhya philosopher thus prove the plurality of Puruṣa-s with the help of the above *hetus*. One may suspect that this contention of the Sāṃkhya philosophers runs counter to the thesis of the scriptures that the self is one. This admission of the plurality of Puruṣa-s is in clear contradiction with what is delivered in the scripture.

This misgiving will be removed if we notice that just as there are scriptures which maintain the oneness of self, similarly, there are others suggesting its plurality. The oneness of non-duality of the self has been interpreted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers in such a way that a multiplicity of entities having the same nature may be described as one. Selves are many, but since they are of the same nature they may be described as one just as we refer to the paddies in a heap as simply 'paddy' Puruṣa is many; but all of them are eternal, changeless, free and pure, so all Puruṣa-s are of the same nature. There is no Puruṣa which is not free, eternal and changeless. So if the Sāṃkhya philosophers admit of the multiplicity of Puruṣa it will not go against the scripture.

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## CHAPTER V

### Advaita Critique of Sāṃkhya

The Sāṃkhya theory advocates the creation of this world through Prakṛti i.e. Prakṛti is the sole cause for world's origination, which is technically called *Pradhānakāraṇatāvāda*'. According to Sāṃkhya Prakṛti has got dynamocity for which creation is possible. It is already stated that Sāṃkhya admitted two categories of reality – Prakṛti and Puruṣa. For creation an effort is needed and Prakṛti has got the same on account of the fact that Puruṣa is indifferent, motionless and actionless. For the sake of the enjoyment of the Puruṣa Prakṛti evolves herself in creation spontaneously. This theory is called *Prakṛtikāraṇatāvāda* or *Pradhānakāraṇatāvāda*.

Sankaracārya in his *Tarkapāda* Chapter of the bhāṣya has tried to establish Brahman as the cause of this world, which is called *Brāhmankāraṇatāvāda* as opposed to *Prakṛtikāraṇatāvāda* by Sāṃkhya. In order to refute the other systems regarding the creation of this world Sankara first attacked the Sāṃkhya as per principle to defeat the prime wrestler (*Pradhāna-malla-nirbahana-nyāya*). In the case of fighting, a wrestler normally attacks the prime one among the opponents in order to demoralize others in the group. In the same way, if there is intellectual battle one should attack the strongest opponents to show his supremacy among the argumentators. Sankara thinks that among the opponents Sāṃkhya is more firm footed than other opponents so far as their

argumentation is concerned. That is why Sankara takes the strong opponent i.e. Sāṁkhya system at the very outset.

Sankara is of the opinion that the ultimate cause from which the world has originated is Brahman. If Sāṁkhya view of Prakṛti is taken into account as the cause of the universe, it will lead to many philosophical problems. It has been argued by Sāṁkhya that the characteristic features of the cause should remain as it is in all the effects. As for example all products made of earth like pot etc. have got the common character earthiness in it and hence their prime cause is to be taken as earth in general. The internal and external world of experience in our daily life has got the common characteristic features like pleasant, unpleasant and dull (infatuative). From these three types of experience we may come to the conclusion that the ultimate cause of these experiences common with those which are constituted by pleasure, pain and dullness. In our daily life Sāṁkhya believes, we have a feeling of enjoyment which may be of pleasant type, unpleasant type and dull type. This ultimate common cause is called Prakṛti or Pradhāna bearing three-fold characteristic features of pleasure, pain and dullness and it is unconscious just like a lump of clay capable of being transformed. For the sake of the enjoyment of conscious spirit or Puruṣa. The unmanifest Pradhāna or Prakṛti is manifested in different kinds on effect.

The first objection raised by Sankara against Sāṁkhya is of the following type. To him, this wonderful world cannot be

originated from the unconscious Pradhāna or Prakṛti. It is contrary to our experience that an object is originated from an unconsciousness stuff. It is found in the external world that an unconscious object without being guided by a conscious agent cannot produce something. It is not possible for the unconscious object Pradhāna to create this wonderful world where diverse needs of diversified persons are fulfilled. It is a matter of our experience that houses, beds etc are made by some intelligent person with the help of the materials like brick, cement etc that are unconscious in nature. These things like bed etc are meant for the enjoyment of human beings. People want to have these in order to get enjoyment as well as to avoid pain. The external world is created in such a manner that an individual can enjoy his results of action performed by him. He will enjoy happiness for the good actions and pain for the bad ones. The material elements like earth, water etc help to build this world which is the place for the enjoyment of the result of actions. Even the bodies of human beings and those of other animals are created in a planned way so that there is an internal coordination among the parts. This related coordination among the created parts makes a human being or an animal survive in this world. The organs are made in such a manner that they can easily function to avail diverse experience. Such a planned body is impossible to create for a man having a keen intelligence. In other words, a person having highest intelligence cannot conceive of such a preplanned body for the sake of enjoyment and day to day function. If it is true, how can unconscious Pradhāna create this wonderful world?<sup>1</sup> This problem remains unanswered by the Sāṅkhya philosophers.

The material objects like earth, stone etc. should be presented in a fashionable manner if they are designed artistically. This has been done by an intelligent potter or sculpture. In the same manner if we think that world is created beautifully, we should presume for the existence of a conscious being like an artist behind this. If Pradhāna is taken as material cause of this universe, it must be guided and controlled by some intelligent being in order to produce the effect. It is quite natural that the material cause can not create the universe without being guided by the efficient cause. In other words, earth, stone, etc may be taken as efficacious for production, if there is the association with the efficient causes like potter, carpenter etc. While emphasizing the material cause one should not ignore the importance of efficient cause. Hence, we must accept some intellectual agency as the ultimate cause of the world. If we do not accept this, it will go against the scriptural injunction. Because it is said in the śruti that there is an idea of an intelligent agent behind the creation of this world. To accept Pradhāna, the ultimate cause of the world is to go against the śruti. Moreover, the wonderful creation of the world presupposes, the diverse intellectual agency which is beyond the capacity of pradhāna. In the śruti text it is said that peacocks are painted by the divine being (*Mayūrāściritā yena*). From this example it follows that the beautiful animals like peacock etc. are made so with the help of various colourful combinations and constituents which are beyond the capacity of an unconscious element like Prakṛti to make hence, an intelligent agent like Brahman has to be accepted as the creator.<sup>2</sup>

From the internal and external effects, we have a feeling of pleasure, pain and dullness and therefore the ultimate cause of this i.e. Pradhāna should have the same feeling. But it is contrary to what we experience in our life. Actually we feel Pleasure, Pain, etc. in our inner states and hence they cannot characterize external objects. The external objects have got their own characteristics like colour, sound etc. which are unlike pleasure, pain etc. The external qualities of things become instrumental to the causes of pleasure and pain. But they are not pleasant or painful themselves. The Advaitins have raised another problems in this connection. One and the same object may seem to be pleasant or painful for a particular individual depending on their different mental conditions. The same colour or sound may seem to be pleasant or painful to someone and may not be the same to others. It depends on the psychological make up of the person concerned. Had the object been taken as having inherently pleasant, it would have created pleasure to all coming in contact to that, but not pleasant to some or painful to others. This is due to different types of mental conditions of different people. If an object were endowed with pleasure, it would uniformly provide a soothing feeling to all the perceivers but in the actual world it is not found.

In response to the above reasoning Sāṃkhya might rejoin the following :

The internal and external objects are limited and have some finite capacities and that is why they are distinct from each other.

Now the question arises how do we feel that these are limited objects? They are limited by virtue of the fact that they are constituted by the conjunction of several elements.

Let us take an example of a limited object. Roots, sprout etc. are to be taken as limited because they are composed of several elements which are instrumental to their production. These objects are complex in nature due to having several elements for their creation. If Brahman is taken as the cause of creation it would be misleading because the nature of Brahman is simple and undifferentiated having no scope of any plurality of elements. Hence Brahman can never be the cause of multiple products of this earth. On the other hand Pradhāna can be their cause because it is of complex nature having three elements - *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. From this it is concluded that the complex Pradhāna having three elements can create the objects having such elements.

The Advaitins are of the opinion that if a limited object is having conjunction of several elements, then *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* having the same limited character would have conjunction and have been produced by several elements. But according to Sāṃkhya the three *guṇa*-s do not require any other cause but they themselves constitute the ultimate reality, Pradhāna.<sup>3</sup>

Apart from the above Sankara says it is not reasonable to substantiate that the unconscious Pradhāna can be established as

the cause of all the objects of experience through the simple relation of cause and effect. Though the causal relation remains in beds and chairs, they are not produced by unconscious material object but by an intelligent being. Any type of causal relation should not be confined within the material cause, but it can be extended to intelligent operation also. If so the effect would come into being.

If we keep the question of creating this wonderful world aside even then Sāṃkhya position is not problem free. A new problem may come on the way of our understanding. How can there be an activity in an unconscious Prādhāna through which it can create or produce the world. At the state of equilibrium no activities are found in Pradhāna. Activities possible when one or the three constituents predominates another. That is not the state of equilibrium. The creative activity begins when the state of equilibrium is disturbed through the prominence of one quality over another. But at the state of equilibrium no creation is possible. The activity as interpreted by Sāṃkhya is unintelligible or inconceivable on account of the fact that an activity is not found to be originated in an unconscious object like wood or clay, if not associated with the conscious being. So an activity is not found in an unconscious object like Pradhāna and hence it can not be taken as an independent cause of the universe.<sup>4</sup>

The Sāṃkhya is of the view that in a solely intelligent object activity cannot be found. Activity is possible in an unintelligent object associated with intelligent or conscious being. Had there

been an activity in mere intelligence, there would arise a problem of locus of that intelligence. The intelligence needs some locus for its activity. There can not be intelligence in the void i.e. without the association of conscious being. Hence, the theory that an activity remains only in intelligence as supported by Sankara is not tenable. It can be explained with the metaphor of chariot. Just as activity is found in an unconscious object like chariot, which is associated with a conscious being, activity is generated in an unconscious body which is associated with a conscious being.

It is the conjecture of the Advaitins that in the external world activity is not always found in intelligence or consciousness even when it is connected with unconscious object. One may be confused if activity remains in conscious object or not. In reply Sāṃkhya argues that there is no confusion regarding the locus of existence of activity. Normally the activity lies there where it is found to exist since the movement of an object or its motion are the matters of direct perception if it is said that consciousness is the seat of activity, it will be misleading because motion is found in a chariot but not in the conscious being. In the same way it can be said that the activity is found in the body alone. That is why the Cārvākas argue that consciousness belongs to body because the marks of consciousness like motion etc are found in the body. It is remarkable contribution of the Sāṃkhya to the Philosophy of materialism when they support Cārvāka in favour of their thesis. As the Cārvākas are in favour of the Sāṃkhya, they will find their position more firm – footed. Being empowered by Cārvākas,

Sāṃkhya can safely declare that activity really belongs to the material object i.e. Prakṛti.<sup>5</sup> The Vedāntins are of the view that it is true the movement etc are seen in an unconscious object as pointed out by Sāṃkhya. But the question is, can unconscious object alone generate movement? Certainly not. The unconscious object can produce movement etc. if and only if it is associated with consciousness. The properties of burning and lighting are found to be existent in a piece of wood which is burning but not found in mere fire. Fire is not available when fuel is isolated and hence nobody thinks that the properties of burning and light are caused by wood. It is a fact that the properties are due to fire on account of the fact these are found when fire exists. In like manner the activity is due to consciousness though it is found in an unconscious object. This position has also been accepted by Cārvākas because they believe that consciousness is found in a man which is an amalgamation of body and consciousness. In other words, it is found as belonging to the body when body is conjoined with consciousness. Therefore, consciousness is the ground of all activities.<sup>6</sup>

Sāṃkhya has raised another difficulty in the above argument. Self is wholly inactive by nature. If it is so how can it be active being associated with an unconscious body because inactive object cannot initiate action in anything. This difficulty can easily be removed if it is realised that an object which is not active itself makes other active, if it is in contact with the appropriate thing. As for example, a magnet without moving itself can make the iron

particles move towards it, if they are brought in close proximity. Colour etc., make eye and other sense-organs receptive towards them while they are themselves inactive. In like manner, God without being active Himself activates all beings and things in the world. Another difficulty would come of in the following manner.<sup>7</sup> If God is the unmoved mover of this world, it would imply that there is duality between God, the mover and the universe to be moved. It will go against the Vedāntins' doctrine that the ultimate reality is one and non-dual (*Ekameva advitīyam*). Hence, the Vedantins' position can not be sustained. According to them, Brahman alone is real and hence there is no distinction (*bheda*) either homogeneous (*sajātīya*), heterogeneous (*bijātīya*) or internal (*svagata*).

