

# **Terrorism : Its Moral Implication**

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for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Arts)

Submitted By

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The present thesis “Terrorism-Its moral implication” is the outcome of my attempt to look at terrorism in its manifold forms in relation to the philosophy of morality. There are many who have helped me in many ways to accomplish this task. I sincerely acknowledge their invaluable help and guidance.

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## INTRODUCTION

A1

At the outset, it is important to understand that the study of terrorism is, first and foremost a study of human behaviour. It is an investigation of highly volatile human interaction. Courses that investigate terrorism must therefore review the events, ideas, motivations, theories and histories that result in terrorist violence. None of these factors can be discussed in isolation from one another if somebody wishes to develop a facility for critically evaluating the nature of terrorism. Thus, the study of terrorism is one of the most multidisciplinary subjects in the social sciences. It is also one of the most dynamic subjects.

The introductory chapter presents an overview of the basic concepts that are developed in the first chapter. This chapter begins with an update of the post-September 11, 2001, war on terrorism, and the dawn of the new era of terrorism is highlighted. The discussion explores historical perspectives, definitional issues, and the morality of terrorist violence. An investigation is made of terrorism and criminal skill, as well as the symbolism of the Oklahoma City and September 11, 2001, attacks.

In the second chapter an attempt has been made to investigate the relation of terrorism with other social aspects. In this respect socio-political, sociological,

psychological, socio-economic and socio-religious impact of terrorism and its relations have been tried to analysed.

In the third chapter an effort has been made to discuss the foundation of terrorism. In this chapter some points are highlighted such as defining extremism, common characteristics of violent extremist, the world of extremist, defining terrorism as an ongoing debate, American context of defining terrorism, types of terrorism, perspective of terrorism as definitional problem etc. Effort continues to discuss whether terrorism can be justified or not. Within this discussion some views are highlighted such as justification of terrorism are unsuccessful, the excuses of terrorism, the response to terrorism, oppression and terrorism, the appeal to morality versus the appeal to law, attacking the innocents etc. from the philosophical point of view.

In the fourth chapter an attempt has been taken to discuss the relation and influence of terrorism on Human Rights. In this chapter we have discussed the protection of Human Rights that has been made by International and National Human Rights commissions and Organizations. Considering the basic goals, some points are highlighted in this chapter. These are as follows: Terrorism and Human Rights, Countering terrorism and protecting Human Rights, International Law, Campaign against Terrorism protecting Human Rights, State Autonomy and International System, The actions of civil society, The action and Initiatives of civil societies are included within this chapter for discussion.

In the concluding chapter I have tried to put forward my opinions regarding terrorism and its morality. This chapter critically looked at the various attempts, which are made to define terrorism, and in this chapter I have tried to pin point the reason why such a definition has so far included political and academic circle And I have also here tried to give my own opinion. Besides, an attempt has been made here to find out how we can win the war on terror. This chapter also consists some important concepts that are highlighted as supply of arms, the concept of rule of Law etc. Some discussions have been put forward against repression by Government and its consequences; the role of intellectuals as well as the status of common people has been discussed. Since every terrorist activity hits human rights, we have no way of knowing what future historians will say about us and our first decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but we do know that we have suffered through many wars-two world wars, the bloody wars of Vietnam, Middle East, Iraq, and several other wars whose end is not yet. Above all, we are deeply disturbed because we do not fully understand the nature of their import. Similarly, it may be noted that ULFA, NSCN (IM and K), NDFB, MAOIST, DHD (J&N), PLP etc. (Revolutionary organizations) of northeastern region of India are not covered within the framework of mainstream terrorism for discussion , because the nature of present scenario of insurgency needs more discussions. Finally the chapter concludes with the view that terrorism is neither permissible as political action nor

as moral action by virtue of “end” and “means” because the means adopted by a terrorist is extremely violent and criminal in nature that is not permissible at all. Secondly the “end” of terrorism creates unpredictable consequences in reality. Of course there are examples of having successful end but we can realize that it was due to the loss of human rights at large. If for instance it is considered that the loss of human rights as well as humanity is inferior than gaining of any other rights then we are extremely sorry to say that we are violating our own rights and consequently there will be no scope to discuss about morality. Further unless human beings try to achieve heavenly feelings of mankind such as brotherhood, love, Gandhian non-violence, benovelence, passion, etc. we never success to bring out solution to terrorism. So, we need a peaceful environment for solving our antisocial, antispiritual and all moral problems.

## CHAPTER- 1

### HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF TERRORISM:

Terrorism is a dark feature of human behaviour since the dawn of recorded history. Great leaders have been assassinated, groups and individuals have committed acts of incredible violence, and entire cities and nations have been put to the sword-all in the name of defending a greater good. Terrorism, however defined, has always challenged the stability of societies and the peace of mind of everyday people. In the modern era, the impact of terrorism-that is, its ability to terrorize- is not limited to the specific locales or regions where the terrorists strike. In the age of television, the internet, satellite communications, the global news coverage, graphic images of terrorist incidents are broadcast instantaneously in to the homes of hundreds of millions of people. Terrorist groups understand the power of these images, and they manipulate them to their advantage as much as they can. Terrorist states also fully appreciate the power of instantaneous information, and so they try to control the "spin" on reports of their behaviour. In many respects, the beginning of the 21st century is an era of globalized terrorism.

Some acts of political violence are clearly acts of terrorism. Most people would agree that politically motivated planting of bombs in market places, massacres of "enemy" civilians, and the routine use of torture by governments are terrorist acts. However, our study of terrorism as it is important to appreciate that we will

encounter many definitional “gray areas.” Depending on which side of the ideological, racial, religious, or national fence one sits, political violence can be interpreted either as acts of unmitigated terrorist barbarity or as freedom fighting and national liberation. These gray areas will be explored in the chapters that follow.

**September 11, 2001: The dawn of a New Era.** The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the U.S. homeland were seen by many as a turning point in the history of political violence. In the aftermath of these attacks, journalists, scholars, and national leaders repeatedly described the emergence of a new international terrorist environment. It was argued that within this new environment, terrorists were now quite capable of using- and very willing to use- weapons of mass destruction to inflict unprecedented casualties and destruction on enemy targets. These attacks seemed to confirm warnings from experts during the 1990s that a new Terrorism,<sup>1</sup> using “asymmetrical” methods, would characterize the terrorist environment in the new millennium.

The modern era of terrorism is primarily a conflict between adversaries who on one side are waging a self-described war on terrorism and on the other side are waging a self-described holy war in defense of their religion. It is an active confrontation, as evidenced by the fact that the incidence of significant terrorist attacks often spikes to serious levels. For example, the number of significant terrorist attacks more than tripled from the 175 in 2003 to 655 in 2004.<sup>2</sup>

Although such trends are disturbing, it is critically important for one to keep these facts in perspective, because the modern terrorist environment is in no manner a unique circumstance in human history.

It will become clear in the following pages that the history of terrorist behavior extends into antiquity and that common themes and concept span the ages. State terrorism, dissident terrorism, and other types of political violence are found in all periods of human civilization. It will also become clear to readers that there are many common justifications rooted in basic beliefs that have been used to rationalize terrorist violence throughout history. For example, the following concepts hold true regardless of the context of history, culture, or region:

- \* Those who practice revolutionary violence and state repression always claim to champion noble causes and values.
- \* Policies that advocate extreme violence always cite righteous goals to justify their behaviour – such as the need to defend a religious faith or defend the human rights of people.
- \* The perpetrators of violent acts uniformly maintain that they are freedom fighters (in the case of governments).

### **Historical perspectives on terrorism:**

It is perhaps natural for each generation to view history narrowly, from within its own political context. Contemporary commentators and laypersons tend to interpret modern events as though they have no historical precedent. However,

terrorism is by no means a modern phenomenon, and in fact it has a long history. Nor does terrorism arise from a political vacuum. The present author will explore the cause of terrorism in detail afterwards; let us submit now a brief summary of several historical periods to illustrate the global and timeless sweep of terrorist behaviour.

### **A. Antiquity:**

In the ancient world, cases and stories of state repression and political violence were common. Several ancient writers championed tyrannicide (the killing of tyrants) as for the greater good of the citizenry and to delight the gods some assassins were honored by the public. For example, when Aristogeiton and Hermodius assassinated the tyrant Hipparchus, statues were erected to honor them after their executions. Conquerors often set harsh examples by exterminating entire populations or forcing the conquered into exile. An example of this practice is the Babylonian Exile, which followed the conquest of the kingdom of Judea. Babylon's victory resulted in the forced removal of the Judean population to Babylon in 598 and 587 B.C.E. Those in authority also repressed the expression of ideas from individuals whom they deemed dangerous, sometimes violently.

In ancient Greece, Athenian authorities sentenced the great philosopher Socrates to death in 399 B.C.E. for allegedly corrupting the city-state's youth and

meddling in religious affairs. He drank hemlock and died in front of his students and followers.

### **B. The Roman age:**

During the time of Roman Empire, the political world was rife with many violent demonstrations of power, which are arguably examples of what we would now term state terrorism. These include the brutal suppression of Spartacus's followers after the servile war of 73-71 B.C.E., after which the Romans crucified surviving rebels along the Appian Way's route to Rome. Crucifixion was used as a form of public execution in Rome, and involved affixing condemned persons to a cross or other wooden platform. The condemned were either nailed through the wrist or hand or tied on the platform; they died by suffocation as their bodies sagged.

Warfare was waged in an equally hard manner, as evidenced by the final conquest of the north African city-state of Carthage in 146 B.C.E.. The city was reportedly allowed to burn for 10 days, the rubble was crushed; the salt was symbolically ploughed into the soil to signify that Carthage would forever remain desolate. During another successful campaign in 106 C.E., the Dacian nation (modern Romania) was eliminated, its population was enslaved, and many Dacians perished in gladiatorial games. In other conquered territories, conquest was often accompanied by similar demonstrations of terror, always with the

intent to demonstrate that Roman rule would be wielded without mercy against those who did not submit to the authority of the empire.

Regicide (the killing of kings) was also fairly common during the Roman age. Perhaps the best-known political incident in ancient Rome was the assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 B.C.E. by rivals in the senate. Other Roman emperors also met violent fates: Caligula and Galba were killed by the Praetorian Guard in 41 and 68 C.E. respectively; Domitian was stabbed to death in 96 C.E. a paid gladiator murdered Commodus in 193 .C.E. and Caracalla, Elagabalus, and other emperors either were assassinated or died suspiciously.<sup>3</sup>

### **C.The Ancient and Medieval Middle East:**

Cases exist of movement in the ancient and medieval Middle East that what modern analysts would consider to be terrorist tactics .For example, in *History of the Jewish War*— a seven volume account of the first Jewish rebellion against Roman occupation (66-73 C.E ) the historian Flavius Josephus describes how one faction of the rebels, the *sicarii*(named after their preferred use of *sica*, or short, curved daggers), attacked both Romans and members of the Jewish establishment.<sup>4</sup> They were masters of guerrilla warfare and the destruction of symbolic property and belonged to a group known as the Zealots (from the Greek *zelos*, meaning ardor or strong spirit), who opposed the Roman occupation of Palestine. The modern term zealot, used to describe uncompromising devotion to radical change, is derived from the name of this group. Assassination was a

commonly used tactic. Some *sicarii* zealots were present at the siege of Masada, a hilltop fortress that held out against the Romans for three years before the defenders committed suicide in 74 C.E. rather than surrender.

#### **D.The French Revolution: Prelude to Modern Terrorism.**

During the French Revolution, British statesman and philosopher Edmond Burke coined the word terrorism in its modern context. He used the word to describe the regime de la terrier, commonly known in English as the Reign of Terror (June 1793 to July 1794).<sup>5</sup> The Reign of Terror, led by the radical Jacobin-dominated government, is a good example of state terrorism carried out to further the goals of a revolutionary ideology.<sup>6</sup> During the terror, Thousands of opponents to the Jacobin dictatorship –and others merely perceived to be enemies of the new revolutionary republic —were arrested and put on trial before a revolutionary Tribunal. Those found to be enemies of the Republic were beheaded by a new instrument of execution –the guillotine .The guillotine had the capability to execute victims one after the other in assembly –line fashion and was regarded by Jacobins and revolutionaries at the time as an enlightened and civilized tool of revolutionary justice.

The ferocity of the reign of terror is reflected in the numbers of victims: Between 17,000 and 40,000 persons were executed and perhaps 200,000 political prisoners died in prisons from disease and starvation.<sup>7</sup> Two incidents illustrate the communal nature of this violence: In Lyon 700 people were massacred by

cannon fire in the town square, and in Nantes thousands were drowned in the Loire River when the boats they were detained in were sunk.<sup>8</sup> The revolutionary tribunal is a symbol of revolutionary justice and state terrorism that has its modern counterparts in 20<sup>th</sup> century social upheavals. Recent examples include the “struggle meetings” in revolutionary china (public criticism sessions, involving public humiliation and confession) and revolutionary Iran’s Komitehs (ad hoc “people’s committees”.)<sup>9</sup>

#### **E.Nineteenth- century Europe: Two Examples from the Left.**

Modern left-wing terrorism is not a product of the 20<sup>th</sup> century .Its ideological ancestry dates to the 19<sup>th</sup> century, when anarchist and communist philosophers began to advocate the destruction of capitalist and imperial society- what Karl Marx referred to as the “spectre...haunting Europe.”<sup>10</sup> Some revolutionaries readily encouraged the use of terrorism in the new cause. One theorist, Karl Heinzen in Germany, anticipated the late -20<sup>th</sup>-century fear that terrorist might obtain weapons of mass destruction when he supported the acquisition of new weapons technologies to utterly destroy the enemies of the people. According to Hansen, these weapons should include poison gas and new high –yield explosive. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, several terrorist movements championed the rights of the lower classes. These movements were prototypes for 20<sup>th</sup> century groups and grew out of social and political environments that were unique to their countries.

To illustrate this point, the following two cases are drawn from early industrial England and the semi feudal Russia context of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.

The Luddites were English workers in the early 1800s who objected to the social and economic transformations of the industrial revolution. Their principal objection was that industrialization threatened their jobs, and so they targeted the machinery of the new textile factories. Textile mills and weaving machinery were disrupted and sabotaged. For example, they attacked stocking looms that mass-produced stockings at the expense of skilled stocking weavers who made them by hand.

A mythical figure, Ned Ludd, was the supposed founder of the Luddite movement. The movement was active from 1811 to 1816 and was responsible for sabotaging and destroying wool and cotton mills. The British government eventually suppressed the movement by passing anti-Luddite laws, including establishing the crime of "machine breaking," which was punishable by death. After 17 Luddites were executed in 1813, the movement gradually died out. Modern anti-technology activists and terrorists, such as the Unabomber, Theodore "Ted" Kaczynski, in the United States, are sometimes referred to as neo-Luddites.

People's Will (Narodnaya Volya) in Russia was a direct outgrowth of student dissatisfaction with the czarist regime in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Many young

Russian university students, some of whom had studied abroad, became imbued with the ideals of anarchism and Marxism. Many of these students became radical reformists who championed the rights of the people, particularly the peasant class. A populist revolutionary society, Land and Liberty (Zemlya Volya), was founded in 1876 with the goal of fomenting a mass peasant uprising by settling radical students among them to raise their class-consciousness. After a series of arrests and mass public trials, Land and Liberty split into two factions in 1879. One faction, Black Repartition, kept to the goal of a peasant revolution. The other fraction was People's will, which fashioned itself into a conspiratorial terrorist organization.

People's Will members believed that they understood the underlying problems of Russia better than the uneducated masses of people did, and that they concluded that they were therefore better able to force government change. This was, in fact, one of the first examples of a revolutionary vanguard strategy. They believed that they could both demoralize the czarist government and expose its weakness to the peasantry. People's Will quickly embarked on a terrorist campaign against carefully selected targets. Incidents of terror committed by Peoples Will members and revolutionaries who emulated them –included shooting, knifings, and bombings against government officials .In one successful attack, Czar Alexander II was assassinated by a terrorist bomb on March 1, 1881. The immediate outcome of the terrorist campaign was the installation of a

repressive police state in Russia that, although not as efficient as the police states would be in the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, succeeded in harassing and imprisoning most members of people's will.

#### **F. The modern Era and the War on Terrorism:**

From the viewpoint of human history, it is clear that terrorism is deeply woven into the fabric of social and political conflict. This quality has not been changed, and in the modern world states and targeted populations are challenged by the new terrorism, which is characterized by the following:

- \* Loose, cell-based networks with minimal lines of command and control
- \* Desired acquisition of high-intensity weapons and weapons of mass destruction
- \* Politically vague, religious, or mystical motivations
- \* "Asymmetrical" methods that maximize casualties
- \* Skillful use of the Internet and manipulation of the media

The new terrorism should be contrasted with traditional terrorism, which is typically characterized by the following:

- \* clearly identifiable organizations or movements.
- \* Use of conventional weapons, usually small arms and explosives.
- \* explicit grievances championing specific classes or ethno-national groups.
- \* Relatively "surgical" selection of targets.

New information technologies and the Internet create unprecedented opportunities for terrorists groups, and violent extremists have become adept at bringing their wars into the homes of literally hundreds of millions of people. Those who specialize in suicide bombings, car bombs, or mass casualty attacks correctly calculate that carefully selected targets will attract the attention of a global audience. Thus, cycles of violence not only disrupt normal routines, but they also produce long period of global awareness. Such cycles can be devastating. For example, during the winter and spring of 2005, Iraqi suicide bombings increased markedly in intensity and frequency, from 69 in April 2005 (a record rate) to 90 in May.<sup>11</sup> These attacks resulted in many casualties, including hundreds of deaths, and greatly outpaced the previous cycle of car bombings by more than two or one.

All of these threats offer new challenges for policy makers about how to respond to the behaviour of terrorist states, groups, and individuals. The war on terrorism launched in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, seemed to herald a new resolve to end terrorism. This has proven to be a difficult task. The war has been fought on many levels, as exemplified by the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the disruption of terrorist cells on several continents. There have been serious terrorist strikes such as those in Madrid, (Spain); Bali, (Indonesia), London, (England) and Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt. In addition, differences have arisen within the post September 11

alliance, creating significant strains. It is clear that the war will likely to be a long-term prospect with many unanticipated events.

## **G. Exploring Definitions and Sources:**

At the outset it is very important to develop a basic understanding of several issues underlying the study of terrorism. These issues are ongoing topics of research and debate among scholars, officials, the media, and activists, and all of them will be explored in greater detail in later chapters. The discussion here profiles the following:

1. First Definitions: Extremism and Terrorism
2. Sources of Terrorism

### **1. First Definition: Extremism and Terrorism**

Extremism is a quality that is “radical in opinion, especially in political matters; ultra; advanced.”<sup>12</sup> It is characterized by intolerance towards opposing interests and divergent opinions, and it is the primary catalyst and motivation for terrorist behaviour. Extremist who cross the line to become terrorists always develop noble arguments to rationalize and justify acts of violence directed against enemy nations, people, religions, or other interests.

It is important to understand that extremism is a radical expression of one’s political values. Both the content of ones beliefs and the style in which one

expresses those beliefs are basic elements for defining extremism. Laird Wilcox summed up this quality as follows:

Extremism is more an issue of style than of content.... Most people can hold radical or unorthodox views and still entertain them in a more or less reasonable, rational, and nondogmatic manner. On the other hand, I have met people whose views are fairly close to the political mainstream but were presented in a shrill, uncompromising, bullying, and distinctly authoritarian manner.

Thus a fundamental definitional issue for extremism is how one expresses an idea, in addition to the question of which belief one acts upon. Both elements—style and content- are important for our investigation of fringe beliefs and terrorist behaviour. We will build on these themes when the extremist foundations of terrorism are explored in the forthcoming.

Terrorism would not, from a layman's point of view, seem to be a difficult concept to define. Most of the people hold an instinctive understanding that terrorism is

\*Politically motivated violence.

\*Usually directed against "Soft targets" (i.e., civilian and administrative government targets), and\*With an intention to affect or terrorize a target audience.This instinctive understanding would also hold that terrorism is a criminal, unfair, or otherwise illegitimate use of force. Layman might presume that this is an easily understood concept, but defining terrorism is not such a

simple process. Experts have for some time grappled with designing (and agreeing on) clear definitions of terrorism; the issue has, in fact, been at the center of an ongoing debate. The result of this debate is a remarkable variety of approaches and definitions. Walter Laqueur noted, “more than a hundred definitions have been offered,” including several of his own.<sup>13</sup> Even within the U.S. government, different agencies apply several definitions. These definitional problems are explored further in the next chapter.

## **2. Sources of Terrorism:**

The underlying causes of terrorism have also been the subject of extensive discussion, debate, and research. This is perhaps because the study of the sources of terrorism spans many disciplines including sociology, psychology, criminology, and political science. Now, a general model will serve as a starting point for developing our understanding factors, which lead to terrorist violence. To begin, we must understand that political violence, including terrorism, has systematic origins that can be ameliorated. Social and economic pressures, frustrated political aspirations, and in a more proximate sense, the personal experiences of terrorists and their relations, all contribute to the terrorist reservoir.

Nehemia Friedland designed “a convenient framework for the analysis of the antecedents of political terrorism,”<sup>14</sup> outlined as follows:

*First*, terrorism is a group phenomenon...perpetrated by organized groups whose members have a clear group identity-national, religious or ideological. *Second*, political terrorism has its roots in intergroup conflict.... *Third*, “insurgent terrorism,”...is a “strategy of the weak.”(P.82, italics added)

One should appreciate that these issues continue to be a source of intensive debate. Nevertheless, working definitions have been adopted as a matter of logical necessity. Let us presume then that terrorist acts are grounded in extremist beliefs that arise from group identity, intergroup conflict, and a chosen strategy.

#### **H. THE MORALITY OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE:**

The term terrorism has acquired a decidedly pejorative (negative) meaning in the modern era, so that few if any states or groups who espouse political violence ever refer to themselves as terrorist. Nevertheless, these same states and groups can be unabashedly extremist in their beliefs or violent in their behaviour. They often invoke- and manipulate-images of a malevolent threat or unjust conditions to justify their actions .The question is whether these justifications are morally satisfactory (and thereby validate extremist violence), or whether terrorism is inherently wrong.It is helpful to review two concepts that are used in the study of criminal justice .In criminal law, the terms *mala prohibita* and *mala in se*<sup>15</sup> are applied to behaviours that society defines as deviant acts. They represent concepts that are very useful for the study of terrorism.

Mala prohibita acts are “crimes that are made illegal by legislation.”<sup>16</sup> These acts are illegal because society has declared them to be wrong; they are not inherently immoral, wicked, or evil. Examples include laws prohibiting gambling and prostitution, which are considered to be moral prohibitions against socially unacceptable behaviours rather than prohibitions of fundamental evils.

Mala in se acts are crimes “that are immoral or wrong in themselves.” These acts cannot be justified in civilized society, and they have no acceptable qualities. For example, premeditated murder and forcible rape are mala in se crimes. They will never be legalized.

Are terrorist methods fundamentally evil? Perhaps so, because terrorism commonly evokes images of maximum violence against innocent victims carried out in the name of a higher cause. However, is terrorist violence always such a bad thing? Are not some causes worth fighting for? Killing for? Dying for? Is not terrorism simply a matter of one’s point of view? Most would agree that basic values such as freedom and liberty are indeed worth fighting for, and sometimes killing or dying for. If so, perhaps “where you stand depends on where you sit.” Thus, if the bombs are falling on your head, is it not an act of terrorism? If the bombs are falling on an enemy’s head in the name of your freedom, how can it possibly be terrorism? Morality is not always a relative consideration, for many behaviors are indeed mala in se. However, this is not always an easy analysis

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because violence committed by genuinely oppressed people can arguably raise questions of mala prohibitum as a matter of perspective.

Critical evaluation of the following quotations would help to address these difficult moral issues:

“One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.”

“One man willing to throw away his life is enough to terrorize a thousand.”

“Extremism in defense of liberty is no vice.”

“It became necessary to destroy the town to save it.”

**“One Persons Terrorist Is Another Persons Freedom Fighter.”**

The authorship of this statement is unknown; it most likely originated in one form or another in the remote historical past. The concept embodied in this quotation is, very simply, perspective. It is a concept that will be applied throughout our examination of terrorist groups, movements, and individuals. As it will become abundantly clear, terrorists never consider themselves to be the “bad guys” in their struggle for what they would define as freedom. They might admit that they have been forced by a powerful and ruthless opponent to adopt terrorist methods, but they see themselves as freedom fighters. Benefactors of terrorists always live with clean hands, because they present their clients as plucky freedom fighters. Likewise, nations that use the technology of war to attack

known civilian targets justify their sacrifice as incidental to the greater good of the cause.

**“One Man Willing to Throw Away His Life Is Enough To Terrorize a Thousand.”**

This quotation was written by the Chinese military philosopher Wu Ch’I, who wrote, “Now suppose there is a desperate bandit lurking in the fields and one thousand men set out in pursuit of him. The reason all look for him as they would a wolf is that each one fears that he will arise and harm him. This is the reason one man willing to throw away his life is enough to terrorize a thousand.”<sup>17</sup> This quotation is the likely source for the better-known statement “kill one man, terrorize a thousand.” The authorship of the latter is undetermined but has been attributed to the leader of the Chinese Revolution, Mao Zedong, and to the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu. Both Wu ch’I and sun Tzu are often discussed in conjunction with each other, but Sun Tzu may be a mythical figure. Sun Tzu’s book *The Art of War* has become a classic study of warfare. Regardless of who originated these phrases, their simplicity explains the value of a motivated individual who is willing to sacrifice him or her when committing an act of violence. They suggest that the selfless application of lethal force- in combination with correct timing, surgical precision, and an unambiguous purpose- is an invaluable weapon of war .It is also an obvious tactic for small,

motivated groups that are vastly outnumbered and outgunned by a more powerful adversary.

