

CHAPTER VI

Some Critical and Conclusive Remarks

All the problems raised by the Advaitins are based on the presupposition that no activity can be generated in a material object which is not connected with any conscious being. They have tried to prove this with the help of various metaphors like chariot etc. This presupposition may not always be true. If this is proved, the Sāṃkhya position can easily be substantiated.

The Sāṃkhya accepts dynamicity of an object having capacity of expanding. It is not correct that a material object does not have any power of movements in the forms of extension, subtraction etc. If the metaphor of magnet which is already referred to by Sāṃkhya in the context of refuting Advaita view is taken into account, we shall see that magnet has got power of its own which can draw the iron particles scattered around it. We do not find any type of conscious element to justify the movement or attraction of iron-particles etc. Each and every material object possesses some inherent power which can be manifested at any time. Had there been no energy in an object, it would not have been manifested any time. From the manifestation of power it becomes active and associated with so many functions. Water has got its own energy which is manifested sometimes automatically or when forcibly thrown downwards. The change of position of water gives rise to

power or energy which is called *Vārabānal* (fire originated from water or hydel-power). In the same way, the friction between the green branches of the tree produces fire power which is called *Dāvānal* (fire generated from the trees). In like manner, energy or power is found even in garbage or human fetus. If fire is available everywhere without the conjunction of a conscious element, the existence of power can always be assumed within the material object. From this it can easily be known that power is not the property of the conscious being, even the material objects have got tremendous power which can change the whole world. Hence, it is not utopian idea to believe in the truth that matters can have the power of extension or movement. Hence, the basic presupposition that Prakṛti cannot have these powers due to its character of being matter is not true.

It is said earlier that Prakṛti creates this beautiful world for the sake of the enjoyment of Puruṣa. In this connection, it may be noted that Prakṛti by virtue of being unconscious cannot have her own intention, because 'intention' or 'desire' is the mark of an intelligent or conscious being. A question may be raised how the activities of Prakṛti can be justifiable. In this case also we have to admit the dynamic character of Prakṛti. By virtue of its dynamic character Prakṛti moves and generates different activities without any intention of her own. Sometimes the three *guṇa*-s of Prakṛti remain at the stage of equilibrium and sometimes it creates due to superordination of one *guṇa* over another. It is the essential nature of Prakṛti to undergo some changes from time to time having no

criterion of the changes. If there is any criterion of such change, it cannot be taken as 'natural'. Something 'natural' means it is not moved by external pressure or external factor. These spontaneous and natural activities are inherited by Puruṣa. Puruṣa 'owns' these activities being identified with Prakṛti. In the case of Prakṛti the question of *owning* or disowning does not come into the picture due to her unconscious character, rather all these actions are, to some extent, spontaneous. Hence the activities are self-generated (*svayambhū*) and Prakṛti does not need any external assistance for their manifestation. The owning of Puruṣa is due to the effect of ignorance or having no knowledge of discrimination.

The above-mentioned fact regarding the dynamic force existing in matter has been endorsed in modern theory of Quantum Mechanics of Physics. To them each and every thing in this world is pre-determined and hence there is no chance of accidentalism. An atom possesses electron and proton, which implies that these particles have got power of having small energies and waves. These energies and waves are generated by Nature. From this it follows that these are naturally given and hence there is no need to believe that these are generated through the association of Conscious Being. The physicists are still engaged in unveiling the power of mystery found in the world of atom which is nothing but matter. They are still engaged in discovering the truth how energy is coming from the atom, how mutual give and take policies subsist within an atom, how electron and proton are revolving around the atom, and also how much electron and proton revolve in its orbit

etc. From this it is known that no conscious principle is involved for the activities going on within the world of atom.

If the above-mentioned notion of Pradhāna is admitted it can be presumed that the three constituents of it are the cause of suffering (*tāpaka*). The question raised earlier how the concept of sufferer (*tāpaka*) remains without a notion of sufferer (*tāpya*). So far as the Prakṛti – part is concerned, there are only the three constituents which are the causes of suffering. If Puruṣa remains and identifies himself with Prakṛti he will surely suffer. If Puruṣa does not feel himself identified with Prakṛti, it is to be taken as knowledge of discrimination, which is the state of liberation. If Puruṣa is liberated, the constituents of Prakṛti having the causes of suffering remain ineffective. The three *guṇa*-s of Prakṛti causing suffering but remaining as ineffective are tantamount to their non-existence. But this cannot be taken as non-existent, because three *guṇa*-s causing suffering cannot be waived from her nature. On account of her naturalness the three *guṇa*-s cannot be free from their character of causing sufferings.

The most important thing in Sāṃkhya system is the three constituents which survey the mental and material objects of the external world. All the objects of the world have in them pure being or existence (*sattā*) as their ultimate basis and essential stuff. The existence is the prime factor which helps us to their intelligibility. The cognition of an object presupposes its existence. The object having no existence cannot come under our awareness. The utopian

ideas like sky-flower (*ākāśa-kusuma*) barren woman's son (*bandhyāputra*) etc cannot come to our level of intelligibility due to their non-existence (*asattā*). The whole epistemological literature remains if the objects of the external world really exist. The property of intelligibility of an object is determined by its existence (*sattā*). Hence *sattā* or existence of an object is to be considered first. This *sattā* of an object is due to the *sattva* element of an object. In fact, in Sanskrit the terms '*sattva* or '*sattā*' have got the same meaning as per the grammatical rules for formation of a word.

The object of experience also contains a few characteristics like resistance, shape, form, impenetrability etc. These are due to their presence of massiveness of an object. An object is massive in character and hence it can assume shape and can resist its complete destruction after allowing some internal change in the form. This massive character in an object is due to the *tamogūṇa* of Pradhāna. Beside the *sattvagūṇa* the object has another constituent called *tamas*. An object does not remain static and it undergoes some changes from one form to another. There is no single and monotonous character in an object. This change or movement is caused by another principle which is called *rajogūṇa*. We may summarise the above-mentioned principles in the following manner.

a) An object exists and is intelligible on account of its generation by the *sattva*-element of Pradhāna.

b) An object undergoes changes due to the *raja*-element of Pradhāna.

c) An object assumes shape and resists destruction through changes due to the *tamo*-element of Prakṛti.

In this connection, a distinction can be drawn between the Vaiśeṣika concept of *guṇa* and that of Sāṃkhya. To the Vaiśeṣikas qualities like lightness, movement etc. remain in a substance through relation of inherence (*dravya-samaveta*). In the Sāṃkhya system these *guṇa*-s like *sattva* etc possess the properties of lightness, movement and heaviness (*kārikā*-13). Hence, these qualities are not inhered in a substance (*dravya-samaveta*). One quality cannot be imagined as possessing another quality or other qualities. These *guṇa*-s like *sattva* etc. are apparently associated with and dissociated from the Puruṣa (*Pravacanabhāṣya*-1/61). If the Vaiśeṣika view is taken into account, the *guṇa*-s cannot remain in Puruṣa because these *guṇa*-s actually and constantly remain in a substance through inherence (*dravya-samaveta*). Puruṣa is not a substance. Logically speaking these *guṇa*-s like *sattva* etc. are the substances themselves. Hence, all the properties remain in themselves which confirms our decision that Prakṛti is self-sustained entity having automatic change, movement etc without depending on any conscious principle. All the objects of the world are the results of different permutations and combinations of those three ultimate reals. Even the objects of the mental world like thoughts or ideas are within the purview of these three *guṇa*-s. These are the modifications of the ultimate reals, which constitute the physical world. In the mental domain of the world the element of *sattva* predominates while in the physical world *tamo-guṇa* dominates over

others. This *tamo guṇa* exists in all our ideas of objects. If not, these mental products could not take the forms of their objects. In each and every case of mental modification (*citta-vṛtti*) the combination of three *guṇa*-s is always identifiable. Our intellectual manifestation (*buddhi-vṛtti*), being manifested, takes the form of its object and for this it needs movement. Our phenomenal consciousness and its objects are generated by the functioning of three *guṇa*-s which are the creative forces of the world. On account of this, the Sāṅkhya system does not distinguish between thought and matter. Both matter and thought are constituted of the same feeling-substances which build the neutral borderline between them. The *guṇa*-s are the feeling substances. As the whole external world is constructed out of these elements, each and every object of cognition possesses the capacity of producing three different feelings in the minds of human being i.e. pleasure, pain and delusion (*Pravacanabhāṣya*, 1/127).

