

## **Chapter VI**

### **Concluding Remarks**

#### I

In this chapter I intend to look back to the discussion spread over five chapters and collect together the loose ends which are bound to be there.

The purpose of this thesis is not to focus on the problem, namely, how to learn a language or how a child learns a language. This is the concern of the linguists. My concern is not at all an analysis of the linguistic construction of an utterance or a sentence in a natural language. Rather is a philosophical investigation into the relation between word and the world which is a variation on the theme of language and the world or thought and the world.

It has been observed that any talk of a relation presupposes a gap between the relata. In fact theories of meaning and truth work on the assumption that there is a gap between language and reality to cross over. If language and reality are interwoven, there is scarcely any need to talk of a relation as bridging a gap. To highlight this matter the prominent theories of meaning and truth are discussed.

In our context, language or word is seen from the dimension of speech acts, so called by J. L. Austin. It has been our intention with the situation of utterance. Linguisticity or linguistic significance is interwoven with the situation in the world. The phenomenological understanding of language as speech or speaking has helped us to recast the problem in the light of human existence in the world. Our discussion

is directed to the search of how a speaker uses his utterance to serve his communicative goal or communicative intent.

The elaboration of this has been prefaced by an account of views of philosophers whose reflections on language and meaning have a bearing on our problem. We have specifically in mind Wittgenstein, Austin and Searle. We have included Strawson not only because of his interesting observations on the world and our conceptual system but also because of his theory of intention and convention in speech act which takes stock of Austin's views on the conventionality of successful performance of speech acts.

In introducing the notion of speech act Austin is proposing a new concept with which to interpret our experience of being in the world. Now in one respect a proposed new concept is in a more exposed and vulnerable position than a concept already in use and acceptable. It may be that the users of an accepted concept cannot give an explicit analysis, an account of the principles governing its use; but if nevertheless, they are able to apply it with widespread agreement to an open class of particular cases, this creates a weak presumption in favour of the acceptability of the concept. It creates no more than a weak presumption since it shows only that the concept in question can be applied systematically, not that it is a fruitful concept to apply or that it is free from false assumption. Nevertheless, weak as this evidence is, it is not available in the case of a new proposed concept. Here we cannot point to the fact that people have always used the concept successfully to make some discrimination or that they will continue to do so in future. So it is no wonder that Austin's introduction of the performative-constative distinction and its supersession by the theory of speech act, in the initial phase, met with the

suspicion regarding its profitability, Austin himself had second thoughts about the performative-constative distinction. If we go through the lectures of his *How to Do Things with Words*, we will find that building up the distinction and dismantling it are parts of the same process. All the same Austin's point of contains an important insight which he failed to exploit. Now, there is a growing awareness that when Austin talks about language as a subject, he does not end up talking only about language, instead he uses a consideration of language as a medium for reaching conclusions about the world. As a consequence, when Austin talks about language, he is forced to a large extent to abandon his ordinary language approach and proceed constructively and creatively, forging new theories about language, and raising philosophical questions about them. Austin not only questions the natural tendency to think that the only virtues or deficiencies in a language resides in its success or failure in reflecting reality. Austin reminds us that there are many other dimensions of language, and he demonstrates that in various ways the idea of people as agents is deeply embedded in the idea of them as language speakers.

From that perspective we have tried to develop Austin's theory of speech acts into an intentional theory in consonance with the phenomenological theory of intentionality of consciousness. Although Austin would not perhaps speak of internal states, his motto being "let our words be our bond", it would not be an overstatement to say that his is a case of linguistic intentionality. The phenomenologists have a special, perhaps unique vision of the manner in which man is intentionally related to the world. For this construal of Austin we have first looked into the reflections on meaning from the point of view of phenomenology, particularly those of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Here

we have taken the pains to show that in a philosophical investigation of language speaker's meaning is to be distinguished from an expression meaning or speaker's meaning. People use language to achieve their various aims and intentions. The use of language by human beings is purposive. Hence, they cannot overlook linguistic meaning. But a speaker's meaning is more than a linguistic meaning. According to the speech act theory of Austin, in uttering a sentence to mean something the speaker requires more than just producing a written or a phonetic realization of the sentence. He also requires knowing what the sentence itself means and the expectation that his addressee shares that knowledge. This is dubbed by Austin as the 'illocutionary' and 'illocutionary point' by Searle.

