

Preface

I was drawn to the theme of this project work by my observation of widespread scepticism about values, particularly moral values, not only among intellectuals, but also among common people. And that created a curiosity in mind about the rationality of scepticism in morality. The theme of my project is an attempt to come to grips with it.

*Since Descartes' *Meditations* many philosophers in the West have been concerned to defend the rationality of our beliefs from the threat of scepticism about our knowledge of the external world. The idea that there might be nothing which we know, or more radically, which we have even the slightest reason to believe, is one that many philosophers have thought to be deserving of serious attention. It seems somewhat surprising; therefore, that there has not been similar attention given to what one might call the application of scepticism to morality. Mine is a humble attempt to address this problem here. I have not said anything strikingly new. Rather, I have tried to restate, reanalyze positions and arguments, clarify concepts and theories in the area of moral scepticism, and add critical comments in defending my contention that scepticism in relation to morality is not sustainable.*

In my work I have used the spelling 'scepticism'. Although, the spelling 'skepticism', wherever it occurs in the literature, is kept intact. In Chapter I, which is the introductory chapter I

have made a general survey of scepticism. In Chapter II, the issue of moral scepticism is taken up and its varieties are distinguished. The ways in which epistemological scepticism and moral scepticism are similar and different are also discussed. One aspect of this Chapter is a discussion of Moore's view in the *Principia Ethica* as providing impetus to both epistemological and ontological moral scepticism.

In the third chapter, the different arguments defending moral scepticism directly and indirectly are stated and elaborated. In Chapter IV these arguments are considered with a view to examine their cogency.

The concluding remark is an overview of what has been done in the main exposition.

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