From the above it is proved that Prakṛti is a self-sustained entity from which the whole world, physical and mental, is originated. The correspondence between inner world and the outer world has been satisfactorily explained by the Sāṅkhya-thinkers assuming the fact that they represent two allied lines of development from a common source i.e. the three *guṇa*-s. This is the dynamism of the Sāṅkhya philosophy and this aspect is as real and as obvious as the aspect of performance. All types of movements and changes are very real and forceful that they cannot be denied by any means. The world in which we reside is not a

static world and it is out and out dynamic. The changes, vibrating currents of life and constant movements are the keys of this phenomenal world which is called *jagat-prapañca*. This seen world does not remain steady and unchanging. On the other hand, it undergoes changes due to its inner push and inner mobility generated through the palpitating nature of three *guṇa*-s. These *guṇa*-s justify clearly the sameness and diversity, affinity and difference which are clear and unignorable. The sameness of the objects is due to the sameness of the ultimate stuff (three-elements), but diversity is due to the different types of relatedness of these elements. If we see the world, we will feel that cause and effect, substance and attribute are identical from the standpoint of the stuff. The world is different if it is seen from the point of view of forms and names.

Though the body is having various qualities like height, fairness and fatness, it is called one. In like manner, though Prakṛti possesses various qualities, it is called one. In another way it can be said that according to Sāṃkhya there is an identity (*tādātmya*) between quality and substance leaving no room to 'manyness'. If 'manyness' is there, there cannot be identity or *abheda* or non-difference. Due to this identity between a quality and a substance the luminosity, movement and heaviness will not be taken as qualities alone but they are substances as well.

Vijñānabhikṣu had also admitted the all-pervading nature of the *guṇa*-s and also their innumerable number. (*Yogavarttikā*, Ch.

11-18). He has admitted it because there will be difficulty in holding the view that creation starts everywhere. Though space, time and *Ākāśa* are all-pervading, there is no problem in the generation of motion essential for initiating creation.

If Puruṣa does not cause anything (*akāraṇa*) or is caused by nothing (*akārya*), what is the necessity of admitting such a *tattva*. For the Sāṅkhyas, the evolution of the world by Prakṛti requires the presence of Puruṣa to disturb the equilibrium of Prakṛti and thereby start creation. If there were no Puruṣa, the equilibrium of Prakṛti would not have lost at all and as a result, no creation would have been possible. Besides this conjunction of Prakṛti with Puruṣa which is necessary for *sāmyāvasthā – bhanga*, we require the disjunction of Prakṛti with Puruṣa to enable Prakṛti to reach its original state of equilibrium and thereby producing *pralaya* or destruction. In other words, the cycles of creation and destruction *sr̥ṣṭi* and *pralaya* by Prakṛti would not have been possible unless there is association and dissociation respectively with Puruṣa. It is to be noted here that though Puruṣa does nothing, yet its presence is necessary to remove the obstacle which hinders manifestation of the effect in the cause. According to Sāṅkhya philosophers, the effect is already present in the cause even prior to effectuation. Had it not been so, everything could have been produced out of anything. That is why, the Sāṅkhya philosophers maintain that which is not inherent or implicit in the cause in some form or other cannot be made manifest or explicit. Vācaspati rightly observes in his *Tattvakaumudī* that even hundreds and thousands of artisans cannot transform blue into

red for the simple reason that red is never present in the blue. That is why; the material cause (*upādāna kāraṇa*) is, for Sāṃkhya, the true cause. The so called efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇa*), according to Sāṃkhya, does nothing except removing the obstacle that hinders manifestation of the effect in the cause. In this sense it is necessary (*prajojana*) although it does not produce anything. Moreover, unlike the material cause, the *nimitta kāraṇa* is not found to be present in the effect itself. So we can always think of its alternative or *vikalpa*. Instead of rotating the wheel by means of a stick one can take the help of electric current for the same purpose. But there is no alternative (*vikalpa*) to the material cause which is invariably present in the effect. That is why, the Sāṃkhya philosophers do not attach much importance to the notion of efficient cause. In truth, the concept of *nimitta kāraṇa* in Sāṃkhya philosophy differs substantially from other Indian systems which advocate it. Further, the Sāṃkhya philosophers characterize Puruṣa as *aprakṛti – avikṛti, i.e., akāraṇa and akārya*. This unmistakably shows that the Sāṃkhya philosophers do not treat Puruṣa, the so called *nimitta kāraṇa*, on the same footing with Prakṛti, the root cause. Puruṣa thus is not that essential in Sāṃkhya philosophy so far as the creation of the world is concerned. But it is quite essential so far as the termination of suffering is concerned. We have already mentioned that for the Sāṃkhya philosophers to finally overcome all sorts of sufferings for ever, we require discriminative knowledge between *vyakta* and *avyakta*, i.e., Prakṛti on the one hand and *Jñā*, i.e., Puruṣa on the other (*vyakta-avyakta-jñā-vijñāna*). This discriminative knowledge between Puruṣa and Prakṛti will not only

enable us to win over our sufferings but also attain liberation from bondage. To this point we shall come now.

To the question who is *baddha* (in fetters) and who is *mukta* (free), we have inconsistent answer in Sāṃkhya philosophy. Initially, it was held that Puruṣa was *baddha* and *mokṣa* finally arose out of *vivekajñāna* (discriminative knowledge) between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. But almost at the end of *Sāṃkhya Kārikā* it was really Prakṛti which was *baddha* owing to conjunction (*samyoga*) with, or semblance of conjunction (*samyogābhāsa*) with or proximity (*sannidhyamātra*) with Puruṣa. This Prakṛti becomes *mukta* when such *vivekajñāna* dawns. To elaborate, in verse no. 21 of Sāṃkhya Kārikā, Īśvarakṛṣṇa argues that creation or evolution of the world out of primordial Prakṛti starts for the fulfillment of twin purposes of enjoyment of Puruṣa (*Puruṣasya darsanārtham*) and ultimate release of Puruṣa (*kaivalyārtham*) from the clutches of Prakṛti. Sankara rightly observes that neither enjoyment (*bhoga*) nor liberation (*apavarga*) is ever possible on the part of Puruṣa. For Puruṣa is utterly inactive and enjoyment is never possible without some kind of activity. Moreover, if Puruṣa is said to enjoy, there will be no cessation of this enjoyment at all. For, Prakṛti will continue to create enjoyable objects ceaselessly for the enjoyment of Puruṣa and Puruṣa in its turn will get entangled in such enjoyment for ever, thereby making liberation impossible. Again, Puruṣa being *mukta* from the very beginning cannot be truly said to be liberated. *Mukti*, being its *svarūpa* (nature), is not obtainable but is always obtained. Further, if, for arguments sake, the liberation of *Puruṣa* is

at all attained, it will continue for ever, thereby making the cycle of creation impossible. Sāṅkhya seems to realize the untenability of its own position when it emphatically declares, in verse no. 62 that bondage, liberation and migration do not affect Puruṣa at all. In reality, Puruṣa is not bound as all – *na kascit Puruṣa badhyate*. Nor is it migrated to the world and assumes *saṁsāra* – *na kascit saṁsārati*. Nor it is liberated – *na kascit Puruṣaḥ muktaḥ*. As a matter of fact *bandhana*, *saṁsārati* and *mokṣa* are not the essence of Puruṣa at all. A person who is in real bondage endeavors to put an end to his bondage and thereby seeks liberation. Truly speaking, Puruṣa can never be in a state of liberation. Truly speaking, Puruṣa can never be in a state of bondage. For, *kleśa*, *karma* and *āśaya* are not possible in Puruṣa who is utterly indifferent, unchanging and devoid of *guṇa*-s. As Vācaspati rightly observes : *Savāsanā-kleśa-karmāśayānañca bandhana-samākhyānām? Puruṣa aparināmīnyasambhāvāt*. By 'vāsanā' is meant *saṁskāra* which arises out of previous impressions. By 'kleśa' is meant *avidyā*, *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dveśa* and *abhiniveśa*. 'Karma' stands for *dharma* and *adharma* arising out of our good or bad deeds. 'Āśaya' means *citta*. Puruṣa being *nirlepa* (untouched by any of these), *aparināmī* (unchangeable) and *niṣkriya* (utterly devoid of any activity) remains unaffected by *bandhana*, *saṁsāra*, *kleśa*, *karma* and *āśaya*. Hence *bandhana*, *saṁsāra* and *mokṣa* are not Puruṣa's real nature. These are attributed to Puruṣa only secondarily (*aupacārika*). This attribution is comparable to a process whereby an army's success or failure – victory or defeat – is attributable to a king whose army it is. As a matter of fact, it is Prakṛti which is bound or liberated. Prakṛti is *nānāśraya*, i.e., related to different Puruṣa-s by virtue of

its close proximity with them. *Bandhana* etc. are the resultants of threefold *guṇa*-s which belong to Prakṛti. It is due to the absence of non-discriminative knowledge of Puruṣa and Prakṛti and also Prakṛti's close proximity with Puruṣa that the nature of reality belonging to Prakṛti appears to be belonging to Puruṣa. In truth, however, *bhoga* and *apavarga* are secondarily attributed to Puruṣa who is above everything.

