Chapter II

Word-World Relationship: An Exposition of the Views of Some Analytic Philosophers

In this chapter we will discuss the views of some eminent philosophers in the analytic tradition keeping in mind their thoughts on the word-world relationship. We start with the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

A: L. Wittgenstein

I

Wittgenstein's problem(s) in both the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* is the problem of meaning - how a sign "means" its signified. In the *Tractatus* emphasis is on the epistemological problem: How do the signs by which we know (express) states of affairs ('the world", "reality"), relate to the signified? The *Tractatus* talks of "representing", "picturing", "mirroring" the world, but not in any literal sense. Wittgenstein was not thinking of images. The signs are what permit the world (reality, states of affairs), to be for us. There is an isomorphism between propositions and reality.

In the *Philosophical Investigations* we are still meditating upon the problem of how a sign "means" its signified, but against a different background. The *Philosophical Investigations* offers us a reversed view in terms of language games. The example of the "slab" game in the early part of the *Philosophical Investigations* is to bring home to us that words are tools of action. By giving order to B, A makes use of instruments to

get B to act in a certain way. Their meaning depends on how B is supposed to act in the situations in which they are uttered. In like manner, the meaning of a descriptive sentence depends upon its role in a given situation within a given culture-frame. Meaning, then, is not some ethereal entity, rather: "Let the use of words teach you their meaning".[1] We are going to elucidate these preliminary remarks below.

II

The early Wittgenstein, the author of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was greatly influenced by the great German logician and philosopher, Gottlob Frege. He was concerned with Frege's problem of 'logical form' of a sentence. The logical form is an aspect about the structure of a sentence. Before Wittgenstein, Frege faced the problem of distinguishing the logical form of a sentence from the grammatical form of it, and in order to do so he framed a 'formula language', modelled upon that of 'Arithmatic' for pure thought. He expressed this in his book, *Begriffsschrift.*[2] In his early work, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* Wittgenstein views language as something restricted to the expression of true/false propositions. The totality of propositions is language.[3] The form of language is discussed here. Wittgenstein points out, "The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties." [4]

According to Wittgenstein, a proposition is a picture of the world. And each word refers to an object, i.e., corresponding to the sentence, "The cat is on the mat''; there are some objects in the world. There is an object corresponding to the word 'cat' and also corresponding to the word 'mat'. And there is a relationship between these two objects. This is how

Wittgenstein explains language-world relation in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. There is an one to one relationship or isomorphism between language and reality. Wittgenstein writes in the *TractatusLogico-Philosophicu,* "In a picture the elements of the picture are representatives of the object."[5] By 'elements' Wittgenstein means 'names'. According to Wittgenstein, 'names' and 'objects' bring language and world together. "A name means an object. The object is its meaning".[6]

According to Wittgenstein by means of linguistic expressions some objects in this world are pointed out. And these objects are the bearers of the meanings of the linguistic expressions. In the *Tractatus* he explains language, 'as the totality of propositions' mirroring 'the totality of facts' which is the world. Wittgenstein says that a proposition is 'a model of reality as we imagine it'.[7] The elementary proposition is the simplest unit of language. The relationship between language and the world established in the case of elementary propositions is referred to as the picture theory. This is based on the following passages. 'A proposition is a picture of reality'.[8] 'A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality,' [9] etc. The expression 'picture theory' has been seen as misleading by many Wittgenstein scholars. It may mean that thoughts are mental images or that individual words are pictures. It needs a clarification of his claim that the elementary proposition can be a picture, even 'in the ordinary sense' of the word, of the situation which it represents.[10]

According to a common understanding of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein first talks about pictures in a loose sense. It embraces drawings, paintings, photographs, maps, even models, all of which are likenesses, or as C. S. Pierce says, icons of what they represent.[11] Then

Wittgenstein takes a sharp turn to the special case constituted by the logical picture, which is not any sort of likeness or icon of what it represents, e.g., musical notation or the thought. Actually, Wittgenstein was not talking about two distinct kinds of picture. There is only one kind of picture. The single principle he sees at work in all picturings is that of likeness or sharing of features; the pictoriality, which he specifies by the locution, "the picture"[12] – the spatial picture, the coloured picture, the logical picture – that is, the picture which pictures by likeness in respect of x which shares x-ness with what it pictures

It is reported that Wittgenstein became drawn to the picture theory from the report of a representation of a motor-car accident in a law court by means of models, dolls, toy cars, etc.[13] A picture, as the court-room model, is a rich picture, and it needs to be considerably stripped down of its richness to retain the pictoriality of a merely logical picture. The logical picture possesses only the minimum of pictoriality which is the minimum pictoriality common to all pictures. Wittgenstein says: "Every picture is at the same time a logical picture." What do we, as language users, know about the language/world correlations? A sentence, Wittgenstein holds, is a picture of the world. As such it is isomorphic to the situation it portrays. But not any isomorphism of something is a picture of it. Does the world pictures language? It seems not. A picture, Wittgenstein says in the Note *Books*, reaches up to reality (2.1511), it is like a scale applied to reality (2.1512). The pictorial relationship acts as the "feelers" of a picture's elements (2.1511). A picture agrees with (or fails to agree with) reality (2.21). Language projects reality (4.0141). We must consider the significant *use* of a sign in order to understand it

(3.326). For what signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs conceal, their application says clearly (3.362).[14]

The above remarks have led some Wittgenstein scholars to interpret him as indicating that language is intentional; it reaches up, feels, projects, agrees, signifies and is applied. The pictorial relationship is inherent in the picture (2.1513). To be an intelligible world is to be describable and the describability of the world in language comprises the meaningfulness of language[15]. We wonder whether language could be meaningful if there were no intelligible world to be described, to be picturable. "...this view grounds one of the most important assumptions in the *Tractatus*, namely, the claim that the structure of the world and the structure of language are isomorphic. To be an intelligible world and to be a describable world are one and the same." [16]

III

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein challenges the representationalist's account of the relation between language and the world by criticising traditional theories of meaning and understanding. Wittgenstein's treatment of language concerns the meaning and understanding of language in relationship to our world of experience. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* starts with an experience into the referential relationship of language with things of the world. His main concern has been to understand and locate the possibility of the world's intelligibility. To solve this problem he attempts an account of our understanding which presupposes the model of ostension.[17] According to this model, we start our life finding ourselves surrounded by objects, and we then learn the

names of those objects through ostensive training. Our understanding of the world is built up from such instances of learning the meaning of words. This presupposes a representationalist's account of mind related to objects, and then tries to explain our understanding in terms of mental processes linking words to things.

Wittgenstein does not accept this position. He suggests that although our understanding of meaning of words includes ostensive definitions, in those cases the learner already knows, "What place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word' and 'the post at which we station the world"'.[18] Wittgenstein's slogan argument against ostensive definition (conceived as primary and fundamental linguistic rule) is that we must already know a lot about language in order to understand that kind of definition. We must know that when we are taught the name of a colour that it is the colour and not the shape of the coloured sample which is shown to us. Ostensive definition does not solve our problems concerning what constitutes the link between language and reality. On the other hand, as far as feelings and mental relations are concerned we cannot appeal to immediate inner experience in order to prove them, but only to public criteria. We do not have any direct means of grasping reality, neither physical, nor psychological ones. We have a purely symbolic (linguistic) relation to reality, we just have our signs, and our language must speak for itself. The meaning of a word cannot be reduced to the object it signifies or to the intention on the part of the speaker. Rather, the meaning of a word is determined by the rules of usages.

This is not to say that Wittgenstein replaced the traditional objects of the realists with the formal rules of language and syntax. He is principally concerned with what we do with language rather than what

language is. He is interested in the regularities in the use of words as given by the phenomenological description of language in the form of rules which brings together the different uses of a word and its significations in effective linguistic transactions. To take an example, if something is red, it is not green. The distinction between red and green is not provided by reality itself but by the rules and conventions of language.

Thus, in his later work, *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein differs from his former interpretation about language in which he focuses on the form of language. In *Philosophical Investigations* he focuses on the content of the language instead of the form of language. Wittgenstein describes the *Philosophical Investigations* as an album of 'a number of sketches of landscape'.[19] He writes that the use of language is an activity. But language does not have the only activity of depicting the world. Language is mentioned as an activity and various kinds of activities are performed by the use of language. As he writes,

> How many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question and command? There are a countless kinds ... And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotton.[20]

Language in the *Tractatus* is limited to propositional logic whereas in the *Philosophical Investigations* language is considered as a non-propositional linguistic activity which does not have the only job of depicting true/false picture of the world. Wittgenstein himself goes

against his former view in *Tractatus* by stating the multiplicity of language games. As he writes:

> It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians, have said about the structure of language (including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*)[21].

Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Investigations* holds that as we perform different kinds of activities with the help of different kinds of tools similarly, we perform different acts with the use of different words and sentences in language. As a game is governed by certain rules and to play a game is to know the rules of the game, similarly, to know a language is to know its uses, according to Wittgenstein. So he writes, "We talk about it as we talk about the pieces of chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties." The question, "What is a world really?", is analogous to "What is a piece in chess ?"[22] He says that as in order to play chess the important thing is its rules and not the shape, and size of the chess board or chess pieces, similarly, the structure of a language is not important in order to know a language, but the rules of using the language are of importance. This insight of Wittgenstein, regarding the uses of language is later developed as the use theory of meaning although he himself does not regard it as the use theory of meaning.

