SPEECH ACTS AND WORD-WORLD RELATIONSHIP:

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

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Preface

I was drawn to the theme of my research work through the instructions of my teachers in the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal during my Post-Graduate studentship. I was captivated both by analytic philosophy as well as the phenomenology of Husserl which was a closed world to us in our Under-Graduate class.

In my work I have not said anything completely original. I have tried to restate, reanalyse, revaluate positions and arguments critically and discover hidden connections. Bridge building between desperate traditions in philosophy has started.

I consider my work as an endeavour to understand this intellectual climate.

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Acknowledgement

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Philosophy of Language

Man's preoccupation with language has had a long history. Language matters to philosophers as it does to the poet, the novelist, the linguist, the grammarian and others interested in language. Yet the philosopher's concern with language goes to a basic level. Philosophers have been concerned with the mysticism enshrined in language, and baffled by it. Now, poets and mystics may also be baffled by the workings of language. What, however, marks out the philosopher's distinctive approach to language is that he seeks his way out of the mystery, and attempt to arrive at an understanding of language, its nature and function. Hence, the philosopher's problem at the basic level is not how we form a well-formed formula, but the singularly surprising phenomenon of what renders a licit concatenation of signs express meaning. How is it that the employment of a well-formed sentence means such and such a state of affairs; how to read off from another sentence, even in advance *what will make it true;* how is it possible for the 'mere signs' of language to be intentional, that is, for a name to reach up to the very object itself of which the name is the name and for a sentence, to a state of affairs? These questions were raised by Plato himself but these are vigorously discussed in the analytical tradition, be it conceptual analysis or analysis of language which goes by the name 'linguistic philosophy'.

Let us digress for a while to clarify these notions. Conceptual analysis, instead of words, or without looking at words attends to concepts or universals which words signify; the reason could be that words are inadequate to express concepts. Language analysis or linguistic philosophy has been broadly classified into ideal language philosophy and the ordinary language philosophy. The ideal language is an improved language free from the vicissitudes of ordinary, common sense language. The formulation of ideal language as the 'logical syntax' of ordinary sentences, i.e. a logically correct language, was initiated by Rudolf Carnap in *The Logical Syntax of Language*.[1] Ordinary language philosophy, on the other hand, claims that ordinary language with its historic-grammatical syntax is well-equipped to analyse typical philosophical problems of knowledge, being, object, other mind, and so on. For both types of linguistic philosophy, it has been said that "... the only difference between Ideal Language Philosophers and Ordinary Language Philosophers is a disagreement about which language is Ideal."[2] Such a characterization of linguistic philosophy is also made by Gustav Bergmann[3] in the following passage:

> All linguistic philosophers talk about the world
> by means of talking about a suitable language.
> This is the linguistic turn, the fundamental
> gambit as to method, on which ordinary and
> ideal language philosophers (OLP, ILP) agree.
> Equally fundamentally, they disagree on what
> is in this sense a "language" and what makes it
> "suitable".

One thing more to be clarified is that the three studies (1) Philosophy of Language, (2) Linguistic Philosophy and (3) Analytic Philosophy are three overlapping philosophical methods. A full account of their checkered career is beyond our present purpose. We simply note that despite subtle distinctions between them they are used interchangeably, and we also propose to so use them whenever the occasion arises.

The purpose of making the digression is that it lays bare the linguistic orientation of philosophy or the linguistic turn which has been the corner stone of analytic philosophy. This linguistic orientation is basically the search for the root of our understanding of word-world relationship.

Since our present concern is the word-world relationship, let us make an attempt to concentrate on the two very important elements in man's experiential framework – language and reality. Language, broadly speaking, stands for any system of signs, verbal and non-verbal. It is defined as an abstract system of symbols and their modes of combination. To put it in more concrete terms, language is the medium of human communication that people use to express thought, emotions, attitudes, etc. Viewed in this way, language is basically a set of words (vocabulary), used following a set of rules and conventions. 'Reality' is a heavily loaded word. 'Reality' is often used to mean that which is the ultimate substratum, the ultimate cause or the essence of the phenomena. Absolute, Brahman, any eternal being, God signify 'reality' in this sense. 'Reality' also means the phenomenal, changing world where we live, move and have our being. Accordingly, which view of reality one subscribes to will determine how he will formulate the language-reality or the word-world relationship.

The present problem of word-world relationship has been variously discussed in the yester years under the rubric of thought and reality, or language and reality, the idea being that language encodes thought or thought is enshrined in language. The relationship between the two sides is by no means straightforward as it appears to be. There are, on the one hand, philosophers who have planted high hopes in the powers of language, its magic; there are, on the other, many philosophers who are skeptical about the nature and working of language in relation to reality. Perhaps the earliest manifestation of the skepticism is found in Plato's *Gorgias*: Being *is*. It never becomes. It is inapprehensible and unknowable by man down earth. Even when it is knowable it is but incommunicable. Elsewhere, also, Plato condemned language as incapable of expressing those things which reason has contemplated. Less strong statements about the inability of language to read reality are made by Henri Bergson and A.N. Whitehead. Reality for Bergson is a creative force charged with becoming or continuity.[4] Language is not molded on reality. It is designed for the practical purpose of manipulating reality. It cannot manipulate without turning the duration into static states. The remedy, therefore, is to give up language, and settle for some form of intuition.[5] A closely related view is maintained by Professor Whitehead in his *Process and Reality*.[6] Like Bergson he too believed that language is not molded on reality. He thinks that language has been affected by the subject-predicate analysis of proposition in Aristotelian logic and as such turns even a changing process into a substance. He, of course, did not write off the power of language to read reality. To be more adequate, he thinks, language should be redesigned. In his words, "Philosophy must redesign language in the way that in the physical science pre-existing

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physical appliances are redesigned."[7] In the present context, by reality we understand the world which we inhabit with others and in which we act in relation to others. The 'others' includes not only other human beings but also animals and things.

Any talk of relationship presupposes a gap, a distance between the terms to be related and hence, the attempts to cross over the gap, the distance. In case of language and reality, to bridge the gap does not mean obliterating the space between language and the world. Arthur Danto in his *Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge* [8] has spoken of a space of an extra-worldly sort between language and the world. The world is an external world only in the respect that relations between the world and description of the world are not intra-worldly. They are not bits of the world.[9] Danto further says that the 'Essential separation of language from the world' has created the structure of philosophical skepticism. And philosophers have sought to close off this gap in their battle against skepticism.[10] Danto refers to J.L. Austin in this connection who, in spite of his stress on performatives in his discussion of language and anti-descriptive stance, holds that "There must be something other than the words, which the words are to be used to communicate about: this may be called the world. There is no reason why the world should not include the words, in every sense except the sense of the actual statement itself which on any particular occasion is being made about the world."[11]

There are, of course, naturalistic analyses of language. As such language is a phenomenon for linguists, a subject matter for a science. It is a subject matter of philosophy in so far as it is *not* in the world. The semantical questions about language like truth, reference, meaning, have developed because there is a world to know, to refer to, a world meant or

about which truth claims are made. The bifurcation of language and reality (world) is the basic presupposition for a philosophy of language.

What demands philosophical elucidation is the language-world relationship. The relationship is worth-studying. Ontologically, language and the world are different. There is hardly any semblance between the word 'chair' and the piece of furniture over there. There is nothing in language that makes it somehow normatively relate to something that is essentially foreign to it. Yet language is about the world. It describes, interprets, articulates the nature of different items of the world, and in whatever degree this relationship is achieved is the result of an attempt to bridge the distance between the two. The question then is of wording our world.

Language is defined as an abstract system of symbols and the rules of their combination; in other words, language consists of vocabulary and grammar. What is important for our purpose is that we learn a language and use it. What we acquire in learning a language is both a concrete body of repertoire and a kind of virtual embodiment through which one 'moves' through one's verbally articulated circumstances with ease. The language one acquires is thus not only a determinate formal structure but a practical mastery of discursive practices situated in their publicly accessible surroundings. It matters both that we inhabit a world to which we reach out through our words, a 'wordy world' and live a verbally expressive life on the one hand; on the other, the talk that goes on around us is an integral part of the world we inhabit.

It has been realized long before by Western philosophers that the problems of truth and meaning lie at the core of understanding the relation between language and the world. Meaning, one might say,

emerges right from the beginning of our encounter with the world. That is why as we reach for suitable metaphors, it is more appropriate to talk of the world as the background or the setting for the particular things we say. Our words are set against, and not over against a world which is what it is in virtue of practices – linguistic ones included – whereby things stand out and take on their identities.

Wittgenstein begins *The Blue Book* by asking the question, "What is the meaning of a word?"[12] In William Alston's formulation the question is, "What are we saying about a linguistic expression when we specify its meaning?"[13] John Searle opens his book *Speech Acts* with the question: "How do words relate to the world?"[14] All such questions centre round the theme of relationship between language and the world. The talk of relation arises when there is a distance or difference. The difference is due to the fact that what is non-linguistic is said to be known by language. Language is seldom self-referential. It is used to talk, refer, indicate or mean, etc., objects or states-of-affairs transcending it.

II

Any theory of meaning is an attempt at making sense of the word-world relationship. Different theories of truth are also the products of a search for this relationship. Since the truth of a proposition is parasitical upon its relation with the reality, the theories of truth like correspondence, coherence and pragmatic, emerged. We shall begin with the theories of truth.

According to the correspondence theory of truth a proposition is true if it corresponds with a fact and false if it does not. For example, if a person says "My pen is red" and if it is a fact that his pen is red then his statement is true because it corresponds with the fact. However, there is no correspondence between the proposition and state of affairs in the sense of resemblance or copying. What is meant by "correspondence" is that the state of affairs which is expressed in the proposition is what is the case or an actual state of affairs. In other words, a proposition if it is to be true there must be something other than the proposition, something to which it corresponds, and this something is the fact or the actual state of affairs and not a fiction or fantasy. Truth is a relation between a proposition and something which is not a proposition, i.e., a state of affairs.

A certain picture of our relationship to the world is intuitively appealing. According to this picture, the world is a mind-independent structure; it consists of objects whose existence, character, and relations are fixed independently of what we happen to say, believe, or desire. We, in turn, respond to that world by forming beliefs and making statements about it. These beliefs and statements are assertoric; they make claims about the world, saying that things are this way or that. Since beliefs and statements are in this way assertoric, each is determinately true or false; and on this picture, truth involves a certain kind of fit or match between a belief/ statement and the world it is about. If the belief/ statement gets the world right, if things are as the belief/statement asserts them to be then the belief/ statement is true; otherwise it is false. So truth is correspondence with a mind-independent world; whereas falsehood is failure of correspondence.

The ideas making up this picture are intuitively attractive. Together they constitute something like the traditional picture of our relationship to the world. Virtually every major thinker in the ancient, medieval, and early modern periods endorsed the themes making up the picture. Indeed, the picture provided something like the framework within which traditional philosophical inquiry took place.

The correspondence theory of truth gives a realist notion of truth. The theory has received a sophisticated form in the hands of Alfred Tarski. Tarski argued roughly that "S" is true if and only if S. To use a concrete example, "Snow is white" if and only if snow is white. In this famous example, '"Snow is white" is true' will come out as equivalent to "Snow is white". What this procedure does is to define 'true' so that saying that a statement is true is equivalent to assenting to the statement; truth, as defined by Tarski, is not a property of a statement at all, but a syncategorematic notion which enables us to 'assent semantically', i.e., to talk about sentences instead of objects. However, what makes Tarski's theory a version of the correspondence theory is that the truth of an utterance depends on just two things; what the words as spoken mean, and how the world is arranged. There is no need to refer to a conceptual scheme, a way of viewing things, a perspective. "Two interpreters, as unlike in culture, language and point of view as you please, can disagree over whether an utterance is true, but only if they differ *on how things are in the world* they share, or what the utterance means."[15]

The coherence theory of truth is the one we have from absolutistic idealism and it is intimately connected with the idealism of Hegel and Bradley. But some of the neo-positivists like Hempel also accept coherence as the nature and test of truth also defending a coherence

theory of justification/knowledge. . According to this theory, to say that a proposition p (idealists usually call it a judgement), is true or false is to say that it coheres or fails to cohere with a system of other propositions. Coherence of propositions with one another constitutes the truth of the proposition. "Coherence is a relation among propositions and not a relation between a proposition and something else (a state of affairs) which is not a proposition."[16] The truth of a proposition is said to consist, not in the fact that the proposition "corresponds" with something which is not itself a proposition, but in the fact that it fits consistently into a certain more general system of proposition.

The main tenet of the coherence theory is that we can speak of truth or falsity of a proposition with reference to the system of propositions or group of propositions that constitute a body of knowledge. A proposition by itself, completely isolated from other propositions, can neither be true nor false. A group of propositions is called a system when there is a relation of implication among such propositions and the propositions are mutually consistent, supporting each other. It thus defines truth as a matter of systematic consistency of beliefs or propositions. Pure mathematics is the paradigm case of a system of propositions. According to the coherence theory, the proposition "All material bodies gravitate" is true because it is coherent with the system of propositions, constituting the general knowledge about material bodies. Likewise, a proposition 'p is false' means that it is inconsistent, that is, the metaphysical supporters with the relevant system of propositions. According to the logical positivist supporters of the theory the system with which all true propositions must cohere is said to be that accepted by the scientists of the contemporary science culture circle. According to the

absolute idealists, that is, the metaphysical supporters the system of propositions cannot be partial and limited but will be all-comprehensive and all-coherent. According to them, the system of knowledge is constantly growing and so is becoming more and more comprehensive and consistent. The absolute is an ideal unattainable by human thought and coherence is a matter of degree, and truth also has degrees. The more a proposition is coherent with the growing system of our knowledge, the truer it is. However, a proposition coherent with the present system of knowledge may not be so in future because this coherence is subject to modification in the light of future extension of knowledge.

The pragmatic theory of truth is the view that "truth is what works, and a true proposition is one that works."[17] We often act upon our proposition and if one's action according to a particular proposition leads to success or in other words, if the proposition works or is useful, the proposition is true. The approach of this theory is utilitarian. According to the pragmatic thinker William James, the criterion of determining truth of a proposition is its fruitfulness in experience. William James holds that truth is the acquired characteristics of men's work. A statement by itself is neither true nor false but becomes true or false when verified in practice. All these are regarded as the characteristics of truth. For example, the statement "Here is a glass of water" is true if by acting according to this judgement we find the practical result that means if water is poured down in one's throat one's thirst is quenched.

Though the theory of truth is dealt with separately from the theory of meaning, these have also certain theories of meaning latent in them. From the point of view of the correspondence theory, meaning of a statement depends upon correspondence between word and fact. According to the

coherence theory, meaning depends on coherence among propositions. From the standpoint of pragmatism, meaning of a statement can be understood in terms of its workability. A theory of meaning is primarily concerned with the specification of the criteria of meaningfulness i.e., the conditions a sentence must satisfy in order to have meaning and specifying the conditions of synonym. According to Alston, it is an attempt to analyse what constitutes meaning of a linguistic expression. It is an analysis of what we are saying when we say that a linguistic expression has meaning. Are we taking into account the meaning of a word or the meaning of a sentence? A theory of meaning is a theory of meaning of linguistic expressions, both words and sentences taken together. There are different theories of meaning among which the main theories are the referential, the ideational, and the behavioral theories. Let us have a look at them.

III

The term 'meaning' in philosophy of language is intrinsic to language. Meaning is the essence of language and the two forms an inseparable relationship. It is due to this that we cannot conceive of a meaningless use of signs. Language, to be language, cannot allow within its system any place for meaningless signs. Even if we do, there will be just the production of some sounds without sense. What is meaning then? How do linguistic expressions get their meaning? These questions lead us to the problem of language and reality (word and the world). We know the world through language. A sentence acquires meaning when it says

something about the world. Since words get their meaning through their relation to the world, it has been claimed that reference to the world fixes meaning.

According to the referential theory of meaning, a word has meaning if it refers to some persons, objects, relations, properties in the world. For example, the proper name 'Jack' refers to a dog which bears the name 'Jack'. The word 'Jack' has meaning because it is the name of that dog. In this view it is supposed that every meaningful expression stands to something in the relation of naming, designating, labeling, referring, etc.[18] The object which is referred to by a word or a linguistic expression need not always be a particular object, it could be a kind of thing like the common name 'man', a quality like 'redness', a state of affairs like 'democracy', a relationship like 'belongs' and so on. In general, the referential theory of meaning is the view that any meaningful expression has the meaning it has because it refers to some object or other. The criterion of determining meaning is the relation of reference between linguistic expressions and things in the world.

This innocent and simplistic statement should not make us oblivious of the controversies that raged in this area between Frege and Russell on sense and reference, and the further contribution to the debate by Saul Kripke[19], Hillary[20] and their followers. As matters stand now Frege's theory of reference3-fixing through sense has been reformulated by Kripke and Putnam who accord primacy to reference rather than sense.

The ideational theory of meaning was propounded by John Locke in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.[21] According to this view, a word is meaningful if it arouses some idea or mental image. For example, a word like 'dog' or 'man' or 'cat' is meaningful because there are some

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ideas corresponding to each. A word is a means of communicating thought because the utterance of the word arouses the same idea in the mind of the hearer which is its meaning. According to the ideational theory, a linguistic expression has meaning if it arouses some idea and the exchange of ideas makes communication possible. This theory holds that in order to express his thought the speaker uses a word which indicates the idea he has in his mind.[22] A linguistic expression is the mark or indication of an idea and that idea is its meaning so that whenever that linguistic expression is used in that sense it indicates the presence of that idea.

The behavioral theory of meaning is also based on a view about what man is doing when he is using language in communication.[23] The difference between the ideational theory and behavioral theory is that according to the former the meaning of a linguistic expression is an internal state of mental image which is not publicly observable but the latter theory holds that the meaning of a linguistic expression has a publicly observable aspect. The behavioral theory holds that to say that a linguistic expression has meaning is to observe how it is being used by people or to observe the various sorts of behavior in which it is involved. The meaning of a word or a linguistic expression is the behavioral response which can be verified by public inspection. The meaning of a linguistic utterance is the connection between an observable stimulus which the utterance creates and the response to it. A meaningful utterance is a verbal stimulus in a situation to which there is some response in the form of behavioural disposition from the hearer. From this viewpoint the criterion of determining the meaning of a linguistic expression is the observation of the behaviour or behavioural disposition of the hearer. The

behavioural theory holds that the meaning of an utterance is the response or behavioural disposition to the utterance in a situation. The word 'oh!' means the behaviour or behavioural disposition of pain or irritation or wonderment of the speaker in a situation.

IV

Now, to come back to the fundamental issue of understanding a philosophy of language on the basis of its purpose to appropriate language to reality. These theories of meaning and truth sketched above are rather digressions in the sense that they depart from achieving such a goal. In these approaches language and reality fall apart, while the correspondence theory of truth and the referential theory of meaning keep the word and the world alien to each other coherence theory is confined to the system of propositions alone.

The correspondence between a proposition and the fact outside cannot be known. If the representationalist version of the realists is accepted then whenever a person tries to know the external fact he has an idea about it, that is to say, a mental representation of it. Hence, the person has only ideas about the fact and not the fact itself. According to Heidegger, problem arises out of the presumption that truth is a property of proposition, i.e., it is a property of an entity which lies between us and the world.[24] The question arises how such an entity can correspond to something in the world.

The correspondence theory presupposes that the facts are completely independent of the knowing mind—a metaphysical position

that may not be acceptable to many philosophers. According to this theory, when we make a true judgement we have certain image or picture of the real in our minds and our judgement is true because this picture is like the reality it represents. That means the picture or mental image copies or resembles reality. From this, it follows that a true judgement does not itself correspond to the physical thing or reality. But we can make a judgement without using any image or mental picture except words and words do not themselves correspond to the things which they represent. Following A.C. Ewing it can be said that "We must not understand 'correspondence' as meaning copying or even resemblance".[25]

The testimony of coherence is only evidence that a statement is true but it does not make it true. The truth of a proposition consists in the fact that the proposition describes an actual state of affairs. Coherence of a proposition points to the truth of a proposition without being what the truth of the proposition consists in[26] A group of propositions may be quite compatible with the falsity of a particular proposition, and in that case the false proposition will be taken to be true.

The coherence theory of truth ultimately leads to the correspondence theory of truth. According to this view the truth of the proposition 'A' means that 'A' is coherent with the body of propositions C.D.E.F, and the truth of the propositions C.D.E.F depends on their coherence with other group of propositions. But this will lead to infinite regress. In order to avoid infinite regress, we have to leave coherence and come to correspondence, that is, to a relation between the proposition and a state of affairs in the world outside this proposition, or any body of propositions.

A body of propositions may be coherent, and yet not true. For example, there are various systems of geometry, which are systems of coherent propositions but not all of these systems of propositions can be true of the world. The truth of a group of propositions does not depend on the relation among the propositions but on the consideration whether any or all of the propositions reports an actual state of affairs in the world.

Though pragmatism comes little closer to the goal in terms of understanding a proposition by working upon it, in concrete cases, its action-based approach is coloured by a theory of reality. The pragmatist's view that a proposition is true if it is workable and false if it is not, is not a satisfactory criterion of determining truth or falsity of a proposition because there are many propositions which are true though not workable in the sense that they have no practical utility. And there may be false propositions which are useful or expedient. The usefulness of false propositions does not make them true. Moreover, if the pragmatic theory is taken for granted then truth will be a relative matter because what is useful or workable to an individual may not be so to another individual; what may be useful or workable with reference to certain community may not be so with reference to another community. Moreover, if workability or usefulness is regarded as the criterion of determining truth or falsity of propositions, religious propositions must be true because they make men act in certain ways. But nobody can insist that religious statements are true. Pragmatism offers a good taste of truth but it fails to describe the nature of truth.

The theories of meaning outlined above also suffer from the shortcomings that arise from a failure to bridge the gulf between language and reality.

The referential theory of meaning is inadequate because meaning of an expression is not the object to which it refers. Two expressions may refer to the same object but they need not have the same meaning.[27] Russell's classic example of this point concerns 'Sir Walter Scott' and 'The author of Waverly'. Though these two expressions refer to the same individual they do not have the same meaning. Again the same individual can be referred to by different expressions which do not have the same meaning. For example John F. Kennedy can be referred to as 'the President of U.S.A. in 1962', 'the husband of Jacqueline Kennedy', 'the U.S. President assassinated in Dallas', etc. Again, there are some expressions which have single meaning but different referents. For example the indexical terms 'I', 'you', 'here', 'this' change their references with changes in the occasion of their utterance. But they do not change their meanings corresponding to these different referents. The very presupposition of referential theory that all meaningful linguistic expressions do refer to something is not acceptable because linguistic expressions like conjunction do not refer to anything. Words like 'and', 'if', 'is' and 'whereas' do not refer to anything. Similarly, general words like the noun 'pencil', the adjectives 'courageous' and the verb 'run' cannot be said to be meaningful if their meaningfulness is due to the fact they refer to concrete observable physical phenomena. It can be concluded that referring is only one of the functions that linguistic expressions perform which is assigned to some sort of expressions and not to others.

The ideational theory of meaning is inadequate because there need not always arise a distinguishable idea in the mind corresponding to the utterance of each meaningful linguistic expression.[28] For example, there

arises no idea in the mind corresponding to the utterance of the words like 'when', 'in', 'course', 'becomes'. It may be that the utterance of some words arouse ideas but those ideas may not be identifiable and producible without these words. From this it does not follow that they do not have meaning.

The difficulty with the ideational theory is that we are unable to spot 'ideas' in order to test the ideational theory. The ideational theory cannot give a satisfactory account of meaning because a word with a single meaning may give rise to different ideas in different situations. For example, the word 'dog' has a single meaning but on one occasion it may arouse the image of a 'collie'; on another, it may arouse the image of a 'beagle'; on one occasion the image of a dog sitting, on another, the image of a dog standing. From this it cannot be said that the word 'dog' has different meanings. Conversely, words with different meanings may have one indistinguishable image. For example the utterance of the words 'beagle', 'hound', 'dog', 'mammal', 'animal', 'organism', 'sports', 'hunting', may accompany the single image of a sleeping beagle.