In verse no. 55, the author of *Sāṅkhyākārika* explains this fact of attribution by saying that *jarāmarāṇakṛtam duḥkham prāpnoti cetanaḥ Puruṣaḥ*. Puruṣa appears to suffer from misery brought about by old age and death. We know from Sāṅkhya literature that Puruṣa is *visuddha caitanya* or pure consciousness. It is depicted as *nitya śuddha, buddha* and *mukta*. Therefore, *jarā* and *marāṇa* cannot be its *dharma* or property. From the etymology of the word 'Puruṣa' (*puri linge śete iti*) we come to know that Puruṣa rests in the subtle body. And that which is primarily connected with the body seems to be related to Puruṣa as well. Hence, so long as Puruṣa gets associated with the subtle body, there is no deliverance from pain, misery and the like. *Jarā, marāṇa* etc. which really affect this body seem to be attributed to Puruṣa which vests in the body but is untouched by the affections of the body. That *jarā* or old age disables our body, cripples our memory and effects many bodily and mental changes is a positive fact of experience which no one can deny. Its influence is universal and inescapable. Similarly, the influence of *marāṇa* cannot be overcome. No one can get rid of this suffering. Hence, if one is born, one must

suffer from old age and death and there is no avoidance from this. This bodily suffering is attributed to conscious Puruṣa who out of non-discrimination looks upon the sufferings of the body as its own. In truth, however, Puruṣa in its purity remains untouched by bodily affections.

It may be asked why Īśvarakṛṣṇa leaves aside *janma* which is generally regarded as a cause of suffering as well. Does not Puruṣa get affected by birth also along with old age and death? In answer to this query, it may be submitted that suffering due to birth is not universal. Human beings and lower animals suffer from birth no doubt. But the divine beings are not subject to this. Moreover, there is a difference between these two kinds of sufferings – sufferings arising out of birth and sufferings arising out of old age and death. In the former case, only the victim – the mother and the child seems to suffer, but not the relatives of the victim. They are rather eager to celebrate and enjoy the appearance of the newcomer. In the latter case, however, both the persons in the death-bed (*jarāmaraṇagrastha*) and their relatives equally suffer.

The evolution of Prakṛti is spontaneous just as milk from the udder of the cow. But it should be borne in mind that Prakṛti has no interests of its own. This is comparable to the nourishment of the calf as the interest of the cow itself. As a matter of fact, Prakṛti, being devoid of consciousness altogether, cannot plan evolution at all. So the evolution of Prakṛti for the salvation of Puruṣa cannot be admitted. The truth is that Prakṛti evolves spontaneously without

being guided or controlled by any conscious agent. The release of Puruṣa arises only as a result. As the activity of Prakṛti proceeds and the release of Puruṣa is not real but apparent. Prakṛti evolves for the benefit of Puruṣa and looks upon the benefit of Puruṣa as its own. Prakṛti never expects her spirit of self-sacrifice to be reciprocated by Puruṣa. Just as a cook prepares food for the satisfaction of his master and turns away from the kitchen when the food is cooked, similarly Prakṛti evolves for the emancipation of each *Puruṣa-prati-Puruṣa-vimokṣārtham* - and looks upon the interest of Puruṣa as its own – *svārtha na parārthā*. Incidentally, it may be mentioned here that Sāṃkhya philosophers like most other Indian philosophers admit both *jīvanamukti and videhamukti*. The moment discriminative knowledge between Puruṣa and Prakṛti dawns, a Puruṣa becomes liberated here and now. But his bodily existence may still continue on account of the momentum of the past deeds, i.e., *prārabdha karma*. As the liberated Puruṣa though embodied, feels no association with body owing to *vivekajñāna*, it does not reap any fruit of *karma* henceforth. The *videhamukti* or final emancipation, however, arises as an outcome of death when Puruṣa gets completely dissociated from the body.

A close look at the Sāṃkhya theory will make us convince at once that this view is riddled with inconsistencies. The Sāṃkhya philosophers begin with by cutting off all links between Puruṣa and Prakṛti declare that they are both eternal, absolute and independent realities. If Puruṣa were really independent i.e. needed no assistance from Prakṛti, then the cycle or creation (*svarga*) and

destruction (*pralaya*) would have remained unexplained. For, the difference in effect cannot be brought about by the same cause. To explain, according to Sāṃkhya, Prakṛti is the real material cause and Puruṣa does nothing except helping manifestation of that which was already present in the material cause. It is common knowledge that if manifestation does not take place without the assistance of somebody, then that somebody should be regarded as one of the causes. Otherwise, to hold that manifestation is spontaneous in the flowing of milk from the udder of the cow is to overlook the fact that the cow is a conscious agent and flowing of milk is also conditioned by the motherly affection and love towards its offspring. But Prakṛti is utterly unconscious and so its spontaneous changes are ruled out. If for arguments sake for such spontaneous changes movement is at all admitted, then it remains to be explained how and why Prakṛti evolves the world in one case and destroys it in another. In other words, the equipoise (*sāmyāvasthā*) of Prakṛti needed to be disturbed for the evolution of the world by the presence of Puruṣa – whether that presence is real, apparent or mere proximity is not that important. The important fact is that there must be some contact between Puruṣa and Prakṛti so that the equilibrium gets disturbed and the subsequent preponderance of one *guṇa* over the rest becomes possible, resulting in creation. How then can Prakṛti be absolute or independent? It may be noted further that if Puruṣa and Prakṛti are both eternal (*nitya*) and all pervading (*vibhu*), their contact must also be viewed as eternal. As a result creation will continue endlessly and dissolution will not take place at all. If, on the contrary, dissolution is regarded as *svarūpa* of Prakṛti (for in that state alone Prakṛti in a state of *Sāmyāvasthā*

which is its real nature), then Prakṛti will refuse to undergo heterogeneous changes being afraid of losing its real nature (*svarūpa-parināma-bhayāt*). Hence, creation and destruction cannot be explained in terms of Prakṛti alone. For that, we require a contact (semblance of contact/mere proximity) or absence of contact with Puruṣa. This convinces us that Prakṛti is not absolute (*nirapekṣa*) or independent (*svādhīna*). Again, if it is considered why and how an absolute or independent Prakṛti can serve the purpose of another, as a cook for his master, then he becomes subservient so that other. This curtails the independence of Prakṛti for which the Sāṃkhya philosophers beat their drum so much. To say that Prakṛti serves the interest of Puruṣa in a spirit of detachment without minding its own interest or receiving acknowledgement from Puruṣa is not to explain how such Prakṛti can be called blind. It is true that a blind person cannot execute perfectly what he plans. But the fact that Prakṛti is able to make planning goes against its unconscious nature. As a matter of fact, both a lame man and a blind man are conscious agents and both are capable of doing certain activities. The same man may not walk but certainly makes verbal utterances to guide the blind man. And these utterances are undoubtedly his activities. Moreover, the lame man is capable of making movements through his hands and other organs and of course, to a certain extent through his feet. He is capable of seeing which is no doubt an activity. So the simile of a lame man for Puruṣa who is utterly inactive and that of a blind man for Prakṛti who is utterly unconscious does not bear scrutiny. Further, if Prakṛti evolves and is full of harmony, design, order and purpose how can then Prakṛti be blind? Again, Prakṛti is compared to a dancing girl who exhibits her

performance before an audience and thereby becomes conditioned by them. Moreover, the claim of the Sāṃkhya philosophers is to the effect that Prakṛti vanishes for that Puruṣa who has seen it, but continues to exist for others. In that case, we have to posit multiplicity of Prakṛti on the line of multiplicity of Puruṣa or think of different Prakṛti to one Puruṣa liberated and other in bondage. In other words, if Prakṛti vanishes for one Puruṣa and continues to exist for others, then Prakṛti becomes relative instead of independent and many instead of one and not external in the true sense. Does not this fact curtail the independent nature (*anapekṣa svabhāva*) of Prakṛti? Coming over to Puruṣa we are overwhelmed with all sorts of confusions and contradictions. Puruṣa is looked upon as pure consciousness (*viśuddha caitanya or caitanya kevalam*) and is untouched by bondage or liberation or transmigration. Yet the Sāṃkhya philosophers speak of plurality of Puruṣa-s on the flimsy ground of birth, death and activity (*janana-marāṇakaraṇāṇām*). Even a causal look will make us feel that birth etc. cannot affect consciousness as such which is *nitya* and *niṣkriya*. Hence birth etc., may be regarded as the qualifications of the phenomenal Ego or *Jīvātmā* who is a product of the reflection of Puruṣa on Buddhi. Puruṣa is transcendental to all these. Yet the Sāṃkhya philosophers never make a distinction between these two kinds of self-Puruṣa proper and *Jīva*. If we look closely at the arguments advanced for the existence of Puruṣa, we will be all the more convinced that all of them prove the existence of *Jīvas*. It is beyond one's comprehension why Sāṃkhya fail to reduce the many *Jīvas* into one absolute Puruṣa in the manner of the manifold material entities being reduced into one primal matter, called