It is clear from the statement in the *Philosophical Investigations*, ' the meaning of a word is its use in the language.'[23] This transition of Wittgenstein's view from *Tractatus Logico -Philosophicus* to

Philosophical Investigations is well depicted by Dr. Suresh Chandra in his book, Wittgenstein. *New Perspectives*, where he writes, "*Tractatus* has certainly created knots in our thinking. The diversion of our mind from 'meaning of words' to 'uses of words' is an attempt to untie those knots."[24]

Wittgenstein's reflection on language and the world leads to an inversion of the traditional order of explanation. According to him, we can learn words in grasping what objects are if we already have an understanding of the world, an understanding itself rooted in a prior mastery of language. Phenomena in the world can stand out as counting for us in certain ways only because we have some mastery of what Wittgenstein calls the significance or importance of the ordinary situations in which we find ourselves. Words have meaning and can be understood only within "intelligible situations". What is happening now has significance in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance."[25]

Wittgenstein insists on replacing explanation by description. By description he means an accurate non-theoretical depiction of some situation or group of situations in which language is used in an ordinary everyday way. These situations and the linguistic uses they embody are the elements of the world to be described. For this everyday world he uses various appellations, “the stream of life”, "a form of life," or "the language game", etc. He introduces a set of interconnected concepts whose key members are: the use of expressions, "the language game" in which words or signs find their usage; and common judgment and common ways of acting."[26]

Wittgenstein's philosophy is a critical description of language, describing how the world is (or might be). It is but one of indefinitely many language games that we play as members of a particular society. There is an insistent emphasis upon speech (language in use) as social activity. This explains why Wittgenstein says that animals do not use language; our word- language that we call language; and then other things by analogy or comparability with this. The fabric of social life may be said to consist of conceptual links between intentions, beliefs, actions, practices, institutions and competences. The connection between language and reality requires a mastery of the use of language which does not emerge "from some kind of "ratiocination"[27] but by correctly using or employing a word in such and such a way. This process of conditioning is inherently social.

Thus, in his later investigation Wittgenstein brings into focus the idea of everydayness as the source of our various daily activities, forms of life.[28] According to him, it is to get out of the *Luftegebaude* (castles floating in the air) of theorizing, to be free from "'conceptual prejudices' and jargon of speculative metaphysics and to get 'back to the rough ground'"[29] of our concrete ordinary grasp of language in use. Our words and expressions have meaning only in 'the stream of life', in the whole 'tapestry of life', but not in a 'sublime' logic beyond life. When we look for justification for our uses, practices, we find that what we simply do in living is actual 'bedrock'. "This 'bedrock' constitutes the ground on which our language moves and our intelligibility of language becomes possible"[30]

Wittgenstein tries to dissolve the problems which arise from the misunderstandings of proper grammar of language from speculative

reflection and illusory interpretation by providing how things show up for us in the course of our ordinary, pre-reflective life. He says in his regard that "We must do away with all explanations, and description alone must take its place".[31] What does he mean by description here and what is it that is to be described? By description he means an accurate non-theoretical depiction of some situation or group of situations in which language is used in an ordinary everyday way. These situations and the linguistic uses they embody are the elements of the world to be described. For this everyday world — its practices, institutions and linguistic uses — Wittgenstein uses various appellations which we have already mentioned, "the stream of life", "a form of life" or " the language game". An appeal to these features represents the descriptions of everydayness and these descriptions of everydayness serve as the basis for disclosing features of our linguistic activities that exclusively represent our forms of life. He asks us "to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use".[32] Stanley Cavell notes here an affinity with Heidegger. He says, "Heidegger's consciousness that our deepest task as philosophers and as men, is one of getting back to that essence of words and world from which we are now away, is an intimate point of similarity with Wittgenstein."[33]This descriptive account of our linguistic activities is characterised by T. R. Schatzki as 'phenomenology of the everyday'[34].

Wittgenstein also appeals to a 'gamut of cases'. This feature is used in contrast to the approach which looks for essence beneath surface phenomena. What Wittgenstein means by a "case" is a description of an activity, phenomenon, object or event in a particular context in ordinary life. Here is an example from *On Certainty* in which ordinary language plays a critical role:

> I go to the doctor, shew him my hand and say "This is a hand, not .....; I've injured it etc. etc. "Am I only giving him a piece of superfluous information? For example, mightn't one say: supposing the words "This is a hand" were a piece of information --- how could you bank on his understanding this information? Indeed, if it is open to doubt 'whether that is a hand', why isn't it also open to doubt whether I am a human being who is informing the doctor of this? — But on the other hand one can imagine cases — even if they are very rare ones — where this declaration is not superfluous, or is only superfluous but not absurd.[35]

In this passage Wittgenstein uses the term "cases". And he alludes to it with the words, "I've injured it etc. etc.". The standard case would be one where, if you injured your hand, you would go to a physician, show him the hand, and say that you have injured it. In saying this you would take it for granted the doctor knows that you are a human being, that what you are showing him is a hand and not a prosthesis.

The point of the passage is to indicate that human activity is complex and cannot be understood according to any simple model or paradigm. The task of philosophy is to provide an accurate account of it. Any such account must be sensitive to the range of differing cases that we find in "language game", that is, in ordinary life. Wittgenstein here provides an explanation as to how human communication entails human form of life in the sense it represents a "language game". Each language game represents essentially an order of human communication, a form of human activity. To that extent he rejects all theoretical programmes, and

thus provides a new sense to human situations by emphasizing on description of our actual life situations in the concrete — the only place where talk about things, events, situations and activities gain meaningfulness.

The descriptional use of what Wittgenstein calls "language games" is an important feature of *Philosophical Investigations*. This concept first appears in *The Brown Book* of 1934. It became a key concept in his later philosophy and is extensively used in such works as *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty*. Instead of being the discovery of something called 'the essence of x', a language game is a description of a slice of human everyday activity including such practices as affirming, doubting, believing, following rules and interacting with others in multifarious ways. Language games refer not only to individual human activities but to those that are common to the whole community comprising such institutions as governments, universities, banks, the militaries and so forth. Wittgenstein makes it clear in section 90.of *Philosophical Investigations* that or study of language games is for the purpose of understanding the grammar of phenomena. He says, "we feel as if we have to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but as one might say towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena".[36] He has also recognised "the need of friction"[37], calls our thinking "back to the rough ground" of our "natural history".[38] "A word has the meaning someone has given to it",[39] away from the "crystalline purity of logic",[40] toward the "rough ground" of "ordinary language". Patterns of meaning or "grammar" of language is as it has "grown up in our common history". "Phenomena"

are here for us in the present moment and we experience them and recognise the experience in language. Because a language has a history, languaging of experience for us is to associate our experience at least implicitly with "the whole life of the tribe". Meaning arises from this fact. Wittgenstein says, " Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in order to have such and such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs".[41]

Wittgenstein shows us a way of describing and of gradually purifying our descriptions in which the search for understanding lives. The gradual mastery of language involves assembling reminders about the use of words, and the kinds of statements we make, so that when we come around again to the same languaging moment we are not again "bewitched". Wittgenstein is urging the traditional philosophers not to think but to look and see what people actually do in the course of their daily life. The description of such activity rather than a synoptic philosophical theory about them will give us an accurate picture of reality. Wittgenstein is principally concerned with what we do with language rather than what language is. The working of language requires that under normal circumstances the use of words is beyond any doubt. The meaning of a word is determined by the rules of use. To have rules of use is to have standards of normality which proves to be factually successful. The success in question is brought about by an agreement in judgment which Wittgenstein calls in a well known passage, agreement in a "....form of life".[42] Agreement in judgments, called a "form of life" by Wittgenstein is characterised by certainty beyond doubt. This gives a first explication of concerned language or reality: if the meaning of a word is

explained by use, but the use itself is governed by praxis of judgment which is the basis of communication then we can say that language and reality are tied together just in those judgments our use is based upon. Wittgenstein's own remark that language and reality are connected by the explanations of the words thus becomes clear.

Wittgenstein's philosophical procedure, designed to bring to us a consciousness of the words we must have, and hence, of the lives we have, represents a recognizable version of the wish "to establish the truth about the world." At this juncture, we want ask: How do we accomplish the task of bringing words back home? By asking "What should we say ...?" Or, "What should we call ...?" And this can be answered by remembering what is said and meant, or by trying out one's own response to an imagined situation, e.g., "What one should say if the next door young man proposes marriage?" And when we employ words in the absence of (any) language game which provides comprehensible employment, illusion is produced (Sec. 96). This section attempts to locate Wittgenstein's thought in a phenomenological tradition which is broadly European rather than narrowly emergent out of British empiricism.

B: Austin and Linguistic Phenomenology

Austin's philosophy is directed towards an aspect which is completely new in the history of philosophy. He was an intellectual authority in the field of philosophy of ordinary language in post-war Oxford, as Wittgenstein was in Cambridge. Austin reacts to the powerful thrust of logical positivism in the same way as Ryle does.

