

# **SAMAVĀYA AS A RELATION: A CRITICAL EXPOSITION**

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Dr. Amal Kumar Harh.*



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*Dedicated*  
*to*  
*my parents*

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This is to certify that the subject matter of the thesis entitled '*Samavaya As A Relation: A Critical Exposition*' is the record of work done by Sri Asit Baran Pal, Selection Grade Lecturer- in- Philosophy, Balurghat Mahila Mahavidyalaya, Balurghat, Dakshin Dinajpur, West Bengal. The content of this thesis did not from a basis of the award of any previous degree, or, to the best of my knowledge, to anybody else. The novelty of approach of the researcher contains comparative points of interest, and evince his own capability of judging independently, which I believe, bears the marks of originality. I am satisfied with the work done by him and hence, he may be allowed to submit his thesis for the award of the Ph. D degree of the University of North Bengal.

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## Prefatory note

The present project is a study of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology with reference to the category of *samavāya*. The intention of the study is to inquire into the ontological status of *samavāya*. The present study differs from usual studies of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought in juxtaposing such point of view as those which either do not admit the concept of *sambandha* or relation, or admit *saṁyoga*, but disallow *samavāya*. It is hoped that by such juxtaposition of views, the uniqueness and the necessity of admitting *samavāya* would be thrown into high relief. The point about ontology has always been kept in view in a distinguished manner from considerations of epistemology and the problem of induction (causality). Of course, such considerations have been paid attention to as and when needed, yet it is the ontological status of *samavāya* that has been the uppermost concern of the present study.

Another feature of the study is the inter-systemic references to the debate concerning *samavāya*. The ontological issues entail metaphysical questions. Often metaphysics in traditional Indian ways of understanding the furniture of the world mingles the descriptive with the revisionary. Ultimately the question turns on the issue of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is descriptive or revisionary. No clear cut answer could be given as P.F. Strawson

might demand to know. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika list of *padārthas* is a mixed bag. Some of the categories are ontologically empirical while others like *sāmānya* or *samavāya* are different. To say that *samavāya* is ontologically empirical requires a revision of the concept of *pratyakṣa* itself. The sense, in which a blue jar is perceived, is certainly not the way in the *samavāya* of blueness *in* the jar is apprehended. The logical realistic empiricism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika seeks to retain both descriptive as well as revisionary metaphysics at one stroke, and this has been target if the critics of the *samavāya*. This is a metaphilosophical issue, and we need not take any sides at this moment. To reiterate, the present study is directed towards understanding the concept of *samavāya* as an ontological issue in the context of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism and logical empiricism.

The present study is structured into twelve chapters, incorporating concluding remarks, besides an appendix. The table of contents stands as follows: The first chapter introduces the concept of *samavāya*, to be followed in the second, by the larger framework of Indian philosophical systems. There are also references to philosophical views of British and European philosophers. The third chapter is a statement of the Vaiśeṣika category of *samavāya*. The chapter is twofold in approach, expository and critical. The fourth pursues the concept of *samavāya* as ramified by the Nyāya, even though the system of Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya are ontologically *samāna-tantra*, there are extensions, ramifications and reconstructions.

The fifth chapter is devoted to considering various definitions of *samavāya* and the sixth chapter takes into the account the arguments offered in support of admitting *samavāya* as a relation in

the metaphysical scheme. I have felt to be inclined to accept the arguments offered by Gangeśa and Vallabha.

The seventh chapter is worked out around the concept of *samavāya* as employed in formulating the Nyāya view of causation. This has been an important issue.

The eighth chapter takes up the Mīmāṃsā views as adumbrated by Kumārīla and Prabhākara. These reservations about *samavāya* have also been noted in due seriousness.

The Buddhist critiques of *samavāya* are the content of ninth chapter. It has been interesting to note their reasons for not endorsing into their scheme of things.

The Jaina understanding of *samavāya* is what the tenth chapter is devoted to.

The eleventh chapter takes up Śaṅkara's arguments against *samavāya*. The followers of Śaṅkara, such as Citsukha and Vyāsatīrtha, have contributed richly towards the Advaita critique of *samavāya*. Their views have been noted as well.

To conclude the project the twelfth chapter records some of the debated issues concerning *samavāya*, and also an overview of the previously discussed issues in the previous chapters.

The appendix is there to put on record some important points that needed highlighting separately.

All the major schools of Indian thought have been brought into focus and as for the method of the study; it has been descriptive, analytical and comparative.

My duty will remain incomplete if I do not record my gratitude to those hearty and helpful people having a company of toils, hard labours, patience and inspiration in my journey period.

I express my gratitude and indebtedness to my supervisor and promoter of studies, Dr. Amal Kumar Harh, Reader-in-Philosophy, Coochbehar College, Coochbehar, for his valued guidance, constructive criticism and sustained interest in my work. Dr. Harh inspires me to create interest in Indian Philosophy in teaching several Sanskrit texts when I worked at Coochbehar College as his colleague. Despite his pre-occupations he spent unbelievably enough in solving problems raised at the time of discussion. Without his encouragement and well-wishing the project could not have been completed.

The present Dean of the faculty of Arts, Commerce and Law, who also the chairperson of the Department of Philosophy, Professor Raghunath Ghosh has been ever unfailing in inspiring me with his observation and suggestion. I have greatly benefited academically in my meetings with him. To him I tender my deep gratitude.

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The.....*11 th August*....., 2008.

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## Chapter-1

# Introduction

This study is proposed as an inquiry into Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics with special reference to the category of *samavāya*.

Belief in the reality of the external world independent of its knowledge by a knower is the realist stand of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika outlook. It lays down a basic and guiding principle that experience is the sole criterion of our acceptance of the reality of external objects: *samvid eva hi bhagavati vastupagame naḥ śaraṇam*<sup>1</sup>. The function of philosophy is rather to analyse that experience and evolve a coherent system of that analysis. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics undertakes just that analysis and bases its metaphysical structure thereon.

Our common experience presents a world consisting of separate individual objects which are called substances (*dravyas*). They appear as substrate of certain properties. Substances, being the substrate of properties, the two appear in the relation of the container and the contained, *ādhārādheya bhāva*<sup>2</sup>, and therefore, the two cannot be identical; they must be different in their essence. For instance, in the case of the experience of a white cloth, the white colour is experienced as a property which resides in the substratum, cloth; and therefore, white colour and cloth are different in their essences. Essential differentiation between the substratum and its properties, *dharma-dharmi bheda* is the cornerstone of the structure of realism. *Dharmaśca dharmīno vastuto vidyate*<sup>3</sup>, the six categories accepted by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika follow as corollaries from that basic principle.

Substratum (*dharmin*) is always in the form of a substance (*dravya*). But the properties (*dharmas*) residing in a substratum are found on further analysis, to be of various kinds. Some properties like colour appear to be of the nature of stationary attributes of their substrata. They are called qualities (*guṇas*). Others are of evanescent nature, for example, the motion of a body. They are called movements (*karma*). We, thus, arrive at the first three categories: (1) *dravya*, (2) *guṇa* and (3) *karma*. Of the numerous objects of our experience, some are so similar that they are designated by a common noun, and there must, therefore, be something common to all individuals of a class. That common thing was regarded as the universal (*sāmānya* or *jāti*), which is the fourth category of the school. In the case of atoms of the same class, differentiation of one atom from another was assumed to be due to a special property called *viśeṣa* residing in the atoms which was later on extended to other eternal substances also, *ekatva* and *ekapṛthakatva*, for example. *Viśeṣa* is the fifth category of the school. Of the five categories, the last four, viz., quality (*guṇa*), etc., being of the nature of properties (*dharmas*), are only found to be residing in the substratum (*dharmin*) which is the first category, i.e., substance. The universal (*sāmānya*) is held to be residing in *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma*. Although the properties, *guṇa*, etc., are different in essence from *dravya*, they cannot exist as separate form, or independent of a *dravya*. Therefore, the relation between the former and the latter cannot be an ordinary one, called 'connection' (*samyoga*), which obtains between the two substances that can be connected and separated at will. A sixth category, therefore, in the form of a special relation called *samavāya* was assumed. This special sixth category is our object of our study and inquiry. To the sixth categories, originally accepted by the school, a seventh one, namely, *abhāva* (non-existence) was added at a later date.

The theory of causation is held in Indian philosophy to be the pivot theory of the metaphysical structure of a system. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation also rests on the same principle, the differentiation between the properties and their substratum (*dharmā-dharmi-veda*). An effect like cloth which is experienced as produced in its cause, an effect is produced *not out of* its cause, but *in* its cause, viz., the threads is like a property of the threads which are its substrata. It would, thus, appear that a property is not only in the form of qualities and actions, etc., but it may also be in the form of a substance. A substratum and its property being different in *essence*, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory declares that the *essence* of cloth was different from that of threads. Thus, the principle of differentiation between properties and their substrata (*dharmā-dharmi-veda*) is the corner-stone of the structure of the school's metaphysics.

Ordinarily, studies of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics is only few and far between often it is the epistemology of that attracts most of the attention. We have ventured to study one of the school's metaphysical categories, namely, *samavāya* for a specific reason. The relation renders a unique service to the school. *Samavāya* is held as a separate external objective category, by *samavāya* most wonders are done, by this relation all the attributes, qualities, actions, the universal and the particular are made to reside in their substrata. In the theory of causation, the material cause is called *samavāyi kāraṇa*, the cause is regarded as a form of part (*avayava*), and the effect as a form of 'whole' (*avayavin*) of the parts, the two are different in their essence, and yet exist simultaneously side by side. The threads of a piece of cloth and the cloth itself, the *avayavas* and the *avayavin* are two different substances, having separate essence and separate qualities, and yet by virtue of *samavāya*, both of them have simultaneous existence and occupy the same space. The idea of two material

substances occupying the same space militates against the very conception of a material substance. It is the very nature of matter to be resistant to another matter occupying the same space. The Buddhists point out that *sapratighatva*, which means impenetrability or resistance to another matter occupying the same space. Even Descartes said that in elaborating on his idea of *Rex Extensa*. *Sapratighatva*, for the Buddhists, is the nature of *rūpa* or matter. The miracle of numerous substances occupying the same space becomes possible by *samavāya*, which is a unique Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept. Both Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra (in the *Vārtika* and the *Tikā* thereon) have explicitly made the point. They call it by the name of *dravya samāhāra*.

In course of our inquiry we shall notice that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had never been a closed system, nor had it been a monolith of settled opinions. There is no finality in philosophical thinking, and any one of the philosophical approaches might be most appealing in a particular setting. Vācaspati Miśra is a great example of the truth. He becomes a faithful adherent of any one system at the time he expounds it. Śrīdhara is second to none in upholding the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism, and yet he did not resist the influence of idealist systems like Sāṃkhya, Vedānta and even Buddhism. In the *Nyāyakandalī*, he salutes the *nitya-vijñāna-vigraha*, and *nirmalam advitīyam*. They are Vedānta ideas. Speaking of the nature of self-realization he quotes a verse from *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* to the effect that true knowledge of self consists in realizing that the soul is free from all adjuncts of knowing, feeling and acting.<sup>4</sup> In the same context he declares that one who thinks that the soul is an actor or enjoyer is ignorant. This too is a Sāṃkhya idea: *yaḥ kartā bhoktāstity ātmānam abhimanyate....so avidyān*.<sup>5</sup> In the context of the means of freeing oneself from the feelings of attachment and hatred Śrīdhara quotes a verse of Dharmakīrti, which says, if the

theory of self or soul is accepted, there arises the idea of *other*, and differentiation between the self and others causes attachment and hatred. This is a denial of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of the soul. But the point is that as for the psychological insight Śrīdhara does not shy away even from his philosophical adversary. Again Udayana, the great champion of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, while refuting Yogācāra idealism declares that if somehow Yogācāra succeeds in proving that difference in cognition is not caused by the difference in the cognized objects, it will only lead to the establishment of Vedānta theory.

*na grāhya-bhedam avadhūya dhiosti vṛttis  
tad-bhāvane balini vedanaye joyaśriḥ.*<sup>6</sup>

Did the author of *Ātmatattva viveka* know that Vedānta theory is as much damaging to the doctrine of realism as that of Yogācāra? Śaṅkara's argument against *samavāya* is a case in point. There is a reason why the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers felt shy of their realism in the context of the theory of emancipation. According to the idealist systems of Vedānta as well as the Buddhists, it is held that our mundane state is due to ignorance, a kind of primordial error; and emancipation comes about when that error is set aside by true knowledge. The idea is so deeply rooted in the Indian mind that even a realist system, where it should have no place, succumbed to it. Such a theory hardly fits in with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, according to which the world, exactly in the form it is experienced, is real, and all attributes like knowledge, desire, hatred, effort, etc., pertain to the soul as a matter of reality. But that theory of emancipation seems to have been adopted in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school from the earliest times, for it is found in the *Nyāya Sūtra* and its commentary by Vātsāyana.

There is another feature worth noticing. Gaṅgeśa tuned the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school from metaphysics to logic and epistemology exclusively. He is the hero of the post-Buddhist period of the Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣika school. The new turn given to the school by Gaṅgeśa put an end to the development of the metaphysical theories of that school. So far as metaphysics is concerned, there is hardly any significant contribution of the post-Buddhist period to the thought of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. With the exit of the Buddhist opponents, there was left no interest in disputation on Realism versus Idealism. The principal adversary in all disputations now is no more the Buddhist, but the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā school, especially the Prabhākara-school. Earlier, during the period of conflict with the Buddhists, the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā was regarded as an allied school. Vācaspati Miśra uses the word '*svatantra*'<sup>7</sup> for Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā.

The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge by S.C.Chatterjee is a lucid exposition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika epistemology, and in many ways, it is an admirable work. The *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics* by Sadananda Bhaduri appears to have been conceived as complementary to Chatterjee's book. It deals chiefly with the material aspect of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, but does not deal at all with metaphysics proper. So far as the pure metaphysics of the school is concerned, it has been just touched upon only in the last two chapters on *Whole and Part* and *Causality*. Theories relating to these topics were developed in conflict with the counter-theories of the Dignāga-school. The author does make some stray references to Buddhist theories, but the structure of the Dignāga system as a whole is left ungrasped. There is another difficulty. The doctrines of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika underwent considerable changes at different stages of the development of the system. Usually expositors of modern times do not as a rule mention the period with which they are concerned. Ordinarily, they may be supposed to present the theories of the school in the latest form of its development. This takes away much of the drama that was enacted throughout the history of the development of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.

The present study is not historical, rather conceptual. Our chief concern is to understand the role of *samavāya* as a category in the metaphysics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school of realism. Towards the endeavour lessons of history is a valuable aid. We have described Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika as a school upholding realism. A caution with regard to the usage of the term 'realism' should be in order. There are no exact equivalents in Sanskrit terminology for 'realism' and 'idealism' to carry the same connotation. D.N.Shastri has suggested that *Bāhyārthavāda*, a theory upholding the reality of external world would be the exact Sanskrit equivalent for the term 'realism'. The term '*sarvāstivāda*' is used for realistic Buddhist schools of Vaibhāṣika and Sautāntika. But the term '*sarvāstivāda*' cannot be used to describe orthodox realistic systems like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika or the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. Neither are the theories of these schools designated as *bāhyārthavāda*, although, in their later development, they are principally concerned with defense of realism against the Buddhists. Even on the Buddhist side, the term '*sarvāstivāda*' does not connote realism in its usual sense. *Sarvāstivāda* literally means a theory of the existence of all objects, external as well as internal. Śaṅkara has used this term in that sense, i.e., in the sense of realism. But in reality the word '*sarvāstivāda*' was used in Buddhist philosophy in quite a different sense. Śaṅkara has used the term '*sarvāstivāda*' for both the schools as explained in *Bhāmatī*.<sup>8</sup>

Why should there be no term in Sanskrit having the same connotation as the term 'realism'? It may be suggested that all the orthodox philosophical systems, with the exception of the Vedānta, are realistic. Even the Vedānta is realistic from the phenomenal standpoint of reality, *vyāvahārika sattā*. If they are all realists, the need for a special term to differentiate them does not arise. In western thought also, in the Greek and the medieval period, all the systems were realistic and there was no problem of realism versus

idealism. It was since the time of Descartes that this problem came to be fore. Similarly, in ancient Indian thought the existence of the external world was taken for granted by all the systems. The need for proving the reality of the external world did not arise even after the appearance of *vijñānavāda*. It became an acute point of controversy only when the realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school was challenged by Dignāga. In ancient time realistic systems were pluralistic, while idealistic ones inclined to monism. Advaitavāda is used to differentiate the idealistic Vedānta from the realistic systems which uphold pluralism or *dvaitavāda*. And lastly, *vijñānavāda* may not be an adequate term for idealism in all its varieties. It may be adequate for subjective idealism of the Yogācāra School. *Vijñānavāda* is not to be used in a wider sense like idealism, and does not cover, for example, the objective idealism of Plato, or the transcendental idealism of Kant.

Realism is also used for the theory that the universals residing in particulars have their independent reality. Presently the term is used for the theory that external objects have their reality independent of our knowledge of them. 'Realism' in the sense of a theory upholding independent reality of the universals is contrasted with the theory of 'nominalism' or 'conceptualism', which holds that the universals have no independent reality, but exist only in the mind as general concepts. For instance, the universal cow-ness has no independent external reality, but it is only a mental concept produced by the repeated cognitions of a cow and brought forth before our mind by the force of the word *cow*. Just as there is the conflict between realism versus idealism, so in medieval Europe, there was the conflict of realism versus nominalism.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the two meanings of realism coincide. The reality of external objects is one meaning of *realism*. The other meaning is that a universal as an external reality, *sāmānya* is a

*padārtha*, and that it is different from the reality of its particulars. Whether a universal has an independent reality or not is one of the principal bone of contention between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhists. The latter are conceptualists or nominalists, and hold the view that universals have no external existence and consist only in the exclusion of other objects from the concept of one object, e.g., cow-*ness* means the exclusion of non-cows, i.e., horses, etc. from the cow: *atadvyāvṛtti* or *apoha*. Exclusion which is the essence of the universal is a mere thought-construction, *vikalpa-yonayaḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabda-yonayaḥ*. The universal being only a thought-form, there can be no question of its being an independent reality.

With the sense of *realism* characterizing the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, we may now proceed to consider the viability, validity and reality of *samavāya* in all its ramifications.