The behavioural theory also fares no better. The behavioural dispositions may determine the meaning of utterances like imperative and declarative. For example, the declarative sentence, 'Your son is ill' may have a bearing on the hearer's future conduct, i.e., it may produce a disposition to go where the hearer believes his son to be if he has a great deal of concern for him. But the behavioural disposition does not determine the meaning of all kinds of utterance. It cannot determine the meaning of purely linguistic utterances.[27] For example, the utterance 'Mozart wrote *Idomeneo* at the age of twenty five', has no behavioural disposition which determines its meaning.

Moreover, behavioural disposition is produced by the utterance of a sentence provided that the hearer believes that the utterer is giving correct information, and the hearer has not previously acquired that information. But no such behavioural disposition can be produced by the utterance of a sentence if the hearer does not believe the utterer or if the hearer is already aware of the spoken fact. For example, if the hearer does not believe the speaker when he says, "Your son is ill", the speaker's utterance will certainly not produce any such disposition. Where the hearer is already acquainted with the information, he may reply, "You need not tell me that."

Even if the above conditions of producing behavioural dispositions are fulfilled the possibility of a list of factors cannot be denied, the presence of which will prevent the production of behavioural disposition. For example the utterance "Your son is ill" will produce in a hearer disposition to go to his son if he has a great deal of concern for him, if he is not physically prevented from doing so, if he has no religious scruples against doing so and so on.

The view that every disposition produced by an utterance has certain bearings on the meaning of the utterance is an inadequate view because utterances with different meanings may have the same behavioural disposition. For example, the utterance "The Sun is 97,000,000 miles away from the earth" produces a disposition to open one's mouth in amazement if one were previously unaware of this. But the same disposition is produced by the utterance with a different meaning, "The Pyramids are several thousands years old". An utterance may have a certain behavioural disposition but the disposition-production does not determine the meaning of the utterance.

In all these theories of truth and meaning sketched above the bifurcation between language and reality remains. The question may always be asked as to where the correspondence between word and fact is exact or whether a coherence among different propositions really represent reality in all its objectivity and independence or whether the workability of a proposition can always be the criterion of its truth. Similarly, the theories of meaning too are in different ways and degrees attempts to make reality intelligible through language. The behaviourist theory of meaning has also been attacked from many corners. One can say safely that its truth and applicability is limited so long as it is not related to the conscious and existential dimension of human existence and speech.

V

Since words (language) and the world are ontologically different and the purpose of language has always been to definitize, understand and communicate the nature of different items of the reality extraneous to users, one may very well think the relation between the two, in whatever degree it is achieved, as the result of an attempt to bridge the difference between the two. To speak in the terminology of Indian philosophy the difference or *bheda* between language and reality is the difference in kind.[30] In Indian terminology *bheda* or difference is of three kinds: *sajātīya, vijātīya and svagata bheda.* The difference between two things of the same kind is called *sajātīya bheda*, e.g., the difference between two men is the *sajātīya bheda.* The difference between two things of different

kinds is called *vijātīya bhed, e.g., difference between a man and a tree is called vijāñya bheda*. And the internal difference between the parts of a whole thing of the same kind is called *svagata bheda*, e.g., the difference among the different parts of a tree, i.e., the difference among the root, stem, leaves of a tree is called *svagata bheda*. The world as it is in itself, across language is unspoken and *not meant*. The purpose of language is to make it *meant*. As K.C. Bhattacharya remarked, "object is what is meant".[31] Searle has rightly said that the philosophies of language of Frege, Wittgenstein, (in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and logical positivists held in common that the only aim of language is to represent and communicate factual information, and the part of language that counts is the 'cognitive' part. In these approaches language and reality are treated as two separate 'things', As Searle says, "They treat the elements of language — words, sentences, propositions — as things that represent things that are true or false, etc., apart from any actions and intentions of speakers and hearers.[32] This was one way of bringing two ontologically different entities closer in terms of an one to one correspondence. This is well reflected in the statement of Wittgenstein of *Tractatus*, 'A proposition is a picture of reality'.[33]

But this attempt to bridge the gulf between language and reality cut off from actions and intentions of speakers and hearers and specific forms of life was realized to be wrong in the late thirties and especially after the second world war by Wittgenstein himself. In his *Philosophical Investigations*, he rejected his earlier position of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and came up with a concept of language which was actions-based. Later-Wittgenstein dealt with basic problems of philosophy of language in a new key. The influence of this approach

prevails even now in the area of philosophy of language. Philosophy of language is not the study in all its complexity, of language in a Platonic world of "Ideas". It is an investigation into the world of objects which human beings inhabit. It is a living world of relationship between men and objects. Here human beings are surrounded by those objects which they have made their own by forming, organizing, arranging, using, and modifying them according to their own choices. It is an experience of our every day life where there is a relationship between human beings and objects, i.e., between words and reality. Language is the means of human beings to know, understand, and explain the world of objects and language is the medium of expressing things in the human world. The human being is existent in the world and he wants to understand how he exists along with the objects of the world which have significance for him. The understanding of the world means the disclosure of the significance of the totality of objects. To my mind, an examination of the theories of meaning and truth involves coming to an understanding of the relation between a human being, his existential modes, understanding, language, speech, etc. The essential philosophical question about language is this: 'What is language for man'? It seems probable that language is something which is absolutely essential to comprehension, something at the very heart of our consciousness and "We have ...to drop the idea that language is an epiphenomenon of the process of comprehension."[34]

We contend that the relation between words and world can be best understood from a phenomenological standpoint which takes over the lead in the present context. In the following chapters we shall trace it from the sources of Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Searle who are

basically analytic philosophers together with the phenonenologists Husserl and Merleau-ponty. We think that a phenomenological treatment of this relation would perhaps make it possible for any future philosophy of language to conceive of 'one single world' enmeshing language and the world without slicing it into 'words' and 'world'. Before we proceed in that task we shall take up an exposition of the views of some analytical philosophers of language on the issue of the word-world relationship. Our purpose in doing this is whether, the analytic philosophers reveal a phenomenological orientation in their doctrines and theories, thereby having a kinship with Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

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Chapter II

Word-World Relationship: An Exposition of the Views of Some Analytic Philosophers

In this chapter we will discuss the views of some eminent philosophers in the analytic tradition keeping in mind their thoughts on the word-world relationship. We start with the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

A: L. Wittgenstein

I

Wittgenstein's problem(s) in both the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and the *Philosophical Investigations* is the problem of meaning - how a sign "means" its signified. In the *Tractatus* emphasis is on the epistemological problem: How do the signs by which we know (express) states of affairs ('the world", "reality"), relate to the signified? The *Tractatus* talks of "representing", "picturing", "mirroring" the world, but not in any literal sense. Wittgenstein was not thinking of images. The signs are what permit the world (reality, states of affairs), to be for us. There is an isomorphism between propositions and reality.

In the *Philosophical Investigations* we are still meditating upon the problem of how a sign "means" its signified, but against a different background. The *Philosophical Investigations* offers us a reversed view in terms of language games. The example of the "slab" game in the early part of the *Philosophical Investigations* is to bring home to us that words are tools of action. By giving order to B, A makes use of instruments to

get B to act in a certain way. Their meaning depends on how B is supposed to act in the situations in which they are uttered. In like manner, the meaning of a descriptive sentence depends upon its role in a given situation within a given culture-frame. Meaning, then, is not some ethereal entity, rather: "Let the use of words teach you their meaning".[1] We are going to elucidate these preliminary remarks below.

II

The early Wittgenstein, the author of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* was greatly influenced by the great German logician and philosopher, Gottlob Frege. He was concerned with Frege's problem of 'logical form' of a sentence. The logical form is an aspect about the structure of a sentence. Before Wittgenstein, Frege faced the problem of distinguishing the logical form of a sentence from the grammatical form of it, and in order to do so he framed a 'formula language', modelled upon that of 'Arithmatic' for pure thought. He expressed this in his book, *Begriffsschrift*.[2] In his early work, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* Wittgenstein views language as something restricted to the expression of true/false propositions. The totality of propositions is language.[3] The form of language is discussed here. Wittgenstein points out, "The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties."[4]

According to Wittgenstein, a proposition is a picture of the world. And each word refers to an object, i.e., corresponding to the sentence, "The cat is on the mat''; there are some objects in the world. There is an object corresponding to the word 'cat' and also corresponding to the word 'mat'. And there is a relationship between these two objects. This is how

Wittgenstein explains language-world relation in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. There is an one to one relationship or isomorphism between language and reality. Wittgenstein writes in the *TractatusLogico-Philosophicu,* "In a picture the elements of the picture are representatives of the object."[5] By 'elements' Wittgenstein means 'names'. According to Wittgenstein, 'names' and 'objects' bring language and world together. "A name means an object. The object is its meaning".[6]

According to Wittgenstein by means of linguistic expressions some objects in this world are pointed out. And these objects are the bearers of the meanings of the linguistic expressions. In the *Tractatus* he explains language, 'as the totality of propositions' mirroring 'the totality of facts' which is the world. Wittgenstein says that a proposition is 'a model of reality as we imagine it'.[7] The elementary proposition is the simplest unit of language. The relationship between language and the world established in the case of elementary propositions is referred to as the picture theory. This is based on the following passages. 'A proposition is a picture of reality'.[8] 'A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality,' [9] etc. The expression 'picture theory' has been seen as misleading by many Wittgenstein scholars. It may mean that thoughts are mental images or that individual words are pictures. It needs a clarification of his claim that the elementary proposition can be a picture, even 'in the ordinary sense' of the word, of the situation which it represents.[10]

According to a common understanding of the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein first talks about pictures in a loose sense. It embraces drawings, paintings, photographs, maps, even models, all of which are likenesses, or as C. S. Pierce says, icons of what they represent.[11] Then

Wittgenstein takes a sharp turn to the special case constituted by the logical picture, which is not any sort of likeness or icon of what it represents, e.g., musical notation or the thought. Actually, Wittgenstein was not talking about two distinct kinds of picture. There is only one kind of picture. The single principle he sees at work in all picturings is that of likeness or sharing of features; the pictoriality, which he specifies by the locution, "the picture"[12] – the spatial picture, the coloured picture, the logical picture – that is, the picture which pictures by likeness in respect of x which shares x-ness with what it pictures

It is reported that Wittgenstein became drawn to the picture theory from the report of a representation of a motor-car accident in a law court by means of models, dolls, toy cars, etc.[13] A picture, as the court-room model, is a rich picture, and it needs to be considerably stripped down of its richness to retain the pictoriality of a merely logical picture. The logical picture possesses only the minimum of pictoriality which is the minimum pictoriality common to all pictures. Wittgenstein says: "Every picture is at the same time a logical picture." What do we, as language users, know about the language/world correlations? A sentence, Wittgenstein holds, is a picture of the world. As such it is isomorphic to the situation it portrays. But not any isomorphism of something is a picture of it. Does the world pictures language? It seems not. A picture, Wittgenstein says in the Note *Books*, reaches up to reality (2.1511), it is like a scale applied to reality (2.1512). The pictorial relationship acts as the "feelers" of a picture's elements (2.1511). A picture agrees with (or fails to agree with) reality (2.21). Language projects reality (4.0141). We must consider the significant *use* of a sign in order to understand it

(3.326). For what signs fail to express, their application shows. What signs conceal, their application says clearly (3.362).[14]

The above remarks have led some Wittgenstein scholars to interpret him as indicating that language is intentional; it reaches up, feels, projects, agrees, signifies and is applied. The pictorial relationship is inherent in the picture (2.1513). To be an intelligible world is to be describable and the describability of the world in language comprises the meaningfulness of language[15]. We wonder whether language could be meaningful if there were no intelligible world to be described, to be picturable. "...this view grounds one of the most important assumptions in the *Tractatus*, namely, the claim that the structure of the world and the structure of language are isomorphic. To be an intelligible world and to be a describable world are one and the same."[16]

III

In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein challenges the representationalist's account of the relation between language and the world by criticising traditional theories of meaning and understanding. Wittgenstein's treatment of language concerns the meaning and understanding of language in relationship to our world of experience. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* starts with an experience into the referential relationship of language with things of the world. His main concern has been to understand and locate the possibility of the world's intelligibility. To solve this problem he attempts an account of our understanding which presupposes the model of ostension.[17]   According to this model, we start our life finding ourselves surrounded by objects, and we then learn the

names of those objects through ostensive training. Our understanding of the world is built up from such instances of learning the meaning of words. This presupposes a representationalist's account of mind related to objects, and then tries to explain our understanding in terms of mental processes linking words to things.

Wittgenstein does not accept this position. He suggests that although our understanding of meaning of words includes ostensive definitions, in those cases the learner already knows, "What place in language, in grammar, we assign to the word' and 'the post at which we station the world"".[18] Wittgenstein's slogan argument against ostensive definition (conceived as primary and fundamental linguistic rule) is that we must already know a lot about language in order to understand that kind of definition. We must know that when we are taught the name of a colour that it is the colour and not the shape of the coloured sample which is shown to us. Ostensive definition does not solve our problems concerning what constitutes the link between language and reality. On the other hand, as far as feelings and mental relations are concerned we cannot appeal to immediate inner experience in order to prove them, but only to public criteria. We do not have any direct means of grasping reality, neither physical, nor psychological ones. We have a purely symbolic (linguistic) relation to reality, we just have our signs, and our language must speak for itself. The meaning of a word cannot be reduced to the object it signifies or to the intention on the part of the speaker. Rather, the meaning of a word is determined by the rules of usages.

This is not to say that Wittgenstein replaced the traditional objects of the realists with the formal rules of language and syntax. He is principally concerned with what we do with language rather than what

language is. He is interested in the regularities in the use of words as given by the phenomenological description of language in the form of rules which brings together the different uses of a word and its significations in effective linguistic transactions. To take an example, if something is red, it is not green. The distinction between red and green is not provided by reality itself but by the rules and conventions of language.

Thus, in his later work, *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein differs from his former interpretation about language in which he focuses on the form of language. In *Philosophical Investigations* he focuses on the content of the language instead of the form of language. Wittgenstein describes the *Philosophical Investigations* as an album of 'a number of sketches of landscape'.[19] He writes that the use of language is an activity. But language does not have the only activity of depicting the world. Language is mentioned as an activity and various kinds of activities are performed by the use of language. As he writes,

> How many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion,
> question and command? There are a countless kinds ...
> And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once
> for all; but new types of language, new language
> games, as we may say, come into existence, and others
> become obsolete and get forgotton.[20]

Language in the *Tractatus* is limited to propositional logic whereas in the *Philosophical Investigations* language is considered as a non-propositional linguistic activity which does not have the only job of depicting true/false picture of the world. Wittgenstein himself goes

against his former view in *Tractatus* by stating the multiplicity of language games. As he writes:

> It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools
> in language and of the ways they are used, the
> multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what
> logicians, have said about the structure of language
> (including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-
> Philosophicus*)[21].

Wittgenstein of *Philosophical Investigations* holds that as we perform different kinds of activities with the help of different kinds of tools similarly, we perform different acts with the use of different words and sentences in language. As a game is governed by certain rules and to play a game is to know the rules of the game, similarly, to know a language is to know its uses, according to Wittgenstein. So he writes, "We talk about it as we talk about the pieces of chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties." The question, "What is a world really?", is analogous to "What is a piece in chess ?"[22] He says that as in order to play chess the important thing is its rules and not the shape, and size of the chess board or chess pieces, similarly, the structure of a language is not important in order to know a language, but the rules of using the language are of importance. This insight of Wittgenstein, regarding the uses of language is later developed as the use theory of meaning although he himself does not regard it as the use theory of meaning.

It is clear from the statement in the *Philosophical Investigations*, ' the meaning of a word is its use in the language.'[23] This transition of Wittgenstein's view from *Tractatus Logico -Philosophicus* to

Philosophical Investigations is well depicted by Dr. Suresh Chandra in his book, Wittgenstein. *New Perspectives*, where he writes, "*Tractatus* has certainly created knots in our thinking. The diversion of our mind from 'meaning of words' to 'uses of words' is an attempt to untie those knots."[24]

Wittgenstein's reflection on language and the world leads to an inversion of the traditional order of explanation. According to him, we can learn words in grasping what objects are if we already have an understanding of the world, an understanding itself rooted in a prior mastery of language. Phenomena in the world can stand out as counting for us in certain ways only because we have some mastery of what Wittgenstein calls the significance or importance of the ordinary situations in which we find ourselves. Words have meaning and can be understood only within "intelligible situations". What is happening now has significance in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance."[25]

Wittgenstein insists on replacing explanation by description. By description he means an accurate non-theoretical depiction of some situation or group of situations in which language is used in an ordinary everyday way. These situations and the linguistic uses they embody are the elements of the world to be described. For this everyday world he uses various appellations, "the stream of life", "a form of life," or "the language game", etc. He introduces a set of interconnected concepts whose key members are: the use of expressions, "the language game" in which words or signs find their usage; and common judgment and common ways of acting."[26]

Wittgenstein's philosophy is a critical description of language, describing how the world is (or might be). It is but one of indefinitely many language games that we play as members of a particular society. There is an insistent emphasis upon speech (language in use) as social activity. This explains why Wittgenstein says that animals do not use language; our word- language that we call language; and then other things by analogy or comparability with this. The fabric of social life may be said to consist of conceptual links between intentions, beliefs, actions, practices, institutions and competences. The connection between language and reality requires a mastery of the use of language which does not emerge "from some kind of "ratiocination"[27] but by correctly using or employing a word in such and such a way. This process of conditioning is inherently social.

Thus, in his later investigation Wittgenstein brings into focus the idea of everydayness as the source of our various daily activities, forms of life.[28] According to him, it is to get out of the *Luftegebaude* (castles floating in the air) of theorizing, to be free from "'conceptual prejudices' and jargon of speculative metaphysics and to get 'back to the rough ground'"[29] of our concrete ordinary grasp of language in use. Our words and expressions have meaning only in 'the stream of life', in the whole 'tapestry of life', but not in a 'sublime' logic beyond life. When we look for justification for our uses, practices, we find that what we simply do in living is actual 'bedrock'. "This 'bedrock' constitutes the ground on which our language moves and our intelligibility of language becomes possible"[30]

Wittgenstein tries to dissolve the problems which arise from the misunderstandings of proper grammar of language from speculative

reflection and illusory interpretation by providing how things show up for us in the course of our ordinary, pre-reflective life. He says in his regard that "We must do away with all explanations, and description alone must take its place".[31] What does he mean by description here and what is it that is to be described? By description he means an accurate non-theoretical depiction of some situation or group of situations in which language is used in an ordinary everyday way. These situations and the linguistic uses they embody are the elements of the world to be described. For this everyday world — its practices, institutions and linguistic uses — Wittgenstein uses various appellations which we have already mentioned, "the stream of life", "a form of life" or " the language game". An appeal to these features represents the descriptions of everydayness and these descriptions of everydayness serve as the basis for disclosing features of our linguistic activities that exclusively represent our forms of life. He asks us "to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use".[32] Stanley Cavell notes here an affinity with Heidegger. He says, "Heidegger's consciousness that our deepest task as philosophers and as men, is one of getting back to that essence of words and world from which we are now away, is an intimate point of similarity with Wittgenstein."[33]This descriptive account of our linguistic activities is characterised by T. R. Schatzki as 'phenomenology of the everyday'[34].

Wittgenstein also appeals to a 'gamut of cases'. This feature is used in contrast to the approach which looks for essence beneath surface phenomena. What Wittgenstein means by a "case" is a description of an activity, phenomenon, object or event in a particular context in ordinary life. Here is an example from *On Certainty* in which ordinary language plays a critical role:

I go to the doctor, shew him my hand and say "This is a hand, not ......; I've injured it etc. etc. "Am I only giving him a piece of superfluous information? For example, mightn't one say: supposing the words "This is a hand" were a piece of information --- how could you bank on his understanding this information? Indeed, if it is open to doubt 'whether that is a hand', why isn't it also open to doubt whether I am a human being who is informing the doctor of this? — But on the other hand one can imagine cases — even if they are very rare ones — where this declaration is not superfluous, or is only superfluous but not absurd.[35]

In this passage Wittgenstein uses the term "cases". And he alludes to it with the words, "I've injured it etc. etc.". The standard case would be one where, if you injured your hand, you would go to a physician, show him the hand, and say that you have injured it. In saying this you would take it for granted the doctor knows that you are a human being, that what you are showing him is a hand and not a prosthesis.

The point of the passage is to indicate that human activity is complex and cannot be understood according to any simple model or paradigm. The task of philosophy is to provide an accurate account of it. Any such account must be sensitive to the range of differing cases that we find in "language game", that is, in ordinary life. Wittgenstein here provides an explanation as to how human communication entails human form of life in the sense it represents a "language game". Each language game represents essentially an order of human communication, a form of human activity. To that extent he rejects all theoretical programmes, and

thus provides a new sense to human situations by emphasizing on description of our actual life situations in the concrete — the only place where talk about things, events, situations and activities gain meaningfulness.

The descriptional use of what Wittgenstein calls "language games" is an important feature of *Philosophical Investigations*. This concept first appears in *The Brown Book* of 1934. It became a key concept in his later philosophy and is extensively used in such works as *Philosophical Investigations* and *On Certainty*. Instead of being the discovery of something called 'the essence of x', a language game is a description of a slice of human everyday activity including such practices as affirming, doubting, believing, following rules and interacting with others in multifarious ways. Language games refer not only to individual human activities but to those that are common to the whole community comprising such institutions as governments, universities, banks, the militaries and so forth. Wittgenstein makes it clear in section 90.of *Philosophical Investigations* that or study of language games is for the purpose of understanding the grammar of phenomena. He says, "we feel as if we have to penetrate phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but as one might say towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena. We remind ourselves, that is to say, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena".[36] He has also recognised "the need of friction"[37], calls our thinking "back to the rough ground" of our "natural history".[38] "A word has the meaning someone has given to it",[39] away from the "crystalline purity of logic",[40] toward the "rough ground" of "ordinary language". Patterns of meaning or "grammar" of language is as it has "grown up in our common history". "Phenomena"

are here for us in the present moment and we experience them and recognise the experience in language. Because a language has a history, languaging of experience for us is to associate our experience at least implicitly with "the whole life of the tribe". Meaning arises from this fact. Wittgenstein says, " Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in order to have such and such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs".[41]

Wittgenstein shows us a way of describing and of gradually purifying our descriptions in which the search for understanding lives. The gradual mastery of language involves assembling reminders about the use of words, and the kinds of statements we make, so that when we come around again to the same languaging moment we are not again "bewitched". Wittgenstein is urging the traditional philosophers not to think but to look and see what people actually do in the course of their daily life. The description of such activity rather than a synoptic philosophical theory about them will give us an accurate picture of reality. Wittgenstein is principally concerned with what we do with language rather than what language is. The working of language requires that under normal circumstances the use of words is beyond any doubt. The meaning of a word is determined by the rules of use. To have rules of use is to have standards of normality which proves to be factually successful. The success in question is brought about by an agreement in judgment which Wittgenstein calls in a well known passage, agreement in a "....form of life".[42] Agreement in judgments, called a "form of life" by Wittgenstein is characterised by certainty beyond doubt. This gives a first explication of concerned language or reality: if the meaning of a word is

explained by use, but the use itself is governed by praxis of judgment which is the basis of communication then we can say that language and reality are tied together just in those judgments our use is based upon. Wittgenstein's own remark that language and reality are connected by the explanations of the words thus becomes clear.

Wittgenstein's philosophical procedure, designed to bring to us a consciousness of the words we must have, and hence, of the lives we have, represents a recognizable version of the wish "to establish the truth about the world." At this juncture, we want ask: How do we accomplish the task of bringing words back home? By asking "What should we say …?" Or, "What should we call …?" And this can be answered by remembering what is said and meant, or by trying out one's own response to an imagined situation, e.g., "What one should say if the next door young man proposes marriage?" And when we employ words in the absence of (any) language game which provides comprehensible employment, illusion is produced (Sec. 96). This section attempts to locate Wittgenstein's thought in a phenomenological tradition which is broadly European rather than narrowly emergent out of British empiricism.