His speech act theory is a later development of his theory of performatives as distinct from constatives. Austin's first discussion of performative-constative distinction appeared in his 1946 paper "Other Minds"[1]. He writes, "When I say 'I promise', a new plunge is taken: I have not merely announced my intention, but, by using this formula (performing this ritual), I have bound myself to others, and staked my reputation, in a new way".[2] The term 'speech act' appears for the first time in "How to Talk: Some simple ways".[3] "How to Talk" is vastly expanded than "Other Minds". Three years later Austin writes a whole article, "Performative Utterances"[4] on this topic. In 1962, Urmson edits a series of twelve lectures that Austin delivered at Harvard University in 1955, and published them in a book form under the title *How to Do Things with Words*.[5] (henceforth will be mentioned as HDTW). This book contains Austin's most extensive and sophisticated theory of speech act, and contemporary interest in speech acts stems directly from Austin's work, and in particular, from his HDTW. Austin completed no books of his own and published only seven papers that also as the condition of delivering those papers; but in spite of that through lectures and talks, Austin became one of the acknowledged leaders in 'Oxford Philosophy' or 'Ordinary Language Philosophy'. Soon after his premature death in 1960, the published papers, together with three previously unpublished, were collected as *Philosophical Papers*[6] by J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock. His contribution to the philosophy of language is enough to establish him as a great and original analytic philosopher in the history of analytic philosophy.

Austin's contribution to philosophy of language consists in a powerful attack on a picture of correspondence between language and the

world which structures philosophical discussions of language. This picture of a correspondence between language and the world he took to be implicit in a traditional ideal of the statement as describing states of affairs as truly or falsely.[7] His aim was to criticize the idea that to talk about language having a bearing on the world just is to talk about 'Statements' or Propositions. The earliest expression of this is found in his paper on "Other Minds" and then in "Performative Utterances". His 1955 Harvard Lectures posthumously published as *"How to Do Things with Words"* clarifies this more fully.

Austin opens his lectures with a discussion of traditional philosophical ideal of the 'Statement' on which, in his words, "the business of a 'Statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which it must do either truly or falsely."[8] He mentions the writings of philosophers who treat the 'descriptive statement' as monopolizing the serious business of language. The main function of our verbal engagement is not always to make truth claims as was maintained by logical positivists. This claim was called in question by Austin's discovery of "Performative Utterances" and correspondingly of performative verbs and performative sentences. The performatives are distinguished from constatives. He proposes the term 'performative' for utterances which are not properly characterized as describing a state of affairs, and in which the uttering of a sentence, e.g., "I promise" is the doing of an action, e.g., making a promise. In his words, a performative utterance is "... a kind of utterance which looks like a statement and grammatically, I suppose, would be classed as a statement, which is not nonsensical, and yet is not true or false."[9] He proposes the term 'constative' for utterances which describe a state of affairs, or state a fact.

e.g., "That dog is dangerous", as description. They appear to attend to the traditional ideal of the 'Statement'. Although the classical 'Statement' – or as, Austin prefers to put it, the constative utterance – can be judged true or false depending on whether it accurately or inaccurately describes a state of affairs or states a fact, the performative utterance is not appropriately assessed in the truth/ falsity dimension.

In answer to the question, how to identify an utterance to be a performative Austin says, we need a grammatical criterion. He points out that the performatives begin with a verb in the first person singular, present active indicative, e.g., "I promise", "I order", "I warn you", etc. This is often accompanied by the addition of the term "hereby", e.g., "I hereby appoint you Vice-Chancellor." But all performatives should not always be in the above form. The utterance, "Shut the door", and "There is a bull in the pasture" are equally an order and a warning and so forth. To say that, "You are hereby warned there is a bull in the pasture," is to make the previous utterance "There is a bull in the pasture" more explicit. But performatives cannot be in the third person like, "He promised"; it is generally a report of what he did. But the above list of rules and grammatical features are not yet sufficient to identify a performative. In the above examples, factors like tone of voice, various gestures and circumstances are missing. To determine an utterance to be an order, or advice or warning it is very necessary to know the circumstances.

This initial classification of utterances into constatives and performatives takes for granted the ideal of the statement. This is emphasized by Austin in his William James Lectures where Austin declares that he finds this ideal deeply problematic, and says that he wants to question "... an age-old assumption in philosophy – the

assumption that to say something, at least in all cases worth considering, i.e., all cases considered, is always and simply to *state* something."[10] It may appear that Austin, in isolating a class of utterances that do not meet the specification of the traditional statement, has already rejected the assumption that "To say something is always to state something." Austin, however, believes that genuine liberation from the assumption requires more than the creation of new categories of utterance to coexist alongside the traditional 'statement'. At various points of his first five lectures, he suggests that philosopher's preoccupation with the category of the statement is a certain view of meaning – a view which makes it appear possible to classify linguistic formulae into those for use in making 'statements' and those for use in producing other kinds of utterances. Further, he attempts to distance himself, not only from this view of meaning, but also from the idea, suggested by the view, that there are at least some linguistic formulae that are perfectly suited for making statements. Hence, both in the 'Performative Utterances' and when, at an early juncture in his Harvard lectures he declares his intention to dislodge an age-old assumption to the effect that "to say something is always and simply to state something", he is hinting at something that he will make explicit later in his lectures, viz., that he thinks his original distinction between constative and performative utterances cannot at the final analysis be preserved.

We have already stated the grammatical criterion given by Austin to distinguish between performatives and constatives. In his second lecture of HDTW he considers various dimensions to assess these utterances – dimensions which he refers to as 'happiness' and 'unhappiness' – very generally. Austin tell us that in order for a

performative to be 'happy' the circumstances in which a person utters a set of words must satisfy the conditions of a conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect – a procedure which involves the uttering of those words by a person of a certain standing in a certain situation. Thus, for example, in order for my utterance of the sentence "I name this Yatch The Moonshine," to be happy there must be an established procedure for naming Yatches, and I must be an appropriate person in appropriate circumstance for performing that procedure. A performative will be unhappy in some way if one or more of these conditions fail to be met. Austin claims that his discussion of infelicity shows that the performative, although it is not ever true or false, "still [is] subject to criticism"[11]. Austin's narrative about his failure to find a grammatical criterion for distinguishing between constative and performative utterances in his essay on "Performative Utterances" is intended to establish that there is something confused in principle about the idea of such a criterion.[12] Austin now considered another suggestion for isolating the performative. The performative might be distinguished by a special vocabulary such as 'hereby'. This suggestion, however, is undermined by the observation that it is possible to produce the performative without that word or to use the word without producing the "performative".[13] What we find is that the grammatical criterion, the doctrine of infelicities or special vocabulary fail to distinguish performatives from constatives. In distancing himself from the possibility of a criterion for distinguishing performative and constative language Austin repudiates the idea that we can somehow identify the sentence *as such* that is considered apart from the circumstances of its use. Austin awakes us to the fact that in every utterance, whether constative or

performative, the speaker performs an act such as stating a fact or opinion, confirming or denying something, making a prediction or a request, asking a question, issuing an order, giving advice or permission, making an offer or promise, greeting, thanking, condoling, effecting a baptism or declaring an umpire's decision – and so forth. He christens them speech acts.

It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that Austin wants to prevent us from drawing distinction between different ways in which language functions. He is discouraging us from studying the workings of language by looking at isolated sentences. He thinks that we can productively study language if we take as our object what he regards as its minimal unit. He christens them speech acts, complete acts of speech. The performative-constative distinction gives way to the theory of speech acts. He now represents his own investigation of language as exclusively concerned with speech acts. He writes that, "The total speech act in the total speech situation is the *only actual* phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating".[14] He classifies the speech acts as locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. A locutionary act, Austin maintains, includes "... the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain 'meaning' in the favourite philosophical sense of that word, i.e., with a certain sense and with a certain reference.[15] For example, the sentence, "He said to me, 'shoot her'" is a locutionary act and in this particular case urging or advising or ordering one to shoot her is an illocutionary act. Austin claims, to perform an illocutionary act, the speaker has to ensure that his audience understands what he is trying to do. If he fails to do so, then he has failed to secure 'uptake'. At the same time Austin makes it clear that

securing uptake is a necessary condition of performing the act, not a consequence of it which may or may not occur, and thus makes it distinguishable from a perlocutionary effect.

Consider the example, 'Can you pass the salt?' If the sentence is uttered at a lunch table then it is certain that by the utterance the speaker intends the hearer to recognize that the speaker's intention in uttering the sentence is to have the hearer recognize that the speaker has made a request bearing the message that the hearer pass the salt. The third kind of speech act is the perlocutionary act. The performance of a locutionary act or an illocutionary act normally produces certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, and it may be done with the design, intention or purpose of producing them. Examples of such perlocutionary acts or perlocutions are, 'he pulled me up, checked me' or 'he stopped me, he brought me to my senses' or 'he annoyed me', etc. The performance of illocutionary acts are conventional but the performance of perlocutionary acts are not conventional. We can say 'I argue that...', or 'I warn you that...' but we cannot say, 'I convince you that...' or 'I alarm you that...'. The perlocutionary act always includes some consequences. There is a doing of things in the performance of the perlocutionary act just as in the case of the locutionary and illocutionsry acts. Austin presents it as, 'By doing x I was doing y'.