To reiterate the point about this study, it is a conceptual study, a study of the concept of *samavāya* as a category of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics, the role it plays in the realistic standpoint. The intention of this study is not exegetical, i.e., no exegesis of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts in particular.

Sworn to realism as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is the question arises, is *samavāya* as real as other *padārthas* of the categorical network? If we take the word *artha* to mean literally a real object, then we may also ask: is *samavāya* an *artha* or a *padārtha*? According to Kaṇāda, the last three categories, namely, *sāmānya*, *samavāya* and *viśeṣa* are *padārthas*, but not *arthas*. Does it show that Kaṇāda's *padārtha* is just the meaning of a word, and not an external objective real? With respect to *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, he has expressly declared that they depend merely on our intellect: *buddhyapekṣam*.<sup>9</sup> They reside in their substrate by *samavāya* itself

does not reside by some other relation. Shall we then say that *samavāya* possesses a larger degree of reality than *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*? In fact, the subsistence (*vr̥tti*) of *samavāya* in the objects related, not being by any other relation, is in the form of the related objects themselves. Thus we find that from the standpoint of reality, out of the categories other than substances (*dravya*), qualities (*guṇa*) and actions (*karma*) form one group, and *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*, the second group, and *samavāya* forms a third group. *Abhāva*, being of negative character, constitutes the fourth group. It may, however, be noted that this kind of gradation, although it follows from the account of the categories as given in the authoritative manuals, is not expressly stated in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika works.

Different grades of reality of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories result from the basic principle that whatever enters into the texture of our experience must have its counterpart in the external world. Critical thinkers of the school, however, did not fail to notice the limitations of this basic principle. In the first instance, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all our experiences are not necessarily valid as it is held to be by the Prabhākara School of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā. The evidence of experience may sometimes be erroneous. Again, if we were to have an external counterpart for every factor of our experience, our world of reality would be flooded with unlimited contents. For instance, in that case, we shall have to assume a new relation for the subsistence of the inherent relation: *samavāya* also. External reality, for the latter Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is to be assumed only where the assumption leads to brevity (*lāghava*). *Samavāya* as a separate category is accepted on the same principle. Instead of numerous relations in the form of numberless objects, the assumption of one ubiquitous entity, *samavāya*, leads to brevity: *ananta svarūpānām sambandhatva-kalpane gauravāl lāghavād eka samavāya-siddhi*.<sup>10</sup> One might be reminded of Occam's razor in

Western philosophy. Similarly the universal, *dravyatva* is accepted by the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, not because of its being experienced as such, but because it is the determining or distinguishing characteristic (*avacchedaka*) of the inherent causation: *samavāyī-kāraṇatāvacchedakataya*.<sup>11</sup> In simple language, it means that only a substance can be an inherent cause: *samavāyī-kāraṇa*. Prior to the Navya-Nyāya school, the existence of an external reality corresponding to all of our ideas was always assumed. *Samavāya*, though primarily a metaphysical principle, plays an epistemological explanatory role as well in the case its employment in explaining the causal phenomena.

Although, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, all the objects coming under the categories and their subdivisions possess objective reality, it appears that there are different levels or gradations of reality. This point is quite harmless, and in no way does it jeopardize the avowed realistic inclinations of the school. *Sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* were in the beginning regarded only as intellectual abstractions (by Kaṇāda). Objective reality was ascribed to them by Praśastapāda. They both reside in their substrata by *samavāya*. *Samavāya* is also regarded as an objective reality. It is related to the objects (which are related by it) not by any other relation, but in the form of the related objects themselves. Therefore, it appears that its level of reality is different from that of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa*. On any account, *samavāya* is a unique Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika category, both in its ontological and epistemic import and functions.

## Notes and references

1. *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā* , - Vācaspati Miśra.
2. *Praśastapāda Bhāṣya*.
3. *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā* , - Vācaspati Miśra.
4. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* ,verse 64, - Śrīdhara.
5. Ibid.
6. *Ātmatattvaviveka*- Udayana.
7. *Nyāyavārttika-tātparyaṭīkā* , -Vācaspati Miśra.
8. *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, (I.2.18), - Śaṅkara.
9. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, (I,ii,3).
10. *Nyāya Siddhānta Muktāvalī*, on Verse II.
11. *Nyāya Siddhānta Muktāvalī*, on Verse III.

## Chapter-2

### The Concept of Relation in Indian Philosophy

We shall try to situate the problem of relation against the background of philosophical thinking on relation in India. We do not claim to be exhaustive, but this will give us indications of the main trends.

Each school of Indian thought deals with its own specific problems of relation in a somewhat empirical fashion. There has been little systematic attempt to evolve a coherent philosophy of relation as such, though there was necessarily a good deal of cross-fertilization in the course of inter-school polemic. This has not always resulted in mutual enlightenment. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school inscribed *sama-vāya* in their list of categories as a member in its own right and simultaneously tossed *samīyoga* into the category of quality. The mixed logical-ontological character of the categories themselves is also a problem point as for the persistent temptation to regard relation as a substantive *tertium quid*<sup>1</sup> which has bedeviled so much of the philosophical thinking of India. But it is also true that "relation" is so centrally important that the various doctrines of the different systems seem to hinge on it. For all the Indian schools, the problem of relation is not, as for Hume, epistemological, but metaphysical. The question asked here is whether relations are real. This is a useful and original frame of reference within which we can locate the various systems.

The two basic aspects of experience, of being and thought, are identity and difference, to which all pairs of categories, subject/object, body/soul, universal/particular, can be reduced, and in virtue of that fact related to each other in the sense that one seems to belong to the other or one seems to imply the other.

There is change, and yet there is somehow permanence also. This is our common belief, and we do not feel bothered about their relation except when we become reflective and metaphysical. When we do begin reflecting, we are immediately confronted by the question: is the relation between the two real? If so, how can both belong to one and the same thing diametrically opposed as they are to each other? The various systems of Indian metaphysics seem to us to be different attempts to answer the question.

All the possible basic approaches to this question can be formulated *a priori* as follows: (1) identity, difference and relation are all equally real; (2) all are equally unreal; (3) both relata are real but the relation between them is false; (4) all identity, difference and the relation are equally false. Every one of the systems of Indian philosophy can be brought under one or the other of the four views. That all the three, relation as well as relata, are equally real is the fundamental metaphysical doctrine of all the realist systems: the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā, Jainism and all the realist interpretations of Vedānta. This is because a pluralist view of reality cannot be sustained without accepting the reality of relation. The question raised here is: how can there be an unreal relation between two reals?

The Sāṃkhya system, on the one hand, held that although the terms are real, the relation between them is false. Relation cannot be of the same status as the relata. *Puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, one representing identity, the other representing difference, are both real, but the relation between the two is not real or ultimate. It can be removed by *viveka* or discriminating knowledge. There is no real relation either between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* or between two *puruṣas*. The question here is: how can there be a real relation between two such incompatible and exclusive realities as *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* or identity and difference?

The Bauddha and Vedāntin schools hold that the relation, and necessarily, therefore, one of the terms, is false. The Vedāntins reject difference and the Bauddhas reject identity. The Mādhyamika Buddhists rejected all three.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas rightly emphasized the reality of relation, but they did to such an extent that it seems to become a “thing” in its own right. The reasons for this lie in the heterogeneous character of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika categories in which predicable and predicament are apparently placed on the same footing. Aristotle was careful to avoid this confusion.

The Sāṃkhya-Yoga thinkers had perceived this difficulty with the realist position. They held that *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* were so totally incompatible that they could not possibly be related. But they did not realize that separation involves relation no less than connection. They thought, relation meant only connection, so that if the relation was rejected, the relata would immediately fall. Therefore, it is possible to ask, if the relation between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is false, why do the two not become one? The conception of two absolutes is self-contradictory. And the further corollary that if relation is false, then the relation between cause and effect is also false and the Śāṃkhya doctrine of *pariṇāmavāda* or real modification of the cause into the effect would be reduced to *vivartavāda*, the theory of apparent modification resulting in a merely apparent effect. A final implication of the logic of accepting identity behind difference which escaped the Sāṃkhya-Yoga school was the necessity it imposed on also accepting one *puruṣa* behind the appearance of the plurality of *puruṣa*. Their insight was valid but imperfect as regards the difference in status of relata and their relation.<sup>2</sup>

The Bauddhas and Vedāntins recognized the impossibility of the hypothesis of two independent realities or absolutes. They both agreed that relation could not be as real as the relata, because it is not immediately given in direct experience like the relata, and secondly, because if it also were "real" then it would itself become a term. The influence of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika seems to be at work here. Relation, they argued, must, therefore, have a status different from that of the relata; therefore, it must be false. But this necessarily entails the falsity of one of the terms of the relation, "difference" of the Vedānta, "identity" for the Buddhists. There cannot be an unreal relation between two reals. Obviously, Bauddhas and Vedāntins are influenced by their unexpressed metaphysical options in their choice of which term to reject. The Vedāntin regards identity as more fundamental than difference, basing upon the *ātman-brahman* teaching of the *Upaniṣads* and the experience of deep sleep and *ātmānubhava*. The Bauddha, on the other hand, argues from the principle that reality must be efficient or *arthakriyākārin*, which identity or permanence is not, since it cannot explain change, which is an obvious fact of experience. It is clear that both Vedāntins and Bauddhas are somewhat selective and that both cannot be right, since it accepts only one aspect of experience. They do, however, share the merit of not rejecting experience altogether, as the Mādhyamikas do in reaction against their apparent dogmatism. Identity and difference, being correlated, must go together, say the Mādhyakas, if one is false or unreal, the other must be too. Since, however, *ātmavāda* and *anātmavāda*, identity and difference, are mutually incompatible, both cannot be accepted. Therefore, both must be rejected. The Mādhyamika argues that neither pure identity nor pure difference can explain change. Both are necessary to account for it. Reality (*tattva*) must transcend all categories. While fully appreciating the inexorable logic of the Mādhyamika School, one has to agree that its weakness is that it seems to allow no point of contact between *tattva* and

ordinary experience. To be free from contradiction, *tattva* must be transcend-ent, yet to be realized, it must also be immanent in experience. This is the corner-stone, the pivotal point of Indian philosophy, and hence clarification of conception of relation becomes a matter of fundamental significance.

We may note the usages of relational terms to gain a clearer insight into the conception of the nature of relation itself. There is no class of words which can escape relations. They appear as nouns, either directly, as in 'son', or indirectly, as in 'knowledge' (which must be knowledge of something); so too with pronouns, verbs, adjectives, numbers, prepositions. We can hardly construct a proposition without relation creeping in, for as an acrobat leaps from trapeze to trapeze, so our mind leaps from relation to relation. Even Śamkara was aware of this. He writes in the *Gītā-bhāṣya* (XIII.12) that every word employed to denote a thing denotes that thing, when heard by another, as associated with a certain genus, or a certain act, or a certain quality, or a certain mode of relation. Thus 'cow' and 'horse' imply genera, 'cook' and 'teacher' imply acts, 'white' and 'black' imply qualities, 'wealthy' and 'healthy' imply possession.

We shall focus on the generic term *sambandha* and three relational words *saṁyoga*, *samavāya* and *svarūpa*.

*Sambandha* means binding or joining together, close connection or union or association, conjunction, inherence, connection with or relation to (instrumental), with or without *saha*, or comparative. *Sambandha* is hard to be defined, and it has wide-ranging connotation of the English "relation". It is used as a generic term embracing *saṁyoga*, *samavāya*, and *tādātmya* as specific kinds of relation. We may refer to Śamkara's *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* (II.ii.38)<sup>3</sup> and in the discussion of the Vaiśeṣika theory of causation

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earlier in the same work (II.ii.13)<sup>4</sup> we get confirmed that the term '*sambandha*' includes relations of spherical contact and causal and logical relations. In such relations both terms are concrete and perceptible and others in which one term is perceptible and one not, and yet others in which neither is so. As a general tenor of his thought Śamkara accepts *samyoga* relation within the sphere of *vyāvahārika* or phenomenal experience, however critical he may be of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika attempts of explaining the causal relationship between the created universe and its creator in terms of *samyoga* and *samavāya*.

Śamkara had serious reservations about *samavāya*. This is evident in passages critically dealing with the Vaiśeṣika system. In the *Gītā-bhāṣya* (XIII.10) he uses *samavāya* in the non-philosophical sense of "society of man" the only instance of *samavāya* used in the philosophical sense occurs in the *Upadeśa-sāhasrī* (I.iii.115): *śarīra samavāyibhiḥ*. The *Brahmaṣūtra* says that pleasant touches connected with body can produce no change in me. But this is a solitary instance, and shows that Śamkara had little use for the term as a vehicle of his thought. In his using metaphysical arguments to support the testimony of *śruti*, he constantly refers to *sambandha* existing between *ātman-brahman* and the world. As for the relation of cause and effect, between the Lord and the world, Śamkara's unequivocal answer is the relation of *tādātmya*, the relation of identity: *tādātmya lakṣaṇa sambandha papatteḥ* (II.ii.38). Even though he found no difficulty in predicating such a relation between the world and Brahman, the four distinct groups of Vedāntins and all claiming to be authentic interpreters of his thought, do not agree. Perhaps the matter is not quite so simple for the average mind.

## Notes and references

1. *Siddhānta Lakṣaṇa Jāgadīsī*, - p. 256, Chow, edn.
2. "nātaḥ sambandho dharmigrāhakamānavādhāt".-5.98.-*Sāṃkhya-kārikā*.
3. "nāpi samavāyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandha; āśrayāśrayibhāvān-irupahyāt".-2.2.38. *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*.
4. "kāryaviśeṣaṇa nānātvarī".-2.2.13. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*.

## Chapter-3

### Vaiśeṣika Statement of *Samavāya*

We propose to discuss the concept of *samavāya* in a two-fold manner: expository and critical. First we shall go along with the Vaiśeṣika account of *samavāya*, and then consider it in a critical manner.

Expository:

Kaṇāda defines *samavāya* or inherence (we shall not question the translation of *samavāya* as 'inherence'. Since the translation is widely accepted, we may use them interchangeably) as the relation between a material cause and its effect, which is the cause of the notion "this subsists in this abode", *ihedam iti yataḥ kāryyakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*<sup>1</sup> (VS.vii.2.26). Praśastapāda defines it as the relation that subsists between two inseparable entities related to each other as the substrate and the content, and which is the cause of the notion "this subsists in this abode", "*ayutasiddhānāmādhāryyādhārabhūtā-nām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*<sup>2</sup>. Śrīdhara defines it as the relation between two inseparable entities, which are of the nature of a substrate and its content.<sup>3</sup> *Samavāya* is not the relation between two entities, which are capable of separate existence and subsistence in different substrates. Separable entities are capable of existing apart from each other and residing in different substrates, a cloth subsists in its constituent yarns. Though the yarns subsist in their parts, which are different from the cloth, yet both cannot subsist in different substrates apart from each other. The cloth subsists in the yarns, which compose it. Though they have an

independent existence apart from the cloth, yet it has no independent existence apart from them. The yarns are the substrate, and the cloth is its content. They are its material cause. It subsists in them. Udayana defines inherence as an inseparable and intimate relation between two entities, which can never be separated from each other, *'prāptā eva santinā prāptā iti yāvat, teṣāṃ sambandhaḥ prāptilakṣaṇaḥ samavāyaḥ, tena saṁyoga vyavacchinnastasyāprāptipūrvakatvāt, tathāca, nityaḥ prāpti samavā-ya iti lakṣaṇam sūcitam'*<sup>4</sup>. It is the relation that subsists between a substrate and its content, which is not adventitious, but natural. A natural relation is not produced. Conjunction (*saṁyoga*) is a contingent, temporary and accidental relation. But *samavāya* is a necessary, uncaused and inseparable relation. It is a relation between a substance and a quality (*guṇaguṇī*), a substance and an action (*karma*), a genus and an individual (*jāti-vyakti*), an eternal substance and its particularity, a whole and its parts. A quality inheres in a substance. An action inheres in a substance. A genus inheres in an individual. A particularity inheres in an eternal substance. A corporate whole inheres in its constituent parts. An effect inheres in its material cause.

Inherence is inseparable relation between two non-pervasive entities, which are restricted to particular places, and which are known to be different from each other, *asarvagatānām adhigatāny-atvānāmaviṣvaghāvaḥ sa samavāyākhyāḥ sambandhaḥ*.<sup>5</sup> Inseparable relation implies incapacity of its relata for independent existence. It is an indissoluble union of two different entities, *apṛthagbhāvo'sv-ātantryaṁ samavāyaḥ bhinnōḥ parasparopāśla-ṣasya sambandha kṛta-tvopalambhāt*.<sup>6</sup>

Inherence is inseparable relation between two entities, one of which is incapable of separate existence apart from the other. The

composite whole cannot exist apart from its parts. But when it is destroyed, the parts can exist apart from it. But so long as the whole exists, it and its parts cannot exist apart from each other. A quality cannot exist apart from its substance. But the substance can exist apart from its quality at the moment of its production. It acquires its qualities at the next moment. But so long as a quality persists, a substance cannot exist apart from it. An action cannot exist apart from its substance. But the substance can exist without its action. An action is temporary, while its substance is enduring. But so long as an action lasts, a substance cannot exist apart from it. An individual cannot exist apart from its genus. But the genus exists before the individual is born and after it is destroyed. But so long as the individual lasts, the genus cannot exist apart from it. The genus and the individual are inseparably related to each other. The genus exists in the other individuals. But its existence in them does not affect its inseparable relation to a particular individual. So Padmanābha Miśra defines inherence as the relation that substance between two entities, which are related to each other, while they are existent, *samavāyasthale ubhau vidyamānau sambandhāveveti bhavaḥ*. A particularity cannot exist apart from an eternal substance. An eternal substance also cannot exist apart from its particularity. There is mutual dependence here. But in the other instances, there is one-sided dependence. Therefore, inherence is an intimate relation, but it is not an internal relation. It is an external relation.

