

Chapter-4

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *Samavāya*:

I. *Samavāya*: Transition from Vaiśeṣika to Nyāya

The Vaiśeṣika insists on the timeless and non-causal character of inherence. Kaṇāda means by inherence the relation between cause and effect ¹. Praśastapāda defines it as the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained, and being the basis of the idea, "this is in that" (*ayūtasiddhānāmādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*) ². Virtue and pleasure, Śrīdhara says, are not related by inherence, though they reside in the self, since they are not related as the container and the contained. The relationship between the word and the thing signified is not one of inherence, since one is not contained in the other. The fruit may be on the ground, but as the two are not inseparable, they cannot be said to be related by way of inherence. *Ayūtasiddhi* or inseparability is not identity, since the two things are not one in reality. The form of fire and the ball of iron are distinct from each other. While Kaṇāda includes only causal ties in the relation of *samavāya*, Praśastapāda brings non-causal ones under it. Generally the relation that binds a substance and its qualities, a whole and its parts, motion and the object in motion, individual and universe, cause and effect, is that of *samavāya* or inherence. The members related are so unified as to present one whole or one identical real.

Samavāya, or necessary connection, is distinguished from *samyoga*, or accidental conjunction, which is a quality of things.

While objects conjoined have a separate existence prior to conjunction, the members related by *samavāya* are inseparably connected. The relationship of *samavāya* is not caused by the action of one of the members related. Conjunction terminates as soon as there is a disjunction of the members conjoined. Again, conjunction takes place between two independent substances, while the members related by way of inherence stand in the relation of the container and the contained. Two things in the relation of *samavāya* cannot be separated without at least one of them being destroyed. *Samyoga* takes place between two things of the same nature which exist disconnectedly and are for a time brought into conjunction. It is external relation, while *samavāya* is internal relation. Johnson's distinction between a characterizing tie and a coupling tie is comparable in this context. In *samyoga* two different things are joined together without forming a real whole which enters into each. *Samavāya* is a real coherence.

Inherence is said to be eternal, since to be produced would involve infinite regress. Śrīdhara says that it cannot appear before, or after, or along with the thing related to it ³. If the inherence of the cloth were possible before the cloth appears, it is conceivable where the inherence could reside, since one member of the relationship is non-existent. If it is produced along with the cloth, then the cloth would lose the character of being the substrate of the relationship of inherence. If it appeared after the cloth is formed, then, too, the cloth could not be its substrata. Nor is it possible for the effect to be its substrata ⁴. *Samavāya* is eternal in the sense that it cannot be produced or destroyed without producing or destroying the product. Its eternity is thus relative. The relation of *samavāya* is not perceptible, though the ancient Naiyāyikas thought that it was open to perception. As the fact stands for Vaiśeṣikas,

samavāya is only inferable from the inseparable connection of things.

Annambhaṭṭa says that the property of *anekatvaṁ* or plurality does not pertain to *samavāya*. It is only one. It does not reside in anything by the relation of inherence, since such residence would involve infinite regress. There is no difference in our various notions of inherence, even as there is no difference in our notions of being (*sattā*). The kind of relationship is the same though the members related may differ.

Speaking strictly, the notion of inherence is the result of intellectual discrimination, though an objective existence is granted to it. It has its origin in abstraction, and has no existence apart from substances or *padārthas*. Śāṅkara criticizes the theory of *samavāya*. He argues that conjunction such as that subsists between the atoms and *ākāśa* is eternal as much as inherence. Inherence, in so far as it is a relation, is not identical with what it relates. The relation of inherence falls outside the terms to be related, and itself requires a relation to relate it to the terms, and so on *ad infinitum*. Again, we have to assume a relationship by which the *samavāya* would reside in the *samavāyī*, or the things related by *samavāya* relationship. If the *samavāya* does not rest in the *samavāyī* by another *samavāya*, but is identical with it, then even *saṁyoga* may be regarded as identical with the things conjoined. Kumārīla, in the *Pratyakṣa Sūtra* of the *Śloka Vārttika*, comments that if *samavāya* is something different from the class and the individual that resides in the class by *samavāya*, then it (the *samavāya*) could not exist in them as a relation; on the other hand, if it be identical with them, then these two would be identical-by the law that the things that are identical with the same thing are identical with themselves.⁵ In saying this Kumārīla is appealing to

the law of transitivity of relations, i.e., for all values of x, y, and z, $(xRy \ \& \ yRz) \rightarrow xRz$.