Austin in *How to Do Things with Words* gives a clear picture of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, saying, "Thus we distinguished the locutionary act (and within it the phonetic, the phatic and the rhetic acts) which has a *meaning*; the illocutionary act which has a certain *force* in saying something; the perlocutionary act which is *the achieving of* certain *effects* by saying something."[16] He writes in *HDTW*,

"whenever I 'say' anything (except perhaps a mere exclamation like 'damn' or 'ouch') I shall be performing both locutionary, and illocutionary acts, and these two kinds of acts seem to be the very things which we tried to use, under the names of 'doing' and 'saying', as a means of distinguishing performatives from constatives."[17]

According to Austin, an illocutionary act determines the way we are using the locution. The doctrine of illocutionary forces arises out of his earlier distinction of performative and constative utterances, contained in HDTW. Austin distinguishes between different kinds of illocutionary act like the act of questioning or answering or informing or assuring or warning and so on with the help of illocutionary force. What is an illocutionary force? Illocutionary force is the way of determining the nature of the locution. In other words, it is the way of determining different types of function that language has in the performance of an illocutionary act. He holds that it is essential to distinguish illocutionary force from the meaning of an utterance as it is to distinguish sense from reference within meaning. Meaning is the locutionary act and 'use of sentence' is the illocutionary act. According to Austin the range of illocutionary acts is restricted by the conventions of illocutionary force.

In the HDTW, Austin gives us a list of explicit performative verbs'. These verbs make explicit the illocutionary force of an utterance, or what illocutionary act is to be performed in issuing that utterance. An utterance's illocutionary force is sometimes spelled out in a so-called 'performative clause'. For instance in the utterance – "I promise to take Max to a movie tomorrow" – 'I promise' is called a performative clause. But the same promise can be made by uttering, "I'll take Max to a movie tomorrow" without using an explicit performative formula. The former is

called a primary illocution and the latter is called an 'indirect illocution'. In order to use the explicit performative verbs certain formal conditions will necessarily be fulfilled. Unless these formal conditions on explicit performative clauses are satisfied, the so-called performative verb is used non-performatively, i.e., the illocutionary point of the utterance will not be described by the meaning of the performative verb. Austin distinguishes five very general classes of utterance depending upon their illocutionary forces. They are: (1) Verdictives, (2) Exercitives, (3) Commisives, (4) Behabitives and (5) Expositives.

Austin's thesis of explicit performative is recognized as a distinct form of linguistic utterance. Such performatives carry a distinct type of force, performative force, of their own: it is the sense of the operative word or phrase within the performative utterance that makes the act to be of the particular kind it is. Austin also speaks of the illocutionary act 'taking effect' – an effect to be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be successful. This 'taking effect' of the 'illocutionary act' is called 'securing *uptake*'. This is made possible by understanding the meaning and the force of the locution.

In developing his account of what he labeled 'illocutionary force' in his celebrated HDTW, Austin approached the matter from a different angle from Peter Strawson. Strawson in his article "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts" comments upon Austin's exposition on illocutionary force. Strawson does not agree with Austin in the view that the achievement of 'uptake' is a necessary condition for the performance of an illocutionary act although in his above article Strawson agrees with Austin in saying that speech act is a kind of human transaction in human society.[18] Obviously, there are conventions governing the meanings of

our utterances. But besides that there are other conventions which govern, and in part constitute the speech act as a whole. These conventions are established in the society and easily recognized by human beings of the society where the speech act occurs. For example, it is certainly a matter of the conventional procedure of law that the foreman of the jury in court at the proper moment utters the word 'guilty'. And here the convention constitutes the foreman's utterance as the act of bringing in a verdict. Similarly, it is governed by a convention that if the appropriate umpire pronounces a batsman 'out', he hereby performs the act of giving the man out, which no player or spectator shouting 'out'! can do. The above examples are cited by Austin. Austin gives other examples too. And always there exist certain conventions relating to the circumstances of utterances. Here Strawson differs from Austin. He cites some examples where there is no need of any convention. He says, there is no need of any special convention of 'warning' or 'objecting' because there is already a thin convention beyond our understanding of the explicitly performative form. If someone says to a person about to skate on a pond, "The ice is very thin", no further convention is needed to make the speaker's words a warning. Strawson thus objects to Austin's thesis of the conventionality of illocutionary acts. In his own words, the objection is to cite "cases in which the illocutionary force of an utterance, though not exhausted by its meaning, is not owed to any conventions other than those which help to give it its meaning."[19] Strawson raises the question: if the illocutionary force is not exhausted by the meaning and it does not also owe to any convention either, to what is it due and from what is it recognized? According to Strawson, it is ultimately due to the intentions of the speaker, and this is recognized from a combination of the meaning with

the circumstances of utterance. Strawson finds H.P. Grice's concept of meaning very helpful in this matter. H.P. Grice in his valuable article 'Meaning' explains the concept of someone's non-naturally meaning something by an utterance in the following way. Grice refers to an utterance of some one, viz. S's, and by this utterance S non-naturally means something. Here meaning is explained in terms of intention. S non-naturally means something by an utterance X; if S intends (i_1) to produce by uttering a certain response (r) in an audience A, and intends (i_2) that A shall recognize S's intention (i_1) and intends (i_3) that this recognition on the part of A of S's intention (i_1) shall function as A's reason, or a part of his reason for his response (r). [20]

However, Strawson allows two types of illocutionary act of Austin to be conventional. One type of illocutionary acts belong to the examples of an umpire's decision, a jury's verdict, a bid of Bridge, a priest's pronouncing a couple man and wife. According to him, these examples can be explained only by reference to a social institution constituted by a convention and the speaker's overt intention plays a certain part in the conventional proceedings. The other type of illocutionary act which is conventional according to Strawson is giving an order. The illocutionary force of this act can be explained in terms of the speaker's intention. And the social practice is the recognition that certain speaker has the authority over certain others in certain respects. A very clear example of this act is the order in the form "Come in" uttered by a speaker who has a room of his own to a hearer who wants to enter it.

For Austin, speech acts have commitments and responsibilities as he puts it, "Our word is our bond". [21] Strawson's overall strategy against Austin is to contest Austin's thesis that every illocutionary act is done as

conforming to some convention. The exploitation of conventions over and above the conventions of the language itself does not seem to be a general constitutive condition for the performance of illocutionary acts, in his view. Michael Dummett in his article "Force and Convention" has made a detailed discussion of Strawson's view in this regard. According to him, the test of whether an act is essentially conventional—resting on a convention other than that governing the means to perform it—is whether it can be executed by non-conventional means. Simple acts of request may be performed without using words to make the request, but one cannot request his employer for leave without having conventionalized means of making a request. Dummett says, "When we learn language, we are initiated, stage by stage, into a complex conventional practice; and the conventions govern the force of an utterance as much as its sense."[22] Taking the example of assertoric utterances he continues as follows:

> "In accordance with these conventions, assertoric utterances count as correct or incorrect, and also as warranted or unwarranted; they may be confirmed or have to be withdrawn. We can be rebuked for making them ('What's that got to do with?', 'you've no business to be talking about that.'), or for not making them ('why didn't you say so?'), our warrant for making them may be challenged. Out of all this we extract the concepts of truth and falsity, and that of a ground of truth; but the conventions governing the practice of assertion amount to much more than simply that an assertoric utterance presents the sentence as true. As Strawson remarks,

Austin asserts again and again that illocutionary force derives form convention. He was quite right to do so." [23]

To perform an illocutionary act, then, a speaker must at least (1) perform a locutionary act L, (2) intend L to have in the circumstances force F, (3) secure uptake, and (4) satisfy certain additional 'practice-defining conventions'.

Austin, as we have noted in the previous section takes ordinary language as his explicit subject matter. We may add that his concern with language only sometimes submerge his discussions of particular philosophical questions. Though Austin is practicing for the most part, a version of the "ordinary language" method in philosophy, in "A Plea for Excuses", he suggests that "'linguistic phenomenology', though it is rather a mouthful might be a better name for his way of doing philosophy than 'linguistic' or 'analytic' philosophy or 'the analysis of language'".[24] In what follows we shall concentrate on Austin's method of linguistic phenomenology, and how it enables him to proceed constructively and creatively forging new theories about language and raising philosophical questions about them. In our discussion we shall fall back not only upon his important papers in this regard but also upon his doctrine of speech act as put forth in the HDTW and summarized in the previous section from the HDTW.