In response to this problem, the Advaitins may rejoin in the following manner. The above-mentioned problem of mover and the moved (i.e. distinction or duality), may occur in the level of phenomenal reality, which is endowed with names and forms as the product of nescience or ignorance. But at the level of ultimate reality there is no question of dichotomy or distinction between the mover and the moved. As there is no world as separated from Brahman, there is unity but not diversity and hence there does not arise any question of duality as shown by the Sāṅkhya. Though the world is an appearance according to them from the empirical point of view, it has to be taken as the effect of our ignorance. As soon as ignorance is dispelled by knowledge of Brahman, the duality ceases.<sup>8</sup>

The Sāṃkhya-thinkers have argued in favour of their position quite consistently. To them the activity found in Prakṛti is not due to some external force or agent but spontaneous. In order to prove the spontaneity of the action of Prakṛti they have taken two metaphors – *milk and water*. Just as the milk flows automatically from the cow for the enjoyment or survival of the calf and water flows downwards spontaneously for the benefit of human beings, Prakṛti can move by itself without being unconscious and is capable of fulfilling human needs spontaneously.<sup>9</sup>

The Advaitins try to refute this standpoint by saying that the movement found in the milk and water is not spontaneous, but due to the existence of some consciousness. It is already an established fact that an inanimate chariot cannot move forward without the association of a conscious being. In like manner, the present case can be justified. In the case of milk we find some consciousness in the animal i.e. cow. The spontaneous discharge of milk is not so in the true sense of the term but due to its desire to feed the calf who will suck it. In like manner it can be said that water flows down due to low level of land but not spontaneously as suggested. When any movement is found in an inanimate being, it is due to some extraneous condition or factor. Hence it is decided that for all types of movement found in an unintelligent being is due to the existence of some conscious principle, which is also supported in the *Śruti* text. It is said in the Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad that it is the conscious Principle or God who guides and controls the activities and movements of water and rivers.<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, the Sāṃkhyas cannot explain the fact why Pradhāna who is taken to be independent moves to activity. By virtue of being independent Prakṛti is not supposed to be affected by external factors. Pradhāna is constituted by three *guṇa*-s which remain in perfect equilibrium and hence there is no external cause through which this equilibrium may be disturbed. So Pradhāna is not supposed to move. Puruṣa again is absolutely indifferent and inactive. Hence, Puruṣa cannot be the cause for Pradhāna's movement. We do not find any external cause which makes or does not make Prakṛti to modify itself into various effects like *mahat* etc. To the Advaitins such problem does not arise because God is taken as all known and all powerful. For this reason He can be active or inactive depending on the demand of the situation with the help of his magical power (*māyā*) producing appearances.<sup>11</sup>

The Sāṃkhya may say that Prakṛti can transform itself into *mahat* etc. naturally without the help of any efficient or auxiliary cause, just as grass changes itself into milk without the help of any other causes.

This view does not stand in the eye of logic according to the Advaitins. A process is certainly necessary for the transformation of grass into milk. It is found in experience that grass taken by a cow may be transformed into milk, otherwise not. Hence it is not natural as claimed by the Sāṃkhya.<sup>12</sup>

The Sāṃkhya reiterates the earlier position and says that the transformation of grass into milk does not need any other factor. We do not find any factor affecting this change. If this factor were known to us, we would have applied this and got milk in the need of hour. But actually it is not found and hence the change of grass into milk is a natural phenomenon. In a similar manner it can be proved that Pradhāna transforms itself independently and naturally.<sup>13</sup>

The Advaitins do not agree again. To them the above change is not natural on account of the fact that it is transformed into milk when taken by a cow. If it is taken by a bull, it is not transformed into milk. From this it is known to us that some external factor works in making grass into milk. A man cannot transform grass into milk. From this, it is not proved that such transformation is natural and independent. It is found from our experience that some of the changes are caused by a human agent and some are performed by the Divine will. It is not true that human agency fails in transforming grass into milk. It is found that people feed the cows in a better way for having more quantity of milk. In the same way we can say that the theory of the Sāṃkhya is not true, because of the unreality of the fact that Pradhāna changes itself into effects naturally or independently.<sup>14</sup>

Again the Advaitins argue that even if it is admitted that Pradhāna is capable of changing itself into various effects independently, we do not find any motive behind this transformation. Pradhāna does not need any auxiliary cause or any

helping cause for its modification. If it is admitted, it will be tantamount to not having any motive or purpose of its own.

If this be the case, the Sāṃkhyaś may assert that Pradhāna has some purpose of fulfilling the ends of Puruṣa and for this reason it undergoes changes. Pradhāna does not need any cause for its modification. From this, it does not follow that it will have no purpose behind.<sup>15</sup>

If this view is admitted the Advaitins may ask : what is this purpose? Is it the enjoyment of Puruṣa or his release? If it is said that it is the enjoyment (*bhoga*) of Puruṣa, it is not seen. That is, we fail to see the enjoyment of Puruṣa in this world. Apart from this, if Puruṣa's enjoyment is the fundamental to Pradhāna's activity, the Puruṣa will not receive freedom from bondage of enjoyment. If the Puruṣa's freedom from enjoyment is the main intention of Pradhāna's activity, the Puruṣa may be free before the activities of Prakṛti start, Prakṛti's activity would seem to be useless and unnecessary, because the purpose for which the activity of Pradhāna is started is already fulfilled in Puruṣa. Moreover, if the achievement of freedom is the end, there would be no enjoyment at all. If both enjoyment and freedom are end there would be no limit to enjoyment leading to non-attainment of freedom, because the items of enjoyment are infinite and endless. If it is admitted that the activity of Pradhāna is only to meet its curiosity or satisfaction, the question arises whose satisfaction or curiosity it is. Because Pradhāna being unconscious in nature cannot have satisfaction or

curiosity of its own. As Puruṣa is indifferent and passive it cannot have curiosity. If Pradhāna is not active the creative power of Pradhāna and cognitive power of Puruṣa would become purposeless and useless. In order to justify this, the Sāṃkhya must admit a generative power in Pradhāna just like cognitive power in Puruṣa. If it exists, there would be no final freedom. Due to all such complications it is not reasonable to say that Pradhāna becomes active for the enjoyment and release of Puruṣa.<sup>16</sup>

Now the Sāṃkhya is trying to explain the world of experience with the help of the cooperation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. It has explained this with the analogy of blind and lame men and magnet and iron. Just as through mutual cooperation a blind man can go through the road smoothly being guided by the lame man who is on his shoulder, Prakṛti, though unconscious can have inclination towards creation for the enjoyment of Puruṣa being guided by Puruṣa who is inactive. This cooperation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is analogous to that of blind and lame man. A blind cannot see, but is capable of walking while a lame can see but not capable of walking. That is why, they are compared with Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Just as a magnet, without moving itself, can easily move other iron-particles towards itself, Puruṣa may lead Prakṛti for inclination towards activity.<sup>17</sup>

If this view is taken for granted, it will go against the basic presupposition of the Sāṃkhyas. The Sāṃkhya claims that Prakṛti becomes active independently i.e., without any external pressure.

But if it is said that Prakṛti is led by Puruṣa, then Pradhāna's activities are not to be taken as independent, but due to external pressure. Moreover, if Puruṣa engages Prakṛti to certain activities, it will be presumed that it has lost its indifference and inactive character, which is unusual. Moreover, the metaphor of blind and lame man cannot be applied here. Puruṣa cannot be compared with a lame man, because a lame man can guide the blind with the help of his words and directions, but Puruṣa lacks this power due to his inactivity. If it is argued that Puruṣa may lead Prakṛti to perform certain activities due to their proximate existence just as a magnet can influence the iron-particles due to their proximate existence, they will have to admit that the activity should continue for endless or longer period of time due to their proximity, which is not possible. It is known to us that the magnet can move the iron-particles due to their proximity, but this is always occasional, transitory but not atemporal. The necessary proximity between them has to be brought with the help of some other actions. Moreover, all magnets are not always capable of creating actions in iron-particles. They can do so if they are cleaned and maintained from time to time. Hence, the analogy of a magnet and iron-particle does not match with Puruṣa and Prakṛti.<sup>18</sup>

One may extend one's argument by saying that a relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti cannot be conceived because Puruṣa is indifferent and Prakṛti is unconscious. How can an indifferent substance be related to an unconscious one? There is no third agency through the interference of which the said relation is

possible. If it is said that only their capability of being related is taken as a relating factor, their relation will continue for ever or endlessly leading to the cessation of release of Puruṣa. If the release of Puruṣa is desirable, it will be accepted that no relation between Puruṣa and Prakṛti is admissible. From this, it is proved that relation is not possible between them for metaphysical reason also.

Moreover, the earlier objections raised against the inclination of Puruṣa towards activities will stand as they are. It is not understandable why Puruṣa will feel for performing activities. In the Advaita framework this is easily explained. Puruṣa, though essentially indifferent and inactive, can involve in activities through the illusory creative power called *Māyā*.

It is admitted by Sāṃkhya that Prakṛti has three constituents – *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which remains at first in equilibrium without overpowering one another. At this stage there is no subordination of the one by another, because all the constituents remain in equilibrium. Hence, they are having independence in the true sense of the term. It is very difficult to understand why they have left their independent status and started subordinating one another. Due to this loss of equilibrium there is subordination of one constituent over another, on account of which there is creation and activity. But the question remains : who has disturbed this equilibrium and why? There is no external agency to disturb them

leading to the land of creativity. The Sāṃkhya cannot provide suitable reply to this.<sup>19</sup>

The Sāṃkhya still argues that Pradhāna and its constituents are not imagined but experienced in their life. They have seen the world and inferred the characteristics of the primordial cause of the world. The three constituents of Prakṛti are not to be taken as inactive and changeless. To them these three constituents are changing themselves and it is true even at the state of equilibrium. Hence, there always remains a possibility of disturbing the state of equilibrium.

Even if these are admitted, the creation of this beautiful world would quite be impossible from an unconscious and unintelligent agent, Prakṛti. If the Sāṃkhya gives an attribute of intelligence to Prakṛti, their position would be taken as equal to the Advaitins. To Sāṃkhya, even at the stage of equilibrium or the state of equipose may be disturbed and the constituents of Prakṛti, may be distributed unequally. For this reason it may be said that such disturbance would not happen without a cause, which is not found anywhere. If it is said that such disturbance may occur any time without any cause, it would continue for endless period of time. If it continues, the creation of this world would continue for endless period of time leading to the cessation of dissolution (*Pralaya*). If it is taken for granted, the final release would become virtually impossible. For all these reasons the Sāṃkhya system is accepted as unacceptable to the Advaitins because it is full of inconsistent statements.<sup>20</sup> Now

the Advaitins are pointing out so many contradictory statements in other cases also. The Sāṃkhya sometimes opines that sense organs are seven in number, sometimes eleven. They sometimes subscribe to the view that the subtle elements (*tanmātras*) originate from the evolute *Mahat* and sometimes from the ego (*Ahaṃkāra*). So far as internal sense organ is concerned, some say that it is three in number and sometimes one. Moreover, the Advaitins think that the Sāṃkhya view is not honoured by the orthodox systems on account of the fact that it is opposed by Śruti which believes in the existence of God as the ultimate cause of the universe and also by Smṛti following Śruti.<sup>21</sup>

Now the Sāṃkhya has shown its critique to the Advaita view. To the Sāṃkhyas the system of Advaita Vedānta is not free from various logical defects. According to Advaita Vedānta, one unitary principle called Brahman or Ātmān is the sufficient cause of the origin, maintenance and destruction of the whole universe. If it is admitted, the sufferer and causes of suffering would not belong to different categories but two modes of the same self. If this view is accepted, the self would never be free from two modes because they are identified with it. It is said in the scripture that an individual will be free from suffering through the right knowledge of self. If the Self is not free from these two special modes the above mentioned scriptural injunction would be in vain. A characteristic feature of an object cannot be separated from the object where it remains just as heat and light cannot be separated. It may be argued by the Vedāntins that there is dichotomy between water and

its agitated states in the forms of waves and ripples. It may seem two at this condition. When the water remains calm and non-agitated condition, the said dichotomy vanishes. In like manner, it may be said that though initially there is suffering in Self it may get rid of the same afterwards. This view is also not acceptable to Sāṃkhya. To them water can never be made free from waves and ripples, which may appear or disappear, but they remain as identified with water. In the same way, the sufferer and cause of suffering remain in the same Self. The Advaitins seem to ignore this point. The multiplicity (*nānātva*) of world has been explained by them with the single unitary principle called Brahman.<sup>22</sup>