B: Austin and Linguistic Phenomenology

Austin's philosophy is directed towards an aspect which is completely new in the history of philosophy. He was an intellectual authority in the field of philosophy of ordinary language in post-war Oxford, as Wittgenstein was in Cambridge. Austin reacts to the powerful thrust of logical positivism in the same way as Ryle does.

His speech act theory is a later development of his theory of performatives as distinct from constatives. Austin's first discussion of performative-constative distinction appeared in his 1946 paper "Other Minds"[1]. He writes, "When I say 'I promise', a new plunge is taken: I have not merely announced my intention, but, by using this formula (performing this ritual), I have bound myself to others, and staked my reputation, in a new way".[2] The term 'speech act' appears for the first time in "How to Talk: Some simple ways".[3] "How to Talk" is vastly expanded than "Other Minds". Three years later Austin writes a whole article, "Performative Utterances"[4] on this topic. In 1962, Urmson edits a series of twelve lectures that Austin delivered at Harvard University in 1955, and published them in a book form under the title *How to Do Things with Words.*[5] (henceforth will be mentioned as HDTW). This book contains Austin's most extensive and sophisticated theory of speech act, and contemporary interest in speech acts stems directly from Austin's work, and in particular, from his HDTW. Austin completed no books of his own and published only seven papers that also as the condition of delivering those papers; but in spite of that through lectures and talks, Austin became one of the acknowledged leaders in 'Oxford Philosophy' or 'Ordinary Language Philosophy'. Soon after his premature death in 1960, the published papers, together with three previously unpublished, were collected as *Philosophical Papers*[6] by J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock. His contribution to the philosophy of language is enough to establish him as a great and original analytic philosopher in the history of analytic philosophy.

Austin's contribution to philosophy of language consists in a powerful attack on a picture of correspondence between language and the

world which structures philosophical discussions of language. This picture of a correspondence between language and the world he took to be implicit in a traditional ideal of the statement as describing states of affairs as truly or falsely.[7] His aim was to criticize the idea that to talk about language having a bearing on the world just is to talk about 'Statements' or Propositions. The earliest expression of this is found in his paper on "Other Minds" and then in "Performative Utterances". His 1955 Harvard Lectures posthumously published as *"How to Do Things with Words"* clarifies this more fully.

Austin opens his lectures with a discussion of traditional philosophical ideal of the 'Statement' on which, in his words, "the business of a 'Statement' can only be to 'describe' some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which it must do either truly or falsely."[8] He mentions the writings of philosophers who treat the 'descriptive statement' as monopolizing the serious business of language. The main function of our verbal engagement is not always to make truth claims as was maintained by logical positivists. This claim was called in question by Austin's discovery of "Performative Utterances" and correspondingly of performative verbs and performative sentences. The performatives are distinguished from constatives. He proposes the term 'performative' for utterances which are not properly characterized as describing a state of affairs, and in which the uttering of a sentence, e.g., "I promise" is the doing of an action, e.g., making a promise. In his words, a performative utterance is "... a kind of utterance which looks like a statement and grammatically, I suppose, would be classed as a statement, which is not nonsensical, and yet is not true or false."[9] He proposes the term 'constative' for utterances which describe a state of affairs, or state a fact.

e.g., "That dog is dangerous", as description. They appear to attend to the traditional ideal of the 'Statement'. Although the classical 'Statement' – or as, Austin prefers to put it, the constative utterance – can be judged true or false depending on whether it accurately or inaccurately describes a state of affairs or states a fact, the performative utterance is not appropriately assessed in the truth/ falsity dimension.

In answer to the question, how to identify an utterance to be a performative Austin says, we need a grammatical criterion. He points out that the performatives begin with a verb in the first person singular, present active indicative, e.g., "I promise", "I order", "I warn you", etc. This is often accompanied by the addition of the term "hereby", e.g., "I hereby appoint you Vice-Chancellor." But all performatives should not always be in the above form. The utterance, "Shut the door", and "There is a bull in the pasture" are equally an order and a warning and so forth. To say that, "You are hereby warned there is a bull in the pasture," is to make the previous utterance "There is a bull in the pasture" more explicit. But performatives cannot be in the third person like, "He promised"; it is generally a report of what he did. But the above list of rules and grammatical features are not yet sufficient to identify a performative. In the above examples, factors like tone of voice, various gestures and circumstances are missing. To determine an utterance to be an order, or advice or warning it is very necessary to know the circumstances.

This initial classification of utterances into constatives and performatives takes for granted the ideal of the statement. This is emphasized by Austin in his William James Lectures where Austin declares that he finds this ideal deeply problematic, and says that he wants to question "... an age-old assumption in philosophy – the

assumption that to say something, at least in all cases worth considering, i.e., all cases considered, is always and simply to *state* something."[10] It may appear that Austin, in isolating a class of utterances that do not meet the specification of the traditional statement, has already rejected the assumption that "To say something is always to state something." Austin, however, believes that genuine liberation from the assumption requires more than the creation of new categories of utterance to coexist alongside the traditional 'statement'. At various points of his first five lectures, he suggests that philosopher's preoccupation with the category of the statement is a certain view of meaning – a view which makes it appear possible to classify linguistic formulae into those for use in making 'statements' and those for use in producing other kinds of utterances. Further, he attempts to distance himself, not only from this view of meaning, but also from the idea, suggested by the view, that there are at least some linguistic formulae that are perfectly suited for making statements. Hence, both in the 'Performative Utterances' and when, at an early juncture in his Harvard lectures he declares his intention to dislodge an age-old assumption to the effect that "to say something is always and simply to state something", he is hinting at something that he will make explicit later in his lectures, viz., that he thinks his original distinction between constative and performative utterances cannot at the final analysis be preserved.

We have already stated the grammatical criterion given by Austin to distinguish between performatives and constatives. In his second lecture of HDTW he considers various dimensions to assess these utterances – dimensions which he refers to as 'happiness' and 'unhappiness' – very generally. Austin tell us that in order for a

performative to be 'happy' the circumstances in which a person utters a set of words must satisfy the conditions of a conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect – a procedure which involves the uttering of those words by a person of a certain standing in a certain situation. Thus, for example, in order for my utterance of the sentence "I name this Yatch The Moonshine," to be happy there must be an established procedure for naming Yatches, and I must be an appropriate person in appropriate circumstance for performing that procedure. A performative will be unhappy in some way if one or more of these conditions fail to be met. Austin claims that his discussion of infelicity shows that the performative, although it is not ever true or false, "still [is] subject to criticism"[11]. Austin's narrative about his failure to find a grammatical criterion for distinguishing between constative and performative utterances in his essay on "Performative Utterances" is intended to establish that there is something confused in principle about the idea of such a criterion.[12] Austin now considered another suggestion for isolating the performative. The performative might be distinguished by a special vocabulary such as 'hereby'. This suggestion, however, is undermined by the observation that it is possible to produce the performative without that word or to use the word without producing the "performative".[13] What we find is that the grammatical criterion, the doctrine of infelicities or special vocabulary fail to distinguish performatives from constatives. In distancing himself from the possibility of a criterion for distinguishing performative and constative language Austin repudiates the idea that we can somehow identify the sentence *as such* that is considered apart from the circumstances of its use. Austin awakes us to the fact that in every utterance, whether constative or

performative, the speaker performs an act such as stating a fact or opinion, confirming or denying something, making a prediction or a request, asking a question, issuing an order, giving advice or permission, making an offer or promise, greeting, thanking, condoling, effecting a baptism or declaring an umpire's decision – and so forth. He christens them speech acts.

It would, however, be a mistake to conclude that Austin wants to prevent us from drawing distinction between different ways in which language functions. He is discouraging us from studying the workings of language by looking at isolated sentences. He thinks that we can productively study language if we take as our object what he regards as its minimal unit. He christens them speech acts, complete acts of speech. The performative-constative distinction gives way to the theory of speech acts. He now represents his own investigation of language as exclusively concerned with speech acts. He writes that, "The total speech act in the total speech situation is the *only actual* phenomenon which, in the last resort, we are engaged in elucidating".[14] He classifies the speech acts as locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary. A locutionary act, Austin maintains, includes "... the utterance of certain words in a certain construction, and the utterance of them with a certain 'meaning' in the favourite philosophical sense of that word, i.e., with a certain sense and with a certain reference.[15] For example, the sentence, "He said to me, 'shoot her'" is a locutionary act and in this particular case urging or advising or ordering one to shoot her is an illocutionary act. Austin claims, to perform an illocutionary act, the speaker has to ensure that his audience understands what he is trying to do. If he fails to do so, then he has failed to secure 'uptake'. At the same time Austin makes it clear that

securing uptake is a necessary condition of performing the act, not a consequence of it which may or may not occur, and thus makes it distinguishable from a perlocutionary effect.

Consider the example, 'Can you pass the salt?' If the sentence is uttered at a lunch table then it is certain that by the utterance the speaker intends the hearer to recognize that the speaker's intention in uttering the sentence is to have the hearer recognize that the speaker has made a request bearing the message that the hearer pass the salt. The third kind of speech act is the perlocutionary act. The performance of a locutionary act or an illocutionary act normally produces certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the audience, and it may be done with the design, intention or purpose of producing them. Examples of such perlocutionary acts or perlocutions are, 'he pulled me up, checked me' or 'he stopped me, he brought me to my senses' or 'he annoyed me', etc. The performance of illocutionary acts are conventional but the performance of perlocutionary acts are not conventional. We can say 'I argue that...', or 'I warn you that...' but we cannot say, 'I convince you that...' or 'I alarm you that...'. The perlocutionary act always includes some consequences. There is a doing of things in the performance of the perlocutionary act just as in the case of the locutionary and illocutionsry acts. Austin presents it as, 'By doing x I was doing y'.

Austin in *How to Do Things with Words* gives a clear picture of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, saying, "Thus we distinguished the locutionary act (and within it the phonetic, the phatic and the rhetic acts) which has a *meaning*; the illocutionary act which has a certain *force* in saying something; the perlocutionary act which is *the achieving of* certain *effects* by saying something."[16] He writes in *HDTW*,

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"whenever I 'say' anything (except perhaps a mere exclamation like 'damn' or 'ouch') I shall be performing both locutionary, and illocutionary acts, and these two kinds of acts seem to be the very things which we tried to use, under the names of 'doing' and 'saying', as a means of distinguishing performatives from constatives."[17]

According to Austin, an illocutionary act determines the way we are using the locution. The doctrine of illocutionary forces arises out of his earlier distinction of performative and constative utterances, contained in HDTW. Austin distinguishes between different kinds of illocutionary act like the act of questioning or answering or informing or assuring or warning and so on with the help of illocutionary force. What is an illocutionary force? Illocutionary force is the way of determining the nature of the locution. In other words, it is the way of determining different types of function that language has in the performance of an illocutionary act. He holds that it is essential to distinguish illocutionary force from the meaning of an utterance as it is to distinguish sense from reference within meaning. Meaning is the locutionary act and 'use of sentence' is the illocutionary act. According to Austin the range of illocutionary acts is restricted by the conventions of illocutionary force.

In the HDTW, Austin gives us a list of explicit performative verbs'. These verbs make explicit the illocutionary force of an utterance, or what illocutionary act is to be performed in issuing that utterance. An utterance's illocutionary force is sometimes spelled out in a so-called 'performative clause'. For instance in the utterance – "I promise to take Max to a movie tomorrow" – 'I promise' is called a performative clause. But the same promise can be made by uttering, "I'll take Max to a movie tomorrow" without using an explicit performative formula. The former is

called a primary illocution and the latter is called an 'indirect illocution'. In order to use the explicit performative verbs certain formal conditions will necessarily be fulfilled. Unless these formal conditions on explicit performative clauses are satisfied, the so-called performative verb is used non-performatively, i.e., the illocutionary point of the utterance will not be described by the meaning of the performative verb. Austin distinguishes five very general classes of utterance depending upon their illocutionary forces. They are: (1) Verdictives, (2) Exercitives, (3) Commisives, (4) Behabitives and (5) Expositives.

Austin's thesis of explicit performative is recognized as a distinct form of linguistic utterance. Such performatives carry a distinct type of force, performative force, of their own: it is the sense of the operative word or phrase within the performative utterance that makes the act to be of the particular kind it is. Austin also speaks of the illocutionary act 'taking effect' – an effect to be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be successful. This 'taking effect' of the 'illocutionary act' is called 'securing *uptake*'. This is made possible by understanding the meaning and the force of the locution.

In developing his account of what he labeled 'illocutionary force' in his celebrated HDTW, Austin approached the matter from a different angle from Peter Strawson. Strawson in his article "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts" comments upon Austin's exposition on illocutionary force. Strawson does not agree with Austin in the view that the achievement of 'uptake' is a necessary condition for the performance of an illocutionary act although in his above article Strawson agrees with Austin in saying that speech act is a kind of human transaction in human society.[18] Obviously, there are conventions governing the meanings of

our utterances. But besides that there are other conventions which govern, and in part constitute the speech act as a whole. These conventions are established in the society and easily recognized by human beings of the society where the speech act occurs. For example, it is certainly a matter of the conventional procedure of law that the foreman of the jury in court at the proper moment utters the word 'guilty'. And here the convention constitutes the foreman's utterance as the act of bringing in a verdict. Similarly, it is governed by a convention that if the appropriate umpire pronounces a batsman 'out', he hereby performs the act of giving the man out, which no player or spectator shouting 'out'! can do. The above examples are cited by Austin. Austin gives other examples too. And always there exist certain conventions relating to the circumstances of utterances. Here Strawson differs from Austin. He cites some examples where there is no need of any convention. He says, there is no need of any special convention of 'warning' or 'objecting' because there is already a thin convention beyond our understanding of the explicitly performative form. If someone says to a person about to skate on a pond, "The ice is very thin", no further convention is needed to make the speaker's words a warning. Strawson thus objects to Austin's thesis of the conventionality of illocutionary acts. In his own words, the objection is to cite "cases in which the illocutionary force of an utterance, though not exhausted by its meaning, is not owed to any conventions other than those which help to give it its meaning."[19] Strawson raises the question: if the illocutionary force is not exhausted by the meaning and it does not also owe to any convention either, to what is it due and from what is it recognized? According to Strawson, it is ultimately due to the intentions of the speaker, and this is recognized from a combination of the meaning with

the circumstances of utterance. Strawson finds H.P. Grice's concept of meaning very helpful in this matter. H.P. Grice in his valuable article 'Meaning' explains the concept of someone's non-naturally meaning something by an utterance in the following way. Grice refers to an utterance of some one, viz. S's, and by this utterance S non-naturally means something. Here meaning is explained in terms of intention. S non-naturally means something by an utterance X; if S intends (i_1) to produce by uttering a certain response (r) in an audience A, and intends (i_2) that A shall recognize S's intention (i_1) and intends (i_3) that this recognition on the part of A of S's intention (i_1) shall function as A's reason, or a part of his reason for his response (r). [20]

However, Strawson allows two types of illocutionary act of Austin to be conventional. One type of illocutionary acts belong to the examples of an umpire's decision, a jury's verdict, a bid of Bridge, a priest's pronouncing a couple man and wife. According to him, these examples can be explained only by reference to a social institution constituted by a convention and the speaker's overt intention plays a certain part in the conventional proceedings. The other type of illocutionary act which is conventional according to Strawson is giving an order. The illocutionary force of this act can be explained in terms of the speaker's intention. And the social practice is the recognition that certain speaker has the authority over certain others in certain respects. A very clear example of this act is the order in the form "Come in" uttered by a speaker who has a room of his own to a hearer who wants to enter it.

For Austin, speech acts have commitments and responsibilities as he puts it, "Our word is our bond". [21] Strawson's overall strategy against Austin is to contest Austin's thesis that every illocutionary act is done as

conforming to some convention. The exploitation of conventions over and above the conventions of the language itself does not seem to be a general constitutive condition for the performance of illocutionary acts, in his view. Michael Dummett in his article "Force and Convention" has made a detailed discussion of Strawson's view in this regard. According to him, the test of whether an act is essentially conventional—resting on a convention other than that governing the means to perform it—is whether it can be executed by non-conventional means. Simple acts of request may be performed without using words to make the request, but one cannot request his employer for leave without having conventionalized means of making a request. Dummett says, "When we learn language, we are initiated, stage by stage, into a complex conventional practice; and the conventions govern the force of an utterance as much as its sense."[22] Taking the example of assertoric utterances he continues as follows:

> "In accordance with these conventions, assertoric utterances count as correct or incorrect, and also as warranted or unwarranted; they may be confirmed or have to be withdrawn. We can be rebuked for making them ('What's that got to do with?', 'you've no business to be talking about that.'), or for not making them ('why didn't you say so?'), our warrant for making them may be challenged. Out of all this we extract the concepts of truth and falsity, and that of a ground of truth; but the conventions governing the practice of assertion amount to much more than simply that an assertoric utterance presents the sentence as true. As Strawson remarks,

Austin asserts again and again that illocutionary force derives form convention. He was quite right to do so." [23]

To perform an illocutionary act, then, a speaker must at least (1) perform a locutionary act L, (2) intend L to have in the circumstances force F, (3) secure uptake, and (4) satisfy certain additional 'practice-defining conventions'.

Austin, as we have noted in the previous section takes ordinary language as his explicit subject matter. We may add that his concern with language only sometimes submerge his discussions of particular philosophical questions. Though Austin is practicing for the most part, a version of the "ordinary language" method in philosophy, in "A Plea for Excuses", he suggests that "'linguistic phenomenology', though it is rather a mouthful might be a better name for his way of doing philosophy than 'linguistic' or 'analytic' philosophy or 'the analysis of language'".[24] In what follows we shall concentrate on Austin's method of linguistic phenomenology, and how it enables him to proceed constructively and creatively forging new theories about language and raising philosophical questions about them. In our discussion we shall fall back not only upon his important papers in this regard but also upon his doctrine of speech act as put forth in the HDTW and summarized in the previous section from the HDTW.

Austin himself makes no effort in formulating the significance of the phenomenological impulses and data in his work in distinguishing it from the work of linguistic science. But the title 'linguistic phenomenology' even in its bare form is suggestive. It suggests that the clarity Austin seeks in philosophy is to be achieved through mapping the field of consciousness lit by the occasions of a word, not through

analyzing or replacing a given word by others. In this sense his philosophical method was not analytical. [25]

Austin regards words as tools and recommends that to use words properly we must guard us against the traps that language sets up. This is very much reminiscent of Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations*. Austin says,

> ... words are not (except in their own little corner) facts or things : We need therefore to prise them off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can relook at the world without blinkers. [26]

How are the conceptual blinkers to be removed? In "A Plea for Excuses" Austin recommends the following procedure:

> When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not *merely* at words (or *'meanings'*, whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena. [27]

The key to understanding Austin is that in doing linguistic phenomenology, we are examining the "realities" when we examine what we ought to say when. We do not *merely* look at the words as data and infer something about the world. Rather the two processes of examining

words or language and examining the world, that is, the circumstances in which utterances occur, go together. When Austin speaks of prising words "off the world" he does not mean, to dichotomize the realities, the phenomena, and the ways we talk about them.

James F. Harris, Jr. has interpreted Austin's remarks in "A Plea for Excuses" as a relationship of 'inseparability' between words or language and the world. Comparing Austin's position to early Wittgenstein he says that Wittgenstein seems to accept the strict dichotomy between language and the world; that Wittgenstein's claim that propositions must share the essential feature with reality which he called 'logical form' was thus his way of 'bridging the gap' between language and reality. This is substantiated by the two following passages from the *Tractatus* :

(4.12) Propositions can represent the whole of reality, but they cannot represent why they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it–logical form.

(4.121) Propositions cannot represent logical form: It is mirrored in them. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses *itself* in *language*, *we* cannot express by means of language, propositions *show* the logical form of reality. They display it.

(4.1212) What *can* be shown *cannot* be said. [28]

Extending his interpretation to Austin's doctrine of speech act, Harris: says,

> The realities, the phenomena, and the ways we talk are inseparably bound together such as in the act of promising and the felicitous uttering of numerous

locutions. The whole doctrine of the illocutionary force of an utterance requires us to regard acts of *doing* something and *acts* of saying something as inseparable, and, in these cases, the utterances are not *descriptions* of the phenomena; they are indistinguishable from the phenomena themselves and indeed, upon occasions may partially constitute the phenomena. [29]

Both James Harris and Stanley Cavell have mentioned Stuart Hampshire's characterization of Austin's procedure but have understood it differently. Stuart Hampshire, in the memorial essay written for the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* distinguishes "two slightly different theses that can plausibly be attributed to him: "a strong and a weak theses".[30]

The strong theses is this : "For every distinction of word and idiom that we find in common speech, there is a reason to be found, if we look far enough, to explain why these distinctions exist. The investigation will always show that the greatest possible number of distinctions have been obtained by the most economical linguistic means."[31] "The weaker, or negative, thesis is that we must first have the facts, and all the facts, accurately stated before we erect a theory upon the basis of them." [32] The weaker thesis is 'negative', presumably, because it counsels study of ordinary language as a preliminary to philosophical advance, whereas the stronger thesis amounts to an application of Leibniz's *Principle of Sufficient Reason* to ordinary language, viz., there is a reason which explains why every distinction in ordinary language is there, and if we look long enough and hard enough, we will find it. It claims, "That the multiplicity of fine distinctions, which such a study would disclose,

would by itself answer philosophical questions about free will, perceptions, namings and describing conditional statements."[33]

Both Harris and Cavell have referred to the response of J.O. Urmson and G.J. Warnock repudiating Hampshire's characterisations of Austin. [34] They reject the weaker these on the ground that it is an "unambitious statement which cannot properly or even plausibly be magnified into a guiding *doctrine* ... or recipe." They reject Hampshire's suggestion that Austin ever held the strong thesis. Such a strong thesis ignores, they claim, the fact that Austin did not claim that all philosophical questions can be answered by attending to fine distinctions.[35] In prising words off the world and holding them apart and against it he is rather trying to remove traditional theories about language in order to relook and see afresh how men use language in situations, that is, in the world. In *How to Do Things with Words* Austin says that he wants to examine the ways "... in which to say something is to do something."[36] This indicates how important he considers the affinity between saying and doing and between language on the one hand and events, facts, or reality on the other. But it is quite another thing to say that language and reality are inseparable. When Austin proposes an elucidation of the total speech acts in the total speech situations:

> The [E]lucidation is a relooking, a looking without
> blinkers, a seeing things freshly. And the things to be so
> viewed are not the things or facts that make up the universe
> but the whole complex nexus of men doing things in the
> world by way of using words.[37]

W. Cerf's review article on Austin's *How to Do Things with Words* makes a comparison between Husserl and Austin. Husserl emphasized the

things and facts in this world as we experience them and Austin's concern was with the words and their uses. Husserl was interested in the acts performed by consciousness and their directedness towards objects. What is of importance in Husserl's formulation of his philosophical task is the analysis that is, unprejudiced descriptions of the objects given to consciousness–objects, the totality of which is the world. What makes Austin's elucidation of the total speech act in the total speech situation phenomenological is the programme of removing blinkers, that is, seeing as it were and relooking at things, which was epitomized in Husserl's slogan 'back to the things themselves'. As Anthony Mansur puts it, "Both wanted to get rid of the prejudices which philosophers have inherited and start philosophy afresh, as is shown by Husserl's slogan 'Back to the things themselves' which I think Austin would have been willing to re-echo."[38] The point of this resemblance is the useful discovery that what Husserl wants to achieve through conscious acts Austin seeks to achieve through words and their uses. We shall not stop here to consider whether Husserl and Austin's account of their respective methods are really free from prejudices. What we want to note is that Austin's methodological notion of linguistic phenomenology has been seen as affording a bridge between Anglo-American linguistic philosophy and Continental phenomenology. As Walter Cerf himself says, "Austin's linguistic phenomenology is, to some degree, the counterpart 'in the formal mode' of mundane phenomenology – if I may so call a broad stream of continental phenomenology..."[39] What is more important for our present purpose is the hint that is dropped by Cerf. He visualizes the possibility of elucidating the total speech act in the total speech situation toward an existential analysis of sorts. He says "From this perspective it will no

longer sound preposterous to say that Austin was moving unknowingly from logico-linguistic analysis in the direction of existential analysis." [40] In the next chapter we shall elaborate on this.