Inherence is the relation between two inseparable entities, which are always related to each other and incapable of substrate and its content, *apṛthogbhūtānām sarvadā mithyāḥ samavetānām ādhāryā-dhārabhūtānām sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ*. It is the relation between two inseparable entities, one of which is the substratum and the other is its content. This definition obviates the objection mentioned above. So long as the two inseparable entities are

related to each other as the container and the contained, the relation between them is inherence. It is a natural relation between a substantive (*dharmin*) and an attribute (*dharma*). It is not an adventitious relation between two entities, which acquire the nature of a substantive and an attribute. 'There is a bird in ether (*ākāśa*). The ether is the substrate, and the bird is its content. But the relation between them is not inherence, because they can exist apart from each other. 'There is a fruit in a plate'. The plate is the substrate, and the fruit is its content. The relation between them is the cause of the notion 'this subsists in this abode'. But it is not inherence, because it does not subsist between two inseparable entities. The fruit and the plate can exist apart from each other. The relation between a word and its objects (*vācyavācakabhāva*) is not inherence, because they are not related to each other as a substrate and its content. A word denotes its object. It cannot exist apart from its object. But there is no relation of inherence between them; because their relation is not the cause of the notion 'this subsists in this abode'. The word does not subsist in its object. A cognition cannot exist apart from its object, which is apprehended by it. But it does not subsist in its object. Therefore, the relation between cognition and its object (*viśayaviśayibhāva*) is not inherence, because they are not related to each other as a substrate and its content.

Inherence is one, because it has the same distinguishing feature. There is no evidence of its distinctions. Inherence can account for all notions 'this subsists in this abode'. So it is useless to assume much inherence. Inherence is enough to relate all its relata, substances and their qualities, substances and their actions, wholes and parts, genera and individuals, eternal substances and their particularities. Though inherence is one only, there is restriction due to the differences of the substrates and their contents. The genus of substance inheres in substances. The genus

of quality inheres in qualities. The genus of action inheres in actions. Substances only have the power of manifesting the genus of substance. Qualities only have the power of manifesting the genus of quality. Actions only have the power of manifesting the genus of action, *dravyatvādīnāmapī samavāyaikate'pi vyaṅgyavyānjakaśakti bhedād ādhārādheyaniyamaḥ*.<sup>7</sup> Thus though inherence is one, it has a restriction as to its substrate and its content due to the differences in the power of being manifesto and the manifested.

Inherence is eternal, though its relata transient. It is not produced by any cause. It is not a temporal relation. It does not pertain to relations of time. Śivāditya defines it as an eternal relation. It is different from conjunction (*samyoga*), which is a temporary relation. Just as one being inheres in many existing entities, so inherence subsists between innumerable pairs of relata. Just as being is eternal, so inherence is eternal. Inherence is different from conjunction, which is temporary relation. An effect is mainly produced by a material cause. It is produced by a non-material cause and an efficient cause with the aid of a material cause. If it had a material cause it would be related to its cause either by itself or by inherence. It cannot be related to its cause by itself, because it would be the substrate of itself. But no entity will be both a substrate and its content. No entity can subsist in itself. Nor can inherence be related to its cause by inherence, since it would lead to infinite regress. Therefore, inherence is uncaused and eternal.

Inherence is not perceptible. It is not perceived to subsist in perceptible entities. There is no distinct perceptual cognition of it. The relation between a rose and its colour is not perceived. It is inferred for the notion 'this subsists in this abode'. It is not perceived as an object (*viśaya*). It is inferred from the qualified

cognition of a substantive, an attributive, and a relation between them. A jar is endowed with colour. The jar is a substantive, colour is an attributive. Inherence is the relation between them. The jar and its colour are perceived. But inherence between them is not perceived.

Inherence does not exist through the inherence of being in it. It is not related to being. It is self subsistent (*svātmavṛttiḥ*)<sup>8</sup>. It does not require any other relation to relate it to its relata. Conjunction cannot subsist between inherence and its relata. It is a quality, which subsists in substances only. Inherence cannot subsist between inherence and its relata, because inherence is one only. There is no third relation, which can subsist between inherence and its relata. Inherence is one and indivisible relation, which subsists between its relata. It has no other relation by which it can relate itself to its relation. Therefore, it is self-subsistent. It has been said, *sāmānyādinām trayāṇām svātmasattvam*,<sup>9</sup> and *teṣām na sattvāyogaḥ sattvam*.<sup>10</sup>

Inherence is not identity. The two inseparable entities, which are related through inherence, do not produce the cognition of one thing. They produce two different cognitions, which apprehend them. The cognitions have different contents. So the relata of inherence are different from each other. They are not really one and the same thing. Therefore, inherence is not essential identity (*svarūpābheda*), but the relation between two inseparable entities, which cannot subsist in different substances apart from each other, *parasparaparihāraṇa pṛthagāśritāmityarthaḥ*.<sup>11</sup> The relata of inherence are different from each other. Inherence is non-difference or identity, as Advaita Vedanta wrongly maintains.

Inherence is not *svarūpasambandha*, which is a relation that is identified with either of its relata. If there is *svarūpasambandha* between a jar and its colour, the jar itself is the relation of colour to it. Therefore, an infinite number of *svarūpasambandhas* assumed to account for the relation between countless substances and their qualities and actions. This will contradict the law of parsimony of hypothesis. Further, the assumption of *svarūpasambandha* between a material cause (parts) and its effect (whole) would underline the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of *Asatkāryavāda*. The effect is a new beginning (*ārambha*), which is different from, and inheres in, its material cause. The whole is different from its parts. It inheres in its parts. Therefore, inherence is not *svarūpasambandha*.

The relation subsisting between the ground and the non-existence of a jar is not inherence. 'There is non-existence of jar on the ground'. Here the non-existence of the jar does not inhere in the ground. The relation is not inseparable. If it were so, there would be the cognition of the non-existence of the jar on the ground, even when it is brought back to the ground. The relation between the non-existence of a jar and the ground is not inherence, but *svarūpa-sambandha*.

Inherence is not conjunction. Conjunction is a relation between two substances. But inherence is a relation between a substance and another substance or non-existence. It is a relation between a material cause (parts) and an effect (whole), a substance and a quality, or an action, or a community, or a particularity. Conjunction is a separable relation. Inherence is an inseparable relation. In conjunction the relata exist as unrelated to each other before they are conjoined. But in inherence the relata are always related to each other, when they are related as a substrate and its content. Inherence is eternal, while conjunction is temporary. Conjunction is produced by the action of one or both of its relata, or

by another conjunction. But inherence is not produced by the action of one or both of its relata. Conjunction is destroyed by disjunction of its relata. But inherence is indestructible. Conjunction is a relation between two independent substances. But inherence is a relation between a substrate and its content. Inherence is the cause of the notion, 'this subsists in this abode' with regard to the categories of substance, quality, action, community and particularity. But conjunction is not the cause of such a notion. It is a relation between two substances, which may not be related to each other as the container and contained. Inherence is a natural and inseparable relation. Conjunction is an adventitious and separable relation.

Inherence is one, while conjunctions are many. Inherence is imperceptible, while conjunction is perceptible. Inherence is different from conjunction, because it is not produced by the action of every of its relata; because it is not produced by the action of any of its relata; because it is not destroyed by disjunction of the relata; because its relata are incapable of independent existence unrelated to each other; because it is inferred from the constant subsistence of a content in a substrate; because it is one, eternal, and imperceptible.

Inherence is different from substance, quality, action, community and particularity, because it is a relation between a substance and the other categories. It is different from non-existence. So it is a distinct category.

The category of inherence explains the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's conception of causality as a new emergence. The effect is different from its material cause, in which it does not pre-exist before its production. The effect inheres in its material cause. There is an inseparable relation between them. The material cause is the

substratum. The effect is its content. They cannot be separated from each other, while they are existent and related to each other as the container and the contained. The relation between them is not identity as the Śāṃkhya maintains. The cause and the effect both are real. The effect is not an appearance of the cause, which is real, as the Advaita Vedānta maintains. The category of inherence is necessary to relate a cause and its effect, both of which are real and different from each other. It is necessary to relate a substance to its quality, action, generality and particularity, which are all real. Inherence plays a very important part in upholding pluralistic realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Critical:

The Vaiśeṣika category of *samavāya* has been severely criticized by Śāṃkara. We shall consider it in a separate sequel. Presently we propose to consider a few remarks made by the Buddhist thinker Śāntarakṣita.

Śāntarakṣita urges that the non-existence of inherence is proved by such perceptions as 'there are threads in a cloth', 'there are branches in a tree', 'there are stones in a mountain'. These are the examples taken from *Tattvasaṃgraha*. A cloth does not inhere in threads. Further, a composite whole does not differ from its composite parts. It is a mere aggregate of parts. So the whole does not inhere in its parts. If two entities are different from each other, one may inhere in the other. Mangoes exist in a plate. But a cloth cannot inhere in its threads, because it does not differ from them. There is colour or motion in a jar. But it does not require inherence. There is identity (*tādātmya*) of colour or motion with the jar. So inherence is identity. Further, if inherence is one, then a cloth should inhere in the parts of a jar, and the jar should inhere in threads. If a cloth inheres in threads and a jar inheres in its parts,

then inherence being one, a cloth should inhere in parts of a jar, and a jar should inhere in threads. Further, if inherence is one, the genus of a cow (*gotva*) would subsist in elephants. It may be argued that though inherence is one, it is restricted to a particular pair of substrate (*ādhāra*) and content (*ādheya*): the genus of substance inheres in substances; the genus of quality inheres in qualities; the genus of action inheres in actions. This amounts to the admission that there is much inherence which is generalized. Further, if inherence is eternal, its relata also must be eternal. If inherence of a jar in its parts is eternal, then the jar also must be eternal. Further, if the whole and the parts both are destroyed, how can inherence relate them to each other persist? So inherence cannot be eternal. When conjuncts are destroyed, conjunction is destroyed. So when the whole and the parts are destroyed, inherence must be destroyed. As there are many conjunctions, so there must be much inherence.

## Notes and References

1. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*. (vii.2.26).-Kanāda (40), p. 158.
2. *Praśastapāda* (57), p.37.
3. "*ayutasiddhāyorāśrayāśroyibhāvaḥ samavāyaḥ*".- Śrīdhara.
4. *Tattvacintāmaṇi* - Udayana, (71), Vol. I, p. 249.
5. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*-2.2.9.
6. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 774, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
7. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*-2.2.9.
8. "*samavāyasya nānyā vṛttirgbluhjklfsxvgjmbkhuhih,sarbxzvasti, tasmāt svātmavṛttiḥ*". -*Padārtha Dharma Saṃgraha*, p. 784.
9. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*-2.2.3.
10. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 49, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
11. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 37, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.

## Chapter-4

### The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of *Samavāya*:

#### I. *Samavāya*: Transition from Vaiśeṣika to Nyāya

The Vaiśeṣika insists on the timeless and non-causal character of inherence. Kaṇāda means by inherence the relation between cause and effect <sup>1</sup>. Praśastapāda defines it as the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the relation of the container and the contained, and being the basis of the idea, "this is in that" (*ayūtasiddhānāmādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*) <sup>2</sup>. Virtue and pleasure, Śrīdhara says, are not related by inherence, though they reside in the self, since they are not related as the container and the contained. The relationship between the word and the thing signified is not one of inherence, since one is not contained in the other. The fruit may be on the ground, but as the two are not inseparable, they cannot be said to be related by way of inherence. *Ayūtasiddhi* or inseparability is not identity, since the two things are not one in reality. The form of fire and the ball of iron are distinct from each other. While Kaṇāda includes only causal ties in the relation of *samavāya*, Praśastapāda brings non-causal ones under it. Generally the relation that binds a substance and its qualities, a whole and its parts, motion and the object in motion, individual and universe, cause and effect, is that of *samavāya* or inherence. The members related are so unified as to present one whole or one identical real.

*Samavāya*, or necessary connection, is distinguished from *samyoga*, or accidental conjunction, which is a quality of things.

While objects conjoined have a separate existence prior to conjunction, the members related by *samavāya* are inseparably connected. The relationship of *samavāya* is not caused by the action of one of the members related. Conjunction terminates as soon as there is a disjunction of the members conjoined. Again, conjunction takes place between two independent substances, while the members related by way of inherence stand in the relation of the container and the contained. Two things in the relation of *samavāya* cannot be separated without at least one of them being destroyed. *Samyoga* takes place between two things of the same nature which exist disconnectedly and are for a time brought into conjunction. It is external relation, while *samavāya* is internal relation. Johnson's distinction between a characterizing tie and a coupling tie is comparable in this context. In *samyoga* two different things are joined together without forming a real whole which enters into each. *Samavāya* is a real coherence.

Inherence is said to be eternal, since to be produced would involve infinite regress. Śrīdhara says that it cannot appear before, or after, or along with the thing related to it <sup>3</sup>. If the inherence of the cloth were possible before the cloth appears, it is conceivable where the inherence could reside, since one member of the relationship is non-existent. If it is produced along with the cloth, then the cloth would lose the character of being the substrate of the relationship of inherence. If it appeared after the cloth is formed, then, too, the cloth could not be its substrata. Nor is it possible for the effect to be its substrata <sup>4</sup>. *Samavāya* is eternal in the sense that it cannot be produced or destroyed without producing or destroying the product. Its eternity is thus relative. The relation of *samavāya* is not perceptible, though the ancient Naiyāyikas thought that it was open to perception. As the fact stands for Vaiśeṣikas,

*samavāya* is only inferable from the inseparable connection of things.

Annambhaṭṭa says that the property of *anekatvaṁ* or plurality does not pertain to *samavāya*. It is only one. It does not reside in anything by the relation of inherence, since such residence would involve infinite regress. There is no difference in our various notions of inherence, even as there is no difference in our notions of being (*sattā*). The kind of relationship is the same though the members related may differ.

Speaking strictly, the notion of inherence is the result of intellectual discrimination, though an objective existence is granted to it. It has its origin in abstraction, and has no existence apart from substances or *padārthas*. Śāṅkara criticizes the theory of *samavāya*. He argues that conjunction such as that subsists between the atoms and *ākāśa* is eternal as much as inherence. Inherence, in so far as it is a relation, is not identical with what it relates. The relation of inherence falls outside the terms to be related, and itself requires a relation to relate it to the terms, and so on *ad infinitum*. Again, we have to assume a relationship by which the *samavāya* would reside in the *samavāyī*, or the things related by *samavāya* relationship. If the *samavāya* does not rest in the *samavāyī* by another *samavāya*, but is identical with it, then even *samyoga* may be regarded as identical with the things conjoined. Kumārīla, in the *Pratyakṣa Sūtra* of the *Śloka Vārttika*, comments that if *samavāya* is something different from the class and the individual that resides in the class by *samavāya*, then it (the *samavāya*) could not exist in them as a relation; on the other hand, if it be identical with them, then these two would be identical-by the law that the things that are identical with the same thing are identical with themselves.<sup>5</sup> In saying this Kumārīla is appealing to

the law of transitivity of relations, i.e., for all values of x, y, and z,  $(xRy \ \& \ yRz) \rightarrow xRz$ .

It is useless to assert that inherence can exist without a third thing to unite it with the things in which it exists, while conjunction needs inherence to hold it to things which are in conjunction. The difficulty is not removed by calling one a category and the other a quality. There is no doubt that the relation of binary atomic compound (*dvaṇuka*) to its constituent elements, or of a species to the individuals constituting it, is not the same as the relation of the tablecloth to the table. But the difficulty in both the cases seems to be the same that a relation, however intimate, cannot be identical with the terms related. The argument that there must be this relation between cause and effect is also difficult to accept. If cause and effect are inseparably connected, as Vaiśeṣika admits, then it is far simpler to assume that there is identity of essence between the two. Moreover, the conception of inseparable connection contradicts the idea that the cause precedes the effect, which is an essential feature of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causality. Śaṅkara makes this point in his *Bhāṣya* (II.2.13-17).<sup>6</sup> The cause is capable of separate existence. If *samavāya* is the connection with the cause of the effect which is incapable of separate existence, then, since a connection requires two terms, and the effect as long as it does not exist, cannot be connected with the cause, there can be no *samavāya* relation between the two. It is equally unavailing to say that the effect enters into the connection after it has begun to exist, for, if the Vaiśeṣika admits that the effect may exist previous to its connection with the cause, then it is not incapable of separate existence. The principle that between effect and cause, conjunction and disjunction do not take place is violated. If the effect can exist before entering into connection with the cause, then the subsequent connection of the two is no longer *samavāya*, but only *saṁyoga*. Just as conjunction and not inherence is the connection in which

every substance as soon as it has been produced stands with the all-pervading substances as *ākāśa*, etc., although no motion has taken place on the part of the said substance, so also the connection of the effect with the cause will be conjunction, and not inherence.

We may ask why the Vaiśeṣika emphasizes *sambandha* in its study of Reality. Reality is not a substance or an aggregate of substances which are the subjects of qualities, but *an essential relatedness*, when we find need for analysis and comparison, distinction and identification. The changing world of experience consists of a plurality of existent things standing in a complicated network of relations of all kinds with one another. The Vaiśeṣika has for its aim the representation of the universe as a systematic whole, a harmony of varying members. So long as we are not able to harmonize the jarring elements, we have not reached our logical ideal. The self-contradictory is the unthinkable and yet there are members of the system which we are not able to think together as parts of one whole. To this extent the Vaiśeṣika will have an endorsement from A.N.Whitehead's *The Concept of Nature*.

The Vaiśeṣika points out that experience must have things and relations. Substance, quality and action exist in themselves as also one in the other, and these are bound by a number of relations called *sāmānya* or generic nature, *viśeṣa* or specific marks, and *samavāya* or inseparable connection. Every substance has a generic quality, a specific difference, and with these latter it is bound up by the relation of *samavāya*. The affirmation of the reality of relations is a fundamental necessity for any pluralistic metaphysics. If the relations are unreal, then there can be only one substance in the world called the Absolute; or the world is composed of monads, as in Leibniz, independent absolutes, which are unrelated, windowless, and which can never be related.

The theory of *samavāya* calls for many ramifications. Can we look upon *samavāya* as a connection between two distinct things and yet regard it as of a different kind from *samyoga*? If *samavāya* is distinct from *samyoga*, then the whole is something over and above the parts. The conception of the world as a systematic whole with interrelated elements is the implication of the Vaiśeṣika view of *samavāya*. Is the Vaiśeṣika pluralism final?

The individuality of the innumerable elements is destructive of the individuality of the whole, and so, if the conception of an organized whole implied by the Vaiśeṣika view of *samavāya* (and also *sāmānya*) is to be sustained, the doctrine of individuals will have to be modified. We may recall Bradley. He has argued: "If the many are not each it and beyond it, they have ceased to be many; and, on the other hand, whatever fails to be self-contained is not individual and unique. Hence the particular beings, which, if they were possible, would each be unique, prove to be mere abstractions. And these, because in principle self-discrepant, are unreal, and in the end are senseless" (*Logic*, Vol.II, p.651).