Prakṛti. What is the harm of applying the same logic in the case of Puruṣa as it is applied in the case of Prakṛti? It is not perhaps out of place to mention that this inherent inconsistency has led certain commentators like Gauḍapāda, Vācaspati, Vijñānabhikṣu etc. to abandon the multiplicity theory of Puruṣa and accept the theory of one Puruṣa instead. Again, consider the inconsistency that one finds in the beginning and later comes across at the end. The Sāṃkhya philosophers emphatically declare at the outset that the movement of Prakṛti for the evolution of the world is arising out of fulfilling the twin purposes of enjoyment and liberation of Puruṣa. Subsequently, however, the Sāṃkhya philosophers retrace their steps by declaring that Puruṣa is not really bound or liberated or migrated. It is Prakṛti which really binds itself, liberates itself and migrates itself. The so called bondage of Puruṣa is simply secondary or attributed falsely (*aupacārika*) because of the close association of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. These two accounts are not in keeping with each other and the Sāṃkhya philosophers are making a mess out of them.

Prakṛti has been described as the creator of all objects and If, though unconscious, has got the power of auto-generation. The whole world is originated from Prakṛti which is called the Primordial Cause. If an unconscious being becomes the cause of any creation etc. by its auto-generated power, there is no need of any conscious agent like God etc for the justification of creation etc. Only conscious principle which is admitted in Sāṃkhya is Puruṣa who is treated to be an indifferent being. Normally God is admitted in some systems of Philosophy to justify creation of the world etc and to

convey the result of karma done by an individual being. If this function is accomplished by Prakṛti or Pradhāna, there is no necessity of admitting another conscious principle called God. That is why; Sāṃkhya is a philosophy of no God and is called atheist.

If we turn our attention to the Nature-World who is otherwise known as Prakṛti, we shall feel its enormous power. When there is a 'natural calamity', it is so called because it is caused by Nature. Let us suppose, there are the cases of earth-quake, *Tsunami*, drought, flood etc. which are cause of our suffering from the innumerable time. Now Science and Technology have developed in a very rapid manner. Even in this scientific and technological age can we have any control over Nature? At best, we can take precaution regarding the natural calamities and disaster. That is why, Prakṛti is, to some extent, beyond the control of human being. She can destroy the whole world within a fraction of second. A human being however educated and scientifically developed he may become helpless in the hands of Nature or Prakṛti. That is why, Prakṛti is called dynamic having an in-built power to procreate without the intervention of any conscious agent. That an inanimate object always can move with a conscious intervention is admitted by almost all the systems of Philosophy like Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Advaita Vedānta etc. What is the contribution of Sāṃkhya in this regard? In reply, it can easily be said that Prakṛti, though inanimate in nature, possesses that in-built power to create something. It is the reservoir of energy from which everything springs up. The constituents of Prakṛti i.e., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* have got some energy arising

out of the three *guṇa*-s, which can create and destroy the whole world. The novelty of Sāṃkhya thought lies in the fact that Prakṛti is self-dependent so far as its power is concerned. In each and every inanimate object there is an energy which is inherent in it. This energy which cannot be seen can easily be inferred from the effect. That in two inanimate objects there is a hidden energy is evidenced from the fact that fire is generated if two pieces of stones are frisked. In this way two pieces of wooden pieces also generate fire if frisked. In the same manner, two branches of a tree, if frisked, generates fire called *dāvānala* due to having the hidden energy in it. Not only this, the water falling from higher places produces hydel current or fire called *Vārabānal*. All these are different forms of energy hidden in Prakṛti. Hence, Prakṛti is herself powerful without taking recourse to any conscious being. Now-a-days the scientists are bringing out energy even from the garbages and cowdung which are of inanimate nature. Had there been no hidden energy in these inanimate object, energy cannot be brought out from them. For this reason material energy is utilized by the conscious beings after certain procedure. From these facts, it is evidenced that *Jaḍa-śakti* always remains in Prakṛti which is responsible for certain, maintenance and destruction of the whole world.

In the light of the above argument, the *paramāṇukāraṇatā-Vāda* (the theory of determining atom as a cause) can be substantiated. The whole world has been originated through the combination of two atoms without any Divine or conscious

intervention. The hidden energy remaining in two atoms makes them united leading to the formation of a binary atom (dvyanuka).

The question raised in this connection, whether two atoms conjoined automatically will go on conjoining for ever leading to the eradication of creation and dissolution (*śṛṣṭi* and *pralaya*). So far as our *Śāstras* are concerned, they depict both creation and destruction. It is true that the creation of this Universe starts from the combination of two atoms and dissolution from the disjunction of the same. This conjunction and disjunction of atoms is not arbitrary, but as per desire of God. That is why, the existence of a conscious principle is essential for the justification of the theory. It may be borne in mind in this connection that God's interference in creation and destruction is also prompted by the result of *Karma* performed by an individual being (*jīva*). God creates the world after considering the result of *Karma* done by an individual being so that he or she can enjoy the same. When the enjoyment of an individual being comes to an end, God thinks it proper to destroy resulting in the disjunction of two atoms.

How can this position of the Vaiśeṣikas be justified or refuted by the Sāṃkhya? Sāṃkhya reiterates the earlier position and substantiate the fact that the conjunction and disjunction of atoms are automatic or spontaneous without depending on any conscious principle as shown in the nature of Prakṛti. Creation may be started from the combination of atoms and so also destruction may follow from the disjunction of the same spontaneously from the

in-built energy available in the atoms themselves, though unconscious in nature. In this connection, the story of enormous power of atom or atomic energy may easily be remembered in the present day context. The power remaining in between two atoms may be taken as a cause of their combination. When this power ceases, the conjoined atoms automatically are splitted up leading to their destruction. The cement remaining in two bricks, for example, may be taken as a power of their combination. As soon as the factor of cementing loses its power, the combination ceases to exist without any eternal force. The same principle may be adopted here. No principle or no effect remains eternally as per the definition of a transitory object. An object is called transitory (anitya) if and only if it is associated with its origination and destruction. An object originated through its atomic conjunction must be followed by its destruction after certain time. For this we do not need any conscious interference. In this connection we may refer to the view of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsākas who do not believe in any type of Divine interference for the performance of any action. An action, if performed, gives rise to its result automatically through the interference of the property called *apūrva* generated through it. This *apūrva* may be interpreted as 'in-built-power' by the Sāṃkhya. This power may not remain for a long period of time and hence its effect remains less leading to the loss of the same which is nothing but destruction. Like Mīmāṃsā Sāṃkhya is also atheist and hence there is no role of God. The reason behind the non-acceptance of God lies in the fact that Prakṛti (Nature) herself has got dynamic power.

The differentiating factors of reality lies in the three constituents called *guṇa*, which tells that all mental and material objects of this phenomenal world are the combination in different proportions of the three ultimate reals (*triguṇa*). To Sāṃkhya each and every fact of experience becomes so when related to consciousness. There is something intelligibility through which it becomes related to the totality of experience of a particular person. Consciousness is revelation and if we are to become conscious of something. An object must have some characteristics which can be revealed if related to consciousness as its object. When a chair, for example, becomes a content of consciousness, it becomes so only because it possesses in itself the capacity of becoming revealed when it comes in contact with consciousness. This capacity which is inherent in an object cannot be discovered in the so-called qualities of the chair, because the qualities can be abstracted. This power, therefore exists in every being of the object and can very well be identified with that (being). Each fact of experience is a being called *sattva*, which constitutes its intelligibility. This intelligibility is the ultimate factor in an object of experience and it is called *sattva-quality*.

Let us now see the derivative meaning of the term '*sattva*' and its influence in different systems of Indian Philosophy and in social life.