Austin himself makes no effort in formulating the significance of the phenomenological impulses and data in his work in distinguishing it from the work of linguistic science. But the title 'linguistic phenomenology' even in its bare form is suggestive. It suggests that the clarity Austin seeks in philosophy is to be achieved through mapping the field of consciousness lit by the occasions of a word, not through

analyzing or replacing a given word by others. In this sense his philosophical method was not analytical. [25]

Austin regards words as tools and recommends that to use words properly we must guard us against the traps that language sets up. This is very much reminiscent of Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Austin says,

> ... words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things : We need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can relook at the world without blinkers. [26]

How are the conceptual blinkers to be removed? In "A Plea for Excuses" Austin recommends the following procedure:

> When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not *merely* at words (or *'meanings'*, whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena. [27]

The key to understanding Austin is that in doing linguistic phenomenology, we are examining the "realities" when we examine what we ought to say when. We do not *merely* look at the words as data and infer something about the world. Rather the two processes of examining

words or language and examining the world, that is, the circumstances in which utterances occur, go together. When Austin speaks of prising words "off the world" he does not mean, to dichotomize the realities, the phenomena, and the ways we talk about them.

James F. Harris, Jr. has interpreted Austin's remarks in "A Plea for Excuses" as a relationship of 'inseparability' between words or language and the world. Comparing Austin's position to early Wittgenstein he says that Wittgenstein seems to accept the strict dichotomy between language and the world; that Wittgenstein's claim that propositions must share the essential feature with reality which he called 'logical form' was thus his way of 'bridging the gap' between language and reality. This is substantiated by the two following passages from the *Tractatus* :

(4.12) Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent why they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it–logical form.

(4.121) Propositions cannot represent logical form: It is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses *itself* in *language*, *we* cannot express by means of language, propositions *show* the logical form of reality. They display it.

(4.1212) What *can* be shown *cannot* be said. [28]

Extending his interpretation to Austin's doctrine of speech act, Harris: says,

> The realities, the phenomena, and the ways we talk are inseparably bound together such as in the act of promising and the felicitous uttering of numerous

> locutions. The whole doctrine of the illocutionary force of an utterance requires us to regard acts of *doing* something and *acts* of saying something as inseparable, and, in these cases, the utterances are not *descriptions* of the phenomena; they are indistinguishable from the phenomena themselves and indeed, upon occasions may partially constitute the phenomena. [29]

Both James Harris and Stanley Cavell have mentioned Stuart Hampshire's characterization of Austin's procedure but have understood it differently. Stuart Hampshire, in the memorial essay written for the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* distinguishes "two slightly different theses that can plausibly be attributed to him: "a strong and a weak theses".[30]

The strong theses is this : "For every distinction of word and idiom that we find in common speech, there is a reason to be found, if we look far enough, to explain why these distinctions exist. The investigation will always show that the greatest possible number of distinctions have been obtained by the most economical linguistic means."[31] "The weaker, or negative, thesis is that we must first have the facts, and all the facts, accurately stated before we erect a theory upon the basis of them." [32] The weaker thesis is 'negative', presumably, because it counsels study of ordinary language as a preliminary to philosophical advance, whereas the stronger thesis amounts to an application of Leibniz's *Principle of Sufficient Reason* to ordinary language, viz., there is a reason which explains why every distinction in ordinary language is there, and if we look long enough and hard enough, we will find it. It claims, "That the multiplicity of fine distinctions, which such a study would disclose,

would by itself answer philosophical questions about free will, perceptions, namings and describing conditional statements."[33]

Both Harris and Cavell have referred to the response of J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock repudiating Hampshire's characterisations of Austin. [34] They reject the weaker these on the ground that it is an "unambitious statement which cannot properly or even plausibly be magnified into a guiding *doctrine* ... or recipe." They reject Hampshire's suggestion that Austin ever held the strong thesis. Such a strong thesis ignores, they claim, the fact that Austin did not claim that all philosophical questions can be answered by attending to fine distinctions.[35] In prising words off the world and holding them apart and against it he is rather trying to remove traditional theories about language in order to relook and see afresh how men use language in situations, that is, in the world. In *How to Do Things with Words* Austin says that he wants to examine the ways "... in which to say something is to do something."[36] This indicates how important he considers the affinity between saying and doing and between language on the one hand and events, facts, or reality on the other. But it is quite another thing to say that language and reality are inseparable. When Austin proposes an elucidation of the total speech acts in the total speech situations:

> The [E]lucidation is a relooking, a looking without blinkers, a seeing things freshly. And the things to be so viewed are not the things or facts that make up the universe but the whole complex nexus of men doing things in the world by way of using words.[37]

W. Cerf's review article on Austin's *How to Do Things with Words* makes a comparison between Husserl and Austin. Husserl emphasized the

things and facts in this world as we experience them and Austin's concern was with the words and their uses. Husserl was interested in the acts performed by consciousness and their directedness towards objects. What is of importance in Husserl's formulation of his philosophical task is the analysis that is, unprejudiced descriptions of the objects given to consciousness–objects, the totality of which is the world. What makes Austin's elucidation of the total speech act in the total speech situation phenomenological is the programme of removing blinkers, that is, seeing as it were and relooking at things, which was epitomized in Husserl's slogan 'back to the things themselves'. As Anthony Mansur puts it, "Both wanted to get rid of the prejudices which philosophers have inherited and start philosophy afresh, as is shown by Husserl's slogan 'Back to the things themselves' which I think Austin would have been willing to re-echo."[38] The point of this resemblance is the useful discovery that what Husserl wants to achieve through conscious acts Austin seeks to achieve through words and their uses. We shall not stop here to consider whether Husserl and Austin's account of their respective methods are really free from prejudices. What we want to note is that Austin's methodological notion of linguistic phenomenology has been seen as affording a bridge between Anglo-American linguistic philosophy and Continental phenomenology. As Walter Cerf himself says, "Austin's linguistic phenomenology is, to some degree, the counterpart 'in the formal mode' of mundane phenomenology – if I may so call a broad stream of continental phenomenology..." [39] What is more important for our present purpose is the hint that is dropped by Cerf. He visualizes the possibility of elucidating the total speech act in the total speech situation toward an existential analysis of sorts. He says "From this perspective it will no

longer sound preposterous to say that Austin was moving unknowingly from logico-linguistic analysis in the direction of existential analysis." [40] In the next chapter we shall elaborate on this.

C: P. F. Strawson

Our purpose for studying the selected area of philosophy of language i.e. speech act and the word–world relationship from a phenomenological perspective is to establish a relationship between two ontologically different domains; one is the world of language and the other is the world of objects or the external world, i.e., the world in which we live and move. In other words, the search is for the interaction between human beings and the objects existing in the world in which human beings live– the manner in which human beings arrange and establish a relationship with the world around him. At the center of this venture is the twentieth century philosophy about which we have discussed much in our writing. At the beginning of the twentieth century philosophy is the analytic philosophy, which tries to establish the relationship between word and world by analyzing the language, which we normally use, and thus solve the philosophical problems, which we face. To solve such philosophical problems Frege speaks about sense and reference of linguistic expressions. Richard Rorty also mentions in the introduction to the *Linguistic Turn*[1] that philosophical problems can be solved by analyzing the language which we use and thus analyzing the reality. Wittgenstein also writes in the *Philosophical Investigations* and in his other writings that the analysis of language is a necessary measure to solve our philosophical problems when he says, "For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.[2] The philosophers in the analytic

tradition try to solve the philosophical problems through a logical analysis of the meaning of linguistic expressions.

One fundamental set of issues that has been central to much of P.F. Strawson's work is a concern with a certain fundamental operation of speech and the objects of that operation. He regards speech as thought (his frequent locution is 'speech or thought'). By speech operations he means the operation of reference and predication or the grammatical categories of subject and predicate. As such he is taking about a question in the philosophy of language. But it is also a question in ontology or metaphysics. Thus, he relates philosophy of language with ontology and metaphysics. Before discussing how he relates philosophy of language with ontology and metaphysics let us have a look at his concern with language

Strawson, like later Wittgenstein, Ayer, Ryle, Austin, and Searle, is interested in ordinary language. Strawson's criticism of ideal language philosophy is a *locus classicus* of the tasks of ordinary language philosophy. Referring to the improved constructed concepts of ideal language he asks:

> .....if the clear mode of functioning of the constructed concepts is to cast light on problems and difficulties rooted in the unclear concepts, then precisely the ways in which the constructed concepts are connected with and depart from the unconstructed concepts must be plainly shown. And how can *this* result be achieved without accurately describing the modes of functioning of the unconstructed concepts? But this task is precisely the task of describing the logical behaviour of the linguistic expressions of natural

languages; and may—*by itself* achieve the sought–for resolution if the problems and difficulties are rooted in the elusive, descriptive mode of functioning of constructed concepts.[3]

Strawson is interested in the philosophical study of speech acts. In fact, Strawson's "On Referring"[4] might be considered as his beginning such a study. Strawson distinguishes between the 'use' of a sentence and the 'utterance' of a sentence or it may be said between the 'use' of an expression and 'utterance' of an expression. In other words, the question is how to fill up the gap between the meaning of the sentences and speaker's intentions in using sentences which is a basic question of all languages. According to Strawson, there is no essential connection between meaning and use of language to communicate. To him the rules of language are 'public rules', accessible to all speakers in common. By distinguishing between these two factors of a sentence or an expression he focuses on the fact that speaking is something people do.