The distinction between the universal and the particular (*jāti* and *vyakti*) are held to be inseparable, since they are bound by the tie of *samavāya*. In other words, the distinction between the two is a distinction in thought, but not a division in reality, and yet, the universals are given an independent existence. They are supposed to survive the destruction of the world, and during *pralaya*, they have for their substratum, time (*kāla*), which is conceived as a real thing (*kālikasambandha*).

Let us take the case of substance and quality. If the substance depends on its qualities, then it is not really independent. Substance is not only united with its qualities by the relation of


*samavāya*, but all substances are united in the same way with the notion of their own class. Śrī Harṣa asks as to why qualities which possess other qualities, like number, should not be included under substances (*khaṇḍana-khaṇḍa-khāḍya*, IV, 3)<sup>7</sup>. The matter is not as simple as it appears. Alexander refuses to call quality a category. Johnson distinguishes adjectives into transitive and intransitive; and transitive adjectives are the relations (*Logic*, vol. I.p.xxxv). The Vaiśeṣika assumes that there can be substance apart from any qualities. But the Vaiśeṣika believes also that a thing would lose its nature if it loses its qualities. Are the two positions reconcilable, when we are repeatedly told that the relation between substance and quality is one of *samavāya*, i.e. one cannot exist without the other? What a substance is, apart from its qualities and behaviour, we cannot hope to know. We define things by their qualities. We speak of a substance as the same at different times only so long as it has the same properties. Locke's problem in this regard is well-known. Sāṃkhya regards substance and quality as possessing the same reality. The Vaiśeṣika wishes the reality of relations to be accepted, but real relatedness is inconsistent with the absolute independence of the related elements. If change and relatedness belong to the very essence of reality, then reality is not an aggregate of simple reals.

## II *Samavāya*: Nyāya, Classical and Modern

System-wise Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya are regarded as *samānatantra*, and often the two systems are coupled together as representing a joined world-view. Together they represent realism and pluralism. The two systems highlight the two aspects of reasoning. The Vaiśeṣika mounts up from particulars (*viśeṣa*) to the general or universal (*sāmānya*), while the Nyāya moves on from the

universal to the particular. One is indirectly inclined, while the other is deductive in thinking. They are two sister systems.


The philosophy of relations occupies an important area of discourse with Nyāya. A great proliferation of relations in Nyāya has been of use in analyzing knowledge of objects in general, and perception specifically. Before we proceed further, let note the variety of relations endorsed by Nyāya:



In Nyāya there occurs a shift in the discourse. In the place of container and contained, we come to have the talk about the qualifier and the qualified, *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*, and appropriate/appre-hension or *viśiṣṭa buddhi*. In the apprehension that the pot is on the floor, *ghaṭavat bhūtaḥ* illustrates the relation between two entities, *ghaṭa* and *bhūta*. This is a case of *saṁyoga*. Again the apprehension that *the boy is intelligent* is so specific that the relata belong together in *samavāya*. No apprehension of entities can be there without being related in some manner.

There is another variety of relation that is similar to reflexivity, i.e., for all values of  $x$ ,  $xRx$ . It is called *svarūpa*

*sambandha*. For example, the potness in the pot, the inherence of the abstract in the concrete belongs to *svarūpa sambandha*. All qualities (*dharma*), except *jāti*, inhere in the qualified. This is true in the case of positive entities (*bhāva padārtha*), and so called *bhāvīya svarūpa*. Accordingly a new classification is made:



The category of *abhāva* resides in its own locus (*adhikaraṇa*) in the form of inherence called *svarūpa sambandha*. For example: the room characterized the absence of the pot: *ghaṭābhāvavat gṛham*. The *abhāva* of the *ghaṭa* in the room inheres in its own nature. *Svarūpa sambandha* is called *viśeṣaṇatā*. In sentences, *idānīm ghaṭaḥ*, the pot at this moment, or *tadānīm ghaṭaḥ*, the pot at that moment is characterized a relation described as *kālika svarūpa* or *kālika viśeṣa-ṇatā*. The pot and the time appear to be apprehended in the form of the contained and the container.

Any object may abide in *saṁyoga* relation with any other object, e.g. the book on the table. And every object abides in *kālika* relation in respect of *mahākāla*, and caused (*janya*) objects also abide in *kālika* relation, except the transcendent and timeless (*nitya*) objects.

Even though *saṁyoga*, *samavāya* and *svarūpa* (both *daiśika* and *kālika*) relations are regarded as *vṛtti niyāmaka*, yet *saṁyoga* is characterized, in the cases of the conjunction of two atoms (*dvaṇuka*), and the connectivity of *manas* with *ātmā* are not so. This is termed as *vṛttya niyāmaka*. Examples of such relation are

*tādātmya*, *viśayatā*, *pratiyogitā*, non-pervasiveness or *avyāpyatva*, *janyatva* (the attribute of being an effect or caused), *janatava* or causal efficaciousness. *Vṛttya niyāmaka* relations are numberless. Some examples may be cited: 'Devadatta is a rich person'. In this case richness implies Devadatta's ownership relation. 'The cognition of a pot' has the *viśayatā* relation between the cognition and the pot. In the case of the pot cognized (*jñāniya ghaṭa*) there is *viśayatā sambandha* of the pot in respect of cognition. In the case of 'Ram's book', Ram stands in the relation of ownership (*svattva*) in respect of the book. In the case of non-presence (*abhāva*) of the pot, non-presence is related to the pot in terms of *pratiyogitā* or *anuyogitā*. In the case of the pot in front (*ayam ghaṭaḥ*), the object in front and the pot are related by *tādātmya* (identity) relationship. All these are instances of *vṛtti niyāmaka* relationship.

Determinate cognition (*viśiṣṭa buddhī*) or savikalpa cognition has three objects: *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣaṇa (prakāra)* and *sambandha*. It can be illustrated in the following manner: Let us take the example of a pot (*ghaṭaḥ*). The cognition of the pot possessing potness (*ghaṭatva*) has for its object, the pot, potness and inherence (*samavāya*). There is *viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* in the pot, and *saṁsargatā* in *samavāya*. The cognition of the pot is *ghaṭa-prakāratā*, *ghaṭaviśeṣyatā* and *samavāya saṁsargatā*. Potness is a class or *jāti*, which inheres in the individual (*vyaktī*) pot. When the pot is there on the floor, the pot resides on the floor in *saṁyoga* mode. *Saṁyoga* relates two objects, and thereby arouses the determinate cognition of two objects. Where does the *saṁyoga* reside? Just as the pot and the floor are related by *saṁyoga*, it is binary, present in both. As a quality (*guṇa*) *saṁyoga* is inherent, it abides in *samavāya* mode as well.

*Samavāya* and other relations abide in their relata in the *svasvarūpa* relationship. The *svarūpa sambandha* resides in their

respective relata reflexively (*sva-sva-sambandhi-svarūpa*). The phrase means that *samavāya* abides in the context of *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*, and does not in any other relation, and that is why is called *svarūpa* or *svasvarūpa sambandha* or relation.

There is another relation called *pariyāpti*. The particle *pari* means proper, and *prāpti* means attainment. *Pariyāpti* is the relation that pervades self-contained (*svāśrayī*) objects as two, three, etc.

Nyāya employs two terms: *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī*, along with *avacchedaka*, and use them with a view to explaining the *samavāya* relation.

It will have been clear by now how important is *samavāya* for Nyāya to build their view of the world and its objects, and also in analyzing on cognitions thereof. Many of the Nyāya theses would have impossible without the concept of *samavāya*. Let us take the case of perception.

In the case of *pratyakṣa* or perception, which Nyāya holds to be two-fold, *niṣprakāraka* and *saprakāraka*. The former is indeterminate, or non-attributive, without the distinction between *that* and *what*, as Bradley would put it. The later is determinate and attributive, exemplified in the cognition that this is something, *idam kiñcit*. Attributive knowledge is determinate apprehension. Nyāya talks about the objective cause (*hetu*) of perceptual knowledge. It results from the contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the sense organs with the object of knowledge (*artha*). Such *hetu* is six-fold: namely, *saṁyoga* or conjunction, *saṁyukta samavāya* or inherence with the conjoint, *saṁyukta samaveta samavāya*, i.e., inherent union with the inherent which is conjoint; *samavāya* or inherence, and *samaveta samavāya* or inherent union with the inherence. Lastly,

there is *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa bhāvaḥ* relation of the attribute with the subject.<sup>8</sup>

The case that is taken for analysis is the perception of a pot. The first operative cause is the contact, producing perception of the pot by the eye. This is so in all cases. The self (*ātman*) comes in contact with mind (*manas*), the mind with the organ (*indriya*), and organ with the object (*viśaya*), and the perceptual knowledge takes place. For Nyāya, direct perception is always dependent on some relation between *indriya* and an *artha* (object). This relation is the operative cause in bringing about cognition.

The second operative cause, in the case of the colour (*rūpa*) of the pot inherent in the pot, is called *saṁyukta samavāya*. The inherent union with the conjoint is the contact in producing the perception of colour of a pot, since the colour is inherently united with the pot which is in contact with the eye. Inherent union with the conjoint is exemplified by *ghaṭarūpa*. The process is explained by saying *cakṣuḥ saṁyukte*. The colour is ultimately united with the pot which is conjoined with the organ. Hence the contact of the eye with the colour of the pot is *saṁyukta samavāya*.

The third operative cause is called *saṁyukta samaveta samavāya*. Inherent union with the intimately united is the contact in producing the perception of the universal genus colourness (*rūpatva*). As colour is inherently united with the pot that is conjoint with the ocular organ, and the genus colourness is inherently united therewith. The eye is in contact with the pot which is intimately united, the colour of the pot which is inhered in its genus. *Ghaṭarūpatva* is, therefore, perceived by the eye by means of the contact *saṁyukta samaveta samavāya*.

The next is the perception of sound (*śabda*) as the fourth operative cause mentioned as *samavāyaḥ sannikarṣa*. In the case of *śabda sāḅātākāra*, or apprehension of sound, inherent union is the contact in the perception of word by the organ of hearing. The organ of hearing is taken to be the ether (*ākāśa*) in the cavity of the ear (*karṇavivaravarti ākāśa*). Sound being the quality of ether, the quality and the qualified is inherently united. Nyāya appeals to the principle of *vīcītaranganyāya*. In the sea one wave propels another, till the first and all the subsequent waves reach the shore. In a similar manner, there is a successive operation in the case of the production of sound till they reach the auditory orifice. With the help of this analogy, Nyāya explains how a distant sound comes in contact with the auditory sense.

What happens in the case of *śabdatva sāḅātākāra*? Inherent union with the inherently united is the contact in cognizing soundness, as the genus soundness is inherently united with sound which is inherently united with the auditory sense. The example of inherent union with the intimately united is by the term *śabdatva*. The position is *śabde śabdatvasya samavāyāt*.

More implicated is the perception of non-existence of the object of apprehension. This is explained in terms of *vīśeṣaṇa-vīśeṣyabhāvaḅ sannikarṣa*. The case taken for analysis is: *ghaṭābhāvāvad bhūtaḅ ityatra*: this spot of earth is with the negation of the pot. The floor of the earth is in contact with the eye. The non-presence of the pot is the attribute of the floor of the earth, *bhūtaḅ*. The connection of the qualifier and the qualified is the conjunction in the perception of absence. The spot or floor of the earth is *with* the absence (or negation) of the pot qualified and the absence of the pot is the attribute. In this cognition, the eye is in contact with the spot of earth of which the negation or absence of the pot is the attribute, and, therefore, the connection is contact

with the attribute. Further, the connection is the contact with the qualified. Both these cognitions, though differing in form, are identical in meaning. They are conjointly expressed as *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāvaḥ*. With the contact of the eye with the spot of the earth in the two cognitions, the negation or absence either on account of its possessing the property of *viśeṣya* or of *viśeṣaṇa* becomes perceived on the spot of the earth. The relation between the spot of earth and the absence of the pot is no other than *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāvaḥ*.

There is, of course, a scope of *tarka*. If the spot were on the ground one should be seeing it right now. But I do not see the pot. This thought brings in the awareness of the absence of the pot on the ground. The existence of the *pratiyogī* (counter entity) of the absence of apprehension is an important item in the entire explanations.

It remains now to be seen how Nyāya employs the notion of *samavāya* in its explanation of the cause and effect relationship. The idea of cause is as *kāryaniyatapūrvavṛtti* <sup>9</sup> In order to escape the under and over shooting the mark in the alleged definition of *kāraṇa*, Nyāya reformulates it in terms of the further component of *ananyathāsiddha*. The phrase means that which does not depend for its invariable existence upon some other antecedent existing thing. The absence of dispensable antecedents is *ananyathāsiddha*.

*Ananyathāsiddhatva*<sup>10</sup> (the dispensable antecedence in the production of a thing) is said to be threefold, of which the first is *samavāya sambandha*. Things that are connected to inherent relation with the cause, it becomes the antecedents to effect through them. For instance, the colour of yarn (*tanturūpa*) and the generic attribute of yarn (*tantutva*) which are intimately united with

yarn, are antecedents to its effect, viz. a piece of cloth. Both *tanturūpa* and *tantutva* are examples for a variety of *ananyathāsiddha*.

Again, a cause is said to be *samavāya asamavāyī nimitta bhedāt*<sup>1</sup>, it is either inherent or non-inherent. We ignore the *nimitta kāraṇa* in the present context, and concentrate on the *samavāyī* and *asamavāyī* varieties of causes. Taking the example of production of a piece of cloth, it is held that yarn is the inherent cause; the contact between two yarns is the non-inherent cause. In the terminology of Western Logic, one may be said to be the sufficient condition ( $p \rightarrow q$ ), while the other, the necessary condition ( $\sim p \rightarrow \sim q$ ). Inherent cause is always a substance; non-inherent cause must be either a quality or an action and nothing else. *Samavāyī kāraṇa* is defined as that inhering in which an effect emerges. The yarn constitutes the intimate cause of its effect cloth is *samavāyī kāraṇa*, because cloth is connected with the yarns by inherent union. Similarly the colour on the piece of cloth being a quality, resides in the cloth by intimate relation. Therefore, the piece of cloth is the inherent cause of the colour on it.

Again, *tantusamyoga* inheres in yarn with cloth which is the effect of the contact of yarns. Thus both the cloth and the *tantusamyoga* hold in the same substratum, i.e., *tantus*. Therefore, *tantusamyoga* is the non-inherent cause to cloth. The allied idea of *karaṇa* is sometimes understood in *sādhakatā*. Keśava Miśra does it in his *Tarkabhāṣā*. He says that *karaṇa* as *sādhakatā* is the most immediate cause in bringing about an effect, that is to say, it is the most efficient cause. This does not concern us directly. But it should be added that modern Nyāya holds *karaṇa* to be a cause which is most essential in producing a result and without the activity of which the effect is not produced in spite of the other causes being present. But the ancient followers of Nyāya define *karaṇa* as

*vyāpāravat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karaṇam*,<sup>12</sup> i.e., *karaṇa* is a special and operative cause. *Vyāpāra* is an operation which, not being a substance; is the product of a thing, and produces the effect of that thing. That which is known as *vyāpāra* by the ancient Naiyāyikas is called as *karaṇa* by the modern ones.

What makes the admission of *samavāya* necessary? Viśvanātha in the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* gives a proof of the eternity of relation conceived as *samavāya*. The notion is that a thing is possessed of qualities (*viśeṣya*), a qualifying adjunct (*viśeṣaṇa*), and a relation between the two, because it is the notion of a qualified entity, as in the case of the notion of the qualified entity.<sup>13</sup> In the example of *dandī puruṣa*, a man holding a staff the relation cannot be *saṁyoga*, we have to accept *samavāya*. It cannot be urged that this is virtually the relation of selfsameness (*svarūpa*), and so it is merely proving something already established or something different from *samavāya*. For it is cumbrous to assume an infinite number of selfsamenesses, varying with each object. Therefore, for the sake of *lāghava*, *samavāya* is to be admitted.

Viśvanātha gives a succinct statement as regards the role of *samavāya* in perception in terms of the *sambandha* between *viśaya* and *indriya*:

*dravya-grahastu saṁyogāt saṁyukta-samavāyataḥ //*  
*dravyeṣu samavetānām tathā tat-samavāyataḥ /*  
*tatrāpi samavetānām śabdasya samavāyataḥ. //*<sup>14</sup>

This is what distinguishes Nyāya from Vaiśeṣika. The later contends that *samavāya* is not perceptible. This is so, since the perception of relation depends on the simultaneous perception of all the individual substratums, past, present, and future of that

relation, which is impossible. Nyāya, in the context of the perception of non-existence as well as of inherence, holds that attributiveness (*viśeṣaṇatā*) of what is related to the organ is the *hetu* or cause. For Vaiśeṣika *samavāya* is inferred, while for Nyāya it is perceived in terms of *sannikarṣa* of a special sort. Nyāya admits a host of *viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-bhāva sannikarṣa*, uses it to explain the possibility of perceiving *samavāya*.

It will be interesting to note the inference for *samavāya*. In the *Dīpikā*, the inference in the following form: '*nīlo ghaṭaḥ*' *iti viśiṣṭapratītiḥ viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇasambandhaviśayā viśiṣṭapratyatvāt. daṇḍītipratyayavaditi samavāyasiddhiḥ*.<sup>15</sup> The *nīla* means blue coloured, and stands for an attribute of a pot, *nīla ghaṭa itī viśiṣṭabuddhiḥ guṇavāna ghaṭa ityādī viśiṣṭabuddhiḥ*. *Ityādī* is to be taken for *kriyāvāna ghaṭa*, *jātimāna ghaṭa*, *ghaṭavat kapalam* and *viśeṣyavāna paramāṇuḥ*. All these are specific apprehensions. In the *anumāna* process, *guṇavāna ghaṭa* is the *pakṣa*; *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandha viśayatvaṁ* is the *sādhyā* and *viśiṣṭabuddhitvaṁ* is the *hetu*. And *daṇḍīpuruṣa* is the *udāharaṇa*, it is also a *viśiṣṭabuddhi*.

*Sarṁyoga* resides both in *guṇa* and *ghaṭa*, the stick and the person holding it and point to the existence of *samavāya*. For Nyāya, *samavāya* is capable of being apprehended by all the sense-organs: *sarvendriyagrāhya*. Through the perception of the relata, inherence of them also is perceived.

In philosophies like Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā and others *tādātmya* is accepted in lieu of *samavāya*. In those instances *tādātmya* means *bhedābheda*. For Nyāya, *tādātmya* means *abheda*. Nyāya argues that *bhedābheda* is contradictory, and cannot reside in the same locus (*adhikaraṇa*).