The phenomenological interpretation of Austin's theory of speech acts has attracted the attention of a large number of Anglo-American philosophers. Anticipations of speech act theory as in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, and more pronouncedly, in Reinach's theory of social acts, are still too little known, so that a philosopher like Searle can rediscover the need for intentionality in the philosophy of language without awareness of the historical precedents. Even before we have reconstructed Austin's theory in the light of the intentionality thesis, we have made mention of Austin's describing his philosophical method as "linguistic phenomenology" and has elaborated it. A good number of articles are being published in the recent years aligning Wittgenstein and Austin with phenomenology. Herbert Spiegelberg, in his *The Context of the Phenomenological Movement* places a great deal of attention on the bridge between continental and Anglo-American philosophy. One piece of general interest is "The Puzzle of Wittgenstein's (1929 .....?)". Why

did Wittgenstein use the term "Phänomenologie" in the early thirties, what did he mean by it, why and how far did he abandon it? Since the section in this thesis on Wittgenstein in chapter II does not touch upon this aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy we deem it apposite to insert a note on that.

## II

The influence of Russell, Moore and Frege upon some of the central themes of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* has long been recognised in the literature. More recently we have begun to understand the relation of Wittgenstein's early thought to the group of philosophers which consists of, among others, contemporaries or near contemporaries of Wittgenstein himself. The central figure in this group was Franz Brentano, whose students and followers were to be found throughout the Austrian Empire, and it will be important for our purpose to note how far the Brentano-Husserl-Meinong tradition and the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus* and beyond, may throw light, on each other and also on the problem at hand. This does not mean that there are any direct influences from the one to the other. Direct influences are not essential to the value of comparison we are trying to defend here. But that there are such influences is not capable of being denied. In many respects much of the thinking of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* and other works has to be regarded as having parallels with a work of the phenomenologists faithful to Husserl's position in the *Logical Investigations* (1900), published only fourteen years before Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*.<sup>1</sup>

We must clarify one thing before we proceed any further. It is to be noted that we should not confuse phenomenology with the notion of phenomenalism. Phenomena are the sense-impressions of what are supposed to be the real things outside of our mind. A phenomenalist would claim that our knowledge is confined to phenomena as opposed to things-in-themselves or noumena. Phenomenology, more generally, can be characterised as a study that gives primacy to what is immediately given to our experience (that is, to consciousness), from which the ultimate structure of reality can be revealed. Its primary concern is what is given immediately in one's experience which is not any impression in one's mind but includes the part of objective reality that impinges upon one's consciousness. The purpose of phenomenological investigation is to grasp that objective reality. Husserl's phenomenology is one such example.<sup>2</sup> In attempting to show that Wittgenstein is doing phenomenology, we shall show that he by attending to immediate experience, he is doing phenomenology and not phenomenalism. Wittgenstein's philosophy, particularly his views on the relationship between language and the world, has been interpreted as phenomenological. Wittgenstein's philosophy leads us to think whether there is any similarity between phenomenology and Wittgenstein's philosophy of language.

According to Wittgenstein, language is the ultimate medium through which we understand the world. Let us examine Wittgenstein's view about the way we use language to describe immediate experience, and how far it is justified to call Wittgenstein's philosophical explanation of language a phenomenological investigation or in other words, Wittgenstein's phenomenology.

A careful study of Wittgenstein's works will enable us with the view that throughout his entire philosophical life Wittgenstein's philosophical attention is directed to immediate experience. Apparently, it seems that Wittgenstein is concerned with empirical knowledge but Wittgenstein's problem is much more complicated and interesting than just epistemological grounding. Wittgenstein used the term 'phenomenology' or 'phenomenological' in his writings after 1929 when he came back to professional philosophy at Cambridge. The first four notebooks of 1929-30, the *Philosophical Remarks*<sup>3</sup> and the *Big Typescript*<sup>4</sup> are the chief sources in which Wittgenstein's own references to phenomenology occur most frequently.