Strawson in his article "Meaning and Truth" mentions the conflict between the theorists of communication-intention and the theorists of formal semantics.[5] According to the former, ".... it is impossible to give an adequate account of the concept of meaning without reference to the possession by speakers of audience-directed intentions of a certain complex kind,"[6] namely, those involved in an analysis of such locutions as 'By uttering x, s, means that p'. The theorists of formal semantics, by contrast, maintain that "... the system of semantic and syntactical rules, in the mastery of which knowledge of language consists—the rules which determine the meanings of sentences—is not a system of rules for communicating at all"[7]. Strawson calls the struggle over such a central

issue in philosophy as 'Homeric' having "...on the one side, say, Grice, Austin and the latter Wittgenstein; on the other, Chomsky, Frege, and the earlier Wittgenstein."[8]

Although these opposed views share some common grounds,[9] their difference is with regard to the relations between the meaning-determining rules of the languages, on the one hand, and the function of communication on the other. While the communication theorists insist that the general nature of those rules can be understood only by reference to the function of communication, the other party advances the notion of truth conditions. That the sense of a sentence is determined by its truth conditions is to be found in Frege and early Wittgenstein. Strawson in his article also mentions Donald Davidson[10] (who is hailed as a pioneer of the truth- theoretic account of meaning)[11]. Strawson argues that the theory of formal semantics is not, though it may seem to be, independent of a theory of communication.

The query, "whether the notion of the truth conditions can itself be explained without reference to the function of communications"[12] receives a negative answer from Strawson. His argument proceeds on the assumption that " ... most of the weight both of a general theory of meaning and of particular semantic theories falls on the notion of truth-conditions and hence on the notion of truth."[13] Now what according to Strawson, are truth-conditions or what does Strawson mean by the notion of truth? According to him, "One who makes a statement or assertion makes a true statement if and only if things are as, in making that statement, he states them to be".[14] That is to say, meaning is determined by truth-conditions. And the meaning of a sentence is determined by these rules which determine how things are stated to be by

one who in uttering the sentence in given conditions, makes a statement. Strawson finds that the consideration of the notion of truth leads to audience-directed intentions. He says that the thesis that meaning of sentences of a language is to be elucidated in terms of rules which determine truth-conditions, "far from being an alternative to a communication theory of meaning, leads us straight into such a theory of meaning."[15] Strawson's communication-intention theory may be considered, as a theory of what Ferdenand de Saussure would have called *parole*. "We connect meaning with truth and truth, too simply, with sentences; and sentences belong to language. But as theorists we know nothing of human language unless we understand human speech."[16]

Strawson does not distinguish between statement and speech act. Starawson's distinction between 'speech-episode' or 'utterance-occasion' which cannot be true or false and 'statement' which is either true or false raises the problem whether a body of statements can remain isolated from human intentions. According to Strawson,' these two aspects are different from one another and are not reducible to one another. 'Speech-episode' or ' utterance-occasion' is ' the speaker's saying something' and statement is 'what the speaker speaks'.[17] In other words, 'statement' is not a manner of speaking something whereas 'speech-episode' is a manner of speaking something. According to Strawson 'speech-episode' is a particular utterance-occasion. Statements are detached from utterance- occasions although any statement must be uttered in a certain manner and the same statement may also be uttered in different utterance-occasions. A statement does not enter any of theses episodes and the truth and falsity of a statement has nothing to do with these episodes. He writes in the article "Truth", "Saying of a statement

that it is true is not related to saying of a speech-episode that it was true as saying of a statement that it was whispered is related to saying of a speech-episode that it was a whisper."[18] They are logically different from one another. Strawson maintains that from the case that the use of 'true' always accompanies an actual or possible episode which is the making of a 'statement' by someone, it does not follow that it is used to characterize such episodes. According to Strawson, to declare a 'statement' 'true' is not to declare that someone has made the statement but to consider the possibility of someone's making it.[19]

In this connection, Strawson criticizes Austin's view that it is basically about speech-episode that we predicate 'true.'[20] Austin regards truth as a characteristic of 'statements'. But Strawson does not accept the view that truth is a characteristic of 'statements'. He does not believe tha 'truth' is used in talking about anything . He rejects Austin's suggestion that the *episode* or the manner is the primary factor in the case of any sentence or assertion. Austin draws a clear cut distinction between 'statement' and sentence by saying that the same sentence may be used to make different statements and also different sentences may be used to make the same statement, when they are made with reference to the same situation or event.[21] But Strawson does not make any distinction between sentence and 'statement' Strawson takes into account neither the same sentence expressing different statements nor different sentences expressing the same statement, but the different occasions in which a sentence may be uttered. According to him, by using different sentences with different meanings we can make the same statement if all of them are used in the same sense, i.e., either in the true sense or in the false sense.[22] He cites in the article "Truth" the example that the

different sentences on different situations in which you say of Jones "He is ill", I say to Jones "You are ill" , and Jones says "I am ill" make the same statement because all of them are used in the same sense, i.e., in the sense in which all of them are true. Strawson in his article "Truth" says, "People make the same statement when the words they use in the situations in which they use them are such that they must (logically) either all be making a true statement or all be making a false statement".[23]

Strawson appears to be particular about the identity of a statement as separate from that of a speech act. But at the same time he is unable to ignore the immediate relation between a statement and the utterance occasion as a sense-determining factor. His departure from Austin on this point does not lead us further in solving the problem regarding the relation between word and world.

Regarding the other correlate of correspondence relation Strawson refutes Austin's earlier view that a statement corresponds to a 'thing', 'event' , 'situation', 'state of affairs' , 'feature' and ' fact'.[24] He objects that Austin wrongly identifies 'facts' to things, i.e., stating to referring. According to Strawson 'facts' are different from things. Strawson agrees with Austin that while constructing statements we refer to a thing or person and characterize it. But he accepts these two aspects as the constituting aspect of a statement and regards them as the referring part and the describing part of a statement.[25] They refer to persons or things about which the 'statement' is about but not 'facts.' A reference can be correct if we refer correctly to a thing. Similarly, a description can be a fit when we describe correctly the person or thing. Strawson does not deny that the referring part and describing part of a statement refer to

extra-linguistic something and describes extra-linguistic something respectively in this world. What he denies is that this reference makes the statement true because there is no extra-linguistic element in this world, which refers to the statement itself as a whole.[26] He holds that it is the thing and not the thing which makes a statement true. A statement is 'true' when it corresponds to 'facts' and not to 'things'. By 'facts' he means not the things (persons, states of affairs, etc.) about which the statement is, but the condition of the 'facts'.

Strawson's approach to language is logical. The 'fact' which makes a statement 'true', does not exist in this world. The statements are about things in the world which have a different logical status from 'facts' which the statements state. Strawson objects that this difference Austin fails to see, and include under 'facts', 'event', 'thing', 'person', 'state of affairs' etc. As there is nothing in this world which corresponds to a statement itself any attempt to search for such a relatum is to commit a 'logically fundamental type-mistake'.[27] The demand that there must exist some extra–linguistic thing in this world which makes a statement true or to which a true statement corresponds is such a demand. Austin's view that a statement is true if it is related with a speech episode in a certain way commits this type of error. Strawson in his article "Truth" expresses his concept of 'facts'. "Facts are what statements (when true) state; they are not what statements are about. They are not, like things or happenings on the face of the globe, witnessed or heard or seen , broken or over tuned, interrupted or prolonged, kicked, destroyed, mended or noisy".[28] The trouble with the correspondence theory of truth is that here 'correspondence' is misrepresented as the relation between statement an events or things or

groups of things and this very trouble is also found in Austin's theory of correspondence .

Strawson's philosophy of language also bears on his views on ontology and metaphysics. In his metaphysical views which is characterized as 'descriptive metaphysics' he says, "metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world".[29] He says that descriptive metaphysics aims to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure. According to him, it differs from conceptual analysis in 'scope and generality'. He does accept that a reliance upon a close examination of the actual uses of words is the best. But this is not general enough and far reaching enough being confined to the surface of language. This expresses Strawson's skepticism about the ability of language analysis to reveal the deep structure of our thought. The conceptual system consists in "The essential structure of ordinary language – that is, of language in its presently established uses. It is the dependably functioning medium of communication between people. Their way of talking to each other about the objects in their world that can be publicly identified and reidentified."[30]

According to Strawson, we think about particular things in terms of our conceptual scheme. Descriptive metaphysics accordingly is concerned with things of the world as they are which are revealed in our ordinary language through the way of communication. Descriptive metaphysics is a description of the actual use of ordinary language. Descriptive metaphysics is, of course, different from philosophical or logical or conceptual analysis. He takes the guidance of analysis of language to reveal the very structure of our conceptual scheme. Now this job could have been achieved by analytic philosophy. Certainly, the task

of analytic philosophy is to analyze and clarify the basic units of language. Descriptive metaphysics too lays emphasis on the method of analysis; hence it is just like the analytic philosophy in intension. But in 'scope and generality' descriptive metaphysics is fundamentally different from it. The aim of descriptive metaphysics is to lay bare "constitutive structures", which is not the function of analytical philosophy. Strawson says:

> Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best and indeed the only sure way in philosophy. But the discriminations we can make , and the connections we can establish, in this way, are not general enough and not far-reaching enough to meet the full metaphysical demand for understanding. For when we ask how we use this or that expression, our answers, however revealing at a certain level, are apt to assume, and not to expose those general elements of structure which the metaphysician wants revealed. The structure he seeks does not readily display itself on the surface of language, but lies submerged. He must abandon his only sure guide when the guide cannot take him as far as he wishes to go."[31]

Our constitutive scheme gets involved in our ordinary language. This philosophical decision of Strawson justifies the reason for his reliance upon the method of analysis of the basic concepts of meanings of words and expressions of ordinary use. He says:

> Among the kinds of expressions which we, as speakers use to make reference to particular are some of which a

> standard function in the circumstances of their use, to enable a hearer to identify to particular which is being referred to. Expressions of these kinds include some proper names, some pronouns, some descriptive phrases beginning with the definite article and expressions compounded of these.[32]

Strawson also says that the nature of his scheme could be better understood if the key concept of identification is understood. An expression which is used to refer to some particular has been called by him, an 'identifying reference'. Strawson's world of particular things is a unified spatio-temporal world of identifiable particular things. We identify a particular thing as exactly as it is in our single spatio-temporal world. A reality is that which has empirical ground, i.e., it is identifiable in a spatio-temporal framework. Strawson's descriptive metaphysics is a study of the reality that exists. It is opposed to Locke's idea and Kant's pure form of sensibility. If objects are given by means of ideas or forms of sensibility, one must fail to know the actual nature of objects.