## Notes and References

1. "*ihedamiti yataḥ kāryakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*"- *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra* 7-2- 26, Kaṇāda (40), p, 158.
2. *Prāśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-9.
3. "*yutasiddhiḥ pṛthaksiddhiḥ, pṛthagavasthitirubhayorapi sambandhinoḥ parasparaparihāreṇa pṛthagāśrayāśrayitvam, sāvayornāsti tāvayutasiddhau, toyoḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ. Yathā tantu-ptaṭayoḥ*".- Śrīdhara (57), p. 37.
4. The relata of inherence are said to be inseparable in the sense that they are conceived to exist in the substratum-superstratum position occupying the same point of space.
5. *samavāyaviyogācca viśeṣa syāt parasparaṁ / tatvalaptānavasthā syāt tasya tasyānyasaṅgātaḥ //148// atha tasyatmarūpatvānnā anyasambandhakalpanā/ abhedātsamavāyostu svarūpaṁ dharmadharminoḥ //149//* -Kumārīla Bhaṭṭa, *Ślokavārttika*.
6. "*samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmīyādanavasthiteḥ*."-2.2.13.  
"*nityameva ca bhāvāt*".-2.2.14.  
"*rūpādimaccvācca viparyayo darśanāt*."-2.2.15.  
"*ubhayathā ca doṣāt*."-2.2.16.  
"*aparigrahāccātvaṅtamanapekṣā*".-2.2.17.
7. *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khāḍya*- IV,3,p. 529,Ganganatha Jha.
8. *Tarkasamgraha*,- Annambhaṭṭa.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.

12. *Nyāyasūtra*, -Gautama.
13. "*guṇa-kriyādi-viśiṣṭa-buddhirviśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sambandhaviṣayā-viśiṣṭabuddhitvāt daṇḍī puruṣa iti viśiṣṭabuddhivadityanumānam.*"-*Bhāṣāpariccheda*, 11.
14. Ibid. 59-60.
15. *Tarkasamgraha Dīpikā*- Annambhaṭṭa.

## Chapter-5

### Definitions of *Samavāya*

In the Vaiśeṣika scheme of categories (*padārtha*) are employed to describe the reality of the empirical world, the Vaiśeṣikas avow seven categories of which inherence or *samavāya* as the sixth category. *Samavāya* is one kind of relation. The first five categories are the relata of this type of relation. There are so many relations like conjunction, self-relation, etc. which are included in the five categories except *samavāya*. *Samavāya* itself is not the relatum of the relation of *samavāya*. It is admitted as a separate category like other five categories.

In *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, Kaṇāda defines *samavāya* as '*ihedamiti yataḥ kāryyakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*<sup>1</sup>. Śaṅkara Miśra, in his '*Upaskāra*' says that in the above *sūtra* the relation between cause and effect and uncaused and non-effect means 'this subsists in this abode'; and also means the relation of inseparable entities<sup>2</sup>. There are causal relation in between non-eternal substance and non-eternal quality, between non-eternal substance and action, between *avayava* and *avayavī* and between eternal substance and non-eternal quality. This follows the phrase '*kāryyakāraṇayoḥ*'. But in between substance and substancehood, between quality and quality-hood, between action and actionhood, between eternal substance and eternal quality, and between eternal substance and particularity; there is no causal relation. But according to Vaiśeṣikas, in all such cases, inherence exists. For this, they admit the term '*ayutasiddha*' to denote the relation of *samavāya*.

Praśastapāda defines *samavāya* in this way that '*ayutasiddhānāmādhāryyādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyaya-hetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*'<sup>3</sup>, i.e. *samavāya* is such a type of relation which holds the awareness of the substratum and the superstratum that are inseparable entities. Śridhara, in his '*Nyāyakandali*', illustrates each term of the definition of *samavāya* which are as under. In this definition, there are four terms like '*ayutasiddhānām*', '*ādhāryyādhārabhūtānām*;', '*ihapratyayahetuḥ*' and '*sambandha*'. If the term '*ayutasiddhānām*', would not be added, the relation of contact (*saṃyoga*) would be included, e.g. the relation between a glass and water consists in between the substratum and the superstratum, 'the water is in the glass', i.e. 'this subsists in this abode' and a mere relation which belongs to separable entities. But if the term '*ayutasiddhānām*' is added, it would not be *ativyāpti* in the contact relation; because the terms 'glass' and 'water' are *yutasiddha* or separable entities which belongs to *saṃyoga*. But the relation between the colour and the pot is *ayutasiddha*; because the colour and the pot do not exist in separate location leaving one from another<sup>4</sup>. This type of relation is called *samavāya*.

Again, if we exclude the term '*ādhāryyādhārabhūtānām*' from the definition of *samavāya* laid by Praśastapāda, in the causal relation between happiness or *dharma* and unhappiness or *adharma*, we see that they belong to the soul, but they would not be the locus of the substratum and the superstratum; although they are inseparable entities, yet it cannot be said that it is *samavāya*<sup>5</sup>. If so, it would be *ativyāpti*. In order to resist the fault of *ativyāpti*, the term '*ādhār-yyādhārabhūtānām*' is included in the definition of *samavāya*.

Again, if we say '*ayutasiddhānāmādhāryyādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha sa samavāyaḥ*', the definition would be *ativyāpti*;

because there is a relation of 'vācya-vācaka' in between sky and sound<sup>6</sup>. They are inseparable entities, the substratum and the superstratum and also the relation. But in the relation between sky and sound, sound is in the sky i.e. 'it is here' cannot be said at all. So if we exclude the term '*ihapratyayahetuḥ*', it would again fall the fault of *ativyāpti*.

Lastly, if we exclude the term '*sambandha*' from this definition of *samavāya* then it would fall the fallacy of *ativyāpti*. As the relation between the colour and the pot is like *ayutasiddha*, '*ādhāryyādhāra-bhūtānām*' and '*ihapratyayahetuḥ*' and also '*sambandha*' and for this it is called *samavāya*. But the two relata i.e. the colour and the pot, they are *ayutasiddha*, *ādhār-ādheya* and *ihapratyayahetuḥ*; but they are not *sambandha* by themselves. But whenever we say to them as *sambandha*, the relation will be judged as *samavāya*.

Udayana, in his '*Kirañāvalī*', defines inherence as '*ayutasiddhānām sambandhaḥ*'. The term '*ādhāryyādhārabhūtānām*' is alternative term of '*ayutasiddhānām*'. Again, the term '*ihapratyayahetuḥ*' is the proof of inherence, nothing more. Udayana says that whatever is inseparable is proved as eternal relation. He admits as '*nityaprāptiḥsamavāyaḥ*'<sup>7</sup>. It means eternal relation. So the two inseparable entities belong to eternal relation, like *samavāya*, but conjunction or *saṁyoga* is not eternal relation.

Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, in his '*Prakāśatikā*', illustrates the term '*ayutasiddha*' in a crucial manner. He admits that if the two different categories are related and proved that a category cannot be detached from other category then that relation is called *ayutasiddha*. If two different categories are proved separately, yet they are related and may exist separately, that cannot be said as

*ayutasiddha*. For example, in case of conjunction, the two relata may be related and proved and may exist separately. For this, the conjunction is not called *ayutasiddha*. So substance and quality are two different categories and their difference is proved. The relation between substance and its quality is called *samavāya*.

When one relatum is under another relatum, whenever one relatum will not be ruined, another relatum would exist. But when the substratum is destroyed then the superstratum would be destroyed. In this case one category remains out of the other. So, except destruction, the two inseparable entities remain always jointly.

Visvanātha, in his *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, also avows the inseparable entities as inherence or *samavāya*. But he does not give any definition of *samavāya* in '*Bhāṣāpariccheda*'. Yet in his *Muktāvalī*, he gives a definition of *samavāya* as '*samavāyatvaṁ nityasambandhatvaṁ*', i.e. *samavāya* is an eternal relation. If *samavāya* is said as *sambandha* then it goes *ativyāpti* in conjunction. But according to the Vaiśeṣika, the conjunction is the non-eternal relation. On the other hand, *samavāya* is eternal relation. Again, if we admit *samavāya* as '*nityapadārtha*' then it goes to soul etc. which are *nitya* and that would be *ativyāpti*. The soul etc. is eternal but not relation at all. For this, *samavāya* is called '*nityasambandha*'. But '*nityasambandhatva*' cannot be the real definition of *samavāya*. According to the Vaiśeṣika, as conjunction (*saṁyoga*) and inherence (*samavāya*) are relations, self-relation is also a kind of relation. This type of relation has also *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī*. But there is a difference between conjunction and self-relation relating their *anuyogins* and *pratiyogins*. In case of conjunction, their *anuyogins* and *pratiyogins* are to be apart from conjunction; whereas in case of self-relation, either it is related to its *anuyogī* or to its *pratiyogī*. For example, if we say that 'there is

the absence of the colour in the sky', the relation between the absence of the colour and the sky is self-relation which is always related as *anuyogī*. Again, in case of absolute absence, the relation between absolute absence and its non-existence is self-relation which is always related to its *pratiyogī*. So if we admit *samavāya* as 'nityasambandhatva', it goes *ativyāpti* in self-relation. In eternal sky etc., the absolute absence of the soul exists in eternal self-relation. So the definiens of *samavāya* must be eternal relation without any relatedness. It can be granted that the definiens of *samavāya* is 'sambandhi bhinnatve sati nityasambandhatvam'.

### ***Samavāya* as eternal and one**

According to the Vaiśeṣika, *samavāya* is eternal and one. But why is *samavāya* called eternal and one? To answer this question, the Vaiśeṣikas face an army of critics. Generally, if the two relata of a relation are non-eternal, the relation itself would be non-eternal and if the two relata of a relation are eternal, the relation would be eternal. The relation between a bird and a tree is non-eternal. This relation is called as conjunction. Again, the absolute absence of the colour in the sky belongs to a relation as eternal relation. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, all the relata of *samavāya* are either eternal or non-eternal. There are five places where *samavāya* exists; such as in between substance and quality, substance and action, universal and individual, *avayava* and *avayavī* and eternal substance and particularity. Substances are earth, water, fire, atoms of air and *avayavī* substances made by atoms, sky, time, space, soul and mind; they are eternal. The quality is divided into two: eternal and non-eternal. Action is non-eternal. Universal and particular are eternal. So atoms, sky, time, soul and mind, eternal quality, universal and particular are the eternal relata of *samavāya*. On the other hand, *dvyañukas* etc. *avayavīs*, non-eternal quality and action

are the non-eternal relata of inherence. In inherence between the non-eternal substances, non-eternal qualities and non-eternal action and their universals; the *anuyogī* relata are non-eternal but the *pratiyogī* relata are eternal. On the other hand, in case of eternal substances and eternal qualities or eternal substances and particulars, the relata of inherence are eternal. Now the question may arise: how can inherence always be eternal? To answer this question, Praśastapāda says that *samavāya* is always eternal because it has no cause<sup>8</sup>. As essence, substancehood, etc. have no cause and for this, they are eternal; so as *samavāya* has no cause, it is eternal. Whatever uncaused or *anādi* is eternal. As *samavāya* is uncaused positive category, it is eternal. On the other hand, conjunction is with-caused because all the relata of a conjunction are the *samavāyī kāraṇa*. So the conjunction is non-eternal. Though there are some relata of inherence as non-eternal, yet they are not either *samavāyī kāraṇa* or *asamavāyī kāraṇa* and even all the eternal relata are not also the *samavāyī* or *asamavāyī kāraṇas*. For this, though the relata are either eternal or non-eternal, yet *samavāya* is always eternal.

According to the Vaiśeṣika, *samavāya* is one. But the question may arise: how can *samavāya* exist as one in both eternal and non-eternal relata? To answer this question, Praśastapāda says that as there can be the same reality<sup>9</sup> in substance, quality and action, *samavāya* can also exist as one among the five categories such as substance, quality, active, universal and particular. These five categories are either *anuyogī* or *pratiyogī* of the *samavāya* but there is no change of *samavāya* as one. Now another question may arise: if *samavāya* is one in all circumstances<sup>10</sup> and though the *samavāya* of substance and substancehood, quality and qualityhood and action and actionhood is possible, why it would not be possible to get the cognition of *samavāya* in between substance and qualityhood. To

answer this question, Praśastapāda says that on the basis of the rule of '*ādhārādheya*', there is no cognition of quality hood in substance. The '*ādhāra*' as substance belongs to the '*ādheya*' as substancehood. Again, in case of *samavāya* in between substance and quality, quality is '*ādhāra*' and substance is '*ādheya*'.

Visvanātha says that as *sparśasamavāya* and *rūpasamavāya* are the same, so *rūpatva* may go inherently in the air. In the air, *sparśa* exists as the relation of *samavāya*. But Visvanātha argues that though *sparśasamavāya* and *rūpasamavāya* are the same, yet there is no *vyañjaka* of *rūpa* in the air. For this, there may not be the cognition of *rūpasamavāya* in the air.

## Notes and references

1. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*.- vii.2.26.
2. "...*asambaddhayovidyamānatvamayutasiddhiḥ*..."-Śaṅkara Miśra (40), p. 159.
3. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, 2.2.9.
4. "*yutasiddhiḥ pṛthaksiddhiḥ, pṛthagavasthitirubhayorapi sambandhinoḥ parasparaparihāreṇa pṛthagāśrayāśrayitvam, sā yoyornāsti tāvayutasiddhau, toyoḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ. Yathā tantupaṭayoḥ*".- Śrīdhara (57), p. 37.

The relata of inherence are said to be inseparable in the sense that they are conceived to exist in the substratum-superstratum position occupying the same point of space.

5. "*ayutasiddhayoḥ sambandha ityucyamāne dharmasya sukhasya ca yaḥ kāryyakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ, soḥpi samavāyaḥ prāpnotī*".- Ibid., p. 38.
6. "*vācyavācakabhāvena ca vyabhicārāt*".-Vyomaśiva (58), p. 108.  
Udayana also has touched the point:  
".....*vācyavācakādibhāvalakṣaṇasambandho na prasajyate. Etadeva spaṣṭayati-ādhāryyādhārabhūtānāmitī*".-Udayana (71), Vol. 1. p. 251.
7. "*prāptā eva santinā prāptā iti yāvat. teṣāṃ sambandhaḥ prāptilakṣaṇaḥ. tena saṃyogo vyavacchinnastasyāprāptipūrvakatvāt. Tathāca nityaprāptiḥ samavāya iti lakṣaṇaṃ sūcitam*".-Ibid., p. 249.
8. "*sambandhyanityatveḥpi na saṃyogavadanityatvaṃ bhāvavadakāraṇatvāt*".- Praśastapāda (57), p. 782.
9. "*bhāvavallīṅgāviśeṣād*".-Ibid.,p. 777.
10. "*tasmād bhāvavat sarvatraikaḥ samavāya itī*".-Ibid.

## Chapter-6

### Some Arguments in favour of *Samavāya*

We now propose to consider some leading arguments in favour of *samavāya*. Earlier we discussed some critical views and arguments supporting the nature and admissibility of *samavāya*. Presently, we note review arguments offered by such thinkers as Vallabha and Gaṅgeśa.

#### I

Vallabha is a strong supporter of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy. In the *Nyāya-Līlavatī*, he offers some favourable arguments about the reality of inherence (*samavāya*). The Nyāya-view of inherence is that perception is the proof of inherence, whereas the Vaiśeṣika-view is the inferential cognition of inherence<sup>1</sup>. Now the question may arise whether perception or inference can at all be taken as a proof of inherence.

The Nyāya-view that perceptual cognition like 'relation between a jar and its colour' affords the evidence of the existence of inherence<sup>2</sup>. But Vallabha shows that perception cannot be the proof of inherence offering some arguments against the Nyāya-view<sup>3</sup>. First, if the perception is the proof of inherence, inherence would be as the ground of awareness of the substratum<sup>4</sup>. But in that condition inherence may be endured as accountable for the cognition of the substratum in both of its relata. Secondly, if the perception is the proof of inherence, inherence would be as the ground of awareness of the superstratum<sup>5</sup>. But in that condition inherence may be endured as accountable for the cognition of the

superstratum in both of its relata. Thirdly, if the perception is the proof of inherence, inherence would be as the ground of awareness of both the substratum and the superstratum<sup>6</sup>. But in that condition inherence may be endured accountable for both the cognition of the substratum and the cognition of the superstratum in both of its relata.

Further, if one says that inherence is proved by perception cognizing the knot between a universal and the individual having that universal. But this supposition is not strong enough to stand. If inherence is perceived, inherence is cognized as related with a universal and the individual having that universal<sup>7</sup>. But Vallabha argues that it ultimately leads to infinite regress<sup>8</sup>; because if so, in that case another relation is to be assumed by which inherence, it may be related with them. Secondly, if inherence is perceived, it is cognized as related with the quality and the substance having the quality, etc<sup>9</sup>. But in that case inherence belongs to the quality and the substance having that quality only; not between a universal and the individual having that universal<sup>10</sup>. Thirdly, if inherence is perceived, it is cognized as a mere relation<sup>11</sup>. But in that case no relation is, in fact, perceived. Vallabha remarks that the cognition of a relation as a mere relation without any reference to its relata is a ridiculous case<sup>12</sup>; because a relation is invariably and necessarily known with reference to its relata and can be the object of knowledge. So a relation as 'a mere relation' cannot be accepted at all.

Vallabha now proceeds to examine a number of traditional inferences. They are as follows:

(1) The cognition 'it is here' proves the inferential ground in favour of the existence of inherence, according to the traditional

view<sup>13</sup>. Inherence is said to be inferred from the cognition 'it is here', because the cognition like 'the cloth is in its threads' cannot be reckoned for until and unless a relation is assumed to exist in between the cloth and the threads. For example, 'the bird is on the tree' is explained on the basis of the relation of conjunction. Similarly, the cognition like 'the cloth is in its threads' is to be explained on the basis of some relation. It cannot be the relation of conjunction; because it is contingent. But the relation between the cloth and its threads is not so.

Vallabha says that as a foundation of the inference of inherence the cognition of 'it is here' is not enough; because it cannot be perceived. If not, inherence cannot be the object of the cognition 'it is here'; because it can not endure to be the prabans through which inherence may be inferred. One may argue here that if it cannot be endure to be the prabans, a relation other than inherence like substratum-super stratum relation may be perceived which may be said to be an object of that cognition. But Vallabha argues that this is not arguable mainly for two reasons:

(a) If another relation is required to establish the relation of substratum-super stratum, it will go *ad infinitum*<sup>14</sup>.