It is useless to assert that inherence can exist without a third thing to unite it with the things in which it exists, while conjunction needs inherence to hold it to things which are in conjunction. The difficulty is not removed by calling one a category and the other a quality. There is no doubt that the relation of binary atomic compound (*dvaṇuka*) to its constituent elements, or of a species to the individuals constituting it, is not the same as the relation of the tablecloth to the table. But the difficulty in both the cases seems to be the same that a relation, however intimate, cannot be identical with the terms related. The argument that there must be this relation between cause and effect is also difficult to accept. If cause and effect are inseparably connected, as Vaiśeṣika admits, then it is far simpler to assume that there is identity of essence between the two. Moreover, the conception of inseparable connection contradicts the idea that the cause precedes the effect, which is an essential feature of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causality. Śaṅkara makes this point in his *Bhāṣya* (II.2.13-17).⁶ The cause is capable of separate existence. If *samavāya* is the connection with the cause of the effect which is incapable of separate existence, then, since a connection requires two terms, and the effect as long as it does not exist, cannot be connected with the cause, there can be no *samavāya* relation between the two. It is equally unavailing to say that the effect enters into the connection after it has begun to exist, for, if the Vaiśeṣika admits that the effect may exist previous to its connection with the cause, then it is not incapable of separate existence. The principle that between effect and cause, conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated. If the effect can exist before entering into connection with the cause, then the subsequent connection of the two is no longer *samavāya*, but only *saṁyoga*. Just as conjunction and not inherence is the connection in which

every substance as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as *ākāśa*, etc., although no motion has taken place on the part of the said substance, so also the connection of the effect with the cause will be conjunction, and not inherence.

We may ask why the Vaiśeṣika emphasizes *sambandha* in its study of Reality. Reality is not a substance or an aggregate of substances which are the subjects of qualities, but *an essential relatedness*, when we find need for analysis and comparison, distinction and identification. The changing world of experience consists of a plurality of existent things standing in a complicated network of relations of all kinds with one another. The Vaiśeṣika has for its aim the representation of the universe as a systematic whole, a harmony of varying members. So long as we are not able to harmonize the jarring elements, we have not reached our logical ideal. The self-contradictory is the unthinkable and yet there are members of the system which we are not able to think together as parts of one whole. To this extent the Vaiśeṣika will have an endorsement from A.N.Whitehead's *The Concept of Nature*.

The Vaiśeṣika points out that experience must have things and relations. Substance, quality and action exist in themselves as also one in the other, and these are bound by a number of relations called *sāmānya* or generic nature, *viśeṣa* or specific marks, and *samavāya* or inseparable connection. Every substance has a generic quality, a specific difference, and with these latter it is bound up by the relation of *samavāya*. The affirmation of the reality of relations is a fundamental necessity for any pluralistic metaphysics. If the relations are unreal, then there can be only one substance in the world called the Absolute; or the world is composed of monads, as in Leibniz, independent absolutes, which are unrelated, windowless, and which can never be related.

The theory of *samavāya* calls for many ramifications. Can we look upon *samavāya* as a connection between two distinct things and yet regard it as of a different kind from *samyoga*? If *samavāya* is distinct from *samyoga*, then the whole is something over and above the parts. The conception of the world as a systematic whole with interrelated elements is the implication of the Vaiśeṣika view of *samavāya*. Is the Vaiśeṣika pluralism final?

The individuality of the innumerable elements is destructive of the individuality of the whole, and so, if the conception of an organized whole implied by the Vaiśeṣika view of *samavāya* (and also *sāmānya*) is to be sustained, the doctrine of individuals will have to be modified. We may recall Bradley. He has argued: "If the many are not each it and beyond it, they have ceased to be many; and, on the other hand, whatever fails to be self-contained is not individual and unique. Hence the particular beings, which, if they were possible, would each be unique, prove to be mere abstractions. And these, because in principle self-discrepant, are unreal, and in the end are senseless" (*Logic*, Vol.II, p.651).