It is also true that the distinction between a seeker and sought is always prominent and hence they can be kept separate. One can seek an object which is completely different from oneself. It is a matter of a contradiction if someone seeks something which remains within oneself and forms the constituting part of oneself. A lamp does seek for light because it remains within itself. Had there been no object which is not distinct from oneself, one would be taken virtually as seeker of oneself. That is, under this circumstance, he will seek for his own self to justify himself as 'seeker', because there is nothing in the external world other than himself. This is quite unnatural or rather unusual.<sup>23</sup>

Moreover, the seeker and the sought are taken as relative terms, because the property of being a seeker is determined (*nirūpita*) in terms of the object sought for and vice-versa. For this

reason we must admit a relation between them, which always remains in two as per the definition – '*dviṣṭhaḥ sambandhaḥ*' (i.e. relation abiding in two). The relation cannot be established if there is only one object. Hence the distinction between a seeker and the sought must remain for the sake of their relationship and hence they are to be taken as separate entities.<sup>24</sup>

The Sāṃkhya is forwarding another argument in favour of the distinction between suffering and the causes of it. There are two types of object whom we want to obtain and want to avoid. In order to distinguish between the two it is necessary to accept their separate existence. In these two the former is called good and the latter bad or evil. What affects us favourably is called our good generating happiness (*anukūla vedanīyaṃ sukhaṃ*) while that which affects us unfavourably is called evil generating misery (*pratikūla-vedanīyaṃ dukhaṃ*). If we look to the external world, we shall see that the objects generating happiness are very few in comparison to those generating misery. Hence, it has been presumed that all objects of our desire in one way may be called evil, which generates pain or misery. The object which seems to be pleasant is not so in the true sense of the term, because ultimately it leads to our suffering. Hence self is the sufferer. If the sufferer and the cause of suffering are not kept separate, but identified as done by the Advaitins while admitting a unitary principle of all objects, there is no possibility of availing freedom in the sense of emancipation or release. If an individual identifies himself with the objects of suffering, he will remain in the midst of suffering leading to the non-

attainment of liberation. If suffering and the cause of it are kept in a separate way, an individual can see the situation and explore the possibility of eradicating sufferings. He would succeed in removing the suffering if he would be able to remove the causes of it. If causes are removed there would be no suffering, which ultimately leads him to the attainment of liberation.

The objections may be raised by the Sāṃkhya are to be taken in a true spirit if the sufferer and the causes of suffering are taken to be related as subject and object. But actually such relationship cannot be found between them. In an absolute unity no such relation is possible according to Advaita Vedānta. The Advaitins have tried to elaborate their view points with the help of fire. Fire which is one and which has got heat and light, does not illumine or burn itself. In the same manner, there is only one immutable Brahman under which the relation between sufferer and the causes of suffering is not at all possible.

A question may be raised; where shall we find the relation of the sufferer and the causes of suffering? If the meaning of the Sanskrit 'tāpa' is taken literally, it may denote both 'heat' and 'suffering'. From this we can take human body as being heated i.e., having suffering or sufferer and the sun is taken as the cause of the heat or suffering. It may be noted here that suffering is possible for an intelligent being only, but not for an unintelligent body. Had suffering belonged to body, it would have been vanished as soon as the body is destroyed. In other words, after the cessation of body

individual would attain release or freedom. If it be so, no man would try to undergo spiritual training for the removal of pain or to get liberation.<sup>25</sup>

But it is not logically possible to believe that suffering belongs to soul. Because, to suffer entails undergoing some changes or modification. It is not possible in Pure Self. We cannot say similarly that the body and self constitute a composite whole, because such combination is not allowed for Self. If self is associated with body and makes a composite whole, it would lose its pure character. Self, if pure, cannot be conjoined with body. It is also meaningless to say that suffering suffers itself.

The Sāṃkhya may justify their standpoint by explaining the possibility of suffering. They may explore the relation between a sufferer and the cause of suffering in the following manner. The Sāṃkhyas may say that one of the constituents of Prakṛti i.e. *sattva*, the cause of the experience of light and darkness, is the sufferer and the other constituent called *rajas* which is the cause of all activities, movements and painful experience is the cause of suffering. The Self which alone has got the 'feeling' cannot feel identified with these constituents and hence cannot share the suffering caused in them or by them. Sāṃkhya would argue that Self appears to be suffering while actually the *sattva* constituent suffers. Self is reflected in *sattva* constituent of Pradhāna and thinks itself sufferer being identified with the suffering of *sattva* element.

It is known so far that self does not suffer really. Though it is true, self appears itself to be sufferer due to ignorance. This standpoint is quite acceptable to the Advaitins also. But Sāṃkhya like Vedāntins cannot admit that suffering is not real but apparent. To Sāṃkhya the experience of suffering is as true as other real objects. If it is admitted, it would be difficult for Sāṃkhya to believe in final release of the Self. If this status of suffering is taken for granted, it would lead them to admit that there would be no release of Self. For, the causes of suffering, being constituents of Prakṛti, are eternal. Hence there will always be the possibility of its suffering.

In order to solve this problem Sāṃkhya adds that though the capacity of suffering in the self and the causes of suffering in the constituents of Pradhāna are there the real suffering occurs when there is a specific conjunction between self and Pradhāna. This specific conjunction follows from a cause, which is the non-discrimination of Pradhāna and the Self. When the cause in the form of non-discrimination is removed, the possibility of further suffering comes to an end.

The above-mentioned solution is not a solution in the true sense of the term. The Advaitins think that even the non-discrimination, the cause of suffering, is itself caused by the *tamas* – constituent of Prakṛti. This constituent, being always there, there is always the possibility of suffering.

The Advaitins are now challenging Sāṃkhyas on their basic presuppositions. They believe that creation starts, when there is lack of equilibrium among three constituents of Prakṛti. In other words, it has been admitted by them that, when the three *guṇā*s are disturbed, one or the other *guṇā*s of these gets overpowered over the rest. It is quite illogical that it is left undetermined how and when this preponderance of one over another happens. If it is not determined, the specific conjunction and disjunction of self with Pradhāna which points to creation and destruction of the whole world remain undetermined. From this it follows that there is an uncertainty of getting one's final release. The theory of Pradhāna-Kāraṇatā is thus refuted by the Advaitins.<sup>26</sup>

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## CHAPTER VI

### **Some Critical and Conclusive Remarks**

All the problems raised by the Advaitins are based on the presupposition that no activity can be generated in a material object which is not connected with any conscious being. They have tried to prove this with the help of various metaphors like chariot etc. This presupposition may not always be true. If this is proved, the Sāṃkhya position can easily be substantiated.

The Sāṃkhya accepts dynamicity of an object having capacity of expanding. It is not correct that a material object does not have any power of movements in the forms of extension, subtraction etc. If the metaphor of magnet which is already referred to by Sāṃkhya in the context of refuting Advaita view is taken into account, we shall see that magnet has got power of its own which can draw the iron particles scattered around it. We do not find any type of conscious element to justify the movement or attraction of iron-particles etc. Each and every material object possesses some inherent power which can be manifested at any time. Had there been no energy in an object, it would not have been manifested any time. From the manifestation of power it becomes active and associated with so many functions. Water has got its own energy which is manifested sometimes automatically or when forcibly thrown downwards. The change of position of water gives rise to

power or energy which is called *Vārabānal* (fire originated from water or hydel-power). In the same way, the friction between the green branches of the tree produces fire power which is called *Dāvānal* (fire generated from the trees). In like manner, energy or power is found even in garbage or human fetus. If fire is available everywhere without the conjunction of a conscious element, the existence of power can always be assumed within the material object. From this it can easily be known that power is not the property of the conscious being, even the material objects have got tremendous power which can change the whole world. Hence, it is not utopian idea to believe in the truth that matters can have the power of extension or movement. Hence, the basic presupposition that Prakṛti cannot have these powers due to its character of being matter is not true.

It is said earlier that Prakṛti creates this beautiful world for the sake of the enjoyment of Puruṣa. In this connection, it may be noted that Prakṛti by virtue of being unconscious cannot have her own intention, because 'intention' or 'desire' is the mark of an intelligent or conscious being. A question may be raised how the activities of Prakṛti can be justifiable. In this case also we have to admit the dynamic character of Prakṛti. By virtue of its dynamic character Prakṛti moves and generates different activities without any intention of her own. Sometimes the three *guṇa*-s of Prakṛti remain at the stage of equilibrium and sometimes it creates due to superordination of one *guṇa* over another. It is the essential nature of Prakṛti to undergo some changes from time to time having no

criterion of the changes. If there is any criterion of such change, it cannot be taken as 'natural'. Something 'natural' means it is not moved by external pressure or external factor. These spontaneous and natural activities are inherited by Puruṣa. Puruṣa 'owns' these activities being identified with Prakṛti. In the case of Prakṛti the question of *owning* or disowning does not come into the picture due to her unconscious character, rather all these actions are, to some extent, spontaneous. Hence the activities are self-generated (*svayambhū*) and Prakṛti does not need any external assistance for their manifestation. The owning of Puruṣa is due to the effect of ignorance or having no knowledge of discrimination.

The above-mentioned fact regarding the dynamic force existing in matter has been endorsed in modern theory of Quantum Mechanics of Physics. To them each and every thing in this world is pre-determined and hence there is no chance of accidentalism. An atom possesses electron and proton, which implies that these particles have got power of having small energies and waves. These energies and waves are generated by Nature. From this it follows that these are naturally given and hence there is no need to believe that these are generated through the association of Conscious Being. The physicists are still engaged in unveiling the power of mystery found in the world of atom which is nothing but matter. They are still engaged in discovering the truth how energy is coming from the atom, how mutual give and take policies subsist within an atom, how electron and proton are revolving around the atom, and also how much electron and proton revolve in its orbit

etc. From this it is known that no conscious principle is involved for the activities going on within the world of atom.

If the above-mentioned notion of Pradhāna is admitted it can be presumed that the three constituents of it are the cause of suffering (*tāpaka*). The question raised earlier how the concept of sufferer (*tāpaka*) remains without a notion of sufferer (*tāpya*). So far as the Prakṛti – part is concerned, there are only the three constituents which are the causes of suffering. If Puruṣa remains and identifies himself with Prakṛti he will surely suffer. If Puruṣa does not feel himself identified with Prakṛti, it is to be taken as knowledge of discrimination, which is the state of liberation. If Puruṣa is liberated, the constituents of Prakṛti having the causes of suffering remain ineffective. The three *guṇa*-s of Prakṛti causing suffering but remaining as ineffective are tantamount to their non-existence. But this cannot be taken as non-existent, because three *guṇa*-s causing suffering cannot be waived from her nature. On account of her naturalness the three *guṇa*-s cannot be free from their character of causing sufferings.

The most important thing in Sāṃkhya system is the three constituents which survey the mental and material objects of the external world. All the objects of the world have in them pure being or existence (*sattā*) as their ultimate basis and essential stuff. The existence is the prime factor which helps us to their intelligibility. The cognition of an object presupposes its existence. The object having no existence cannot come under our awareness. The utopian

ideas like sky-flower (*ākāśa-kusuma*) barren woman's son (*bandhyāputra*) etc cannot come to our level of intelligibility due to their non-existence (*asattā*). The whole epistemological literature remains if the objects of the external world really exist. The property of intelligibility of an object is determined by its existence (*sattā*). Hence *sattā* or existence of an object is to be considered first. This *sattā* of an object is due to the *sattva* element of an object. In fact, in Sanskrit the terms '*sattva* or '*sattā*' have got the same meaning as per the grammatical rules for formation of a word.

The object of experience also contains a few characteristics like resistance, shape, form, impenetrability etc. These are due to their presence of massiveness of an object. An object is massive in character and hence it can assume shape and can resist its complete destruction after allowing some internal change in the form. This massive character in an object is due to the *tamogūṇa* of Pradhāna. Beside the *sattvagūṇa* the object has another constituent called *tamas*. An object does not remain static and it undergoes some changes from one form to another. There is no single and monotonous character in an object. This change or movement is caused by another principle which is called *rajogūṇa*. We may summarise the above-mentioned principles in the following manner.

a) An object exists and is intelligible on account of its generation by the *sattva*-element of Pradhāna.

b) An object undergoes changes due to the *raja*-element of Pradhāna.

c) An object assumes shape and resists destruction through changes due to the *tamo*-element of Prakṛti.