(b) In that case if the substratum-super stratum relation is an object, it may endure to be the prabans that can be inferred only, not the inherence, and it will go the defect of admitting something else<sup>15</sup>.

Thus, by no means the cognition 'it is here' can serve as the foundation for the inference of inherence.

(2) Vallabha examines another traditional view about the inference of inherence on the basis of the cognition of something as

determined by universal, etc<sup>16</sup>. When a substance is cognized as determined by quality or by action or by universal, a relation between the determinans and the determinant is inferred. For example, if the term 'man' is determined by the term 'man-ness', the inherence is inferred as the relation between the 'man' and 'man-ness'. But this argument does not appear to be a sound one for two reasons:

(a) If inherence can be made from any cognition of the determinan-determinant cases, another relation other than inherence may be inferred from it, for instance, if we say that 'there is no bird on the tree'; here the absence of a bird is cognition of the determined. There is a relation between the absence of a bird as the determinans and the tree as the determinant. Here is a relation, but that relation is called as self-relation, not inherence. So the cognition of the determined ultimately stands as the proof of a relation other than inherence<sup>17</sup>.

(b) If one argues that the relation between the determinans and the determinant is the cause of the cognition of the determined it goes further the same relation as self-relation. So inherence inferred through certain cognitions of the determined cannot prove the existence of inference at all<sup>18</sup>.

Vallabha, thus, ultimately shows that neither the cognition 'it is here' (*ihetibuddhi*), nor the cognition of something as determined by universal, etc. (*jātyādiviśiṣṭapratyaya*) can perform as a solid foundation for the inference of inherence. Besides, he introduces the third prabans as an uncontradicted usage of 'the determined'. But the determined relation fails to prove the inferential inherence; rather it goes to some other relation like 'the jar is on the ground', and nothing more.

If we take as 'the usage as determined by universal, etc.' which is uncontradicted usage of 'the determined' which has only the positive entities as its objects; the term 'usage' may be used in two senses as 'the ground is determined by the jar' follows from a relation, whereas an uncontradicted usage of 'the determined' has only the positive entities as its objects. For this, the usage as determined by universal, etc. like 'the man is determined by manness'- may be assumed to chase from a relation. So in the first case, the usage chases from the relation of conjunction, the locus of which can be substance alone, while in the second case, the usage chases from the relation of inherence which endures between all the positive categories excepting itself.

Now the word '*viśiṣṭapratyaya*' or the cognition of the determined is replaced here by the word '*viśiṣṭavyavahāra*' or the usage of 'the determined'. The word '*pratyaya*' means only the cognition, whereas the word '*vyavahāra*' means cognition as it expressed in language. The expression, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, always presupposes cognition.

The central point of the above inference, however, is that without the knowledge of any relation the usage of 'the determined' is not possible. But the opponent may say that the knowledge of some relation is not much needed for the usage of 'the determined'. In case of the usage of 'the determined', there is needed for the cognition like 'the ground is without a jar', 'the absence of the jar' and 'the ground are the objects'. Having them as the objects of the cognition are to be needed much more causes of them; so there is no need of bringing any relation for the usage of 'the determined'<sup>19</sup>.

Now Vallabha enquires the need of the inference of inherence on the basis of the pervasiveness of the relation over the usage<sup>20</sup>.

The usages like 'the ground is determined by the jar' may plead in favour of the above demand. Firstly, he shows that the relation between the ground and the jar is in first place seen as the relation of perceptual cognition as a relation of conjunction and in the second stage, it is seen as there is a role of some relation in those cases where such usage occurs without the perception of any relation. For, when we say that 'a man' is determined by 'man-ness', Vallabha concedes that no relation like inherence between man-ness and the man is perceived. So this type of relation between man-ness and the man must be inherence and it is known through inference.

One may argue that if the relation between man-ness and the man is inherence, the relation between the ground and absence of a jar would be inherence also. But Vallabha argues that if so, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, only a positive entity can have its inherent cause<sup>21</sup>. But the absence of a jar has no more a positive entity. Again, another problem may be raised if the relation between the ground and absence of a jar would be inherence, the destruction of the absence of a jar would be cause of the destruction of the ground which is absurd.

Thus, Vallabha comes to the conclusion that as there is no proof of inherence like perception; inference must be the proof of inherence.

## II

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, Gaṅgeśa, in his chapter on *samavāyavāda* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, initiates a doubt whether the relation avowing between the determinans (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the determinant (*viśeṣya*) is the object of the cognitions like 'the red pot', or not. He admits that the cognitions of the determinans and

the determinant are to be well admitted but the relation between them either exists or not<sup>22</sup>.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits three objects like the determinans (*viśeṣaṇa*), the determinant (*viśeṣya*) and the relation between the above two (*saṁsarga*) in connection with the inherence (*samavāya*). But the third kind of object like the relation between the above two (*saṁsarga*), Gaṅgeśa endorses whether it would have any viability to admit it as a separate object. For instance, when we say about 'a red pot', the determinans (*viśeṣaṇa*) is 'red', the determinant (*viśeṣya*) is 'pot' that are the objects of the cognitions; but the relation between the above two (*saṁsarga*) would not be determined as the object of cognition.

In order to extradite the doubt that Gaṅgeśa takes at the starting of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), he admits the help of this kind of inferences: the cognition like 'a red pot', etc. has the relation between the determinans and the determinant as its object, because it is a qualificatory cognition<sup>23</sup>. In this inference, the subject (*pakṣa*) is the cognition like 'a red pot', etc.; the prabandum (*sādhya*) is 'having the determinans-the determinant relation as the object'; and the prabans (*hetu*) is 'being a qualificatory cognition'. It serves the determinans-the determinant relation as the object of qualificatory cognition. The cognition like 'a red pot' holds the relation between the red colour and the pot that is objectified along with the red colour and the pot (*samuhālabana-jñāna*) and the cognition of the red pot (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) is left unexplained. The two cognitions are different in nature in this sense that the former is non-qualificatory cognition, while the latter is qualificatory cognition. But Gaṅgeśa raises further a problem that if so, in case of inferences like 'the ground without a pot', etc., though it is a qualificatory cognition, yet no relation would be the object of these

cognitions. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, this type of relation belongs to the self-relation (*svarūpasambandha*), not to inherence (*samavāya*); because in this type of inference, a bar plays a role. So the absence of bar (*bādhakābhāva*) is the criteria of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and in this way the first problem is easily removed.

Again, the opponent may argue against the proof of inherence as the absence of bar in this way that if so, it cannot be said that inherence is the object of the qualificatory cognition; because as the absence of bar is a proof of inherence, since inherence is yet to be proved, the absence of its proof may stand as a bar against having inherence as the object<sup>24</sup>.

But Gaṅgeśa argues that the second problem is also solved by two reasons:

(a) If inherence would be argued that as it cannot be judged as the object of the qualificatory cognition because of non-existence of bar; there is no proof of inherence. But if it is accepted to be known as inherence must be objected.

(b) If the cognition is said to be qualificatory cognition for its having inherence as an object and a cognition is said to have inherence as its object in order to be qualificatory cognition, it falls into circular fallacy. So it cannot be said that inherence is the object of cognition.

Now a question may arise what the status of the relation between the determinans and the determinant that are the objects of that relation is; because the opponents give their response to the view of the determinans-determinant as the objects of the cognition. Gaṅgeśa tries to give his view against the opponents'

requirement that there must be some relation; but it is neither (a) a conjunction, nor (b) inherence, nor (c) a mere relation, nor (d) determinant relation<sup>25</sup>.

(a) Conjunction does not belong to the relation in between the determinans and the determinant, which is an object of the qualificatory cognition. It endures solely between two substances. But qualificatory cognition bases on the determinans and the determinant which are neither substance. For instance, 'a green colour' as determined by green-ness which is a universal, i.e., determinans, and the determinant as the green colour which is a quality cannot possess any substance. So the relation cannot be conjunction.

(b) It is not inherence, because when we say 'the ground is without a pot', the absence of the pot is the determinans, the ground is the determinant and also it is qualificatory cognition, but the relation cannot be admitted as inherence.

(c) It cannot be admitted as a mere relation, because as it is proved as relation before, it cannot be counted as a proof of relation. If so, it falls in the fault of 'assertion of the asserted'.

(d) It cannot be said that the relation which is qualificatory cognition is responsible of that cognition. In this inference like 'the ground is without a pot', the determinant (*niyāmaka*) relation is self-relation; the self-relation is generally responsible for any qualificatory cognition. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is that it is inherence, but the opponent's view is that it may be called as inherence but ultimately it is self-relation. But if so, it will fall a defect called 'assertion of something else'.

Thus, Gaṅgeśa reckons with the opponent's view that the inference produced as a proof of inherence ultimately stands nowhere. He suggests that the probandum of inference would be the adjective, *sambandhibhinnatva*; being different from the relata. The inference is made up in this way: the cognition like 'a red pot', etc. has the determinans-determinant relation which is different from its relata as its objects on the ground of the qualificatory cognition.

The opponent may not admit such inference because the probans of it does not cover the cognition of absence and the cognitions of special qualities like merit (*punya*), pleasure (*sukha*), etc. which exist in the locus of the self (*ātmā*). It cannot be said such cognitions, the relation between the determinans and the determinant is not different from the relata.

Again, another objection may be raised in this way that the probans of an inference like 'the ground is without a pot', is present in the locus of the absence of the pot (probandum); it falls into the defect of *vyabhicāri*. The probans here is exclusive and it cannot be the object of the cognition though the relation is different from the relata. So this type of inference is not enough in order to establish inherence.

Now Gaṅgeśa presents a sound argument in favour of inherence. The inference is: the qualificatory cognition in which something is known to be determined by quality, or by action, or by universal, has the relation of the determinans, which is different from the relata, as its object, because it is qualificatory cognition in which the determinans is objectless (*nirviśayaka*) and positive (*bhāva*)<sup>26</sup>. Here the subject is 'the qualificatory cognition in which something is known to be determined either by quality, or by action, or by universal' (*guṇa-kriyā-jātivīśiṣṭabuddhi*). The

probandum is 'having the relation, which is different from the relata, of the determinans as its object' (*sambandhibhinnaviśeṣaṇa-sambandhaviśayatva*). The probans of the inference is 'being a qualificatory cognition in which the determinans is objectless and positive' (*nirviśayakabhāvaviśeṣaṇakaviśiṣṭa-buddhi-tva*).

Gaṅgeśa here claims the present inference as sound one. The probans of the previous inference, 'qualificatory cognition', is being extended with objectless and positive to prevent from *vyabhicāri* like 'this is known', 'the ground is without a pot', etc. But again the opponent may object that the probans in it is too weighty with a number of adjectives. Gaṅgeśa further introduces an alternative probans: '*itaranirūpaṇānirūpyaviśeṣaṇakaviśiṣṭabuddhi-tva*', i.e., being such a qualificatory cognition in which the determinans is not known without reference to something else. By this alternative addition, in case of 'the ground is without a pot' or 'this is known' involves the determinans like 'the absence of pot' or 'knowledge has got to be cognized with reference to 'the pot' or 'this' respectively. So the alternative inference prevents the probans to be deviant.

Vyāsatīrtha brings an objection against Gaṅgeśa's inference is that the inference like 'the colour of the pot is in time' is fallen in the defect of *vyabhicāra*<sup>27</sup>. The cognition of colour of the pot in time is qualificatory cognition because here time is cognized to be determined by the colour of the pot. It has such a relation as its object, different from its relata. As the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is that the relation between the colour of the pot and time is self-relation (*svarūpasambandha*), Gaṅgeśa's inference does not hold such case as self-relation. For, it is qualificatory cognition, objectless and positive and is not known without reference to something else. So this inference like 'the colour of the pot in time' would be included as inherence which goes against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology.

To answer the question of Vyāsatīrtha, Gaṅgeśa suggests some points to prevent the defect of *vyabhicāra*:

(a) The colour of a pot is a non-eternal quality which possesses in that particular pot and it is inherently related with the pot. But time is not inherent cause of the colour of the pot. So inherence does not play in case of the colour of the pot and time, rather the relation between them is self-relation.

(b) Inherence between substance and quality means that a particular quality abides only in that particular substance by which that quality is commanded. The colour of the pot is related to the pot by inherence, because the colour of the pot is the quality commanded by the pot and that pot alone, not by any other substance. So here the pot is alone a substance and other substance like time cannot be considered at all.

## Notes and references

1. "*kiṃ punaḥ samavāyasiddhau mānam, pratyakṣamanumānam vā?*" – Vallabha (73), p. 704.
2. "*nyāyanaye tu pratyakṣa eva samavāyaḥ.....*" –Ibid., p.718.
3. "*iha tantuṣu paṭa ityatra pratyakṣamasti iti cenna. vicārāsahatvāt.*" –Ibid., p. 704.
4. "*nādyāḥ. ubhayatrāpi iheti pratiti prasaṅgāt.*" –Ibid.
5. "*na dvitīyāḥ. ubhayatrāpyādheyabuddhiprāpteḥ.*" –Ibid.
6. "*na tṛtīyāḥ. ubhayatrāpyubhayabuddhiprasakteḥ.*" –Ibid.
7. "*atrānubhave hi samavāyastadiyatvena vāhnu bhūyate,.....*" –Ibid.
8. "*nādyāḥ. tadiyatvasya sambandhāntaratvenānavasthāpātāt.*" –Ibid.
9. "*anyadiyatvena vā,.....*" –Ibid.
10. "*netaraḥ. anyatraivasambandhabodhaprasaṅgāt.*" –Ibid.  
pp. 704-05.
11. "*sambandhasvarūpamātreṇa vā.*" –Ibid.

12. *"na tṛitīyaḥ. Kkacidapi sambandhapratyayānupap  
atteḥ."* -Ibid., p.705.
13. *"ihetibuddhirliṅgamiti cet."* -Ibid., p.706.
14. *"duṣitatvāt,....."* - Ibid.
15. *"padārthāntarasvīkāraprasaṅgācca."* -Ibid.
16. *"jātyādiviśiṣṭapratyayayo liṅgamiti cenna."* -Ibid., pp.  
706-07.
17. *"viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasya sambandhāntarasya  
svīkāraprasaṅgāt."* -Ibid., p.707.
18. *"tata eva viśiṣṭa bodhotpattau samavāyānanumān  
aprasaṅgācca"* -Ibid.
19. *"asati sambandhāvabhāse viśiṣṭavyavahāraḥ kuta iti  
cet guṇadravyaviśayāt buddhiviśeṣāditi brūmaḥ aghaṭam  
bhūtalamityatra ghaṭābhāvabhūtalaviṣa-yādbuddhiviśeṣādīva".*  
-Ibid., pp.710-11.
20. *"na hi tathāsati viśiṣṭavyavahārajanakatvena  
sambandhānumānam, api tu tadvyāpakatvena"* -Ibid.
21. *"tathāsati dhvaṁsasya samavāyikāraṇavattve (na)  
bhāvatvāpatteḥ"* -Ibid., pp.711-12.
22. *"vipratipattiśca śuklaḥ paṭa iti pratītiḥ viśeṣaṇa  
viśeṣyasambandhaviśayā na veti"* -Gaṅgeśa (24),p.640.
23. *"niloghaṭa ityādyanubhavo viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyasamba-  
ndhaviśayaḥ viśiṣṭapratītitvāt daṇḍijñānava-diti..."* -Ibid. -pp.640-41.
24. *"bādhakābhāvasya sādhatkavavat sādhakābhāvasya  
bādhakstvāt"* -Ibid.

25. *"sambandhaśca na samyogaḥ samavāyo vānyataro vā  
bādhādasiddhervā. nāpi sambandhamātram, jñāpakatvādinā  
siddhasāadhanāt. nāpyaviśiṣṭavyavṛttaviśiṣṭajñānaniyāmakaḥ,  
abhāvajñānādāviva svarūpasambandhenārthāntaratvāt".-Ibid., p.  
642.*
26. *"navyāstu guṇa-kriyā-jātivīśiṣṭabuddhiḥ  
sambandhibhinnavīśeṣaṇasam- bandhaviṣayā  
nirviṣayakabhāvaviśeṣaṇakaviśiṣṭabuddhitvāt  
itaranirūpaṇ-ānirūpyaviśeṣaṇakaviśiṣṭabuddhitvādvā....."-Ibid., p. 651.*
27. *"kāle ghaṭarūpamityādipratītau vyabhicārāt".-Vyāsātīrtha  
(78), p.449.*

## Chapter-7

### *Samavāya* and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of Causation

The theory of causation is the crux of every school of Indian philosophy. The conception of reality of each school is based on its approach to the problem how objects are brought into existence. We propose to examine the nature of the various theories of causation held by different philosophical systems. It will give clue to their metaphysical structure.

The most natural theory of causation conforming to common sense is that of change. An object, under certain conditions, changes into another form. The previous condition of the object is the cause, and the latter condition is the effect. For instance, threads change into the form of a cloth. To take complex examples, milk changes into curd, or a seed changes into a sprout. In these cases, there may be other factors contributing to the essence of the effect, e.g., in the case of a sprout, earth, water, etc., besides the seed, contribute to the essence of the sprout. They are regarded as accessories. Besides, there are factors like the farmer, implements, etc., which, though not contributing in any way to the essence of the effect, constitute the conditions under which the change takes place. They are called efficient or instrumental causes *nimitta-kāraṇas* as against the former which are the material causes (*upādāna-kāraṇas*). We are mainly concerned here with the material cause which provides the essence of the effect.

According to the Sāṃkhya-school, causation means change from one condition to another. The theory is known *parināma-vāda*. The question arises whether an effect, whose essence is wholly

drawn from its cause, is a new reality or only the cause-essence manifested in a different form. The Sāṃkhya takes up the latter view and declares that the effect already exists in the form of its cause; it is not a new reality. The production of an effect means merely its manifestation from the unmanifested condition in which it already existed in the form of its cause. This is technically called the theory of the origination of the already existent effect or *sat-kārya-vāda*. The Sāṃkhya theory obviously diverges from the theory which holds an effect, like cloth, curd or sprout, to be a new emergent, i.e., a new reality which did not exist before. Does the view stand to logic? If an effect is merely the cause-stuff arranged in a different form to which not a bit of new reality has been added, how can it be regarded as something different from the cause? According to this view, nothing that exists can become non-existent, and nothing that is non-existent can become existent, or in other words, nothing can be added to or subtracted from the existent reality. That being so, an effect, according to the Sāṃkhya, cannot be a reality in any sense. The change from one condition to another (*parināma-vāda* or *vikāra-vāda*) inevitably leads to the Vedānta theory of *vivarta-vāda*, or unreal origination. Again the Sāṃkhya view, the Buddhist thinker Kamalaśīla had argued that the something cannot become otherwise, because becoming otherwise means the origination of a new nature: *svabhāvantarotpatti*.<sup>1</sup>

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is pledged to realism, and advances a theory opposed to the Sāṃkhya theory. A newly originated effect, like cloth, curd or sprout brought into existence after much causal operation, cannot be held to be already existent. An effect, therefore, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is a new emergent which was non-existent before. This is the theory of origination of the non-existent-effect: *asatkārya-vāda* or *ārambha-vāda*.