A fundamental aspect of Strawson's approach to descriptive metaphysics is that his approach is developed by the application of the method of analysis of language. It marks a new direction in thinking that language analysis can be of help in ontology. It is expected from this that Strawson will appeal to and rely upon a close examination of actual use of words. Indeed, Strawson has relied upon a close examination of words and expressions, of ordinary use - but it is determined by the purpose - one such example is the use of the word "I". On that very basis of the ordinary use of the expression 'I', he attempted to explain the concept of person. Strawson said that our conceptual structure in terms

of which we think about the world is expressed in everyday speech, and so to understand how we operate our conceptual scheme we must understand how words and expressions of such everyday speech are used., With a view to make clear the actual behaviour of such words and expressions Strawson made a grammatical analyses of a sentence into its subject and predicate expressions. Strawson's analysis of the basic structure of the ordinary language shows the following features of it.

1) The semantic aspect of language is determined by the set of rules, habits and conventions.

2) As a medium of communication language is used in speaker-hearer context.

3) Some expressions of ordinary language, e.g., proper names, pronouns, descriptive phrases, etc., we as speakers use to make identifying references to particulars, persons and events, to enable our hearers to identify particulars which are referred to.

4) We not only make identifying references to particular things, but we think or say something about those particular things.

Strawson says, "One of the main purposes for which we use language is the purpose of stating facts about things and persons and events."[33] He says that, ".... the philosopher's principal task is the understanding of how our thought about things work, and that we cannot find out about these workings except by looking at how we use words."[34]

D: J. R. Searle

John Searle was among one of the analytic philosophers who shared the idea of the centrality of language to philosophy. He adopted the philosophical method of the logical analysis of language like Austin, Ryle, Strawson and Frege. Although gradually Searle had distinguished himself in a number of important ways from other analytic philosophers. Unlike other analytic philosophers he had taken a respect for common sense and for the results of modern science. Searle did not hold the view that major philosophical problems could be solved merely by attending to the use of words. In his *Speech Acts,* he held that language is to be found in the realms of consciousness and the mental in the midst of social and institutional reality. "In *Speech Acts,* he attempts to come to grips with the facts of language with utterances, with referring and predicating, and with acts of stating, questioning, commanding and promising."[1]

Two philosophers can, however, be named who had made early efforts to advance theory of speech act. Like Austin and Searle they also believed that language is a social act. The first is Thomas Reid and the second is Adolf Reinach. "Reid's technical terms for uses of language such as promising, warning, forgiving and so on are ' Social operations'. Sometimes he also calls them "social acts', opposing them to' solitary acts' such as judging, intendings, deliberatings and desirings." [2] According to Reid, the latter are characterized by the fact that their performance does not need any being other than the person who performs them; whereas the former, by contrast, must be directed to some other person. He called it a miniature 'civil society'; constituting both the one who initiates it and the one to whom it is directed.

Adolf Reinach was a member of a group of followers of Husserl based in Munich. He took Husserl's theory of linguistic meaning as depicted in *Logical Investigations*[3].

As his starting point for philosophical reflections on language, meaning and intentionality. In answer to the question what kinds of uses of language are involved in promises or questions or commands Reinach developed the first systematic theory of the performative uses of language, " not only in promising and commanding but also in warning, entreating, accusing, flattering, declaring, baptizing and so forth -phenomena that Reinach like Reid before him, called ' social acts.'"[4]

According to Searle, speaking a language is a rule-governed activity. This activity is expressed, " [firstly] that speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, and so on; and more abstractly, acts such as referring and predicating, and secondly, that these acts in general are made possible by and are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use of linguistic elements." [5]

Searle explained Austin's general theory of speech acts (which Austin adopted later after giving up his theory of performatives) in the framework of utterance, meaning and action taken together. "All three components are fated to play a significant role in the subsequent development of Searle's thinking." [6] He started with the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. The former, as he puts it simply regulates existing forms of behaviour. "For example, the rules of polite table behaviour regulate eating, but eating itself exists independent of these rules." [7] The latter, on the other hand, do not merely regulate; they also create or define new forms of behaviour. As

for example, the rules of chess engage us in the type of activity that we call playing chess . The constitutive rules do not occur alone. According to Searle, " Speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with certain constitutive rules." [8] As for example, "When we make a promise: we bind ourselves to performing certain actions in the future by using the power of collective acceptance to impose the corresponding function on our utterance and thus the status of obligation functions upon ourselves."[9]

Following Grice in his explanation of non-natural meaning Searle gave the following three conditions. Searle in his book *Speech Acts* wrote that in order to say that a speaker utters a sentence T and means what he says the following conditions must be satisfied:[10]

a. the speaker has an intention I that his utterance produces in the hearer the awareness that the state of affairs corresponding to T obtains,

b. the speaker intends to produce this awareness by means of the recognition of the intention I,

c. the speaker intends that this intention I will be recognized in virtue of the rules governing the elements of the sentence T.

Searle in his book *Speech Acts* introduced the concept of 'institutional fact'. He defined it as a fact whose existence presupposes the existence of certain systems of constitutive rules. Searle wrote, "When you perform a speech act, you create certain institutional facts" (you create what Reid referred to as a miniature 'civil society')".[11] According to Searle, institutional facts include certain cognitive ways in which we treat the world and each other and certain institutional contexts. He mentioned certain observer independent features of the

world - such as force, mass, and gravitational attraction. And he mentioned certain observer relative features of the world - such as money, property, marriage and government. The latter are institutional facts and as such systems of constitutive rules, according to Searle. He explained the constitutive rule in the form "X counts as Y in context C." [12]

Searle in his book *Speech Acts* gave a more detailed account of speech acts than Austin. As he not merely gave a general framework for a theory of speech acts but dealt with the specification of speech acts themselves. He distinguished between two kinds of felicity conditions; conditions on the *performance* of a speech act and conditions on its *satisfaction*, the former to issue a promise, the latter to keep the promise. Conditions on performance are further divided into preparatory, propositional, sincerity, and essential conditions.[13] According to Searle, a speech act is performed 'successfully and non-defectively' when certain propositional content, preparatory, essential and sincerity rules characterize the performance of an act. In case of the speech act of promising, these rules require that the words used by the speaker must predicate a future action of the speaker (propositional content rule), that both speaker and the hearer must want the action of the promise done and that it would not otherwise be done (preparatory rules), that the speaker must intend to perform the action of the promise (sincerity rule), and that the utterance of the promise counts as undertaking an obligations to perform the action of the promise (essential rule). Each of these rules commits the speaker to certain obligations. The reorganization on the hearer's side of the speaker's obligations and his willingness to be committed is the illocutionary effect of the performative act on the hearer.

In "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts" Searle classified the relationship between language and reality into two kinds. One from word to world, other from world to word. [14] According to Searle, the act of promise is tied with the concept of obligation which is an institutional concept. When I engage in the activity of promising, I thereby subject myself in a quite specific way to the corresponding system of constitutive rules. In virtue of this, I count as standing under an obligation."[15] He holds that, "Language, above all, enables us to bind ourselves in the future, not only in acts of promising but also in a range of other ways." [16]

In his career, Searle was not content to study mere uses of language. "He is perfectly clear that, even when we have classified and fully understood the uses of verbs or adverbs of given types, there will still remain genuine philosophical problems to be solved." [17] In *Intentionality*, Searle developed his speech acts theory to a theory of intentionality.[18] Like Brentano Searle also used the term intentional as mental. Accordingly we can distinguish two factors: the *type* or *quality* of the act which is sometimes called its Illocutionary force and *content* of the act which is called the *propositional element.*

Searle in his article, "Collective Intentions and Actions"[19] explained his idea about collective intentionality. According to Searle, human beings are able to engage with others in cooperative behaviour in such a way as to share the special types of beliefs, desires and intentions involved in such behaviour. This is called the collective intentionality. The non-human animals also have this capacity in a very small degree. The reason is perhaps that the non-human animals do not have the capacity of using improved language and symbolizing devices as the

human beings have. That is why that the non-human animals can hunt but they cannot promise. To Searle, language is a basic social institution. He distinguished between individual intentionality and collective intentionally. Individual intentionality is subject dependant fact and collective intentionality is social fact.