By way of rounding of the concept an effort has been made to show that some social and ethical background prevails behind the

formulation of this concept. The same social and moral idea remains in the concept of *sat* as propagated by the Buddhists, Naiyāyikas etc. though it is not openly written or discussed in their philosophical or commentarial literature. Here an attempt is being made to throw some light on this aspect which seems to be apparently novel with the help of some arguments. In this connection different meanings of the term *sat* have been highlighted. It has also been pointed out that these meanings have some bearing on social harmony and peace. In other words, the concept of *sat* is used in Indian tradition in the sense of *justified existence* as mentioned earlier.

An individual having *sattva* element may also be called *sat* in as much as the term '*sattva*' is derived from '*sat*' and hence, a balanced person can also be described in terms of *sat* as he possesses the balanced quality i.e., *sattva*. Let us try to understand the literal meaning of the term '*sat*'. The literal meaning of it is 'existent' or 'that which is existing'. One who is existent is called *sat*. It may be argued that each and every living being is existent and hence all the existent persons should be described as *sat* leading to the non-availability of the negation of it. In reply, it can be said that a man who exists physically is not taken as *sat*, but a man who has justified his existence is called *sat*. If a man does not perform any work, good or bad, he is not at all known to others and hence his existence is not known to others or his existence is not justified in the sense that he has not made his existence 'meaningful'. If a man is known to all and has made his existence

meaningful by way of performing many social works, he is called *sat* or existent. This *sattva* or *sattā* (existence) does not mean a man's mere physical existence.

It may be argued that a man may prove his existence negatively or positively. In other words, one may think of proving one's existence after performing many antisocial and immoral works like theft, decoity, murder etc. In this case can he be taken as *sat*? In reply it may be said such persons are negatively famous or negatively prove their 'existence' and hence, their existence should be denied from moral view point, for which they should be distinguished as *asat*. A man may be remembered due to some actions having some positive value in the society or he may be so due to some works having negative value in society. The former is *sat* while the latter is *asat*.

It follows from the above discussion that through the performance of various duties in various spheres of life (towards our family members, social members etc.) by way of performing good works like social welfare, service of mankind etc. our existence is justified and hence we are called *sat* or is otherwise known as honest. Let us try to understand the term '*satata*', the Sanskrit rendering of the term 'honesty', which is originated from the term '*sat*'. If any relative gives me an object for my use, it would be my sacred duty to enjoy the use of it in order to show honour to him and to his faith on me, but not to destroy. If I destroy the object without using, it is also a kind of dishonesty. In like manner, our

valuable 'existence' which we have got through natural courses should be made justified, failing which we may be charged as dishonest (*asat*) due to the misuses of our valuable property i.e. existence.

The physically existent person who does not perform his duties for the sake of harmony is *asat*. Hence a father who is very much annoyed upon his son who does not perform his duties or engages in doing foul works is generally found lamenting with the words : 'I have no son though he exists'. On the other hand, a man being satisfied with the service rendered by a gentleman with whom he has no blood connection is found saying 'I am endowed with son that though really I have not'. In the former case the son has got physical existence which is taken as tantamount to not having a son, while in the latter the son has not physical existence which is taken as equal to having a son keeping the duties performed by the person in view. In short, one who maintains harmony after performing different duties in different spheres of life is called *sat* or honest while the person doing reverse is called *asat* or dishonest.

The Buddhists, I think, also believed in this concept of *sat*. They admit that an object is to be understood as *sat* if it has got some causal efficacy (*arthakriyāritvam*). In other words, an object is *sat* if it has capacity to serve our purpose and to fulfill any action. On the other hand, the object which does not serve our purpose is called *asat*. The jar, pot etc. would come under the first category (i.e. *sat*) as they have got the above mentioned capacity. The hare's

horn etc. is called *asat* as they do not have such capacity. I believe that this doctrine which is applicable to this epistemic world can be extended to other places. In other words, behind the formulation of the definition of *sat* or *asat* are coinage of the terms *sat* etc., there is functioning some idea related to social welfare and sense of morality, which needs to be focus send here. These Buddhists notion of *sat* may also cover an individual who is described as *sat* in the sense mentioned above. A man may be described as *sat* or *asat* after keeping his *arthākriyākāritva* by way of doing social welfare, adopting *maītrī* and *karuṇā* etc. or *anāarthakriyākāritva* respectively in view, just as an object having causal efficacy (in the positive sense) is *sat* in the true sense of the term. On the other hand, our existence which is not endowed with such causal efficacy or which is endowed with causal efficacy in the negative sense is called *asat*. Hence, *sattā* and *asattā* of an object or of us is determined in terms of causal efficacy or non-efficacy respectively. To the Butddhists the human body is nothing but an object. As it is a body of human being, the *sattā* of it is determined in terms of causal efficacy connected with human value or social value, which leads him to the path of *maītrī* and *karuṇā*. Hence, the causal efficacy of human being is different, which is not expressed in an explicit way in Buddhist literature. The same idea can be traced when they described *sat* as *svalakṣaṇa* or unique. Just as the causal efficacy of water lies in the object itself, but not in the word 'water', the causal efficacy lies in human being, but not in the name, race or caste etc. possessed by him. From this it is understood that an individual has to prove himself as *sat* by his own causal efficacy in the form of good works, but not through his name, race, caste etc. Hence, the

Buddhists have coined the term *kalpanā* in order to refer to his name, race etc. They have preferred to mention them as *kalpanā* or imagination on account of the fact that they have no value in proving a man *sat*. A man having unique character and free from imaginary attributes is self-luminous. A man is *svaprakāśā* and hence, he does not need to mention his name, father's name, race etc. to make him famous or *sat*. If a person without doing any work related to the welfare of society claims himself as *sat* due to having his high post or high family etc. he is not taken as *sat*. In other words, a man who is self-luminous through his own auspicious deeds is *sat*.

The view is found to echo in the religious poem composed by Kabir, which runs as follows :

*"Vaḍā huyā to kyā huyā
Jaise vaḍi khejur
Pānthako chāyā nāhi
Phal lāge atidūr"*

That is, what is use of being born in a high family? Just as big date-palm tree has no significance to the society in as much as it does not provide the travellers with shadow and the fruits exist in such a high place that they cannot be plucked by the social beings, a man born in a high society or having high education etc. is insignificant to the society if he does not engage himself in auspicious works like social welfare etc. From this it is known that a

man proves himself really existent by way of doing such good works, but not through his birth in high family or race etc. In this situation an individual can maintain harmony between his own welfare and that of social members and thereby he becomes *sat*.

For the reasons mentioned above the Naiyāyikas perhaps made a clear distinction between *śuddhasattā* (pure existence) and *viśiṣṭasattā* (qualified existence). The pure *sattā* (*śuddhasattā*) exists in substance (*dravya*) quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*). It indicates that the real existence is not confined to the gross body which comes under *dravya*, but it is pervasive to quality and action also. If a man having body does not possess any mentionable quality and action, he does not have *sattā* in the true sense of the term, which is indicated by the term *pure sattā*. Here 'quality' and 'action' denotes the good qualities like social service, broadness of mind etc. and good action like service of making, performance of duties (entrusted to him) towards family or social members respectively. If there is harmony among body (*dravya*), good qualities (*guṇa*) and good action (*karma*) in an individual, the real *sattā* prevails there. If a man having a good body does not have any mentionable quality and action, he has also a *sattā* which is not at all 'pure' but 'qualified' or *vaiśiṣṭa* which has got a second rate importance in the Nyāya system. That's why, they have not denied the *sattā* existing in *dravya* alone, which is different from quality and action (*guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattā*), but this is not pure in the sense that the existence as *dravya* alone has not much importance in the family and social life due to the lack of harmony. As the term

'*śuddha*' or 'pure' is taken as an adjunct of *sattā*, this type of existence is acceptable or desirable. To distinguish this pure *sattā* from the other type of *sattā*, the Naiyāyikas are careful to use the term '*viśiṣṭasattā*' i.e., *sattā* qualified by the difference of *guṇa* and *karma*. In other words, the *sattā* which does not exist in *guṇa* and *karma* is called '*viśiṣṭasattā*' i.e. *guṇakarmānyatvaviśiṣṭasattā* which has got less importance in social life. This idea can be gathered from the fact that they have not described it as pure *sattā*, which indicates that there is no purity (i.e. impurity) in the existence. To described *sattā* as pure or impure is based on the social values indicated earlier, which, I think, have prompted the Naiyāyikas to formulate the definition and classification of *sattā* in this way though this is used in the context of logical analysis of the definition of Vyāpti. From the above discussion, it can be concluded that pure existence (*śuddhasattā*) is real *sattā* which may be called *sattva*.