The distinction between the universal and the particular (*jāti* and *vyakti*) are held to be inseparable, since they are bound by the tie of *samavāya*. In other words, the distinction between the two is a distinction in thought, but not a division in reality, and yet, the universals are given an independent existence. They are supposed to survive the destruction of the world, and during *pralaya*, they have for their substratum, time (*kāla*), which is conceived as a real thing (*kālikasambandha*).

Let us take the case of substance and quality. If the substance depends on its qualities, then it is not really independent. Substance is not only united with its qualities by the relation of


samavāya, but all substances are united in the same way with the notion of their own class. Śrī Harṣa asks as to why qualities which possess other qualities, like number, should not be included under substances (*khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, IV, 3)⁷. The matter is not as simple as it appears. Alexander refuses to call quality a category. Johnson distinguishes adjectives into transitive and intransitive; and transitive adjectives are the relations (*Logic*, vol. I.p.xxxv). The Vaiśeṣika assumes that there can be substance apart from any qualities. But the Vaiśeṣika believes also that a thing would lose its nature if it loses its qualities. Are the two positions reconcilable, when we are repeatedly told that the relation between substance and quality is one of *samavāya*, i.e. one cannot exist without the other? What a substance is, apart from its qualities and behaviour, we cannot hope to know. We define things by their qualities. We speak of a substance as the same at different times only so long as it has the same properties. Locke's problem in this regard is well-known. Sāṃkhya regards substance and quality as possessing the same reality. The Vaiśeṣika wishes the reality of relations to be accepted, but real relatedness is inconsistent with the absolute independence of the related elements. If change and relatedness belong to the very essence of reality, then reality is not an aggregate of simple reals.

II *Samavāya*: Nyāya, Classical and Modern

System-wise Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya are regarded as *samānatantra*, and often the two systems are coupled together as representing a joined world-view. Together they represent realism and pluralism. The two systems highlight the two aspects of reasoning. The Vaiśeṣika mounts up from particulars (*viśeṣa*) to the general or universal (*sāmānya*), while the Nyāya moves on from the

universal to the particular. One is indirectly inclined, while the other is deductive in thinking. They are two sister systems.


The philosophy of relations occupies an important area of discourse with Nyāya. A great proliferation of relations in Nyāya has been of use in analyzing knowledge of objects in general, and perception specifically. Before we proceed further, let note the variety of relations endorsed by Nyāya:



In Nyāya there occurs a shift in the discourse. In the place of container and contained, we come to have the talk about the qualifier and the qualified, *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*, and appropriate/appre-hension or *viśiṣṭa buddhi*. In the apprehension that the pot is on the floor, *ghaṭavat bhūtalam* illustrates the relation between two entities, *ghaṭa* and *bhūtala*. This is a case of *samyoga*. Again the apprehension that *the boy is intelligent* is so specific that the relata belong together in *samavāya*. No apprehension of entities can be there without being related in some manner.

There is another variety of relation that is similar to reflexivity, i.e., for all values of x , xRx . It is called *svarūpa*

sambandha. For example, the potness in the pot, the inherence of the abstract in the concrete belongs to *svarūpa sambandha*. All qualities (*dharma*), except *jāti*, inhere in the qualified. This is true in the case of positive entities (*bhāva padārtha*), and so called *bhāvīya svarūpa*. Accordingly a new classification is made:



The category of *abhāva* resides in its own locus (*adhikaraṇa*) in the form of inherence called *svarūpa sambandha*. For example: the room characterized the absence of the pot: *ghaṭābhāvavat gṛham*. The *abhāva* of the *ghaṭa* in the room inheres in its own nature. *Svarūpa sambandha* is called *viśeṣaṇatā*. In sentences, *idānīm ghaṭaḥ*, the pot at this moment, or *tadānīm ghaṭaḥ*, the pot at that moment is characterized a relation described as *kālika svarūpa* or *kālika viśeṣa-ṇatā*. The pot and the time appear to be apprehended in the form of the contained and the container.

Any object may abide in *saṁyoga* relation with any other object, e.g. the book on the table. And every object abides in *kālika* relation in respect of *mahākāla*, and caused (*janya*) objects also abide in *kālika* relation, except the transcendent and timeless (*nitya*) objects.