"Phenomenology" in a positive sense, in particular, in the *Big Typescript* contains an entire chapter entitled "phenomenology", which begins with a section titled "Phenomenology is Grammar". We even have a report of Wittgenstein declaring, "You could say of my work that it is 'phenomenology'".<sup>5</sup> In fact, the *Philosophical Remarks* begins with the problems that Wittgenstein calls "phenomenology" and "phenomenological language".<sup>6</sup> There are about a dozen references to phenomenology in the *Remarks*. Throughout his *Notebooks* of 1929-30, Wittgenstein struggles to find out whether there is a phenomenological language. Wittgenstein in *Philosophical Remarks* strongly suggests that there are "phenomenological problems".<sup>7</sup>

Indeed, what Rush Rhees testifies as Wittgenstein's attempted phenomenological theory of colour is suggested in the *Philosophical Remarks* in several places, where Wittgenstein makes the point that he does not want to establish anything like a physical colour theory, but "a psychological or rather phenomenological colour theory. It must be a

theory in pure phenomenology in which mention is only made of what is actually perceptible and in which no hypothetical objects, waves, rods, cones and all that -- occur."<sup>8</sup> And, again in *Remarks on Colour*, Wittgenstein says: "There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems".<sup>9</sup>

It has been held by an array of philosophers that Wittgenstein was, at some stage of his career, a phenomenologist. Paul Ricoeur says that the 'picture theory' of the *Tractatus* is close to a phenomenological concept.<sup>10</sup> He claims that the idea of representation of possibility in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* comes close to phenomenology. In this sense, Ricoeur's view is that phenomenology occurs in Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Herbert Spiegelberg says that Wittgenstein's thought seems to belong to "the pattern of the phenomenological movement in the wider sense",<sup>11</sup> and that "...Wittgenstein's phenomenology was an important, if not essential, station on his road from logical atomism to the philosophical grammar of the *Philosophical Investigations*."<sup>12</sup>

Don Ihde attributes a phenomenological reduction to Wittgenstein.<sup>13</sup> Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka argue that the views of the early Wittgenstein are "closely similar to those of phenomenologists", specially Husserl."<sup>14</sup> Wataru Kuroda, a Japanese philosopher, proposes that Wittgenstein was influenced by Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, and believes that this influences are carried forward beyond the *Tractatus* in his later works. A very strong case for Wittgenstein's phenomenology has been made by Nicholas Gier, who not only claims that Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist from 1929 until the end of his life, but that "...Wittgenstein definitely uses a phenomenological epoche".<sup>15</sup> Some more names, favouring or discounting the possibility of Wittgenstein's



philosophical development as phenomenological, may be added to the above list. In fact, for over several decades now, scholars have been writing and debating about Wittgenstein's relationship to phenomenology.

There are arguments that the views of the early Wittgenstein were akin to phenomenology. The Hintikkas believe that the early Wittgenstein is very close to Husserl. They conclude that his Husserlian phase ends in 1929. The Hintikkas are the first to propose that the 'short-lived' phenomenology of Wittgenstein's middle period is nothing but "Tractarian doctrines in new garb". They believe that the slogan of Wittgenstein's middle period, "phenomenology is grammar" is actually Tractarian logic which is once called "logical grammar".<sup>16</sup> Tractarian phenomenology can be summed up as the view that "the entire logical structure of the world can ...be read off from immediately given data".<sup>17</sup>

That the conception of phenomenology that appears in Wittgenstein's writings of the period from 1929 to the years immediately following are concerned with the issues that lay at the heart of TLP, is the view of Robert Alva Noe.<sup>18</sup> The issues, e.g., the nature of linguistic representation, logic and logical necessity and the nature of logical analysis are consistent with what Noe calls phenomenology and phenomenological language. According to him, Wittgenstein's new interest in phenomenology and the construction of a phenomenological language does not signify a break with his earlier concerns in the, TLP, namely, with the problems of logical analysis and the relationship between language and logic. He says, "Wittgenstein had not gone off to a totally new direction. Indeed, his novel thinking only makes sense within the more familiar Tractarian setting".<sup>19</sup>