It is Praśastapāda who formulated this theory in a clear cut and definite form. The theory was further developed in the works of Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta and others. In Śrīdhara's *Nyāya-Kandalī*, the view was crystallized and carried to its logical conclusion.<sup>2</sup> The form in which the theory is found in such works as *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and *Tarka-Samgraha* indicates that development.

In the context of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation the salient features may be noted as under:

1. We take the example of threads being woven into the new entity called cloth. The new entity, i.e., the effect (cloth) appears in the form of a 'whole' (*avayavin*) made up of the parts (*avayava*), i.e., threads. As the emergent effect is a new entity, it follows that it was altogether non-existent before. The essence or the substance-stuff which constitutes the effect did not exist before its origination.

2. The new emergent 'whole' is not a mere aggregate (*samudaya*) of parts, but quite different from them; it is a new entity which has emerged as a result of the connections of parts. The fact that the effect, viz., the 'whole' (cloth) is different from the cause, viz., the parts (threads) means that the essence or stuff of the cloth is different from that of the threads. The cloth and the threads are two separate entities different in their essence, both of which exist side by side.

3. Obviously, the threads and the cloth do not appear to common sense as two separate independent entities. There is only one entity which was in the form of threads before the origination of cloth, and now the same appears in the form of cloth. Even if you look upon the cloth as threads, it is only one entity, call it cloth or threads. The obvious objection to the theory was met by the device

of *samavāya* relation obtaining between the two entities which appeared identical (e.g., the substance and its qualities, etc.), but which were held to be two separate entities. The effect, the 'whole' (cloth) is thus conceived as residing in its cause (i.e., the parts, namely, threads) by *samavāya* relation.

4. It follows that the material cause and the effect are always, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, in the form of 'parts' and the 'whole', and further, an effect (the 'whole') necessarily resides in its cause (the 'parts') by *samavāya* relation.

5. When a number of entities are connected, there appears a new entity which was non-existent before. It should be noted that a bundle of sticks is not a new entity; it is a mere aggregate or *samudāya mātra* of the sticks. The bundle is not a new entity or emergent called the 'whole' or *avayavin*. Nor is an army a new 'whole' produced by the soldiers as parts or a forest of many trees. There are mere aggregates. When, however, a number of threads are connected, an *avayavin* in the form of 'cloth' emerges.

6. The effect is produced in the form of an *avayavin* in the parts which are the material cause. The cause (threads) continues to exist even after the origination of its effect (cloth). In other words, the cloth is not produced *out* of the threads, but *in* the threads. The threads do not impart their essence to the cloth for the simple reason that the threads continue to exist *intact* side by side with the cloth.

Although the threads do not transfer their own essence to the cloth, the cloth when originated resides in the threads by *samavāya* relation. Threads are the cause of the cloth in the sense that they are the *condition precedent* to the origination of the cloth. The position is similar to the Buddhist theory of *pratityasamutpāda* in so

far as, according to both of them, a cause does not transfer its own essence to its effect. The only difference is that while, according to the Buddhist theory, the preceding cause-moment is totally annihilated before the origination of its effect, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, the cause continues its existence and holds its effect in itself.

The thread and the cloth are held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to be altogether two different entities, each having its separate essence-stuff and separate weight. A question was raised with regard to the difficulties in maintaining their separate weights. The question naturally arises: from where does the essence of an effect come? It could be that the essence of an effect arises of its own accord, or in other words, it comes as it were from the void. But as soon as an effect is originated, it resides in the cause by *samavāya* relation. In fact, its origination and residence in the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* come about at one and the same moment. The term for the material cause in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, which means that a cause in which its effect resides by *samavāya* relation. The word *upādāna kāraṇa* (material cause) as a synonym of *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception is not quite appropriate, because the implication of *upādāna kāraṇa* is that it should impart its essence to its effect, as we find in the case of the Sāṃkhya view. For the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school an inherent cause is always in the form of parts (*avayavas*), while an effect is in the form of a 'whole' (*avayavin*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school maintains against the Buddhist that a 'whole' is not merely an aggregate of its parts. A 'whole' (*avayavin*) emerges as residing in its parts by *samavāya sambandha*. This means that an effect is different in *essence* from its cause in which it resides by inherent relation as a separate entity. Cause and effect are not conceived by the Sāṃkhya as different entities; they are identical. A piece of cloth, according to the Sāṃkhya, is only a different arrangement of threads. The

thread imparts essence to the cloth, or more exactly, the essence of both is the same. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, however, the inherent cause, which exists simultaneously and side by side with its effect and as such retains its full essence to itself, cannot, in any way, impart essence to its effect. An inherent cause or *samavāyi-kāraṇa* is not a material cause or *upādāna kāraṇa*. Uddyotakara clearly suggests that an inherent cause is not a material cause, but is extraneous like the accessory causes. He remarks that yarn is an entity quite different from cloth, because it is the cause of the latter like the shuttle, etc., as the shuttle, etc., which are the cause of cloth, are different from it, similarly, the yarn also (which is a cause) is different from cloth. To quote: *arthāntaram paṭāt tantuvaḥ tad-hetutvāt turyādivad iti. Turyādi paṭakāraṇam arthāntaram iti dṛṣtam, tathā ca tantuvaḥ, tasmād arthāntaram iti.*<sup>3</sup> Now, if an inherent cause were regarded as material cause, Uddyotakara's argument will lose its point. It has force only when it is held that the yarn does not impart essence to the cloth like the shuttle, etc. The question of the source of the essence of cloth is thus a problem for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. The only possible answer can be that an inherent cause, without transferring its own essence and retaining it intact, imparts in some way essence to its effect which resides in it by an inherent relation. This is the beauty of *samavāya sambandha*. The essence of an effect is constituted by the fact of its residing in the cause by *samavāya sambandha*. Or perhaps we may say that the same essence-stuff simultaneously serves the purpose of being the essence of the cause as well as of its effect which are, albeit, two quite different entities.

In this context, we may look at the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conception of substance (*dravya*). According to the theory of substance which we can experience with eternal sense is always an effect-substance (*kārya-dravya*) and it is necessarily an *avayavin* or

'whole'. Although all the effect-substances are *avayavins*, the denotation of the term '*dravya*' or substance is wider. While all *avayavins* are *dravyas*, all *dravyas* are not *avayavins*, inasmuch as they also include eternal substances, or non-*avayavins* like ether, etc. The connotations of the two terms are different. A substance connotes an entity in which qualities and movements reside by *samavāya* relation. An *avayavin* connotes an entity which has parts in it which resides by *samavāya* relation. For instance, a cloth, an *avayavin* resides in its parts (threads) by *samavāya* relation, but as a substance, it is the abode of its qualities-colour, etc. which reside in it by *samavāya* relation.

The Buddhist refutes the conception of a separate substance apart from its qualities as emphatically as he does that of a 'whole' (*avayavin*) apart from its parts (*avayavas*). The acceptance of substance, as an entity separate and distinct from its qualities, is a bone of contention between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist. In fact, from the Buddhist point of view, the basis of the erroneous conceptions, viz. that of *dravya* and that of *avayavin* is the same. The Buddhists hold that qualities like colour, touch, etc. are atom-like point-instants (*kṣaṇas*), or unique particulars (*svalakṣaṇas*). They are discrete and disconnected point-instants which come, one after the other, in a constant flux. Apart from these point-instants which are mere *dharmas* (qualities or properties) there is no substratum in the form of a substance in which these properties may be residing, even as there is no separate entity called 'whole' (*avayavin*) apart from the aggregate of its parts. The Buddhists thus reject in the same breath the conception of substance and that of *avayavin*. Along with the relation of *samavāya* too goes out.

Now we come back to our point about *upādāna kāraṇa* as a synonym for *samavāyi-kāraṇa*. The word '*upādāna kāraṇa*' is appropriate only for the *cause* of the Sāṃkhya conception, because

it means a cause which is conceived as transferring its essence to its effect. As a matter of fact, the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is as extraneous in relation to its effect as the efficient cause or *nimitta kāraṇa* is, because the former like the latter does not impart any essence to its effect. For, Uddyotakara argues that the cloth and the threads are different entities because the cause and the effect must be different entities like the shuttle and the cloth: *arthāntaram patāt tantavaḥ tad-hetutvāt turyādivad (Nyāya Vārtika)*.<sup>4</sup> All the features of the causal theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school imply the laconic definition of *samavāyi-kāraṇa* as a cause in which the effect resides by *samavāya sambandha: yat-samavetam kāryam bhavati jñeyamtu samavāyi-janakam tat*.<sup>5</sup>

## Notes and references

1. *Tattva-Saṁgraha-Pañjikā* – Kamalaśīla.
2. “*ayutasiddhānāmādhāryādhārabhūtānām kāryakāraṇabhūtānāmā-kāryakā raṇabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha iha pratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*”.-Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 773, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
3. *Nyāya Vārtika*, II, i.36
4. *Nyāya Vārtika*.
5. *Nyāya Siddhānta Muktāvalī*, Verse 18.

## Chapter-8

### Mīmāṃsā concept of *Samavāya*:


#### I. *Samavāya*: the category of *Samavāya*.

The great names that popularized and developed the Mīmāṃsā philosophy are those of Kumārīla and Prabhākara. It is thought that Prabhākara was an older contemporary of Kumārīla, who was himself an older contemporary of Śaṅkara, the great Advaitin. All the three belonged to an age of orthodox revival and of the weakening of Buddhism and Jainism. Prabhākara is the author of the great commentary called *Bṛhatī* and Kumārīla of *Ślokavārtika* and *Tantravārtika*. Murārī Miśra is said to be the third great thinker of the school. The three do not always agree with one another.

Mīmāṃsā accepts the reality of the world and of the individual and his actions, and it builds up an epistemology for supporting its realism. Its contributions to epistemology are important and are accepted even by followers of Śaṅkara so far as this world goes.

Mīmāṃsā metaphysics is essentially the metaphysics of ethical action. It is, therefore, both qualitatively and quantitatively pluralistic, and has to accept almost everything that a pluralistic philosophy has to accept. In categorizing the world, Kumārīla and Prabhākara differ from each other. According to Kumārīla, the categories are first divided into two kinds, the positive and the negative. The positive categories are four: substance, quality, activity and generality (*jāti*, *sāmānya*, universal). The negative categories are also four: prior negation (*prāgabhāva*), posterior negation (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*), infinite or absolute negation

(*atyantābhāva*), and mutual negation (*anonyābhāva*). We thus get the following chart:



It may be noticed that *samavāya* does not occur in the chart. The point is that Prabhākara does not accept the categorization of reality as given by Kumārīla. Prabhākara gives eight positive categories: substance, quality, action, universal, inherence, force, similarity, and number. Kumārīla holds that *samavāya* is not a distinct category, since it is the same as the entities in which it exists. For instance, quality and action are found in substances and universals are found in substances, qualities and actions. This kind of being present in something else is called inherence which is really nothing different from the entities in relation. But Prabhākara says that *samavāya* is the relation of dependence (*paratantratā*). The universal is dependent on the individual, and quality and action are dependent on substance. This dependence is not the same as the object in which it is found. Our experience of it has a distinct character of its own. We have, therefore, to accept it as a distinct category. However, Prabhākara does not accept the Nyāya concept of *samavāya* as an eternal relation. For if the relation between the individual and universal is eternal then neither can perish. But we

see many individuals and universals coming to an end. Many species of animals have become extinct and many individuals are dying every moment, even their universal is extinct.

In the categorization of reality, Kumārīla and Prabhākara seem to have adopted that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to their own needs. In fact, we find its influence on all pluralistic cosmologies. But it is hard to prove that the adoption or adaptation is always intentional.

Before we undertake delineating the differences between Kumārīla and Prabhākara on the category of *samavāya*, we may do well in reminding ourselves what had been the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of it.

Kaṇāda explains *samavāya* as the cause of the notion that something is "here" in a locus, and connects its function to causality. He also conceives that there is only one *samavāya* since there is no indication that different *samavāya* relations connect different pairs of things related by it. The theory of a single *samavāya* carries on until Navya- Nyāya times.

Vāstsyāna says that *samavāya* relates two things when one cannot occur without the other. The definitive form of the account is provided by Praśastapāda, who defines *samavāya* as the relation between two inseparable or *ayutasiddha* things related as located to locus. He further explains that "inseparability" means different things for non-eternal entities than it does for eternal ones. Two entities, at least one of which is non-eternal, are inseparable if all loci of one are loci of other, while two eternal entities are inseparable if all motions that occur within one occur within the other.

*Samavāya* relates qualities, motions, universals and individuators (*avacchedaka*) to substances. It also relates universals to qualities and universals to motions. Finally, it relates composite individuals to the "parts" which are the composite individuals' cause.

Praśastapāda has a number of interesting things to say about *samavāya*. For one thing, he follows Kañāda in saying it is marked through our knowledge, i.e. that its presence is in some manner dependent on our attending to it. Does this mean that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realistic epistemology is jeopardized? For another, *samavāya* has no universal inhering in it or any individuator individuating it. This is not surprising, since there is only one *samavāya*. But Praśastapāda is also aware of the possibility of infinite regress, were inherence to be related to a universal inferences by inherence. Which leads us to a basic question: what relates inherence to its relata? Praśastapāda's answer is that it is related to them by the relation of identity (*tādātmya*). Furthermore, what happens to inherence when its relata are destroyed or disappear? According to Praśastapāda, inherence is unaffected. It may be likened to glue which glues together whatever inseparable things happen to fall into it. If there are no such things, the glue exists in potency, ready to glue but not, at the moment, gluing! Uddyotakara argues that if it were not independent of its relata in this way it could not do its job.

Praśastapāda thinks that *samavāya* is not directly perceived, but is known through inference. This is consistent with his idea that it is somehow dependent on our knowing about it. But Uddyotakara and the Naiyāyikas generally hold that inherence is directly perceptible. Jayanta and Bhāsarvajña are equally explicit about it, although the latter characteristically differs in details, holding that *samavāya* is only sometimes perceptible. The commentators on

Praśastapāda mention the view that *samavāya* is perceptible as the view of "others", and scholars say that this is one of the few differences between the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya systems. Vallabha is apparently trying to adjudicate this discrepancy when he argues that though *samavāya* is not perceived, it is inferred as closely involved in judgements of perception and so seems to be perceived because of this involvement.

The Vaiśeṣika theory of relations may be compared with the views of such philosophers as Sigwart and Windelband, who divide relations into three sorts: (1) reflective relations, produced to mental reflections, (2) constitutive relations, which are in the things themselves, and (3) modal relations, which relate our ideas and feelings and their contents. Vaiśeṣikas thought *samavāya* was a reflective relation, while Mīmāṃsākas took it as constitutive. It may be a mistake to attribute to Vaiśeṣikas the view that *samavāya* is mind-dependent in the sense that European logicians had in mind. There are various ways in which an entity may be mind-dependent, and not all of them are inconsistent with direct epistemological realism.

Our philosophers did hold that *samavāya* not only related objects known by us, but also entered into the relations between our knowing apparatus and its objects. Uddyotakara lists six different kinds of relations between the sense organs and their objects, one of which is *samavāya*, another being the qualifier-qualificand relation. The rest of six are direct contact and three indirect relations involving *samavāya* and contact (*samyoga*) in combination.

## ***II Samavāya: Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Views***

In this section we propose to discuss the contending Mīmāṃsā views as presented by Kumārīla and Prabhākara. Kumārīla's view is known as the *Bhāṭṭa* view, while that of Prabhākara is said after his own name, i.e. *Prābhākara*.

First let us have the Bhāṭṭa view.

*Samavāya* is of the nature of a permanent relation intervening between two entities, either of which is incapable of separate existence apart from the other. It is defined variously by the Naiyāyikas. According to Kaṇāda, as we have already noted, it is the relation between cause and effect. Praśastapāda regards it as a relation of the container and the contained. The chair on the ground is not in inherent relation to the ground, because the chair is not inseparable from the ground or the locus where it rests. This inseparability is not identity, since the two entities are not one in reality. The fire which inheres in the red hot ball of iron is separate from the ball itself. The relationship of a substance to its qualities, a whole to its parts, a genus to its individuals (*vyakti*), and an effect to its causes are instances of *samavāya* relation.

It is also argued that *samavāya* is not *samyoga* or conjunctive relation, since the objects in conjunction, as in the case of the chair on the ground, has had or can have separate existence prior to the state of conjunction. Conjunction ends at the moment when the conjuncts or the member parts of the conjunction are separated, while in *samavāya* there is no disjunction, and consequently no termination of inherence.

Conjunction occurs between two independent substances, while in inherence the members stand in relation of the container and the contained. Two entities related to each other by inherence

cannot be separated without at least one of them being destroyed. *Samyoga* takes place between two entities of similar nature which remain separate in the beginning, and later on conjoin, whereas the fire that inherence in the ball of iron is of a totally different nature. Conjunction is external relation, while *samavāya* is internal relationship. In *samyoga* the member parts are joined together without forming a real whole, whereas in *samavāya* the parts form a coherent whole.

Now Kumārīla criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view stated above. He holds that no relation can subsist between any two objects that are not already known to be established entities. And if either member of the relation be accepted as being an established entity, prior to the assertion of the relation, then the alleged inseparability ceases. Only those objects which exist separately, like a book and a hand, can be related to which?