**“Extremism in Defense of Liberty Is No Vice”<sup>18</sup>**

Senator Barry M. Goldwater of Arizona made this statement during his bid for the presidency in 1964. The theme of his campaign was very conservative and anti-communist. However, because of the nations rivalry with the Soviet Union during this period in American political history, every major candidate was overtly anti –communist. Thus, Goldwater tried to outdo incumbent President Lyndon Johnson, his main rival on this issue. This quotation represents an uncompromising belief in the absolute righteousness of a cause .It defines a clear belief in good versus evil and a belief that the end justifies the means .If one simply substitutes any cause for the word liberty in the quotation, one can fully understand how it lends itself to the legitimization of uncompromising devotion to the cause. Terrorists use this reasoning to justify their belief that they are defending their championed interest (be it ideological, racial, religious, or national) against all perceived enemies –who are, of course, evil. Hence, the practice of ethnic cleansing was begun by Serb militias during the war in Bosnia in 1991-1995 to forcibly remove Muslims and Croats from villages and towns. This was done in the name of Bosnian Serb security and historical claims to land

occupied by others.<sup>19</sup> Bosnian and Croat paramilitaries later practiced ethnic cleansing to create their own ethnically “pure” enclaves.

**“It Became Necessary to Destroy the Town to Save It.”<sup>20</sup>**

This quotation has been attributed to a statement made by an American officer during the war in Vietnam. When asked why a village thought to be occupied by the enemy had been destroyed, he allegedly replied that American soldiers had destroyed the village to save it.<sup>21</sup> The symbolic logic behind this statement is very seductive: If the worst thing that can happen to a village is to be occupied by an enemy, then destroying it is a good thing. The village has been denied to the enemy, and it has been saved from the horrors of enemy occupation. The symbolism of the village can be replaced by any number of symbolic values.

Terrorist uses this kind of reasoning to justify hardships that they impose not only on a perceived enemy but also on their own-championed group. For example, the nihilist dissident terrorists, who are content to wage “revolution for revolution’s sake.” They have no concrete plan for what kind of society will be built upon the rubble of the old one-their goal is simply to destroy an inherently evil system. To them, anything is better than the existing order. A historical example of this reasoning on an enormous scale is found in the Great War between two totalitarian and terrorist states-Germany and the soviet union- from

July 1941 to May 1945. Both sides used scorched-earth tactics as a matter of policy when their armies retreated, destroying towns, crops, roadways, bridges, factories, and other infrastructure as a way to deny resources to the enemy.

### **I. Terrorism and Criminal skill:**

Terrorism is condemned internationally as an illegal use of force and an illegitimate expression of political will. Applying this concept of illegality, one can argue that terrorists are criminals and that terrorist attacks require some degree of criminal skill. For example, the radical Islamic network Al Qaeda set up an elaborate financial system to sustain its activities. This financial system included secret bank accounts, front companies, offshore bank accounts, and charities.<sup>21</sup> Al Qaeda is an example of a stateless movement that became a self-sustaining revolutionary network. It is also an example of a sophisticated transnational criminal enterprise.

Terrorist attacks involve different degrees of criminal skill. The following cases are examples of the wide range of sophistication found in incidents of political violence. These are viz.,

\*Richard Baumhammers, an American neo-Nazi who went on a killing spree near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in April 2000.

\*Ted Kaczynski, also known as the Unabomber, who was famous for sending mail bombs to his victims and who eluded capture for 18 years, from 1978 to 1996.

\*RamziYousef, an international terrorist who was the mastermind behind the first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993.

### **J. Terrorist Symbolism: Oklahoma City and September 11, 2001.**

Symbolism is a central feature of terrorism. Most terrorist targets at some level symbolize the righteousness of the terrorist's cause and the evil of the opponent they are fighting. Symbolism can be used to rationalize acts of extreme violence and can be manipulated to fit any number of targets into the category of an enemy interest. Terrorists are very mindful of their image and skill-fully conduct public relations and propaganda campaigns to "package" themselves. Modern terrorist and their supporters have become quite adept at crafting symbolic meaning from acts of violence.

Symbolism can create abstract ideological linkages between terrorists and their victims. This process was seen during the wave of kidnappings by Latin American leftists during the 1970s, when terrorists seized civilian businessmen and diplomats who the kidnappers said symbolized capitalism and exploitation. Symbolic targets can also represent enemy social or political establishments, as in the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) assassination of Lord Louis Mountbatten (the uncle of prince Philip Mountbatten, Queen Elizabeth II's husband) in 1979

and the IRA's attempted assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher in 1984. In some cases, entire groups of people can be symbolically labeled and slaughtered, as during the genocides of the Nazi Holocaust (pseudo-racial), in the killing fields of Cambodia (social and political), in Rwanda (ethnic and social), and in the Darfur region of Sudan (racial).

Two examples of deadly domestic terrorism in the United States demonstrate the important role of symbolism in the worldview of terrorists. The first example is an act of terrorism perpetrated by an American terrorist in Oklahoma City. The second example is the series of attacks on September 11, 2001, by international terrorists in New York City, Washington, D. C., and in the skies over rural Pennsylvania.

### **The Oklahoma City Bombing**

On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh drove a rented Ryder truck to the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. He deliberately chose April 19, as a symbolic date for the attack-It was the 220<sup>th</sup> anniversaries of the battles of Lexington and Concord and the second anniversary of the law enforcement disaster in Waco, Texas. McVeigh was a hard-core devotee of the patriot movement and a believer in New World Order conspiracy theories. He was almost certainly a racial supremacist, having tried to solicit advice from the neo-Nazi National Alliance and the racial separatist Elohim City group about going

underground after the bombing. McVeigh had also visited the Branch Davidian site at Waco, Texas,<sup>22</sup> where about 75 members of the Branch Davidian cult died in a fire that was ignited during a paramilitary raid by federal law enforcement officers.

Mc Veigh had converted the Ryder truck in to a powerful mobile ammonium nitrate and fuel oil (ANFO)-based bomb. He used “more than 5,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate fertilizer mixed with about 1,200 pounds of liquid nitromethane, [and] 350 pounds of Tovex.”<sup>23</sup> When he detonated the truck bomb at 9:02a.m.it destroyed most of the federal building and killed 168 people, including 19 children. More than 500 hundred others were injured.

Mc Veigh’s attack was in large part a symbolic act of war against the federal government. He had given careful consideration to achieving a high casualty rate, just as “American bombing raids were designed to take lives, not just destroy building.”<sup>24</sup> The deaths of the 19 children were justified in his mind as the unfortunate “collateral damage” against innocent victim’s common to modern warfare.<sup>25</sup> Timothy Mc Veigh was tried and convicted, and he was executed in a federal facility in Terre Haute, Indiana, on June 11, 2001.His execution was the first federal execution since 1963.

**September 11, 2001.**

The worst incident of modern international terrorism occurred in the United States on the morning of September 11, 2001. It was carried out by 19 Al Qaeda terrorists who were on a suicidal "martyrdom mission." They committed the attack to strike at the symbol of American (and western) interests in response to what they perceive to be a continuing process of domination and exploitation of Muslim countries. They were religious terrorists fighting in the name of a holy cause against perceived evil emanating from the west. Their sentiments were born in the religious, political, and ethno-national ferment that has characterized the politics of the Middle East for much of the modern era. Nearly 3,000 people were killed in the attack. The sequence of events occurred as follows:

7:59 am. American Airlines Flight 11, carrying 92 people, leaves Boston's Logan International Airport for Los Angeles..

8:14 a.m. United Airlines Flight 175, carrying 65 people, leaves Boston for Los Angeles.

8:20 a.m. American Airlines Flight 77, carrying 64 people, takes off from Washington's Dulles Airport for Los Angeles.

8:42 a.m. United Airlines Flight 93, carrying 44 people, leaves Newark, New Jersey, International Airport for San Francisco.

8:46 a.m. American Flight 11 crashes into the north tower of the World Trade Centre.

9:03 a.m. United Flight 175 crashes into the south tower of the World Trade Centre.

9:37 a.m. American Flight 77 crashes in to the Pentagon. Trading on Wall Street is called off.

9:59 a.m. Two World Trade Centre- the south tower- collapses.

10:03 a.m. United Flight 93 crashes 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

10:28 a.m. One World Trade Centre- the north tower- collapses.<sup>26</sup>

The United States had previously been the target of international terrorism at home and abroad, but the American homeland had never suffered a terrorist strike on this scale. The most analogous historical event was the Japanese attack on the Naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941. The last time so many people had died from an act of war committed on American soil was during the civil war in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century.

After the Al Qaeda assault and the subsequent anthrax crisis (in October-December 2001, more than 20 people were infected with anthrax in the United States; 5 died), ordinary American culture shifted away from complete openness to a period of high security. The adaptation of the American people and political establishment to this new environment was a new experience for the nation. The symbolism of the attack, combined with its sheer scale, drove the United States to war and dramatically changed the American security environment. Counter

terrorism in the United States shifted from a predominantly law enforcement mode to a security mode. Security measures included unprecedented airport and seaport security, border searches, visa scrutiny, and immigration procedures. Hundreds of people were administratively detained and questioned during a sweep of persons fitting the terrorist profile of the 19 attackers. These detentions set off a debate about the constitutionality of these methods and the fear by many that civil liberties were in jeopardy. In October 2001, the USA PATRIOT act was passed. The new law granted significant authority to federal law enforcement agencies to engage in surveillance and other investigative work. On November 25, 2002, seventeen federal agencies (later increased to 22 agencies) were consolidated to form a new department of homeland security.

The symbolism of a damaging attack on homeland targets was momentous because it showed that the American superpower was vulnerable to attack by small groups of determined revolutionaries. The twin towers had dominated the New York skyline since the completion of two-world trade centre in 1972. They were a symbol of global trade and prosperity and pride of the largest city in the United States. The Pentagon, of course, is a unique building that symbolizes American military power, and its location across the river from the nation's capital showed the vulnerability of the seat of government to attack.

On May 30, 2002, a 30 foot long steel beam was ceremoniously removed from the 'ground zero' site in New York City. It was the final piece of debris to be removed from the September 11 homeland attack.

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## CHAPTER 2

### **SOCIO-POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND SOCIO-RELIGIOUS IMPACT OF TERRORISM.**

#### **1. Socio-political Impact of Terrorism:**

The concept of socio-political impact of terrorism can be understood by the studies of political ideologies, because these ideologies work as a source of terrorism in society. Any type of revolution or terrorism represents for the social change directly or indirectly. Therefore socio-political concept cannot be separated from each other. It is important to grasp the influence of ideological systems on the modern era. For this reason, several political ideologies, Anarchism, Marxism, Fascism, and the just war doctrine, are discussed below.

#### **A. Anarchism:**

Anarchism is a leftist philosophy that was an ideological by-product of the social upheavals of mid-19<sup>th</sup>-century Europe, a time when civil unrest and class conflict swept the continent, culminating in the revolutions of 1848. Anarchists were among the first antiestablishment radicals who championed what they considered to be the downtrodden peasant and working classes. They abhorred central government control and private property. Frenchman Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who published a number of articles and books on the virtues of anarchism, coined an enduring slogan among anarchist—"Property is theft!" In his 1840 publication *what Is Property? An Inquiry In to the principle of Right and of government.*

Proudhon wrote: “If I had to answer the following question, “What is slavery?” and if I should respond in one word, “It is murder,” my meaning would be understood at once. I should not need a long explanation to show that the power to deprive a man of his thought, his will, and his personality is the power of life and death. So why to his other question, “What is property?” Should I do not answer in the same way, “It is theft,” without fearing to be misunderstood”.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the radical undercurrent for anarchist thought began with the proposition that *property is theft*. Mikhail Bakunin and his philosophical associates Sergei Nechayev and Petr Kropotkin, all Russians, were the founders of modern anarchism. They supported destruction of the state, radical decentralization of power, atheism, and individualism. They also opposed Capitalism and Karl Marx’s revolutionary doctrine of building a socialist state. Among these early anarchists, Bakunin’s theories had a particularly international influence.

Anarchists never offered a concrete plan for replacing centralized state authority because they were not concerned about building a clearly defined vision of post-revolutionary society. Instead, early anarchists considered the destruction of the state alone to be their contribution to the future. In the *Revolutionary Catechism*, Nechayev wrote:

“The revolutionary...must have a single thought, a single goal-implacable destruction. Pursuing this goal coldly and relentlessly, he must be prepared to

perish himself and to cause to perish, with his own hands, all those who would prevent him from achieving his goal".<sup>2</sup>

Bakunin, Nechayev, and Kropotkin believed that revolutionary violence was needed to destroy capitalism and state socialism. Bakunin rejected publication of the anarchist cause through traditional media such as newspapers or leafleting. Instead, he advocated achieving propaganda victories by violently pursuing the revolution, which became known as propaganda by the deed. Terrorism was advocated as a principal means to destroy state authority. Interestingly, they argued that terrorists should organize themselves into small groups, or cells, a tactic that has been adopted by modern terrorists. Anarchists actively practiced propaganda by the deed, as evidenced by many acts of violence against prominently symbolic targets. In Russia, the Peoples' Will (Narodnaya Volya) conducted a terrorist campaign from 1878 to 1881, and other anarchist terrorist cells operated in Western Europe. Around the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, anarchists assassinated the Russian Czar Alexander II, Austro-Hungarian Empress Elizabeth, Italian King Umberto I, and French President Carnot. An alleged anarchist, Leon Czolgosz, assassinated President William McKinley in the United States.

### **B. Marxism:**

Radical Socialism, like Anarchism, is a leftist ideology that began in the turmoil of mid-19<sup>th</sup>-century Europe and the uprisings of 1848. Socialists championed the emerging industrial working class and argued that the wealth produced by these

workers should be more equitably distributed, rather than concentrated in the hands of the wealthy elite.

Karl Marx is regarded as the founder of modern Socialism. He and his associate Friedrich Engels, both Germans, argued that their approach to socialism was grounded in the scientific “discovery” that human progress and social evolution is the result of a series of historical conflicts and revolutions. Each era was based on the working group’s unequal relationship to the means of production (e.g., slaves, feudal farmers, and industrial workers) vis-à-vis the ruling group’s enjoyment of the fruits of the working group’s labour. In each era, a ruling *thesis* group maintained the status quo and a labouring *antithesis* group challenged the status quo (through agitation and revolution), resulting in a socioeconomic synthesis that created new relationships with the means of production. Thus, human society evolved in to the next era. According to Marx, the most advanced era of social evolution would be the *synthesis* Communist era, Which Marx argued would be built after the *antithesis* industrial working class overthrows the thesis capitalist system. Marx theorized that the working class would establish the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in the Communist society and build a just and egalitarian social order.

Marx and Engels collaborated on the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, a short work completed in 1847 and published in 1848. It became one of the most widely read documents of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. In it, Marx and Engels explained the

revolutionary environment of the industrial era and how this era was an immediate precursor to the Communist era. They wrote that The communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen of all countries, unite!

Marxist socialism was pragmatic and revolutionary. It was action oriented and was adopted by many revolutionary leaders and movements throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. For example, Vladimir Ilich Lenin in Russia, Mao Zedong in China, Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, and Fidel Castro in Cuba all based their revolutionary doctrines on Marx's precepts. Terrorism, both state and dissident, was used during these revolutions and during the consolidations of power after victory. It is interesting to note that none of the Marxist revolutions of the century was led by the industrial working class; all occurred in preindustrial developing nations, often within the context of anticolonial warfare waged by peasants and farmers.

### **C. Fascism:**

Fascism was a rightist ideological counterpoint to Marxism and anarchism that peaked prior to World War II. Its name is derived from the Latin word *fasces*, which was a bundle of wooden rods bound together with an axe protruding from the center; it was the roman imperial symbol of strength and power and was carried before processions of Roman officials.

Like Marxism and anarchism, fascism's popular appeal grew out of social turmoil in Europe, this time as a reaction to the 1917 Bolshevik (communist) revolution in Russia, the subsequent Bolshevik-inspired political agitation elsewhere in Europe, and the widespread unrest during the Great Depression of the 1930s. It was rooted in a brand of extreme nationalism that championed the alleged superiority of a particular national heritage or ethno-racial group. Fascism was anti-communist, anti-monarchist, antidemocratic, and anti-intellectual (although there were some fascist writers). It demanded extreme obedience to Law, order, and the state. Fascism also required cultural conservatism- often looking backward in history to link the ancient past to the modern state. Fascists created their own conceptualizations of traditional values such as military duty, the Christian church, and motherhood. Strong antidemocratic leadership was centralized in the state, usually under the guidance of a single charismatic leader who symbolically embodied the virtues of the state, the people, and the underlying fascist ideology. Italian dictator Benito Mussolini was the first to consolidate power and create a fascist state. Beginning with his March on Rome in 1922, he gradually eliminated all opposition and democratic institutions. He was a mentor for Adolf Hitler, who led the fascist National Socialist German Worker's (Nazi) party to power in Germany in 1933. Both the Italian and German fascist regimes sent troops to fight on the side of right-wing Spanish rebels led by Francisco Franco during the Spanish civil war.<sup>3</sup> These regimes- fascist Italy, Nazi German, and Falangist

Spain-represent three strains of fascism that reflect their own cultural and national idiosyncrasies:

1. *Italian fascism* was nationalistic and expansionistic. It hearkened back to Italy's ancient past, seeking to symbolize the rise of a new Roman Empire. Mussolini sent his fascist legions on wars of conquest in Abyssinia, North Africa, the Balkans, and Greece.
2. *German fascism* was also nationalistic and expansionistic. Unlike Italian fascism, the Nazis also practiced an ideology of racial supremacy. Nazism looked back to the Germanic people of ancient past, seeking to symbolize a time of Teutonic tribal and racial glory.
3. *Spanish fascism* was also nationalistic but strongly rejected an expansionist ideology. The Franco regime successfully resisted intimidation from Adolf Hitler to enter World War II on the side of Germany and Italy. Spanish rightists looked to Spanish institutions and history to consolidate power domestically. They had a strong ideological influence in Latin America that lasted throughout the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The power of all three regimes was rooted in a disciplined political party, a charismatic leader, glorification of the military, and an organized elite. Fascist regimes during this period also took root in Hungary (1930s), Bulgaria (1934), and Romania (1938). Only Franco's Fascist regime survived World War II, lasting until his death in 1975. Although the first fascist movement largely collapsed in 1945, right-wing groups and political parties have continued

to promote neofascist ideals. Some terrorist groups in Europe and the United States have been overtly fascist and racist. Also, dictatorships have arisen since World War II that adopted many features of prewar fascism. For example, Latin American regimes arose in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and El Salvador—to name a few- that fit the fascist pattern.

#### **D. The Just War Doctrine:**

The just war doctrine is an ideal and a moralistic philosophy rather than an ideology. The concept has been used by ideological and religious extremists to justify acts of extreme violence, throughout history, nations and individuals have gone to war with the belief that their cause was just and their opponents' cause unjust. Similarly, attempts have been made for millennia to write fair and just laws of war and rules of engagement. For example, in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the Hague Conventions produced at least 21 international agreements on the rules of war.<sup>4</sup>

This is a moral and ethical issue that raises the questions of whether one can ethically attack an opponent, how one can justifiably defend oneself with force, and what types of force are morally acceptable in their context. The just war debate also asks who can morally be defined as an enemy and what kinds of targets it is morally acceptable to attack. In this regard, there are two separate components to the concept of just war (which philosophers call the just war tradition): the rationale for initiating the war (war's ends) and the method of

warfare (war's means). Criteria for whether a war is just are divided into *jus ad bellum* (justice of war) and *jus in bello* (justice in war) criteria.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, *jus in Bello* is correct behaviour while waging war and *jus ad bellum* is having the correct conditions for waging war in the first place. Philosophers and theologians have debated these concepts for centuries. The early Christian philosopher Augustine concluded in the fifth century that war is justified to punish injuries inflicted by a nation that has refused to correct wrongs committed by its citizens. The Christian religious tradition, especially the Roman Catholic Church, has devoted a great deal of intellectual effort to clarifying Augustine's concept. Augustine was, of course, referring to warfare between nations and cities, and church doctrine long held that an attack against state authority was an offence against God.<sup>6</sup> Likewise, the Hague Conventions dealt only with rules of conflict between nations and afforded no legal rights to spies or antistate rebels. Neither system referred to rules of engagement for nonstate or antistate conflicts.

In the modern era, both dissidents and states have adopted the just war tradition to their political environments. Antistate conflict and reprisals by states are commonplace. Dissidents always consider their cause just and their methods proportional to the force used by the agents of their oppressors. They are, in their own minds, freedom fighters waging a just war. As one Hamas fighter said, "before I start shooting, I start to concentrate on reading verses of the Koran because the Koran gives me the courage to fight the Israelis."<sup>7</sup>

Antiterrorist reprisals launched by states are also justified as appropriate and proportional applications of force- in this case as a means to root out bands of terrorists. For example, after three suicide bombers killed or wounded scores of people in Jerusalem and Haifa in December 2001, Israeli Prime minister Ariel Sharon justified Israeli reprisals by saying, “A war of terrorism was forced on us (by the terrorist)...if you ask what the aim of this war is, I will tell you. It is the aim of terrorists.... to exile us from here.... This will not happen.”<sup>8</sup>

From the perspective of terrorism and counter terrorism, both dissident and state applications of force are legitimate subjects of just war scrutiny, especially because dissidents usually attack soft civilian targets and state reprisals are usually not directed against standing armies. The following “moral checklist” was published in the American newspaper *The Christian Science Monitor* during the first phase of the war on terrorism begun after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks:

- \*Is it justified to attack states and overturn regimes to get the terrorists?
- \*Can the U.S.legitimately target political figures like Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar?
- \*what are U.S.obligations in terms of minimizing civilian casualties?
- \*what type of force should be used?
- \*when should U.S.forces take prisoners, rather than killing Afghan troops?
- \*Is there a plan for peace?<sup>9</sup>

These questions are generically applicable to all state antiterrorist campaigns, as well as to antistate dissident violence. It is important to remember that rules of war and the just war tradition are the results of many motivations. Some rules and justifications are self-serving, others are pragmatic, and others are grounded in ethno-nationalist or religious traditions. Hence, the just war concept can be easily adapted to justify ethnic, racial, national, and religious extremism in the modern era.

In the earlier discussion it is cleared that experts have identified and analyzed many terrorist environments. These environments include state, dissident, religious, ideological, international, and criminal terrorism. One distinguishing feature within each model is the relationship between quality of force used by the terrorists and the characteristics of the victim of the attack. It might be pointed out here that the definitional and ethical issues are not always clearly drawn when one uses terms such as combatants, noncombatants, discriminate force, or indiscriminate force.

#### **E. Combatants and Noncombatants:**

The term *combatants* certainly refers to conventional or unconventional adversaries who engage in armed conflict as members of regular military or irregular guerilla fighting units. The term *noncombatants* obviously include civilians who have no connection to military or other security forces. There are, however, circumstances in which these definitional lines become blurred. For

example, in times of social unrest, civilians can become *combatants*. This has occurred repeatedly in societies where communal violence (e.g., civil war) breaks out between members of ethno-national, ideological, or religious groups. Similarly, *noncombatants* can include off-duty members of the military in nonwarfare environments.<sup>10</sup> They become targets because of their symbolic status.

#### **F. Indiscriminate and Discriminate Force:**

Indiscriminate force is the application of force against a target without attempting to limit the level of force or the degree of destruction of the target. Discriminate force is a more surgical use of limited force. Indiscriminate force is considered to be acceptable when used in any nonwarfare environment regardless of the characteristics of the victim.<sup>11</sup> There are, however, many circumstances when adversaries define "warfare environment" differently. When weaker adversaries resort to unconventional methods (including terrorism), they justify these methods by defining them as being necessary during a self defined state of war. Discriminate force is considered to be a moral use of force when it is applied against specific targets with the intention to limit so-called collateral damage, or unintended destruction and casualties.

#### **2. Sociological aspect of terrorism:**

Sociological explanations generally hold that terrorism is a product of intergroup conflict that results in collective violence. The sociological approach argues that

terrorism is a group-based phenomenon that is selected as the only available strategy by a weaker group. From the perspective of an opponent group, “terrorism and other forms of collective violence are often described as ‘senseless,’ and their participants are often depicted as irrational.”<sup>12</sup> However, this is not an entirely complete analysis, because if “rational” means goal directed.... then most collective violence is indeed rational.... their violence is indeed directed at achieving certain, social change-oriented goals, regardless of whether we agree with those goals or with the violent means used to attain them. If ‘rational’ further means sound, wise, and logical, then available evidence indicates that collective violence is rational.... because it sometimes can help achieve their social goals.<sup>13</sup>

In essence, the disadvantaged group asserts its rights by selecting a methodology- in this case, terrorism- that from the group’s perspective is its only viable option. The selection process is based on the insurgent group’s perceptions and its analysis of those perceptions. To illustrate this point, the following examples describes a hypothetical groups analytical progression toward revolution:

- \* The perception grows within a particular group that the government or social order is inherently brutal or unfair toward the group.
- \* Because the system does not allow for meaningful social dissent by the group (in the opinion of group members), it concludes that the only recourse is to oust the existing government or order.

- \* The group perceives that an opportunity for change is available at a particular point in history. To wait longer would likely mean a lost possibility for revolutionary change.
- \* After analyzing the contemporary political environment, the group perceives that the government or system possesses inherent weakness or “contradictions”(to use a Marxist term).<sup>14</sup> All that is needed is a revolutionary “push” to achieve the group’s goals.
- \* An important ingredient in the group’s calculation is the perception that the people are ripe for revolution. What is required is for the group to act as a vanguard to politicize the broader masses and lead them to revolution.

The foregoing analytical progression incorporates two theoretical concepts: Structural theory and relative deprivation theory.<sup>15</sup> These theories are summarized below.