C: P. F. Strawson

Our purpose for studying the selected area of philosophy of language i.e. speech act and the word–world relationship from a phenomenological perspective is to establish a relationship between two ontologically different domains; one is the world of language and the other is the world of objects or the external world, i.e., the world in which we live and move. In other words, the search is for the interaction between human beings and the objects existing in the world in which human beings live– the manner in which human beings arrange and establish a relationship with the world around him. At the center of this venture is the twentieth century philosophy about which we have discussed much in our writing. At the beginning of the twentieth century philosophy is the analytic philosophy, which tries to establish the relationship between word and world by analyzing the language, which we normally use, and thus solve the philosophical problems, which we face. To solve such philosophical problems Frege speaks about sense and reference of linguistic expressions. Richard Rorty also mentions in the introduction to the *Linguistic Turn*[1] that philosophical problems can be solved by analyzing the language which we use and thus analyzing the reality. Wittgenstein also writes in the *Philosophical Investigations* and in his other writings that the analysis of language is a necessary measure to solve our philosophical problems when he says, "For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.[2]   The philosophers in the analytic

tradition try to solve the philosophical problems through a logical analysis of the meaning of linguistic expressions.

One fundamental set of issues that has been central to much of P.F. Strawson's work is a concern with a certain fundamental operation of speech and the objects of that operation. He regards speech as thought (his frequent locution is 'speech or thought'). By speech operations he means the operation of reference and predication or the grammatical categories of subject and predicate. As such he is taking about a question in the philosophy of language. But it is also a question in ontology or metaphysics. Thus, he relates philosophy of language with ontology and metaphysics. Before discussing how he relates philosophy of language with ontology and metaphysics let us have a look at his concern with language

Strawson, like later Wittgenstein, Ayer, Ryle, Austin, and Searle, is interested in ordinary language. Strawson's criticism of ideal language philosophy is a *locus classicus* of the tasks of ordinary language philosophy. Referring to the improved constructed concepts of ideal language he asks:

> ......if the clear mode of functioning of the constructed
> concepts is to cast light on problems and difficulties rooted
> in the unclear concepts, then precisely the ways in which
> the constructed concepts are connected with and depart
> from the unconstructed concepts must be plainly shown.
> And how can *this* result be achieved without accurately
> describing the modes of functioning of the unconstructed
> concepts? But this task is precisely the task of describing
> the logical behaviour of the linguistic expressions of natural

languages; and may—*by itself* achieve the sought–for resolution if the problems and difficulties are rooted in the elusive, descriptive mode of functioning of constructed concepts.[3]

Strawson is interested in the philosophical study of speech acts. In fact, Strawson's "On Referring"[4] might be considered as his beginning such a study. Strawson distinguishes between the 'use' of a sentence and the 'utterance' of a sentence or it may be said between the 'use' of an expression and 'utterance' of an expression. In other words, the question is how to fill up the gap between the meaning of the sentences and speaker's intentions in using sentences which is a basic question of all languages. According to Strawson, there is no essential connection between meaning and use of language to communicate. To him the rules of language are 'public rules', accessible to all speakers in common. By distinguishing between these two factors of a sentence or an expression he focuses on the fact that speaking is something people do.

Strawson in his article "Meaning and Truth" mentions the conflict between the theorists of communication-intention and the theorists of formal semantics.[5] According to the former, ".... it is impossible to give an adequate account of the concept of meaning without reference to the possession by speakers of audience-directed intentions of a certain complex kind,"[6] namely, those involved in an analysis of such locutions as 'By uttering x, s, means that p'. The theorists of formal semantics, by contrast, maintain that "... the system of semantic and syntactical rules, in the mastery of which knowledge of language consists—the rules which determine the meanings of sentences—is not a system of rules for communicating at all"[7]. Strawson calls the struggle over such a central

issue in philosophy as 'Homeric' having "...on the one side, say, Grice, Austin and the latter Wittgenstein; on the other, Chomsky, Frege, and the earlier Wittgenstein."[8]

Although these opposed views share some common grounds,[9] their difference is with regard to the relations between the meaning-determining rules of the languages, on the one hand, and the function of communication on the other. While the communication theorists insist that the general nature of those rules can be understood only by reference to the function of communication, the other party advances the notion of truth conditions. That the sense of a sentence is determined by its truth conditions is to be found in Frege and early Wittgenstein. Strawson in his article also mentions Donald Davidson[10] (who is hailed as a pioneer of the truth- theoretic account of meaning)[11]. Strawson argues that the theory of formal semantics is not, though it may seem to be, independent of a theory of communication.

The query, "whether the notion of the truth conditions can itself be explained without reference to the function of communications"[12] receives a negative answer from Strawson. His argument proceeds on the assumption that " ... most of the weight both of a general theory of meaning and of particular semantic theories falls on the notion of truth-conditions and hence on the notion of truth."[13] Now what according to Strawson, are truth-conditions or what does Strawson mean by the notion of truth? According to him, "One who makes a statement or assertion makes a true statement if and only if things are as, in making that statement, he states them to be".[14] That is to say, meaning is determined by truth-conditions. And the meaning of a sentence is determined by these rules which determine how things are stated to be by

one who in uttering the sentence in given conditions, makes a statement. Strawson finds that the consideration of the notion of truth leads to audience-directed intentions. He says that the thesis that meaning of sentences of a language is to be elucidated in terms of rules which determine truth-conditions, "far from being an alternative to a communication theory of meaning, leads us straight into such a theory of meaning."[15] Strawson's communication-intention theory may be considered, as a theory of what Ferdenand de Saussure would have called *parole*. "We connect meaning with truth and truth, too simply, with sentences; and sentences belong to language. But as theorists we know nothing of human language unless we understand human speech."[16]

Strawson does not distinguish between statement and speech act. Starawson's distinction between 'speech-episode' or 'utterance-occasion' which cannot be true or false and 'statement' which is either true or false raises the problem whether a body of statements can remain isolated from human intentions. According to Strawson,' these two aspects are different from one another and are not reducible to one another. 'Speech-episode' or ' utterance-occasion' is ' the speaker's saying something' and statement is 'what the speaker speaks'.[17] In other words, 'statement' is not a manner of speaking something whereas 'speech-episode' is a manner of speaking something. According to Strawson 'speech-episode' is a particular utterance-occasion. Statements are detached from utterance- occasions although any statement must be uttered in a certain manner and the same statement may also be uttered in different utterance-occasions. A statement does not enter any of theses episodes and the truth and falsity of a statement has nothing to do with these episodes. He writes in the article "Truth", "Saying of a statement

that it is true is not related to saying of a speech-episode that it was true as saying of a statement that it was whispered is related to saying of a speech-episode that it was a whisper."[18] They are logically different from one another. Strawson maintains that from the case that the use of 'true' always accompanies an actual or possible episode which is the making of a 'statement' by someone, it does not follow that it is used to characterize such episodes. According to Strawson, to declare a 'statement' 'true' is not to declare that someone has made the statement but to consider the possibility of someone's making it.[19]

In this connection, Strawson criticizes Austin's view that it is basically about speech-episode that we predicate 'true.'[20] Austin regards truth as a characteristic of 'statements'. But Strawson does not accept the view that truth is a characteristic of 'statements'. He does not believe tha 'truth' is used in talking about anything . He rejects Austin's suggestion that the *episode* or the manner is the primary factor in the case of any sentence or assertion. Austin draws a clear cut distinction between 'statement' and sentence by saying that the same sentence may be used to make different statements and also different sentences may be used to make the same statement, when they are made with reference to the same situation or event.[21] But Strawson does not make any distinction between sentence and 'statement' Strawson takes into account neither the same sentence expressing different statements nor different sentences expressing the same statement, but the different occasions in which a sentence may be uttered. According to him, by using different sentences with different meanings we can make the same statement if all of them are used in the same sense, i.e., either in the true sense or in the false sense.[22] He cites in the article "Truth" the example that the

different sentences on different situations in which you say of Jones "He is ill", I say to Jones "You are ill", and Jones says "I am ill" make the same statement because all of them are used in the same sense, i.e., in the sense in which all of them are true. Strawson in his article "Truth" says, "People make the same statement when the words they use in the situations in which they use them are such that they must (logically) either all be making a true statement or all be making a false statement".[23]

Strawson appears to be particular about the identity of a statement as separate from that of a speech act. But at the same time he is unable to ignore the immediate relation between a statement and the utterance occasion as a sense-determining factor. His departure from Austin on this point does not lead us further in solving the problem regarding the relation between word and world.

Regarding the other correlate of correspondence relation Strawson refutes Austin's earlier view that a statement corresponds to a 'thing', 'event', 'situation', 'state of affairs', 'feature' and ' fact'.[24] He objects that Austin wrongly identifies 'facts' to things, i.e., stating to referring. According to Strawson 'facts' are different from things. Strawson agrees with Austin that while constructing statements we refer to a thing or person and characterize it. But he accepts these two aspects as the constituting aspect of a statement and regards them as the referring part and the describing part of a statement.[25] They refer to persons or things about which the 'statement' is about but not 'facts.' A reference can be correct if we refer correctly to a thing. Similarly, a description can be a fit when we describe correctly the person or thing. Strawson does not deny that the referring part and describing part of a statement refer to

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extra-linguistic something and describes extra-linguistic something respectively in this world. What he denies is that this reference makes the statement true because there is no extra-linguistic element in this world, which refers to the statement itself as a whole.[26] He holds that it is the thing and not the thing which makes a statement true. A statement is 'true' when it corresponds to 'facts' and not to 'things'. By 'facts' he means not the things (persons, states of affairs, etc.) about which the statement is, but the condition of the 'facts'.

Strawson's approach to language is logical. The 'fact' which makes a statement 'true', does not exist in this world. The statements are about things in the world which have a different logical status from 'facts' which the statements state. Strawson objects that this difference Austin fails to see, and include under 'facts', 'event', 'thing', 'person', 'state of affairs' etc. As there is nothing in this world which corresponds to a statement itself any attempt to search for such a relatum is to commit a 'logically fundamental type-mistake'.[27] The demand that there must exist some extra–linguistic thing in this world which makes a statement true or to which a true statement corresponds is such a demand. Austin's view that a statement is true if it is related with a speech episode in a certain way commits this type of error. Strawson in his article "Truth" expresses his concept of 'facts'. "Facts are what statements (when true) state; they are not what statements are about. They are not, like things or happenings on the face of the globe, witnessed or heard or seen , broken or over tuned, interrupted or prolonged, kicked, destroyed, mended or noisy".[28] The trouble with the correspondence theory of truth is that here 'correspondence' is misrepresented as the relation between statement an events or things or

groups of things and this very trouble is also found in Austin's theory of correspondence .

Strawson's philosophy of language also bears on his views on ontology and metaphysics. In his metaphysical views which is characterized as 'descriptive metaphysics' he says, "metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world".[29] He says that descriptive metaphysics aims to lay bare the most general features of our conceptual structure. According to him, it differs from conceptual analysis in 'scope and generality'. He does accept that a reliance upon a close examination of the actual uses of words is the best. But this is not general enough and far reaching enough being confined to the surface of language. This expresses Strawson's skepticism about the ability of language analysis to reveal the deep structure of our thought. The conceptual system consists in "The essential structure of ordinary language – that is, of language in its presently established uses. It is the dependably functioning medium of communication between people. Their way of talking to each other about the objects in their world that can be publicly identified and reidentified."[30]

According to Strawson, we think about particular things in terms of our conceptual scheme. Descriptive metaphysics accordingly is concerned with things of the world as they are which are revealed in our ordinary language through the way of communication. Descriptive metaphysics is a description of the actual use of ordinary language. Descriptive metaphysics is, of course, different from philosophical or logical or conceptual analysis. He takes the guidance of analysis of language to reveal the very structure of our conceptual scheme. Now this job could have been achieved by analytic philosophy. Certainly, the task

of analytic philosophy is to analyze and clarify the basic units of language. Descriptive metaphysics too lays emphasis on the method of analysis; hence it is just like the analytic philosophy in intension. But in 'scope and generality' descriptive metaphysics is fundamentally different from it. The aim of descriptive metaphysics is to lay bare "constitutive structures", which is not the function of analytical philosophy. Strawson says:

> Up to a point, the reliance upon a close examination of the actual use of words is the best and indeed the only sure way in philosophy. But the discriminations we can make, and the connections we can establish, in this way, are not general enough and not far-reaching enough to meet the full metaphysical demand for understanding. For when we ask how we use this or that expression, our answers, however revealing at a certain level, are apt to assume, and not to expose those general elements of structure which the metaphysician wants revealed. The structure he seeks does not readily display itself on the surface of language, but lies submerged. He must abandon his only sure guide when the guide cannot take him as far as he wishes to go."[31]

Our constitutive scheme gets involved in our ordinary language. This philosophical decision of Strawson justifies the reason for his reliance upon the method of analysis of the basic concepts of meanings of words and expressions of ordinary use. He says:

> Among the kinds of expressions which we, as speakers use to make reference to particular are some of which a

standard function in the circumstances of their use, to enable a hearer to identify to particular which is being referred to. Expressions of these kinds include some proper names, some pronouns, some descriptive phrases beginning with the definite article and expressions compounded of these.[32]

Strawson also says that the nature of his scheme could be better understood if the key concept of identification is understood. An expression which is used to refer to some particular has been called by him, an 'identifying reference'. Strawson's world of particular things is a unified spatio-temporal world of identifiable particular things. We identify a particular thing as exactly as it is in our single spatio-temporal world. A reality is that which has empirical ground, i.e., it is identifiable in a spatio-temporal framework. Strawson's descriptive metaphysics is a study of the reality that exists. It is opposed to Locke's idea and Kant's pure form of sensibility. If objects are given by means of ideas or forms of sensibility, one must fail to know the actual nature of objects.

A fundamental aspect of Strawson's approach to descriptive metaphysics is that his approach is developed by the application of the method of analysis of language. It marks a new direction in thinking that language analysis can be of help in ontology. It is expected from this that Strawson will appeal to and rely upon a close examination of actual use of words. Indeed, Strawson has relied upon a close examination of words and expressions, of ordinary use - but it is determined by the purpose - one such example is the use of the word "I". On that very basis of the ordinary use of the expression 'I', he attempted to explain the concept of person. Strawson said that our conceptual structure in terms

of which we think about the world is expressed in everyday speech, and so to understand how we operate our conceptual scheme we must understand how words and expressions of such everyday speech are used., With a view to make clear the actual behaviour of such words and expressions Strawson made a grammatical analyses of a sentence into its subject and predicate expressions. Strawson's analysis of the basic structure of the ordinary language shows the following features of it.

1) The semantic aspect of language is determined by the set of rules, habits and conventions.

2) As a medium of communication language is used in speaker-hearer context.

3) Some expressions of ordinary language, e.g., proper names, pronouns, descriptive phrases, etc., we as speakers use to make identifying references to particulars, persons and events, to enable our hearers to identify particulars which are referred to.

4) We not only make identifying references to particular things, but we think or say something about those particular things.

Strawson says, "One of the main purposes for which we use language is the purpose of stating facts about things and persons and events."[33] He says that, ".... the philosopher's principal task is the understanding of how our thought about things work, and that we cannot find out about these workings except by looking at how we use words."[34]

D: J. R. Searle

John Searle was among one of the analytic philosophers who shared the idea of the centrality of language to philosophy. He adopted the philosophical method of the logical analysis of language like Austin, Ryle, Strawson and Frege. Although gradually Searle had distinguished himself in a number of important ways from other analytic philosophers. Unlike other analytic philosophers he had taken a respect for common sense and for the results of modern science. Searle did not hold the view that major philosophical problems could be solved merely by attending to the use of words. In his *Speech Acts,* he held that language is to be found in the realms of consciousness and the mental in the midst of social and institutional reality. "In *Speech Acts,* he attempts to come to grips with the facts of language with utterances, with referring and predicating, and with acts of stating, questioning, commanding and promising."[1]

Two philosophers can, however, be named who had made early efforts to advance theory of speech act. Like Austin and Searle they also believed that language is a social act. The first is Thomas Reid and the second is Adolf Reinach. "Reid's technical terms for uses of language such as promising, warning, forgiving and so on are ' Social operations'. Sometimes he also calls them "social acts', opposing them to' solitary acts' such as judging, intendings, deliberatings and desirings." [2] According to Reid, the latter are characterized by the fact that their performance does not need any being other than the person who performs them; whereas the former, by contrast, must be directed to some other person. He called it a miniature 'civil society'; constituting both the one who initiates it and the one to whom it is directed.

Adolf Reinach was a member of a group of followers of Husserl based in Munich. He took Husserl's theory of linguistic meaning as depicted in *Logical Investigations*[3].

As his starting point for philosophical reflections on language, meaning and intentionality. In answer to the question what kinds of uses of language are involved in promises or questions or commands Reinach developed the first systematic theory of the performative uses of language, " not only in promising and commanding but also in warning, entreating, accusing, flattering, declaring, baptizing and so forth -phenomena that Reinach like Reid before him, called ' social acts.'"[4]

According to Searle, speaking a language is a rule-governed activity. This activity is expressed, " [firstly] that speaking a language is performing speech acts, acts such as making statements, giving commands, asking questions, making promises, and so on; and more abstractly, acts such as referring and predicating, and secondly, that these acts in general are made possible by and are performed in accordance with certain rules for the use of linguistic elements." [5]

Searle explained Austin's general theory of speech acts (which Austin adopted later after giving up his theory of performatives) in the framework of utterance, meaning and action taken together. "All three components are fated to play a significant role in the subsequent development of Searle's thinking." [6] He started with the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. The former, as he puts it simply regulates existing forms of behaviour. "For example, the rules of polite table behaviour regulate eating, but eating itself exists independent of these rules." [7] The latter, on the other hand, do not merely regulate; they also create or define new forms of behaviour. As

for example, the rules of chess engage us in the type of activity that we call playing chess . The constitutive rules do not occur alone. According to Searle, " Speech acts are acts characteristically performed by uttering expressions in accordance with certain constitutive rules." [8] As for example, "When we make a promise: we bind ourselves to performing certain actions in the future by using the power of collective acceptance to impose the corresponding function on our utterance and thus the status of obligation functions upon ourselves."[9]

Following Grice in his explanation of non-natural meaning Searle gave the following three conditions. Searle in his book *Speech Acts* wrote that in order to say that a speaker utters a sentence T and means what he says the following conditions must be satisfied:[10]

a. the speaker has an intention I that his utterance produces in the hearer the awareness that the state of affairs corresponding to T obtains,

b. the speaker intends to produce this awareness by means of the recognition of the intention I.

c. the speaker intends that this intention I will be recognized in virtue of the rules governing the elements of the sentence T.

Searle in his book *Speech Acts* introduced the concept of 'institutional fact'. He defined it as a fact whose existence presupposes the existence of certain systems of constitutive rules. Searle wrote, "When you perform a speech act, you create certain institutional facts" (you create what Reid referred to as a miniature 'civil society')".[11] According to Searle, institutional facts include certain cognitive ways in which we treat the world and each other and certain institutional contexts. He mentioned certain observer independent features of the

world - such as force, mass, and gravitational attraction. And he mentioned certain observer relative features of the world - such as money, property, marriage and government. The latter are institutional facts and as such systems of constitutive rules, according to Searle. He explained the constitutive rule in the form "X counts as Y in context C." [12]

Searle in his book *Speech Acts* gave a more detailed account of speech acts than Austin. As he not merely gave a general framework for a theory of speech acts but dealt with the specification of speech acts themselves. He distinguished between two kinds of felicity conditions; conditions on the *performance* of a speech act and conditions on its *satisfaction*, the former to issue a promise, the latter to keep the promise. Conditions on performance are further divided into preparatory, propositional, sincerity, and essential conditions. [13] According to Searle, a speech act is performed 'successfully and non-defectively' when certain propositional content, preparatory, essential and sincerity rules characterize the performance of an act. In case of the speech act of promising, these rules require that the words used by the speaker must predicate a future action of the speaker (propositional content rule), that both speaker and the hearer must want the action of the promise done and that it would not otherwise be done (preparatory rules), that the speaker must intend to perform the action of the promise (sincerity rule), and that the utterance of the promise counts as undertaking an obligations to perform the action of the promise (essential rule). Each of these rules commits the speaker to certain obligations. The reorganization on the hearer's side of the speaker's obligations and his willingness to be committed is the illocutionary effect of the performative act on the hearer.

In "A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts" Searle classified the relationship between language and reality into two kinds. One from word to world, other from world to word. [14] According to Searle, the act of promise is tied with the concept of obligation which is an institutional concept. When I engage in the activity of promising, I thereby subject myself in a quite specific way to the corresponding system of constitutive rules. In virtue of this, I count as standing under an obligation."[15] He holds that, "Language, above all, enables us to bind ourselves in the future, not only in acts of promising but also in a range of other ways." [16]

In his career, Searle was not content to study mere uses of language. "He is perfectly clear that, even when we have classified and fully understood the uses of verbs or adverbs of given types, there will still remain genuine philosophical problems to be solved." [17] In *Intentionality*, Searle developed his speech acts theory to a theory of intentionality.[18] Like Brentano Searle also used the term intentional as mental. Accordingly we can distinguish two factors: the *type* or *quality* of the act which is sometimes called its Illocutionary force and *content* of the act which is called the *propositional element.*

Searle in his article, "Collective Intentions and Actions"[19] explained his idea about collective intentionality. According to Searle, human beings are able to engage with others in cooperative behaviour in such a way as to share the special types of beliefs, desires and intentions involved in such behaviour. This is called the collective intentionality. The non-human animals also have this capacity in a very small degree. The reason is perhaps that the non-human animals do not have the capacity of using improved language and symbolizing devices as the

human beings have. That is why that the non-human animals can hunt but they cannot promise. To Searle, language is a basic social institution. He distinguished between individual intentionality and collective intentionally. Individual intentionality is subject dependant fact and collective intentionality is social fact.

J. L. Austin and J. Searle were the main exponents of the speech act theory. The speech act theory was developed during the middle of the twentieth century when the investigation of the analytic philosophers into language was on the peak. As such the logical positivists were dominating then. Some of the famous logical positivists were A. J. Ayer, G. Bergmann, R. Carnap, H. Feigl, V. Kraft, M. Schilick and F. Waismann. The logical positivists focused on the meaning of language on its sentential level irrespective of the contextual background in which it is used. All they looked at were the truth conditions of the sentences. At the beginning, J. L. Austin and J. Searle also started with language like the logical positivists. They also focused on the sentential structure of language. "But they viewed sentences not as artifacts that carry meaning on their own shoulders, but as *issuances* by speakers for the benefit of their hearers."[20] According to them sentences are issuances, performances or actions whose meaning is understood only by taking into account the role of the speakers, the hearers and the rest of the context of the issuance. They hold that the main units of philosophical analysis into language are the whole speech acts and not sentences. Searle has labelled speech acts-"the basic or minimal units of linguistic communication."[21] Searle says that when we use language we perform some sort of act according to certain rules and in case of such speech acts the roles of the speaker and the hearer are equally important; they are

meaningful only in a specific social context. According to Searle in this sense promise, order, and assertions all are speech acts.

Searle, in the introduction of the paper " What is a Speech Act",[22] explains speech act as an act performed in a speech situation-involving speaker, a hearer, an utterance by the speaker. The speaker by his utterance performed many kinds of acts like making statements, asking questions, issuing commands, giving reports greetings and warnings. The speech act is performed with the help of verbs like state, assert, describe, warn, remark, comment, command, order, request, criticize, apologize, assure, approve, etc. According to Austin, there were over a thousand such verbs in English.