It is in this setting that Wittgenstein comes to believe that some direct insight into "The logical structure of phenomena" is itself needed to explain among other things, the logical relation exhibited by statements of colour (Wittgenstein wrote extensively about colour after returning to Cambridge in 1929). We know what form elementary propositions must have when we have gained an analysis of the phenomena. Wittgenstein argues that logic and logical syntax is grounded in the phenomena which language is used to describe. Noe writes: "Phenomenology, then, is the name Wittgenstein gives to the investigation into the nature of phenomena which is required in order to determine the logical syntax of the clarified notation."<sup>20</sup> It is a notation in which there is a perfect correspondence between the structure of the perceptible sentence and that of what is expressed by it. This is called by Frege a *begriffsschrift*. Phenomenon and symbol must share the same multiplicity, that is to say, they must have the same range of possibilities .... Phenomenology is thus concerned to determine what is possible as opposed to what is actual or likely. To exhibit the possibilities of phenomena is to exhibit the essence, that is, the full range of relations in which phenomena can sensibly be set to figure. This kind of a phenomenological investigation contrasted with physics is brought out in the foreword of *Philosophical Remarks*. A phenomenological language, then, aims to be what Wittgenstein called a correct representation of phenomena. Just as Wittgenstein had contrasted phenomenology and physics with respect to the fact that the latter, but not the former, employs hypotheses and hypothetical objects in its explanations, so also he seems to imply that 'ordinary-physical-language is in important respects unsuited to the representation of immediate experience. So Wittgenstein writes:

The worst philosophical errors always arise when one wants to apply our ordinary-physical-language in the field of the immediately given. If, e.g., one were to ask "does the chair still exist, when I am not looking at it, "then the only correct answer would be "certainly, if no one has carried it off and destroyed it." Of course the philosopher would not be satisfied with this answer, but it would correctly reduce his questioning ad absurdum.<sup>21</sup>

The above gives us a fairly clear idea of a phenomenological language as a 'correct' representation of the immediately given. But sometimes around the latter part of 1929 Wittgenstein changes his mind about this. He comes to believe that our ordinary language is good enough as a method of representation. His change of mind concerns the idea that we are mistaken to think that one method of representation is more correct than another one in virtue of its "formal relation to reality." The shift in Wittgenstein's approach is closely related to a thought that Wittgenstein had as early as the post-Tractarian period but which grows in importance in the years to come is that phenomenology is grammar, that is to say, that the phenomenological investigation is no more than or comes to the same as an investigation of what it makes sense to say (e.g., in the domain of visual experience). Noe translates relevant portions from Wittgenstein's unpublished manuscript, MS 105 which reads, "physics strives for truth , that is , for correct prediction of events, whereas phenomenology does not do that. It strives for sense not truth".<sup>22</sup> A few lines later, Noe says, he has written "Physics has a language and in this language it says propositions. These propositions can be true or false. These propositions form physics and grammar [forms] phenomenology

(or whatever one wishes to call it).”<sup>23</sup> Something on the same idea is stated some years later in *Philosophical Investigations*. Wittgenstein says,

We feel as if we have to penetrate phenomena [*Erscheinungen*]: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but as one might say towards the "possibilities" of phenomena. We remind ourselves, of the kind of statement that we make about phenomena.<sup>24</sup>

Wittgenstein comes to recognise that the phenomenological investigation just is a consideration of what it makes sense to say about phenomena viz., a grammatical investigation of the word used to express immediate experience. The identification of phenomenology with grammar leads to his rejection of the need to construct a phenomenological language altogether. By grammar he means the norms, standards or rules of the methods of representation he employs. Rules of grammar are arbitrary. Grammar is not indebted to reality. The considerations about the arbitrariness of grammar, about its autonomy force Wittgenstein to recognise the question of what it makes sense to say, about immediate experience, viz., the grammatical investigation of the language used to describe experience, is, at best, misleadingly characterised as requiring the inspection of experience, or of the phenomenon itself. Noe has the impression that from the beginning Wittgenstein had explored the significance of the idea of an identity between phenomenological investigation and grammatical investigation. He says:

...the phenomenological investigation and the grammatical investigation were in fact one. But this led him finally to realize that the appropriate philosophical

task ought not to be that of developing a notation that is structurally isomorphic with reality, but ought rather to be that of understanding what it makes sense to say about experience. But since what it makes sense to say about experience is independent of what experience is like - since any description of what experience is like begs the issue of what it makes sense to say about experience - there is no need for phenomenology nor for a new phenomenological notation.<sup>25</sup>