Structural theory has been used in many policy and academic disciplines to identify social conditions (“structures”) that affect group access to services, equal rights, civil protections, freedom, or other quality-of-life measures. Examples of social structures include government policies, administrative bureaucracies, spatial (geographic) location of the group, the role of security forces, and access to social institutions. Applying this theory to the context of terrorism, we find that Structural theories of revolution emphasize that weaknesses in state structures

encourage the potential for revolution...According to this view; a government beset by problems such as economic and military crisis is vulnerable to challenges by insurgent forces.... Other governments run into trouble when their...policies alienate and even anger elites within the society.<sup>16</sup>

The state is the key actor in structural theories of revolution. Its status is the precipitating factor for popular revolutions. Popular discontent, the alienation of elites, and a pervasive crisis are the central ingredients for bringing a society to the brink of revolution. Relative deprivation theory essentially holds that "feelings of deprivation and frustration underlie individual decisions to engage in collective action."<sup>17</sup> According to this theory, when a group's rising expectations are met by sustained repression or second-class status, the group's reaction may include political violence. Their motive for engaging in political violence is their observation that they are relatively deprived, vis-à-vis other groups, in an unfair social order. This should be contrasted with absolute deprivation, when a group has been deprived of the basic necessities for survival by a government or social order. This condition can lead to political violence.

One observation must be made about relative deprivation theory: Although it was, and still is, a popular theory among many experts, three shortcomings have been argued:

- \* Psychological research suggests that aggression happens infrequently when the conditions for relative deprivation are met.
- \* The theory is more likely to explain individual behaviour rather than group behaviour.
- \* Empirical studies have not found an association between relative deprivation and political violence.<sup>18</sup>

**International cases in point:**

Examples of movements that are motivated against a government or social order include ethno- nationalist movements among Basques in Spain. Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland, Palestinians in Israel, and French Canadians in Quebec. Sociological explanations for these movements are summarized below.

*Basques in Spain:* The Basques region of northern Spain is home to approximately 2.5 million Basques. Nationalism in the region dates of the defeat of Spanish Republicans during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. After the war, Francisco Franco's fascist regime suppressed Basque culture, integrated the region in to Spain, and banned the Basque Language. Spanish culture and language were imposed on the Basque region. Since the late 1950s, Basques nationalist, especially Basque Fatherland and Liberty (Euskadi Ta Azkatasuna, or ETA), have fought for autonomy from Spain and the preservation of their national identity.

*Irish Catholic Nationalism:* Irish Catholic nationalism in Northern Ireland dates to the 16<sup>th</sup> century, when English king James I granted Scottish protestant settlers

land in Ireland, thus beginning a long process of relegating Irish Catholics to second-class status in their own country. Protestant (“Scotch-Irish”) and English domination was secured in 1690 at the battle of the Boyne. Catholic independence was finally won in 1919 and 1920, but the island was formally divided between the independent Irish Republic in the south and the British-administered six-county region of Northern Ireland. Since that time, Some Irish Republicans in the north, especially the provisional Irish Republicans in the north, especially the provisional Irish Republican Army have engaged in armed resistance against Protestant and British Political domination. They seek union with the southern republic.

*Palestinian Nationalism:* Palestinian nationalism dates to the formal creation of the state of Israel on May 14, 1948. The next day, the Arab League (Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) declared war on Israel. Israel was victorious, and in the subsequent consolidation of power, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians either left Israel or were expelled. Since that time, Palestinian nationalists, especially the Palestine liberation organization and Hamas, have fought a guerrilla and terrorist war against Israel to establish a Palestinian state.

*French Canadian Nationalism:* French Canadian Nationalism is centered in Quebec, where French-descended residents (Known as the Quebecois) predominate. Quebecois has always vigorously protected the French identity in Quebec against English domination. Some Quebecois are nationalist, seeking

greater autonomy or independence from English-speaking Canada. Most French Canadian nationalism has been democratic in expression and has been led by the party Quebecois. However, a separatist group founded in 1963 known as the Front du Liberation de Quebec (FLQ) engaged in a bombing campaign to promote an independent Quebec. Nationalist sentiment increased during the late 1960s when, during a visit by French President Charles de Gaulle in July 1967, he delivered a speech using the now-famous phrase “Vive le Quebec libre,” or “Long live free Quebec.”

### **3. Psychological Explanations of Terrorism:**

Psychological approaches to explaining terrorism broadly examine the effects of internal Psychological dynamics on individual and group behaviour. This kind of analysis incorporates many of the concepts that were discussed previously in this chapter, such as moral convictions and simplified definitions of good and evil.

At the outset, it is useful to examine the presumption held by a number of people-experts, policymakers, and laymen- that terrorism is a manifestation of insanity or mental illness or that terrorism is the signature of a lunatic fringe. This presumption suggests that terrorism is a priori (fundamentally) irrational behaviour and that only deranged individuals or deranged collections of people would select terrorist violence as a strategy.

Most experts agree that this blanket presumption is incorrect. Although individuals and groups do act out of certain idiosyncratic psychological processes, their behavior is neither insane nor necessarily irrational.

Those who engage in collective violence are, in many respects, “normal” people:

How rational are the participants in collective violence? Are they sane? Do they really know what they’re doing...the available evidence favors rationality....

Although some explanations of collective violence stress psychological abnormality among its participants, studies on this issue suggest that in general they’re as psychologically normal and rational as the average person.<sup>19</sup>

#### **A. Individual-Level explanations:**

Some experts argue that the decision to engage in political violence is frequently an outcome of significant events in individual lives that give rise to antisocial feelings. They actively seek improvement in their environment or desire redress and revenge from the perceived cause of their condition. Very often psychological motivation for terrorism derives from the terrorist’s personal dissatisfaction with his life and accomplishments. He finds his raison d’être in dedicated terrorist action.... Terrorists tend to project their own antisocial motivations onto others, creating a polarized “we versus they” outlook. They attribute only evil motives to anyone outside their own group. This enables the terrorists to dehumanize their victims and removes any sense of ambiguity from their minds. The resultant

clarity of purpose appeals to those who crave for violence to relieve their constant anger.<sup>20</sup>

Research has not found a pattern of psychopathology among terrorists. In comparing nonviolent and violent activists, studies reported “preliminary impressions...that the family backgrounds of their politically active counterparts.”<sup>21</sup> There is evidence of some psychosocial commonalities among violent activists. For example, research on 250 West German terrorists reported “a high incidence of fragmented families; severe conflict, especially with the parents; conviction in juvenile court; and a pattern of failure both educationally and vocationally.”<sup>22</sup>

### **B. Group-Level Explanations:**

In a number of Social and political contexts, political violence is a familiar social and political violence is a familiar social phenomenon for some people. When this process is combined with “the pronounced need to belong to a group,”<sup>23</sup> individual can in the end “define their social status by group acceptance.” Thus, at the group level, another result of psychological motivation is the intensity of group dynamics among terrorists. They tend to demand unanimity and be intolerant of dissent.... (And) pressure to escalate the frequency and intensity of operations is ever present... Comprise is rejected, and terrorist groups lean towards maxi-malist position.<sup>24</sup> An important outcome of these dynamic is the development of a self-perpetuating cycle of rationalizations of political violence. This occurs because

the psychodynamics also make announced group goal nearly impossible to achieve. A group that achieves its stated purpose is no longer needed; thus, success threatens the psychological well being of its members.

### **C. Generalized Psychological Explanations:**

Psychological explanations are fairly broad approaches to dynamic of terrorist behaviour. Both individual and group theories attempt to generalize reasons for the decision to initiate political violence and processes that perpetuate such violence.

These explanations may be summarized as follows:

\*Terrorism is simply a choice among violent and less violent alternatives. It is a rational selection of one methodology over other options.

\*Terrorism is a technique to maintain group cohesion and focus. Group solidarity overcomes individualism.

\*Terrorism is a necessary process to build the esteem of an oppressed people. Through terrorism, power is established over others, and the weak becomes strong. Attention itself becomes self-gratifying.

\*Terrorists consider themselves to be an elite vanguard. They are not content to debate

the issues, because they have found a "truth" that needs no explanation. Action is superior to debate.

\*Terrorism provides a means to justify political violence. The targets are depersonalized, and symbolic labels are attached to them. Thus, symbolic

buildings become legitimate targets even when occupied by people, and individual victims become symbols of an oppressive system.

*Case: The Stockholm syndrome.* In August 1973, two bank robbers in Stockholm, Sweden took hostage three women and one man. The botched robbery led to a hostage crisis that lasted for six days. During the crisis, the robbers threatened to kill the four hostages if the authorities tried to rescue them. At the same time, the hostages received treatment from the robbers that they began to think of as kindness and consideration. For example, one hostage was told that he would not be killed, but rather shot in the leg if the police intervened, and that he should play dead. Another hostage, who suffered from claustrophobia, was let out of the bank vault on a rope leash. These were perceived as acts of kindness because the situation was very tense inside the bank:

The hostages were under extended siege by a horde of police seeking opportunities to shoot the robbers, depriving the group of food and necessities to force their surrender, and poking holes in walls to gas the robbers into submission. The captors often acted as the hostages' protectors against the frightening maneuvers by the police.<sup>25</sup>

During the six –day episode, all of the hostages began to sympathize with the robbers and gradually came to completely identify with them. They eventually denounced the authorities' attempts to free them. After the situation was resolved, the hostages remained loyal to their former captors for months. They refused to

testify against them and raised money for their legal defense. One of the female former hostages actually became engaged to one of the robbers. This was, to say the least, surprising behaviour. The question is whether this was an isolated phenomenon or whether it is possible for it to occur in other hostage crises.

Experts are divided about whether the Stockholm syndrome is a prevalent condition. Those who contend that it can occur and has occurred in other situations argue that the syndrome sets in when a prisoner suffers a psychological shift from captive to sympathizer. In theory, the prisoner will try to keep his or her captor happy in order to stay alive whenever he or she is unable to escape, is isolated, and is threatened with death. This becomes an obsessive identification with what the captor likes and dislikes, and the prisoner eventually begins to sympathize with the captor. The psychological shift theoretically requires three or four days to see in. An example of the Stockholm syndrome during the kidnapping of newspaper heiress Patricia Hearst, When Hearst was kidnapped by the terrorist group the Symbionese Liberation Army and joined group after being psychological and physically tormented for more than 50 days.

Summing up, In essence, then, psychological explanations of terrorist behaviour use theories of individual motivations and group dynamics to explicate why people first decide to adopt strategies of political violence and why groups continue their campaigns of violence. Among violent extremists, it appears that people who are aggressive and action oriented, and who place greater than normal

reliance on the psychological mechanisms of externalization and splitting, are disproportionately represented among terrorists. Pressures to conform to the group, combined with pressures to commit acts of violence, form a powerful psychological drive to carry on in the name of the cause, even when victory is logically impossible. These pressures become so prevalent that achieving victory becomes a consideration secondary to the unity of the group. Having said this, it is inadvisable to completely generalize about psychological causes of terrorism, because “most terrorist do not demonstrate serious psychopathology,” and “there is no single personality type.”<sup>26</sup>

#### **4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM:**

Economic developments refers to a process over a long period involving increase in per capita real income accompanied by qualitative changes in all the factors influencing economic development. Socio-cultural at most fair in backward countries is an important free condition for their rapid development. Social factors have strong influence upon economic development. Since economic development needs a series of change of Institutions, structure of people’s way of living, mode of thinking etc. therefore socio-economic stabilities must be there for smooth running of the process of economic development. There is a negative correlation between economic development and terrorism. Here the author likes to discuss the socio-economic impact of terrorism with special reference to North East region of India. The northeastern state has been affected badly by terrorism involving

numbers of terrorist group! and emergence of new group intensifies the complicated problem of terrorism. Socio-cultural at most fair which is free condition for economic development has been violated due to terrorism in NER.

The problem of terrorism in NER is a threat to social stability and stands as a barrier to economic development. Insurgency creates so many Socio-Economic, political problems to the society, which pull back the process of economic development of this region. There is historical evidence that the terrorism prone countries are economically and socially backward and their rate of economic development is very slow. The NER has been suffering from this problem for a long period. The adverse affect of this problem is reflected in overall economic backwardness of this region.

A number of separatist organizations operated in the states of Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, and Manipur and lately in Assam. While a few of these organizations in Mizoram, Tripura discarded military and joined mainstream, others in Nagaland, Manipur and Assam are still continuing this struggle. Terrorism in Nagaland has the goal to achieve an independent Nagaland comprising not only area falling within the Nagaland but also the Naga-inhabited areas of Manipur and Myanmar. Angami Zapu Phizo was the first insurgent leader of northeastern region. Later the stringent counter measures forced Phizo to Flee to London and he became a British citizen. The leaderless insurgence naturally accepted the amnesty offer of the Indian government and signed the Shillong Accord on November 11.

1975. A group of diehards refused to accept govt. offer on the view that they did not take up arms for material gains and they form the pro-communist outfit, the national socialist council of Nagaland (NSCN). The NSCN activities are such that it has been creating terror for those who advocated peaceful solution from their bases in North Myanmar under the leadership of S.S Khaplang (president), Issac Swu (chairmen), T.Muivah (General Secretary)

Mainly two groups are there in Manipur which have taken up arms for sovereign Manipur. They are the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the people's Liberation Army of Kangleipak (PREPAK). The ideology of both these two groups are almost similar. The only difference is that PREPAK has been fighting for the identity of the Meities (original inhabitants of Manipur) whereas PLA is working for liberated North Eastern region. United Nations Liberation Front, the UNLF led by the scholar revolutionary R.K. Meghen came next. Unlike the PLA and PREPAK, the UNLF has never resorted to violence because its strategy was to invade India with the military assistance of China to liberate Manipur. Recently another militant organization, Ireipakchasingee Punshi Kanba Phurub (IPKF) has emerged in Manipur. In late 1989, this group issued a press note demanding that the Manipur Govt. should publish a list of narcotic Pushers. Corrupt Politicians and bureaucrats for immediate drastic action.

One of the first terrorist out fits in Assam was the Assam people's Liberation Army (APLA) formed in Tezpur by one Arupan Bezbaruah. APLA came to notice

in November 1980. APLS'S first task was to establish contact with the PLA of Manipur, NSCN of Nagaland and MNF of Mizoram. In 1983, on the eve of the Assam State Assembly Election, the APLA committed a number of terrorist acts including the killing of police officers.

The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) one of the major insurgency organization in North-East formally came into being in 1981 when it developed purposeful connections with the NSCN for procuring arms and obtaining training of cadres in handling them.

The declared aims of the ULFA constitutions, *inter alia*, are:

- a) To obtain Assam's sovereignty by armed revolution.
- b) To safeguard the people and interest of Assam and those of its neighboring land, that is Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura.
- c) To have full control over the revenue resources of Assam like oil and natural gas, forest resources etc.
- d) To gain public support against Indian and non Indian exploitation.
- e) To stand against any suppression and repression of the Assamese Masses.<sup>27</sup>

During the sixties, hill tribes, viz, Khasis, Garos, Jaintia, Mizo and Nagas pressed for separation from Assam and secured states. The Plains Tribes Council of Assam (PTCA) placed a similar demand in 1967 for a separate Bodoland to be called "Uddayachal" with a union territory status. The All-Bodo Students Union

(ABSU) was formed in the same year 1967 as a student's wing of PTCA. Another militant organization called United Tribal Nationalist Liberation Front UTNLF was formed under the leadership of former Indian Navy Officer, B.K. Basumatary. The ABSU and UTNLF worked together.

The harmful consequences of Terrorism on Economic development are examined as follows:

**A. Lack of infrastructure for Industrial Development:** Economic development needs sound infrastructure. NER lacks this important pillar of economic development. As the lion's share of revenue is spent annually on maintaining law and order, the development and social welfare activities get affected. The private sector is reluctant to invest in the region due to terrorism and law and order problems. The extortion by terrorist adversely affects the economy and development as it diverts the state's funds.

**B) Administrative Efficiency:** Administrative efficiency is the pre condition of economic development. This is also an essential political determinant of economic development. The problem of terrorism is standing as a barrier in maintaining administrative efficiency. For administrative efficiency the government. must be capable of maintaining law and order situation so that it can carry on the process of economic development very smoothly. But it has become a hard task on the part of the government of NER mainly of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, and Tripura due mainly to the terrorist activities.

**C) Social Stability:** Social stability is one of the important factors of economic development. Social climate should be such that it can create the atmosphere of entrepreneurship for development activities. But problem of terrorism of NER creates havoc among the people of different ethnic groups and discourages them to do something new in the line of production, creative works etc.

**D) Employment Opportunities:** since the private sector is reluctant to invest in this region due to terrorism, the scope of opening employment avenues for huge number of unemployed youths is dampening. This adds fuel to the burning problem of unemployment. In the present global scenario, it could have been possible for NER to explore and utilize the resources available. But due to the problem of terrorism it does not happen in this region.

**E) Tourism Industry:** Natural beauty of NER is the gift of God. There is a vast scope of enlarging tourism industry. But people outside NER have a wrong conception that majority of the people of this region are terrorist and movement of terrorist with guns and other weapons is a part of normal life. With this view regarding NER, outside people are afraid and they are not interested to come here as tourists. Due to terrorism, tourism industry is badly affected in another way also. Infrastructural facilities for example-power, roads, bridges, housing, water supply etc. are urgently needed to gear up this sector. But since a huge amount of state fund is to be spent annually for maintenance of law and order, and the funds provided by the central government in different heads are diverted, it is not

possible on the part of the state governments of NER to provide funds for infrastructure development.

**F) Political Crisis:** The terrorists have created considerable crisis in the political scenario of NER mainly in Assam by manipulating voting behaviour of the people through the barrel of the gun. Besides, the terrorists are seen to extend issue based support to different political parties at different times in forming the governments as was demonstrated in the Assam Assembly Election in 2001. The disruptions of various terrorist groups and their network with other organizations that are inimical to India have caused a national security concern. The gradual involvement of Pakistan's ISI with the terrorists is a new dimension which threatens regional peace and stability.

**G) Economic backwardness:** Assam the gateway of NER is badly affected by the problem of terrorism. The economy of the state has been declining gradually. Huge amount of government revenue has to be spent in maintaining law and order and therefore the process of economic development of the state becomes very slow. This leads to economic backwardness of this state. Once the per capital income of Assam was well above the national average, but it has fallen far below today. The census of 2001 has shown a very pathetic picture of the poverty index. Corruption and extortion by the terrorists have become a part of life in the state that affects the state economy as well as security of the people. Due to diversion of funds, the rate of investment has fallen which causes low employment generation.

Low employment results in low demand and low saving which leads the economy to a backward direction.

**H) Academic Atmosphere:** Human resource is the prime factor of economic development. For human resource mobilization there should be quality education with a peaceful academic atmosphere. But due to problem of terrorism in NER, academic atmosphere has been vitiated. It results in drainage of brilliant students to outside regions. This also results in outflow of huge amount of money from this region as cost of education of the students.

**I) Dranage of Skills:** Due to terrorism in NER the government has to spend a huge amount in maintaining law and order and therefore they can not afford a huge sum for establishing development projects. This drives the skilled persons, viz., engineers, doctors, managers etc. outside in search of jobs and their skills are used in the development activities of other states and countries.

**J) Bandh Call:** Frequent bandhs called by various terrorist groups creates chaos and disorder in smooth functioning of various economic activities. Transportation sector is badly affected by these bandhs. Besides this, other sectors like Industry, Banking, Public administration, Education, Commerce, Tourism etc. are badly affected by bandh calls. Wage earners are the ultimate sufferers of this bandh calls. The people of Assam adopt this bandh call. This is very harmful for the development of the state. Recently an appreciable effort had been made by the Sibsagar District Transport Association to protest bandh-calls.

**K) Surrendered Militants:** Surrendered Militants create havoc in social life showing their strengths by dominating other competitor in their business fields. This makes public life miserable.

**L) Money Demand by the terrorists:** Forceful demand of money from different groups of people is a common feature of terrorist groups. This is a dangerous practice practiced by the terrorist groups. This leads the economy to a backward direction. The money collected from different source are used in purchasing arms and ammunition and as a result forge in countries from whom they purchase these are benefited. On the other hand, this region lacks fund for development activities.

**M) Loss in Oil Sector:** There is a slogan that “Oil flows, nation grows.” Oil sector is a very important sector for the development of a country. The state of Assam is endowed with natural oil and gas. IOCL, ONGC etc. are profit-making organization. But the oil and natural gas sectors have been suffering from insurgent activities as they have blasted many oil tanks, pipes etc. causing heavy loss to this sector.

**N) Adverse Effect of Mobile Theatre:** The most popular mobile theatre of Assam is unique in world cultural history. These theatres in one hand reflects the society and its various problems by staging dramas on various themes and on the other hand it provides jobs to many youths mainly from rural areas and contributes to solve the unemployment problem of the state to some extent. But due to the presence of terrorism these theatre groups suffer badly. People are worried about

bomb blasts in public places. For fear, they do not want to go the theatre. This leads the theatre groups to face a loss-making situation.

**o) Tea Industry:** Tea Industry is badly affected by the terrorist activities in Assam. The abduction of tea garden managers from time to time results in minimizing efficiency and innovative ideas regarding production and distribution of the managers.

From the above discussions on different points we can agree with the view that terrorism in NER is an impediment or hindrance to socio-economic development of this region.

### **5. Socio-Religious Impact of Terrorism:**

Terrorism in the name of religion has become the predominant model for political violence in the modern world. This is not to suggest that it is the only model, because nationalism and ideology remain as potent catalysts for extremist behaviour. However religious extremism has become a central issue for the global community.

In the modern era, religious terrorism has increased in its frequency, scale of violence, the global reach. At the same time, a relative decline has occurred in secular-nonreligious-terrorism. The old ideologies of class conflict, anticolonial liberation, and secular nationalism have been challenged by a new and vigorous infusion of sectarian(religious) ideologies. Grassroots extremist support for religious violence has been most widespread among populations living in

repressive societies that do not permit demands for reform or other expressions of dissent. In this regard,” It is perhaps not surprising that religion should become a far more popular motivation for terrorism in the post-Cold War era as old ideologies lie discredited by the collapse of the Soviet union and communist ideology, while the promise of munificent benefits from the liberal-democratic, capitalist state...fails to materialize in many countries throughout the world.”<sup>28</sup>

What is religious terrorism? What are its fundamental attributes? How is religion inspired violence rationalized? Religious terrorism is a type of political violence that is motivated by an absolute belief that an otherworldly power has sanctioned and commanded- the application of terrorist violence for the greater glory of the faith. Acts that are committed in the name of the faith will be forgiven by the otherworldly power and perhaps rewarded in an afterlife. In essence, one’s religious faith legitimizes violence so long as such violence is an expression of the will of one’s deity.

Experts present a model that compares the fundamental characteristics of religious and secular terrorism. The following discussion would review the following:

- A.** Primary and secondary motives: The Idiosyncratic Quality of Religious Terrorism.
- B.** Historical Cases in point: Fighting, Dying, and Killing in the Name of the Faith.
- C.** State-Sponsored Religious Terrorism in the Modern Era.
- D.** Dissident Religious Terrorism in the Modern Era.

### **A. Primary and Secondary Motives: The Idiosyncratic Quality of Religious Terrorism.**

Religious terrorism is an idiosyncratic type of terrorism; it originates from countless national, cultural, and historical contexts. Unlike secular terrorism, which usually has an inherent (but fringe) rationality, religious terrorism is often an expression of unquestioned faith in a supernatural purpose. It is therefore very much contingent on trends within specific religions, the historical experiences of ethno-national groups, and the unique political environments of nations. As a basis for terrorism, religious faith has been applied in different ways, depending on the cultural and political environments of each terrorist movement. In some environments, religion is the primary motive for terrorist behaviour. In other contexts, it is a secondary motive that is part of an overseeing cultural identity for politically violent movements.

As a primary motive, religion is at the very core of an extremist group's political, social, and revolutionary agenda. Within this context, the religious belief system is the driving force behind their behaviour. Examples of these profiles are found in the Middle East and elsewhere among jihadi Islamic fundamentalists, in India among Hindu extremists, and in the United States among violent Christian anti-abortionists. In the United States, the Army of God has expressed support for, and advocated, violent attacks against abortion clinics and providers.

As a secondary motive, religion represents one aspect of an extremist group's overall identity and agenda. For many ethno-nationalist and other revolutionary movements, national independence or some other degree of autonomy forms the primary motivation for their violent behaviour. Religious affiliation can be important because it is an element of their ethnic or national identity, but their ultimate goal is grounded in their secular identity. Examples of this profile are found in Northern Ireland among Catholic and Protestant terrorists, in southern Sudan among Christians and believers in traditional faiths, and in pre-independence Palestine among Jewish terrorists. In Palestine, the Jewish terrorist group Lohmey Heruth Israel (Fighters for the freedom of Israel)- commonly known as the stern Gang- issued the following (mostly nationalistic) rationalization for the group's violence against the British occupation of Palestine:

“Now this is the law of our war. So long as there is fear in the heart of any Jew in the world, so long as there are embers burning under our feet anywhere in the world, so long there is a foreign master over our country, so long as we do not rule our own land, so long shall we be in your way. You will look around you and fear day and night.”<sup>29</sup>

It should be understood that the concept of primary vis-à-vis secondary motives is exclusively an attribute of religious extremism, but also exists among secular extremist groups. For example, Marxism has been applied in different ways, depending on the political environment of each extremist movement. Ideological

groups such as Italy's Red Brigade were motivated primarily by Marxist ideals during the 1970s and 1980s, but nationalist movements such as Vietnam's Viet Cong were motivated secondarily by ideology during the 1960s and 1970s-the Viet Cong's primary motivation was their national identity.