In this connection, a distinction can be drawn between the Vaiśeṣika concept of *guṇa* and that of Sāṃkhya. To the Vaiśeṣikas qualities like lightness, movement etc. remain in a substance through relation of inherence (*dravya-samaveta*). In the Sāṃkhya system these *guṇa*-s like *sattva* etc possess the properties of lightness, movement and heaviness (*kārikā*-13). Hence, these qualities are not inhered in a substance (*dravya-samaveta*). One quality cannot be imagined as possessing another quality or other qualities. These *guṇa*-s like *sattva* etc. are apparently associated with and dissociated from the Puruṣa (*Pravacanabhāṣya*-1/61). If the Vaiśeṣika view is taken into account, the *guṇa*-s cannot remain in Puruṣa because these *guṇa*-s actually and constantly remain in a substance through inherence (*dravya-samaveta*). Puruṣa is not a substance. Logically speaking these *guṇa*-s like *sattva* etc. are the substances themselves. Hence, all the properties remain in themselves which confirms our decision that Prakṛti is self-sustained entity having automatic change, movement etc without depending on any conscious principle. All the objects of the world are the results of different permutations and combinations of those three ultimate reals. Even the objects of the mental world like thoughts or ideas are within the purview of these three *guṇa*-s. These are the modifications of the ultimate reals, which constitute the physical world. In the mental domain of the world the element of *sattva* predominates while in the physical world *tamo-guṇa* dominates over

others. This *tamo guṇa* exists in all our ideas of objects. If not, these mental products could not take the forms of their objects. In each and every case of mental modification (*citta-vṛtti*) the combination of three *guṇa*-s is always identifiable. Our intellectual manifestation (*buddhi-vṛtti*), being manifested, takes the form of its object and for this it needs movement. Our phenomenal consciousness and its objects are generated by the functioning of three *guṇa*-s which are the creative forces of the world. On account of this, the Sāṅkhya system does not distinguish between thought and matter. Both matter and thought are constituted of the same feeling-substances which build the neutral borderline between them. The *guṇa*-s are the feeling substances. As the whole external world is constructed out of these elements, each and every object of cognition possesses the capacity of producing three different feelings in the minds of human being i.e. pleasure, pain and delusion (*Pravacanabhāṣya*, 1/127).

From the above it is proved that Prakṛti is a self-sustained entity from which the whole world, physical and mental, is originated. The correspondence between inner world and the outer world has been satisfactorily explained by the Sāṅkhya-thinkers assuming the fact that they represent two allied lines of development from a common source i.e. the three *guṇa*-s. This is the dynamism of the Sāṅkhya philosophy and this aspect is as real and as obvious as the aspect of performance. All types of movements and changes are very real and forceful that they cannot be denied by any means. The world in which we reside is not a

static world and it is out and out dynamic. The changes, vibrating currents of life and constant movements are the keys of this phenomenal world which is called *jagat-prapañca*. This seen world does not remain steady and unchanging. On the other hand, it undergoes changes due to its inner push and inner mobility generated through the palpitating nature of three *guṇa*-s. These *guṇa*-s justify clearly the sameness and diversity, affinity and difference which are clear and unignorable. The sameness of the objects is due to the sameness of the ultimate stuff (three-elements), but diversity is due to the different types of relatedness of these elements. If we see the world, we will feel that cause and effect, substance and attribute are identical from the standpoint of the stuff. The world is different if it is seen from the point of view of forms and names.

Though the body is having various qualities like height, fairness and fatness, it is called one. In like manner, though Prakṛti possesses various qualities, it is called one. In another way it can be said that according to Sāṃkhya there is an identity (*tādātmya*) between quality and substance leaving no room to 'manyness'. If 'manyness' is there, there cannot be identity or *abheda* or non-difference. Due to this identity between a quality and a substance the luminosity, movement and heaviness will not be taken as qualities alone but they are substances as well.

Vijñānabhikṣu had also admitted the all-pervading nature of the *guṇa*-s and also their innumerable number. (*Yogavarttikā*, Ch.

11-18). He has admitted it because there will be difficulty in holding the view that creation starts everywhere. Though space, time and *Ākāśa* are all-pervading, there is no problem in the generation of motion essential for initiating creation.

If Puruṣa does not cause anything (*akāraṇa*) or is caused by nothing (*akārya*), what is the necessity of admitting such a *tattva*. For the Sāṅkhya, the evolution of the world by Prakṛti requires the presence of Puruṣa to disturb the equilibrium of Prakṛti and thereby start creation. If there were no Puruṣa, the equilibrium of Prakṛti would not have lost at all and as a result, no creation would have been possible. Besides this conjunction of Prakṛti with Puruṣa which is necessary for *sāmyāvasthā – bhanga*, we require the disjunction of Prakṛti with Puruṣa to enable Prakṛti to reach its original state of equilibrium and thereby producing *pralaya* or destruction. In other words, the cycles of creation and destruction *sr̥ṣṭi* and *pralaya* by Prakṛti would not have been possible unless there is association and dissociation respectively with Puruṣa. It is to be noted here that though Puruṣa does nothing, yet its presence is necessary to remove the obstacle which hinders manifestation of the effect in the cause. According to Sāṅkhya philosophers, the effect is already present in the cause even prior to effectuation. Had it not been so, everything could have been produced out of anything. That is why, the Sāṅkhya philosophers maintain that which is not inherent or implicit in the cause in some form or other cannot be made manifest or explicit. Vācaspati rightly observes in his *Tattvakaumudī* that even hundreds and thousands of artisans cannot transform blue into

red for the simple reason that red is never present in the blue. That is why; the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) is, for Sāṃkhya, the true cause. The so called efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*), according to Sāṃkhya, does nothing except removing the obstacle that hinders manifestation of the effect in the cause. In this sense it is necessary (*prayojana*) although it does not produce anything. Moreover, unlike the material cause, the *nimitta kāraṇa* is not found to be present in the effect itself. So we can always think of its alternative or *vikalpa*. Instead of rotating the wheel by means of a stick one can take the help of electric current for the same purpose. But there is no alternative (*vikalpa*) to the material cause which is invariably present in the effect. That is why, the Sāṃkhya philosophers do not attach much importance to the notion of efficient cause. In truth, the concept of *nimitta kāraṇa* in Sāṃkhya philosophy differs substantially from other Indian systems which advocate it. Further, the Sāṃkhya philosophers characterize Puruṣa as *aprakṛti – avikṛti, i.e., akāraṇa and akārya*. This unmistakably shows that the Sāṃkhya philosophers do not treat Puruṣa, the so called *nimitta kāraṇa*, on the same footing with Prakṛti, the root cause. Puruṣa thus is not that essential in Sāṃkhya philosophy so far as the creation of the world is concerned. But it is quite essential so far as the termination of suffering is concerned. We have already mentioned that for the Sāṃkhya philosophers to finally overcome all sorts of sufferings for ever, we require discriminative knowledge between *vyakta* and *avyakta*, i.e., Prakṛti on the one hand and *Jñā*, i.e., Puruṣa on the other (*vyakta-avyakta-jñā-vijñāna*). This discriminative knowledge between Puruṣa and Prakṛti will not only

enable us to win over our sufferings but also attain liberation from bondage. To this point we shall come now.

To the question who is *baddha* (in fetters) and who is *mukta* (free), we have inconsistent answer in Sāṃkhya philosophy. Initially, it was held that Puruṣa was *baddha* and *mokṣa* finally arose out of *vivekajñāna* (discriminative knowledge) between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. But almost at the end of *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* it was really Prakṛti which was *baddha* owing to conjunction (*samyoga*) with, or semblance of conjunction (*samyogābhāsa*) with or proximity (*sannidhyamātra*) with Puruṣa. This Prakṛti becomes *mukta* when such *vivekajñāna* dawns. To elaborate, in verse no. 21 of Sāṃkhya Kārikā, Īśvarakṛṣṇa argues that creation or evolution of the world out of primordial Prakṛti starts for the fulfillment of twin purposes of enjoyment of Puruṣa (*Puruṣasya darsanārtham*) and ultimate release of Puruṣa (*kaivalyārtham*) from the clutches of Prakṛti. Sankara rightly observes that neither enjoyment (*bhoga*) nor liberation (*apavarga*) is ever possible on the part of Puruṣa. For Puruṣa is utterly inactive and enjoyment is never possible without some kind of activity. Moreover, if Puruṣa is said to enjoy, there will be no cessation of this enjoyment at all. For, Prakṛti will continue to create enjoyable objects ceaselessly for the enjoyment of Puruṣa and Puruṣa in its turn will get entangled in such enjoyment for ever, thereby making liberation impossible. Again, Puruṣa being *mukta* from the very beginning cannot be truly said to be liberated. *Mukti*, being its *svarūpa* (nature), is not obtainable but is always obtained. Further, if, for arguments sake, the liberation of *Puruṣa* is

at all attained, it will continue for ever, thereby making the cycle of creation impossible. Sāṅkhya seems to realize the untenability of its own position when it emphatically declares, in verse no. 62 that bondage, liberation and migration do not affect Puruṣa at all. In reality, Puruṣa is not bound as all – *na kascit Puruṣa badhyate*. Nor is it migrated to the world and assumes *saṁsāra* – *na kascit saṁsārati*. Nor it is liberated – *na kascit Puruṣaḥ muktaḥ*. As a matter of fact *bandhana*, *saṁsārati* and *mokṣa* are not the essence of Puruṣa at all. A person who is in real bondage endeavors to put an end to his bondage and thereby seeks liberation. Truly speaking, Puruṣa can never be in a state of liberation. Truly speaking, Puruṣa can never be in a state of bondage. For, *kleśa*, *karma* and *āśaya* are not possible in Puruṣa who is utterly indifferent, unchanging and devoid of *guṇa*-s. As Vācaspati rightly observes : *Savāsanā-kleśa-karmāśayānañca bandhana-samākhyānām? Puruṣa aparināmīnyasambhāvāt*. By 'vāsanā' is meant *saṁskāra* which arises out of previous impressions. By 'kleśa' is meant *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveśa* and *abhiniveśa*. 'Karma' stands for *dharma* and *adharma* arising out of our good or bad deeds. 'Āśaya' means *citta*. Puruṣa being *nirlepa* (untouched by any of these), *aparināmī* (unchangeable) and *niṣkriya* (utterly devoid of any activity) remains unaffected by *bandhana*, *saṁsāra*, *kleśa*, *karma* and *āśaya*. Hence *bandhana*, *saṁsāra* and *mokṣa* are not Puruṣa's real nature. These are attributed to Puruṣa only secondarily (*aupacārika*). This attribution is comparable to a process whereby an army's success or failure – victory or defeat – is attributable to a king whose army it is. As a matter of fact, it is Prakṛti which is bound or liberated. Prakṛti is *nānāśraya*, i.e., related to different Puruṣa-s by virtue of

its close proximity with them. *Bandhana* etc. are the resultants of threefold *guṇa*-s which belong to Prakṛti. It is due to the absence of non-discriminative knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛti and also Prakṛti's close proximity with Puruṣa that the nature of reality belonging to Prakṛti appears to be belonging to Puruṣa. In truth, however, *bhoga* and *apavarga* are secondarily attributed to Puruṣa who is above everything.

In verse no. 55, the author of *Sāṅkhyākārika* explains this fact of attribution by saying that *jarāmarāṇakṛtam duḥkham prāpnoti cetanaḥ Puruṣaḥ*. Puruṣa appears to suffer from misery brought about by old age and death. We know from Sāṅkhya literature that Puruṣa is *visuddha caitanya* or pure consciousness. It is depicted as *nitya śuddha, buddha* and *mukta*. Therefore, *jarā* and *marāṇa* cannot be its *dharma* or property. From the etymology of the word 'Puruṣa' (*puri linge śete iti*) we come to know that Puruṣa rests in the subtle body. And that which is primarily connected with the body seems to be related to Puruṣa as well. Hence, so long as Puruṣa gets associated with the subtle body, there is no deliverance from pain, misery and the like. *Jarā, marāṇa* etc. which really affect this body seem to be attributed to Puruṣa which vests in the body but is untouched by the affections of the body. That *jarā* or old age disables our body, cripples our memory and effects many bodily and mental changes is a positive fact of experience which no one can deny. Its influence is universal and inescapable. Similarly, the influence of *marāṇa* cannot be overcome. No one can get rid of this suffering. Hence, if one is born, one must

suffer from old age and death and there is no avoidance from this. This bodily suffering is attributed to conscious Puruṣa who out of non-discrimination looks upon the sufferings of the body as its own. In truth, however, Puruṣa in its purity remains untouched by bodily affections.

