

Chapter-3

Vaiśeṣika Statement of *Samavāya*

We propose to discuss the concept of *samavāya* in a two-fold manner: expository and critical. First we shall go along with the Vaiśeṣika account of *samavāya*, and then consider it in a critical manner.

Expository:

Kaṇāda defines *samavāya* or inherence (we shall not question the translation of *samavāya* as 'inherence'. Since the translation is widely accepted, we may use them interchangeably) as the relation between a material cause and its effect, which is the cause of the notion "this subsists in this abode", *ihedam iti yataḥ kāryyakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*¹ (VS.vii.2.26). Praśastapāda defines it as the relation that subsists between two inseparable entities related to each other as the substrate and the content, and which is the cause of the notion "this subsists in this abode", "*ayutasiddhānāmādhāryyādhārabhūtā-nām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*"². Śrīdhara defines it as the relation between two inseparable entities, which are of the nature of a substrate and its content.³ *Samavāya* is not the relation between two entities, which are capable of separate existence and subsistence in different substrates. Separable entities are capable of existing apart from each other and residing in different substrates, a cloth subsists in its constituent yarns. Though the yarns subsist in their parts, which are different from the cloth, yet both cannot subsist in different substrates apart from each other. The cloth subsists in the yarns, which compose it. Though they have an

independent existence apart from the cloth, yet it has no independent existence apart from them. The yarns are the substrate, and the cloth is its content. They are its material cause. It subsists in them. Udayana defines inherence as an inseparable and intimate relation between two entities, which can never be separated from each other, '*prāptā eva santinā prāptā iti yāvat, teṣāṃ sambandhaḥ prāptilakṣaṇaḥ samavāyaḥ, tena saṁyoga vyavacchinnastasyāprāptipūrvakatvāt, tathāca, nityaḥ prāpti samavā-ya iti lakṣaṇam sūcitam*'⁴. It is the relation that subsists between a substrate and its content, which is not adventitious, but natural. A natural relation is not produced. Conjunction (*saṁyoga*) is a contingent, temporary and accidental relation. But *samavāya* is a necessary, uncaused and inseparable relation. It is a relation between a substance and a quality (*guṇaguṇī*), a substance and an action (*karma*), a genus and an individual (*jāti-vyakti*), an eternal substance and its particularity, a whole and its parts. A quality inheres in a substance. An action inheres in a substance. A genus inheres in an individual. A particularity inheres in an eternal substance. A corporate whole inheres in its constituent parts. An effect inheres in its material cause.

Inherence is inseparable relation between two non-pervasive entities, which are restricted to particular places, and which are known to be different from each other, '*asarvagatānām adhigatāny-atvānāmaviṣvaghāvaḥ sa samavāyākhyāḥ sambandhaḥ*'⁵. Inseparable relation implies incapacity of its relata for independent existence. It is an indissoluble union of two different entities, '*apṛthagbhāvo'sv-ātantryaṁ samavāyaḥ bhinnōḥ parasparopāśla-ṣasya sambandha kṛta-tvopalambhāt*'⁶.

Inherence is inseparable relation between two entities, one of which is incapable of separate existence apart from the other. The

composite whole cannot exist apart from its parts. But when it is destroyed, the parts can exist apart from it. But so long as the whole exists, it and its parts cannot exist apart from each other. A quality cannot exist apart from its substance. But the substance can exist apart from its quality at the moment of its production. It acquires its qualities at the next moment. But so long as a quality persists, a substance cannot exist apart from it. An action cannot exist apart from its substance. But the substance can exist without its action. An action is temporary, while its substance is enduring. But so long as an action lasts, a substance cannot exist apart from it. An individual cannot exist apart from its genus. But the genus exists before the individual is born and after it is destroyed. But so long as the individual lasts, the genus cannot exist apart from it. The genus and the individual are inseparably related to each other. The genus exists in the other individuals. But its existence in them does not affect its inseparable relation to a particular individual. So Padmanābha Miśra defines inherence as the relation that substance between two entities, which are related to each other, while they are existent, *samavāyasthale ubhau vidyamānau sambandhāveveti bhavaḥ*. A particularity cannot exist apart from an eternal substance. An eternal substance also cannot exist apart from its particularity. There is mutual dependence here. But in the other instances, there is one-sided dependence. Therefore, inherence is an intimate relation, but it is not an internal relation. It is an external relation.