### **I. Understanding Jihad as a Primary Religious Motive: An Observation and Caveat.**

Keeping the Idiosyncratic quality of religious terrorism in mind, it is arguably necessary to make a sensitive observation-and caveat-about the study of religious terrorism in the modern era. The observation is that in the modern era, radical Islamist disproportionately commits the incidence of religious terrorism:

“Popular Western perception equates radical Islam with terrorism.... there is, of course, no Muslim or Arab monopoly in the field of religious fanaticism; it exists and leads to acts of violence in the United States, India, Israel, and many other countries. But the frequency of Muslim- and Arab-inspired terrorism is still striking...A discussion of religion -inspired terrorism cannot possibly confine itself to radical Islam, but it has to take into account the Muslim countries' preeminent position in this field.”<sup>30</sup>

The caveat is that there is much misunderstanding in the West about the historical and cultural origins of the growth of radical interpretations of Islam. One such misunderstanding is the common belief that the concept of “holy war” is an underlying principle of the Islamic faith. Another misunderstanding is that

Muslims are united in supporting Jihad. This is simplistic and fundamentally incorrect. Although the term jihad is widely presumed in the West to refer exclusively to waging war against nonbelievers, an Islamic jihad is not the equivalent of a Christian Crusade (the Crusades are discussed further in this chapter). It is important to remember that, most Muslims, even most fundamentalists, are not terrorists. Instead, they have overwhelmingly been the victims of violent conflict. Hundreds of thousands of Muslims were killed in the war between Iran and Iraq, and the civil wars of Afghanistan and Algeria led to similarly horrific numbers of casualties. Noncombatant Muslims have suffered untold losses in the war between Chechnya and Russia, in the turmoil in Indonesia, and throughout much of Africa and the Middle East.<sup>31</sup>

## **II. A Case of Secondary Religious Motive:**

### **The Protocols of the learned Elders of Zion.**

Extremist ideologies have historically scapegoated undesirable groups. Many conspiracy theories have been invited to denigrate these groups and to implicate them in various plans to destroy an existing order. Some of these conspiracy theories possess quasi-religious elements that in effect classify the scapegoated group as being in opposition to a natural and sacred order. Among right-wing nationalists and racists, there often exists a convergence between scapegoating and mysticism. Just as it is common for rightist to assert their natural and sacred superiority, it is also common for them to demonize a scapegoated group.

essentially declaring that the entire group is inherently evil. One quasi-religious conspiracy theory is the promulgation of a document titled *The protocols of the learned Elders of Zion*.<sup>32</sup>

The *Protocols* originated in czarist Russia and were allegedly the true proceedings of a meeting of a mysterious committee of the Jewish faith, during which a plot to rule the world was hatched—in league with the Freemasons. The *protocols* are a detailed record of this alleged conspiracy for world domination, but they were, in fact, a forgery written by the secret police (Okhrana) of Czar Nicholas II around 1895 and later published by Professor Sergyei Nilus. Many anti-Semitic groups have used this document to justify the repression of European Jews, and it was an ideological foundation for the outbreak of anti-Jewish violence in Europe, including massacres and pogroms (violent anti-Jewish campaigns in eastern Europe).

The National Socialist (Nazi) movement and Adolf Hitler used the *protocols* extensively. Modern Euro centric neo-Nazis and Middle Eastern extremists (both secular and religious) continue to publish and circulate the *protocols* as anti-Semitic propaganda. In regard, neo-Nazis and Middle Eastern extremists have found common cause in quasi-religious anti-Semitism. In 1993, a Russia court formally ruled that the *protocols* are a forgery.<sup>33</sup>

## **B. Historical Cases in Point: Fighting, Dying, and Killing in the Name of the Faith:**

Terrorism carried out in the name of the faith has long been a feature of human affairs. The histories of people, civilizations, nations and empires are replete with examples of extremist “true believers” who engage in violence to promote their particular belief system. Some religious terrorists are inspired by defensive motives, others seek to ensure the predominance of their faith, and others are motivated by an aggressive amalgam of these tendencies.

Why do some movements and ethno-nationalist groups link their cause to an underlying spiritual principle? Is it accurate to characterize all spiritually rooted violence as terrorist or extremist? What kind of historical cases illustrate the idiosyncratic qualities of religious violence? To begin, we may observe that faith based violence exhibits the same qualities as other terrorist environments. Religious terrorism can be communal, genocidal, nihilistic, or revolutionary. Lone wolves, clandestine cells, large dissident movements, or governments can commit it. And, depending on one’s perspective, there is often debate about whether the perpetrators should be classified as terrorists or religious freedom fighters.

The following cases are historical examples of the idiosyncratic qualities of religious violence. This is a selective survey (by no means exhaustive) that will demonstrate how some examples of faith-based violence are clearly examples of

terrorism, how others are not so clear, and how each example must be considered within its historical and cultural context.

### **I. Judeo Christian Antiquity:**

Within the Judeo-Christian belief system, there are references in the Bible not only to assassinations and conquest but also to the complete annihilation of enemy nations in the name of the faith. One such campaign is described in the Book of Joshua.

The story of Joshua's conquest of Canaan is the story of the culmination of the ancient Hebrews' return to Canaan. To Joshua and his followers, this was the "promised Land" of the covenant between God and the chosen people. According to the Bible, the Canaanite cities were destroyed and the Canaanites themselves were attacked until "there was no one left who breathed."<sup>34</sup> Assuming that Joshua and his army put to the sword all the inhabitants of the 31 cities mentioned in the Bible, and assuming that each city averaged 10,000 people, his conquest cost 310,000 lives.<sup>35</sup>

To the ancient Hebrews, the Promised Land had been occupied by enemy trespassers. To fulfill God's covenant, it was rational and necessary from their perspective to drive them from the land, exterminating them when deemed necessary.

## II. Christian Crusades:

During the Middle ages, the western Christian (i.e., Roman Catholic) church launched at least nine invasions of the Islamic east, the first one in 1095. These invasions were termed Crusades because they were conducted in the name of the Cross. The purpose of the Crusades was to capture the holy lands from the disunited Muslims, whom they referred to collectively as Saracens.

Christian knights and soldiers answered the call for many reasons. Another important reason was the spiritual promise, made by Pope Urban II, that fighting and dying in the name of the Cross would ensure martyrdom and thereby guarantee a place in heaven. Liberation of the holy lands would bring eternal salvation. Thus “knights who with pious intent took the Cross would earn a remission from temporal penalties for all his sins; if he died in battle he would earn remission of his sins.”<sup>36</sup> This Religious ideology was reflected in the war cry of the early Crusades: *Deus lo volt!* (God wills it!)

During the first Crusades, Western knights-primarily Frankish soldiers- captured a broad swath of biblical lands, including Jerusalem and Bethlehem. When cities and towns were captured, most of the Muslim and Jewish inhabitants were killed outright, a practice that was common in medieval warfare. When Jerusalem was captured in July 1099, Frankish knights massacred thousands of Muslim, Jewish, and Orthodox Christian residents. An embellished Crusader letter sent to Pope

Urban II in Rome boasted that the blood of the Saracens reached the bridles of the Crusaders' horses.

Not all Christian Crusades were fought in Muslim lands. The Western Church also purged its territories of Jews and divergent religious beliefs that were denounced as heresies. The zealotry and violence of these purges became legendary. During the brutal Albigensian Crusade in southern France during the 13<sup>th</sup> century, the story was told that concerns were raised about loyal and innocent Catholics who were being killed along with targeted members of the enemy Cathar sect. The Pope's representative, Arnaud Amaury, allegedly replied, "Kill them all, God will know his own."

The Church-sanctioned invasions and atrocities were deemed to be in accordance with God's wishes and therefore perfectly acceptable. An extreme and unquestioning faith in the cause led to a series of campaigns of terror against the non-Christian (and sometimes the Orthodox Christian) residents of conquered cities and territories. In a typical and tragic irony of the time, the Greek Orthodox city of Constantinople, center of the Byzantine Empire and one of the great cities of the world, was captured and sacked by Western Crusaders in 1204 during the fourth Crusade. The Crusaders looted the city and created a short-lived Latin Empire, which lasted until 1261.

### **C. State-Sponsored Religious Terrorism in the Modern Era:**

State sponsored terrorism is the most organized, and potentially the most far-reaching, application of terrorist violence. Governments possess an array of resources that are unavailable to sub state dissident groups, which means that the state is unmatched in its ability to commit acts of violence. Government sponsorship of terrorism is not limited for providing support for ideological or ethno-national movements. It also incorporates state sponsorship of religious revolutionary movements.

#### **National Case: Iran**

Iran became a preeminent state sponsor of religious terrorism after the overthrow of the monarchy of Shah Mauhammed Reza Pahlavi in 1979, and the creation of the theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran soon thereafter. Iran has been implicated in the sponsorship of a number of groups that are known to have engaged in terrorist violence, making it a perennial entry on the U.S. Department of State's list of state sponsors of terrorism. The Iranian **Revolutionary Guards Corps** has a unit-- the **Qods (Jerusalem) Force**-- that promotes Islamic revolution abroad and the "liberation" of Jerusalem from non-Muslims. Members of the Revolutionary Guards have appeared in Lebanon and Sudan.

#### **Regional Case: Pakistan and India**

India and Pakistan are seemingly implacable rivals. Much of this rivalry is grounded in religious animosity between the Hindu and Muslim communities of

the subcontinent, and the sponsorship of terrorist proxies have kept the region in a state of nearly constant tension.

Hindus and Muslims in Southwest Asia have engaged in sectarian violence since 1947, when British colonial rule ended. The spiritual and political architect of the movement against British rule was Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi, who led an independence movement based on nonviolence and principles of inclusive community. Unfortunately, Gandhi's deep spiritual convictions could not forestall sectarian confrontation in the new nation. During and after the British withdrawal, communal fighting and terrorism between Hindus and Muslims led to the partition of British India into mostly Muslim East Pakistan and West Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and mostly Hindu India. During the partition, Hindus and Muslims migrated across the new borders by the hundreds of thousands. Since independence, conflict has been ongoing between Pakistan and India over many issues, including Indian support for Bangladesh's war of independence from Pakistan, disputed borders, support for religious nationalist terrorist organizations, the development of nuclear arsenals and the disputed northern region of Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan, through its intelligence agency, the **Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)**, has a long history of supporting insurgent groups fighting against Indian interests. Religious terrorist groups in the Indian state of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir have received Pakistani aid in what has become a high-stakes

conflict between two nuclear powers that can also field large conventional armies. The Pakistan-India conflict is arguably as volatile as the Arab-Israeli rivalry but with many times the manpower and firepower. This is especially noteworthy because both countries possess nuclear arsenals.

#### **D. Dissident Religious Terrorism in the Modern Era:**

Dissident religious terrorism is a political violence conducted by groups of religious “true believers” who fervently have faith in the sacred righteousness of their cause. Any behaviour carried out in the defense of this sacred cause is considered to be not only justifiable but also blessed. As discussed previously, most major religions-- in particular, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism-- possess extremist adherents, some of them have engaged in terrorist violence. Smaller religions and cults have similar adherents. Among the unambiguous principles found among religious extremists are their convictions that they are *defending* their faith from attack by nonbelievers, or their faith in an indisputable and universal guiding principle that must be advanced for the salvation of the faithful. These principles are manifested in various ways and to varying degrees by religious extremists, but they are usually at the core of their belief system.

#### **Regional Case: Religious Zealotry in the Middle East.**

From the perspective of religious radicals in the Middle East, violence done in the name of God is perfectly rational behaviour because God is on their side.

Many of the holy sites in the region are sacred to more than one faith, as in the case of Jerusalem, where a convergence of claims exists among Muslims, Jews, and Christians. When these convergences occur, some extremists believe that the claims of other faiths are inherently blasphemous. Because of this sort of indisputable “truth”, some extremists believe that God wishes for nonbelievers to be driven from sacred sites, or otherwise barred from legitimizing their claims. As Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the assassinated founder of the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas explained in a 1998 justification of defensive religious violence, First of all.... these are not suicide operations. [Islam forbids suicide.] We are protecting ourselves... The Jews attack and kill our civilians-- we will kill their civilians, too.... From the first drop of blood [the bomber] spills on the ground, he goes to Paradise. The Jewish victims immediately go to Hell.

37

**Movement Case: The International Mujahideen-- Holy Warriors for the faith.**

The mujahideen, or “holy warriors.” are Islamic fighters who have sworn a vow to take up arms to defend the faith. They tend to be believers in fundamentalist interpretations of Islam who have defined their jihad, or personal struggle, to be one of fighting and dying on behalf of the faith.

The modern conceptualization of the Mujahideen began during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, which dated from the time of the Soviet invasion of the country in December 1979 to their withdrawal in February 1989. Although several Afghan

rebel groups (mostly ethnically based) fought the Soviets, they collectively referred to themselves as “Mujahaideen.” To them, their war of resistance was a holy jihad. Significantly, Muslim volunteers from around the world served alongside the Afghan mujahideen. These “**Afghan Arabs**” played an important role in spreading the modern *jihadi* ideology throughout the Muslim world.

Reasons for taking up arms as a *jihadi* vary, depending on one’s personal or national context. Some mujahideen recruits answer calls for holy war from religious scholars who might declare, for example, that the West is repressing Islam. Others respond to clear and identifiable threats to their people or country, such a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, or the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the west bank. And others may join as mujahideen on behalf of the cause of other Muslims, such as the wars fought by Bosnian Muslims or Algerian rebels. Regardless of the precipitating event, mujahideen are characterized by their faith in several basic values.

The ideology of the modern mujahideen requires selfless sacrifice in defense of the faith. Accepting the title of mujahideen requires selfless sacrifice in defense of the faith. Accepting the title of mujahideen means that one must live, fight, and die in accordance with religious teachings. They believe in the inevitability of victory, because the cause is being waged on behalf of the faith and in the name of God; both the faith and God will prevail. During this defense of the faith, trials and ordeals should be endured without complaint, because the pain suffered in this

world will be rewarded after death in paradise. If one lives a righteous and holy life, for example by obeying the moral proscriptions of the Qur'an, one can enjoy these proscribed pleasures in the afterlife. Thus, the essence of modern mujahideen ideology is a hybrid and simplistic blend of Islamic fundamentalism. This "Islam" seeks to eradicate all forms of Islam other than its own strict literal interpretation of the Koran. It comes packaged with a set of now well-known political grievances... and justifies violence as a means of purging nations of corruption moral degradation, and spiritual torpor.<sup>38</sup>

As applied by the mujahideen, the defensive ideology of jihad holds that when one defends the faith against the unfaithful, death is martyrdom, and through death paradise will be achieved. One oath of commitment made by a recruit to the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan read:

"I... State in the presence of God that I will slaughter infidels my entire life... And with the will of God I will do these killings in the supervision and guidance with Harkut ul-Ansar.... may God give me strength in fulfilling this oath."<sup>39</sup>

### **Organization Case: Al Qaeda's Religious Foundation**

The modern era's most prominent pan-Islamic revolutionary organization is Saudi national **Osama bin Laden's** cell-based Al Qaeda (The Base), which seeks to unite Muslims throughout the world in a holy war. Al Qaeda is not a traditional hierarchical revolutionary organization, nor does it call for its followers to do much more than engage in terrorist violence in the name of the faith. Al Qaeda is

best described as a movement or loose network of like-minded Islamic revolutionaries. Compared to other movements in the postwar era, it is a different kind of network, because Al Qaeda

- \* Holds no territory
- \* Does not champion the aspirations of an ethno-national group
- \* Has no “top-down” organizational structure
- \* Has virtually nonexistent state sponsorship
- \* Promulgates political demands that are vague
- \* Is completely religious in its worldview

Experts do not know how many people count themselves as Al Qaeda operatives, but estimates range from 35,000 to 50,000. Of these, perhaps 5,000 received training in camps in Sudan and Afghanistan.<sup>40</sup> Others are new recruits from around the Muslim world and Europe, and many others are veteran Afghan Arabs who fought in the jihad against the Soviet and later against the post-September 11, 2001, American-led coalition forces in Afghanistan. With a presence in an estimated 50 to 60 countries, it is likely that new recruits will continue to join the Al Qaeda cause (or Al Qaeda-inspired causes) in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks.

Al Qaeda’s religious orientation is a reflection of Osama bin Laden’s sectarian ideological point of view. Bin Laden’s worldview was created by his exposure to Islam-motivated armed resistance. As a boy, he inherited between \$20 million and

\$80 million from his father, with estimates ranging as high as \$300 million. When the Soviet invaded Afghanistan in 1979, bin Laden eventually joined with thousands of others non-Afghan Muslims who traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan, to prepare to wage jihad. However, his main contribution to the holy war was to solicit financial and *materiel* (military hardware) contributions from wealthy Arab sources. He apparently excelled at this. The final leg on his journey toward international Islamic terrorism occurred when he had thousands of other Afghan veterans-- the Afghan Arabs-- returned to their countries to carry on their struggle in the name of Islam. Beginning in 1986, bin Laden organized a training camp that grew in 1988 into the Al Qaeda group. While in his home country of Saudi Arabia, bin Laden “became enraged when King Fahd let American forces, with their rock music and Christian and Jewish troops, wage the Persian Gulf war from Saudi soil in 1991.”<sup>41</sup>

After the Gulf War, bin Laden and a reinvigorated Al Qaeda moved to its new home in Sudan for five years. It was there that the Al Qaeda network began to grow into a self-sustaining financial and training base for promulgating jihad. Bin laden and his followers configured the Al Qaeda network with one underlying purpose: “launching and leading a holy war against the Western infidels he could now see camped out in his homeland, near the holiest shrines in the Muslim world.”<sup>42</sup> Al Qaeda has inspired Islamic fundamentalist revolutionaries and terrorists in a number of countries. It became a significant source of financing and

training for thousands of *jihadis*. The network is essentially a nonstate catalyst for transnational religious radicalism and violence.

When Al Qaeda moved to Afghanistan, its reputation as financial and training center attracted many new recruits and led to the creation of a loose network of cells and “sleepers” in dozens of countries. Significantly, aboveground radical Islamic groups with links to Al Qaeda took root in some nations and overtly challenged authority through acts of terrorism. Two of these groups-- Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Laskar Jihad in Indonesia.

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## CHAPTER 3

### **Philosophical Foundation of Terrorism.**

#### **A. The Foundation of Terrorism:**

An important step toward defining terrorism is to develop an understanding of the sources of terrorism. To identify these sources, one must first understand the important role of extremism as a primary feature underlying all terrorist behaviour.

Behind each incident of terrorist violence is some type of deeply held belief system that has motivated the perpetrators. These belief systems are, at their core, extremist systems characterized by intolerance. One must keep in mind, however, that although terrorism is a violent expression of their beliefs as sponsoring debates or publishing newspapers. They might engage in vandalism and other disruptions of the normal routines of their enemies. Our focus in this chapter and subsequent chapters will be on violent extremist behaviour that many people would define as act of terrorism. But first, we must briefly investigate the general characteristics of the extremist foundations of terrorism.

#### **B. Defining Extremism:**

Extremism is broadly defined as “radical in opinion, especially in political matters; ultra; advanced.”<sup>1</sup> More especially, political extremism refers to taking a political idea to its limits, regardless of unfortunate repercussions, impracticalities, arguments, and feelings to the country, and with the intention not only to confront,

but also to eliminate opposition... Intolerance toward all views other than one's own.<sup>2</sup>

Extremism is a precursor to terrorism--it is an overarching belief system that is used by terrorists to justify their violent behaviour. Extremism is characterized by what a person's beliefs are as well as how a person expresses his or her beliefs. Thus, no matter how offensive or reprehensible one's thoughts or words are, they are not by themselves acts of terrorism. Only persons who violently act out their extremist beliefs are labeled as terrorists.

**Two examples illustrate this point:**

First, an example of extremist behaviour. Daniel and Philip Berrigan were well-known members of the Roman Catholic pacifist left and were leaders in the anti-war and antinuclear movements in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s. What they believed in was an uncompromising commitment to pacifism. They expressed their beliefs by committing a series of symbolic, and often illegal, protest actions. During one such action on May 17, 1968, they and seven other Catholic men and women entered the Baltimore Selective Service Board, stole Selective Service classification forms, took them outside to a parking lot, and burned several hundred of the documents with a homemade napalm-like gelled mixture of gasoline and soap flakes. This was certainly extremist behaviour, but it falls short of terrorism.<sup>3</sup>

Second, an example of extremist speech. The American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (AK-KKK) were an activist faction of the KKK that operated mostly in the Midwest and East during the 1990s. What they believed in was racial supremacy. They expressed their beliefs by holding a series of rallies at Government sites, often-county courthouses. They were known for their vitriolic rhetoric. The following remarks were reportedly taken from a speech delivered by the imperial Wizard of the AK-KKK in March 1998 at a rally held at the county courthouse in Butler, Pennsylvania, near Pittsburgh:

“Take a stand . . . Join the Klan; stick up for your rights.... Only God has the right to create a race- not no black and white, not no nigger, not no Jew.... Yes, I will use the word nigger, because it is not illegal...we are sick and tired of the government taking your money, and giving food and jobs to the niggers when the white race has to go without! Wake up America.”<sup>4</sup>

This language is intentionally racist, hateful, and inflammatory, and yet it falls short of advocating violence or revolution. A sympathetic listener might certainly act out against one of the enemy groups identified in the speech, but it reads more like a racist diatribe than a revolutionary manifesto.

### **C. Common Characteristics of Violent Extremist:**

Scholars and other experts have identified common characteristics exhibited by violent extremists. These characteristics are expressed in different ways, depending on a movement's particular belief system. The following

commonalities are summaries of traits identified by these experts and are by no means an Exhaustive inventory.<sup>5</sup>

*Intolerance.* Intolerance is the hallmark of extremist belief systems and terrorist behaviour. The Cause is considered to be absolutely just and good, and those who disagree with the cause (or some aspect of the cause) are cast into the category of the opposition. Terrorist affixes their opponents with certain negative or derisive labels to set them apart from the extremist's movement. These characterizations are often highly personalized, so that specific individuals are identified who symbolize the opposing belief system or cause. Thus, during the cold war, the American president was labeled by the pro-United States camp as the "leader of the free world" and by Latin American Marxists as the embodiment of "Yankee imperialism."<sup>6</sup>

*Moral Absolutes:* Moral absolutes are adopted by terrorists, so that distinction between good and evil is very clearly drawn, as are the lines between the terrorists and their opponents. The terrorists' belief or cause is a morally correct vision of the world and is used to establish moral superiority over others. Violent extremists thus become morally and ethically pure elites who lead the oppressed masses to freedom. For example, religious terrorists often believe that their "one truth faith" is superior to all others and that any behaviour committed in defense of the faith is perfectly justifiable.

*Broad Conclusions:* Extremist conclusions are made to simplify the goals of the cause and the nature of the extremist's opponents. These generalizations are not debatable and allow for no exceptions. Evidence for these conclusions is rooted in one's belief system rather than based on objective data. Terrorists often believe these generalizations thinking that they must be true. For example, ethno-nationalists frequently categorize all members of their opponent group as having certain broadly negative traits.

*New Language and Conspiratorial Beliefs:* Language and conspiracies are created to demonize the enemy and set the terrorists apart from those who are not part of their belief system. Extremists thus become a special elite who have discovered a hidden agenda and who have become targets of the agenda. For example, some American far right conspiracy proponents express their anti—Semitic beliefs by using coded reference to “international bankers” or the Zionist Occupied Government (ZOG). Neo—Nazi rightists degrade members of non-European races by referring to them as “mud people.”

#### **D. The world of Extremist:**

Extremist have a very different and at times, fantastic world view compared to nonextremists. They set themselves apart as protectors of some truth or as the true heirs of some legacy. For example, racial extremists within the American Patriot movement have argued that nonwhites are nothing but “Fourteenth Amendment citizens” Whites are sovereign citizens whose rights are delineated, not by the

government, but rather by a cobbled assortment of historical writings whose meaning is often subject to their fanciful interpretation.<sup>7</sup>

Likewise, extremists frequently believe that secret and quasi-mythical forces are arrayed against them and that these forces are the cause of worldwide-calamities. For example, some bigoted conspiracy believers argue that the illuminati or international Judaism mysteriously control world banking and the media or run the governments of France and the United States. One conspiracy theory that was widely believed among Islamic extremists in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks was that Israeli agents were behind the attacks; that 4,000 Jews received telephone calls to evacuate the World Trade center in New York; and thus, that no Jews were among the victims of the attack. When terrorists adopt a religious belief system, their worldview becomes one of the struggles between supernatural forces of good and evil. They view themselves, as living a righteous life in a manner that fits with their interpretation of God's will. According to religious extremists, those who do not conform to their belief system are opposed to the one true faith. Those who live according to the accepted belief system are a chosen people, and those who do not are not chosen. These interpretations of how one should behave include elements of the social or political environment that underlies the belief system. For example, Bob Jones University in Greenville, South Carolina, is a fundamentalist Christian university founded in 1927. It once justified its prohibition against interracial dating and marriage as an application of

God-mandated truths found in Holy Scripture. Similarly, one student at a Pakistani religious school stated, “Osama [bin Laden] wants to keep Islam pure from the pollution of the infidels.... He believes Islam is the way for all the world. He wants to bring Islam to the world.”<sup>8</sup>

Extremist has a very clear sense of mission, purpose, and righteousness. They create a worldview that sets them apart from the rest of society. Thus extremist beliefs and terrorist behaviours very logical from the perspective of those who accept the extremists’ belief system, but illogical from the point of view of those who reject the system.

#### **E. Defining Terrorism: An Ongoing Debate.**

There is some consensus among experts- but no unanimity- on what kind of violence constitutes an act of terrorism. Governments have developed definitions of terrorism, individual agencies within governments have adopted definitions, and academic experts have proposed and analyzed dozens of definitional constructs. This Lack of unanimity, which exists throughout the public and private sectors, is an accepted reality in study of political violence.

A significant amount of intellectual energy has been devoted to identifying formal elements of terrorism, as illustrated by Alex Schmid’s surveys, which identified more than 100 definitions.<sup>9</sup> Establishing formal definitions can, of course, be complicated by the perspective of the participants in a terrorist incident, who instinctively differentiate freedom fighters from terrorists, regardless of

formal definitions. Another complication is that most definitions focus on political violence perpetrated by dissident groups, even though many governments have practiced terrorism as both domestic and foreign policy. One important observation must be kept in mind and understood at the outset: Terrorism is not synonymous with guerrilla warfare. The term guerrilla (“little war”) was developed during the early 19<sup>th</sup> century when Napoleon’s army fought a long brutal, and ultimately unsuccessful war in Spain. Unlike the Napoleonic campaigns elsewhere in Europe, which involved conventional armies fighting set-piece battles in accordance with rules of engagement, the war in Spain was a classic unconventional conflict. The Spanish people, as opposed to the Spanish army, rose in rebellion and resisted the invading French army. They liberated large area of the Spanish countryside.