Searle in the article "What is a Speech Act?" writes, "I think it is of interest and importance in the philosophy of language to study speech acts, or as they are sometimes called, language acts or linguistic acts. I think it is essential to any specimen of linguistic communication that it involves a linguistic act. It is not as has generally been supposed, the symbol, or word or sentence or even the token of the symbol or word or sentence, which is the unit of linguistic communication, but rather it is the production of the token in the performance of the speech act that constitutes the basic unit of linguistic communication. To put this point more precisely, the production of the sentence taken under certain conditions is the illocutionary act, and the illocutionary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication."[23] He distinguished between just uttering some sounds or making marks and performing a speech act. The difference between them is that while performing speech act the sound or marks which one makes *have meaning* and by those sounds or marks one *means* something.

While discussing illocutionary acts, which Searle regarded as 'the minimal unit of linguistic communication', he faced the necessity of distinguishing between two factors: the difference between the thing which one means by saying some words and the thing, which has a meaning. To point out the difference Searle borrowed the idea of Paul Grice in this matter. In an article entitled "Meaning", Grice gives the analysis of the notion 'meaning' as "To say that A meant something by x is to say that 'A intended the utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.'"[24] Searle accepted this analysis as a useful start because according to him, in speaking a language the speaker attempts to communicate things to his hearer by means of getting him to recognize the speaker's intention to communicate just those things. Moreover, it shows the close relationship between the notion of meaning and the notion of intention. However, Searle realised that Grice's account of meaning is unable to show the connection between one's meaning something by uttering an utterance and the actual meaning of the utterance in language. Moreover, Grice's account of 'meaning' is limited to speaker's intention to mean something and the hearer's recognition of the speaker's intention. According to Searle, "Meaning is more than a matter of intention, it is also a matter of convention."[25] As such he amended Grice's account of meaning by writing, "We must therefore reformulate the Grician account of meaning in such a way as to make it clear that one's meaning something when one says something is more than just contingently related to what the sentence means in the language one is speaking".[26]

Searle in his analysis of illocutionary acts, takes into account both the intentional and the conventional aspects and the relationship between

them. Searle explained the amended Gricean analysis of 'meaning' in connection with explaining 'How to promise', "The speaker intends to produce a certain illocutionary effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect and he also intends this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the lexical and syntactical character of the item he utters conventionally associates it with producing that effect." [27]

Searle speaks about indirect speech acts in the book *Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts.* [28] Searle argues for the principle of expressibility, the principle that whatever can be meant can be said. From this it can be said that an analysis of illocutionary verbs must not be confused with an analysis of illocutionary acts. For example, from the fact that some verbs such as "hint", and "insinuate" do not name types of illocutionary acts some philosophers conclude that hint or insinuate is an implicit manner of performing a speech act, that some types of meaning, therefore, are inherently inexpressible. Again this Searle's point is that hinting, insinuating, etc., are not part of meaning in the sense that they are neither part of illocutionary force or illocutionary content. [29] He says that there are certain utterances which although do not have the grammatical form of a performative but rather have the grammatical form of a statement can perform an illocutionary act. For example utterances like 'I will be there on time', or 'I want you to come to home early' lack the character of having an illocutionary verb and have the grammatical form of a statement. Although they are performing the illocutionary act of stating yet they are performing additionally the illocutionary act of promising and requesting respectively. Searle says

that the illocutionary verbs used in these cases are only one kind of illocutionary force indicating devices (IFID).[29]

Searle's view on indirect speech acts is about the relations between literal sentences meaning and speaker's utterance meaning where utterance meaning differs from the literal meaning for the expression uttered. He holds that in case of indirect speech acts the speaker's intended utterance meaning is distinguished from the literal sentence meaning. In case of indirect speech acts the literal meaning is not taken into consideration; factors such as context and the intentions of speakers are considered. That utterance 'Can you tell me the time?' is an indirect speech act because it is not an actual illocutionary act of questioning but an intended illocutionary act of requesting. The speaker must know that the person to whom he or she is requesting has the ability to tell the time. Here the relationship between the intended illocutionary act and illocutionary act that is actually used is conventional. The context is enough to assume that the speaker does not intend to communicate the utterance's literal meaning but the intended utterance meaning of request. And no inference is required on the part of the hearer to understand that speaker's intended utterance meaning is that of request. In case of indirect speech act too conventionality plays a significant role.

There have been two apparently inconsistent stands in speech acts theory. One stand is most prominently associated with the name of Grice.[30.] He treats individual intentionality as the fundamental notion in the theory of speech acts. In his analysis, there is no suggestion that convention, rules or social practices are in any way essential for the performance of speech acts. A second tradition associated with Austin's HTDW and Searle's early *Speech Acts* emphasizes the role of social

institutions in the performance of speech acts. On this view social convention, rule and context of utterance play a crucial role in the determination of speech act. Meaning, on this view, is not just a product of individual intentionality but it is also a product of social practices. There is something profoundly misleading about this account of speech acts in terms of individual intentionally. Searle says, "It is as if the solitary subject could solipsistically impose conditions of satisfaction on his utterances and thus bestow meaning on what would otherwise be neutral sound in the world."[31] In case of indirect speech acts the literal meaning is not taken into consideration; factors such as context and the intentions of speakers are considered. That utterance 'Can you tell me the time?' is an indirect speech act because it is not an actual illocutionary act of questioning but an intended illocutionary act of requesting. The speaker must know that the person to whom he or she is requesting has the ability to tell the time. Here the relationship between the intended illocutionary act and illocutionary act that is actually used is conventional. The context is enough to assume that the speaker does not intend to communicate the utterance's literal meaning but the intended utterance meaning of request. And no inference is required on the part of the hearer to understand that speaker's intended utterance meaning is that of request. In case of indirect speech act too conventionality plays a significant role.

There have been two apparently inconsistent stands in speech acts theory. One stand is most prominently associated with the name of Grice[32] He treats individual internationality as the fundamental notion in the theory of speech acts. In his analysis, there is no suggestion that convention, rules or social practices are in any way essential for the

performance of speech acts. A second tradition associated with Austin's HTDW and Searle's early *Speech Acts* emphasizes the role of social institutions in the performance of speech acts. On this view social convention, rule and context of utterance play a crucial role in the determination of speech act. Meaning, on this view, is not just a product of individual intentionality but it is also a product of social practices. There is something profoundly misleading about this account of speech acts in terms of individual intentionally. Searle says, "It is as if the solitary subject could solipsistically impose conditions of satisfaction. On his utterances and thus bestow meaning on what would otherwise be neutral sound in the world."[33]

Searle argues that the performance of speech acts and thus the creation of speaker's meaning is able to function against the presupposition, rules convention and practices. It is not likely that a person makes a promise to another person only once in the whole human history because something counts as a promise if it is part of a general institution or practice of promising. Social institutions are a part of social reality, made possible by systems of constitutive rules. Some speech acts, usually of a rather simple kind, such as greetings and simple requests, do not in this way require systems of constitutive rules. Most of the speech acts, however, require extra-linguistic institutions. If we ask about the relationship of speech acts to the world the answer is language is an aspect of human social life and speech acts make reference to social institutions which are not natural phenomena or a part of our natural history. The world, so to say, scooped out as relevant for the performance of speech act is not the world as is ordinarily understood, but the social world where individuals are in social relationship meaning things by what

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they say and communicating among themselves. What makes some given practices, social practices is that they essentially refer to other agents in the society besides the speaker himself and the functioning of these practices requires the contract between different agents in society. For some types of speech acts Searle speaks of a word-world relationship – the direction of fit is from the words to the world. All the members of the assertive class which are assessed in the truth-false dimension commit the speaker to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition. This is what Seale means by word-world fit. The assertive class will contain most of Austin's expositives. In directives, on the other hand, the relationship is reversed. They are attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something, for example, "I order you to shut the door", "I request you to attend the meeting", etc. Here the direction of fit is from world to words. In these cases Searle utilizes the two components of a speech act: the propositional element and the illocutionary force.

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Chapter III

Phenomenological Account of Language and Meaning

Preamble

In our foregoing discussion on Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson and Searle we have so far dealt with speech or human linguistic behaviour as an object of logical/empirical analysis. We have not explicitly accounted for the phenomenon of 'communication' in any of these approaches. As Richard Lanigan says, "Speech acts in this account are only a part of the object of consciousness which is human behaviour generally or as Searle would say, 'form of behaviour'". It is through the phenomenological analysis that there emerges an account of speech as humanly existential within the phenomenon of communication, rather than speech as a linguistic paradigm of only logical significance. From this point of view the concept of 'speech act' in Austin's sense would be an apt choice for us to come up with a phenomenological significance of it, principally from the standpoints of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. It is interesting to note that not only Austin's, but also Wittgenstein's philosophical project is found to have interconnection with the work of Husserl. This is a matter needing probe. Before we delve into it we propose to prepare the ground by elaborating the phenomenological standpoint in the light of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

Continental philosophy, perhaps simply because it stands far removed from the analyst's open preoccupation with verbal expressions, has not drawn attention to its implications in the realm of philosophy of language, comparable to that of the work of Wittgenstein, although the

major exponents of phenomenology have not failed to treat the subject. If we care to compare the extreme type of logical atomism with the phenomenological view stark contrast appears between phenomenology and the analytic movement in the beginning. In the case of early analysis, the relation of language to experience is through clearly stated protocol sentences, which express simple facts. If one turns to early phenomenology it is not at all certain that linguistic problems are even major problems for the philosopher. But as the phenomenologist started to explore wider areas it became apparent that language does constitute a major problem. For example, it appears that frequently a larger problem for the phenomenologist is the relationship between the speaker and the language. Speech as an intentional act is more central. For several reasons an examination of Husserl, and particularly, Merleau-Ponty's rather extensive writings on language seems specifically appropriate for our purpose.

A: Edmund Husserl

Husserl's theory of meaning develops in two stages, in his early writings, at the core of which is the *Logical Investigations*[1] and in his latter writings which is the constitutive phase of his philosophical development.

Husserl in his early writings develops his theory of meaning in sharp opposition to naturalism and psychologism of his times. He introduces his theory of meaning by making several distinctions such as (i) 'the act of meaning' which confers meaning on words or symbols and thereby enables them to mean, to refer to 'objects', (ii) the 'objects' meant or referred to by the expression and (iii) meaning in the sense of

'an ideal content'. To emphasise the distinctive presence of the 'act of meaning' and its functions Husserl introduces yet another vital distinction between 'sign' and 'expression'.

In ordinary discourse these terms are used synonymously but according to Husserl, they do not always coincide in application. He says, "Every sign is a sign for something, but not every sign has a meaning, a 'sense' that the sign 'expresses'".[2] "A sign *qua* sign is only an indicator, and it stands in an indicative relation to what 'it signifies'".[3] Husserl's own examples are ".... a brand is the sign of a slave, a flag that of a nation."[4]

The distinction between sign and expression makes one thing clear: The essence of an expression does not consist either in its indicating function or in its relation to language. The life of an expression, according to Husserl, consists in certain acts carried out by the person concerned in his inner mental life, and these are what he called acts of meaning — the meaning conferring acts and the meaning fulfilling act.

Expressions are also means of communication; an expression communicates the thought, and that which the communication of the speaker entertains. On the level of communication expression is intertwined with indication. But when there is no communication language is superfluous. In monologue, strictly speaking, there is no hearer, no speaker, and no use of words. The person lives only in the understanding of the word which alone makes the expression an expression.[5] Husserl's distinction between indicative and expressive signs has been critiqued by Jacques Derrida.[6] It has attracted critical notice of continental as well as Anglo-American philosophers. The real import of Derrida's critique is deemed as follows:

Derrida's deconstruction of Husserl's view of meaning is neither a refutation nor a denial of Husserl's view. Nonetheless, it is polemical and the polemic is directed not only against Husserl but against the entire tradition of Western metaphysics right from Plato onwards. The entire Greek and European tradition is inexorably linked to logo-centrism—the dominance of the principle of reason. Derrida finds Husserl trapped in it despite his criticism of metaphysical speculation. His indication-expression distinction testifies to that[7].

According to Husserl, each expression not only has a meaning (says something) but also refers to certain objects (says it of something). He will make a distinction between meaning and reference. According to him, "An expression only refers to an objectivity correlate because it means something, it can rightly be said to signify and name the object through its meaning."[8] "But the object never coincides with the meaning."[9] Owing to this relation between meaning and reference Husserl's theory of meaning leads to the rejection of the referential theory of meaning. It is the mental act and not the object of reference which accounts for an expression having significance. Still, Husserl could not explain away the fact of reference, every expression involves a reference to an object. The problem of reference leads Husserl to bring in the concept of intentionality. Intentionality is that essential property of consciousness whereby every act of consciousness is consciousness of something. An expression has reference to the object because the meaning act involved in the expression is intentionally directed towards the object. Thus the intentional structure of meaning act enables Husserl

to explain the fact of reference without involving causalistic metaphysics or ontological commitment with regard to the objects of reference.

The concept of intentionality leads to the conclusion that the meaning of an expression is independent of the existence or non-existence of the 'object' meant or referred to by the expression. That which the expression names or designates need not necessarily be an existent object. For example, we say "Macbeth saw the dagger". Macbeth performed the intentional act of perceiving. The dagger was intended in the act of perception, even though the dagger did not exist and was fictitious. The expression secures reference to an intentional object just by virtue of the mental act that entertains meaning.

Another aspect of Husserl's theory of meaning is that he speaks about meanings as "ideal unities". Husserl's primary reason for regarding meaning as ideal unities is that one identical meaning can be repeated in several acts of meaning. Thus in the case of word meanings, a word uttered thousand times, remains the same word although each act of utterance is different from every other one. Correspondingly, Husserl speaks about an "eidetic language" or "essential language", and regards it as an ideal language. All other empirical languages are "realisations" of the "eidetic" language or essential language. That means the "eidetic" or essential language determines the form of all other languages.

In his later writings a change is discernable as Husserl speaks about language as "speech" and not as formal language. 'Language as speech' a process of concretization of ideal language. His earlier concept of structural language transforms into constitutive language.[10] However, these two aspects of Husserl's philosophy of language should not be taken as opposite or irreducible to each other. rather together they

constitute a satisfactory account of the philosophy of language. The ideal language constitutes the *a-priori* form of all languages and the empirical languages supply the content for the ideal language.[11]

Husserl's theory of meaning as found in the constitutive phase of Husserl's philosophy of language views language from the standpoint of noetic act and *Labenswelt*, that is, life-world.

Husserl's 'constitutive' aspect of meaning is the unity of the linguistic expression and its meaning but this unity is not an external unity because the meaning intending act or *noetic act* is an internal act which is performed by the speaker uttering the linguistic expression. The meaning-intending act is regarded as an 'intentional experience' by Husserl. By an 'intentional-experience' Husserl means consciousness of an object and the directedness of the consciousness towards an object. The meaning intending act does not merely imply the meaning of linguistic expressions. It implies more than the combination of certain words. It means something through which it refers to an object. Husserl states, "While speaking we perform an inner act of meaning which mingles itself with the words and at the same time animates them".[12] The linguistic expression is the objective phenomenon of language and the meaning giving aspect or the *noetic act* is the *experience of language*. Husserl gives importance to the latter rather than to the former because according to him, the meaning-intending act unites the linguistic expression and the meaning of language. Language in its 'constitutive' form is speech, which is experienced by consciousness. The linguistic expression does not exist independently of human consciousness. The human consciousness constitutes linguistic expression and uses it. In this sense the objective phenomenon of linguistic expression is constituted by the meaning-giving

act or *meaning-intending-act* of the speaker. According to Husserl, the phenomenological analysis of meaning is an analysis of meaning in its entirety, i.e., it is an analysis both from the 'objective' aspect and the 'subjective' aspect; that means both from the aspect of 'meant as such' and the 'act of meaning' which is an intentional act. As such the 'phenomena of meaning' is not merely the logical structure of language in isolation but in communication with 'the act of meaning'.

In the terminology of philosophy of language the transition from *'language'* to *speech* leads us to intentional communication.[13] Husserl writes: "The environment, which constitutes itself in the experience of the other, in the reciprocal understanding, and in agreement is called by us the 'communicative environment'."[14] Speech is the interaction between the speaker and the hearer in the *'communicative environment'*. Husserl's phenomenological attitude is constituted of both his earlier 'Edietic' phase and the later 'constitutive' phase where the 'Eidetic' phase is essentials for the *'intentional act'* of communicating subjects because it is only in the situation of inter-subjective communication that a linguistic expression gets its meaning. As such the phenomenological attitude to language entails at the same time both the subjectivity and the objectivity. Parain also says that in the Husserlian manner language is "neither subject nor object, is pertaining neither to one nor to the other, **subject** whilst I am speaking, object whilst I hear myself speaking".[15]

The existentialist philosopher Heidegger has much in common with Husserl. Heidegger relates language with human existence. According to Heidegger, language is not merely a tool which is used in order to communicate thoughts. The essential function of language is to disclose the existence of a man to himself which he regards as the *Being*. That

means language is an awareness of *Being*. In this respect Heidegger distinguishes between authentic and inauthentic language. In authentic language the existence of the speaker encounters things and other people. In authentic language a human being does not use language as a tool rather language arises from human existence. In inauthentic language the speaker uses language as a tool in order to express his thought where human existence is partially related to language. According to Heidegger, "In the former case, we *speak* in the true sense, in the latter case, we 'make use' of a tool".[16]   From the existential standpoint the relation between existence and the   authenticity of language is interdependent. The more authentic the speaker's language is, the more existent he is, and the less authentic the speaker's language is the less existent he is. The existentialist thinker Martin Buber in his *I and Thou* distinguishes between two aspects of language, the 'living dialogue' and the 'objective expression'. His distinction is similar to Husserl's distinction between the linguistic expression of language and speech. Both of them agree on the point that the logicians give importance only to the linguistic construction of language. Moreover, Martin Buber speaks in the same manner in which Husserl says that the objective theory in the logical sense is rooted in the *Labenswelt*, that is, the objective expression arises from the living dialogue. Hans Lipps says in the Husserlian manner that real language consists not in the abstract form of it, but in the living conversation that takes place between person and person.[17] But his approach to language is closer to Wittgenstein when he rejects any attempt to construct theories of meaning, and gives importance to the meaning of words in relation to context. According to him, words cannot be given any readymade meaning.

Husserl departs from the formalist by admitting that the logical form is found in the nature of all languages, and it concerns also the content and not merely the structure. But Husserl's concept of 'ideal language' is being criticized by Wittgenstein, Ryle and Hans Lipps on the ground that language is not merely an ideal linguistic expression which is devoid of the context in which there is an interaction between the speaker and the hearer.[18] A satisfactory philosophy of language must include both the aspects of an ideal, personal expression and a real and interpersonal situation. Buber is the philosopher who takes care of both these aspects. According to him, man is personal in uttering sentences, but he becomes impersonal in observing his utterance as a hearer. The very concept of communication is based on the personal-impersonal characteristic of language.

The phenomenological approach to language is both a subjective and an objective approach. The difference between existentialists and Husserl is that the existentialist's concern is with individual existence whereas Husserl's phenomenological approach is not an existential approach to language. His approach to language is an 'intentional' approach. Husserl's Platonism does not refer to the existence of language in an ideal world. He is not concerned with the existence of language but with the experience of language. Philosophy is a study of the given. Husserl as a phenomenologist is not interested to go beyond the given. The given is the 'intended object' and the main concern of phenomenology is the given or the intended object. In the phenomenological term the object as intended is noema which is the objective aspect of phenomenology, and the act of intending is the noesis which is the subjective aspect of phenomenology.

The central theme of Husserl's phenomenology is noetic-noematic correlation. Both these aspects interact upon each other, but none of them affect the autonomy of the other. The charge of Platonism in the sense that in the theory of meaning we are searching the primary entities called meanings does not hold good of Husserl. According to Husserl, in the *meaning intending* experience we are not aware of the meaning itself because we do not concentrate on the meaning itself. We experience meaning. Meaning is derived from the *intentional act*. But the intentional act is not meaning searching act. It is only through an act of reflection that we could be aware of the meaning.

The two aspects of Humboldt's philosophy of language, the static and dynamic, which are the objective and subjective aspects respectively may be compared with Husserl's eidetic and constitutive phases of language. According to Humboldt, language in its static aspect is an ideal language which is perfect and all empirical languages are approximation of that ideal language.[19] In this aspect language has an existence of its own independent of man's use of language. In the dynamic aspect, language as a perfect construction, transforms into language as an activity.[20] In this respect language is not an ideal complete product, but an incomplete product, produced in living communication. Humboldt, also like Husserl, unites these two aspects of language. His concept of language is a unity of both the objective and subjective aspects of language.

B. Maurice Merleau-Ponty

The chief inspiration behind Merleau-Ponty's thought as a whole is the phenomenology that emerged in Germany in the early decades of the twentieth century. To understand Merleau-Ponty's work at all, one must appreciate the abiding commitment to Husserl's conceptions of phenomenological description as an antidote to abstract theorizing, conceptual system building and reductive phenomenological explanation. However, Husserl was not the only influence. He was also influenced by Heidegger and Sartre. Yet he is own approach outgrew crucially from Husserl as well as any other of the major figures of the phenomenological movement. Far from revealing realm of pure transcendental subjectivity separated from the external world by what Husserl deems 'a veritable abyss'[1], or the domain of ideal essences distinct in principle from all factual reality, phenomenological inquiry instead finds embodies agents immersed in worldly situations in virtue of perceptual affective attitudes whose contents are themselves often conceptually indeterminate.

Merleau-Ponty represents phenomenology as the constant relationship between perception of the world and the action of the perceiver on the world i.e. the knowledge of the world and the consciousness acting upon it. Hence, according to him, experience about the world consist in our being intentional, i.e., always directed toward the world and its acting upon it. He does not regard this relation of the consciousness and the world as a mere synthesis of them. Rather he says, 'It is a "living cohesion" in which I belong to myself while belonging to the world'[2]. The dualism of idealism and realism does not arise to Merleau-Ponty because for him both the subject (which has

consciousness) and the object (which belongs to the world) are real and equally important. Merleau-Ponty never speaks about a 'cogito' or absolute consciousness or transcendental consciousness, like Descartes or Husserl. For him, objects are perceived because they are presented before the body, and that also is due to the fact that the body is in a certain situation. In short, embodiment is a necessary condition of perception. Consciousness experiences anything by being embodied and its body is the measure of all perceptions. Phenomenologically, a disembodied consciousness is unable to perceive anything because nothing would appear before such a consciousness. In fact, nothing remains in order to appear before such a consciousness; knowledge is the communication of the embodied rational being with the world. According to Merleau-Ponty the relationship between consciousness and the world is reciprocal. The world is for the individual the ground on which it acts i.e. It is the *living-world* for him and without this world the individual's existence would be a mere private state of affairs. Similarly the worlds disconnected from the consciousness is merely and 'uninhabited' world'. Merleau-Ponty says in *The phenomenology of Perception*, "For a disembodied spirit or transcendental subjectivity there can be no perspective, and, far from everything appearing explicitly to such a consciousness, everything would cease to be, for such a world be uninhabited"[3]. And the phenomenological reduction is a method of studying both the world around the individual and the individual. The motive of the phenomenological reduction is neither ontological nor epistemological. The aim of the phenomenological reduction is to understand the notion of internationality, which ties the individual and the world. As such the phenomenological method is a method, which aims to describe *lived*

experiences. Indeed, far Merleau-Ponty, perception and the body together constitute *the* phenomenon most crucial to an understanding of what he calls our "being in the world", Merleau-Ponty's perceptual bedrock of human existence, remains his most profound and original contribution to philosophy.