Harry, F. Reeder in his article "Wittgenstein Never was a Phenomenologist"<sup>26</sup> argues against the view that Wittgenstein was at some point of his philosophical career a phenomenologist. He refutes every attempt at a phenomenological construction of Wittgenstein, and in so doing he occupies a position completely opposite of the view of Nicholas Gier who offers a full-length phenomenological interpretation of Wittgenstein. However, majority of the interpreters are in favour of a phenomenological interpretation, and it will be rash to say in view of the evidences offered by them that Wittgenstein was not a phenomenologist in some sense or other . In what sense he could be called a phenomenologist -- about this question there is no agreement and Wittgenstein himself was in some sense responsible for this indecision .Whether or not to identify Wittgenstein as a phenomenologist can be in my understanding be the topic of a full research work which is beyond the scope of our present task. <sup>27</sup>

We have seen above that there are many different interpretations for and against Wittgenstein's relation to phenomenology. While some of these claims that Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist at least during

some period of his philosophical career, others are critical of the view that Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist at all. Now, it is true that there is hard evidence that Wittgenstein himself used the words 'phenomenology' and 'phenomenological language' for a certain period of time. There has been a strong tendency to fit in Wittgenstein within Husserlian phenomenological terminology and scheme and to establish connection between Husserl and Wittgenstein. Such attempts have not been fully successful but there is another side of the matter. Phenomenology is a study which attempts to understand the ultimate structure of reality from what is immediately and simply given to experience. From this perspective it will be useful and helpful to look for possible parallelism between Husserl and Wittgenstein. Husserl's phenomenology starts from the problems of the immediately given, and the way we grasp reality. So does Wittgenstein's phenomenology. But the difference in the structure of the immediately given inevitably resulted in different phenomenologies of the two different philosophers. For Wittgenstein, the phenomenological character is most clearly present in his early period. What makes all the complex meaning and logic of our language and thought possible depends entirely upon the logical form of simple objects given in immediate experience. Even after his emphatic pronouncement of the impossibility of phenomenological language it seems he does not entirely abolish phenomenology. The "Phenomenology" chapter in the so called *Big Type Script* is a good example showing that Wittgenstein did not entirely give up his phenomenology after the 1929's rejection of phenomenological language. For Wittgenstein the phenomenological problems are the problems of immediate experience and the way we describe it. The problem of immediate experience does not appear to have

changed greatly. The preoccupation with the problem of colour in immediate experience remains an important concern for Wittgenstein. If we consider Wittgenstein from the *Tractatus* through the *Brown Book*, *Philosophical Investigations* and *Remarks on the Philosophical Psychology*, what has changed during his philosophical development is his view on the way in which we express and describe immediate experience. Wittgenstein's rejection of phenomenological language is the rejection of one way of describing immediate experience in favour of another. Wittgenstein appears to have never given up his constant concern with immediate experience. But what he came to believe is that the language that expresses immediate experience cannot be phenomenological. In his middle period, logical analysis of phenomenological language becomes grammatical analysis of physicalistic language. However, we want to make two points, one is Wittgenstein never utilizes any sort of phenomenological method, phenomenological reduction and constitution nor has he given a clear definition of the word 'phenomenology'. But dismissal of a phenomenological interpretation of Wittgenstein just because of the lack of its clarity cannot be justified. Wittgenstein is well-known for his cryptic and aphoristic style, and many of his key concepts, like language games, forms of life etc., even the expression 'picture theory' needed to be interpreted. Similarly, it goes to his lack of clarity that he did not give any clear formulation of his ideas of phenomenology. However, these two points should not be used against viewing Wittgenstein's philosophy as phenomenology. At the same time it is virtually impossible to prove any connection between Husserl and Wittgenstein. But one can develop the idea of his idea of phenomenology independently.