The same idea has been expressed by Bhartrhari in the *śloka* of *Nīṭisataka*, which runs as follows :

*"Eke satpuruṣāḥ parārthagatakāḥ
 Svārthān parityajya ye;
 Sāmānyāstu parārthamudyamabhṛtā
 Svārthā-virodhena ye;
 Temī mānavarākṣakāḥ parahitam
 Svārthāya nighnanti ye,
 Ye tu ghnanti nirarthakam
 Parahitam te ke na jānīmahe"*¹

i.e. There are some *satpuruṣa-s*, good people, who engage themselves in the good of others sacrificing their own self-interest; the *Sāmānyas*, the generality of people, on the other hand, are those who engage themselves in the good of others so long as it does not involve the sacrifice of their own self-interest. There are those others, the *Mānavarākṣakas*, a devilish men, who sacrifice the good of others to gain their own selfish ends; but alas, what am I to say of those who sacrifice the good of others without gaining thereby any good to themselves or to any one else.²

The *satpuruṣa-s* or good men have got their overwhelming goodness which is not at all vitiated by their selfish motive and hence they become glorified or they have glorified their existence. If they would engage themselves to serve their own self-interest without paying any heed to the welfare of others, they are not *sat*.

On the other hand, the people who destroy others' welfare in order to have more pleasure or comfort in their own lives are called *Mānavarākṣakas*, the devilish men or *asuras*. At this stage an individual tries to develop or satisfy his biological or physical needs, but fails to develop his morality though he has so called proper education. Due to lack of moral education, a man dares to adopt unfair means in order to fulfill his own interest. Here self-interest is fulfilled sometimes at the cost of others' life. Hence, this type of people is known as devil in the form of man. The person having this devilish attitude (*asuratva*) is called 'anti-social' who fails to maintain harmony with the society or social needs. But this type of

man can be transformed to *satta* from the world of *asuratva*, the devilish attitude.

It is true that at present day society, the melody is completely lost due to having this devilish attitude in man and it can be regained if this attitude is removed. *Satpuruṣa*-s can be brought again. For this our nation's moral health is to be improved. Svāmī Ranganāthānanda observes : "The moral health of the nation entirely depends upon this immense group. Steadying itself by drawing inspiration from the small minority of the *Satpuruṣa* group above it ... the self-criticism which is evident in our nation today, and which is a sure sign of the basic health of our society will slowly generate the necessary moral force to cure the nation of its present ailments. The ailment is a moral ailment and the remedy has to be a moral remedy. We all desire that our nation should be healthy, physically as well as mentally Cynicism, self-centredness and utter unconcern for others are more deadly physical diseases and viruses that cause them; for they corrode the nation's resolve to be free, to be united and to march onward to progress. We cannot be blind to the fact that this disease has already invaded our body-political, including our youths. We have to take energetic measures to arrest the further progress of this disease and to eliminate it from the body politic. And the nation has to be alert thereafter to see that these deadly mental viruses do not invade our society again."³

The same type of human existence has been admitted by Rāmakṛṣṇa when he says - '*janmechis jakhan dāg rekhe jā'* (i.e.,

you should keep some impression in this earth as a mark of your birth). In fact, it is advised to all human beings that they should justify their existence by way of doing some good works so that people can remember them after their demise. In this connection Rāmakṛṣṇa had asked Vivekānanda to become as big as a banyan tree so that other pain-tormented persons can come under its shadow and take shelter in it. The metaphor of the banyan tree is not a new thing in Indian tradition. In the *Kaṭhōpaniṣad* and *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā* the metaphor of banyan tree has been taken into account to point out that a human being should become as big as this tree having dense shadow protecting human beings and animals from the scorching sun. Apart from this the shadow in this context stands for solace to the pain-tormented persons. From this it is shown that human beings like Vivekānanda should not find satisfaction being confined within them or fulfilling their narrow intention, but they should be broader in heart and attitude so that they can provide peace, solace and well-being to others. It is the real mark of meaningful existence. The word 'meaningful existence' means 'justified existence'. Human existence can receive its utmost meaning if it can do something for others going beyond his own self.

The Buddhist theory of being can again be substantiated in terms of its causal efficacy in the following manner. A section of the botanists believe and justify that each and every plant is medicinal on account of the fact that all the plants including the negligible ones have got some medicinal value. To them some plants may seem to be redundant so far as their causal efficacy is concerned.

But ultimately they will provide their causal efficacy so far as their medicinal value is concerned. From this theory a decision can be taken that they have got their places in the lap of Nature because they have some utility or causal efficacy either in the protection of the environment or in the protection of human beings. From the fact of their existence from time immemorial, it can be presumed that they have some contribution for the sustenance of this earth. Now-a-days the Zoologists also have properly realized the importance of the animals and insects for the protection of the environment. We now often come across with various Government organizations and projects like tiger project, crocodile project, etc. to save our assets in the forest (*banajasampad*). In fact, in lap of Nature nothing can be redundant. Had it been so, it would have been destroyed absolutely without keeping any trace in the earth or keeping any chance of their survival. Hence, by the fact of their existence from a longer period of time it may easily be presumed or inferred that they have got causal efficacy for the protection of the environment and human being, which again reminds me the Buddhist phrase *Arthakriyakāritvalakṣaṇaṁ sat*.

The object which is in our awareness possesses certain qualities like resistance, impenetrability, shape and form which are in fact due to 'massiveness' in an object. For this reason mass or *tamo-guṇa* is another element present in the object. Again, an object undergoes changes from a particular situation to another situation or from a particular form to another form. This change or movement is due to the third constituent *rajas*, which literally

means dust. As dust covers our eyes, the constituent called *rajas* can cover our eyes and as dust is full of movement, the movement arising from an object is the effect of *rajo-guṇa*.

There is a diversity of opinions among the philosophers in Indian philosophy regarding whether causation implies emergence or origination (*ārambha*) or not. According to some philosophers, effect is an absolutely new event. Another group of philosophers hold that effect is a pre-existing thing which comes into existence in a newly developed form. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika advocated the former standpoint whereas the latter standpoint is advocated by Sāṃkhya-Yoga school. That is to say, the Sāṃkhya is the propounder of *satkāryavāda* i.e. the doctrine that effect exists in the cause prior to production. And Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds *asatkāryavāda*, the doctrine that the effect does not exist before its production in the cause.

According to Sāṃkhya, the effect, pre-exists in the cause in some form or other. From a non-existent object nothing comes into being. In order to support their position Sāṃkhya puts forward the statement of the Gitā, which is in the form '*nāsato vidyete bhāvonābhāvo vidyate sataḥ*' i.e. that which non-existent can never be produced and pre-existent cause is never destroyed.⁴ Sāṃkhya opines that, if the production of a non-existent thing is possible, an absurd entity like hare's horn can not be prevented from being produced. There is no object which comes into being from a non-existent object. Nobody can say that a particular object is produced from a sky-locus which is not-existent in character.⁵

Sāṃkhya says that the production of an effect is nothing but the manifestation of pre-existent fact. Production is coming out of a existent fact and destruction is lapsing of an pre-existing fact. The effect pre-exists in the cause in a latent form which becomes potent by causal operation. Sāṃkhya offers many arguments to prove the pre-existence of the effect. According to them, cause and effect are identical in nature. So if the cause exists, the effect must also exist.⁶ The effect which has got existence must follow from the cause which has also got existence. It is perceived that oil can be drawn if it pre-exists in the sesamum seed. If it does not, it can never be drawn.⁷ It is known that effect pre-exists in the cause due to its capacity of accepting its materials (*Upādāna*). By the term 'material' (*Upādāna*) effect is to be understood. As there is relation of the effect with the cause, it is known that effect pre-exists in the cause. Such type of relation is not possible with a non-extent object. Sāṃkhya argues that there is a necessary relation between cause and effect. Because of necessary relation between cause and effect a definite cause produces a definite effect.⁸ It cannot be argued that an effect is produced without being related with the cause. If it is found, any kind of effect can be produced from any kind of cause, a jar may be produced from a cloth, which is absurd in nature. Between two different things there cannot subsist the relation of the component and composite. So there is no other alternative than to admit a relation of the effect with the cause.⁹

It may be asked whether an object becomes a cause if it is associated with the power of producing an effect or it becomes a

cause without being associated with the power of producing an effect.¹⁰ If the second alternative is taken for granted, the causal relation will unduly extend to the other places.¹¹ That is, there will be no fixed rule as to the cause and effect relation. As a result of this there will arise contingency of producing the effect like jar from the causes like cloth etc., which is not possible. If the first alternative is taken into account, i.e. if an object becomes a cause being associated with the power of producing an effect, it may be urged in this connection whether this power is related to all the effects or some specific effect. If the first alternative is taken for granted, power will unduly extend to other places.¹²

If the second alternative is taken into consideration, it can be said that the power cannot be fixed in a specific effect which is non-existent. As the non-existent object has got no power of its own, an effect which is the object of that power must exist in its cause before the production.¹³ The whole (*avayavi*) is not a separate object or completely different object from the parts. The nature of an effect depends on that of its material cause. An object which is absolutely different from another object cannot be produced out of that object. e.g. a cow cannot be produced from buffalow, a red cloth cannot be produced from yellow thread.¹⁴ From this it is proved that an effect preexists in a cause.