After years of costly fighting –in which atrocities were common on both sides–the French were driven out. Thus, in contrast to terrorists, the term guerrilla fighters refers to a numerically larger group of armed individuals, who operate as a military unit, attack enemy military force, and seize and hold territory (even if only ephemerally during the daylight hours) at the same time also exercising some form of sovereignty or control over a defined geographical area and its population.<sup>10</sup>

Dozens, if not scores, of examples of guerrilla warfare exist in the modern era. They exhibit the classic strategy of hit-and –run warfare. Many examples also

exist of successful guerilla campaign against numerically and technologically superior adversaries.

Thus, the effort to formally define terrorism is a critical one; because government's antiterrorist policy calculations must be based on criteria that determine whether or not a violent incident is an act of terrorism. Government ant policymakers must piece together the elements of terrorist behaviour and demarcate the factors that distinguish terrorism from other forms of conflict.

#### **F. A Sampling of Formal Definitions:**

In Europe, countries that endured terrorist campaigns have written official definitions of terrorism. The British have defined terrorism as "use or threat, for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, of action which involves serious violence against any person or property."<sup>11</sup> In Germany terrorism has been described as an "enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life of property of other persons, especially by means of severe crimes."<sup>12</sup> And the European interior Ministers note that "Terrorism is ...the use, or the threatened use by a cohesive group of persons of violence (short of warfare) to effect political aims."<sup>13</sup>

Scholars have also tried their hand at defining Terrorism. For example, Gurr has described Terrorism' as "the use of unexpected violence to intimidate or coerce

people in the pursuit of political or social objectives".<sup>14</sup> It was described by Gibbs as "illegal violence or threatened violence against human or nonhuman objects,"<sup>15</sup> so long as that violence meets additional criteria such as secretive features and unconventional warfare. Bruce Hoffman wrote:

We come to appreciate that terrorism is ineluctably political in aims and motives; violent- or, equally important, threatens violence; designed to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the immediate victim or target; conducted by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia); and perpetrated by a sub national group or non-state entity.

We may thus define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of change.<sup>16</sup>

To further illustrate the range of definitions, Whittaker lists the following descriptions of terrorism-by-terrorism experts: <sup>17</sup>

Contributes the illegitimate use of force to achieve a political objective when innocent people are targeted (Walter Laqueur).

A strategy of violence designed to promote desired outcomes by instilling fear in the public at large (Walter Reich).

The use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change (Brian Jenkins).

From this discussion, we can identify the common features of most formal definitions:

- \*The use of illegal force.
- \*Sub national actors
- \*Unconventional methods
- \*Political motives
- \*Attack against “soft” civilian and passive military targets
- \*Acts aimed at purposefully affecting an audience

The emphasis, then, is on the adoption by terrorists of specific types of motives, methods and targets. One fact that is readily apparent from these formal definitions is that they are very focused on terrorist groups rather than terrorist states. As will be made abundantly clear in later chapter that terrorism has been responsible for many more deaths and much more suffering than terrorism originating from small bands of terrorists.

### **G. The American Context: Defining Terrorism in the United States.**

The United States has not adopted a single definition of terrorism as a matter of government policy; it instead relied on definitions that are developed from time to time by government agencies. These definitions reflect the United State’s traditional law enforcement approach to distinguishing terrorism from more

common criminal behaviour. The following definitions are a sample of the official U.S. approach toward defining terrorist behaviour:

The U.S. Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of, or threatened use, of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.”<sup>18</sup> The U.S code defines terrorism as illegal violence that attempts to “intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a government by assassination or kidnapping.”<sup>19</sup> The Federal Bureau of Investigation has defined terrorism as “the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”<sup>20</sup> By the state Department, terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”<sup>21</sup>

Using this definition, the following common elements can be used to construct a composite American definitional model:

Terrorism is a premeditated and unlawful act in which groups or agents of some principle engage in a threatened or actual use of force or violence against human or property targets. These groups or agents engage in this behaviour intending the

purposeful intimidation of governments or people to affect policy or behaviour with underlying political objectives.

These common elements indicate that the United States has adopted a fairly narrow and legalistic approach to defining terrorism. When these elements are assigned to individual suspects, they may label and detained as terrorists. We in evaluating the practical policy implications of this approach, should bear in mind that labeling and detaining suspects as terrorists is not without controversy. Some counter terrorist practices have prompted strong debate as a consequence of the post-September 11, 2001, war on terrorism. For example, when enemy soldiers are taken prisoner, they are traditionally afforded legal protection as prisoners of war. This is well recognized under international law. During the war on terrorism, many suspected terrorists were designated by the United States as enemy combatants and were not afforded the same legal status as prisoners of war. Such practices have been hotly debated among proponents and opponents.

#### **H. Types of Terrorism:**

The basic elements of terrorist environments are uncomplicated, and experts and commentators generally agree on the forms of terrorism found in modern political environments. For example, academic experts have described the following environments:

\*Barkan and Snowden described vigilant, insurgent, transnational, and state terrorism.<sup>22</sup>

\*Hoffman discusses ethno-nationalist/separatist, international, religious, and state sponsored Terrorism.<sup>23</sup>

\*While undertaking the task of defining the new terrorism, Liqueur conceptualize Religious, state, “exotic,” and criminal terrorism.<sup>24</sup>

\* Other experts evaluate narco-terrorism, toxic terrorism, and netwar.<sup>25</sup>

**I. Perspectives on Terrorism.** It should now clear that defining terrorism can be exercised in semantics and context, driven by one’s perspective and worldview. Absent definitional guidelines, these perspectives would be merely the subject of personal opinion and academic debate. Perspective is a central consideration in defining terrorism. Those who oppose an extremist groups violent behavior- and who might be the targets of the group- would naturally consider them to be terrorists. On the other hand, those who are being championed by the group- and on whose behalf the terrorist war is being fought- often view them as liberation fighters; this can occur even when the championed people do not necessarily agree with the methods of the group. “The problem is that there exist no precise or widely accepted definition of terrorism.”<sup>26</sup> We will consider four perspectives that illustrate this problem. These perspectives are the following:

1. Participants in a terrorist environment. People who participate in, or are affected by terrorist incidents are prone to have very different interpretations of the incident.

2. Terrorism or freedom fighting? Whether the classification of a group or movement as terrorists or freedom fighters is simply a question of one's perspective.
3. Extremism or "mainstreamism"? Whether extremist behaviour can move from the ideological fringes into a nation or people's mainstream.
4. Ideologies and ideals. Whether ideologies that promise a better future can justify terrorist behaviour in the present.

### **Perspective1: Participants in a terrorist Environment**

The participants in a terrorist environment interpret motives, methods, and targets of violent extremists differently. These participants can, and often do, draw their own subjective conclusions about violent political incidents regardless of the accepted formal definitions that have been crafted by officials or experts. Typically, the participants in a terrorist environment include the following actors, each of whom may advance different interpretations of an incident:<sup>27</sup>

**The terrorist.** Terrorists are the perpetrators of a politically violent incident. The perspective of the terrorist is that the violent incident is a justifiable act of war against an oppressive opponent. "In so far as terrorist seeks to attract attention, they target the enemy public or uncommitted bystanders."<sup>28</sup> This is a legitimate tactic in their minds, because from their point of view they are always freedom fighters and never terrorists.

**The Supporter.** Supporters of the terrorists are patrons, in essence persons who provide a supportive environment or apparatus. Supporters will generally refer to the terrorist participants as freedom fighters. Even if supporters disagree with the force or with the application of force in a specific incident, they will often realize its use as the unfortunate consequence of a just war.

**The victim.** Victims of political violence, and of warfare, will rarely sympathize with the perpetrators of that violence, regardless of the underlying motive. From their perspective, the perpetrators are little better than terrorists.

**The Target.** Targets are usually symbolic. They represent some feature of the enemy and can be either property targets or human targets. As is the case with the victim, human targets will rarely sympathize with the perpetrators.

**The Onlooker.** Onlookers are the broad audience to the terrorist incident. They can be directly affected by the incident at the scene of an attack or indirectly affected via modern mass media. The onlooker may sympathize with the perpetrators, revile them, or remain neutral. Depending on the worldview of the onlooker, he or she might actually applaud a specific incident or a general dissident environment. Television is a particularly effective medium for broadening the scope of who is an onlooker. This was evident during the live broadcasts of the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. The Internet has also become a means of broadening the audience for terrorist acts, such as beheadings of hostages, bombings, and other incidents.

**The Analyst.** The analyst is an interpreter of the terrorist incident. Analysts are important participants because they create perspectives, interpret incidents, and label the other participants. Analysts can include political leaders, media experts, and academic experts. Very often, the analyst will simply define for the other participants who is- or is not- a terrorist.

Many factors shape the perspectives of terrorists, supporters, victims, targets, onlookers, and analysts. These factors include culture, collective history, individual experiences, and group identity. Participants, thus causing them to adopt biased spins on events, can interpret the same terrorist event in a number of different ways. The following factors illustrate this problem:

- \*Political associations of participants can create a sense of identification with either the target group or the defended group. This identification can be either favorable or unfavorable, depending on the political association.
- \*Emotional responses of participants after a terrorist incident can range from horror to joy. This response can shape a participant's opinion of the incident or the extremists' cause.
- \*Labeling of participants can create either a positive or negative impression of an incident or cause. Labeling can range from creating very positive symbolism on behalf of the terrorists to the dehumanization of enemy participants (including civilians)
- \*Symbolism plays an important role in the terrorists' selection of targets. The targets can be inanimate objects that symbolize an enemy people. Other

participants sometimes make value judgments on the incident based on the symbolism of the target, thus asking whether the selected target was legitimate or illegitimate.

### **Perspective 2: Terrorism or Freedom fighting?**

The second perspective for understanding terrorism is the question of whether the use of political violence is terrorism or freedom fighting. Members of politically violent organizations will rarely label themselves as terrorists. Instead, they adopt the language of liberation, national identity, religious fervor, and even democracy. Ethno-nationalist and religious organizations such as Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) in Israel, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (the Provos) in the United Kingdom all declare that they are armies fighting on behalf of an oppressed people, and they are viewed by their supporters as freedom fighters. Conversely, many Israelis, Sinhalese, and British would label members of these groups as terrorists.

The declarations published by these and other organizations are in the language of liberation and freedom. For example, the Palestinian Information Center explained that Hamas is an acronym that stands for the Islamic Resistance Movement, a popular national resistance movement which is working to create conditions conducive to emancipating the Palestinian people, delivering them from tyranny, liberating their land from the occupying usurper, and to stand up to the Zionist scheme which is supported by neo-colonist forces...Hamas...is part of the Islamic awakening movement and upholds that this awakening is the road which will lead

to the liberation of Palestine from the river to sea. It is also a popular movement in the sense that it is a practical manifestation of a wide popular current that is deeply rooted in the ranks of the Palestinian people and the Islamic nation.<sup>29</sup>

Likewise, the leader of the LTTE delivered the following remarks on November 27, 2001, the LTTE's Heroes' Day:

The Tamil people want to maintain their national identity and to live in their own lands in their historically given homeland with peace and dignity. They want to determine their own political and economic life; they want to be on their own. These are the basic political aspirations of the Tamil people. It is neither separatism nor terrorism.<sup>30</sup>

Despite the seemingly noble aspirations embodied in the Hamas and LTTE statements, both conflicts have been markedly violent and have included many assassinations and terrorist bombings, as well as thousands of deaths. However, as ruthless as the LTTE and Hamas organizations have been, their opponents- the Sri Lankan and Israeli governments, respectively- have regularly applied repressive measures against them and their supporters, including physically coercive interrogations, the destruction of homes and assassinations. This repression has fueled fresh support for the rebellions. Sinn Fein, the overground Irish republican political party that champions the unification of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland, remarked in a statement titled "The conditions for peace in Ireland."

The root cause of the conflict in Ireland is the denial of democracy, the refusal by the British government to allow the Irish people to exercise their right to national self-determination. The solution to the conflict in Ireland lies in the democratic exercise of that right in the form of national reunification, national independence and sovereignty.

Although Sinn Fein participated in the successful brokering of a peace agreement between the Provos and their opponents, it has historically championed many Provo “martyrs” and their common goal of unification. These cases exemplify the important role of perspective in defining one’s champions or opponents, and how the absence of a definitional model relegates the debate of terrorism or freedom fighting to one of opposing values and opinions.

### **Perspective 3: Extremism or “Mainstreamism”?**

The third perspective for understanding terrorism is the question of whether political violence always lies at the political fringes of society, or whether it is in fact a rational choice of some mainstreamism. Members of organizations such as Hamas, the LTTE, and the Provos (prior to the peace accord) readily acknowledge that their methods are extreme but justify them as being proportional to the force used by the agents of their oppressors. In Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) argued that the Colombian government’s response to FARC initiatives was to strengthen the quasi-official death squads, the most despicable form of extermination. In this way, they cold-bloodedly annihilated the opposition political parties, union leaders, and defenders of human rights, priests,

peasant leaders and democratic personalities, among others.... From the moment a new agreement was made with President Andres Pastrana to establish the talks at San Vicente del Caguan on Jan. 7, 1999, the savagery grew. No week passed without a massacre, a murder or a forced evacuation, all done in the name of the Paramilitaries but planned in the military bases. It is the realization of the imperialist doctrine of internal security.<sup>31</sup>

Governments have also adopted authoritarian measures to counter domestic threats from perceived subversives. They likewise rationalize their behaviour as a proportional response to an immediate threat. Numerous cases of this rationalization exists, such as when the Chilean and Argentine armed forces seized power during the 1970s and engaged in widespread violent repression of dissidents. In Argentina, an estimated 30,000 people disappeared during the so-called Dirty War waged by its military government from 1976 to 1983.

Thus, from the perspective of many violent groups and governments, extremist beliefs and terrorist methods are logical and necessary. They are considered to be rational and justifiable choices. Such beliefs and methods become mainstreamed within the context of their worldview and political environment, which in their minds offer no alternative to using violence to acquire freedom or to maintain order. Conversely, those who oppose the practitioners of political violence reject their justifications of terrorist methods and disavow the opinion that these methods are morally proportional to the perceived political environment.

**Perspective 4: Ideologies and Ideals.**

The fourth perspective for understanding terrorism is central to developing the facility to critically evaluate the quality of political violence. This perspective involves the underlying ideologies and ideals that justify acts of political violence. It is not uncommon for members of ethno-nationalist and other organizations to justify their beliefs and behaviors by adopting an ideological ideal that promises a better and more just future. Ideologies are systems of belief; they are derived from theories that explain human social and political conditions. Lowi described one element of ideology as “a source of principles and a means of justifying behaviour.”<sup>32</sup> Some ideologies are very intricate, intellectual, and dynamic, such as Marxism. Other ideologies are rather uncomplicated and straightforward, such as nationalism in East Africa, the Balkans, and elsewhere. And some ideologies are nothing more than paranoid conspiracy theories, such as the one-world-government and new world order conspiracies underlying the patriot movement in the United States. Ideologies can constitute political, social, or economic programs. They can also constitute religious, racial, or ethnic systems of belief. The common attribute of all ideologies is that they guide the worldview and manner of living for individuals, groups, and nations.

In their most extreme application, ideologies permit no deviation from their perceived truth and are completely intolerant of any criticism. It is important to grasp the influence of ideological systems of the modern era. For this reason,

several ideologies, Anarchism, Marxism, Fascism, and the just war doctrine, are discussed in the earlier chapter.

### **J. Can Terrorism be justified?**

The central question about terrorism is whether terrorism can ever be morally justified. One might presuppose that terrorism is indefensible, and goes on to consider whether several excuses might nevertheless have some force. It might be pointed out that these “excuses” are justifications in the ordinary sense of term. But one might urge that although terrorist acts involve doing something morally wrong, they may nonetheless be the best actions available to the terrorist. The terrorist may view his or her situation as a moral dilemma, in which all the available options are morally unacceptable, and in which the best one can do is therefore to choose the least awful possibility. If a regime is sufficiently oppressive and tyrannical, for example, and if the potential terrorist is convinced that no means short of terrorism will dislodge it, then such a person may well believe that, however horrible terrorist acts may be in themselves, they are best option available.

It might be argued that in fact terrorism is never the best available option. It is never the last option, because there will always be others to try; it may be that no other option seems likely to succeed, but if so, this must be because the movement considering terrorism lacks popular support, in which case it should not pretend to act on behalf of the populace; it is never the only effective method, because in fact it is never effective. Whether or not they agree with the way as the issue is set up,

most people will probably agree with the conclusion that terrorism is not only morally wrong, but also rarely if ever even the best option of a bad lot. So, what makes terrorism philosophically interesting? This question may be replied as what is especially interesting about terrorism is the difficulty of saying why it is wrong. (Of course, if it turns out to be impossible to satisfactorily explain why it is always and inevitably wrong, we may be led to change our opinion that it is always and inevitably wrong.) It might be pointed out that terrorists could often offer justifications of their actions. It may be difficult to say what is wrong with such justifications without also ruling out as unjustifiable other forms of violence that in fact we do not reject.

We suggested earlier that the features that make terrorist action seem morally unacceptable are their criminal nature and the fact that they target people who by ordinary standards are innocent. Consider criminality first. It seems too simple to say that terrorism is immoral because it is criminal. For there is a crucial distinction between legality and morality. There certainly are regimes that are unjust through and through, and in which acting morally requires acting illegally. We do not want to say that crime is automatically immoral; the cost will be insisting that those who helped Jews escape Nazi Germany were acting immorally, that the American Revolution was immoral, that the Chinese students who demonstrated against their government in Tiananmen Square were acting immorally. When the law itself is unjust, morality may require acting illegally, and it is important to remember that by the terrorists' view point, the regimes they are

defying are thoroughly corrupt. We need to consider indictments of particular societies on their merits, without insisting that whatever a regime dictates is automatically moral.

The second especially troubling feature of terrorism concerns its targets. Who often are, by ordinary standards, innocent of wrongdoing? Indeed, this is probably the main reason that we so often find terrorist acts not just wrong but horrifying. Most of us take for granted an absolute prohibition on the international killing of the innocent. This is true even in wartime; it is an important part of the way convention that “noncombatants cannot be attacked at any time.”<sup>33</sup> Terrorism seems to violate our view that attacks on innocents cannot be justified.

It might be pointed out, however, matters unfortunately are not so simple. The distinction between the innocent and the guilty is a difficult one to make, and it is typical of terrorists that, whatever our views of the matter, they do not regard their victims as innocent. This may be seen, for instance, IRA.’s a number of bombing targets; these include not only bombing targets, but also factories, firms, stores...owned in whole or part by British financiers or companies, or who in any way are a contributory facto to the well-being of her Majesty’s invading forces. It is clear here that the authors regard those who provide any sort of assistance or contribution to the presence of British forces in Ireland as legitimate targets: The fact that these institutions provide support is to make them guilty, even though they are not themselves directly engaged in violence. Similarly, Carlos Marighella

describes legitimate targets of the Brazilian “urban guerilla” as including top government leaders their subordinates, and the stooges of the North American Imperialists. We may suspect that the notion of a stooge of the North American imperialists might be interpreted rather broadly.

The terrorists, then may regard complicity with the unjust ruling authority as a kind of guilt, and view anyone guilty in this way as a legitimate target. Terrorists often regard killing those who are complicitous as a kind execution: The execution of Aldo Moro, and Marighella says that any firing team may independently decide to execute an agent of the dictatorship. If we take seriously this notion of terrorist killing as execution a form of punishment, we may perhaps see a line of response to the position that terrorism is justified because merely participating in, or supporting, or profiting from an unjust regime amounts to a kind of guilt. There is a first of all something peculiar in the notion that killing people on individual initiative can be regarded as a kind of punishment. Punishment seems to require a richer institutional background than this. Second and more important, however, we saw in case of capital punishment that those who defend retributive theories of punishment defend either an “eye for an eye” doctrine, according to which one deserves to be paid back in kind for what one has done, or the somewhat milder “proportional retributive”, according to which punishment should be proportional to the crime but needed not be served as the crime itself. On either view, the killing of those complicitous with an unjust regime could be justified only if they

were not merely guilty, but guilty for murder. It seems difficult to see how the guilt of noncombatants could extend this far.

Difficult, but perhaps is not impossible. It is interesting to compare the point we have now reached with a view that is sometimes held about world hunger. To allow someone to starve is just as bad as actively killing someone, and people who do not do what can to alleviate hunger are allowing people to starve. We may notice that if execution is an appropriate punishment for murder, and not alleviating hunger is tantamount to murder, then it might be appropriate to execute people for not contributing to charity. Perhaps the attitude of terrorists is something like this. The regimes they regard as unjust may be unjust not only because of assassinations, “disappearances”, and the like, but also because of inequitable distribution of wealth that result in the death by starvation and disease of many members of the underclass. The terrorism may take the attitude that anyone who does nothing to try to remedy this situation is guilty or allowing people to die; if allowing someone to die as bad as murder, then execution may be an appropriate response. This strikes us, no doubt, as a primitive and unjustifiable view, but it is surprising to see how close it is to views that seem at first to be enlightened and, even if mistaken, at least worth of respect.

**K. Justifications of Terrorism are unsuccessful:**

No one these days advocates terrorism, not even those who regularly practice it. The practice is indefensible now that it has been recognized, like rape and murder, as an attack upon the innocent. In a sense, indeed, terrorism is worse than rape and

murder commonly are, for in the latter cases the victim has been chosen for a purpose; he or she is the direct object of attack, and the attack has some reason, however twisted or ugly it may be. The victims of a terrorist attack are third parties, innocent bystanders; there is no special reason for attacking them; anyone else within a large class of (unrelated) people will do as well. The attack is directed indiscriminately against the entire class. Terrorists are like killers on a rampage, except that their rampage is not just expressive of rage or madness; the rage is purposeful and programmatic. It aims at a general vulnerability: kill these people in order to terrify those. A relatively small number of deed victims make for a very large number of living and frightened hostages.

This, then, is the peculiar evil of terrorism—not only the killing of innocent people but also the intruding of fear into everyday life, the violation of private purposes, the insecurity of public spaces, and the endless coerciveness of precaution. A crime wave might, I suppose, produce similar effects, but no one plans a crime wave; it is the work of a thousand individual decision makers, each one independent of the others, brought together only by the invisible hand. Terrorism is the work of visible hands; it is an organizational project, a strategic choice, a conspiracy to murder and intimidate... you and me. No wonder the conspirators have difficulty defending in public, the strategy they have chosen.

The moral difficulty is the same, obviously, when the conspiracy is directed not against you and me but against the Protestants, say, not Catholics; Israelis, not Italians or Germans; blacks, not whites. These “limits” rarely hold for long; the

logic of terrorism steadily expands the range of vulnerability. The more hostages they hold, the stronger the terrorists are. No one is safe once whole populations have been put at risk, even if the risk were contained, however, the evil would be no different. So far as individual Protestants or Israelis or blacks are concerned, terrorism is random, degrading, and frightening. That is its hallmark, and that, again, is why it cannot be defended.

But when moral justification is ruled out, the way is opened for ideological excuse and apology. We live today in a political culture of excuses. This is far better than a political culture in which terrorism is openly defended and justified, for the excuse at least acknowledges the evil. But the improvement is precarious, hard won, and difficult to sustain. It is not the case, even in this better world, that terrorist organizations are without supporters. The support is indirect but by no means ineffective. It takes the form of apologetic descriptions and explanations, a litany of excuses that readily undercuts our knowledge of the evil. Today that knowledge is insufficient unless it is supplemented and reinforced by a systematic critique of excuses. That every act of terrorism is a wrongful act. The wrongfulness of the excuse, however, cannot be taken for granted; it has to be argued. The excuses themselves are familiar enough, the stuff of contemporary political debate.

#### **L. The Excuses for Terrorism:**

The most common excuse for terrorism is that it is a last resort, chosen only when all else fails. The image is of people who have literally run out of options.

One by one, they have tried every possibility, failed everywhere, until no alternative remains but the evil of terrorism. They must be terrorists or do nothing at all. The easy response is to insist that, given this description of their case, they should do nothing at all; they have indeed exhausted their possibilities. But this response simply reaffirms the principle, ignores the excuse; this response does not attend to the terrorists' desperation. Whatever be the cause to which they are committed, we have to recognize that, given the commitment, the one thing they cannot do is "nothing at all."

But the case is badly described. It is not so easy to reach the "last resort." To get there, one must indeed try everything (which is a lot of things) and not just once, as if a political party might organize a single demonstration, fail to win immediate victory, and claim that it was now justified in moving on to murder. Politics is an art of repetition. Activists and Citizens learn from experience, that is, by doing the same things over and over again. It is by no means clear when they run out of options, but even under conditions of oppression and war, citizens have a good run short of that. The same arguments applies to state officials who claim that they have tried "everything" and are now compelled to kill hostages or bomb peasant villages. Let us imagine such people called before a judicial tribunal and required to answer the question. What exactly did you try? Does anyone believe that they could come up with a plausible list? "Last resort" has only a national finality; the resort to terror is ideologically last, not in an actual series of actions, just last for the sake of the excuse. In fact, most state officials and movement militants who

recommended a policy of terrorism recommend it as a last resort; they may not get their way at the beginning. If they are honest, then, they must make other excuses and give up the pretense of the last resort.

The second excuse is designed for national liberation movements struggling against established and powerful states. Now the claim is that nothing else is possible, that no other strategy is available except terrorism. This is different from the first excuse it does not require would-be terrorists to run through all the available options. The second excuse rather requires terrorists to run through all the options in their heads, not in the world, notional finality is enough. Movement strategists consider their options and conclude that they have no alternative to terrorism. They think that they do not have the political strength to try anything else, and thus they do not try anything else. Weakness is their excuse.