Merleau-Ponty holds that the notion of consciousness is a notion of institution rather than a notion of constitution[4]. Consciousness is an institution which consists of consciousness and its directedness towards some object and all its members are closely connected. This relationship is not a relation between two distinct objects but it is a relation between two objects which do not have any separate existence. To speak in the terminology of Indian Philosophy this is like the Samavāya relationship of the vaiśeṣika too is a concept. Like the institution of truth, ideas and culture the institution of consciousness is based on the series of interchange between subjectivity and situation. Such interchange is to be found in the relation of consciousness with language and speech and it may also serve as an introduction to other symbolic institutions like history and social sciences. This interpretation of Merleau-Ponty goes against Husserl's early concept of constructing an '*eidetic*' of all possible symbolic structures and his concept of a universal timeless constituting consciousness. According to Merleau-Ponty consciousness, language and speech are correlation depending upon each other and the role of consciousness is not the role of a constituting consciousness as held by Husserl. As such the though of constructing an 'eidetic' of all possible symbolic structure is discarded by Merleau-Ponty on the ground that it would raise the problem of intersubjectivity. Merleau-Ponty holds that consciousness is revealed in the acts of expression like language, speech

as the world is revealed in the creations of the artist, in the writing of the writer. However, Husserl in his latter writing admits with Merleau-Ponty that language is not merely an external instrument of expressing thought or an external garb rather language is a part of thought because without language the existence of thought is not possible. Merleau-Ponty says, "we know what we have in mind or what we mean once we know how to say it, by a kind of permutation of the intentional object and its embodiment in an expressive gesture[5]. Without language thought would be devoid of any intersubjective value. It is by means of language that thought is expressed. In fact language shapes thought.

Against the view that linguistic meaning is private, a function of the inner life, Merleau-Ponty reacts in the following way:

> Thought (we might say, 'meaning') is no 'internal' thing, and does not exist independently of the world and of words. What misleads us in this connection, and causes us so believe in a thought (meaning) which exists far itself prior to expression, is thought already constituted and expressed, which we can silently recall to ourselves, and through which we acquire the illusion of an inner life[6].

In order to speak of a signification prior to an actual speaking one must first be able to speak, and internal speech, or thought, is possible only if one has, in fact, learned to speak in public. Private signification is contingent upon public, that is to say, a private language presupposes a public language. The thrust of Merleau-Ponty thinking is to eliminate reference to an occult region of 'internal' meaning. This is further reinforced by turning to the actual "speaking subject". For instance,

The orator does not think before speaking, not even while speaking; his speech is his thought. In the same way the listener does not form concepts on the basis of sigh[7].

Merleau-ponty distinguishes between the study of linguists and the study of the philosophers of language. The linguists treat language as an objective element whereas the philosophers see language as they are used by human beings i.e. language as speech act. The former is an investigation into a system of signs such as words and sentences; the latter is the investigation into the meaning as used by a speaker according to certain rules, customs and conventions of a society. Speech act is the use-value of language in which it is transformed from a system of signs to meaningful expression to both the speaker and the hearer. The institution of meaning is constituted by the speaker's intention to communicate something to the hearer and the hearers understanding of it. Husserl, in his earlier writings gives impotence to consciousness and considers language as secondary correlative of consciousness. Merleau-Ponty gives importance to both consciousness and language. In order to give the thought in the mind of the speaker a public status it has to be embodied in language otherwise such thought would be a mere private state which has nothing to communicate. Language from the phenomenological perspective is not a mere collection of signs or symbols; language is a human activity and since all other activities language can be best understood by studying human activities like history, social science and politics. Language becomes alive in a society and social men use language to uncover the world.

In the case of human communication Merleau-Ponty represents language as a living-encounter between interpersonal activities. Merleau-Ponty's concept of phenomenology is the communication between personal perception and expression, which is the combination of the act of consciousness and awareness in public encounter. Merleau-ponty defines phenomenology as the study of essences[8]. And essences are *meaning-as-lived*. Mearleau-Ponty speaks of four levels of phenomenolizing. They are (i) the descriptive step (ii) the step of radical reduction (iii) internationality and (iv) expression and perception. These four dimensions together constitute the perspective for his reflectives on language. The concept of 'Intentionality' from an existential standpoint gives a concrete character to individual speech acts. It also relates individual speech acts (parole) which are surely connected with intentions and actions with the given objective structure of language (lang).

Merleau-Ponty holds in the descriptive step of the phenomenological method, that phenomenology describes the content or "objectivity" of *lived-experiences* which is communicate[9]. This content is the perception of one's thought and this arises from reality because the corporeal subject is situated in a world where be lives the reality. Meaning is given to his thought in the context of acting on reality and being fed back by reality. At this stage of phenomenolizing language becomes experience of signs, experience of symbols rather than a system of signs or a system of symbols i.e. language becomes *lived experience* and meaningful expression. The phenomenological description is the description of meaning present in the consciousness of both the speaker and the hearer. Merleau-Ponty explain in '*Praise of philosophy*: "the

communicative life of men" is history in the existential sense of human *immanence*[10].

The vehicle which he thought has to make itself public is speech. Thought takes on inter-subjectivity through speech acts, and thus it is, according to Husserl, that private thought can be shared publicly. For Merleau-Ponty, the inevitable question arises : How does meaning which will transcend the mere private or personal intention to speak and make itself available to other persons? Or, to put the question in other words, what is the source of inters-subject meaning. Merleau-Ponty is concerned to show that this kind of question can be approached and answered by performing a phenomenology of speaking, i.e., by actually investigating what one is dong when one is making verbal utterances.

In the step of the 'radical reduction' of the phenomenological method the speaker also becomes the object in the sense that he observes himself in the same way as the listener observes him i.e. the speaker becomes the listener at the same time. That means the speaker must be able to infer about himself in the same way in which the listener can; the listener's inference of the meaning is also determinate of the speaker's meaning. The 'radical reduction' makes communication possible, Merleau-Ponty writes in *signs*, "to the extent that what I say has meaning, I am a different' other' for myself when I am speaking; and to the extent that I understand, I no longer know who is speaking and who is listening[11]. Thus meaning though originated from an individual consciousness it is independent of the individual's situation and behaviour. It has an universal appeal in terms of its being interpersonal. Meaning comes from the subject but through the path of communication it becomes intersubjective. The aim of the phenomenological method is to

transform personal experience to interpersonal experience. Thus Merleau-Ponty turns phenomenology from the concept of 'intentionality' to an existential project.

"Expression at the level of description, according to Mereleau-Ponty should be designated as language"[12]. Following the explanation of the linguist Ferdinan de Saussure Merleau-Ponty defines language as the unification of the *signifier* and the *signified*[13]. In the terminology of Merleau-Ponty 'linguistic' structure which is the syntactical structure of language is an external structure of 'linguistic' content but not an 'expressed' structure of *lived-experience*. The *intended* meaning cannot be found in the perception of linguistic structure but in the expression of the *lived-experience*. Merleau-Ponty says that the '*act of speaking*' is at the core of intentionality. Speaking implies existence. Existence is inherent in the modality of expression. The existence of the speaker speaking is clear from the fact that while speaking, he is careful because he is conscious that he is expressing to himself and in the same way to others. This fact is demonstrated in our use of language before others. Merleau-Ponty defines speech in *signs* where he says "Speech as distinguished from language, is that moment when the significative intention (still silent and wholly inert act) proves itself capable of incorporating itself into any culture and the culture of others – of shaping me and others by transforming the meaning of cultura instruments"[14]. That means speech is the penetration of private existential meaning into the language or 'tongue' which we all speak and *the reality which we all inhabit*. Speech is the human utterance in a social context in which it is a matter of public perception. Speech without any social context is a

collection of symbols or signs i.e. it is mere language devoid of public perception.

According to Merleau-Ponty, there is no universal system of significance for all minds, spread out as if before an all-embracing consciousness or constituted as such. And his argument is as follows:

It (language) is never composed of absolutely univocal meanings which can be made completely explicitly beneath the gaze of a transparent constituting consciousness. It will be a question not of a system of forms of signification clearly articulated in terms of one another not of a structure of linguistic ideas built according to a strict plan but a cohesive whole of convergent linguistic gestures, each of which will be defined less by a signification than by a use value[15].

There are thus only varying language-systems, depending upon "use value", and meanings will be a function of sharing the same general reference system, and not of a single, universal scheme of classification. Hence, to the question what more is there in speech besides the "significative intention" to speak, Merleau-Ponty replies that it is the "world" words are like physical gestures; they come to possess the and sustain meaning because of the situation or world in which they are expressed. Just as gesture points to something which transcends the word, as well. "The spoken word is a genuine gesture, and it contains its meaning in the same way as the gesture contains its". (PP, op cit., p. 183)[16]

Speaking meaningfully requires a "taking up of a position in the world"[17]. Without this world there would be no linguistic significance. Meaning is neither subjective or objective, idealistic or realistic, not a function of simply men's mind nor of external physical objects, but it is a product of both. So Merleau-Ponty says very pointedly:

> Probably the chief gain from phenomenology is to have united extreme subjectivism and objectivism in its notion of the world....[18].

And by this, Merleau-Ponty means a "would" largely of our own design, a world in which there is no other pattern than our own that is of significance. So it is that, according to Merleau-Ponty meaning is constituted out of this life-world which involves as a necessary condition man's existence within it.

It has been pointed out that rather than turning to the "world", Merleau-Ponty could have followed the phenomenological reconstruction of linguistic significance[19]. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of speaking is not radical enough in reconstructing linguistic significance centering around the self. We thin that this stand of Merleau-Ponty is due to his outgrowing the Husserlean phenomenology and working towards a Heideggerean position. However, his reference to the "Life-world" is suggestive of lingering influence of Husserl. Husser, in his *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* does speak of a world which is intersubjective[20]. It is the *life-world* which is from the beginning "nothing other than the living moment of being-with-one-another and in-one-another of original meaning constitution.....[21].

According to Merleau-Ponty meaning is the unification of expression and perception at the intersubjective level.

The phenomenological philosophy of language which we wish to propose in the following chapter concentrates more on the communicative action by means of which language and reality are knitted together in one perspective. According to the phenomenological thesis of the intentionality of consciousness, consciousness is always projective i.e., it is a consciousness of something. In other words consciousness means acts of consciousness. Now the phenomenon of language is closely related to the being of man and his action for expressing himself to the other. Austin's 'Performative' can be looked at from this standpoint.

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Chapter IV

Austin's Speech Act Theory and Its Phenomenological Interpretation

A: Intentionality thesis :

The concept of intentionality from the phenomenological standpoint provides a clue to understanding Austin's 'performative' as constitutive of a "word-cum-world" and thereby making language a part of reality. Before we proceed to consider Austin's 'Performative' in this light it is necessary to give an account of the phenomenological notion of 'Intentionality'.

The phenomenological notion of 'intentionality' must be distinguished from 'intentionality' in the psychological sense. In ordinary language, words like 'intention' and 'intentional' are used to refer to some sheer psychological states or mental states which are generally expressed in the forms of the sentences like 'I did not have intention to hurt you', 'Her intention was not bad', 'He has not done this intentionally', etc. Here the word 'intention' or 'intentionally' is used in order to describe certain mental acts or psychological acts like desire, wish, purpose etc. all of which are descriptions of mental experiences or psychological experiences. In general, the word like 'intention' or 'intentional' is used in ordinary as mental phenomenon as contrasted with physical phenomenon. In this sense 'intention' and 'intentionality' is related to the subject and indicates some mental states or psychological as its object. From the phenomenological standpoint too the concept of intentionality is related to the subject, but it does not refer to any

psychological state or mental state, i.e., to any sheer subjective aspect. From the phenomenological standpoint 'intention' or 'intentionality' is not interpreted as certain states of consciousness. In phenomenology it is regarded as 'intentionality of consciousness'. It signifies the 'intentional' nature of consciousness.[1] In phenomenology *intentionality* can be best understood from the Husserlian standpoint. According to Husserl, the concept has more an epistemological bearing than an ontological bearing, or a psychological bearing. Epistemologically, the phenomenological concept *of intentionality of consciousness* explains a new relationship between the subject and the object. Phenomenology is regarded neither as subjectivism nor as objectivism but as a combination of both. The concept of *'intentionality of consciousness'* is inseparable from this relationship between the subject and the object and without this neither the subject nor the object can be explained. The difference between the ordinary usage and the phenomenological usage of the concept under discussion is that while in the former case the concept is inseparable from consciousness or states of consciousness, in the latter case the concept is inseparable from the relationship between consciousness and its object. For this reason Brentano's interpretation of the notion of intentionality is rejected by Husserl because his explanation has a psychological bearing when he regards it as 'Intentional inexistence' or 'mental inexistence'[2]. However, in phenomenology, the 'intentional object' need not necessarily be an existing object, it may also be a non-existent object because the *object of intentionality* is interpreted epistemologically and the ontological background of the *object of intentionality* is not sought. The 'intentional object' may be a physical object or a mental object. In the

phenomenological interpretation *the intentionality of consciousness* signifies that consciousness is always a 'consciousness of something'[3].

Husserl understood under 'intentionality' the unique peculiarity of experiences 'to be the consciousness of something'. In Husserlian explanation the term 'intentional' acquired the meaning of *'directedness toward an object'*. According to Husserl, the acts thus directed were called "intentions" and were referred to "intentional objects", i.e. ,objects that were the targets of intentions. According to Husserl, the expression "Intentional" and "Intentionality" stood for the rational property of having an intention or being aimed at by it. From the phenomenological standpoint intentionality is always of consciousness but it does not mean that intentionality alone is limited to consciousness. Because consciousness is never empty. Consciousness is always consciousness of something. That something is the object of consciousness. An empty consciousness is no consciousness at all. But the converse is also true. A distinct object or unrelated object which may be called in the phenomenological language *'an unintended object'* is no object at all. From the phenomenological standpoint the very definition of experience is the objects being perceived within the reach of consciousness which may be regarded phenomenologically the object's being intended (not in a psychological sense) by the consciousness. The relationship between consciousness and its object is reciprocal. The phenomenological interpretation of the relationship between consciousness and its object may compared with Kant's famous saying "Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind"[4]. But the difference between Kantian interpretation and the phenomenological interpretation is that in the former case there is no such *'directedness of consciousness*

toward its object'. Moreover according to Kant, the phenomenon is not the real thing or 'thing-in-itself'. There is noumenon behind the phenomenon which is the 'thing-in-itself'. That is Kant is concerned with the ontological background of phenomenon which is regarded as the noumenon by Kant. Though phenomenological investigation may have certain ontological implications it is basically an epistemological and methodological investigation and not a meta-physical one. There is no such distinction between phenomenon and noumenon in phenomenology. All that is there in phenomenology is the phenomenon which is regarded in the phenomenological term the 'given' or 'thing itself'. The principle motto of phenomenology is 'back to thing itself'. Phenomenological method is epistemological in the sense that it is concerned with knowledge, i.e., with experience and in this respect it investigates *that which appears* in experience which is the 'given' or phenomenon. Its ontological implication centre around the nature of consciousness and object of experience. But its main concern is neither the consciousness as such nor the object as such. It is primarily concerned with experience as a whole. By consciousness we mean conscious acts. 'Directedness of consciousness' means the directedness of conscious acts, like perceiving, remembering, judging, surmising, etc. Every act has its object. I am persevering or judging something but there is no object of perception or judgment, this is not possible. The experience-field is always structured in the act-object polarity.

The attempt of phenomenology was not to construct any theory regarding the object of experience. Nor was it concerned with the possibility or impossibility of knowing the object of experience. Phenomenological investigation does not inquire into the logical status of

the object of consciousness. Such questions do not arise in the field of phenomenology. Phenomenology was mainly concerned with experience. And the notion of *'intentionality of consciousness'* is the main basis of experience. That is why *'intentionality of consciousness'* is the core of the phenomenological investigation.

B: Austin, Speech Acts and the Intentionality Thesis:

The classification of speech acts has been of much interest to philosophers of language and linguista[1]. It may also be linked with the broad stream of continental phenomenology which was primarily concerned with the world as we experience it. The relation that we have specially in mind is the relation of performatives and constatives as forms of speech act with the phenomenological concept of intentionality.

From the phenomenological standpoint 'intentionality' has a directionality in terms of its 'acts' upon something other than itself. To treat an object of knowledge phenomenologically it has to be reduced from its natural order to a phenomenological order, i.e., it has to be brought within the preview of the acts of consciousness.

Now the phenomenological treatment of 'Perfoemative' can be understood from two angles, viz., (i) from the viewpoint of a suspension of the notion of thinghood of meaning content towards which speech acts are directed, (ii) from the standpoint of a mutual intentionality. Let me elaborate (i). Speech acts, locutionary, illocutionary or perlocutionary are to be conceived in a phenomenological perspective for two reasons. First, they are preceded by a suspension of the notion of thing as such or thing in itself. Fundamentally, they are concerned with meaning in terms of

communication. They point to *objects* or *states-of-affairs* which are meant, and therefore not things. Meaning cannot be the primary focus of performatives unless the concept of thing beyond the meaning giving function of the speaker is suspended.

There is still a stronger thesis involved here. It is that human beings are capable in intervention in nature in a way no other creatures are, as a result of conscious decision to intervene. This is what gives human beings the possibility of quiet literally creating their own environment. A second and related point is the capacity which human beings have to *map* the structure of the world. This capacity to map the actual world may be a passage to map the possible world. Austin's theory of speech acts is working against this natural tendency to think that the only function of language is to reflect reality truly or falsely. He reminds us that there are many uses of language and the idea of people as agents is deeply embedded in the idea of them as language users.

In the case of a speech act when the speaker is uttering a word or a sentence in order to perform some act he must have some meaning as the object toward which his intentionality is directed i.e. the meaning is the object of consciousness and the real thing or thing in itself is not the object of consciousness. That is why the meaning content of an utterance is included within the purview of intentionality of consciousness. And as a speech act is performed between a speaker and a hearer in a particular context the question of mutual intentionality between the speaker and the hearer naturally arises. And this mutual intentionality between the speaker and hearer in a circumstance makes communication possible. So the performance of a speech act presupposes communication. Let us discuss these aspects respectively.

Speech act is the performance of an act by uttering words or sentences in a particular context. There must be a speaker and a hearer to make a speech act possible. From the phenomenological standpoint the meaning of an utterance is given by the speaker. That means the meaning of an utterance is that which the speaker want to convey to the hearer in a situation and the meaning is not the actual thing or thing-in-itself. To speak in the phenomenological term the 'thinghood; is to be 'bracketed' and attention should be given to the meaning the speaker wants to convey to the hearer, i.e., a suspension of the thing as such or thing-in-itself beyond the meaning giving function of the speaker is to be made. Certainly the meaning of an utterance is determined both by the speaker and the hearer i.e. both by the attempt of the speaker to convey the meaning and the attempt of the hearer to recognize the meaning, speech act may be regarded as a correlation between the speaker and the hearer in a situation through an utterance. If a word or a sentence is uttered by speaker in a situation and if its meaning is limited to the speaker alone and is not conveyed to the hearer it is not at all a speech act except in the sense that here the speaker speaks to himself. Now if the thinghood is not 'suspended' or 'bracketed' neither would it be possible for the speaker to communicate anything to the hearer nor would it be possible for the hearer to recognize what the speaker is saying. If in the case of an utterance the thinghood or the thing in itself is not bracketed and if attention is given to this thinghood instead of the meaning the speaker wants to communicate then it would be a mere description of the actual thing or a mere reference to the actual thing. But speech act is not the description of reference to things in the world. Speech act is the performance of some acts like the act of promising, advising,

commanding, requesting, stating, etc. The concept of speech act implies that any utterance must be construed with the meaning the speaker wants to convey and the listener's recognition of the meaning in a circumstance. For example if a speaker utters the word 'dangerous' to a person walking on a road behind whom a bull is coming and if the listener does not 'bracket' the thing-in-itself behind the meaning giving function of the speaker and concentrates on the word 'dangerous' then certainly he would get a knock by the ox. In order to recognize the meaning the speaker wants to convey in a circumstance the listener has to bracket the actual thing and concentrate on the meaning giving function of the speaker.

In *How to Do Things with Words* Austin wishes us to relook at words as used by men in situations[2]. He is not asking us to relook at things or facts that make up the universe but the whole nexus of man doing things in the world by way of using words. Performatives as a form of speech act is an act of elucidating the meaning which the speaker communicates or fails to communicate.

So, meaning of an utterance is not prior to the utterance rather utterance rather utterance is prior to meaning because meaning is not an isolate factor, but it is determined with reference to a situation and within the realm of interaction between the speaker and the hearer.

Pointing to *objects or states of affairs* which are meant involves a directedness of consciousness of the speaker. Speaker's intention in any kind of speech acts is manifested in the act of relating his/her speech act to something other than his/her consciousness. For example, promising something indicates a possible future event, bringing into existence or

producing something which does not already exist; speech act, in this sense, is a noetic act.

Performatives are to be conceived phenomenologically with a special stress on the aspect of communication, philosophical theory of speech act is a phenomenological account of 'meaning' in an existential sense of interpersonal communication while elucidating the classification of speech acts Austin on several occasions, speaks of the 'uptake' of an illocutionary act. It means the understanding by the hearer what the speaker is meaning. This again confirms the communicative aspect of speech acts. The account suggests that meaning can be best understood phenomenologically as the mutual intentionality (i.e. Husserl's sense of an object of consciousness) of a speaker and a listener with reference to an object or state-of-affairs.

Communication is the understanding between the speaker and the hearer regarding an utterance. The utterance of the speaker is conveyed to the hearer. The recognition of the utterance-which the speaker wants to convey-by the hearer makes communication possible. Austin explains in his *'How to Do Things with Words'*. "A speech act is dependent upon the listener's securing uptake"[3]. Communication is the basis of speech act because if an utterance whether it be a word or a sentence is uttered and if it is not communicated to the hearer then it is not at all a speech act because the speech act is the performance of an act through an utterance and in the utterance is not communicated to the hearer then the act is not at all performed. For example if an utterance is made in the form of an order but if the hearer takes that to be a request then the act the speaker wants to perform is not performed at all and this is due to lack of communication. In this sense we can say that speech act is purposive.

And the purpose of a speech act is the purpose of performing some acts of requesting, commanding, ordering, stating, etc. which may be regarded in a wider sense the purpose of communicating because all these speech acts are whether it be a request or a command or an order-different forms of communication. These linguistic actions are performed by uttering some words or sentences or group of sentences which are the units of communication. From the phenomenological standpoint these units of communication are meaningless when considered separately; they got their meaning when they are being used by some conscious user under certain circumstance. They must be used by a speaker in order to perform an act according to some rules in a circumstance. Searle, in his *Speech Acts*, rightly said that "The unit of linguistic communication is not, as has generally been supposed, the symbol, word or sentence, or even the token of the symbol, word or sentence, but rather the production or issuance of the symbol or sentence in the performance of the speech act"[4]. The concept of communication presupposes the understanding of the speaker's utterance by someone other than the speaker under a particular circumstance. In order to make understanding possible one must have to suppose that what he tries to express must also be understood by the hearer, i.e., there must be the possibility of the hearer's knowing what the speaker wants to convey. Such a conception necessarily leads us a linguistic atmosphere under a circumstance. Searle in his *'Speech Acts'* wrote, "When I take a noise or a mark on a piece of paper to be an instance of linguistic communication, as a message, one of the things I must assume is that noise or mark was produced by being or beings more or less myself and produced with certain kinds of intentions"[5]. Therefore, the conditions necessary for communication is the performance of

linguistic action by a speaker, which is governed by some rules under a specific circumstance for which the performance of the action is understood by other. The rules of uttering a word or a sentence or a set of sentences in a society or community constitute the form of a performative which makes the hearer's understanding possible. It is like the grammar or syntax of a linguistic action. But we know that in a language the grammar or syntax is not the only thing but the application of the rule in the game is also essential. There is also the content or semantics of a language. It is true that without knowing the grammatical or syntactical aspect of a language one is not able to speak and understand that language. But there must also be some contents or semantics for whom the grammars are made or in other words on which the grammars are to be applied. This is the meaning aspect of a linguistic action. The object of communication is the meaning which the speaker intends to communicate.

Communication is the interaction between a speaker and a hearer in a circumstance through an utterance. There must be some object which the speaker wants to convey to the hearer by uttering a word or a sentence. The hearer after hearing the utterance tries to recognize it. If the recognition is of that object which the speaker wants to convey, i.e., if the hearer recognizes exactly what the speaker wants to convey then communication is made and consequently, the speech act of a particular kind with reference to the utterance is performed. But if the object which the speaker wants to convey to the hearer is not conveyed or if the hearer fails to recognize what the speaker wants to convey then communication is not made. Austin says that even in the case of misunderstanding between the speaker and the hearer there is a communication.

Misunderstanding is not the inability of the hearer to understand but it is the inability of the hearer to understand what the speaker is saying, i.e., it is not the case that the hearer does not have any understanding; the point is the hearer does have the same understanding as the speaker.