In response to the arguments given by Sāṃkhya philosophers, the Vaiśeṣika questions why the cloth which, according to Sāṃkhya philosophers, exists in threads is not known

though there are causes of perception and desire of the same.¹⁵ According to them (Vaiśeṣikas), for the perception of any object three conditions are necessary which are as follows : (i) the presence of the object which is to be perceived (ii) the desire of the perception of that object (iii) the presence of conditions that are necessary for the perception of that object.(viz, the naturalness of sense organs, the perceptibility of object and the presence of light etc.) So, to admit the presence of cloth in threads before its production is to admit the presence of the above mentioned causes of perception before the production of the cloth. In spite of that, why the cloth is not perceived? – This is the quality of the Vaiśeṣika philosophers to Sāṃkhya philosophers.

In response to the above charge, the Sāṃkhya philosophers are of the opinion that at that time the cloth was non-manifested, and hence it is not perceived.

Here Vaiśeṣika philosophers raise a question : what do they (Sāṃkhya) mean by the term 'non-manifestation'?¹⁶

If by the term 'non-manifestation' denotes 'the absence of apprehension' there will be no difference between opponents' standpoint and Vaiśeṣika's standpoint.¹⁷ The absence of non-apprehension amounts to non-existence which is desired by the Vaiśeṣika philosophers. So Sāṃkhya will have to admit Vaiśeṣika's doctrine that the effect does not pre-exist in the cause. The

arguments that are to be forwarded in support of *Asatkāryavāda* are offered by the opponents (i.e. Sāṃkhya philosophers) who do not support *Asatkāryavāda*. So there is no difference between opponents' standpoint and the Vaiśeṣika's standpoint. So the Sāṃkhya philosophers are ultimately admitting theory of *Asatkāryavāda*.

If by the term 'non-manifestation' (*anabhivyakta*) they mean the absence of the inducer of the necessity which is served by an object which is known, they will have to admit the theory of *Asatkāryavāda*.

For, an object which is the inducer of necessity is produced if it is absent in the effect earlier. As for example, the colour which is the inducer of necessity is produced if it is absent in the cloth.¹⁸ An effect is produced if and only if there is non-existence of that effect before the production. That which exists before the production can never be produced. So according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers, the object which is produced is found to be non-existent before its production. So, it cannot be said that the inducer of the necessity served by a particular object is absent before the production of the object, as it amounts to the prior non-existence of that object. And to admit the prior non-existence of an effect before its production is to admit that the effect does not exist in the cause before production, which is favoured by the Vaiśeṣika philosophers.

The upholders of *Satkāryavāda* may say that, just as sense-organs like eye etc. are causes of perception of cloth, the activity of the weaver of the cloth etc. are also the causes. According to them, cloth is not known due to the non-existence of the above mentioned causes of the perception of cloth, although cloth exists before its production.¹⁹

The above-mentioned view is also not acceptable. Because to admit the presence of all effects before production is to admit the presence of the activity of the weaver of cloth etc. at that time also. It may be argued by the Sāṃkhya philosophers that at first the effects of causes were non-manifested and afterwards they become manifested through those causes that help in producing the perceptual knowledge of the effects like cloth etc.²⁰

Opinion like this is also not acceptable according to the Vaiśeṣika philosophers. The question may arise whether the manifestation of the cause is pre-existent or not. If pre-non-existent, those causes can never be the causes of perception. If pre-existent, there would arise the question of perception of the effects like cloth etc. The latter apprehension of an object which is not known earlier is possible if it is produced afterwards. It is known afterwards as it is produced afterwards.²¹ According to Sāṃkhya philosophers it is impossible to admit the production of an object like sky-lotus which is non-existent in character. Vaiśeṣika philosophers do not accept their opinion. Because they do not make a distinction between what is an absolute non-entity and what is

pre-non-existent. According to the Vaiśeṣikas object may be of various nature. For them, the absolute non-existence is the nature of sky-lotus, on the other hand a jar is both existent and non-existent in nature. It is characterised as non-existent before its production and as existent after its production.

The upholders of *Satkāryavāda* may say that an object can never have opposite properties viz. existence and non-existence.

In response to this, the Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that although the two properties, existence and non-existence can never belong to an object simultaneously but they can belong to an object at different times.²²

It may be asked that non-existence cannot be a property of cloth, as the object having property (*dharmī*) like cloth etc. does not exist before its production.

In response to this, the Vaiśeṣika's reply is that the object which is non-existent can never have the property of existence according to the principle involved in 'specific type of offering is made to a specific type of God'. So non-existence is the property of a non-existent object.²³

How can the property in the form of existence remain in an object which is non-existent before production? In response to this,

the Vaiśeṣika's reply is that with the help of causal operation the previously non-existent is brought into existence. Through the causal operation the previously non-existent object turns into existence, i.e. pre-non-existent effect is changed into existence through the causes like weaver etc.²⁴

According to Sāṃkhya, it is impossible to think of the absolute absence of the connection between an absolutely non-existent effect with an existent cause. If this absolute absence of connection is accepted, then causal operation will unduly extend to other places. From causes like halves of the jar, a cloth may be produced.

The above-mentioned opinion given by Sāṃkhya is not acceptable to the Vaiśeṣikas. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, in threads etc. there is potential power with the help of which an effect like cloth etc. are produced. So the question of undue extension does not arise at all. Moreover, it may be asked to Sāṃkhya philosophers why thread turns into cloth but the halves do not turn into cloth.

In response to this the Sāṃkhya philosopher argue that threads etc. are the nature of cloth, but the property of jar etc. can never be the nature of cloth.²⁵

If the upholders of the *Satkāryavāda* accept the above mentioned view, it will be taken for granted that the material cause

of a particular object is a particular thing. By applying the method of agreement and difference it can be said that in threads etc. there is the power of producing cloth etc.²⁶

According to *Satkāryavāda*, the cause and effect are identical in nature. So if the cause exists, the effect which is not different from cause will also exist. If it is so, the absolute non-existent object (*asiddha* i.e. the object whose existence is not evidently known) is to be proved through the absolutely non-existent reason. If sky-lotus is absolutely non-existent object, it is to be proved as non-existent through some reason which is also absolutely non-existent, as effect and cause are taken as identical by the followers of *Satkāryavāda*.

Again if Sāṃkhya admits that the cause and effect are not identical, the nature, the power etc. of cause and effect will be different. If this world is identical with Prakṛti, like Prakṛti this world would be beyond the reach of the sense organs. But this world is not so. It can be concluded that the cause and effect are not identical in nature but different from each other. So, the effect does not exist in the cause before production.²⁷

Refuting the above-mentioned arguments in favour of *Asatkāryavāda* the Sāṃkhya philosophers reiterate their earlier decision of *Satkāryavāda* repeating the following reasons. Regarding the relation of cause and effect the Sāṃkhya holds that before

actual production, the effect exists in the cause in the form of 'potential energy' which is otherwise described as 'in-built power'. It is not always manifested due to having certain obstacles. As soon as the obstacles are removed, the energy gets a free passage and produces the necessary transformation known as the effect. Creation to them is only the process of transforming the implicit into the explicit form. All things exist in potential form in Prakṛti before creation and at this time the *guṇa*-s are thrown out of balance. Prakṛti changes into different categories of the universe in a gradual way. Although this law of causation reveals to us a continuous process of becoming, changes do not occur in a vacuum. Becoming is the becoming of some dynamic force which is the underlying support of all changes. In this sense the cause and effect are taken as identical by the Sāṃkhya-thinkers. If something is taken as 'non-manifested', it does not mean the 'absence of that object'. Something exists but not properly known by us – this type of object is called non-manifested object. There may remain many objects in the present world, but all of them are not known to us due to their non-manifestation due to absence of certain criteria of knowing due to my absent-mindedness, absence of light etc. Hence, the effect remaining in cause is not always manifested due to having some obstacles, which does not mean its absence.

To Sāṃkhya the modifiable cause of the world is Prakṛti. Prakṛti which is constituted of three *guṇa*-s is real and eternal and at the same time an essentially dynamic principle. It is only a substance which is capable of being modified and hence all

phenomena constituting the world are nothing but so many states of Prakṛti which are potentially present in the causal substance even before their actual manifestation. Matter and energy which exist in a particular causal form changes into the appropriate effect form as soon as the factors responsible of its manifestation become active. The temporal distinctions between the past, present and future states of the effect are possible only on the assumption of the prior existence of the effect in the causal substance, in the form of matter and energy.