Even though *saṁyoga*, *samavāya* and *svarūpa* (both *daiśika* and *kālika*) relations are regarded as *vṛtti niyāmaka*, yet *saṁyoga* is characterized, in the cases of the conjunction of two atoms (*dvaṇuka*), and the connectivity of *manas* with *ātmā* are not so. This is termed as *vṛttya niyāmaka*. Examples of such relation are

tādātmya, *viṣayatā*, *pratiyogitā*, non-pervasiveness or *avyāpyatva*, *janyatva* (the attribute of being an effect or caused), *janatava* or causal efficaciousness. *Vṛttya niyāmaka* relations are numberless. Some examples may be cited: 'Devadatta is a rich person'. In this case richness implies Devadatta's ownership relation. 'The cognition of a pot' has the *viṣayatā* relation between the cognition and the pot. In the case of the pot cognized (*jñāniya ghaṭa*) there is *viṣayatā sambandha* of the pot in respect of cognition. In the case of 'Ram's book', Ram stands in the relation of ownership (*svattva*) in respect of the book. In the case of non-presence (*abhāva*) of the pot, non-presence is related to the pot in terms of *pratiyogitā* or *anuyogitā*. In the case of the pot in front (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*), the object in front and the pot are related by *tādātmya* (identity) relationship. All these are instances of *vṛtti niyāmaka* relationship.

Determinate cognition (*viśiṣṭa buddhī*) or savikalpa cognition has three objects: *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣaṇa (prakāra)* and *sambandha*. It can be illustrated in the following manner: Let us take the example of a pot (*ghaṭaḥ*). The cognition of the pot possessing potness (*ghaṭatva*) has for its object, the pot, potness and inherence (*samavāya*). There is *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* in the pot, and *saṁsargatā* in *samavāya*. The cognition of the pot is *ghaṭa-prakāratā*, *ghaṭaviśeṣyatā* and *samavāya saṁsargatā*. Potness is a class or *jāti*, which inheres in the individual (*vyaktī*) pot. When the pot is there on the floor, the pot resides on the floor in *saṁyoga* mode. *Saṁyoga* relates two objects, and thereby arouses the determinate cognition of two objects. Where does the *saṁyoga* reside? Just as the pot and the floor are related by *saṁyoga*, it is binary, present in both. As a quality (*guṇa*) *saṁyoga* is inherent, it abides in *samavāya* mode as well.

Samavāya and other relations abide in their relata in the *svasvarūpa* relationship. The *svarūpa sambandha* resides in their

respective relata reflexively (*sva-sva-sambandhi-svarūpa*). The phrase means that *samavāya* abides in the context of *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*, and does not in any other relation, and that is why is called *svarūpa* or *svasvarūpa sambandha* or relation.

There is another relation called *pariyāpti*. The particle *pari* means proper, and *prāpti* means attainment. *Pariyāpti* is the relation that pervades self-contained (*svāśrayī*) objects as two, three, etc.

Nyāya employs two terms: *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī*, along with *avacchedaka*, and use them with a view to explaining the *samavāya* relation.

It will have been clear by now how important is *samavāya* for Nyāya to build their view of the world and its objects, and also in analyzing on cognitions thereof. Many of the Nyāya theses would have impossible without the concept of *samavāya*. Let us take the case of perception.

In the case of *pratyakṣa* or perception, which Nyāya holds to be two-fold, *niṣprakāraka* and *saprakāraka*. The former is indeterminate, or non-attributive, without the distinction between *that* and *what*, as Bradley would put it. The later is determinate and attributive, exemplified in the cognition that this is something, *idam kiñcit*. Attributive knowledge is determinate apprehension. Nyāya talks about the objective cause (*hetu*) of perceptual knowledge. It results from the contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the sense organs with the object of knowledge (*artha*). Such *hetu* is six-fold: namely, *saṁyoga* or conjunction, *saṁyukta samavāya* or inherence with the conjoint, *saṁyukta samaveta samavāya*, i.e., inherent union with the inherent which is conjoint; *samavāya* or inherence, and *samaveta samavāya* or inherent union with the inherence. Lastly,

there is *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa bhāvaḥ* relation of the attribute with the subject.⁸

The case that is taken for analysis is the perception of a pot. The first operative cause is the contact, producing perception of the pot by the eye. This is so in all cases. The self (*ātman*) comes in contact with mind (*manas*), the mind with the organ (*indriya*), and organ with the object (*viśaya*), and the perceptual knowledge takes place. For Nyāya, direct perception is always dependent on some relation between *indriya* and an *artha* (object). This relation is the operative cause in bringing about cognition.