Inherence is the relation between two inseparable entities, which are always related to each other and incapable of substrate and its content, *apṛthogbhūtānām sarvadā mithyāḥ samavetānām ādhāryā-dhārabhūtānām sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ*. It is the relation between two inseparable entities, one of which is the substratum and the other is its content. This definition obviates the objection mentioned above. So long as the two inseparable entities are

related to each other as the container and the contained, the relation between them is inherence. It is a natural relation between a substantive (*dharmin*) and an attribute (*dharma*). It is not an adventitious relation between two entities, which acquire the nature of a substantive and an attribute. 'There is a bird in ether (*ākāśa*). The ether is the substrate, and the bird is its content. But the relation between them is not inherence, because they can exist apart from each other. 'There is a fruit in a plate'. The plate is the substrate, and the fruit is its content. The relation between them is the cause of the notion 'this subsists in this abode'. But it is not inherence, because it does not subsist between two inseparable entities. The fruit and the plate can exist apart from each other. The relation between a word and its objects (*vācyavācakabhāva*) is not inherence, because they are not related to each other as a substrate and its content. A word denotes its object. It cannot exist apart from its object. But there is no relation of inherence between them; because their relation is not the cause of the notion 'this subsists in this abode'. The word does not subsist in its object. A cognition cannot exist apart from its object, which is apprehended by it. But it does not subsist in its object. Therefore, the relation between cognition and its object (*viṣayaviṣayibhāva*) is not inherence, because they are not related to each other as a substrate and its content.

Inherence is one, because it has the same distinguishing feature. There is no evidence of its distinctions. Inherence can account for all notions 'this subsists in this abode'. So it is useless to assume much inherence. Inherence is enough to relate all its relata, substances and their qualities, substances and their actions, wholes and parts, genera and individuals, eternal substances and their particularities. Though inherence is one only, there is restriction due to the differences of the substrates and their contents. The genus of substance inheres in substances. The genus

of quality inheres in qualities. The genus of action inheres in actions. Substances only have the power of manifesting the genus of substance. Qualities only have the power of manifesting the genus of quality. Actions only have the power of manifesting the genus of action, *dravyatvādīnāmapī samavāyaikate'pi vyaṅgyavyānjakaśakti bhedād ādhārādheyaniyamaḥ*.⁷ Thus though inherence is one, it has a restriction as to its substrate and its content due to the differences in the power of being manifesto and the manifested.

Inherence is eternal, though its relata transient. It is not produced by any cause. It is not a temporal relation. It does not pertain to relations of time. Śivāditya defines it as an eternal relation. It is different from conjunction (*samyoga*), which is a temporary relation. Just as one being inheres in many existing entities, so inherence subsists between innumerable pairs of relata. Just as being is eternal, so inherence is eternal. Inherence is different from conjunction, which is temporary relation. An effect is mainly produced by a material cause. It is produced by a non-material cause and an efficient cause with the aid of a material cause. If it had a material cause it would be related to its cause either by itself or by inherence. It cannot be related to its cause by itself, because it would be the substrate of itself. But no entity will be both a substrate and its content. No entity can subsist in itself. Nor can inherence be related to its cause by inherence, since it would lead to infinite regress. Therefore, inherence is uncaused and eternal.

Inherence is not perceptible. It is not perceived to subsist in perceptible entities. There is no distinct perceptual cognition of it. The relation between a rose and its colour is not perceived. It is inferred for the notion 'this subsists in this abode'. It is not perceived as an object (*viśaya*). It is inferred from the qualified

cognition of a substantive, an attributive, and a relation between them. A jar is endowed with colour. The jar is a substantive, colour is an attributive. Inherence is the relation between them. The jar and its colour are perceived. But inherence between them is not perceived.

Inherence does not exist through the inherence of being in it. It is not related to being. It is self subsistent (*svātmavṛttiḥ*)⁸. It does not require any other relation to relate it to its relata. Conjunction cannot subsist between inherence and its relata. It is a quality, which subsists in substances only. Inherence cannot subsist between inherence and its relata, because inherence is one only. There is no third relation, which can subsist between inherence and its relata. Inherence is one and indivisible relation, which subsists between its relata. It has no other relation by which it can relate itself to its relation. Therefore, it is self-subsistent. It has been said, *sāmānyādinām trayāṇām svātmasattvam*,⁹ and *teṣām na sattvāyogaḥ sattvam*.¹⁰

Inherence is not identity. The two inseparable entities, which are related through inherence, do not produce the cognition of one thing. They produce two different cognitions, which apprehend them. The cognitions have different contents. So the relata of inherence are different from each other. They are not really one and the same thing. Therefore, inherence is not essential identity (*svarūpābheda*), but the relation between two inseparable entities, which cannot subsist in different substances apart from each other, *parasparaparihāraṇa pṛthagāśritāmityarthaḥ*.¹¹ The relata of inherence are different from each other. Inherence is non-difference or identity, as Advaita Vedanta wrongly maintains.

Inherence is not *svarūpasambandha*, which is a relation that is identified with either of its relata. If there is *svarūpasambandha* between a jar and its colour, the jar itself is the relation of colour to it. Therefore, an infinite number of *svarūpasambandhas* assumed to account for the relation between countless substances and their qualities and actions. This will contradict the law of parsimony of hypothesis. Further, the assumption of *svarūpasambandha* between a material cause (parts) and its effect (whole) would underline the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *Asatkāryavāda*. The effect is a new beginning (*ārambha*), which is different from, and inheres in, its material cause. The whole is different from its parts. It inheres in its parts. Therefore, inherence is not *svarūpasambandha*.