It may be asked why Īśvarakṛṣṇa leaves aside *janma* which is generally regarded as a cause of suffering as well. Does not Puruṣa get affected by birth also along with old age and death? In answer to this query, it may be submitted that suffering due to birth is not universal. Human beings and lower animals suffer from birth no doubt. But the divine beings are not subject to this. Moreover, there is a difference between these two kinds of sufferings – sufferings arising out of birth and sufferings arising out of old age and death. In the former case, only the victim – the mother and the child seems to suffer, but not the relatives of the victim. They are rather eager to celebrate and enjoy the appearance of the newcomer. In the latter case, however, both the persons in the death-bed (*jarāmaraṇagrastha*) and their relatives equally suffer.

The evolution of Prakṛti is spontaneous just as milk from the udder of the cow. But it should be borne in mind that Prakṛti has no interests of its own. This is comparable to the nourishment of the calf as the interest of the cow itself. As a matter of fact, Prakṛti, being devoid of consciousness altogether, cannot plan evolution at all. So the evolution of Prakṛti for the salvation of Puruṣa cannot be admitted. The truth is that Prakṛti evolves spontaneously without

being guided or controlled by any conscious agent. The release of Puruṣa arises only as a result. As the activity of Prakṛti proceeds and the release of Puruṣa is not real but apparent. Prakṛti evolves for the benefit of Puruṣa and looks upon the benefit of Puruṣa as its own. Prakṛti never expects her spirit of self-sacrifice to be reciprocated by Puruṣa. Just as a cook prepares food for the satisfaction of his master and turns away from the kitchen when the food is cooked, similarly Prakṛti evolves for the emancipation of each *Puruṣa-prati-Puruṣa-vimokṣārtham* - and looks upon the interest of Puruṣa as its own – *svārtha na parārthā*. Incidentally, it may be mentioned here that Sāṃkhya philosophers like most other Indian philosophers admit both *jīvanamukti and videhamukti*. The moment discriminative knowledge between Puruṣa and Prakṛti dawns, a Puruṣa becomes liberated here and now. But his bodily existence may still continue on account of the momentum of the past deeds, i.e., *prārabdha karma*. As the liberated Puruṣa though embodied, feels no association with body owing to *vivekajñāna*, it does not reap any fruit of *karma* henceforth. The *videhamukti* or final emancipation, however, arises as an outcome of death when Puruṣa gets completely dissociated from the body.

A close look at the Sāṃkhya theory will make us convince at once that this view is riddled with inconsistencies. The Sāṃkhya philosophers begin with by cutting off all links between Puruṣa and Prakṛti declare that they are both eternal, absolute and independent realities. If Puruṣa were really independent i.e. needed no assistance from Prakṛti, then the cycle or creation (*svarga*) and

destruction (*pralaya*) would have remained unexplained. For, the difference in effect cannot be brought about by the same cause. To explain, according to Sāṃkhya, Prakṛti is the real material cause and Puruṣa does nothing except helping manifestation of that which was already present in the material cause. It is common knowledge that if manifestation does not take place without the assistance of somebody, then that somebody should be regarded as one of the causes. Otherwise, to hold that manifestation is spontaneous in the flowing of milk from the udder of the cow is to overlook the fact that the cow is a conscious agent and flowing of milk is also conditioned by the motherly affection and love towards its offspring. But Prakṛti is utterly unconscious and so its spontaneous changes are ruled out. If for arguments sake for such spontaneous changes movement is at all admitted, then it remains to be explained how and why Prakṛti evolves the world in one case and destroys it in another. In other words, the equipoise (*sāmyāvasthā*) of Prakṛti needed to be disturbed for the evolution of the world by the presence of Puruṣa – whether that presence is real, apparent or mere proximity is not that important. The important fact is that there must be some contact between Puruṣa and Prakṛti so that the equilibrium gets disturbed and the subsequent preponderance of one *guṇa* over the rest becomes possible, resulting in creation. How then can Prakṛti be absolute or independent? It may be noted further that if Puruṣa and Prakṛti are both eternal (*nitya*) and all pervading (*vibhu*), their contact must also be viewed as eternal. As a result creation will continue endlessly and dissolution will not take place at all. If, on the contrary, dissolution is regarded as *svarūpa* of Prakṛti (for in that state alone Prakṛti in a state of *Sāmyāvasthā*

which is its real nature), then Prakṛti will refuse to undergo heterogeneous changes being afraid of losing its real nature (*svarūpa-parināma-bhayāt*). Hence, creation and destruction cannot be explained in terms of Prakṛti alone. For that, we require a contact (semblance of contact/mere proximity) or absence of contact with Puruṣa. This convinces us that Prakṛti is not absolute (*nirapekṣa*) or independent (*svādhīna*). Again, if it is considered why and how an absolute or independent Prakṛti can serve the purpose of another, as a cook for his master, then he becomes subservient so that other. This curtails the independence of Prakṛti for which the Sāṃkhya philosophers beat their drum so much. To say that Prakṛti serves the interest of Puruṣa in a spirit of detachment without minding its own interest or receiving acknowledgement from Puruṣa is not to explain how such Prakṛti can be called blind. It is true that a blind person cannot execute perfectly what he plans. But the fact that Prakṛti is able to make planning goes against its unconscious nature. As a matter of fact, both a lame man and a blind man are conscious agents and both are capable of doing certain activities. The same man may not walk but certainly makes verbal utterances to guide the blind man. And these utterances are undoubtedly his activities. Moreover, the lame man is capable of making movements through his hands and other organs and of course, to a certain extent through his feet. He is capable of seeing which is no doubt an activity. So the simile of a lame man for Puruṣa who is utterly inactive and that of a blind man for Prakṛti who is utterly unconscious does not bear scrutiny. Further, if Prakṛti evolves and is full of harmony, design, order and purpose how can then Prakṛti be blind? Again, Prakṛti is compared to a dancing girl who exhibits her

performance before an audience and thereby becomes conditioned by them. Moreover, the claim of the Sāṃkhya philosophers is to the effect that Prakṛti vanishes for that Puruṣa who has seen it, but continues to exist for others. In that case, we have to posit multiplicity of Prakṛti on the line of multiplicity of Puruṣa or think of different Prakṛti to one Puruṣa liberated and other in bondage. In other words, if Prakṛti vanishes for one Puruṣa and continues to exist for others, then Prakṛti becomes relative instead of independent and many instead of one and not external in the true sense. Does not this fact curtail the independent nature (*anapekṣa svabhāva*) of Prakṛti? Coming over to Puruṣa we are overwhelmed with all sorts of confusions and contradictions. Puruṣa is looked upon as pure consciousness (*viśuddha caitanya or caitanya kevalam*) and is untouched by bondage or liberation or transmigration. Yet the Sāṃkhya philosophers speak of plurality of Puruṣa-s on the flimsy ground of birth, death and activity (*janana-maraṇakaraṇāṇām*). Even a causal look will make us feel that birth etc. cannot affect consciousness as such which is *nitya* and *niṣkriya*. Hence birth etc., may be regarded as the qualifications of the phenomenal Ego or *Jīvātmā* who is a product of the reflection of Puruṣa on Buddhi. Puruṣa is transcendental to all these. Yet the Sāṃkhya philosophers never make a distinction between these two kinds of self-Puruṣa proper and *Jīva*. If we look closely at the arguments advanced for the existence of Puruṣa, we will be all the more convinced that all of them prove the existence of *Jīvas*. It is beyond one's comprehension why Sāṃkhya fail to reduce the many *Jīvas* into one absolute Puruṣa in the manner of the manifold material entities being reduced into one primal matter, called

Prakṛti. What is the harm of applying the same logic in the case of Puruṣa as it is applied in the case of Prakṛti? It is not perhaps out of place to mention that this inherent inconsistency has led certain commentators like Gauḍapāda, Vācaspati, Vijñānabhikṣu etc. to abandon the multiplicity theory of Puruṣa and accept the theory of one Puruṣa instead. Again, consider the inconsistency that one finds in the beginning and later comes across at the end. The Sāṃkhya philosophers emphatically declare at the outset that the movement of Prakṛti for the evolution of the world is arising out of fulfilling the twin purposes of enjoyment and liberation of Puruṣa. Subsequently, however, the Sāṃkhya philosophers retrace their steps by declaring that Puruṣa is not really bound or liberated or migrated. It is Prakṛti which really binds itself, liberates itself and migrates itself. The so called bondage of Puruṣa is simply secondary or attributed falsely (*aupacārika*) because of the close association of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. These two accounts are not in keeping with each other and the Sāṃkhya philosophers are making a mess out of them.

Prakṛti has been described as the creator of all objects and If, though unconscious, has got the power of auto-generation. The whole world is originated from Prakṛti which is called the Primordial Cause. If an unconscious being becomes the cause of any creation etc. by its auto-generated power, there is no need of any conscious agent like God etc for the justification of creation etc. Only conscious principle which is admitted in Sāṃkhya is Puruṣa who is treated to be an indifferent being. Normally God is admitted in some systems of Philosophy to justify creation of the world etc and to

convey the result of karma done by an individual being. If this function is accomplished by Prakṛti or Pradhāna, there is no necessity of admitting another conscious principle called God. That is why; Sāṃkhya is a philosophy of no God and is called atheist.

If we turn our attention to the Nature-World who is otherwise known as Prakṛti, we shall feel its enormous power. When there is a 'natural calamity', it is so called because it is caused by Nature. Let us suppose, there are the cases of earth-quake, *Tsunami*, drought, flood etc. which are cause of our suffering from the innumerable time. Now Science and Technology have developed in a very rapid manner. Even in this scientific and technological age can we have any control over Nature? At best, we can take precaution regarding the natural calamities and disaster. That is why, Prakṛti is, to some extent, beyond the control of human being. She can destroy the whole world within a fraction of second. A human being however educated and scientifically developed he may become helpless in the hands of Nature or Prakṛti. That is why, Prakṛti is called dynamic having an in-built power to procreate without the intervention of any conscious agent. That an inanimate object always can move with a conscious intervention is admitted by almost all the systems of Philosophy like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Advaita Vedānta etc. What is the contribution of Sāṃkhya in this regard? In reply, it can easily be said that Prakṛti, though inanimate in nature, possesses that in-built power to create something. It is the reservoir of energy from which everything springs up. The constituents of Prakṛti i.e., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* have got some energy arising

out of the three *guṇa*-s, which can create and destroy the whole world. The novelty of Sāṃkhya thought lies in the fact that Prakṛti is self-dependent so far as its power is concerned. In each and every inanimate object there is an energy which is inherent in it. This energy which cannot be seen can easily be inferred from the effect. That in two inanimate objects there is a hidden energy is evidenced from the fact that fire is generated if two pieces of stones are frisked. In this way two pieces of wooden pieces also generate fire if frisked. In the same manner, two branches of a tree, if frisked, generates fire called *dāvānala* due to having the hidden energy in it. Not only this, the water falling from higher places produces hydel current or fire called *Vārabānal*. All these are different forms of energy hidden in Prakṛti. Hence, Prakṛti is herself powerful without taking recourse to any conscious being. Now-a-days the scientists are bringing out energy even from the garbages and cowdung which are of inanimate nature. Had there been no hidden energy in these inanimate object, energy cannot be brought out from them. For this reason material energy is utilized by the conscious beings after certain procedure. From these facts, it is evidenced that *Jaḍa-śakti* always remains in Prakṛti which is responsible for certain, maintenance and destruction of the whole world.

In the light of the above argument, the *paramāṇukāraṇatā-Vāda* (the theory of determining atom as a cause) can be substantiated. The whole world has been originated through the combination of two atoms without any Divine or conscious

intervention. The hidden energy remaining in two atoms makes them united leading to the formation of a binary atom (dvyanuka).

The question raised in this connection, whether two atoms conjoined automatically will go on conjoining for ever leading to the eradication of creation and dissolution (*śṛṣṭi* and *pralaya*). So far as our *Śāstras* are concerned, they depict both creation and destruction. It is true that the creation of this Universe starts from the combination of two atoms and dissolution from the disjunction of the same. This conjunction and disjunction of atoms is not arbitrary, but as per desire of God. That is why, the existence of a conscious principle is essential for the justification of the theory. It may be borne in mind in this connection that God's interference in creation and destruction is also prompted by the result of *Karma* performed by an individual being (*jīva*). God creates the world after considering the result of *Karma* done by an individual being so that he or she can enjoy the same. When the enjoyment of an individual being comes to an end, God thinks it proper to destroy resulting in the disjunction of two atoms.