The notion of communication can be interpreted phenomenologically from the standpoint of mutual intentionality between the speaker and the listener. From the phenomenological standpoint communication is possible through the mutual intentionality between the speaker and the hearer. Phenomenologically any object in order to be experienced must be within the realism of consciousness and as consciousness is always intended toward something it must be experienced with the purview of 'Intentionality of consciousness'. In the performance of a speech act the must be performed within the realm of consciousness and not only within the realm of consciousness but 'Intentionality of consciousness'. Now in a speech act the speaker has the purpose of communicating a particular kind of act like the act of requesting, ordering, commanding, etc. That very act is the object toward which the consciousness of the speaker is directed, which is regarded as the 'intended act', in the phenomenological term and the speaker's directedness to the intended act is the "intentionality of consciousness. But in order to perform a speech act the factor of the speaker's 'intentionality of consciousness' is not sufficient because the speaker's intention is to be communicated. The counterpart of the speech act, i.e., the hearer is not at all involved in this act. In order to make speech act possible the utterance is to be received by the hearer. And if the hearer is able to recognize the utterance as the same which the speaker wants to communicate then only communication between the speaker and the

hearer is made and speech act is successfully performed. This recognition of the utterance of the speaker by the hearer is due to the factor of 'Intentionality of Consciousness' on the hearer's side. The hearer's recognition of the intended act is due to the directedness of the consciousness toward the intended act, i.e., intentionality of consciousness. This is called the mutual intentionality between the speaker and the hearer through which communication is made between them and the speech act is performed.

Austin classifies the illocutionary act as the distinguishing feature of an act because of an act because here lies the force of an act. The illocutionary act characterizes an act as an act of requesting, ordering, commanding stating etc. The illocutionary act contains the meaning aspect of an utterance because the force of an act determines the meaning the speaker wants to convey. The force of the illocutionary act clarifies what the speaker wants to convey. The perlocutionary act makes the recognition of the speaker's meaning by the hearer because it contains the effect of the utterance upon the hearer. In *'How to Do things with Words'* Austin describes the perlocutionary act as the effect which brings about the understanding of the meaning of the speaker's utterance.[6] He says that the perlocutionary act is the result of saying something, which has effect upon the feelings though or actions of the audience. Therefore, the illocutionary part of a speech act contains the force of an utterance which is the meaning of the utterance. And the perlocutionary part of a speech act contains the effect of the utterance on the hearer. It contains the recognition of the meaning of the speaker by the hearer, i.e., it is the perlocutionary part of a speech act which makes the understanding by the hearer of the speaker's meaning possible. These two aspects of speech act

together make communication between the speaker and the hearer possible. The illocutionary part which is the subjective aspect becomes inter subjective through the understanding by the hearer of the speaker's meaning.

The inter-subjectivity of meaning and the social dimension of language is thus made apparent in this approach to Austin. The world becomes a meaningful world of humanity as a whole after a suspension of any abstraction of it as a mere physical world and bringing it in relation with actual human linguistic performance. Intentionality thesis of phenomenology has been taken here as a clue to understanding Austin's concept of 'performative' or 'speech act' in a new light to solve the problem of word-world relationship in philosophy of language.

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Chapter V

Some Recent Developments

in

Speech Act Theory

In the foregoing chapters we have detailed the word-world relationship between speech and performance and the world, and have tried to see the problem from the phenomenological viewpoint. However, the problem is no longer a reserve of philosophers. It has assumed importance outside the precincts of philosophy. New disciplines dealing with language, its use and problem of communication have fallen back on the insights of Austin, Searle, or Grice in developing new concepts and principles. Naturally, the theme of the present investigation has wide ramification for researches in linguistics, communication theory, cognitive science and in areas where the relation of signs to their users is pertinent. In what follows we shall discuss some of these developments in recent years.

I

This section is devoted to linguistics. Linguistics is a scientific study of human natural languages. It is a growing and exciting area of study, with an important contact with fields as diverse as philosophy, anthropology, sociology, cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, among others. Fundamentally, linguistics is concerned with the nature of language and linguistic communication. These are apparently the fields of linguistics which as a whole remain focused on those components which are relevant for our present purpose. So far as the structural property of human

language is concerned there are three broad subdivisions of linguistics—syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Syntax is the study of the sentence structure. It is about the formal relationship of linguistic signs to one another and their principles of combination. Semantics is about the relationship of language to the world that is, the relations of signs to the objects to which the signs are applicable. It assumes sense or the meaning of an expression to be the core notion and it issues forth in theories of meaning, reference, truth etc. which are the principle issues in philosophy of language. According to its earliest formulation pragmatic studies are "the relations of signs to interpreters"[1]. Pragmatics is the study of language use and communication. It is the study of linguistic acts and the context in which they are performed. The major problem to be solved within pragmatics is to define interesting types of speech acts and speech products. The analysis of illocutionary acts is an example of this problem. Broadly speaking, thus, the ultimate aim of linguistics is to understand how language itself is structured and how it functions.

Of the three components of linguistics each has been influenced by the philosophical theories on the word-world relationship, sometimes to a lesser and sometimes to a greater extent. Of these, the influence of speech act theory on pragmatics is the most pronounced. We have seen before how the theory of communication that was latent in Austin's theory of speech acts was later developed into a full-fledged theory of communication by Searle. Grice, in his own way, also contributed in the development.

In linguistic encoding, a thought is converted into a linguistic form that is communicated to the hearer. Linguistic decoding is the decoding of the linguistic form which is communicated to the hearer by

the speaker. As such Austin's speech act theory has been developed not only by J. Katz[2]; Bach and Harnish have also developed an indirect analysis of constative utterances.[3] F. Recanati[4] has developed declarational analysis of speech acts which is an extension of Seale's work on performatives as declarations.[5] A number of linguists and linguistically oriented philosophers have provided an analysis of many central speech act verbs. Mention may be made of J. Verschueren[6] and A. Wierzbicka[7]. An interesting work has been done on performative verbs by Roy Harnish.[8] A major finding of his survey of English verbs is that their non-performative use is parasitical upon their performative uses.[9] A survey of recent publications in pragmatics reveals how Austin and Searle's accounts of speech acts assume an ongoing, regulative role in relation to pragmatics.

Though these studies have taken diverse directions, their main thrusts are human linguistic communication. The centrality of the phenomenon of communication in pragmatics is recognised when it is observed that the term *pragmatics* covers the study of language use and in particular the study of linguistic communication in relation to language structure and context of utterance.[10] It will not be irrelevant to state some theories of communication in this connection.

For the last fifty years the most common and popular conception of human linguistic communication has been what we will term the Message Model. Though it has a modern ring, it goes back over three centuries to the philosopher John Locke whose theory of meaning we have already sketched in chapter I. There are, moreover, many contemporary statements of essentially the same idea. It was put forward

by J. Katz in his early writings as an instance of successful communication.

Linguistic encoding is one of the recent developments in the field of communication. Linguistic encoding is the encoding of the semantic meaning of a sentence as well as the encoding of the mental representation of the speaker of a sentence according to the intention of the speaker on a particular occasion.

In the message model the speaker acts as a transmitter, the hearer acts as a "receiver". The speaker encodes the message he wants to communicate to a hearer in some linguistic expression. The hearer decodes the message using her knowledge of language. Linguistic encoding is the encoding of the semantic meaning of a sentence as well as the mental representation of the speaker of the sentence according to the intensions of the speaker in a particular occasion. In linguistic encoding a thought is converted into a linguistic form. Linguistic decoding is the decoding of the linguistic form which is communicated to the hearer by the speaker.

The message model which has been the simplest and the most popular model of communication has problems. The most crucial defect is that many expressions are linguistically ambiguous, vague, fuzzy, and vitiated by indirection — performing one communicative act by means of performing another communicative act. For example, decoding is dependent upon the hearer's knowledge of the meanings of words to obtain the semantic meaning of the linguistic form. But it may happen that this semantic meaning is not the meaning that the speaker intends to communicate through the linguistic utterance. There are some other factors too which are inferential in nature, required in order to get the

intended meaning of the speaker's utterance. One such factor is the principle of cooperation.

A successful communication is dependent upon the principle of cooperation. While a speaker utters something the speaker has an intention to communication on a given context to the hearer to recognise his communicative intentions. From the hearer's point of view the problem is to successfully recognise the speaker's communicative intention on the basis of the words which the speaker has chosen and the context of utterance. As such there is an inferential aspect on the part of the hearer in case of a linguistic communication. The simplest and most straightforward sort of speech act and thereby communication is performed or made literally and directly. Being literal and direct the speaker means what he utters. Another characteristic of literal and direct utterance is the contextual appropriateness of the utterance of the speaker. But there is a non-literal or indirect sort of speech act and communication which is not the literal or direct utterance. It may happen that sometimes when the speaker utters something he means something other than what his words mean. That is to say the meaning of the utterance is not literally compatible with the utterance, e.g., the utterance 'No one understands me' is a non-literal utterance or communication. Contextual inappropriateness of the utterance of the speaker is the characteristic of indirect speech act or communication. By hearing the utterance of the speaker the hearer recognises that it would be contextually inappropriate for the speaker to be speaking this literally. Therefore, the speaker is speaking non-literally or indirectly.

In the communicative context it may so happen that the speaker utters something but the utterance is encoded in such a way that the

intended meaning of the speaker is not dependent upon the semantic meaning of the utterance; it is dependent upon some inferential factors on the side of the receiver or the hearer which are the concern of pragmatics. Inference is the process by which an addressee in conversation is able to derive implicatures from a speaker's utterance in combination with features of context. This may be regarded as the indirect meaning of the speaker's utterance. For example, in case of the utterance of the speaker to an addressee, "There are frequent power cuts", the addressee infers indirect request to carry a torch or keep the emergency light ready at hand, as opposed to a simple statement of fact. Here the hearer has the capacity to infer the indirect request of the speaker, to assess that it is a request on the part of the speaker and not a statement of fact. Here, the context is not 'given' but 'created' as it is inferred. According to the speech act theory of Austin, a speaker's purpose in speaking is not simply to produce sentences that have a certain sense and reference. Rather, it is to produce such sentences with a view to interactional move to communication. And the illocutionary forces are the specifications of the interactional acts. And the successful performance of the perlocutionary acts are the signs that the speaker's communicative intention is achieved by the hearer. Hence successful communication is made.

L. Cummings[11] has mentioned some social / pragmatic theories of meaning besides the speech act to explicate some social/ pragmatic concepts such as deixis and presupposition. Deixis is the phenomenon through which the relationship between language and context is reflected in the very structures of language. It includes a study of demonstratives, pronouns specific time and place adverbs like 'now', 'here' and a variety of grammatical features which are anchored in the discourse location of

the current utterance. So instead of being about individual speech acts, deictic analysis is basically focussed on social discourse. Cummings discusses discourse analysis and conversational analysis which are some of the important development of speech act theory of meaning. According to him, no study of language use would be complete in the absence of the most common form of language use, conversation. This brings us to an important offshoot of the speech act theory, conversational analysis.

II

Traditional speech act theory is largely confined to single speech act. But, as we all know, in real life, speech acts are often not like that at all. In real life, speech characteristically consists of longer sequences of speech acts, either on the part of one speaker, in a continuous discourse, or it consists, more interestingly, of sequences of exchange speech acts in conversation, either between the speaker and hearer or among interlocutors in a group.

Cummings says that deictic terms like 'I', 'here', 'today', etc. are meaningful only on the assumption of the presence of conversational participants other than the speaker of the utterance. "It is difficult to see what sense can be made of the utterance 'I'm going to stay here today' if the presence of conversational participants other than the speaker could not be assured. In a similar manner, the presuppositions of an utterance reveal something of the knowledge and assumptions that are shared by participants in conversation."[12] According to Cummings, conversational participants such as the speaker and the hearer must be present in the conversational context in order for speech acts to be performed

felicitously. He also speaks in the manner of Austin about the uptake of a speech act and the dependence of the performance of the speech act on that uptake. Moreover, he speaks about some conversational implicatures which are necessary for the assumptions about conversational context and thus performing the speech act.

Cummings distinguishes between discourse analysis and conversation analysis.[13] According to him, discourse analysts develop rules that govern the structure of texts. Discourse analysis despite of its modern form of examining language in the wider context of human knowledge of the world and society, still strongly reflects the influence of its formal, linguistic origins. "The origins of conversation analysis, on the other hand, are not linguistic, but sociological in nature. Conversation analysis originates in an American Sociological Movement of the 1970s called ethnomethodology defined as the study of 'ethnic', that is, participants' own methods of production and interpretation of social interaction.[14]

Searle is critical of the conversational analysis of speech acts.[15] His main objection is that we do not have constitutive rules for conversations in a way as we have for speech acts. Hence, we cannot get an account of conversations parallel to our account of speech acts. It is the constitutive rules which give speech acts their inner structure and a particular point or purpose. Thus, the illocutionary point of a promise is to undertake an obligation, the illocutionary point of a statement is to represent how things are in the world. Conversations do not, in this way, have an internal point simply for being conversations. They are often pointless, dragging, 'idle talk', shop talk, talk about whether and so on. But that does not mean tha we cannot give theoretical accounts of conversation.

Searle who has criticised the conversational analysis recognizes that one virtue of conversations is that "...they involve shared intentionality". Conversations are a paradigm of collective behaviour. The shared intentionality should not be confused with a summation of individual intentional states about the other person's intentional states. Searle is not only attacking the conversationalists, he has in mind Grice's approach with his maxims of communication when he criticises the traditional analytic devices that treat all intentionality as having strictly Grice in mind. What is this collective intentionality? Collective intentionality is shared intentionality. Individual intentionality, according to Searle, derives from collective intentionality. Two persons beginning a conversation are beginning a joint activity and not two separate activities. He says, "This phenomenon of shared collective behaviour is a genuine social phenomenon and underlies much social behaviour."[16]

A second point which is needed for successful communication is, what Searle terms as "the background". The is needed not only for understanding conversation, but for understanding language in general.[17] Consider the sentences "President Obama is the President of USA" and"President Omaba has stopped outsourcing". The background knowledge of these two sentences do not coincide. To understand the first we have to have background knowledge of what is meant by 'President', what is the electoral form of government, what is a federation; in case of the latter the relevant background information is, what is meant by outsourcing, what are its economic constraints, why will it be stopped, etc. Searle calls this "networking" because it supposes that whenever there is conversation the background knowledge, belief,

opinion, doubt, or presupposition form a web or network. Let us quote his words:

> ...all meaning and understanding goes on against a background which is not itself meant and understood, but which forms the background conditions on meaning and understanding, whether in conversations or in isolated utterances[18]

Searle concludes by saying that in some conversations, e.g., British T.V. Broadcast,

> " ... the richness of the shared background enables a very minimal explicit semantic content to be informative and even satisfying to the participants and audience. On the other hand some of the most frustrating and unsatisfying conversations occur between people of radically different backgrounds, who can speak in great length and achieve only mutual incomprehension."[19]

III

One of the recent developments in the area of speech act theory is Jürgen Habermas' theory of communicative action set forth in Vol. I & II of his book *The Theory of Communicative Action*.[20] He classifies actions into communicative and strategic. While the former is a case of "reciprocity" influencing one another by actions and achieving success by acting in a purposive rational manner, the latter is geared to reaching an

understanding through a rational argumentation, among the members of a life world.

Habermas defines understanding in simple terms as "... reaching understanding (*verstandigung*) considered to be a process of reaching agreement (*Einiguing*) among speaking and acting subjects".[21] As competent speakers we cannot leave out the possibility of reaching agreement through coercion or intimidation being aware of the many ways in which linguistic exchanges can express relation of power, authority, coercion and condensation. Habermas was not interested in reaching an agreement as a matter of strategy but arriving at an understanding. Understanding is not likemindedness of a group. It is an agreement reached after rational discourse among the participants. Habermas says: "Processes of reaching understanding aim at an agreement that meets the conditions of rationally motivated assent (*ustimmung*) to the content of an utterance."[22] Habermas is convinced that agreement rests on common conviction. And he emphatically asserts, "Reaching understanding is the telos of human speech."[23] To elucidate the interactive capacity of language to establish interpersonal relations between speakers and not to coerce them into agreement, Habermas falls back on Austin's concept of illocutionary act, and like Austin, he dismisses the illocutionary from the perlocutionary acts in the following manner.

1   In illocutionary speech acts meaning of the utterance echoes the intention of the speaker, and the speaker does not intend more than what he means in the utterance. In perlocutionary speech-acts the speaker's intention need not coincide with the meaning of the speaker. To take an example.

1. Shut the door.

2. I can't.

3. Well, I will see how to make you do that.

When we make an utterance our intention is that the speaker will understand its meaning. But sometimes the meaning and intention fall apart.

2. In the case of illocutionary acts the process and the effects can be brought under certain semantical conditions. The perlocutionary, etc., go beyond the meaning of what the speaker said and the results are not necessarily direct but strategic. Habermas says that the description of perlocutionary effects must, therefore, refer to a context of teleological action that goes beyond the speech act.

3. Habermas refers to Strawson's criterion of demarcation. The stark contrast between the illocutionary and the perlocutionary verbs is that illocutions are expressed openly; perlocutions may not be "admitted" as such —the speaker's illocutionary aim is given by his illocutionary acts. This does not hold good of perlocutionary acts. Perlocutionary acts are carried out by means of speech acts under the conditions that the speaker does not declare or admit his aim as such.

According to Austin, that the illocutionary act is a means to perlocutionary mode of language is a necessary condition of its perlocutionary uses. However, this does not exist, and this explains why the communicative use of language is the basic or primitive mode. This latter thesis demands in addition that concepts of "reaching understanding", "content-oriented attitude", and "communicative action"

can be explained by illocutionary acts alone. This is plausible, according to, Habermas because the illocutionary acts have a *rational force*. The speaker, in performing a speech act is able to motivate the hearer "to exceed to a *rationally binding or bonding force*".

To understand a speech act is to know the conditions of its acceptability. And to explain these conditions of acceptability is to explain the rational force of an illocutionary act. In the standard case, the speaker's utterance amounts to a claim to the validity of what is said, and at the same time it effects the guarantee that he can convince any sceptical hearer of its validity.

The rational force of an illocutionary act, according to Habermas, is the making and vindication of four validity claims.

1.   Comprehensibility,

2.   Truth

3.   Rightness and

4.   Truthfulness.

The comprehensibility claim is common to all linguistic communication, strategic as well as consensual. Apart from the comprehensibility claims the speaker makes three validity claims when performing any speech act. These three validity claims are made explicit in three different modes. The truth-claim is thematized in constative speech acts (e.g., I state that it will rail). The rightness claim is thematized in regulative-speech acts (e.g., I order you to do x) and the truthfulness claim is thematized in expressive speech acts (e.g., I admit you to x).

What Habermas said is very relevant for our purpose. He claims that in perforating a speech act the speaker relates himself to three words: (1) The objective, i.e., the totality of entities about which we can make true or false statements; (2) the social world, i.e., the world of legitimately regulated interpersonal relation; and (3) the subjective world of the speaker's intentional experiences to which he has privileged access. The three modes of acceptability are related to three worlds.

What makes it possible for the speaker to relate himself to all *three* worlds when performing *one* speech act? Habermas' argument is as follows:

Every speech act has three components—the propositional, the illocutionary and the expressive. Habermas' thesis now is that the propositional content of a speech act is correlated to the objective world and the truth claim. The illocutionary component is correlated to the social world and to the rightness claim, and the expressive component is correlated to the subjective world and the truthfulness claim. This is how the speaker of *one* speech act can relate himself to *three* different modes and *three* worlds.

Habermas is less concerned with the discursive concept of truth than with possibility of conceiving truth, purified of all connotations of correspondence as a special case of validity whereas the general concept of validity can be explained in terms of the discursive redemption of validity claim. In this way we open up a conceptual space where the concept of validity is situated.

The social world which is important for our present interests in speech act is the totality of legitimately ordered interpersonal relations. At

first, accessible from the participant's perspective it is intrinsically historical, and hence, has an ontological constitution different from that which can be described from the observer's perspective.[24] The social world is inextricably interwoven with the practices and languages of its members. That holds in a similar way for *descriptions* of the objective world but not for this world itself hence, the discursive redemption of truth claims has a meaning different than that of rightness validity claims. In the former cases the discursively achieved agreement *signifies* that the truth conditions of an assertoric proposition interpretated in terms of assertibility conditions are fulfilled. In the latter case, the discursively achieved agreement *justifies* the fact that a norm is worthy of recognition, and thereby itself contributes to the fulfilment of its conditions of validity. Instead of an objective world presupposed to exist independently of us, what is not in our power to accept or reject, here is the interpersonal point of view. In communicative action, it is not the social world as such that is not at our disposal but the structure and procedure of a process of argumentation which facilitates both the production and discovery of the norms of a properly regulated social existence. Because language, through the mechanism of illocutionary acts, has the ability to achieve mutual understanding and coordinative actions in a cooperative or consensual way that the social world gains objectivity, thus moving not only beyond the ontological presupposition of an objective world, but also beyond a world where relationships are forced and manipulated.

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Chapter VI

Concluding Remarks

I

In this chapter I intend to look back to the discussion spread over five chapters and collect together the loose ends which are bound to be there.

The purpose of this thesis is not to focus on the problem, namely, how to learn a language or how a child learns a language. This is the concern of the linguists. My concern is not at all an analysis of the linguistic construction of an utterance or a sentence in a natural language. Rather is a philosophical investigation into the relation between word and the world which is a variation on the theme of language and the world or thought and the world.

It has been observed that any talk of a relation presupposes a gap between the relata. In fact theories of meaning and truth work on the assumption that there is a gap between language and reality to cross over. If language and reality are interwoven, there is scarcely any need to talk of a relation as bridging a gap. To highlight this matter the prominent theories of meaning and truth are discussed.

In our context, language or word is seen from the dimension of speech acts, so called by J. L. Austin. It has been our intention with the situation of utterance. Linguisticality or linguistic significance is interwoven with the situation in the world. The phenomenological understanding of language as speech or speaking has helped us to recast the problem in the light of human existence in the world. Our discussion

is directed to the search of how a speaker uses his utterance to serve his communicative goal or communicative intent.

The elaboration of this has been prefaced by an account of views of philosophers whose reflections on language and meaning have a bearing on our problem. We have specifically in mind Wittgenstein, Austin and Searle. We have included Strawson not only because of his interesting observations on the world and our conceptual system but also because of his theory of intention and convention in speech act which takes stock of Austin's views on the conventionality of successful performance of speech acts.

In introducing the notion of speech act Austin is proposing a new concept with which to interpret our experience of being in the world. Now in one respect a proposed new concept is in a more exposed and vulnerable position than a concept already in use and acceptable. It may be that the users of an accepted concept cannot give an explicit analysis, an account of the principles governing its use; but if nevertheless, they are able to apply it with widespread agreement to an open class of particular cases, this creates a weak presumption in favour of the acceptability of the concept. It creates no more than a weak presumption since it shows only that the concept in question can be applied systematically, not that it is a fruitful concept to apply or that it is free from false assumption. Nevertheless, weak as this evidence is, it is not available in the case of a new proposed concept. Here we cannot point to the fact that people have always used the concept successfully to make some discrimination or that they will continue to do so in future. So it is no wonder that Austin's introduction of the performative-constative distinction and its supercession by the theory of speech act, in the initial phase, met with the

suspicion regarding its profitability, Austin himself had second thoughts about the performative-constative distinction. If we go through the lectures of his *How to Do Things with Words*, we will find that building up the distinction and dismantling it are parts of the same process. All the same Austin's point of contains an important insight which he failed to exploit. Now, there is a growing awareness that when Austin talks about language as a subject, he does not end up talking only about language, instead he uses a consideration of language as a medium for reaching conclusions about the world. As a consequence, when Austin talks about language, he is forced to a large extent to abandon his ordinary language approach and proceed constructively and creatively, forging new theories about language, and raising philosophical questions about them. Austin not only questions the natural tendency to think that the only virtues or deficiencies in a language resides in its success or failure in reflecting reality. Austin reminds us that there are many other dimensions of language, and he demonstrates that in various ways the idea of people as agents is deeply embedded in the idea of them as language speakers.