The second operative cause, in the case of the colour (*rūpa*) of the pot inherent in the pot, is called *saṁyukta samavāya*. The inherent union with the conjoint is the contact in producing the perception of colour of a pot, since the colour is inherently united with the pot which is in contact with the eye. Inherent union with the conjoint is exemplified by *ghaṭarūpa*. The process is explained by saying *cakṣuḥ saṁyukte*. The colour is ultimately united with the pot which is conjoined with the organ. Hence the contact of the eye with the colour of the pot is *saṁyukta samavāya*.

The third operative cause is called *saṁyukta samaveta samavāya*. Inherent union with the intimately united is the contact in producing the perception of the universal genus colourness (*rūpatva*). As colour is inherently united with the pot that is conjoint with the ocular organ, and the genus colourness is inherently united therewith. The eye is in contact with the pot which is intimately united, the colour of the pot which is inhered in its genus. *Ghaṭarūpatva* is, therefore, perceived by the eye by means of the contact *saṁyukta samaveta samavāya*.

The next is the perception of sound (*śabda*) as the fourth operative cause mentioned as *samavāyaḥ sannikarṣa*. In the case of *śabda sāḅātkāra*, or apprehension of sound, inherent union is the contact in the perception of word by the organ of hearing. The organ of hearing is taken to be the ether (*ākāśa*) in the cavity of the ear (*karṇavivaravarti ākāśa*). Sound being the quality of ether, the quality and the qualified is inherently united. Nyāya appeals to the principle of *vīcītaranganyāya*. In the sea one wave propels another, till the first and all the subsequent waves reach the shore. In a similar manner, there is a successive operation in the case of the production of sound till they reach the auditory orifice. With the help of this analogy, Nyāya explains how a distant sound comes in contact with the auditory sense.

What happens in the case of *śabdatva sāḅātkāra*? Inherent union with the inherently united is the contact in cognizing soundness, as the genus soundness is inherently united with sound which is inherently united with the auditory sense. The example of inherent union with the intimately united is by the term *śabdatva*. The position is *śabde śabdatvasya samavāyāt*.

More implicated is the perception of non-existence of the object of apprehension. This is explained in terms of *vīśeṣaṇa-vīśeṣyabhāvaḅ sannikarṣa*. The case taken for analysis is: *ghaṭābhāvāvad bhūṭalam ityatra*: this spot of earth is with the negation of the pot. The floor of the earth is in contact with the eye. The non-presence of the pot is the attribute of the floor of the earth, *bhūṭala*. The connection of the qualifier and the qualified is the conjunction in the perception of absence. The spot or floor of the earth is *with* the absence (or negation) of the pot qualified and the absence of the pot is the attribute. In this cognition, the eye is in contact with the spot of earth of which the negation or absence of the pot is the attribute, and, therefore, the connection is contact

with the attribute. Further, the connection is the contact with the qualified. Both these cognitions, though differing in form, are identical in meaning. They are conjointly expressed as *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāvaḥ*. With the contact of the eye with the spot of the earth in the two cognitions, the negation or absence either on account of its possessing the property of *viśeṣya* or of *viśeṣaṇa* becomes perceived on the spot of the earth. The relation between the spot of earth and the absence of the pot is no other than *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāvaḥ*.

There is, of course, a scope of *tarka*. If the spot were on the ground one should be seeing it right now. But I do not see the pot. This thought brings in the awareness of the absence of the pot on the ground. The existence of the *pratiyogī* (counter entity) of the absence of apprehension is an important item in the entire explanations.