How can this position of the Vaiśeṣikas be justified or refuted by the Sāṃkhya? Sāṃkhya reiterates the earlier position and substantiate the fact that the conjunction and disjunction of atoms are automatic or spontaneous without depending on any conscious principle as shown in the nature of Prakṛti. Creation may be started from the combination of atoms and so also destruction may follow from the disjunction of the same spontaneously from the

in-built energy available in the atoms themselves, though unconscious in nature. In this connection, the story of enormous power of atom or atomic energy may easily be remembered in the present day context. The power remaining in between two atoms may be taken as a cause of their combination. When this power ceases, the conjoined atoms automatically are splitted up leading to their destruction. The cement remaining in two bricks, for example, may be taken as a power of their combination. As soon as the factor of cementing loses its power, the combination ceases to exist without any eternal force. The same principle may be adopted here. No principle or no effect remains eternally as per the definition of a transitory object. An object is called transitory (*anitya*) if and only if it is associated with its origination and destruction. An object originated through its atomic conjunction must be followed by its destruction after certain time. For this we do not need any conscious interference. In this connection we may refer to the view of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsākas who do not believe in any type of Divine interference for the performance of any action. An action, if performed, gives rise to its result automatically through the interference of the property called *apūrva* generated through it. This *apūrva* may be interpreted as 'in-built-power' by the Sāṃkhya. This power may not remain for a long period of time and hence its effect remains less leading to the loss of the same which is nothing but destruction. Like Mīmāṃsā Sāṃkhya is also atheist and hence there is no role of God. The reason behind the non-acceptance of God lies in the fact that Prakṛti (Nature) herself has got dynamic power.

The differentiating factors of reality lies in the three constituents called *guṇa*, which tells that all mental and material objects of this phenomenal world are the combination in different proportions of the three ultimate reals (*triguṇa*). To Sāṃkhya each and every fact of experience becomes so when related to consciousness. There is something intelligibility through which it becomes related to the totality of experience of a particular person. Consciousness is revelation and if we are to become conscious of something. An object must have some characteristics which can be revealed if related to consciousness as its object. When a chair, for example, becomes a content of consciousness, it becomes so only because it possesses in itself the capacity of becoming revealed when it comes in contact with consciousness. This capacity which is inherent in an object cannot be discovered in the so-called qualities of the chair, because the qualities can be abstracted. This power, therefore exists in every being of the object and can very well be identified with that (being). Each fact of experience is a being called *sattva*, which constitutes its intelligibility. This intelligibility is the ultimate factor in an object of experience and it is called *sattva-quality*.

Let us now see the derivative meaning of the term '*sattva*' and its influence in different systems of Indian Philosophy and in social life.

By way of rounding of the concept an effort has been made to show that some social and ethical background prevails behind the

formulation of this concept. The same social and moral idea remains in the concept of *sat* as propagated by the Buddhists, Naiyāyikas etc. though it is not openly written or discussed in their philosophical or commentarial literature. Here an attempt is being made to throw some light on this aspect which seems to be apparently novel with the help of some arguments. In this connection different meanings of the term *sat* have been highlighted. It has also been pointed out that these meanings have some bearing on social harmony and peace. In other words, the concept of *sat* is used in Indian tradition in the sense of *justified existence* as mentioned earlier.

An individual having *sattva* element may also be called *sat* in as much as the term '*sattva*' is derived from '*sat*' and hence, a balanced person can also be described in terms of *sat* as he possesses the balanced quality i.e., *sattva*. Let us try to understand the literal meaning of the term '*sat*'. The literal meaning of it is 'existent' or 'that which is existing'. One who is existent is called *sat*. It may be argued that each and every living being is existent and hence all the existent persons should be described as *sat* leading to the non-availability of the negation of it. In reply, it can be said that a man who exists physically is not taken as *sat*, but a man who has justified his existence is called *sat*. If a man does not perform any work, good or bad, he is not at all known to others and hence his existence is not known to others or his existence is not justified in the sense that he has not made his existence 'meaningful'. If a man is known to all and has made his existence

meaningful by way of performing many social works, he is called *sat* or existent. This *sattva* or *sattā* (existence) does not mean a man's mere physical existence.

It may be argued that a man may prove his existence negatively or positively. In other words, one may think of proving one's existence after performing many antisocial and immoral works like theft, decoity, murder etc. In this case can he be taken as *sat*? In reply it may be said such persons are negatively famous or negatively prove their 'existence' and hence, their existence should be denied from moral view point, for which they should be distinguished as *asat*. A man may be remembered due to some actions having some positive value in the society or he may be so due to some works having negative value in society. The former is *sat* while the latter is *asat*.

It follows from the above discussion that through the performance of various duties in various spheres of life (towards our family members, social members etc.) by way of performing good works like social welfare, service of mankind etc. our existence is justified and hence we are called *sat* or is otherwise known as honest. Let us try to understand the term '*satata*', the Sanskrit rendering of the term 'honesty', which is originated from the term '*sat*'. If any relative gives me an object for my use, it would be my sacred duty to enjoy the use of it in order to show honour to him and to his faith on me, but not to destroy. If I destroy the object without using, it is also a kind of dishonesty. In like manner, our

valuable 'existence' which we have got through natural courses should be made justified, failing which we may be charged as dishonest (*asat*) due to the misuses of our valuable property i.e. existence.

The physically existent person who does not perform his duties for the sake of harmony is *asat*. Hence a father who is very much annoyed upon his son who does not perform his duties or engages in doing foul works is generally found lamenting with the words : 'I have no son though he exists'. On the other hand, a man being satisfied with the service rendered by a gentleman with whom he has no blood connection is found saying 'I am endowed with son that though really I have not'. In the former case the son has got physical existence which is taken as tantamount to not having a son, while in the latter the son has not physical existence which is taken as equal to having a son keeping the duties performed by the person in view. In short, one who maintains harmony after performing different duties in different spheres of life is called *sat* or honest while the person doing reverse is called *asat* or dishonest.

The Buddhists, I think, also believed in this concept of *sat*. They admit that an object is to be understood as *sat* if it has got some causal efficacy (*arthakriyāritvam*). In other words, an object is *sat* if it has capacity to serve our purpose and to fulfill any action. On the other hand, the object which does not serve our purpose is called *asat*. The jar, pot etc. would come under the first category (i.e. *sat*) as they have got the above mentioned capacity. The hare's

horn etc. is called *asat* as they do not have such capacity. I believe that this doctrine which is applicable to this epistemic world can be extend to other places. In other words, behind the formulation of the definition of *sat* or *asat* are coinage of the terms *sat* etc., there is functioning some idea related to social welfare and sense of morality, which needs to be focus send here. These Buddhists notion of *sat* may also cover an individual who is described as *sat* in the sense mentioned above. A man may be described as *sat* or *asat* after keeping his *arthākriyākāritva* by way of doing social welfare, adopting *maītrī* and *karuṇā* etc. or *anāarthakriyākāritva* respectively in view, just as an object having causal efficacy (in the positive sense) is *sat* in the true sense of the term. On the other hand, our existence which is not endowed with such causal efficacy or which is endowed with causal efficacy in the negative sense is called *asat*. Hence, *sattā* and *asattā* of an object or of us is determined in terms of causal efficacy or non-efficacy respectively. To the Butddhists the human body is nothing but an object. As it is a body of human being, the *sattā* of it is determined in terms of causal efficacy connected with human value or social value, which leads him to the path of *maītrī* and *karuṇā*. Hence, the causal efficacy of human being is different, which is not expressed in an explicit way in Buddhist literature. The same idea can be traced when they described *sat* as *svalakṣaṇa* or unique. Just as the causal efficacy of water lies in the object itself, but not in the word 'water', the causal efficacy lies in human being, but not in the name, race or caste etc. possessed by him. From this it is understood that an individual has to prove himself as *sat* by his own causal efficacy in the form of good works, but not through his name, race, caste etc. Hence, the

Buddhists have coined the term *kalpanā* in order to refer to his name, race etc. They have preferred to mention them as *kalpanā* or imagination on account of the fact that they have no value in proving a man *sat*. A man having unique character and free from imaginary attributes is self-luminous. A man is *svaprakāśā* and hence, he does not need to mention his name, father's name, race etc. to make him famous or *sat*. If a person without doing any work related to the welfare of society claims himself as *sat* due to having his high post or high family etc. he is not taken as *sat*. In other words, a man who is self-luminous through his own auspicious deeds is *sat*.

The view is found to echo in the religious poem composed by Kabir, which runs as follows :

*"Vaḍā huyā to kyā huyā  
Jaise vaḍi khejur  
Pānthako chāyā nāhi  
Phal lāge atidūr"*

That is, what is use of being born in a high family? Just as big date-palm tree has no significance to the society in as much as it does not provide the travellers with shadow and the fruits exist in such a high place that they cannot be plucked by the social beings, a man born in a high society or having high education etc. is insignificant to the society if he does not engage himself in auspicious works like social welfare etc. From this it is known that a

man proves himself really existent by way of doing such good works, but not through his birth in high family or race etc. In this situation an individual can maintain harmony between his own welfare and that of social members and thereby he becomes *sat*.

For the reasons mentioned above the Naiyāyikas perhaps made a clear distinction between *śuddhasattā* (pure existence) and *viśiṣṭasattā* (qualified existence). The pure *sattā* (*śuddhasattā*) exists in substance (*dravya*) quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*). It indicates that the real existence is not confined to the gross body which comes under *dravya*, but it is pervasive to quality and action also. If a man having body does not possess any mentionable quality and action, he does not have *sattā* in the true sense of the term, which is indicated by the term *pure sattā*. Here 'quality' and 'action' denotes the good qualities like social service, broadness of mind etc. and good action like service of making, performance of duties (entrusted to him) towards family or social members respectively. If there is harmony among body (*dravya*), good qualities (*guṇa*) and good action (*karma*) in an individual, the real *sattā* prevails there. If a man having a good body does not have any mentionable quality and action, he has also a *sattā* which is not at all 'pure' but 'qualified' or *vaiśiṣṭa* which has got a second rate importance in the Nyāya system. That's why, they have not denied the *sattā* existing in *dravya* alone, which is different from quality and action (*guṇakarmāṇyatvaviśiṣṭasattā*), but this is not pure in the sense that the existence as *dravya* alone has not much importance in the family and social life due to the lack of harmony. As the term

'*śuddha*' or 'pure' is taken as an adjunct of *sattā*, this type of existence is acceptable or desirable. To distinguish this pure *sattā* from the other type of *sattā*, the Naiyāyikas are careful to use the term '*viśiṣṭasattā*' i.e., *sattā* qualified by the difference of *guṇa* and *karma*. In other words, the *sattā* which does not exist in *guṇa* and *karma* is called '*viśiṣṭasattā*' i.e. *guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattā* which has got less importance in social life. This idea can be gathered from the fact that they have not described it as pure *sattā*, which indicates that there is no purity (i.e. impurity) in the existence. To described *sattā* as pure or impure is based on the social values indicated earlier, which, I think, have prompted the Naiyāyikas to formulate the definition and classification of *sattā* in this way though this is used in the context of logical analysis of the definition of Vyāpti. From the above discussion, it can be concluded that pure existence (*śuddhasattā*) is real *sattā* which may be called *sattva*.

The same idea has been expressed by Bhartrhari in the *śloka* of *Nīṭisataka*, which runs as follows :

*"Eke satpuruṣāḥ parārthagatakāḥ  
 Svārthān parityajya ye;  
 Sāmānyāstu parārthamudyamabhṛtā  
 Svārthā-virodhena ye;  
 Temī mānavarākṣakāḥ parahitam  
 Svārthāya nighnanti ye,  
 Ye tu ghnanti nirarthakam  
 Parahitam te ke na jānīmahe"*<sup>1</sup>

i.e. There are some *satpuruṣa-s*, good people, who engage themselves in the good of others sacrificing their own self-interest; the *Sāmānyas*, the generality of people, on the other hand, are those who engage themselves in the good of others so long as it does not involve the sacrifice of their own self-interest. There are those others, the *Mānavarākṣakas*, a devilish men, who sacrifice the good of others to gain their own selfish ends; but alas, what am I to say of those who sacrifice the good of others without gaining thereby any good to themselves or to any one else.<sup>2</sup>

The *satpuruṣa-s* or good men have got their overwhelming goodness which is not at all vitiated by their selfish motive and hence they become glorified or they have glorified their existence. If they would engage themselves to serve their own self-interest without paying any need to the welfare of others, they are not *sat*.