J. L. Austin and J. Searle were the main exponents of the speech act theory. The speech act theory was developed during the middle of the twentieth century when the investigation of the analytic philosophers into language was on the peak. As such the logical positivists were dominating then. Some of the famous logical positivists were A. J. Ayer, G. Bergmann, R. Carnap, H. Feigl, V. Kraft, M. Schilick and F. Waismann. The logical positivists focused on the meaning of language on its sentential level irrespective of the contextual background in which it is used. All they looked at were the truth conditions of the sentences. At the beginning, J. L. Austin and J. Searle also started with language like the logical positivists. They also focused on the sentential structure of language. "But they viewed sentences not as artifacts that carry meaning on their own shoulders, but as *issuances* by speakers for the benefit of their hearers."[20] According to them sentences are issuances, performances or actions whose meaning is understood only by taking into account the role of the speakers, the hearers and the rest of the context of the issuance. They hold that the main units of philosophical analysis into language are the whole speech acts and not sentences. Searle has labelled speech acts-"the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication."[21] Searle says that when we use language we perform some sort of act according to certain rules and in case of such speech acts the roles of the speaker and the hearer are equally important; they are

meaningful only in a specific social context. According to Searle in this sense promise, order, and assertions all are speech acts.

Searle, in the introduction of the paper " What is a Speech Act",[22] explains speech act as an act performed in a speech situation-involving speaker, a hearer, an utterance by the speaker. The speaker by his utterance performed many kinds of acts like making statements, asking questions, issuing commands, giving reports greetings and warnings. The speech act is performed with the help of verbs like state, assert, describe, warn, remark, comment, command, order, request, criticize, apologize, assure, approve, etc. According to Austin, there were over a thousand such verbs in English.

Searle in the article "What is a Speech Act?" writes, "I think it is of interest and importance in the philosophy of language to study speech acts, or as they are sometimes called, language acts or linguistic acts. I think it is essential to any specimen of linguistic communication that it involves a linguistic act. It is not as has generally been supposed, the symbol, or word or sentence or even the token of the symbol or word or sentence, which is the unit of linguistic communication, but rather it is the production of the token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication. To put this point more precisely, the production of the sentence taken under certain conditions is the illocutionary act, and the illocutionary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication."[23] He distinguished between just uttering some sounds or making marks and performing a speech act. The difference between them is that while performing speech act the sound or marks which one makes *have meaning* and by those sounds or marks one *means* something.

While discussing illocutionary acts, which Searle regarded as 'the minimal unit of linguistic communication', he faced the necessity of distinguishing between two factors: the difference between the thing which one means by saying some words and the thing, which has a meaning. To point out the difference Searle borrowed the idea of Paul Grice in this matter. In an article entitled "Meaning", Grice gives the analysis of the notion 'meaning' as "To say that A meant something by x is to say that 'A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.'"[24] Searle accepted this analysis as a useful start because according to him, in speaking a language the speaker attempts to communicate things to his hearer by means of getting him to recognize the speaker's intention to communicate just those things. Moreover, it shows the close relationship between the notion of meaning and the notion of intention. However, Searle realised that Grice's account of meaning is unable to show the connection between one's meaning something by uttering an utterance and the actual meaning of the utterance in language. Moreover, Grice's account of 'meaning' is limited to speaker's intention to mean something and the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention. According to Searle, "Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also a matter of convention."[25] As such he amended Grice's account of meaning by writing, "We must therefore reformulate the Grician account of meaning in such a way as to make it clear that one's meaning something when one says something is more than just contingently related to what the sentence means in the language one is speaking".[26]

Searle in his analysis of illocutionary acts, takes into account both the intentional and the conventional aspects and the relationship between

them. Searle explained the amended Gricean analysis of 'meaning' in connection with explaining 'How to promise', "The speaker intends to produce a certain illocutionary effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect and he also intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the lexical and syntactical character of the item he utters conventionally associates it with producing that effect." [27]

Searle speaks about indirect speech acts in the book *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts.*[28] Searle argues for the principle of expressibility, the principle that whatever can be meant can be said. From this it can be said that an analysis of illocutionary verbs must not be confused with an analysis of illocutionary acts. For example, from the fact that some verbs such as "hint", and "insinuate" do not name types of illocutionary acts some philosophers conclude that hint or insinuate is an implicit manner of performing a speech act, that some types of meaning, therefore, are inherently inexpressible. Again this Searle's point is that hinting, insinuating, etc., are not part of meaning in the sense that they are neither part of illocutionary force or illocutionary content.[29] He says that there are certain utterances which although do not have the grammatical form of a performative but rather have the grammatical form of a statement can perform an illocutionary act. For example utterances like 'I will be there on time', or 'I want you to come to home early' lack the character of having an illocutionary verb and have the grammatical form of a statement. Although they are performing the illocutionary act of stating yet they are performing additionally the illocutionary act of promising and requesting respectively. Searle says

that the illocutionary verbs used in these cases are only one kind of illocutionary force indicating devices (IFID).[29]

Searle's view on indirect speech acts is about the relations between literal sentences meaning and speaker's utterance meaning where utterance meaning differs from the literal meaning for the expression uttered. He holds that in case of indirect speech acts the speaker's intended utterance meaning is distinguished from the literal sentence meaning. In case of indirect speech acts the literal meaning is not taken into consideration; factors such as context and the intentions of speakers are considered. That utterance 'Can you tell me the time?' is an indirect speech act because it is not an actual illocutionary act of questioning but an intended illocutionary act of requesting. The speaker must know that the person to whom he or she is requesting has the ability to tell the time. Here the relationship between the intended illocutionary act and illocutionary act that is actually used is conventional. The context is enough to assume that the speaker does not intend to communicate the utterance's literal meaning but the intended utterance meaning of request. And no inference is required on the part of the hearer to understand that speaker's intended utterance meaning is that of request. In case of indirect speech act too conventionality plays a significant role.

There have been two apparently inconsistent stands in speech acts theory. One stand is most prominently associated with the name of Grice.[30] He treats individual intentionality as the fundamental notion in the theory of speech acts. In his analysis, there is no suggestion that convention, rules or social practices are in any way essential for the performance of speech acts. A second tradition associated with Austin's HTDW and Searle's early *Speech Acts* emphasizes the role of social

institutions in the performance of speech acts. On this view social convention, rule and context of utterance play a crucial role in the determination of speech act. Meaning, on this view, is not just a product of individual intentionality but it is also a product of social practices. There is something profoundly misleading about this account of speech acts in terms of individual intentionally. Searle says, "It is as if the solitary subject could solipsistically impose conditions of satisfaction on his utterances and thus bestow meaning on what would otherwise be neutral sound in the world."[31] In case of indirect speech acts the literal meaning is not taken into consideration; factors such as context and the intentions of speakers are considered. That utterance 'Can you tell me the time?' is an indirect speech act because it is not an actual illocutionary act of questioning but an intended illocutionary act of requesting. The speaker must know that the person to whom he or she is requesting has the ability to tell the time. Here the relationship between the intended illocutionary act and illocutionary act that is actually used is conventional. The context is enough to assume that the speaker does not intend to communicate the utterance's literal meaning but the intended utterance meaning of request. And no inference is required on the part of the hearer to understand that speaker's intended utterance meaning is that of request. In case of indirect speech act too conventionality plays a significant role.

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Searle argues that the performance of speech acts and thus the creation of speaker's meaning is able to function against the presupposition, rules convention and practices. It is not likely that a person makes a promise to another person only once in the whole human history because something counts as a promise if it is part of a general institution or practice of promising. Social institutions are a part of social reality, made possible by systems of constitutive rules. Some speech acts, usually of a rather simple kind, such as greetings and simple requests, do not in this way require systems of constitutive rules. Most of the speech acts, however, require extra-linguistic institutions. If we ask about the relationship of speech acts to the world the answer is language is an aspect of human social life and speech acts make reference to social institutions which are not natural phenomena or a part of our natural history. The world, so to say, scooped out as relevant for the performance of speech act is not the world as is ordinarily understood, but the social world where individuals are in social relationship meaning things by what

they say and communicating among themselves. What makes some given practices, social practices is that they essentially refer to other agents in the society besides the speaker himself and the functioning of these practices requires the contract between different agents in society. For some types of speech acts Searle speaks of a word-world relationship – the direction of fit is from the words to the world. All the members of the assertive class which are assessed in the truth-false dimension commit the speaker to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition. This is what Seale means by word-world fit. The assertive class will contain most of Austin's expositives. In directives, on the other hand, the relationship is reversed. They are attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something, for example, "I order you to shut the door", "I request you to attend the meeting", etc. Here the direction of fit is from world to words. In these cases Searle utilizes the two components of a speech act: the propositional element and the illocutionary force.

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