In the modern age when it is found that a jar comes into being from a lump of clay, what does actually happen there? The clay-form of the matter and energy becomes implicit and the potentiality of becoming transformed into the jar-form is expressed in its place. The effect is only the transformed cause which is modified in a new fashion. As the effect comes into being from the energy remaining in a cause it is of the same substance. The effect pre-exists in the cause and is a real transformation of the cause.

Such theory of causation tries to explain fully the transformation of one causal substance (i.e. Prakṛti) into the form of this diversified world. One single unitary principle which is the world-cause is becoming many due to having the potentiality of diversification. It is due to the fact that in an act of production one causal substance is undergoing transformation from one state to another. For this reason, it is believed that there is the relation of *tādātmya* (identity) between the cause and the effect from

materialistic standpoint. So far as the material cause (*upādāna*) is concerned, there is an identity between cause and effect. This *tādātmya* alone serves as the ground for establishing the existence of Prakṛti as the material cause of the world after observing the facts and phenomena of the world. That is why, this causal theory is also known as *Parināmvāda*. An object is called transformation (*parinama*) if it is an effect whose existence is equal to that of its material cause. ("Upādāna-sama-sattāka-kāryāpattiḥ" – *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Pratyakṣa pariccheda). In this case, there is an equality between a cause and an effect due to the acceptance of identity (*tādātmya*) between them.

The above-mentioned thesis is corroborated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa also in the kārika no. 8. It has been clearly stated that the intellect and the rest are both like and unlike Prakṛti. (*Prakṛti svarūpāṇi virūpāṇi ca*). In other words, the effect is identical with the cause in respect of the matter or *upādāna* while the effect is different from the cause so far as the form is concerned.

In this way the metaphor of iron-parts and magnet can be substantiated from the Sāṃkhya point of view. The iron-parts can move because there is inherent energy in them which is manifested through the circumstances i.e. through the magnetic influence. It is to be borne in mind that both magnet and iron particles are unconscious in nature. Sometimes the energy remaining in an object becomes more manifested due to the 'situation' when another unconscious object becomes a factor. Let us take an

example of water. The power or energy in water becomes manifested if and only if it is thrown from above or certain high altitude. This high altitude which is also a part of Prakṛti becomes 'factor' in bringing out the 'in-built' power of the object. In the same way the in-built power existing in iron-particle may be brought out through the contribution of the magnetic influence. So Prakṛti has to be taken as full of energy which becomes the cause of creation etc. of this beautiful world.

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1. Bhartrihari - *Nīśataka*, verse no. 64.
2. Ranganathananda, Swami (Trs.) : *Eternal Values for a Changing Society*, P.580, Bharatiya Vidya Bhawan, Bombay, 1971.
3. *Ibid*, p. 582
4. *Gīta*, 3/16
5. "Na byāsato gaganakuśumasya sattvaṃ kencicchakyaṃ kartum." – Commentary known as '*Nyāyakandali*' on *Praśastapādabhāṣya*. P.no. 369, Vārānasī edition.
6. "Sataśca satkāraṇaṃ yuktameva taddharmatvāt." – *Ibid*.
7. "Dṛṣtam hi tileṣu sat eva tailasya niṣpīḍanena kāraṇam." – *Ibid*.

8. "Itaśca satkāryam - upādānagrahaṇāt, upādānāmi kāraṇāni teṣāṃ kāryeṇa grahaṇam kāryasya taiḥ saha sambandhaḥ tasmāttat kāryam sadeva, avidyamānasya ambandhābhāvāt." – *Ibid.*
9. "Asambaddhameva kāryam kāraṇaiḥ kriyata iti cet? Na sarva sambhavābhāvāt, asambaddhatvaviśeṣe sarvam sarvasmādbhavet. Na caivam, tasmāt kāryam prāgutpatteḥ kāraṇaiḥ saha sambaddham." – *Ibid.* P.340
10. "Api ca śaktasya janakatvam aśaktasya vā ?" – *Ibid.*
11. "Aśaktasya janaktve tāvadatiprasaktiḥ." – *Ibid.*
12. "Śaktasya janakatva tu kimasya śaktiḥ sarvatra ? Kvacidevā va ? Sarvatra saivātivāpitiḥ." – *Ibid.*
13. "Kathamasati tasmin kāraṇasya tatra śaktirniyateti vaktavyam, asoto. Viśyatvāyogāt. Tasmācchaktasya yacchakyaṃ śaktiviśayo yo'rthaḥ tasya karaṇātprāgapi śakyam sadeva." – *Ibid.* P. 141
14. "Ito'pi satkāryam kāraṇabhāvāt, kāraṇa svabhāvam kāryamiti nānyo'vayavī avayavebhya-staddeśtvāt. Yattu yasmādanyatra tattasya deśo yathā gouraśvetyādibhiḥ pramānaiḥ pratipāditam, Kāraṇam ca sat, atastadavyatireki kāryamapi sadeveti." – *Ibid.*
15. "Atrocyate yadi kāraṇavyāpārāt prāgapi patastantuṣusanneva, kimutyu-palabdhikāraṇeṣu satsu satyāmapi jijñāsāyām no palabhyate ?" – *Ibid.*
16. "Anabhivyaktatvāditi cet ? Keyamanabhivyaktiḥ ?" – *Ibid.*

17. "Yadyupalabdherabhāvastasyaivānupapattis-coditā katharṁ tadevottaram ?" – *Ibid.*
18. "Athopalabdhiyogyasyārtha kriyānivartanakṣamasya rūpasya biraho'nabhivyaktiḥ ? Tadānīmasatkāryavādaḥ, tathābhātasya rūpasya prāgabhava paścādbhāvāt." – *Ibid.*
19. "Atha mataṁ paṭasya cakṣurādivat kubindā-dikāraṇavyāpāro' pyupalabdhi-kāraṇam tasyābhavāt sato'pyanupa-labdhiriti ?" – *Ibid.*
20. "Na, kāraṇavyāpāro'pi pūrvamanathivyaktaḥ samprati, kāraṇairabhivyajyamāno bhāvamupalambhayatīti cet ?" – *Ibid.*
21. "Abhivyaktirapi yadyasatī ? katharṁ tasyāḥ kāraṇam ? Satīti cedbhāvopalambhaprasaṅga-stadavastha eveti kasyacidapūrv-asya viśeṣasyopajananamantareṇa prāganupalabdhasya paścādupalambho durghaṭaḥ." - *Ibid.*
22. "Yaccoktarṁ - asadaś'akyakaraṇarṁ vyomakusumavaditi, tatra svadhāvabhedād asadeka svabhāvarṁ gaganakuśumarṁ, sadasatsvabhāvam tu ghaṭādikaṁ. Tatpūrvamasat pas'cād sadbhavati. katharṁ sadasatorekatra na birodha iti cet ? Kālabhedena samābeśāt" – *Ibid.*
23. "Prāgutpatteh paṭasya dharmino'bhāvāt kathamasattvarṁ tasya dharmaiti cet ? Yādrś'o yakṣastādrśo valiḥ sattvamasato dharmo na syādasatvarṁ tvasata eva yuktarṁ." – *Ibid.*
24. "Yadasatopūrvamasīt tasya katharṁ sattvamiti cet ? Kāraṇasāmarthyāt, asti śako'pi mahimā turyādinām yadeteṣu sambhūya vyāpriyamāneṣvasanneva paṭaḥ sambhavati" – *Ibid.*

25. "Asato' Sambaddhasya janyatve' tiprasaktiriti cennaitat,
tantujātīyasya paṭajātīya eva. Sāmurthyāt. Kuta etat ?
Tvatpakṣe'pi kuta etat ? Tantuṣveva paṭātmatā na sarvatreti ?
Vastusvābhavyādīcet ?" - *Ibid.*
26. "Saivātrāpi bhavīsyati. Ataeva copādānaniyamah,
anvayavyātīrekāvyaṁ tajjātīyanīyamane tajjātīyasya
śaktyavadhāraṇāt." – *Ibid.*
27. "Yatpunaretat kāryakāraṇayoravyātīrekāt
kāraṇāvasthānadeva kāryasyāpyavasthānamiti,
tadasiddhamasiddhena sādhitam kāryakāraṇayoḥ
svarūpaś' aktisamsthānabhedasya pratyakṣasiddhatvāt.
Pradhānātmakaviśvasyā tīndriyatva prasangācca."
- *Ibid.*