But two very different kinds of weakness are commonly confused here; the weakness of the movement vis-a-vis the opposing state and the movement's weakness vis-a-vis its own people. This second kind of weakness, the inability of the movement to mobilize the nation, makes terrorism the "only" option because it effectively rules out all the others; nonviolent resistance general strikes, mass demonstrations, unconventional warfare, and so on.

These options are only rarely ruled out by the sheer power of the state, by the pervasiveness and intensity of oppression. Totalitarian states may be immune to nonviolent or guerrilla resistance, but all the evidence suggests that they are also immune to terrorism. Or, more exactly, in totalitarian state terror dominates every

other sort. Where terrorism is a possible strategy for the oppositional movement (in liberal and democratic states, most obviously), other strategies are also possible if the movement has some significant degree of popular support. In the absence of popular support, terrorism may indeed be the one available strategy, but it is hard to see how its evils can hence be excused. For it is not weakness alone that makes the excuse, but the claim of the terrorists to represent the weak; and the particular form of weakness that makes terrorism the only option calls that claim into question.

One might avoid this difficulty with a stronger instance on the actual effectiveness of terrorism. The third excuse is simply that terrorism works (and nothing else does); it achieves the ends of the oppressed even without their participation. When the act accuses, the result excuses. This is a consequentiality argument, and given a strict understanding of consequentialism, this argument amounts to a justification rather than an excuse. In Practice, however, the argument is rarely pushed so far. More often, the argument begins with the terrorists' wrongdoing. Their hands are dirty, but we must make a kind of peace with them because they have acted effectively for the sake of people who could not act for themselves. But, in fact, have the terrorists' actions been effective? I doubt that terrorism has ever achieved national liberations- up nation that I know owes its freedom to a campaign of random murder- although terrorism undoubtedly increases the power of the terrorists within the national liberation movement. Perhaps terrorism is also conducive to the survival and notoriety (the

two go together) of the movement, which is now dominated by terrorists. But even if we were to grant some means end relationship between terror and national liberation, the third excuse does not work unless it can meet the further requirements of a consequentialist argument. It must be possible to say that the desired end could not have been achieved through any other less wrongful means. The third excuse depends, then, on the success of the first or second, and neither of these look likely to be successful.

The fourth excuse avoids this crippling dependency. This excuse does not require the apologist to defend either of the improbable claims that terrorism is the last resort or that it is the only possible resort. The fourth excuse is simply that terrorism is the universal resort. All politics is virtually nothing but terrorism. The appearance of innocence and decency is always a piece of deception, more or less convincing in accordance with relative power of the deceivers. The terrorist who does not bother with appearances is only doing openly what everyone else does secretly.

This argument has the same form as the maxim "All's fair in love and war." Love is always fraudulent, war is always brutal, and political action is always terrorist in character. Political action (as Thomas Hobbes long ago argued) only by generating fear in innocent men and women. Terrorism is the politics of state officials or the militants, but it does excuse them all. We hardly can be harsh with people who act the way everyone else acts. Only saints are likely to act differently, and sainthood in politics is supererogatory, a matter of grace, not obligation.

But this fourth excuse relies too heavily on cynicism about political life, and cynicism only sometimes answers well to experience. In fact, legitimate states do not need to terrorize their citizens, and strongly based movements do not need to terrorize their opponents. Officials and militants who live, as it were, on the margins of legitimacy and strength sometimes choose terrorism and sometimes do not. Living in terror is not a universal experience. The world terrorists create has its entrances and exits.

The fourth excuse can also take, often does take, a more restricted form. Oppression, rather than political rule more generally, is always terrorist in character, and thus, we must always excuse the opponents of oppression. When they choose terrorism, they are reacting to someone else's previous choice, repaying in kind the treatment they have long received. Of course, their terrorism repeats the evil-innocent people are killed, who were never themselves oppressors-but repetition is not the same as initiation. The oppressors set the terms of the struggle. But if the struggle is fought on the oppressors' terms, then the oppressors are likely to win. Or, at least, oppression is likely to win, even if it takes on a few faces. The whole point of a liberation movement or a popular mobilization is to change the terms. We have no reason to excuse the terrorism reactively adopted by opponents of oppression unless we are confident of the sincerity of their opposition, the seriousness of their commitment to a non-oppressive politics. But the choice of terrorism undermines that confidence.

We are often asked to distinguish the terrorism of the oppressed from the terrorism of the oppressors. What is it, however, that makes the difference? The message of the terrorist is the same in both cases; a denial of the peoplehood and humanity of the groups among whom he or she finds victims. Terrorism anticipates, when it does not actually enforce, political domination. Does it matter if another replaces one dominated group? Imagine a slave revolt whose protagonists' dream only of enslaving in their turn the children of their master. The dream is understandable, but the fervent desire of the children that the revolt be repressed is equally understandable. In neither case does understanding make for excuse-nor at least, after a politics of universal freedom has become possible. Nor does an understanding of oppression excuse the terrorism of the oppressed, once we have grasped the meaning of liberation.

These are the four general excuses for terror, and each of them fails. They depend upon statements about the world that are false, historical arguments, for there is no evidence, all moral claims turn out to be hollow or dishonest. This is not to say that there might not be more particular excuses that have greater plausibility, extenuating circumstances in particular cases that we would feel compelled to recognize. As with murder, we can tell a story that might lead us, not to justify terrorism, but to excuse this or that individual terrorist. We can provide a personal history, a psychological study of compassion destroyed by fear, moral reason by hatred and rage, social inhabitation by unending violence-the product, an individual driven to kill or readily set on a killing course by his or her political

leaders. But the force of this story will not depend on any of the four general excuses, all of which grant what the storyteller will have to deny: that terrorism is the deliberate choice of rational men and women. Whether they conceive it to be one option among others or the only one available, they nevertheless argue the choose. Whether they are acting or reacting, they have made a decision. The human instruments they subsequently find to plant the bomb or shoot the gun may act under some psychological compulsion, but the men and women who choose terror as a policy act freely. They could not act in any other way, or accept any other description of their action, and still pretend to be the leaders of the movement or the state. We ought never to excuse such leaders.

#### **M. The Response to Terrorism:**

What follows from the critique of excuses? There is still a great deal of room for argument about the best way of responding to terrorism. Certainly, terrorists should be resisted and it is not likely that a purely defensive resistance will ever be sufficient. In this sort of struggle, the offense is always ahead. The technology of terror is simple; the weapons are readily produced and easy to deliver. It is virtually impossible to protect people against random and indiscriminate attack. Thus, resistance will have to be supplemented by some combination of repression and retaliation. This is dangerous business because repression and retaliation so often take terrorist forms and there are a host of apologists ready with excuses that sound remarkable like those of the terrorists themselves. It should be clear by now, however, that counter terrorism cannot be excused merely because it is reactive.

Every new actor, terrorist or counter terrorists, claims to be reacting to someone else, standing in a circle and just passing the evil along. But the circle is ideological in character; in fact, every actor is a moral agent and makes an independent decision. Therefore, repression and retaliation must not repeat the wrongs of terrorism, which is to say that repression and retaliation must be aimed systematically at the terrorists themselves, never at the people for whom the terrorist claim to be acting. That claim is in any case doubtful, even when it is honestly made. The people do not authorize the terrorist to act in their name. Only a tiny number actually participate in terrorist activities; they are far more likely to suffer than to benefit from the terrorist program. Even if they supported the program and hoped to benefit from it, however they could still be immune from attack exactly as civilians in time of war who support the war effort but are not themselves part of it are subject to the same immunity. Civilians may be put at risk by attacks on military targets, as by attacks on terrorist targets, but the risk must be kept to minimum, even at some cost to the attackers. The refusal to make ordinary people targets whatever be their nationality or even their politics is the only way to say no to terrorism. Every act of repression and retaliation has to be measured by this standard.

But what if the only way to defeat the terrorist is to intimidate their actual or potential supporters? It is important to deny the premise of this question, that terrorism is a politics dependent on mass support. In fact, it is always the politics of an elite, whose numbers are dedicated and fanatical and more than ready to

endure, or to watch others endure, the devastations of a counter terrorist campaign. Indeed terrorists will welcome counter terrorism. It makes the terrorists excuses more plausible and is sure to bring them, however many people are killed or wounded, however many are terrorized, the small number of recruits are needed to sustain the terrorist activities.

Repression and retaliation are legitimate response to terrorism only when they are constrained by the same moral principles that rule out terrorism itself. But there is an alternative response that seeks to avoid the violence that these two entail. The alternative is to address directly, us, the oppression the terrorists claim to oppose. Oppression, they say, is the cause of terrorism. But that is merely one more excuse. The real cause of terrorism is the decision to launch a terrorist campaign, a decision made by that group of people sitting around a table whose liberations I have already described. However, terrorists do exploit oppression, injustice, and human misery generally and took to these at least for their excuses. There can hardly be any doubt that oppression strengthens their hand. Is that a reason for us to come to the defense of the oppressed? It seems to me that we have our own reasons to do that, and do not need this one, or should not to prod us into acting. We argue against the adoption of a terrorist strategy although not, as the terrorist say because these militants are prepared to tolerate oppression. They already are opposed to oppression and now add to that opposition. perhaps for the same reasons, a refusal of terror.

But there is an argument, put with some insistence these days that we should refuse to acknowledge any link at all between terrorism and oppression as if any defense of oppressed men and women, once a terrorist campaign has been launched, would concede the effectiveness of the campaign. Or, at least, a defense of oppression would give terrorism the appearance of effectiveness and so increase the likelihood of terrorist campaigns in the future. Here we have the reverse side of the litany of excuses; we have turned over the record. First oppression is made into an excuse for terrorism, and then terrorism is made into an excuse for oppression. The first is the excuse of the far left; the second is the excuse of the neo-conservative right<sup>34</sup> I doubt that genuine conservatives would think it a good

reason for defending the status quo that it is under terrorist attack; they would have independent reasons and would be prepared to defend the status quo against any attack. Similarly, those of us who think that the status quo urgently requires change have our own reasons for thinking so and need not be intimidated by terrorists or, for that matter antiterrorist.

If one criticizes the first cause, one should not neglect the second. But I need to state that the second should be criticized more precisely. It is not so much an excuse for oppression as an excuse for doing nothing about oppression. The claim is that the campaign against terrorism has priority over every other political activity. If the people who take the leading of this campaign are the old oppressors, then we must make a kind of peace with them-temporarily, of course,

until the terrorists have been beaten. This is a strategy that denies the possibility of a two front war. So long as the men and women who pretend to lead the fight against oppression are terrorists, we can concede nothing to their demands. Nor can we oppose their opponents.

#### **N. Oppression and terrorism:**

It is worth considering at greater length the link between oppression and terror. To pretend that there is no link at all is to ignore the historical record, but the record is more complex than any of the excuses acknowledged. The first thing to be read out of it however is simple enough. Oppression is not so much the cause of terrorism as terrorism is one of the primary means of oppression. This was true in ancient times, as Aristotle recognized and it is still true today. Tyrants rule by terrorizing their subjects; unjust and illegitimate regimes are upheld through a combination of carefully aimed and random violence. If this method works in the state, there is no reason to think that it will not work, or that it does not work in the liberation movement. Wherever we see terrorism, we should look for tyranny and oppression. Authoritarian states, especially in the moment of their founding, need a terrorist apparatus secrete police with unlimited power, secrets prisons into which citizens disappear, death squads in unmarked cars. Even democracies may use terror, not against their own citizens, but at the margins in their colonies, for example, where colonizers also are likely to rule tyrannically. A steady and discriminate pressure sometimes maintains oppression, sometimes by intermittent

and random violence- what we might think of as terrorist melodrama designed to render the subject population fearful and passive.

This later policy, especially if it seems successful, invites imitation by opponents of the state. But terrorism does not spread only when it is imitated. If state officials can invent it, movement militants can also invent it. Neither one need taking lessons from the other; the circle has no single or necessary starting point. Wherever it starts, terrorism in the movement is tyrannical and oppressive in exactly the same way as is terrorism in the state. The terrorists aim to rule, and murder is their method. They have their own internal police, death squads, and disappearances. They begin by killing or intimidating those comrades who stand in their way, and they proceed to do the same if they can, among the people they claim to represent. If terrorists are successful, they rule tyrannically, and their people bear without consent the cost of the terrorist's rule. But terrorist cannot win the ultimate victory they seek without challenging the established regime or colonial power and the people it claims to present, and when terrorists do that, they themselves invite imitation. The regime may then respond with its own campaign of aimed and random violence. Terrorist tracks terrorist, each claiming the other as an excuse.

The same violence can also spread to countries where it has not yet been experienced; now terror is reproduced not through temporal succession but through ideological adaption. State terrorists wages bloody war against largely imaginary enemies; army colonels, say, hunting down the representatives of

international communism or movement terrorist wage bloody wars against enemies with whom, but for the ideology, they could readily negotiate and compromise: Nationalist fanatics committed to a permanent irredentism. These wars, even if they are without precedents, are likely enough to become precedents, to start the circle of terror and counter terror, which is endlessly oppressive for the ordinary men and women where the state calls its citizens and the movement its people.

The only way to break out of the circle is to refuse to play the terrorist game. Terrorists in the state and the movement warn us, with equal vehemence, that any such refusal is a sign of softness and naiveté. The self-portrait of the terrorists is always the same. They are tough-minded and realistic; they know their enemies and they are ready to do what must be done for victory. Why then the terrorist does turn around and around in the same circle? It is true: Movement terrorist win support because they pretend to deal energetically and effectively with the brutality of the state. It is also true: State terrorists win support because they pretend to deal energetically and effectively with the brutality of the movement. Both feed on the fears of brutalized and oppressed people. But there is no way of overcoming brutality with terror. At most, the burden is shifted from these people to those; more likely, a new burden is added for everyone. Genuine liberation can come only through a politics that mobilizes the victims of brutality and takes careful aim at its agents, or by a politics that surrenders the hope of victory and domination and deliberately seeks a compromise settlement. In either case, once

tyranny is repudiated, terrorism is no longer an option. For what lies behind all the excuses of officials and militants alike is the predilection for a tyrannical politics.

There is as a matter of fact no moral defense available to the terrorist, no justification. Terrorism is worse than murder and rape, and no one can justify them. The only thing we can do with terrorists is excusing them. But the standard excuses we might offer are themselves lame and unpersuasive.

This is a puzzling analysis. First there is no precise characterization of the terrorist. We do not know exactly who it is that is beyond justification, and so we remain unclear as to why. Second, and more puzzling, Walzer doesn't talk about excuses at all.<sup>35</sup> The arguments he criticizes are all defenses of terrorism.

Consider the second point first. The avowed aim of the chapter is to examine excuses made for terrorism. According to Walzer, there are basically four of them. Terrorism is an act of last resort; terrorism is a tool of the weak; terrorism is the only effective tool the weak have; everybody practices terrorism. But there are not excuses, strictly speaking. We excuse people by arguing that they acted in ignorance or under compulsion.<sup>36</sup> This is not what the apologists of terrorism say about terrorist. As walzer himself points out, the four excuses he discussed acknowledge that terrorism is the deliberate choice of rational person. The apologists for terrorism do not offer an apology but an apologia. They put forward arguments that say the terrorist; all things considered did not act wrongly.

Walzer pictures the terrorist as attacking “innocent bystanders”, as killing or harming “indiscriminately.” This is not a picture likely to enlist out sympathetic ear to the terrorist’s case. We are going to take it for granted, too, that the terrorist is wrong. But some of walzer’s own later observations belie his initial description. Terrorists are often very discriminate in their targets. I press these points because the outrage we feel for terrorist acts too easily prompts us to make and support blanket condemnations of terrorism by resort to equivocation or word play. Therefore, it is important not to be vague about who the terrorist is and not to blur distinctions or relevant questions.

Who are terrorists? Here is a list. Basque separatists, factions of the PLO, the IRA, the Red Brigades, Croatian nationalists, the Tupamaros, the Puerto Rican National Liberation Front, the Baader-MeinhofGang, Black September, Shining Path, Posse Comitatus, South Malaccan nationalists, Armenian Revanchists, the Symbioses Liberation Army, why is there no defense for what they do? Why are they beyond justification? It must be because 1) they make no claims and arguments at all or in terms we can understand or 2) they make claims and arguments so flimsy that it is quite difficult to go through the exercise of answering them.

Benzion Netanyahu takes the first path by diabolizing the terrorist. “The terrorist,” he claims, “represents a new breed of man which takes humanity back to prehistoric rime, to the times when morality was not yet born. Divested of any moral principle, he has no moral sense no moral controls. and is therefore capable

of committing any crime, like a killing machine, without shame or remorse.” If this is the terrorist, then he or she is so alien from our own moral experience that there is no ground for understanding him or her. There are no moral claims and arguments to answer.

Walzer, in fact, uneasily straddles the line between the first and second paths. There are arguments, although Walzer puts them not in the mouth of terrorists-what could indiscriminate killers say? -but in the mouth of the apologist for terrorism. These arguments are “excuses” too incomplete or shallow to be taken very seriously.

The slaughter of Jewish worshippers in the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul last year exemplifies the mad and indiscriminate terrorism that Walzer obviously has in mind. During services, two terrorists entered the synagogue, barred the doors, and machine-gunned twenty-two people to death before exploding grenades to destroy themselves and all identity of who they were. The worshippers in Istanbul met their deaths because they were Jews and because their attackers were willing to target Jews as such in the former’s “war against Zionism.” The slaughter was so horrible and revolting that it may strike us as too morally grotesque to understand, from their point of view, the goals and the values that animated the slaughters.

But the Turkish synagogue episode is less typical of terrorism during the last one hundred years that is, for example, the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro in

1978. The Red brigades abducted Moro, Probably the most respected political leader in Italy, subjected him to a “trial” for his “crimes” (as representative and principal agent of the “rotten” and “repressive” Italian state). And “executed” him. The abduction had been planned over several months and followed a period of kidnapping and kneecapping of industrialist and lesser political figures. There was nothing indiscriminate about the taking of Aldo Moro.

Are the brigatisti, too, morally beyond the pale, subhuman throwbacks to a prehistoric time, divided from us by some moral chasm, their aims not worth a charitable understanding? It is unfortunately, too easy to foreclose questions of justification here by definitional sleights of hand. Benjamin Netanyahu agrees

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with Walzer “terrorism is always unjustifiable.” This seems to follow from Netanyahu’s definition “terrorism is the deliberate and systematic murder,

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maiming, and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends” and from the fact that deliberately killing innocents is wrong. But Netanyahu gets the kidnapers of Aldo Moro under his proscription only by sliding over to a characterization of terrorists as attackers of civilians, implicitly equating

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“innocents” and “civilians.” According to the Netanyahu definition and under Walzer’s characterization the Red Brigades’ kidnapping of Aldo Moro does not qualify as terrorism unless we characterize Moro as an innocent civilian, but the

just begs the question again the Red Brigades. They chose Moro because he was not an innocent (by their lights).

Aldo Moro kidnapping not because the actions of the Red Brigades were incomprehensible but because the actions were fully comprehensible in moral terms convulsed Italy. Everybody understands crime and punishment. The arguments of the Red Brigades were so understandable, in fact, that the Italian establishment feared they might even seduce many Italian citizens.

The political parties of Italy from the onset of the Moro crisis locked themselves into a rigid position. No negotiations for Moro's release. The parties did not take this position because they thought the arguments of the Red Brigades had no credibility. If the Red brigades had defended their kidnapping of Moro on the grounds that he was guilty of secretly poisoning all the water in Italy with fluorides, or that he had betrayed the planet earth to galactic enemies, the Italian government would not have felt that negotiations for Moro's life risked giving the kidnapers widespread legitimacy among the populace. It was precisely because the Red Brigades' arguments had enough facial credibility to start with that the government saw any concessions as undermining its own legitimacy. Its policy on Moro amounted to an argument-by-deed addressed to the Italian public that there was no truth to the charge that the state was rotten, repressive, and illegitimate.

#### **O. The Appeal to Morality versus the Appeal to Law:**

Benzion Netanyahu gets the matter exactly backward. Terrorists are not throwbacks to a prehistoric time "when morality was not yet born." If anything

terrorists are throwbacks to a “time” when morality was not yet under control. What is often scary about terrorists is that they appeal to morality without appealing to the law. Let me explain.

Political theorists tell a story about the “state of nature” to explain and defend government. The state of nature proves to be intolerable for its inhabitants, whose lives are solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. Contrary to common impressions, however, the problem in the state of nature is not that people are so immoral-so selfish and rapacious that they persistently endanger each other. The problem is that people are so moral- so determined to vindicate rights or to uphold honor at any costs that they become a menace to one another.

The distinctive feature of the state of nature, as John Locke points out, is not the absence of morality but the absence of law. It is a circumstance in which “the law of nature”- the moral law- must be enforced by each person. Each is responsible for vindicating his or her own rights and the rights of others. All prosecution of crime and injustice in the state of nature is freelance. Such a situation is the inevitable spawning ground of her never-ending chain of retaliation and counter-retaliation of the blood feud. For every one in that state being both Judge and Executioner of the Law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cases; as well as negligence, and unconcernedness, to make them too remiss, in other men’s.

Even if persons were not biased in their own favor, the problems of enforcing justice in the state of nature would remain deadly. How would crime be defined? How would evidence for its commission be gathered? Who is to be punished, and in what manner? Nothing about the state of nature ensures any common understanding about these questions. The contrary is the case. Private understanding pitted against standing produces and escalation of response and counter-response that lets violence erupt and feed on it.

The solution, of course, is an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the Standard of Right and Wrong, and the common measure to decide all Controversies and a known and indifferent Judge, with Authority to determine all offences according to the established Law. Conventions, established standards, and rulings keep the peace, and when they exist by "common consent," they do justice as well.

"Consent of the governed" is the ideal that underlies democratic regimes, at least in Anglo-American cultures. It is an attractive ideal. When a regime of law is "chosen" by "free and rational person," the "strains of commitment" will be minimal. That is to say, there will be widespread willingness to obey the law and accept its rulings.

But in the governments we live under-even the best of them-the strains of commitment often are severe. Impatience with the existing procedures of law can, and does, lead people to resort to "irregular justice," including political violence. Such "irregular justice," even it is violent and rebellious, need not repudiate the

existing rule of law. Irregular justice may be directed only at egregious failures of the law or at illegality tolerated as law.

Ordinary political violence can itself have all the earmarks of terrorism. The Molly Maguires- a secrete band of Irish miners in mid-nineteenth century Pennsylvania – carried on a decade-long labor “war” with mine owners and police. Emerging from violent resistance among Pennsylvania Irish to the civil War draft, the Molly Maguires had their own way of dealing with the labor strife of the time. They resorted to arson, beatings, and murder, directed against mine foremen, superintendents, policemen, and others against whom the Molly Maguires had grievances. The violent was meant to intimidate (targeted foremen, for example, often left the community after receiving threats) for political ends. The Molly Maguires resorted to war because they perceived both the law and its enforcers to be in the pockets of owners and bankers. A less remote situation is the bombing and burning of scores of abortion facilities in the United States during the last decade. The aim of the attackers is to stop impede abortions, and these attackers resort to irregular justice because the law fails to protect the unborn. They appeal to a “higher law” to morality itself. Our responses to political violence of this kind are ambivalent. In general we do not want free- lance justice; we do not want people arrogating to themselves decisions the law should make. But in particular cases, our sympathies often are enlisted on the side of the violent, even if we go through proforma condemnations of their actions. We as often romanticize the Molly Maguires of our history as vilify them.

It is not surprising because it is a part of US political tradition that we may be forced, in Merleau-ponty's words to "judge the law at the risk of being judged by it."<sup>41</sup> "I like a little rebellion now and then." wrote Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams. "The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions, that I wish it to be always kept alive. It will often be exercised when wrong, but better so than not to be exercised at all."<sup>42</sup> Political violence serves the useful function of shaking governments out of its unresponsiveness to the rights and interests of some of its citizens. The violence strains but does not rupture the rule of law because the appeal to morality made by the rebels draws from the same principles embodied in the law. It is not Jeffersonian rebellions and outbreaks that truly frighten and disturb us. But revolutionary violence directed against a whole existing regime of law, including its underlying principles. Political violence that strikes against the very regime itself is doubly disturbing. For one thing, such violence is more frightening than ordinary dissidence or rebellion because the underlying common allegiance to the principles of the law that we expect to moderate or contain the violence of the dissident or rebel is present. It is false to say that the revolutionary terrorist has no moral limits; but it is true that he or she repudiates the conventional boundaries that guide our own actions. More importantly for our purposes, revolutionary violence is more frustrating because it is hard to answer the challenges of revolutionaries without begging the question against them. We can condemn ordinary political violence, including

ordinary terrorism, by appealing to the “constitution” that is, the basic ideas of legality upon which our political, economic and cultural institution rest. Revolutionaries repudiate the “constitution”. They do so in the name of recognizable moral ideas: creating a just or human society, ending oppression and misery. But “just” humane, and so on are attractions that we typically fill in by reference to the principles and practices of our existing social order. If we cannot resort to this strategy in answering revolutionaries, then how do we convincingly repudiate their claims for justice? How do we show their violence to be condemned rather than supported by morality? I do not mean we have to answer these questions for the satisfaction of revolutionaries. They have already pulled a gun. It is for our satisfaction that we would like to give an intellectually honest answer to revolutionaries’ rejectionism. We appeal to the law; they reject our law and appeal to morality. We claim morality, too, but then notice we have filled it up with our law.

**P. Attacking the Innocent:**

The case with which we beg the question against revolutionaries is illustrated by Walzer’s depiction of terrorists as killers of the innocent. How are we to understand “innocent”? Aldo Moro was clearly innocent in one sense: He had never been convicted of any wrong by a duly authorized judge or jury of any state or officially recognized international agency. But this sense of innocence is not terribly helpful for condemning the Red Brigades. Many instances of political violence that any of us would endorse are directed against innocents in this

respect. Was Moro innocent in a deeper sense; not casually or morally responsible for the “crimes” of Italy, not an accessory, not complicit?