It remains now to be seen how Nyāya employs the notion of *samavāya* in its explanation of the cause and effect relationship. The idea of cause is as *kāryaniyatapūrvavṛtti* ⁹ In order to escape the under and over shooting the mark in the alleged definition of *kāraṇa*, Nyāya reformulates it in terms of the further component of *ananyathāsiddha*. The phrase means that which does not depend for its invariable existence upon some other antecedent existing thing. The absence of dispensable antecedents is *ananyathāsiddha*.

*Ananyathāsiddhatva*¹⁰ (the dispensable antecedence in the production of a thing) is said to be threefold, of which the first is *samavāya sambandha*. Things that are connected to inherent relation with the cause, it becomes the antecedents to effect through them. For instance, the colour of yarn (*tanturūpa*) and the generic attribute of yarn (*tantutva*) which are intimately united with

yarn, are antecedents to its effect, viz. a piece of cloth. Both *tanturūpa* and *tantutva* are examples for a variety of *ananyathāsiddha*.

Again, a cause is said to be *samavāya asamavāyī nimitta bhedāt*¹, it is either inherent or non-inherent. We ignore the *nimitta kāraṇa* in the present context, and concentrate on the *samavāyī* and *asamavāyī* varieties of causes. Taking the example of production of a piece of cloth, it is held that yarn is the inherent cause; the contact between two yarns is the non-inherent cause. In the terminology of Western Logic, one may be said to be the sufficient condition ($p \rightarrow q$), while the other, the necessary condition ($\sim p \rightarrow \sim q$). Inherent cause is always a substance; non-inherent cause must be either a quality or an action and nothing else. *Samavāyī kāraṇa* is defined as that inhering in which an effect emerges. The yarn constitutes the intimate cause of its effect cloth is *samavāyī kāraṇa*, because cloth is connected with the yarns by inherent union. Similarly the colour on the piece of cloth being a quality, resides in the cloth by intimate relation. Therefore, the piece of cloth is the inherent cause of the colour on it.

Again, *tantusamyoga* inheres in yarn with cloth which is the effect of the contact of yarns. Thus both the cloth and the *tantusamyoga* hold in the same substratum, i.e., *tantus*. Therefore, *tantusamyoga* is the non-inherent cause to cloth. The allied idea of *karaṇa* is sometimes understood in *sādhakatā*. Keśava Miśra does it in his *Tarkabhāṣā*. He says that *karaṇa* as *sādhakatā* is the most immediate cause in bringing about an effect, that is to say, it is the most efficient cause. This does not concern us directly. But it should be added that modern Nyāya holds *karaṇa* to be a cause which is most essential in producing a result and without the activity of which the effect is not produced in spite of the other causes being present. But the ancient followers of Nyāya define *karaṇa* as

vyāpārat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karaṇam,¹² i.e., *karaṇa* is a special and operative cause. *Vyāpāra* is an operation which, not being a substance; is the product of a thing, and produces the effect of that thing. That which is known as *vyāpāra* by the ancient Naiyāyikas is called as *karaṇa* by the modern ones.

What makes the admission of *samavāya* necessary? Viśvanātha in the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* gives a proof of the eternity of relation conceived as *samavāya*. The notion is that a thing is possessed of qualities (*viśeṣya*), a qualifying adjunct (*viśeṣaṇa*), and a relation between the two, because it is the notion of a qualified entity, as in the case of the notion of the qualified entity.¹³ In the example of *dandī puruṣa*, a man holding a staff the relation cannot be *saṁyoga*, we have to accept *samavāya*. It cannot be urged that this is virtually the relation of selfsameness (*svarūpa*), and so it is merely proving something already established or something different from *samavāya*. For it is cumbrous to assume an infinite number of selfsamenesses, varying with each object. Therefore, for the sake of *lāghava*, *samavāya* is to be admitted.