The relation subsisting between the ground and the non-existence of a jar is not inherence. 'There is non-existence of jar on the ground'. Here the non-existence of the jar does not inhere in the ground. The relation is not inseparable. If it were so, there would be the cognition of the non-existence of the jar on the ground, even when it is brought back to the ground. The relation between the non-existence of a jar and the ground is not inherence, but *svarūpa-sambandha*.

Inherence is not conjunction. Conjunction is a relation between two substances. But inherence is a relation between a substance and another substance or non-existence. It is a relation between a material cause (parts) and an effect (whole), a substance and a quality, or an action, or a community, or a particularity. Conjunction is a separable relation. Inherence is an inseparable relation. In conjunction the relata exist as unrelated to each other before they are conjoined. But in inherence the relata are always related to each other, when they are related as a substrate and its content. Inherence is eternal, while conjunction is temporary. Conjunction is produced by the action of one or both of its relata, or

by another conjunction. But inherence is not produced by the action of one or both of its relata. Conjunction is destroyed by disjunction of its relata. But inherence is indestructible. Conjunction is a relation between two independent substances. But inherence is a relation between a substrate and its content. Inherence is the cause of the notion, 'this subsists in this abode' with regard to the categories of substance, quality, action, community and particularity. But conjunction is not the cause of such a notion. It is a relation between two substances, which may not be related to each other as the container and contained. Inherence is a natural and inseparable relation. Conjunction is an adventitious and separable relation.

Inherence is one, while conjunctions are many. Inherence is imperceptible, while conjunction is perceptible. Inherence is different from conjunction, because it is not produced by the action of every of its relata; because it is not produced by the action of any of its relata; because it is not destroyed by disjunction of the relata; because its relata are incapable of independent existence unrelated to each other; because it is inferred from the constant subsistence of a content in a substrate; because it is one, eternal, and imperceptible.

Inherence is different from substance, quality, action, community and particularity, because it is a relation between a substance and the other categories. It is different from non-existence. So it is a distinct category.

The category of inherence explains the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's conception of causality as a new emergence. The effect is different from its material cause, in which it does not pre-exist before its production. The effect inheres in its material cause. There is an inseparable relation between them. The material cause is the

substratum. The effect is its content. They cannot be separated from each other, while they are existent and related to each other as the container and the contained. The relation between them is not identity as the Śāṃkhya maintains. The cause and the effect both are real. The effect is not an appearance of the cause, which is real, as the Advaita Vedānta maintains. The category of inherence is necessary to relate a cause and its effect, both of which are real and different from each other. It is necessary to relate a substance to its quality, action, generality and particularity, which are all real. Inherence plays a very important part in upholding pluralistic realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Critical:

The Vaiśeṣika category of *samavāya* has been severely criticized by Śāṃkara. We shall consider it in a separate sequel. Presently we propose to consider a few remarks made by the Buddhist thinker Śāntarakṣita.

Śāntarakṣita urges that the non-existence of inherence is proved by such perceptions as 'there are threads in a cloth', 'there are branches in a tree', 'there are stones in a mountain'. These are the examples taken from *Tattvasaṃgraha*. A cloth does not inhere in threads. Further, a composite whole does not differ from its composite parts. It is a mere aggregate of parts. So the whole does not inhere in its parts. If two entities are different from each other, one may inhere in the other. Mangoes exist in a plate. But a cloth cannot inhere in its threads, because it does not differ from them. There is colour or motion in a jar. But it does not require inherence. There is identity (*tādātmya*) of colour or motion with the jar. So inherence is identity. Further, if inherence is one, then a cloth should inhere in the parts of a jar, and the jar should inhere in threads. If a cloth inheres in threads and a jar inheres in its parts,

then inherence being one, a cloth should inhere in parts of a jar, and a jar should inhere in threads. Further, if inherence is one, the genus of a cow (*gotva*) would subsist in elephants. It may be argued that though inherence is one, it is restricted to a particular pair of substrate (*ādhāra*) and content (*ādheya*): the genus of substance inheres in substances; the genus of quality inheres in qualities; the genus of action inheres in actions. This amounts to the admission that there is much inherence which is generalized. Further, if inherence is eternal, its relata also must be eternal. If inherence of a jar in its parts is eternal, then the jar also must be eternal. Further, if the whole and the parts both are destroyed, how can inherence relate them to each other persist? So inherence cannot be eternal. When conjuncts are destroyed, conjunction is destroyed. So when the whole and the parts are destroyed, inherence must be destroyed. As there are many conjunctions, so there must be much inherence.

Notes and References

1. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*. (vii.2.26).-Kanāda (40), p. 158.
2. *Praśastapāda* (57), p.37.
3. "*ayutasiddhāyorāśrayāśroyibhāvaḥ samavāyaḥ*".- Śrīdhara.
4. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* - Udayana, (71), Vol. I, p. 249.
5. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*-2.2.9.
6. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 774, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
7. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*-2.2.9.
8. "*samavāyasya nānyā vṛttirgbluhjklfsxvgjmbkhuhih,sarbxzvasti, tasmāt svātmavṛttiḥ*". -*Padārtha Dharma Saṃgraha*, p. 784.
9. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*-2.2.3.
10. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 49, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
11. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 37, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.