If we accept that the Italian state is a “criminal” enterprise, a repressive and unjust system, than it was clearly reasonable directly to connect Moro with it and its “crimes”. Few other figures in Italy were so centrally involved in maintaining the rule of Christian democratic governments since World War II. Other targets of the Red Brigades were similarly connected in some important way to the political, military, or economical functioning of the state. If we grant the premises of the Red Brigades, then the charge that they killed innocent people is not so readily sustainable.

But aren't there some lines to be drawn that are independent of any point of view, lines that everyone must acknowledge? Perhaps so, but finding an institutionally context less conception of innocence will not be easy. Consider the infamous massacre of the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics. Weren't they uncontroversial innocent? Yet a case can be made from the point of view of their attackers, that these athletes were legitimate targets. They were willing and knowing representatives of their state to an international affair in which their presence and participation would lend yet further international credibility and legitimacy to Israel. Thus, from the point of view of their attackers, the “athletes” were active and informed accessories in a continuing crime- the support of the “criminal” state of Israel.

Of course, by International Convention, unarmed athletes participating in the Olympics are innocent. The willingness of terrorists to violate this convention burdens their defense. A great deal can be said in favor of such a convention; even terrorists are unlikely to prefer a world in which every criminal is an open target. Nevertheless, the circumstances, as the terrorists saw them may have justified irregular justice. Like the Molly Maguires, the terrorists saw themselves as attacking fair targets that current conventions protect. Such terrorists concede that they attack the conventionally innocent, but not that they attack the really innocent.

What about the victims of the slaughter at Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul? Surely they cannot be connected to crimes of any sort. Their only connection to “Zionist imperialism” was that they were Jews; and if that is enough of a moral notion and there will be no one who is really innocent. There is doubtless some point of view from which the slaughter in Istanbul makes sense, but it is a point of view that comes close to being too alien for us to comprehend or even credit as a moral point of view. Here the claims of Walzer and the rhetoric of Netanyahu seem appropriate. But I say come close because the rationalization of the Istanbul massacre may be less alien than we expect.

The terrorism I am describing now flows from a conception of universal human rights. Every human individual has an inviolability and dignity just as a human being. Independently of any feature of his or her social environment or historic circumstances, a person has claim to our moral concern, a claim pressed in the

possession of basic human rights. The immunity thesis- that innocent persons cannot be made the targets of violent assault describes one of those rights. An alternative view denies the moral individualism and universalism underlying the human rights approach. This view claims that the value of a person is wholly exhausted in his or her class or group membership. There is no trans group or extra class humanity that creates moral pull. Moral universalism is false.

Stated so starkly, perhaps this is a view not subscribed to anyone. But there clearly are views that show considerable kinship. For example, at least some forms of Marxism imply, in present historical circumstances, that a person's right and duties are wholly a function of his or her class. Moreover, parochial moralities that see the universe from the point of view of God, or history's, chosen people are not hard to imagine or even to find in history. Another alternative conception sees the modern world as so dehumanized, so devoid of value that it is perverse to agonize over the protection of innocents, to erect conventions, make law and pass judgment as if current humanity itself had any value. Modern humans are deracinated and deformed, a mockery of what a fully realized humanity could be. That such beings are incidentally slaughtered, maimed and terrorized in the upheaval of a revolution for a transformed social order is of no importance.

Thus two basic ideas compete against the idea of universal human rights. One measures the worth of people according to their group membership. The other measures are not alien and incomprehensible to us. In attenuated and confined forms, they are a part of the moral armory of even those of us who describe to

universal human rights. We value community and cherish special relations of affinity and kinship. We hold ideals and strive for collective reform and improvement. We can thus comprehend the role of these ideas for those who acknowledge no limits on their force. Even the maddest terrorism shows a familiar face. Moreover, within our own philosophical culture, we cannot say with confidence that the intellectual foundations of human rights are clear or that they are universally acknowledged. The reigning fashions in the academy today include various attacks on liberal individualism. In contrast to the atomistic individual supposedly subscribed to by liberalism, current critics offer pictures of individuals essentially connected with others in community, individuals whose identities are constituted by community.

The ideas of essence and constitution in this picture are not made clear; these ideas may turn out to be innocuous and hardly at odds with anything except a caricature of individualism. But lurking within them are possible interpretations that would make the grounds of nonmoral universalism obscure. To say that people are essentially related to community may mean they have no value outside some community. Community may encompass the loosest human associations and the most casual forms of sociability, or it may mean a highly structured group bound by corporate values. Out of these options there can emerge interpretations that render the view that human beings have a worthy and dignity independently of any of their relations a proposition too abstract and empty to hold. Perhaps other grounds of universalism are available; or perhaps a conception of human rights

can be erected on non-universalist views. But our intellectual house is not in such good order that rationally refundable barriers are in place against an extreme extension if the quest for community or the quest for ideals-both of which can lead us to discount rather sharply the value of some humans. Then the rationalization of Neve Shalom is not so far away.

To understand terrorist and to take their self-justification seriously is not to acquiesce in the terrorists' deeds or concede them any measure of right. Rather, the point is to see the full spectrum of political violence realistically, without demonization, for our own sake, not the sake of terrorists. Because revolutionary terrorists repudiate so much of what is settled and in place, we struggle to make sense of the meaning they give to the moral notions they deploy. But they invite us to see how rotten the existing system is and to trust that in destroying it a new and morally preferable society will emerge. If terrorists war on us, we can war on them without compunction, but that does not answer their invitation. To do that, we have to say why the existing rule of law deserves allegiance.

Terrorists typically appeal to history for vindication. We can appeal to history, too, in defense of the vindications and practices terrorists revolt against or violate. Some terrorism we can condemn by appeal to those very conventions, some we can condemn by appeal to abstract principle, but most we must condemn because we judge the terrorist grotesquely mistaken in their understanding of historical possibilities. The discussion of the four "excuses" shows the burden of proof that terrorism, ordinary or revolutionary, seldom meets.

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## CHAPTER 4

### Terrorism and Human Rights Violation

#### A. Human Rights and Terrorism:

The concept of Human Rights is a dynamic one, which finds expanded expression and constantly covers new areas as human society continues to evolve higher levels of development. The direct linkage between terrorism and violation of human rights was recognized by the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 1993), of the Vienna Declaration and its programme of Action stipulates that “the acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations as well as linking in some countries to drug trafficking are activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of state and destabilizing legitimately constituted Government.”<sup>1</sup>

Little, in fact, had been written systematically on the subject of terror and terrorism but its place in the history of ideas seemed worth exploring, not so much in the abstract as in the particular cases of the legalized terror of the Holocaust and the Gulag, and the response of literary imagination to that terror. It seemed particularly appropriate for our many constituent communities-Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis and others to address the unanswerable but unavoidable questions of our time. How would the world of law and literature, so central, after

all, to the cultures, which produced our centuries of terror and terrorism, try to understand it?<sup>2</sup>

Further discussion indicated the literary, historical and philosophical foundation for our topic. Terrorism has never been far from the consciousness of poetic culture since the French Revolution, and philosophers such as Burke and Kant were grappling contemporaneously with the curious compulsion toward terror of the modern age. Before them, Shakespeare, writing in a time of commercial and military expansionism, masterfully depicted institutional terror, often related to the subtle dehumanization of legal systems.

Thus modern western culture in a real sense began its progression towards twentieth century terrorism and 31st century as early as the Renaissance. The related linguistic cultures of law and narrative literature grew and particularly from the late eighteenth century to the beginning of World War II, thrived. They finally were able to assimilate, or even assist, the ultimate attacks on the individual

of Dachau and the Gulag of Drancy and the Kolyma. The presentations on the Holocaust at many international symposiums reflected the notion that contemporary terror may not finally be consigned to a limited attention span framework covering only our own time, unmindful of the factors leading up to it that developed over hundreds of years and unwilling to recognized the foreshadowing's, compromises and fatal flaws contained in institutional culture. This paper include inquiries into the heart of that culture the contributions of

western academic jurisprudence, and especially and even of nineteenth century German contributions. European narrative fictions to the mounting anguish and chaos. The combined methodology of this chapter, perceiving as normative both legal and fictional texts, seeks to diagnose the development of a philosophic, religious and linguistic inadequate legal illness through a cross-disciplinary analysis.

The theme on the Asian experience with terror similarly sought to present an overall view of the place of terror in Asian history and culture. Terror is seen as pervasive and essentially dual in nature, attracting and repelling both victim and perpetrator, often binding one to the other. Thus boundaries are blurred and interchangeability of roles takes place. Nineteenth century literary and quasi-literary representations of terror and the terrorist frequently rise to a level of sublimity one might not have suspected. Both terror and terrorist are granted redemptive powers by this literature. A more historical approach indicates, however that this literary “attractiveness” is not reflective of reality; both terror and the terrorist were much duller in fact than as depicted in the function of Russia’s great authors. In the twentieth century, the situation is somewhat different. Leadership cults, beginning representations of this terror show its ultimate by in its metamorphic capability— its ability to transform completely the human personality into something no longer recognizable as human. Yet this literary evocation of terror is intended as way of possibly eliminating it altogether

In addition to the subject matter itself, the academic planners also hoped to bring together at the international symposiums a human rights community perhaps not yet aware of its own existence. With the invaluable assistance of Professors Soul Touster and Bernard Wassertein of Brandeis's Tauber Institute, the conference did take place. "Human Rights and Terrorism" an international conference was held and the community of lawyers, literacy people, historians and others who attended created a momentum whose next logical step is this endeavor. This chapter here reflects the relative informality of the symposium structure; but they also have been temperate by the comments of the respondents (some of which are also included) and of the audience

We believe they will offer one of the first systematic attempts to grapple with the phenomenon of terror in its stark modern forms. We welcome further dialogue with lawyers, political scientists, activists, NGOs, both on this subject and on the other human rights issue of the particular concern and expertise—mounting censorship of the creative process, threatening trends in defamation law as applied to works of art and increasing capacities to violate individual autonomy and dignity

The experience of terror and terrorism though it may go under different names, is known to everyone, despite the fact that we so often attempt to forget it or acknowledge it only in fiction. Nothing human is strange to us, yet the experience of terror and terrorism is a borderline one because it threatens to make us strangers even to ourselves. That is how Thiruvalluvar in the chapter '*Absence of Terrorism*'

in Ten Couplets from 561 to 570 described his response; and whatever the cause, his reaction typifies for us the effect of terror or dread or shock. Can one do more than describe, compulsively or not, such an experience? Can such a radical estrangement be psychologically integrated, or does it remain as a suspicion that keeps undermining our hospitable feelings, dividing humanity through xenophobia or racism, for example? We find nothing to ward-off this latter concern; and yet there is some comfort in Elie Wiesel's return to an image of childhood in his description of his refusal to abandon what he had felt before the strangeness of the world in the living hell of the camps formed itself into an alienation of man from man, as deep as we have ever known. Like a child, he saw a messenger in every stranger: it was for him alone to receive his blessing or his curse. When something is represented as terror and terrorism or as causing terror and terrorism what are its features? Yet a mental suffering or defense vis-à-vis the extreme event we are presupposing may already modify such a representation.

In literary language there is, even in ordinary depictions of an experience, a trembling of the referent. That is, it is openly shown. Such inadequacy or indefiniteness of representation is a problem in any area where the "idea" or "effect" keeps resonating, so that even if the idea can be linked to a specific cause or occasion we suspect that there are contributory springs secretly feeding into the stream of the representation. So, the specificity of terror and terrorism may reside in its specific unspecific but at this point we feel gray theory overcoming us.

Let us not forget, when we study terror and terrorism its claim to *Virtue*. Robespierre and Saint Just made that connection clear in their use of terror as an instrument of the state. Terror here is in the service of the state, and the person asked to exert it, the executioner, must find an exalted alibi. There is evidence that no human being can deliberately terrorize another human being without an exaltation, which the Jacobians thought of a “virtue”, aware of the Latin “Vir” (man) in the world. There is further evidence that programmatic or collectively exerted terror and terrorism requires that the executioners not only see themselves as idealists or enthusiasts, but also hold a massive conviction of purifying mankind of those who cannot be remade. The virtue of the executioner translates itself into a program of purification; a mutilation upwards of their own image. The executioners however orgiastic their feelings, are always virtuous, ascetic, exalted, pure. It is the questioner (in the old and ominous sense of the word.) who is full of hope. Let us cite a contemporary reflection from Jacobo Timerman’s *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number*. If one reads transcripts of the long interrogations that dissident Jews have undergone, it’s possible to discern the precise moment at which the interrogation crosses the borderline of hope. Hope is something that belongs to the interrogator rather than to the prisoners. The interrogator always seems to feel that he can succeed in modifying the will of the interrogated.

It is sometimes said that terror is resorted to when persuasion fails; that it is, in a sense, a desperate form of persuasion. There is another purpose that terror serves

when persuasion is no longer necessary. Wherever totalitarianism possesses absolute control. It replaces propaganda with indoctrination and uses violence not so much to frighten people (this is done only in the initial stages when political opposition still exists) as to realize constantly its ideological doctrine and political lies. It has been observed that terror continues to be used by totalitarian regimes even when its psychological aims are achieved: its real horror is that it reigns over a completely subdued population.

The reason for this may be simple: Terror, allied to purity, can allow no contradiction, must enforce absolute consistence, a laying world of consistency, more adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself. The very enormity of the terror exerted makes it unbelievable to the outside world, even unbelievable to the victims who have entered what the religious imagination calls HELL: a condition without hope. The enormity of terror makes a response— in the form of protest or resistance or words— nearly impossible. Response is possible only when the victim or the person who hears about the terror can believe it happened and can happen again; when he thinks of it as real, when it has not derealized or dehumanized his idea of the person. The response to terror, therefore, is more than an ethical reaction. The response acknowledges what is denied, breaking an evil spell that has gained its victory over the mind by the illusion that to forger terror is to vanquish it— to deny its reality. But this denial is the most dangerous consent of all. A response to terror that defies rather than denies terror is obligatory. It can be ritual, such as not eating on Yom Kippur

despite starvation; it can be legal such as recognizing the criminal facts and bringing the executioners to judgment even where no appropriate law yet exists; it can be a scholarly attempt; and it is, above all, the responsibility of memory, the same that has made the survivors testify and now obliges us to hear them speak in their own voice and their our image.

After the incident of 9|11, an internationally renowned academic Professor Dipankar Gupta published the article “Bonded by threat,” in *New York Times* that our diagnosis of terrorism and our subsequent interventions in this respect now stand vindicated in the light of American’s recent experiences and reactions. We have always advocated a full-scale on slaught against terrorism. How many more carnages must take place, and how many more bodies and souls must turn to ash before we realize that there is no such thing as just terrorism.

Security Council Begins Evaluating Counter terror Measures. The effort to forge a united international front against terrorism entered a new phase today as the UN Security Council began examining reports on how governments are complying with council requirements for strengthening national laws against terrorism. With only a small number of reports published, it is clear there is consensus that action must be taken but not so clear against whom that action should be taken.

A Controversy that will come up during this phase of the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) work is the definition of “terrorist”. There is no internationally recognized definition of word. UN Resolution 1373 does not provide one and

negotiations on a draft comprehensive treaty on terrorism is stalemated over this problem. Therefore, governments in their reports to the Council define a terrorist in various ways.

The Asian Human Rights Commission, in its 10 December 2001 Message, “... The willingness of Asia’s governments to join the international coalition against terrorism... is part of their domestic political strategy to stifle dissent and to deny people their right to freedom of expression and association and, most importantly, their right to self-determination.”<sup>5</sup>

Already the government of India has labeled as terrorist Muslims in Kashmir seeking an alternative to the political and territorial *status quo*. Likewise, the government of China has pinned the world terrorist to the Uyghur movement of Muslims in Xingjian Province who desires a homeland for themselves (East Turkistan). Similarly, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in Malaysia has sought to link the main Malay opposition party, Parti Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), with the Malaysian Mujahidin Group (Kumpulan Militan, Malaysia or KMM, a reportedly militant Islamic group) in order to discredit PAS and reinforce the Malaya community’s support for Mahathir’s United Malays National Organization (UMNO).

**B. Countering “terrorism”, Protecting Human Rights:** UN Secretary—General Kofi Annan, in his address to the UN Security Council gathered to evaluate the results of counter terrorism measures 3 months after September 11:

“We should all be clear that there is no trade-off between effective action against terrorism and protection of human rights. On the contrary, I believe that in the long-term, we shall find that human rights along with democracy and social justice are one of the best prophylactics against terrorism... It will be self-defeating if we sacrifice other key priorities—such as human rights— in the process (of preventing terrorism).”<sup>6</sup> Human rights groups warned late in 2001 that some governments were likely to use the Security Council mandate to smear and attack political opponents.

*Human Rights Watch*, in its annual report, said in 2001 that some states, including US allies in its war in Afghanistan such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Russia and Uzbekistan, are using the anti-terrorism campaign for illegitimate ends. The advocacy group also criticized the United States for not following international humanitarian law in its treatment of prisoners captured in Afghanistan.

*Asian Human Rights Commission* said, in its 10 December message that “the war on terrorism in Asia can easily become a war on human rights in the region.”<sup>7</sup> To combat terrorism rather than fight the violence of terrorism with further state-initiated violence the world must of all address people’s poverty and ensure that functioning institutions of justices are in place. There must also be recognition and respect for people’s human rights—their social and economic rights as well as their civil and political rights. Without proving hope in the form of alleviating

poverty and offering a forum for grievances to be fairly decided, terrorism will be seen as an answer to despair.

### **C. International Law: UN Security Council. Counter-Terrorism Resolution 1373.**

From the UN Wire report:

“... The Council’s counter-terrorism resolution. 1373, which was unanimously adopted two weeks after the September 11 terror attacks on the United States, contains a long list of legally binding demands on member states to suppress and prevent terrorism. The CTC was set-up by this resolution to monitor nation’s implementation of the resolution. This is the second 90-days period in the life of the resolution. The first phase, which ended December 27 was simply to collect national reports and provide technical assistance to “the willing but less capable” states, in British Ambassador Green stock’s words. Shortly after the committee was established, Green stock said, “It’s not the role of the CTC at this stage to pursue any state in a law enforcement sense. ... It is not getting into the business of scrutinizing national legislation.”<sup>8</sup>

Unlike submissions to General Assembly requests (the import and export of certain categories of weapons, for example), which are accepted without comment or criticism, reports to the Security Council will be evaluated for their varsity. Until now, these reports have been transmitted to the Council without comment, but the CTS have appointed six outside experts to help the committee evaluate the

reports. So far, 123 of 189 UN member-states have submitted reports. Only 27 have been published, pending translation into the world body's six official languages.

The six experts who will assist the committee in evaluating reports are: *Walter Gear* of Austria, *Heidi Broekhuis* of the Netherlands and *Joel Sollier* of France are experts in international law; Col. *Benedicto Jimene— Bacca* of Peru is an expert on police issues; M.R. Sivraman of India specializes in financial controls, including hawala, the informal banking system common in the Middle East and South Asia (a system the United States believes was used by suspected terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden to finance his Al-Qaeda network without detection); and Jeremy Wainwright of Australia, a counter-terrorism expert.

When asked why there is no expert on Islamic law. Green stock said such a person had been identified but is currently working for the United Nations in a different capacity and will join the team later. The Amnesty International letter said the group is concerned that none of the six are experts in human rights and urged the Council to appoint such as expert. The United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly condemned terrorism. Thus resolution 49/185 of 23 December 1994, entitled "Human rights and terrorism", reiterates the General Assembly's unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, as activities aimed at the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening the territorial integrity and security of States, destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments, undermining pluralistic civil society and

having adverse consequences on the economic and social development of States. It furthermore deplors the increasing number of innocent persons killed, massacred and maimed by terrorists in indiscriminate and random acts of violence and terror, which, it states, “cannot be justified under any circumstances” (Preamble). The resolution calls upon States to take all necessary and effective measures in accordance with international standards of human rights, to prevent, combat and eliminate all acts of terrorism wherever and by whomsoever are committed, and urges the international community to enhance co-operation in the fight against the threat of terrorism at national, regional and international levels. In 1996, the Conference against Terrorism was organized in Sharm el-Sheik (Egypt).

The UN Charter. Article 51 provides that nothing in the present character shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nation. A literal interpretation of this clause would rule out using force until another state had actually launched its attack, which, in the modern age of weapons of mass destruction, would often be too late to respond successfully. Arguing that the UN Charter was not meant to be a ‘suicide pact’, governments and legal scholars have long maintained that Article 51 should be read as permitting neither ‘anticipatory’ nor ‘pre-emptive’ self-defense in the context of an imminent and overwhelming threat.

It is noteworthy that the equally authentic French version of article 51 uses the phrase ‘aggression armee’, meaning ‘armed aggression’, instead of the more

restrictive term 'armed attack' contained in the English version. The right to respond to armed aggression would include the right to respond to credible threats, since aggression can exist separate from and prior to an actual attack.

#### **D. International Law: Campaign against Terrorism and Protecting Human Rights.**

Most experts agree that terrorism is the use of threat of violence, a method of combat or strategy to achieve certain goals that its aim is to induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and doesn't conform to humanitarian norms and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy.

Terrorism is unequivocally defined as the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends. The General Assembly's Legal Committee on 21 November approved a draft resolution strongly condemning all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed. Approved without a vote, the text which went to the Assembly for adoption calls such acts "unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them."<sup>9</sup> It recommended that the assembly urged all states to become parties to the relevant conventions and protocols, including the conventions for the suppression of terrorist bombings and the financing of terrorism. Terrorism is a serious but not a useful legal concept since it covers too many different actions and

circumstances. For the present purpose this phase of the book address only terrorism that has an international dimension is the object of discussion.

State law subject to international legal limitations of general applicability governs individual terrorism. Any state may apply and enforce its laws against terrorist activities committed in its territory. In some circumstances, a state may apply its laws to terrorist activities committed outside in its territory, subject to general limitations in international law on the exercise of jurisdiction by States. Enforcement is of course subject to general human rights requirements: even terrorists are entitled to due process of law and International law does not address acts of individual terrorists; it addresses States that are implicated in such terrorist activities. External support for domestic terrorists raises issues in intervention in internal hostilities. The international system's commitment to the impermeability of States helps a "rogue State" that is prepared to practice terrorism to mask its involvement. A state's refusal to extradite a terrorist raises questions under particular treaties and under the accepted exception to extradition for political offences.

Every state is required to afford protection against terrorist activities to foreign diplomats and foreign nationals generally. Every state is required to do what is necessary to prevent its territory from being used for launching terrorist attacks on another state's territory, or against its diplomats, nationals or property. A state's failures to take such steps any encouragement or condonation by state of such activities in its territory, surely State sponsorship of terrorist activities against

another state, are clear and serious violations of international law. When terrorist activities for which a state is responsible are of sufficient magnitude, they may constitute a use of force against the territorial integrity of the target state in violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, and in some circumstances may amount to an armed attack.

Complicated legal issues arise when terrorist activities are of unknown provenance and especially when there is an attack on personnel of one state in the territory of another state. Are such activities a use of force prohibited by Article 2(4)? An armed attack? Against the territorial state? Against the state whose personnel are targeted? Politically as well as legally, the response of the international system, and of individual states, is troubled by uncertain facts— by the uncertain identity of the terrorists, uncertainty as to whether terrorist activities are sponsored by a state, and if so, which State.

The case of Libya and the United States in 1986 highlights some of the difficulties of developing and applying international norms to terrorist activities. Declaring that the Libyan Government was responsible for terrorist acts in Europe, including the bombing of a night club in Berlin frequented by United States Servicemen, in which one soldier was killed and many wounded, the United States responded by bombing targets in Libyan territory. President Reagan described the attack as “fully consistent”<sup>10</sup> presumably because, in the view of the United States, the terrorist act (or acts) constituted an “armed attack” justifying the bombing as a use

of force in self-defense.<sup>11</sup> The bombing of Libya by the United States was widely

condemned and the claimed justifications widely rejected.<sup>12</sup>

The inter-state system and its commitment to state values tend to discourage a state victim of terrorist activities from responding by attacking another state based on unproven (and often improvable) suspicions that the latter was responsible for the terrorist attacks. When evidence of such state sponsorship is clear and strong, there are nonetheless difficult legal issues as to the permissible response.

Before the United Nations Charter, international law permitted a state to use some force in reprisal for a violation of law (following a demand for reparation) and permitted force in self-defense broadly construed, but the permissible response was limited by principles of necessity and proportionality. Since the United Nations Charter, Article 2(4) prohibits reprisal, and the use of force is permitted only in response to an "Armed attack." It is difficult to make an "armed attack: out of a limited, isolated terrorist attack or even a few sporadic ones. It is difficult to accept a general bombing as a "necessary" and "proportional" response to a terrorist attack. It is difficult to justify such a response if one balances competing state values or even competing human values.

Surely the appropriate response is not counter terrorism or other forcible intervention in another state (even if one is confident of that state's responsibility for the terrorist acts.) But some response to terrorism is surely necessary and therefore must be permissible. Perhaps the system must develop collective finding

of facts and collective responses. Unless the international system develops effective lawful response, target States will be hard pressed not to use some measures and tempted— as was the United States— to use force.

#### **E. State Autonomy and International Systems:**

In an international system committed to state autonomy and independence, the norm of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force by one state against another crucial. The right of a state Victim to defend its own independence and autonomy (or those of another state) against violation of the Charter prohibition also goes without saying. But both the prohibition norm and the right of “horizontal enforcement” of that norm in self-defense must be carefully defined so as to promote and ensure the underlying values. State autonomy and independence, State impermeability and pursuit of its own happiness, are not to be sacrificed to desire by other States to use armed forces to Promote other values; inter-state justice, self-determination, socialism, or even democracy and respect for human rights. Even if the international system were unanimous in its dedication to those values, even if one could assure that a use of force against another State is in fact designed to achieve that benign result, will in fact assure that result and will be “worth” the cost, the system resists it and in the author’s view does well to resist it. In fact, however, the values claimed to justify the forcible violation of another state’s independence and autonomy are difficult to define; the motives and designs of states purporting to further those ends are at best ambiguous and often specious and hypocritical; the costs to the victim state

and its inhabitants and to the values of the inter-state system are inculpable and usually exorbitant. We do well then, to reject all “benign” exceptions to Article 2(4). We do well seek to assure that Article 51 serves only to permit and promote authentic response by a victim to serious violations of Article 2(4)—armed attack. The system must struggle to find remedies for injustice, means to promote democracy and human rights, responses to the scourges of terrorism and drug smuggling, so that states will not be tempted to seek unilateral solutions by force— often the “instinctive” response from frustration, though it rarely serves its alleged purpose and is often destructive of State as well as human values.