Viśvanātha gives a succinct statement as regards the role of *samavāya* in perception in terms of the *sambandha* between *viśaya* and *indriya*:

dravya-grahastu saṁyogāt saṁyukta-samavāyataḥ //
dravyeṣu samavetānām tathā tat-samavāyataḥ /
*tatrāpi samavetānām śabdasya samavāyataḥ. //*¹⁴

This is what distinguishes Nyāya from Vaiśeṣika. The later contends that *samavāya* is not perceptible. This is so, since the perception of relation depends on the simultaneous perception of all the individual substratums, past, present, and future of that

relation, which is impossible. Nyāya, in the context of the perception of non-existence as well as of inherence, holds that attributiveness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) of what is related to the organ is the *hetu* or cause. For Vaiśeṣika *samavāya* is inferred, while for Nyāya it is perceived in terms of *sannikarṣa* of a special sort. Nyāya admits a host of *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva sannikarṣa*, uses it to explain the possibility of perceiving *samavāya*.

It will be interesting to note the inference for *samavāya*. In the *Dīpikā*, the inference in the following form: '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*' *iti viśiṣṭapratītiḥ viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇasambandhaviśayā viśiṣṭapratyatvāt. daṇḍītipratyayavaditi samavāyasiddhiḥ*.¹⁵ The *nīla* means blue coloured, and stands for an attribute of a pot, *nīla ghaṭa itī viśiṣṭabuddhiḥ guṇavāna ghaṭa ityādī viśiṣṭabuddhiḥ*. *Ityādī* is to be taken for *kriyāvāna ghaṭa*, *jātimāna ghaṭa*, *ghaṭavat kapalam* and *viśeṣyavāna paramāṇuḥ*. All these are specific apprehensions. In the *anumāna* process, *guṇavāna ghaṭa* is the *pakṣa*; *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandha viśayatvaṁ* is the *sādhya* and *viśiṣṭabuddhitvaṁ* is the *hetu*. And *daṇḍīpuruṣa* is the *udāharaṇa*, it is also a *viśiṣṭabuddhi*.

Sarṁyoga resides both in *guṇa* and *ghaṭa*, the stick and the person holding it and point to the existence of *samavāya*. For Nyāya, *samavāya* is capable of being apprehended by all the sense-organs: *sarvendriyagrāhya*. Through the perception of the relata, inherence of them also is perceived.

In philosophies like Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā and others *tādātmya* is accepted in lieu of *samavāya*. In those instances *tādātmya* means *bhedābheda*. For Nyāya, *tādātmya* means *abheda*. Nyāya argues that *bhedābheda* is contradictory, and cannot reside in the same locus (*adhikaraṇa*).

Notes and References

1. "*ihedamiti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*"- *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*
7-2- 26, Kaṇāda (40), p, 158.
2. *Prāśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-9.
3. "*yutasiddhiḥ pṛthaksiddhiḥ, pṛthagavasthitirubhayorapi samban-
dhinoḥ parasparaparihāreṇa pṛthagāśrayāśrayitvam, sā
yoyornāsti tāvayutasiddhau, toyoḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ. Yathā
tantu-paṭayoḥ*".- Śrīdhara (57), p. 37.
4. The relata of inherence are said to be inseparable in the sense that
they are conceived to exist in the substratum-superstratum
position occupying the same point of space.
5. *samavāyaviyogācca viśeṣa syāt parasparaṁ /
tatvalaptānavasthā syāt tasya tasyānyasaṅgātaḥ //148//
atha tasyatmarūpatvānnā anyasambandhakalpanā/
abhedātsamavāyostu svarūpaṁ dharmadharminoḥ //149//*
-Kumārīla Bhaṭṭa, *Ślokavārttika*.
6. "*samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmādanavasthiteḥ*."-2.2.13.
"*nityameva ca bhāvāt*".-2.2.14.
"*rūpādimaccvācca viparyayo darśanāt*."-2.2.15.
"*ubhayathā ca doṣāt*."-2.2.16.
"*aparigrahāccātvaṅtamanapekṣā*".-2.2.17.
7. *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya*- IV,3,p. 529,Ganganatha Jha.
8. *Tarkasamgraha*, - Annambhaṭṭa.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.

12. *Nyāyasūtra*, -Gautama.
13. "*guṇa-kriyādi-viśiṣṭa-buddhirviśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhaviṣayā-viśiṣṭabuddhitvāt daṇḍī puruṣa iti viśiṣṭabuddhivadityanumānam.*"-*Bhāṣāpariccheda*, 11.
14. Ibid. 59-60.
15. *Tarkasamgraha Dīpikā*- Annambhaṭṭa.