On the other hand, the people who destroy others' welfare in order to have more pleasure or comfort in their own lives are called *Mānavarākṣakas*, the devilish men or *asuras*. At this stage an individual tries to develop or satisfy his biological or physical needs, but fails to develop his morality though he has so called proper education. Due to lack of moral education, a man dares to adopt unfair means in order to fulfill his own interest. Here self-interest is fulfilled sometimes at the cost of others' life. Hence, this type of people is known as devil in the form of man. The person having this devilish attitude (*asuratva*) is called 'anti-social' who fails to maintain harmony with the society or social needs. But this type of

man can be transformed to *satta* from the world of *asuratva*, the devilish attitude.

It is true that at present day society, the melody is completely lost due to having this devilish attitude in man and it can be regained if this attitude is removed. *Satpuruṣa*-s can be brought again. For this our nation's moral health is to be improved. Svāmī Ranganāthānanda observes : "The moral health of the nation entirely depends upon this immense group. Steadying itself by drawing inspiration from the small minority of the *Satpuruṣa* group above it ... the self-criticism which is evident in our nation today, and which is a sure sign of the basic health of our society will slowly generate the necessary moral force to cure the nation of its present ailments. The ailment is a moral ailment and the remedy has to be a moral remedy. We all desire that our nation should be healthy, physically as well as mentally ..... Cynicism, self-centredness and utter unconcern for others are more deadly physical diseases and viruses that cause them; for they corrode the nation's resolve to be free, to be united and to march onward to progress. We cannot be blind to the fact that this disease has already invaded our body-political, including our youths. We have to take energetic measures to arrest the further progress of this disease and to eliminate it from the body politic. And the nation has to be alert thereafter to see that these deadly mental viruses do not invade our society again."<sup>3</sup>

The same type of human existence has been admitted by Rāmakṛṣṇa when he says - '*janmechis jakhan dāg rekhe jā'* (i.e.,

you should keep some impression in this earth as a mark of your birth). In fact, it is advised to all human beings that they should justify their existence by way of doing some good works so that people can remember them after their demise. In this connection Rāmakṛṣṇa had asked Vivekānanda to become as big as a banyan tree so that other pain-tormented persons can come under its shadow and take shelter in it. The metaphor of the banyan tree is not a new thing in Indian tradition. In the *Kaṭhōpaniṣad* and *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* the metaphor of banyan tree has been taken into account to point out that a human being should become as big as this tree having dense shadow protecting human beings and animals from the scorching sun. Apart from this the shadow in this context stands for solace to the pain-tormented persons. From this it is shown that human beings like Vivekānanda should not find satisfaction being confined within them or fulfilling their narrow intention, but they should be broader in heart and attitude so that they can provide peace, solace and well-being to others. It is the real mark of meaningful existence. The word 'meaningful existence' means 'justified existence'. Human existence can receive its utmost meaning if it can do something for others going beyond his own self.

The Buddhist theory of being can again be substantiated in terms of its causal efficacy in the following manner. A section of the botanists believe and justify that each and every plant is medicinal on account of the fact that all the plants including the negligible ones have got some medicinal value. To them some plants may seem to be redundant so far as their causal efficacy is concerned.

But ultimately they will provide their causal efficacy so far as their medicinal value is concerned. From this theory a decision can be taken that they have got their places in the lap of Nature because they have some utility or causal efficacy either in the protection of the environment or in the protection of human beings. From the fact of their existence from time immemorial, it can be presumed that they have some contribution for the sustenance of this earth. Now-a-days the Zoologists also have properly realized the importance of the animals and insects for the protection of the environment. We now often come across with various Government organizations and projects like tiger project, crocodile project, etc. to save our assets in the forest (*banajasampad*). In fact, in lap of Nature nothing can be redundant. Had it been so, it would have been destroyed absolutely without keeping any trace in the earth or keeping any chance of their survival. Hence, by the fact of their existence from a longer period of time it may easily be presumed or inferred that they have got causal efficacy for the protection of the environment and human being, which again reminds me the Buddhist phrase *Arthakriyakāritvalakṣaṇaṃ sat*.

The object which is in our awareness possesses certain qualities like resistance, impenetrability, shape and form which are in fact due to 'massiveness' in an object. For this reason mass or *tamo-guṇa* is another element present in the object. Again, an object undergoes changes from a particular situation to another situation or from a particular form to another form. This change or movement is due to the third constituent *rajas*, which literally

means dust. As dust covers our eyes, the constituent called *rajas* can cover our eyes and as dust is full of movement, the movement arising from an object is the effect of *rajo-guṇa*.

There is a diversity of opinions among the philosophers in Indian philosophy regarding whether causation implies emergence or origination (*ārambha*) or not. According to some philosophers, effect is an absolutely new event. Another group of philosophers hold that effect is a pre-existing thing which comes into existence in a newly developed form. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advocated the former standpoint whereas the latter standpoint is advocated by Sāṃkhya-Yoga school. That is to say, the Sāṃkhya is the propounder of *satkāryavāda* i.e. the doctrine that effect exists in the cause prior to production. And Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds *asatkāryavāda*, the doctrine that the effect does not exist before its production in the cause.

According to Sāṃkhya, the effect, pre-exists in the cause in some form or other. From a non-existent object nothing comes into being. In order to support their position Sāṃkhya puts forward the statement of the Gitā, which is in the form '*nāsato vidyete bhāvonābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*' i.e. that which non-existent can never be produced and pre-existent cause is never destroyed.<sup>4</sup> Sāṃkhya opines that, if the production of a non-existent thing is possible, an absurd entity like hare's horn can not be prevented from being produced. There is no object which comes into being from a non-existent object. Nobody can say that a particular object is produced from a sky-locus which is not-existent in character.<sup>5</sup>

Sāṃkhya says that the production of an effect is nothing but the manifestation of pre-existent fact. Production is coming out of a existent fact and destruction is lapsing of an pre-existing fact. The effect pre-exists in the cause in a latent form which becomes potent by causal operation. Sāṃkhya offers many arguments to prove the pre-existence of the effect. According to them, cause and effect are identical in nature. So if the cause exists, the effect must also exist.<sup>6</sup> The effect which has got existence must follow from the cause which has also got existence. It is perceived that oil can be drawn if it pre-exists in the sesamum seed. If it does not, it can never be drawn.<sup>7</sup> It is known that effect pre-exists in the cause due to its capacity of accepting its materials (*Upādāna*). By the term 'material' (*Upādāna*) effect is to be understood. As there is relation of the effect with the cause, it is known that effect pre-exists in the cause. Such type of relation is not possible with a non-extent object. Sāṃkhya argues that there is a necessary relation between cause and effect. Because of necessary relation between cause and effect a definite cause produces a definite effect.<sup>8</sup> It cannot be argued that an effect is produced without being related with the cause. If it is found, any kind of effect can be produced from any kind of cause, a jar may be produced from a cloth, which is absurd in nature. Between two different things there cannot subsist the relation of the component and composite. So there is no other alternative than to admit a relation of the effect with the cause.<sup>9</sup>

It may be asked whether an object becomes a cause if it is associated with the power of producing an effect or it becomes a

cause without being associated with the power of producing an effect.<sup>10</sup> If the second alternative is taken for granted, the causal relation will unduly extend to the other places.<sup>11</sup> That is, there will be no fixed rule as to the cause and effect relation. As a result of this there will arise contingency of producing the effect like jar from the causes like cloth etc., which is not possible. If the first alternative is taken into account, i.e. if an object becomes a cause being associated with the power of producing an effect, it may be urged in this connection whether this power is related to all the effects or some specific effect. If the first alternative is taken for granted, power will unduly extend to other places.<sup>12</sup>

If the second alternative is taken into consideration, it can be said that the power cannot be fixed in a specific effect which is non-existent. As the non-existent object has got no power of its own, an effect which is the object of that power must exist in its cause before the production.<sup>13</sup> The whole (*avayavi*) is not a separate object or completely different object from the parts. The nature of an effect depends on that of its material cause. An object which is absolutely different from another object cannot be produced out of that object. e.g. a cow cannot be produced from buffalow, a red cloth cannot be produced from yellow thread.<sup>14</sup> From this it is proved that an effect preexists in a cause.

In response to the arguments given by Sāṃkhya philosophers, the Vaiśeṣika questions why the cloth which, according to Sāṃkhya philosophers, exists in threads is not known

though there are causes of perception and desire of the same.<sup>15</sup> According to them (Vaiśeṣikas), for the perception of any object three conditions are necessary which are as follows : (i) the presence of the object which is to be perceived (ii) the desire of the perception of that object (iii) the presence of conditions that are necessary for the perception of that object.(viz, the naturalness of sense organs, the perceptibility of object and the presence of light etc.) So, to admit the presence of cloth in threads before its production is to admit the presence of the above mentioned causes of perception before the production of the cloth. In spite of that, why the cloth is not perceived? – This is the quality of the Vaiśeṣika philosophers to Sāṃkhya philosophers.

In response to the above charge, the Sāṃkhya philosophers are of the opinion that at that time the cloth was non-manifested, and hence it is not perceived.

Here Vaiśeṣika philosophers raise a question : what do they (Sāṃkhya) mean by the term 'non-manifestation'?<sup>16</sup>

If by the term 'non-manifestation' denotes 'the absence of apprehension' there will be no difference between opponents' standpoint and Vaiśeṣika's standpoint.<sup>17</sup> The absence of non-apprehension amounts to non-existence which is desired by the Vaiśeṣika philosophers. So Sāṃkhya will have to admit Vaiśeṣika's doctrine that the effect does not pre-exist in the cause. The

arguments that are to be forwarded in support of *Asatkāryavāda* are offered by the opponents (i.e. Sāṃkhya philosophers) who do not support *Asatkāryavāda*. So there is no difference between opponents' standpoint and the Vaiśeṣika's standpoint. So the Sāṃkhya philosophers are ultimately admitting theory of *Asatkāryavāda*.

If by the term 'non-manifestation' (*anabhivyakta*) they mean the absence of the inducer of the necessity which is served by an object which is known, they will have to admit the theory of *Asatkāryavāda*.

For, an object which is the inducer of necessity is produced if it is absent in the effect earlier. As for example, the colour which is the inducer of necessity is produced if it is absent in the cloth.<sup>18</sup> An effect is produced if and only if there is non-existence of that effect before the production. That which exists before the production can never be produced. So according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, the object which is produced is found to be non-existent before its production. So, it cannot be said that the inducer of the necessity served by a particular object is absent before the production of the object, as it amounts to the prior non-existence of that object. And to admit the prior non-existence of an effect before its production is to admit that the effect does not exist in the cause before production, which is favoured by the Vaiśeṣika philosophers.

The upholders of *Satkāryavāda* may say that, just as sense-organs like eye etc. are causes of perception of cloth, the activity of the weaver of the cloth etc. are also the causes. According to them, cloth is not known due to the non-existence of the above mentioned causes of the perception of cloth, although cloth exists before its production.<sup>19</sup>

The above-mentioned view is also not acceptable. Because to admit the presence of all effects before production is to admit the presence of the activity of the weaver of cloth etc. at that time also. It may be argued by the Sāṃkhya philosophers that at first the effects of causes were non-manifested and afterwards they become manifested through those causes that help in producing the perceptual knowledge of the effects like cloth etc.<sup>20</sup>

Opinion like this is also not acceptable according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers. The question may arise whether the manifestation of the cause is pre-existent or not. If pre-non-existent, those causes can never be the causes of perception. If pre-existent, there would arise the question of perception of the effects like cloth etc. The latter apprehension of an object which is not known earlier is possible if it is produced afterwards. It is known afterwards as it is produced afterwards.<sup>21</sup> According to Sāṃkhya philosophers it is impossible to admit the production of an object like sky-lotus which is non-existent in character. Vaiśeṣika philosophers do not accept their opinion. Because they do not make a distinction between what is an absolute non-entity and what is

pre-non-existent. According to the Vaiśeṣikas object may be of various nature. For them, the absolute non-existence is the nature of sky-lotus, on the other hand a jar is both existent and non-existent in nature. It is characterised as non-existent before its production and as existent after its production.

The upholders of *Satkāryavāda* may say that an object can never have opposite properties viz. existence and non-existence.