In fact, the system, and states generally, have recognized the paramount importance of the Charter norms. Even with the frustrations of finding a peaceable response to injustice, to terrorism and drug smuggling, the threshold of temptation for states to use force against other states has remained much higher than it was before the Second World War. There has been much fighting, but the very large parts of the hostilities that have violated peace during the region of the law of the Charter have been different from those of the pre-Charter era. They have been internal, ideological wars, inspired, sometimes instigated, and generally supported by ideological and political sponsors, the super-powers and the allies and surrogates in a divided, bipolar world. The United Nations Charter has been of marginal relevance and the international system has been too relevance and the international system has been too risen to maintain traditional norms or to develop

new ones to constrain those wars of intervention and counter intervention, the subject of the next theme.

#### **F. The actions and initiatives of the civil society:**

What about the rest of civil society? Is everyone else ready to take this stand? Hopefully they are but this may not necessarily be the case. A number of conceptual confusions still haunt us. The same courage that we will need to stand, perhaps alone, in the midst of widespread and blind anger, to demand that all states respect human rights in this war against terrorism, will also be required to define, with absolute clarity, what we really stand for and what we are definitively opposed to. It is important to point out that civil society, too can have negative influence on our values. We must ensure that intolerance, violence and hate, even in pursuit of higher cause, are not part of the agenda for the 21st century. They were very much part of the movement in the last one hundred years and the results are there for all to see. A world of freedom, social justice and participatory democracy cannot be created through the same political vision and culture that brought us the toleration and repressive regimes of the left and right in the 21st century.

To this end, the actions and initiatives of civil society in future demonstrations and global protests should be democratically discussed by, and based on, the consensus of the social justice movement as a whole. It is our responsibility to prevent states from taking advantage of any violent initiatives by a minority group of protesters in order to arbitrarily criminalize as “terrorist” what is, in fact, the

highest expression of the legitimate, democratic and non violent citizen's movement for expanding democracy and defending social inclusion and human rights for all. Planning and coordinating is necessary to ensure that such demonstrations do not provide ammunition to the defenders of the *status quo* in their efforts to turn public opinion against the protestors and to suppress all dissent regarding the current global economic order.

Civil society organization must play a curricula role in the campaign against terrorism, but to do so they must not be reactive, waiting for events to unfold by themselves. Rather they must be proactive immediately demanding full respect for human rights and international humanitarian standards from all parties involved in this conflict. They must also play a crucial role in ensuring that this campaign will be aimed at stopping all forms of terrorism and be waged against terrorist forces. But most importantly, they must push the international community of states to come forward with some genuine and permanent solution to the challenge of uprooting all forms of terrorism once and for all. We cannot wait for some thorough and impeccable academic analysis of this conflict. The time to act is now. Either civil society organizations seize the initiative or they will be dragged by the initiative of others.

Without abounding their own national efforts to bring the World Trade Center criminals to justice, it is important to bear in mind that the USA could also make an immediate and important contribution to the struggle against terrorism by simply restoring its support to the establishment of the International Criminal

Court (ICC). Lobbying with these countries to get universal acceptance of the jurisdiction of ICC and cooperating with its mechanisms might prove to be a safer response to terrorism than launching massive military strikes against Afghanistan. If the Statute of Rome were amended, perhaps the ICC could judge terrorists that have committed crimes against humanity. If every state would come to recognize, cooperate and respect ICC, then the USA- as well as other countries— would be able to see at least some of the criminals they have been after, finally judged and sentenced. At the same time, the universal recognition of the legitimate role of a transnational entity such as the ICC in this struggle would prevent any country from becoming the one and only judge, jury and executioner in the war against terrorism.

What we must understand after a very violent 20th century is that criminal actions, intolerance and the politics of hate are not a solid foundation for the creation of a just and democratic world in which all individuals are able to fully exercise their rights. In the past, the path taken by the oppressed to achieve an egalitarian, fraternal and free society has often brought only new nightmares. On the other hand, the “Powers that be” should remember Kennedy’s wise statement; “those who make social change impossible make revolution inevitable.” That was the idea behind the short-lived Alliance for progress in the Americas that he initiated (together with a vast counter urgency program to contain revolutions already on their way) in the 1960’s. The paradox of trying to bring about change while supporting the forces of the status quo was at the Alliance’s relative failure.

Today, the international economic order is too unfair to provide global governability. It is and will be challenged by all those who are excluded from its benefits as well as by all decent people who simply believe in justice for all and for few. More than just a military response will be required to put terrorism definitively to an end. New ideas, rather than new weapons are needed in the quest for democratic and sustained development. An environment that encourages social and sustainable development is the best shield against all forms of extremism. We will need as many or more specialists trained in the art of peaceful resolution of conflict as those trained in waging military operations.

But to expand the concept and scope of democratic institutions in order to be able to eradicate poverty and other underlying causes of social justice, we certainly do not need self-described “freedom fighters” that dedicate themselves to blowing our innocent peoples into pieces. We need more activism and mobilization from civil society to bring about true global negotiations for a new, socially inclusive, economic order. We need more human rights and development NGOs embracing economic, cultural and social rights as part of their democratic struggle for civil and political liberties, instead of more terrorists killing people in the name of life. We need more citizens’ organizations to demand from the Israelis and Palestinian authorities to immediately and effectively stop their escalation of violence in the Middle East and to formalize a peace agreement from which they could move towards a broader and more comprehensive treaty. We need global citizens to

demand respect for human rights within the context of this conflict even if that means standing alone in this moment of understandable anger.

The bad news is that terrorists are spread all over the world and can produce a lot of damage in the short-run unless they are immediately and forcefully confronted. The good news is that we have come to the point its ramifications affect where almost everyone is or coupled. Ironically, this is what makes a global consensus feasible. The possibility of all states, once and for all, rejecting terrorism as a tool for advancing any ideological or political global has been furthered. Without state support, facing international cooperation to uproot not only their military, but also their social and financial bases, terrorist organizations, coming from different ideological and political latitudes, to clearly reject terrorism as a political tool. It is about time that everyone agrees—states as well as civil society— that every person's life, whatever race, religion or belief has the same value.

Terrorism is a global phenomenon that operates in different manners, aligns itself with a variety of ideological persuasions and comes to existence in different geographical locations. There is no one solution or plan proof action that will put it out of business. A combination of measures and policies ranging from the use of intelligence and the military to diplomatic, economic and social incentives are needed to first neutralize and then uproot terrorism.

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## CHAPTER-5

### CONCLUSION

Terrorism is arguably the most dominant term in the political vocabulary of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. However, it is ironical that no acceptable definition has yet been arrived at for the term. In fact, it might be impossible to define Terrorism because it is intangible and fluctuates according to historical and Geographical contexts. Except for a miniscule minority of outfits inspired by drug laced profits, most of the Terrorist brotherhoods proclaim and subscribe to a particular ideology. Since ideology is mostly individual; it brings in an element of subjectivity, which makes the goal of arriving at a universally acceptable definition extremely improbable if not impossible. Every attempt for arriving at definition has been thwarted by the apt repeated phrase “one person’s Terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter”, which has, far from being more cliché has become one of the major obstacles in arriving at a consensus. Every definition that has so far been forwarded has essentially been an expression of the demands and exigencies that the particular group identifies with. Terrorism is an emotionally charged expression, and has been frequently used to politically denigrate and isolate once opponents. This attitude of the world leaders in this regard has been suitably captured in President Bush’s post 9|11 declaration, where he made it clear that either you are with America or with the terrorist.

Terrorism is a politically loaded term and lack of agreement as to the nature and scope of the phenomenon has led to a general disagreement as regards its

definition. In the struggle against terrorism, the problem of definition is a crucial element, for without accurately identifying the enemy, no international co-ordination in the war against terror is possible. A comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon's demands a thorough analysis. It shows that it is not only the violence and direct consequence of themselves but a deeper insight in to the ideologies and motivations that perpetrate the acts of terror. Although, the matter of definition and conceptualization is usually a purely theoretical issue but when dealing with terrorism, implications of any definition tend to transcend the boundaries of theoretical discourse.

Simonsen and Spinlove in their book *Terrorism today the past, the present the future*, made a thorough analysis of the three definition by comparing and contrasting the different constructs, have concluded that the department of state emphasizes motives the department of defense emphasizes goals, and the FBI approach emphasizes methods. In other words if the state department's definition is political, the FBI's is practical, and the department of defense, is strategic. Combination of the three definitions may lead to complications and may not suit the purpose of various agencies that are responsible to implement it. Thus political and administrative expediency are the most important factors that determine the propriety of the definition. Given this attitude it would be impossible to ever arrive at a consensual definition of the term.

If such contradiction looms large among the different departments of the same country, it is only to be expected that as an International plan it would be ever more difficult to arrive at any semblance of the consensus. The Islamic writers feel that the term Terrorism has been used as a tool by the West to vilify and demonize their political rivals. They feel that America is the mother of International terrorism, and is perpetrating a terror network by nourishing oppression by patronizing dictatorial, occupational forces. They argue that no comprehensive definition can be concluded without including state terrorism within the ambit of the term. The feelings is that American's War on terror is based on a flawed premise, and the definition followed by her is a tool to liquidated her rivals and realize her own political and economic gains. In pursuance of this cause the banner of anti terrorism fits the bill well. Agatullah Sheikh Mohammed Ali Taskhiri while presenting a paper at the International conference on Terrorism called by the organization of the Islamic conference, Geneva, defined terrorism as an act carried out to achieve an inhuman and corrupt objective and involving threat to security of any kind and violation of rights acknowledged by religion and mankind. This paper thus explicitly lies down that acts of violence against oppressive forces do not constitute acts of terrorism. Within the definition are however included all acts which are aimed at perpetrating socio-economic gaps among nations as are included acts which are aimed at denying the nations their rights of self determination. It can be seen that a lot of subjectivity is involved in construing some of the expressions used, which is bound to lead to ambiguity.

The subjectivity involved makes it seem extremely unlikely that any consensus will be arrived at in near future; nevertheless, effort must be made in the direction. An objective definition in which precision precedes self-interest, and which denies to a Terrorist the epithet of "Freedom Fighter," is indispensable for any co-coordinated fight against global terror. Such a definition must be open enough to admit terrorist activities perpetrated by the states within its ambit; only then can true global alliance against terror be forged. Terrorism is the scourge of the present era; and a joint political will is required to tackle it effectively. Without a working consensus on this issue the future of the global war on terror is doomed, as the International platform will be issued by the various nations to further their own self-interest.

The question we should be asking is not, "when will we win the war on terror?" It is, "When will we recognize that no such victory is possible?" In many respects, modern terrorism is a response by poor countries to the advance of the West. It is not so much direct aggression that the Muslim world is trying to "free" itself from, as it is the persistent penetration of Western values into its cultural and historical environment. While this encroachment points to the weakness and limited opportunities of Muslim societies, it compels these societies to turn to traditional values in an attempt to define themselves. The advocates of this freedom and the use of terrorism to achieve this goal do not need rational arguments, positive programmes or plans. They position themselves, as spokesmen for the blind will of the masses, rather than as defenders of the interest of particular groups. Not

counting the victims of 9|11, every year since 1999, there has been a 60to 80 percent increase in the number of people killed in terrorist attacks. At the same time, more and more countries are suffering at the hands of terrorists. In these circumstances the West has only one option; to help Muslim countries achieve the freedom they desire and stop trying to its humanitarian values, goods and technologies and even its democracy on this part of the world. It should be recognized that liberation from western values is not tantamount, and that the independence of one society from the dominance of another doesn't necessarily make its citizens happy and prosperous. In the modern world, the reverse is true: the wealthier countries and nations are, the less independent they are. The more independent they are from every one else, the more they are doomed to poverty. Therefore the process of liberation leads to a dead end, and there are currently no forces in the world (and nor will there be in the future) capable of ensuring that no nation will successfully come out against this blank wall. The West cannot civilize the Muslim world in the way in which it wishes. Yet it should not try to block the process of decivilization or to minimize its negative consequence. Policy of noninterference is not fraught with serious economic risk for the West.

Today the Islamisation of Europe is being carried out in the name of symmetrical culture influence; western civilization is changing the Muslim world with its idea and values while the Muslim world is influencing the West with its immigrants and its customs. If the West gave up its attempts to spread its ideas and values, it would

be able to start to prevent the reverse effect. What is referred to here by stopping the construction of Mosques and prayer house banning the practice of inviting Mullahs from Arab countries to preach in the east and forbidding ostensive signs and displays of religious adherence?

Immigration to the EU should once again be strictly economic. Immigrants should have the right to work and live in western countries and enjoy all the rights of residents, but they should not be allowed to become citizens, or obtain voting rights enabling them to form lobby groups. Of course, they should remember that they could always be deported. Considering that it was only forty years ago that Muslims began immigrating to Europe in any real numbers, there are no grounds whatsoever to praise them for actively contributing to the growing prosperity of western country. Reciprocity is very important; western nations should not prevent Muslims from establishing their own systems in the countries of their traditional (historical) residence, and for their part, Muslims should not arrive in Europe or the US and make 'demands'. Strict controls must be imposed on the supply of dual-purpose technologies with civilian and military applications to states whose citizens have repeatedly been involved in acts of terror. The G-8 should ban all sales of arms to the Middle East and should use the threat of economic sanction to compel other countries (China and India in particular) to follow suit. It is both inadmissible and illogical to wage a war against terrorism while supplying unstable states with arms.

Instead of trying to impose democracy, the west should be supporting democrats in Middle Eastern and other developing countries, that is, those people who are genuinely interested in providing a new future for their nations. Moreover, this support should be given to people who are actually living in these countries, rather than those who are killing away their time as immigrants.

The concept of Human Rights is a dynamic one, which finds expanded expression and constantly covers new areas as human society continues to evolve higher levels of development. We possess some right by birth which are inherent in our nature and without which we cannot survive as human beings. These rights are essential for all the individuals as they are in harmony with their freedom and dignity and are contributive to physical, moral, social and spiritual welfare. Human Rights allow us to fully develop and use our human qualities, intelligence and talent and to satisfy our common and fundamental needs. It further creates suitable conditions for the material and moral upliftment of men, as to satisfy man's increasing demands for a life in which the inherent dignity and worth of each human being will receive respect and protection. And for their immense significance to human beings human rights are also called "Fundamental Rights", "Basic Rights", "Natural Rights" or "Birth Rights" etc.

The original philosophy of fundamental freedom was limited and confined to civil and political rights of the individual, often referred to as the first generation rights,

which in large part call for a negative obligation on governments to resist from interfering with the exercise of individual liberties. The expansive nature of the concept of Human rights adjoined with the realization that without guaranteeing economic, social and cultural rights full enjoyment of civil and political rights was not possible. This led to the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights, popularly known as second generation rights. These second generation rights stand for more positive duty on government to act in order to ensure the realization of those rights. But the nature of human rights in its expanding form has now led to encompass which is stated as the third generation rights which cover right to self determination, right to sovereignty over natural wealth and resources of country and right to development as well as the right of downtrodden people to special protection. Thus the road travelled by Human rights movement from "Magna Carta to Universal Declaration" has been historic and historic.

The long route of human rights is neither smooth nor clear or straight rather it is full of stumbles. The actual reason is always pushed to one side and rights are trodden underfoot-when there is a tag of war between the power of the state on one side and liberty of citizens on the other. As a result, the innocent people are always victimized by aggressive impulses of either authoritarian structures or violent private agencies. So it is imperative to follow the rule of law, which has the most leading approach to human rights. But the rule of law is also under serious threat of erosion and it is not considered properly for the protection of human rights. Abuse

of rule of law always lead to injustice, arbitrariness, inequality, poverty corruption, frustration and ultimately social unrest. If the principles of rule of law could have been implemented properly in proper time, its adverse effect like insurgency, ethnic crisis or conflicts etc may not take birth. The application of terrorism in order to achieve political destiny is not a new idea, from the era of Shivaji to Netaji. All oppressive governments found terror to be an effective means of social control, in the name of national security or law and order. Measuring the width and depth of causes of terrorism, it has been perceived that a terrorist does not become terrorist overnight. It develops in geometrical process that begins with some resentment frustration or alienation etc, which is based on some genuine social and political issues and all these take place in defiance of rule of law.

By the uses of repression in the name of operation of state agencies sometimes provoke the struggling forces to adopt the path of terrorism. This phenomenon was manifested during the British period in India. Due to their repressive attitude the trend of militant nationalism had been growing effectively from 1905 and particularly after Rowlatt act, 1919. However the seed of independent movement was germinated during the Sepoy Mutiny, 1857 though the episode of the greased cartridges was the apparent and immediate cause it was due to economic exploitation of the country and complete destruction of its traditional economic fabric that the strength for independence originated. Both impoverished the vast masses of peasants, artisans and handy crafts as also large number of traditional

Zaminders and chiefs. The economic decline of the peasantry found expression in twelve major and numerous minor famines from 1770 to 1857. While discussing the causes of the revolt, William Edwards, a British official, wrote in 1859, that the police were a scourge to the people and that their oppression and exactions formed one of the main grounds of dissatisfaction with our government. Another instance of violation of rule of law can easily be traced in Indian council act of 1892. When existing political rights were attached, in 1904 the official secrets Act was passed restricting the freedom of Press, Lokamanya Tilak and other newspaper editors sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, in the year 1904. The universities Act was an attempt to bring Indian universities under tighter officials control and to check the growth of higher education. All these happened after the disastrous famines, which ravaged India from 1896 to 1900 and took a toll of over 90 lakh lives due to evil economic consequences of the British rule. As a result, school of militant nationalism was organized from the year of 1905.

Thus in India repression of nationalists was not diminished. The terrorists and revolutionaries had been hunted down, hanged and imprisoned. The British government decided to arm itself with more far reaching powers, which went against the accepted principles of rule of law. In March 1919, it passed Rowlat Act, empowering the government to imprison any person without trial and conviction in a court of law. The act also enabled the Government to suspend the right of Habeas Corpus, which had been the foundation of Civil Liberties in British regime.

In Assam too, agrarian revolts took place against British oppression in various times, particularly in Phulaguri and Patharughat. The British rulers terrorized the people by imposing excess arbitrary revenue in the name of reforms. All local authorities directed their attention to raising revenues on land and to tapping new sources of revenue. Hence the conflict between human rights and terrorism has become a common phenomenon of the global agenda. The style of terrorism is quite different according to various circumstances. The demands of human rights emerged where terrorism violates the minimum basic rights of any individual. The terms of human rights and terrorism both are reciprocal. Human rights are infringed where terrorism begins or an end of terrorism could be possible when human rights are established. As such both the problem of human rights as well as terrorism are getting serious attention of the world community. In unequivocal term, under no circumstances can the two be equated nor can the latter be excused for the former. On the other hand, different laws, which are legislated only to curb the insurgency problem, also sometimes create some problems of violation of human rights, instead of solving the main problems. It is wrong for an individual to do something, and then it is also wrong for a state to do it. By adopting repressive measures or by enacting draconian law a movement cannot be suppressed unless its root cause is not eradicated.

Human Rights are the nectar of Rule of Law. AV Dicey's Rule of Law has been identified with concept of rights of the citizens. The doctrine of Rule of Law has

been bejewelled as a basic structure of our constitution. In Latin it is said that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. Law is only to serve the social purpose not the only means to control social organism. Duguit says that with the development of free activities the social solidarity develops. Hence the development of every individual is imperative for the development of the society which is the ultimate destination of mankind i.e., the peace, because peace can only be achieved through development and progress. The most important factor is the political will. Unless the political leadership does not realize the problem, promotion of Human Rights and implementation of rule of law are well nigh impossible. Hence a pragmatic political approach is imperative and it is the need of the hour.

From above discussions it shows that there is no final or consensus definition of terrorism has been found. But considering all the perspectives of terrorism we can find a fact that terrorism is a curse for human being. It would never be healthy for mankind. Temporary development of a community or a country does not mean developed country. Real progresses of humanity and of a country consist in the development of basic needs and ideals of mankind. There is always an iota for terrorism to emerge a new terrorism again. So, terrorism in the name of development of some section of people is definitely inhuman. Such kind of practices can be observed in present era globally. Therefore, for me, terrorism is an universal language of violence, perpetrated violently for achieving some aims and objectives of which no moral justifications can be traced for humanity or human rights.

The most important factor of this dissertation is the moral implications of terrorism without which the value of this dissertation would be incomplete. For this author the moral implication of terrorism consist of terrorist environment where there is a victim, a target, onlooker, innocent people, supporters. the terrorist, the onlooker and analyst; and finally the way in which it is tried to solve is most important. In the trial to solve the problem of terrorism there must be somebody to play a vital role (United States of America playing the role).

So, America is on the forefront against terrorism and should try to analyze every possible aspect in the war against terror. America should well known that the problem of terrorism is a global phenomenon and should solve globally for which international coalition is needed. In the war against terrorism it is worth to refer to Kant's moral philosophy. Terrorism is an undoubtedly universal phenomenon that seeks universal therapy so that everybody can be benefited. Lastly in the name of war against terrorism no nation should try to take advantage of their own and human being should not be treated as means in achieving its goal because every human being is the kingdom of the ends. America should understand that Americans are not above humanity: America could survive if and only if humanity prevails in the world and inhumanitarian forces must be finished from the world at any cost. So, a rational decision is very important to solve terrorism internationally and must be played in the war against terrorism.

“One person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter”. This statement today works as prime fuel in continuing terrorism in the name of insurgency. Many times terrorists try to defend themselves as revolutionaries rather than a terrorist. In this juncture many intellectualist are giving them support directly and indirectly. What is morally important for those intellectualist is that along with their support they should try to save the life and property, security of common people. In the attempt of protecting the terrorist rights, the rights of common people should not be violated at any cost. Secondly, by protecting the Terrorist rights they are at the same time encouraging the terrorist activities too. Therefore an appeal is made to those intellectuals for not to support the violent terrorist activities. Logically, supporting the rights of terrorist and at the same time neglecting their activities is a sheer self-contradiction. Therefore what morally implies to intellectuals is to create a peaceful environment first and then should try to solve the problem. In the attempt to solve the problem, common people or innocent people should not be used as means. It is because in the name of struggle common people have lost their owns v.i.z parents, brother, sister, son, daughter, well-wishers and neighbours. So, common people are neither the gainer of this struggle nor they are somehow benefited. A common person survives their lives with their daily work. In this globe there is not any country where one can feed himself without doing his work; there is no such country where common people earning property from a government without his talent or qualifications. The reality is that common people do not like such a system that bleeds the human blood. Therefore the roles of intellectuals are very vital. If an

intellectualist is in the true sense intellectual he must hate those systems that are unfit for public otherwise I think intellectuals are the most dangerous terrorists than the practitioners of violent means of terrorism. Therefore an intellectualist must deeply realize that his role towards the society is to build the society, to protect the lives of people but not to support the enemies of society or humanity.

It is worth pondering why sections of intellectuals are disillusioned with the problem of terrorism as insurgency in some context. They also try to find a difference between the two where insurgency is a revolt by a group of national people against the constitutional government of a country. It is not a fight between individuals but a struggle between social groups and political forces. The difference between the two is that an insurgent has the support of a large section of the local population while a terrorist need not have such support. Again, an insurgent is a national of a country, which is in revolt against the constitutional government of his country and fight to overthrow the government by guerrilla warfare. The terrorist may or may not be a national of the country in which he operates. The aims of the insurgents differ from those of the ordinary criminals. Most criminals commit crimes for personal profit. But most insurgents as well as terrorists commit crimes in support of political causes to draw international attention on a neglected problem.

Considering the fact it is cleared that the theoretical concept of terrorism is undoubtedly acceptable but the present existence of insurgents are doubtful. It is because in practice there is not even a single example where insurgents do their

work without harming the innocent people. We should not try to make equivalent status for insurgents with freedom fighters of the Indian freedom struggle movement. There is a big difference between these two movements. In Indian freedom struggle movement every individual realized the feelings of patriotism and paid his/her tribute by many ways.v.i.z they donated willingly for the movement, even women donated their ornaments for the movement. But today, the picture is completely different. Insurgents and terrorist both are habituated in demanding money, kidnapping etc. Therefore I think today it is not the proper time to say the activist of NER and Jammu Kashmir as insurgent or revolutionaries. Today, the so-called terrorist groups and their network is globally connected with one another in many ways- viz, Training of cadres, Arms purchasing, financial help, mutual help, joint operation, joint trade etc. Therefore, the nature of present scenario of insurgency needs more discussion.

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At the end I shall conclude with the opinion that terrorism is neither permissible as political action nor as moral action by virtue of “Means” and “End”. Because the “Means” adopted by terrorist is violent and criminal in nature. Secondly, the “Means” adopted by terrorist creates unpredictable consequences in practice, which is not permissible universally at all. Thirdly, The “end” of terrorism means achieving their demands. In fact, there is a big gap between theoretical fulfilment of demand and “end” of the demand in practice. The so-called “end” of terrorist goes far away from reality and becomes an illusion because the end or consequences of

terrorism is not predictable by terrorist themselves. Further unless human being tries to achieve heavenly feelings of mankind such as brotherhood, love, Gandhian nonviolence, benovelence, passion etc. we never success to bring out solution to terrorism. So, we need a peaceful environment for solving antisocial, antispiritual and all moral problems.

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