From Wittgenstein's observations in the chapter on 'Phenomenology' in the *Big Type Script* and *Remarks on Colour* it can be pointed out that phenomenological problems for him were problems of immediate experience. The problem of immediate experience, we repeat, does not appear to have changed greatly, because colour—i.e., the immediate experience of colour is taken as one of his philosophical problems from the earliest years to the last. Byong-Chul-Park observes:

The problem of colour appears in the *Tractatus* with regards to logical possibility. In the *Philosophical Remarks*, Wittgenstein explicitly says that he is 'concerned with colour as something we immediately experience'. Colours also function as an important example as Wittgenstein develops the idea of the language-game. Wittgenstein discusses this problem in *The Brown Book*, *Philosophical Investigations*, and *Remarks on the Philosophy of psychology*. And finally, perhaps there is no better example than *Remarks on Colour*, which shows how Wittgenstein consistently takes up the problem of colour, for it is Wittgenstein's very last work and proves that he was still struggling with the problem of colour after all those years".<sup>28</sup>

The problem of the possibility of phenomenology for Wittgenstein should be approached from the perspectives of the ways we describe immediate experience, and not of eidetic science. Phenomenology is interested in the structure of our experience which, according to Husserl, is contributed by consciousness. Husserl would speak rather of the relationship between consciousness and the object immediately given to



it. The object is an object for consciousness and gets its meaning from consciousness. Language is the outer garb or clothing of consciousness. For Wittgenstein description of immediate experience in language is of importance and it is physicalist's language.

In this section, we have tried to forge a link between Wittgenstein and phenomenology to get some idea of the word-world relationship. What we find are interesting parallels with Husserl in spite of differences in structure and terminology. The picture theory explains how the elementary sentence represents what goes on in the world. On the other hand, truth function theory extends the picture idea to all the propositions of that language. Wittgenstein's in this regard shows the reduction of everything cognitively meaningful to immediate experience. But in his transitional period there is a shift from the phenomenological language of the *Tractatus* to the physicalist language of ordinary use. The change in the language paradigms, it appears, makes it rather difficult for Wittgenstein to conduct the phenomenological enterprise. The phenomenological aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy are watered down from the middle period on to the extent that he declares, "It is rather puzzling how can there be phenomenological problems when the possibility of phenomenological language is given up".<sup>29</sup>

We find him wrestling with this phenomenological problems as he developed the language game idea. The phenomenological realm of immediate experience had to be explained within the framework of physicalist language. This is sought to be done when Wittgenstein developed the idea that the language game is the most fundamental ground of our language and language use, so that all the meaning, whether it is of the external or of the internal objects, should be given by

our practice of language game that involves public framework. Indeed, this is the role of the language game as the connecting link between language and the world. The names of sensations, has to be connected to sensations themselves by the language game. The phenomenological problems remain with Wittgenstein even in the *Philosophical Investigations*. They are now explained with reference to language games.

It is plain from our discussion that not all the puzzles are resolved, nor could they be, but we get a reasonably clear idea of what Wittgenstein meant. We know at least that *something* which Wittgenstein sometimes called ‘phenomenology’, sometimes ‘grammar’ played an important but shifting role from “Some Remarks on Logical Form” to *Remarks on Colour*.

I intend to close off this concluding chapter by an account of the reciprocal impacting of Anglo-American analytic philosophy and continental philosophy.

### III

The development of philosophy from the ancient time to the modern time may be divided into two sectors—analytic philosophy and continental philosophy.

Analytic philosophy traced to the ancient time is propounded by the thinkers oriented to natural science. It flourished through the enlightenment to the twentieth century. Analytic philosophy actually developed in the English-speaking world for most of the twentieth century and is still continuing vigorously. It flourished mainly among the

modern European philosophers of the Enlightenment. Although it started with natural science it blossomed with the artistic, moral, and religious truth of the Enlightenment. The development of analytic philosophy is centred on the western English-speaking countries of Europe, United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Kant influenced both the analytic and continental philosophy. His philosophy was a response to the radical skepticism of David Hume, one of the central figures of the Scottish Enlightenment. But the philosophy of Hegel which arose as the criticism of Kant's philosophy was not accepted by the analytic philosophers. After Hegel, the two main divisions of Western and European philosophy has been demarcated as the analytic and continental philosophy. Analytic philosophy is propounded by the philosophers of the twentieth century such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore who were engaged at the time a battle with the idealist and the Hegelian, or in other words, continental philosophers of Britain and the rest of the English-speaking world. The rise of what we understand as analytic philosophy today, dates from this time. Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica* was an important watershed. According to David West, both positivists and neo-Kantian philosophers of continental Europe were much closer to analytical than to contemporary continental philosophy. He says, "Analytical philosophy revived the sceptical, scientific, spirit of the Enlightenment with the help of technical developments in logic and mathematics. The resulting principles and techniques were deployed, initially with good enthusiasm against the 'usual suspects' or, at least, their direct descendants: the claims of continental metaphysical idealism, traditional religion and dogmatic morality".<sup>30</sup>