In response to this, the Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that although the two properties, existence and non-existence can never belong to an object simultaneously but they can belong to an object at different times.<sup>22</sup>

It may be asked that non-existence cannot be a property of cloth, as the object having property (*dharmī*) like cloth etc. does not exist before its production.

In response to this, the Vaiśeṣika's reply is that the object which is non-existent can never have the property of existence according to the principle involved in 'specific type of offering is made to a specific type of God'. So non-existence is the property of a non-existent object.<sup>23</sup>

How can the property in the form of existence remain in an object which is non-existent before production? In response to this,

the Vaiśeṣika's reply is that with the help of causal operation the previously non-existent is brought into existence. Through the causal operation the previously non-existent object turns into existence, i.e. pre-non-existent effect is changed into existence through the causes like weaver etc.<sup>24</sup>

According to Sāṃkhya, it is impossible to think of the absolute absence of the connection between an absolutely non-existent effect with an existent cause. If this absolute absence of connection is accepted, then causal operation will unduly extend to other places. From causes like halves of the jar, a cloth may be produced.

The above-mentioned opinion given by Sāṃkhya is not acceptable to the Vaiśeṣikas. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, in threads etc. there is potential power with the help of which an effect like cloth etc. are produced. So the question of undue extension does not arise at all. Moreover, it may be asked to Sāṃkhya philosophers why thread turns into cloth but the halves do not turn into cloth.

In response to this the Sāṃkhya philosopher argue that threads etc. are the nature of cloth, but the property of jar etc. can never be the nature of cloth.<sup>25</sup>

If the upholders of the *Satkāryavāda* accept the above mentioned view, it will be taken for granted that the material cause

of a particular object is a particular thing. By applying the method of agreement and difference it can be said that in threads etc. there is the power of producing cloth etc.<sup>26</sup>

According to *Satkāryavāda*, the cause and effect are identical in nature. So if the cause exists, the effect which is not different from cause will also exist. If it is so, the absolute non-existent object (*asiddha* i.e. the object whose existence is not evidently known) is to be proved through the absolutely non-existent reason. If sky-lotus is absolutely non-existent object, it is to be proved as non-existent through some reason which is also absolutely non-existent, as effect and cause are taken as identical by the followers of *Satkāryavāda*.

Again if Sāṃkhya admits that the cause and effect are not identical, the nature, the power etc. of cause and effect will be different. If this world is identical with Prakṛti, like Prakṛti this world would be beyond the reach of the sense organs. But this world is not so. It can be concluded that the cause and effect are not identical in nature but different from each other. So, the effect does not exist in the cause before production.<sup>27</sup>

Refuting the above-mentioned arguments in favour of *Asatkāryavāda* the Sāṃkhya philosophers reiterate their earlier decision of *Satkāryavāda* repeating the following reasons. Regarding the relation of cause and effect the Sāṃkhya holds that before

actual production, the effect exists in the cause in the form of 'potential energy' which is otherwise described as 'in-built power'. It is not always manifested due to having certain obstacles. As soon as the obstacles are removed, the energy gets a free passage and produces the necessary transformation known as the effect. Creation to them is only the process of transforming the implicit into the explicit form. All things exist in potential form in Prakṛti before creation and at this time the *guṇa*-s are thrown out of balance. Prakṛti changes into different categories of the universe in a gradual way. Although this law of causation reveals to us a continuous process of becoming, changes do not occur in a vacuum. Becoming is the becoming of some dynamic force which is the underlying support of all changes. In this sense the cause and effect are taken as identical by the Sāṃkhya-thinkers. If something is taken as 'non-manifested', it does not mean the 'absence of that object'. Something exists but not properly known by us – this type of object is called non-manifested object. There may remain many objects in the present world, but all of them are not known to us due to their non-manifestation due to absence of certain criteria of knowing due to my absent-mindedness, absence of light etc. Hence, the effect remaining in cause is not always manifested due to having some obstacles, which does not mean its absence.

To Sāṃkhya the modifiable cause of the world is Prakṛti. Prakṛti which is constituted of three *guṇa*-s is real and eternal and at the same time an essentially dynamic principle. It is only a substance which is capable of being modified and hence all

phenomena constituting the world are nothing but so many states of Prakṛti which are potentially present in the causal substance even before their actual manifestation. Matter and energy which exist in a particular causal form changes into the appropriate effect form as soon as the factors responsible of its manifestation become active. The temporal distinctions between the past, present and future states of the effect are possible only on the assumption of the prior existence of the effect in the causal substance, in the form of matter and energy.

In the modern age when it is found that a jar comes into being from a lump of clay, what does actually happen there? The clay-form of the matter and energy becomes implicit and the potentiality of becoming transformed into the jar-form is expressed in its place. The effect is only the transformed cause which is modified in a new fashion. As the effect comes into being from the energy remaining in a cause it is of the same substance. The effect pre-exists in the cause and is a real transformation of the cause.

Such theory of causation tries to explain fully the transformation of one causal substance (i.e. Prakṛti) into the form of this diversified world. One single unitary principle which is the world-cause is becoming many due to having the potentiality of diversification. It is due to the fact that in an act of production one causal substance is undergoing transformation from one state to another. For this reason, it is believed that there is the relation of *tādātmya* (identity) between the cause and the effect from

materialistic standpoint. So far as the material cause (*upādāna*) is concerned, there is an identity between cause and effect. This *tādātmya* alone serves as the ground for establishing the existence of Prakṛti as the material cause of the world after observing the facts and phenomena of the world. That is why, this causal theory is also known as *Parināmvāda*. An object is called transformation (*parinama*) if it is an effect whose existence is equal to that of its material cause. ("Upādāna-sama-sattāka-kāryāpattiḥ" – *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Pratyakṣa pariccheda). In this case, there is an equality between a cause and an effect due to the acceptance of identity (*tādātmya*) between them.

The above-mentioned thesis is corroborated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa also in the kārika no. 8. It has been clearly stated that the intellect and the rest are both like and unlike Prakṛti. (*Prakṛti svarūpāṇi virūpāṇi ca*). In other words, the effect is identical with the cause in respect of the matter or *upādāna* while the effect is different from the cause so far as the form is concerned.

In this way the metaphor of iron-parts and magnet can be substantiated from the Sāṃkhya point of view. The iron-parts can move because there is inherent energy in them which is manifested through the circumstances i.e. through the magnetic influence. It is to be borne in mind that both magnet and iron particles are unconscious in nature. Sometimes the energy remaining in an object becomes more manifested due to the 'situation' when another unconscious object becomes a factor. Let us take an

example of water. The power or energy in water becomes manifested if and only if it is thrown from above or certain high altitude. This high altitude which is also a part of Prakṛti becomes 'factor' in bringing out the 'in-built' power of the object. In the same way the in-built power existing in iron-particle may be brought out through the contribution of the magnetic influence. So Prakṛti has to be taken as full of energy which becomes the cause of creation etc. of this beautiful world.

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3. *Ibid*, p. 582
4. *Gīta*, 3/16
5. "Na byāsato gaganakuśumasya sattvaṃ kencicchakyaṃ kartum." – Commentary known as '*Nyāyakandalī*' on *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. P.no. 369, Vārānasī edition.
6. "Sataśca satkāraṇaṃ yuktameva taddharmatvāt." – *Ibid*.
7. "Dṛṣtam hi tileṣu sat eva tailasya niṣpīdanena kāraṇam." – *Ibid*.

8. "Itaśca satkāryam - upādānagrahaṇāt, upādānāmi kāraṇāni teṣāṃ kāryeṇa grahaṇam kāryasya taiḥ saha sambandhaḥ tasmāttat kāryam sadeva, avidyamānasya ambandhābhāvāt." – *Ibid.*
9. "Asambaddhameva kāryam kāraṇaiḥ kriyata iti cet? Na sarva sambhavābhāvāt, asambaddhatvaviśeṣe sarvam sarvasmādbhavet. Na caivam, tasmāt kāryam prāgutpatteḥ kāraṇaiḥ saha sambaddham." – *Ibid.* P.340
10. "Api ca śaktasya janakatvam aśaktasya vā ?" – *Ibid.*
11. "Aśaktasya janaktve tāvadatiprasaktiḥ." – *Ibid.*
12. "Śaktasya janakatva tu kimasya śaktiḥ sarvatra ? Kvacidevā va ? Sarvatra saivātivyāpitiḥ." – *Ibid.*
13. "Kathamasati tasmin kāraṇasya tatra śaktirniyateti vaktavyam, asoto. Viśyatvāyogāt. Tasmācchaktasya yacchakyam śaktiviśayo yo'rthaḥ tasya karaṇātprāgapi śakyam sadeva." – *Ibid.* P. 141
14. "Ito'pi satkāryam kāraṇabhāvāt, kāraṇa svabhāvam kāryamiti nānyo'vayavī avayavebhya-staddeśtvāt. Yattu yasmādanyatra tattasya deśo yathā gouraśvetyādibhiḥ pramānaiḥ pratipāditam, Kāraṇam ca sat, atastadavyatireki kāryamapi sadeveti." – *Ibid.*
15. "Atrocyate yadi kāraṇavyāpārāt prāgapi patastantuṣusanneva, kimutyu-palabdhikāraṇeṣu satsu satyāmapi jijñāsāyām no palabhyate ?" – *Ibid.*
16. "Anabhivyaktatvāditi cet ? Keyamanabhivyaktiḥ ?" – *Ibid.*

17. "Yadyupalabdherabhāvastasyaivānupapattis-coditā katharṁ tadevottaram ?" – *Ibid.*
18. "Athopalabdhiyogyasyārtha kriyānivartanakṣamasya rūpasya biraho'nabhivyaktiḥ ? Tadānīmasatkāryavādaḥ, tathābhātasya rūpasya prāgabhava paścādbhāvāt." – *Ibid.*
19. "Atha matarṁ paṭasya cakṣurādivat kubindā-dikāraṇavyāpāro' pyupalabdhi-kāraṇam tasyābhavāt sato'pyanupa-labdhiriti ?" – *Ibid.*
20. "Na, kāraṇavyāpāro'pi pūrvamanathivyaktaḥ samprati, kāraṇairabhivyajyamāno bhāvamupalambhayatīti cet ?" – *Ibid.*
21. "Abhivyaktirapi yadyasatī ? katharṁ tasyāḥ kāraṇam ? Satīti cedbhāvopalambhaprasaṅga-stadavastha eveti kasyacidapūrv-asya viśeṣasyopajananamantareṇa prāganupalabdhasya paścādupalambho durghaṭaḥ." - *Ibid.*
22. "Yaccoktarṁ - asadaś'akyakaraṇarṁ vyomakusumavaditi, tatra svadhāvabhedād asadeka svabhāvarṁ gaganakuśumarṁ, sadasatsvabhāvam tu ghaṭādikaṁ. Tatpūrvamasat pas'cād sadbhavati. katharṁ sadasatorekatra na birodha iti cet ? Kālabhedena samābeśāt" – *Ibid.*
23. "Prāgutpatteh paṭasya dharmino'bhāvāt kathamasattvarṁ tasya dharmaiti cet ? Yādrś'o yakṣastādrśo valiḥ sattvamasato dharmo na syādasatvarṁ tvasata eva yuktarṁ." – *Ibid.*
24. "Yadasatopūrvamasīt tasya katharṁ sattvamiti cet ? Kāraṇasāmarthyāt, asti śako'pi mahimā turyādinām yadeteṣu sambhūya vyāpriyamāneṣvasanneva paṭaḥ sambhavati" – *Ibid.*

25. "Asato' Sambaddhasya janyatve' tiprasaktiriti cennaitat,  
tantujātīyasya paṭajātīya eva. Sāmurthyāt. Kuta etat ?  
Tvatpakṣe'pi kuta etat ? Tantuṣveva paṭātmatā na sarvatreti ?  
Vastusvābhavyādīcet ?" - *Ibid.*
26. "Saivātrāpi bhaviṣyati. Ataeva copādānaniyamah,  
anvayavyātīrekāvyaṁ tajjātīyaniamane tajjātīyasya  
śaktyavadhāraṇāt." - *Ibid.*
27. "Yatpunaretat kāryakāraṇayoravyatīrekāt  
kāraṇāvasthānadeva kāryasyāpyavasthānamiti,  
tadasiddhamasiddhena sādhitam kāryakāraṇayoḥ  
svarūpaś' aktisamsthānabhedasya pratyakṣasiddhatvāt.  
Pradhānātmakaviśvasyā tīndriyatva prasangācca."  
- *Ibid.*

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