From that perspective we have tried to develop Austin's theory of speech acts into an intentional theory in consonance with the phenomenological theory of intentionality of consciousness. Although Austin would not perhaps speak of internal states, his motto being "let our words be our bond", it would not be an overstatement to say that his is a case of linguistic intentionality. The phenomenologists have a special, perhaps unique vision of the manner in which man is intentionally related to the world. For this construal of Austin we have first looked into the reflections on meaning from the point of view of phenomenology, particularly those of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Here

we have taken the pains to show that in a philosophical investigation of language speaker's meaning is to be distinguished from an expression meaning or speaker's meaning. People use language to achieve their various aims and intentions. The use of language by human beings is purposive. Hence, they cannot overlook linguistic meaning. But a speaker's meaning is more than a linguistic meaning. According to the speech act theory of Austin, in uttering a sentence to mean something the speaker requires more than just producing a written or a phonetic realization of the sentence. He also requires knowing what the sentence itself means and the expectation that his addressee shares that knowledge. This is dubbed by Austin as the 'illocutionary' and 'illocutionary point' by Searle.

The phenomenological interpretation of Austin's theory of speech acts has attracted the attention of a large number of Anglo-American philosophers Anticipations of speech act theory as in Husserl's Logical Investigations, and more pronouncedly, in Reinach's theory of social acts, are still too little known, so that a philosopher like Searle can rediscover the need for intentionality in the philosophy of language without awareness of the historical precedents. Even before we have reconstructed Austin's theory in the light of the intentionality thesis, we have made mention of Austin's describing his philosophical method as "linguistic phenomenology" and has elaborated it. A good number of articles are being published in the recent years aligning Wittgenstein and Austin with phenomenology. Herbert Spiegelberg, in his The Context of the Phenomenological Movement places a great deal of attention on the bridge between continental and Anglo-American philosophy. One piece of general interest is "The Puzzle of Wittgenstein's (1929 .....?)". Why

did Wittgenstein use the term "Phänomenologie" in the early thirties, what did he mean by it, why and how far did he abandon it? Since the section in this thesis on Wittgenstein in chapter II does not touch upon this aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy we deem it apposite to insert a note on that.

II

The influence of Russell, Moore and Frege upon some of the central themes of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* has long been recognised in the literature. More recently we have begun to understand the relation of Wittgenstein's early thought to the group of philosophers which consists of, among others, contemporaries or near contemporaries of Wittgenstein himself. The central figure in this group was Franz Brentano, whose students and followers were to be found throughout the Austrian Empire, and it will be important for our purpose to note how far the Brentano-Husserl-Meinong tradition and the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* and beyond, may throw light, on each other and also on the problem at hand. This does not mean that there are any direct influences from the one to the other. Direct influences are not essential to the value of comparison we are trying to defend here. But that there are such influences is not capable of being denied. In many respects much of the thinking of Wittgensten's *Tractatus* and other works has to be regarded as having parallels with a work of the phenomenologists faithful to Husserl's position in the *Logical Investigations* (1900), published only fourteen years before Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.[1]

We must clarify one thing before we proceed any further. It is to be noted that we should not confuse phenomenology with the notion of phenomenalism. Phenomena are the sense-impressions of what are supposed to be the real things outside of our mind. A phenomenalist would claim that our knowledge is confined to phenomena as opposed to things-in-themselves or noumena. Phenomenology, more generally, can be characterised as a study that gives primacy to what is immediately given to our experience (that is, to consciousness), from which the ultimate structure of reality can be revealed. Its primary concern is what is given immediately in one's experience which is not any impression in one's mind but includes the part of objective reality that impinges upon one's consciousness. The purpose of phenomenological investigation is to grasp that objective reality. Husserl's phenomenology is one such example.[2] In attempting to show that Wittgenstein is doing phenomenology, we shall show that he by attending to immediate experience, he is doing phenomenology and not phenomenalism. Wittgenstein's philosophy, particularly his views on the relationship between language and the world, has been interpreted as phenomenological. Wittgenstein's philosophy leads us to think whether there is any similarity between phenomenology and Wittgenstein's philosophy of language.

According to Wittgenstein, language is the ultimate medium through which we understand the world. Let us examine Wittgenstein's view about the way we use language to describe immediate experience, and how far it is justified to call Wittgenstein's philosophical explanation of language a phenomenological investigation or in other words, Wittgenstein's phenomenology.

A careful study of Wittgenstein's works will enable us with the view that throughout his entire philosophical life Wittgenstein's philosophical attention is directed to immediate experience. Apparently, it seems that Wittgenstein is concerned with empirical knowledge but Wittgenstein's problem is much more complicated and interesting than just epistemological grounding. Wittgenstein used the term 'phenomenology' or 'phenomenological' in his writings after 1929 when he came back to professional philosophy at Cambridge. The first four notebooks of 1929-30, the *Philosophical Remarks*[3] and the *Big Typescript*[4] are the chief sources in which Wittgenstein's own references to phenomenology occur most frequently.

"Phenomenology" in a positive sense, in particular, in the *Big Typescript* contains an entire chapter entitled "phenomenology", which begins with a section titled "Phenomenology is Grammar". We even have a report of Wittgenstein declaring, "You could say of my work that it is 'phenomenology'".[5] In fact, the *Philosophical Remarks* begins with the problems that Wittgenstein calls "phenomenology" and "phenomenological language"[6] There are about a dozen references to phenomenology in the *Remarks*. Throughout his *Notebooks* of 1929-30, Wittgenstein struggles to find out whether there is a phenomenological language. Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Remarks* strongly suggests that there are "phenomenological problems"[7]

Indeed, what Rush Rhees testifies as Wittgenstein's attempted phenomenological theory of colour is suggested in the *Philosophical Remarks* in several places, where Wittgenstein makes the point that he does not want to establish anything like a physical colour theory, but "a psychological or rather phenomenological colour theory. It must be a

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theory in pure phenomenology in which mention is only made of what is actually perceptible and in which no hypothetical objects, waves, rods, cones and all that -- occur."[8] And, again in *Remarks on Colour*, Wittgenstein says: "There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems".[9]

It has been held by an array of philosophers that Wittgenstein was, at some stage of his career, a phenomenologist. Paul Ricoeur says that the 'picture theory' of the *Tractatus* is close to a phenomenological concept.[10]. He claims that the idea of representation of possibility in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* comes close to phenomenology. In this sense, Ricoeur's view is that phenomenology occurs in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Herbert Spiegelberg says that Wittgenstein's thought seems to belong to "the pattern of the phenomenological movement in the wider sense",[11] and that "...Wittgenstein's phenomenology was an important, if not essential, station on his road from logical atomism to the philosophical grammar of the *Philosophical Investigations*."[12]

Don Ihde attributes a phenomenological reduction to Wittgenstein.[13] Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka argue that the views of the early Wittgenstein are "closely similar to those of phenomenologists", specially Husserl."[14] Wataru Kuroda, a Japanese philosopher, proposes that Wittgenstein was influenced by Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, and believes that this influences are carried forward beyond the *Tractatus* in his later works. A very strong case for Wittgenstein's phenomenology has been made by Nicholas Gier, who not only claims that Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist from 1929 until the end of his life, but that "...Wittgenstein definitely uses a phenomenological epoche".[15] Some more names, favouring or discounting the possibility of Wittgenstein's

philosophical development as phenomenological, may be added to the above list. In fact, for over several decades now, scholars have been writing and debating about Wittgenstein's relationship to phenomenology.

There are arguments that the views of the early Wittgenstein were akin to phenomenology. The Hintikkas believe that the early Wittgenstein is very close to Husserl. They conclude that his Husserlian phase ends in 1929. The Hintikkas are the first to propose that the 'short-lived' phenomenology of Wittgenstein's middle period is nothing but "Tractarian doctrines in new garb". They believe that the slogan of Wittgenstein's middle period, "phenomenology is grammar" is actually Tractarian logic which is once called "logical grammar".[16] Tractarian phenomenology can be summed up as the view that "the entire logical structure of the world can ...be read off from immediately given data".[17]

That the conception of phenomenology that appears in Wittgenstein's writings of the period from 1929 to the years immediately following are concerned with the issues that lay at the heart of TLP, is the view of Robert Alva Noe.[18] The issues, e.g., the nature of linguistic representation, logic and logical necessity and the nature of logical analysis are consistent with what Noe calls phenomenology and phenomenological language. According to him, Wittgenstein's new interest in phenomenology and the construction of a phenomenological language does not signify a break with his earlier concerns in the, TLP, namely, with the problems of logical analysis and the relationship between language and logic. He says, "Wittgenstein had not gone off to a totally new direction. Indeed, his novel thinking only makes sense within the more familiar Tractarian setting".[19]

It is in this setting that Wittgenstein comes to believe that some direct insight into "The logical structure of phenomena" is itself needed to explain among other things, the logical relation exhibited by statements of colour (Wittgenstein wrote extensively about colour after returning to Cambridge in 1929). We know what form elementary propositions must have when we have gained an analysis of the phenomena. Wittgenstein argues that logic and logical syntax is grounded in the phenomena which language is used to describe. Noe writes: "Phenomenology, then, is the name Wittgenstein gives to the investigation into the nature of phenomena which is required in order to determine the logical syntax of the clarified notation."[20] It is a notation in which there is a perfect correspondence between the structure of the perceptible sentence and that of what is expressed by it. This is called by Frege a *begriffsschrift*. Phenomenon and symbol must share the same multiplicity, that is to say, they must have the same range of possibilities .... Phenomenolgy is thus concerned to determine what is possible as opposed to what is actual or likely. To exhibit the possibilities of phenomena is to exhibit the essence, that is, the full range of relations in which phenomena can sensibly be set to figure. This kind of a phenomenological investigation contrasted with physics is brought out in the foreword of *Philosophical Remarks*. A phenomenological language, then, aims to be what Wittgenstein called a correct representation of phenomena. Just as Wittgenstein had contrasted phenomenology and physics with respect to the fact that the latter, but not the former, employs hypotheses and hypothetical objects in its explanations, so also he seems to imply that 'ordinary-physical-language is in important respects unsuited to the representation of immediate experience. So Wittgenstein writes:

The worst philosophical errors always arise when one wants to apply our ordinary-physical-language in the field of the immediately given. If, e.g., one were to ask "does the chair still exist, when I am not looking at it, "then the only correct answer would be "certainly, if no one has carried it off and destroyed it." Of course the philosopher would not be satisfied with this answer, but it would correctly reduce his questioning ad absurdum.[21]

The above gives us a fairly clear idea of a phenomenological language as a 'correct' representation of the immediately given. But sometimes around the latter part of 1929 Wittgenstein changes his mind about this. He comes to believe that our ordinary language is good enough as a method of representation. His change of mind concerns the idea that we are mistaken to think that one method of representation is more correct than another one in virtue of its "formal relation to reality." The shift in Wittgenstein's approach is closely related to a thought that Wittgenstein had as early as the post-Tractarian period but which grows in importance in the years to come is that phenomenology is grammar, that is to say, that the phenomenological investigation is no more than or comes to the same as an investigation of what it makes sense to say (e.g., in the domain of visual experience). Noe translates relevant portions from Wittgenstein's unpublished manuscript, MS 105 which reads, "physics strives for truth , that is , for correct prediction of events, whereas phenomenology does not do that. It strives for sense not truth".[22] A few lines later, Noe says, he has written "Physics has a language and in this language it says propositions. These propositions can be true or false. These propositions form physics and grammar [forms] phenomenology

(or whatever one wishes to call it)."[23] Something on the same idea is stated some years later in *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein says,

> We feel as if we have to penetrate phenomena [*Erscheinungen*]: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but as one might say towards the "possibilities" of phenomena. We remind ourselves, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena.[24]

Wittgenstein comes to recognise that the phenomenological investigation just is a consideration of what it makes sense to say about phenomena viz., a grammatical investigation of the word used to express immediate experience. The identification of phenomenology with grammar leads to his rejection of the need to construct a phenomenological language altogether. By grammar he means the norms, standards or rules of the methods of representation he employs. Rules of grammar are arbitrary. Grammar is not indebted to reality. The considerations about the arbitrariness of grammar, about its autonomy force Wittgenstein to recognise the question of what it makes sense to say, about immediate experience, viz., the grammatical investigation of the language used to describe experience, is, at best, misleadingly characterised as requiring the inspection of experience, or of the phenomenon itself. Noe has the impression that from the beginning Wittgenstein had explored the significance of the idea of an identity between phenomenological investigation and grammatical investigation. He says:

> ...the phenomenological investigation and the grammatical investigation were in fact one. But this led him finally to realize that the appropriate philosophical

task ought not to be that of developing a notation that is structurally isomorphic with reality, but ought rather to be that of understanding what it makes sense to say about experience. But since what it makes sense to say about experience is independent of what experience is like - since any description of what experience is like begs the issue of what it makes sense to say about experience - there is no need for phenomenology nor for a new phenomenological notation.[25]

Harry, F. Reeder in his article "Wittgenstein Never was a Phenomenologist"[26] argues against the view that Wittgenstein was at some point of his philosophical career a phenomenologist. He refutes every attempt at a phenomenological construction of Wittgenstein, and in so doing he occupies a position completely opposite of the view of Nicholas Gier who offers a full-length phenomenological interpretation of Wittgenstein. However, majority of the interpreters are in favour of a phenomenological interpretation, and it will be rash to say in view of the evidences offered by them that Wittgenstein was not a phenomenologist in some sense or other . In what sense he could be called a phenomenologist -- about this question there is no agreement and Wittgenstein himself was in some sense responsible for this indecision .Whether or not to identify Wittgenstein as a phenomenologist can be in my understanding be the topic of a full research work which is beyond the scope of our present task. [27]

We have seen above that there are many different interpretations for and against Wittgenstein's relation to phenomenology. While some of these claims that Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist at least during

some period of his philosophical career, others are critical of the view that Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist at all. Now, it is true that there is hard evidence that Wittgenstein himself used the words 'phenomenology' and 'phenomenological language' for a certain period of time. There has been a strong tendency to fit in Wittgenstein within Husserlian phenomenological terminology and scheme and to establish connection between Husserl and Wittgenstein. Such attempts have not been fully successful but there is another side of the matter. Phenomenology is a study which attempts to understand the ultimate structure of reality from what is immediately and simply given to experience. From this perspective it will be useful and helpful to look for possible parallelism between Husserl and Wittgenstein. Husserl's phenomenology starts from the problems of the immediately given, and the way we grasp reality. So does Wittgenstein's phenomenology. But the difference in the structure of the immediately given inevitably resulted in different phenomenologies of the two different philosophers. For Wittgenstein, the phenomenological character is most clearly present in his early period. What makes all the complex meaning and logic of our language and thought possible depends entirely upon the logical form of simple objects given in immediate experience. Even after his emphatic pronouncement of the impossibility of phenomenological language it seems he does not entirely abolish phenomenology. The "Phenomenology" chapter in the so called Big *Type Script* is a good example showing that Wittgenstein did not entirely give up his phenomenology after the 1929's rejection of phenomenological language. For Wittgenstein the phenomenological problems are the problems of immediate experience and the way we describe it. The problem of immediate experience does not appear to have

changed greatly. The preoccupation with the problem of colour in immediate experience remains an important concern for Wittgenstein. If we consider Wittgenstein from the *Tractatus* through the *Brown Book*, *Philosophical Investigations* and *Remarks on the Philosophical Psychology*, what has changed during his philosophical development is his view on the way in which we express and describe immediate experience. Wittgenstein's rejection of phenomenological language is the rejection of one way of describing immediate experience in favour of another. Wittgenstein appears to have never given up his constant concern with immediate experience. But what he came to believe is that the language that expresses immediate experience cannot be phenomenological. In his middle period, logical analysis of phenomenological language becomes grammatical analysis of physicalistic language. However, we want to make two points, one is Wittgenstein never utilizes any sort of phenomenological method, phenomenological reduction and constitution nor has he given a clear definition of the word 'phenomenology'. But dismissal of a phenomenological interpretation of Wittgenstein just because of the lack of its clarity cannot be justified. Wittgenstein is well-known for his cryptic and aphoristic style, and many of his key concepts, like language games, forms of life etc., even the expression 'picture theory' needed to be interpreted. Similarly, it goes to his lack of clarity that he did not give any clear formulation of his ideas of phenomenology. However, these two points should not be used against viewing Wittgenstein's philosophy as phenomenology. At the same time it is virtually impossible to prove any connection between Husserl and Wittgenstein. But one can develop the idea of his idea of phenomenology independently.

From Wittgenstein's observations in the chapter on 'Phenomenology' in the *Big Type Script* and *Remarks on Colour* it can be pointed out that phenomenological problems for him were problems of immediate experience. The problem of immediate experience, we repeat, does not appear to have changed greatly, because colour—i.e., the immediate experience of colour is taken as one of his philosophical problems from the earliest years to the last. Byong-Chul-Park observes:

> The problem of colour appears in the *Tractatus* with regards to logical possibility. In the *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein explicitly says that he is 'concerned with colour as something we immediately experience'. Colours also function as an important example as Wittgenstein develops the idea of the language-game. Wittgenstein discusses this problem in *The Brown Book*, *Philosophical Investigations*, and *Remarks on the Philosophy of psychology*. And finally, perhaps there is no better example than *Remarks on Colour*, which shows how Wittgenstein consistently takes up the problem of colour, for it is Wittgenstein's very last work and proves that he was still struggling with the problem of colour after all those years".[28]

The problem of the possibility of phenomenology for Wittgenstein should be approached from the perspectives of the ways we describe immediate experience, and not of eidetic science. Phenomenology is interested in the structure of our experience which, according to Husserl, is contributed by consciousness. Husserl would speak rather of the relationship between consciousness and the object immediately given to

it. The object is an object for consciousness and gets its meaning from consciousness. Language is the outer garb or clothing of consciousness. For Wittgenstein description of immediate experience in language is of importance and it is physicalist's language.

In this section, we have tried to forge a link between Wittgenstein and phenomenology to get some idea of the word-world relationship. What we find are interesting parallels with Husserl in spite of differences in structure and terminology. The picture theory explains how the elementary sentence represents what goes on in the world. On the other hand, truth function theory extends the picture idea to all the propositions of that language. Wittgenstein's in this regard shows the reduction of everything cognitivety meaningful to immediate experience. But in his transitional period there is a shift from the phenomenological language of the *Tractatus* to the physicalist language of ordinary use. The change in the language paradigms. it apears, makes it rather difficult for Wittgenstein to conduct the phenomenological enterprise. The phenomenological aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy are watered down from the middle period on to the extent that he declares, "It is rather puzzling how can there be phenomenological problems when the possibility of phenomenological language is given up".[29]

We find him wrestling with this phenomenological problems as he developed the language game idea. The phenomenological realm of immediate experience had to be explained within the framework of physicalist language. This is sought to be done when Wittgenstein developed the idea that the language game is the most fundamental ground of our language and language use. so that all the meaning, whether it is of the external or of the internal objects. should be given by

our practice of language game that involves public framework. Indeed, this is the role of the language game as the connecting link between language and the world. The names of sensations, has to be connected to sensations themselves by the language game. The phenomenological problems remain with Wittgenstein even in the *Philosophical Investigations*. They are now explained with reference to language games.

It is plane from our discussion that not all the puzzles are resolved, nor could they be, but we get a reasonably clear idea of what Wittgenstein meant. We know at least that *something* which Wittgenstein sometimes called 'phenomenology', sometimes 'grammar' played an important but shifting role from "Some Remarks on Logical Form" to *Remarks on Colour*.

I intend to close off this concluding chapter by an account of the reciprocal impacting of Anglo-American analytic philosophy and continental philosophy.

III

The development of philosophy from the ancient time to the modern time may be divided into two sectors—analytic philosophy and continental philosophy.

Analytic philosophy traced to the ancient time is propounded by the thinkers oriented to natural science. It flourished through the enlightenment to the twentieth century. Analytic philosophy actually developed in the English-speaking world for most of the twentieth century and is still continuing vigorously. It flourished mainly among the

modern European philosophers of the Enlightenment. Although it started with natural science it blossomed with the artistic, moral, and religious truth of the Enlightenment. The development of analytic philosophy is centred on the western English-speaking countries of Europe, United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Kant influenced both the analytic and continental philosophy. His philosophy was a response to the radical skepticism of David Hume, one of the central figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. But the philosophy of Hegel which arose as the criticism of Kant's philosophy was not accepted by the analytic philosophers. After Hegel, the two main divisions of Western and European philosophy has been demarcated as the analytic and continental philosophy. Analytic philosophy is propounded by the philosophers of the twentieth century such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore who were engaged at the time a battle with the idealist and the Hegelian, or in other words, continental philosophers of Britain and the rest of the English-speaking world. The rise of what we understand as analytic philosophy today, dates from this time. Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* was an important watershed. According to David West, both positivists and neo-Kantian philosophers of continental Europe were much closer to analytical than to contemporary continental philosophy. He says, "Analytical philosophy revived the sceptical, scientific, spirit of the Enlightenment with the help of technical developments in logic and mathematics. The resulting principles and techniques were deployed, initially with good enthusiasm against the 'usual suspects' or, at least, their direct descendants: the claims of continental metaphysical idealism, traditional religion and dogmatic morality".[30]

David West locates the source of analytical philosophy to Hume's distinction between 'Relations of Ideas' and 'Matters of Facts'. The former includes principally the truths of mathematics and logic which are dependent upon mere thought and not upon anything existing in the world. The latter includes contingent truths about the world which 'seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect'.[31] Hume seems to be influenced by the natural sciences of his day. Anything which does not belong to anyone of the above-stated categories is treated as worthless. But philosophy is not a branch of logic or mathematics neither is a natural science like Physics or Biology. That is why philosophy must restrict itself to the careful analysis of concepts. As such there was no way of developing scientifically, other than analytical philosophy. Hence, the philosophers of twentieth century attempt to analyze language. This analysis of language is called "linguistic turn". Philosophical problems can be encountered by an analysis of language. In this analytical approach the problem of meaning occupies the centre stage with the theory of sense and reference and associated problems in philosophy of language. The problem of sense and reference has been extended and developed into a bewildering variety of sub-problems, those of proper names, demonstratives, indexical and the semantical analysis of sentences containing demonstrative and indexical. These problems which started with Frege and Russell have been carried forward by present day philosophers of language like David Kaplan, J. McDowell and Keith Dunnellon.

Continental philosophy is usually contrasted with the 'analytical philosophy'. Analytical philosophy has dominated academic philosophy in the English-speaking world for most of the twentieth century.

Continental philosophy includes thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, Keirkegaard, Nietzche, Husserl, Heideggar, Sartre, Gadamer, Habermas, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and Baudrillard. As it stands today, it is linked with Hegelian idealism, Marxism, the 'critical theory' of the Frankfurt school, existentialism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, structuralism, post-structuralism and post-modernism. From this picture of the trend of the continental philosophy it is quite clear that it is not related with any single homogeneous tradition.

The main exposition of the continental philosophy can be found in the writings of Herder and Rousseau, but it is expressed most systematically in the philosophy of Hegel. Unlike the analytical philosophers the continental philosophers did not discard the appeal of the metaphysician, moralists and religious believers. Existential, moral or ethical and aesthetic questions got importance in the trend of continental philosophy.

If one stresses the history of analytic philosophy in a fairly 'broad strokes' rather than 'pointed listing dots' it appears that in certain ways the family of analytic philosophies has more closely approached the continental insights into language than is generally noticed. And if one traces the history of continental philosophy it appears that language has become more and more a problem for it. At the beginning a sharp contrast appears between the continental and the analytical philosophies. The extreme type of logical atomism practiced by the early analysists derived mainly from the works of Carnap, Russell and the early Wittgenstein. If one turns to continental philosophy, it is not at all certain that linguistic problems are major problems for the philosophers. The difference is made on the plane of ideas than on geographical locations. However, there now

are signs of convergence between these two systems of philosophy. This is specially traceable in gradually closing the gap between analytical philosophy and phenomenology.

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