David West locates the source of analytical philosophy to Hume's distinction between 'Relations of Ideas' and 'Matters of Facts'. The former includes principally the truths of mathematics and logic which are dependent upon mere thought and not upon anything existing in the world. The latter includes contingent truths about the world which 'seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect'.<sup>31</sup> Hume seems to be influenced by the natural sciences of his day. Anything which does not belong to anyone of the above-stated categories is treated as worthless. But philosophy is not a branch of logic or mathematics neither is a natural science like Physics or Biology. That is why philosophy must restrict itself to the careful analysis of concepts. As such there was no way of developing scientifically, other than analytical philosophy. Hence, the philosophers of twentieth century attempt to analyze language. This analysis of language is called "linguistic turn". Philosophical problems can be encountered by an analysis of language. In this analytical approach the problem of meaning occupies the centre stage with the theory of sense and reference and associated problems in philosophy of language. The problem of sense and reference has been extended and developed into a bewildering variety of sub-problems, those of proper names, demonstratives, indexical and the semantical analysis of sentences containing demonstrative and indexical. These problems which started with Frege and Russell have been carried forward by present day philosophers of language like David Kaplan, J. McDowell and Keith Dunnellon.

Continental philosophy is usually contrasted with the 'analytical philosophy'. Analytical philosophy has dominated academic philosophy in the English-speaking world for most of the twentieth century.

Continental philosophy includes thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, Keirkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Gadamer, Habermas, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and Baudrillard. As it stands today, it is linked with Hegelian idealism, Marxism, the 'critical theory' of the Frankfurt school, existentialism, hermeneutics, phenomenology, structuralism, post-structuralism and post-modernism. From this picture of the trend of the continental philosophy it is quite clear that it is not related with any single homogeneous tradition.

The main exposition of the continental philosophy can be found in the writings of Herder and Rousseau, but it is expressed most systematically in the philosophy of Hegel. Unlike the analytical philosophers the continental philosophers did not discard the appeal of the metaphysician, moralists and religious believers. Existential, moral or ethical and aesthetic questions got importance in the trend of continental philosophy.

If one stresses the history of analytic philosophy in a fairly 'broad strokes' rather than 'pointed listing dots' it appears that in certain ways the family of analytic philosophies has more closely approached the continental insights into language than is generally noticed. And if one traces the history of continental philosophy it appears that language has become more and more a problem for it. At the beginning a sharp contrast appears between the continental and the analytical philosophies. The extreme type of logical atomism practiced by the early analysts derived mainly from the works of Carnap, Russell and the early Wittgenstein. If one turns to continental philosophy, it is not at all certain that linguistic problems are major problems for the philosophers. The difference is made on the plane of ideas than on geographical locations. However, there now

are signs of convergence between these two systems of philosophy. This is specially traceable in gradually closing the gap between analytical philosophy and phenomenology.

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22. Robert Alva Noe, "Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and What it makes Sense to Say" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 54, No. 1 1994, pp. 1-42.
23. *Ibid.* p. 7.
24. *Ibid.* .
25. L Wittgenstein, Ts. 208, 93 (originally occurring in Ms 107 from an October entry) Source: Albert Noe (trans. from original German op. cit., p. 11).
26. Ms 105, p. 3. Robert Alva Noe (trans.).
27. Op.cit, p. 20.
28. L Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, G.E.M.Anscombe(trans.), Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968, Sec. 90.
29. Robert Alva Noe, "Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and What it Makes Sense to Say", *op. cit.*, p. 2.
30. H.F.Reeder, "Wittgenstein Never was a Phenomenologist" in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 20, 1989, p. 257-76.
31. Cf. This is what is done by Byong- Chul- Park, *Phenomenological Aspects of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, Kluwer Academic Publs., The Netherlands, 1998.

32. Byong-Chul-Park, *Phenomenological Aspects of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*, op. cit.,p. 210.
33. L Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Remarks*, op. cit.
34. David West, *An Introduction to continental philosophy*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 4.
35. David Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV. Part I. Sections 20 – 1, pp. 25-6.