*na capyayutasiddhānām sambandhitvena kalpanā /  
nāniṣpannasva sambandho niṣpattau yutasiddhatā.//*<sup>1</sup>

So inseparableness and relationship cannot be reconciled. There being no inseparability, there is no any such relationship as inherence between the genus and individual. And there being no ground for relationship there could be any relationship among the categories:

*tathā ca sati sambandhe hetuḥ kaścinna vidyate /  
ṣaṅgīnāmapi na sambandhaḥ padārthānām pratīyate.//*<sup>2</sup>

The Bhaṭṭas ask the question: Is *samavāya* itself to the objects among, whom it is said to subsist, or not? If it is not, then there can be no inherence with regard to the objects. And if it is, then this inherent relationship with the objects would stand in need of another relationship and so on and it leads to the defect of ad infinitum:

*samavāyaviyogācca viśeṣaḥ syāt parasparam /*

*tatvaluptānavasthā syāt tasya tasyānvuṣangataḥ.//*<sup>3</sup>

To get rid of the defect, the Naiyāyikas may declare that *samavāya* is a sort of absolute relationship which does not require any other relation for its own subsistence in the objects. But it cannot be acceptable by the Naiyāyikas, because on account of this identity, the inherence may become only a particular form of the qualification and the qualified (i.e. genus and individual), which is not acceptable to the Naiyāyikas. So the relationship between the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the qualified (*viśeṣya*) is not that of inherence, but is only that of identity-cum-difference (*tādātmya*):

*atha tasyātmarūpatvānnānyasambandhakalpanā /*

*abhedātsamavāyostu svarūpaṁ dharmadharminoḥ.//*<sup>4</sup>

Here the relation of identity-cum-difference is substituted for inferences. The reason is that inherence as a form of relation, subsisting between two naturally inseparable things, is rejected by the Bhaṭṭas.

Here arises a question as to why the Bhaṭṭas rejecting the *samavāya* relation, postulate a relation called *svarūpa dharmadharmī* or identity-cum-difference? The reason for the postulation may be stated as follows: The Bhaṭṭas wish to retain their basic claim as realists, and at the same time, they intend to avoid the difficulties like *ad infinitum*. Therefore, they deny absolute difference between the sets of objects and assert a natural relation. They are scared of accepting the absolute difference of objects, for that would lead them to an undesirable state of unrelated world of particulars as the Buddhists declare. On the other hand, they did not want to entertain absolute identity either, but it would land them in an unpleasant stage of identity to the pleasure of the Vedāntin.

We may now turn to considering the Prābhākara view of *samavāya*. Prabhākara, like the Naiyāyikas, admits *samavāya* as a distinct category. It is the relationship between two inseparable entities. Nyāya accepts the category as eternal on the ground that if it is accepted as non-eternal, it would necessarily be multiple and it would be an effect of positive nature, all the three causes will have to be assigned to it, and further there would arise many difficulties in the assumption of three causes. So the Naiyāyikas say that *samavāya* is timeless or eternal, and as eternal or *nitya*, it can only be one. Prabhākara criticizes the alleged eternality of the Nyāya concept of *samavāya*, and establishes inherence of two kinds, viz. eternal and non-eternal. The eternal *samavāya* is to be encountered amongst eternal substances, and the non-eternal one in the case of non-eternal substances. There is much inherence. Inherence is produced, when an effect is produced, which inheres in material cause.

The Naiyāyikas hold that inherence is perceptible, while the Prābhākaras and the Vaiśeṣikas oppose the said view. Generally an object can be perceived only if it comes in contact with a sense organ. Sense organs being substances can have contact in the mode of *samyoga* or conjunction or *sannikarṣa* only with other substances. In the case of the perception of non-substances, indirect contacts are established. In perceiving non-existence, the contact between the non-existence and sense organ is the contact of the qualifier and the qualified, *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*. Inherence is also an attribute of the object in which something resides by that relation, and that inherence also, like non-existence, is perceived by the contact of the qualifier and the qualified, *samavāye cābhāve ca viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*. The Prābhākaras denied the contact of the qualifier and the qualified. Further as the other contacts are unintelligible and are not admitted, the inherence cannot be perceived. However, inherence can be established through

inference. The knowledge that there is cowness in the cow is conditioned by the relation of the container and the contained, because of the knowledge of cowness (*gotva*) in this (*iha*) like the knowledge of rice in this jar. So inherence is inferable only.

Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa composed his *Mānameyodaya*, following the principles of Kumārīla. In the chapter on *pratyakṣa*, he discusses the case of *samavāya*, and criticizes the six-fold classification of *sannikarṣa* offered by Nyāya. The first three of the Nyāya *sannikarṣas*, namely, *saṃyoga*, *saṃyukta samavāya* and *saṃyukta-samaveta-samavāya* are renamed by the Bhattas as *saṃyoga*, *saṃyukta tādātmya* and *saṃyukta-tādātmya-tādātmya* respectively. But since the Bhattas hold *śabda* as *vibhadravya*, no question of *samavāya* would arise in the perception of *śabda*, and *samaveta-samavāya* in the case of perceiving *śabdatva*. On the Bhaṭṭa view *samavāya* is like hare's horn: *śaśasṅgāyamāṇatvāt*. Prābhākara admits only *saṃyoga*, *saṃyukta samavāya* and *samavāya* modes of *sannikarṣa*. They too descry *viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva* as a mode of *sannikarṣa*, nor perceptuality of *samavāya* as a category. This mode of *sannikarṣa* is as illusory as the earlier one.

Addendum:

### Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa

In a valuable manual of the Bhatta School, *Mānameyodaya*, the doctrine of inherence laid by the Nyaya-Vaisesikas is criticized thoroughly. The book, *Mānameyodaya* consists of two parts: the first part is called *Māna* and the second part is called *Meya*. Among the Mīmāṃsakas, the Bhattas do not avow inherence. Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa is a spokesman of the Bhatta-school. He argues that inherence is real as a hare's horn. In the *Meya* part, he rejects

inherence as there is no proof of its reality. If so, either it is perception or inference.

The Naiyāyikas maintain that perception is the proof of inherence. But Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa rejects it. He says that in case of inherence, like 'a jar subsists in its colour'; here are two relata, such as a jar and its colour. We can perceive only a jar as a substratum and its colour as a superstatum; but we cannot perceive their relation of inherence. The Naiyāyikas argue that we can perceive the relation of inherence as a qualified object. But Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa raises a question: if inherence as a qualified object, it can be perceived but where does a qualified object exist? We can perceive only a jar and its colour and nothing more. So it is proved that perception cannot be the proof of inherence.<sup>5</sup>

Nārāyaṇa rejects the possibility of the inferential proof of inherence.<sup>6</sup> If we say that 'a coloured jar' consists of two relata: one is a jar and another is its colour; then we cannot infer 'a coloured jar' as inherence. So it is proved that inference cannot be the proof of inherence.

Nārāyaṇa gives another objection against the doctrine of inherence whether it is identical with its relata or not.<sup>7</sup> First; he says that inherence cannot be identical with its relata. For inherence cannot exist without its relata. Secondly, inherence cannot be different from its relata, because the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that inherence exists in between its relata. So inherence can be neither identical nor different from its relata; because if it would be accepted either, it involves logical contradiction. For this, Nārāyaṇa does not admit inherence by any means. Rather he concludes that the relation of inherence is to be replaced as identity relation (*tādātmya*).

## Notes and references

1. *Ślokaṽṛttika*-Kumārīla Bhaṭṭa, Verse:146.
2. Ibid. Verse,147.
3. Ibid. Verse,148.
4. Ibid. Verse,149.
5. "*samavāyarūpasyaiva vipratipannatvādetesām pratyayānām samavāyaviṣayatvāsiddheḥ*".-Nārāyaṇa, p.294.
6. "*nāpi prābhākarānumatamanumanam pramāṇarī*".-Ibid.
7. "*apica samavāyaḥ samavāyibhyāmatyantābhinno vā na vā*".-Ibid.

## Chapter-9

### Buddhist Critiques of *Samavāya*

#### I

According to the school of the Elders or Theravāda, Buddha taught the four Aryan Truths, *āryasatyas*, often translated as noble truths. They are the truth of suffering (*dukkhasatya*), the truth of causation (*samudayasatya*), the truth of cessation (*nirodhasatya*), and the truth of way (*mārgasatya*). These truths are interpreted as: Everything is misery; everything is caused; if the cause destroyed, the effect is destroyed; and there is a way to destroy the cause. But although the truths are simple, their interpretation and exposition gave rise to some of the grandest philosophies and a large number of schools. First, the doctrine of momentariness was developed out of the first truth. There is suffering in every drop of existence, because it is born, decays and dies. There is nothing in the world that is not subject to change. According to the conservative Buddhists, every bit of existence is born, stays, and dies at the same moment, giving place to another bit of existence. Existence or Being is a momentary event and contains its own non-existence or Non-being. There is, therefore, no being without its non-being. Everything is both positive and negative at the same place and time. This doctrine of flux is called the doctrine of momentariness or *kṣaṇikavāda*.

The stability of things is only an appearance. Everything that appears to stay or events passes on its pattern to the next group of events, and we think that the same object continues to exist. But it is really a series of aggregates of events following the same pattern. Apart from the aggregates, the thing is nothing. It is a whole of parts. A chariot is nothing but its parts. Man is nothing but the parts that constitute him. Every ultimate part of man is a momentary event. But although the events themselves are momentary, the

patterns are not momentary, but continue for a time. Practically they play the role of universals in Buddhist thought. But they are neither real nor unreal. The Buddhists do not accept the reality of universals.

Out of the second Aryan Truth, that every event has a cause is developed the main Buddhist doctrine of causation. Nothing happens without a cause, and the causal relation is fixed between two events. Otherwise anything can originate out of anything. The acorn can produce only the oak, but not an apple tree. Yet since everything is momentary, the cause has to die before the effect originates. There is, therefore, no material cause continuing into the effect. The effect originates, depending on the cause, but not as a new form of the cause. From the side of the effect, causation is called dependent origination or *pratityasamutpāda*. From the side of the cause, it becomes a necessary occasion for the appearance of the effect. Without it, the effect cannot arise.

The rest of the noble Truths are salvific and are of ethical import, and we refrain from discussing them. However, through the course of a few centuries, the four Aryan Truths taught by Buddha were recast and were accepted in a new form. The Truths in a new form are: Everything is misery (*sarvam duhkham*); everything is momentary (*sarvam kṣaṇikam*); everything is self-less (*sarvam nairātmyam* or *anātmam*); and everything is void (*sarvam śūnyam*). The third and fourth follow from the doctrine of aggregates and momentariness.

The whole is nothing but its parts. The self (*ātman*) which experiences itself as "I am" is an aggregate of psycho-physical aggregates. The concept of selflessness (*anātmata*) and naturelessness (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) was extended to all objects of the world. The chariot has no self or nature of its own apart from that of

its parts. As everything is caused by certain causes, it cannot have a self or nature of its own apart from that of its causes. Every one of the causes also cannot have a self or nature of its own apart from that of its own causes. Then nothing in the world can have a self or nature of its own. So everything is a void (*śūnya*), self-less, nature-less.

We may say that, throughout the philosophy of Buddhism, the two ideas that everything its own nature (*sarvam svalakṣaṇam*) and nothing has its own nature (*sarvam nihsvabhāvam*) almost run parallel, sometimes separately and other times mixing up with each other in different ways. Nagarjuna wanted to show that ultimate reality cannot be described either in positive or negative terms. It cannot have any characteristics, not even that of suchness (*tathvatā*). Also the phenomenal world has its own nature. He developed one of the most devastating dialectics ever written in the world and exposed the natureless-ness (*nihsvabhāvatā*) and attacked the view that everything has its own nature (*svalakṣaṇa*). If everything can be shown to have only relative existence then which thing can have its own nature? And if everything is devoid of its own characters and is, therefore, void and there is nothing that is not void, the absolute reality must be void. What we see is only an appearance of the void. Appearance is the empirical truth (*samvṛtisatya*); the void is the Absolute Truth or *paramārthasatya*. So everything that belongs to this world is only an empirical truth. If the world is not real, it could not have been born and was, therefore, never born. This doctrine is known as an *ajātivāda*. Nagarjuna disapproved the reality of causality. An example will suffice to illustrate his method. When we say every event has a cause, do we speak of real events or unreal events? Real events are already real and existent and do not need a cause. Neither do unreal events need a cause. Then what is causality for? Causality is, therefore, unreal. Nagarjuna calls himself the follower of the middle

path (*mādhyaṃika*). Reality is neither such-ness nor consciousness (*vijñāna*); even these two terms are characterizations. It is only void. Indeed, even to call it void is to characterize it.

## II

It will have been seen by now that the Buddhist formulates his views and presuppositions in so radical a manner that availability of such notions as *avayavi* and *avayava*, the container and the contained, etc. is rendered impossible. Yet, it is the case that the older Nyāya engaged itself with the Buddhist. The polemic was even sided, and we have the *locus classicus* of the Buddhist antique of the very concept of *sambandha* itself in Dharmakīrti's *Sambandha Parīkṣā*.

In the present context we propose to concentrate on the statement of Dharmakīrti:

*Pāraṅtryaṃ hi sambandhaḥ siddhe ka paraṅtratā ।*

*Tasmāt sarvasya bhāvasya sambandha nāsti tattvataḥ ॥<sup>1</sup>*

What is significant is that Dharmakīrti rejects admitting *sambandha* from the point of *tattvaḥ*. Or to put it in another way, relations could be admitted empirically, at the level of *saṃvṛti*, but *not* real *per se*, i.e., from the *paramārtha* point of view.

Dharmakīrti proposes to understand *sambandha* in either of the following senses: (a) *pāraṅtrya*, (b) *rūpaśleṣa*, or (c) *aniṣpanna*. Relations then can be asserted to obtain between relata of dependent character, or in the case of the amalgam of the two relata, or between two relata that are not at all produced. And each of the sense is shown to be inadmissible.

Now we take the case of *pāraṅtrya* first. If a and b are the relata, and R is the relation in aRb, and if a and b are endowed with *sattā* or existence prior to their being related by R, what then is the

function of R? If R has no function as to a and b, they can hardly be called 'relation'. If the reference of the relata is opaque, R becomes problematic. The point is that R can be asserted only if a and b are mutually dependent.

Then as regards *rūpaśleṣa*, that is amalgam of forms in the case of *sambandha*. R, instead of existing apart from a and b, is now considered as an amalgam of a and b or the mixture of their forms, e.g. the two halves or *kapālas* of *ghaṭa*. If the relata are distinct objects existing without reference to the other, the *rūpaśleṣa* or their amalgam is hardly noticeable. Therefore, no *sambandha* as *rūpaśleṣa* can be admitted. If ab is the *rūpaśleṣa* or amalgam of a and b, irrespective of R, what then is the function of the *āśleṣa* or the amalgam?

It may be conjectured that the concept of *rūpaśleṣa* corresponds to the Nyāya idea of *samavāya*. If that is the case, then inadmissibility of *rūpaśleṣa* should disallow *samavāya* as well. Since on Dharmakīrti's premises no relation in the above three senses is possible, *samavāya* too would remain an impossibility.

Again, *rūpaśleṣa* may be interpreted as *nairantaryam*, i.e., having no spatio-temporal gap between the two relata. This possibility is also ruled out as the phenomenon cannot be conceived as real. No relation admits such a gap. Relation is something positive, and in its absence, *nairantaryam*, relation becomes negative in import, and it goes against the idea of relation itself. Nor can the *abhāva* of *nairantaryam* be taken as a relation.

Now we take the case of *rūpaśleṣa* further. It may be asked, is the amalgamation total or partial? Between two atoms in total *rūpaśleṣa* might give rise to a larger in size than either of the relata, but this is not conceivable. Again, if the *rūpaśleṣa* is partial, the

question would be if it is identical with the whole or not. If the *rūpaśleṣa* is partial, it amounts to saying that an atom, which is definitionally *niramśa*, has parts. This is not to be allowed. In either case, the dyadic complex in the *rūpaśleṣa* of a and b will remain problematic. If the *rūpaśleṣa* is total, the identity of a and b will be erased, and if a and b retain their identity in partial *rūpaśleṣa*, it makes no sense at all.

Dharmakīrti proliferates the argument in another way. If  $R \neq (a \cdot b)$ , a and b remain but no R. if  $R = (a \cdot b)$ , R alone remains, without a and b. neither of the two possibilities are admissible and conceivable. Dharmakīrti summarizes his position in the following manner:

*rūpaśleṣo hi sambandho dvitve sa ca katṭhāṃ bhavet |*

*tasmāt prakṛtibhinnānām sambandho nāsti tattataḥ ||<sup>2</sup>*

The matter is that Dharmakīrti finds 'the concept of *sambandha* logically inadequate to be admitted' into philosophical vocabulary. Let us take a few more examples of his arguments. If relation is understood in the sense of *parāpekṣā* or dependence of one relation on another, the relatum will have to be either existent (*sat*) or non-existent (*asat*). If the relatum is non-existent, it makes no sense to say that it depends on another, since 'dependence' or *parāpekṣā* cannot be said to be the property of a non-existent object. If, on the other hand, the relatum is existent, it cannot be said that it is dependent on another relatum *necessarily*. Being *kṣaṇika*, as per the definition of *sat*, the relatum, the question of dependence will not arise.

The Buddhist view holds that if a relatum is *sat*, it wills causal efficacy or *arthakriyākāritva*. But it is causally efficacious, why should it depend on any other object? In this manner Dharmakīrti does away with the concept of relation as *parāpekṣā*.

Again, Dharmakīrti refers to the problem of *anāvasthā*. This is of some interest. Let there be a book on the table. There is *samyoga*. But since *samyoga* is a *guṇa*, and the table is the possessor of the *guṇa*, that is the *guṇī*, the case of supposing *samavāya* comes up between them. But between the *samavāya* and the book there should be another *sambandha*, and so on. Thus for Dharmakīrti, only the relata remain, relation being a null concept.

If relation is a positive entity, R would have been a *svalakṣaṇa*, just as the relata, a and b are so. A *svalakṣaṇa* is referentially opaque, and therefore, a, R and b are and would remain unrelated. R stands unrelated to a and b, just as a and b are to each other. The logic of *svalakṣaṇa* renders relation impossibility.

More interestingly, Dharmakīrti criticizes the realist's contention as regards the reality of the relation between cause and effect. According to Nyāya, causal relationship is characterized by the property of *dvitatva*, existing in two relata. 'Cause' and 'effect' are not simultaneous occurrences. Simultaneity does not entitle one event to be called 'cause', and another 'event'. The left and the right horns of a cow exist simultaneously but neither is the cause of the other. It cannot be said that the causal relation in either of the relata in a successively manner, for had it been so, the relation may exist in either of the relata, in the absence of the other. This is absurd and a travesty of the notion of that relation. The concept of relation is binary, R (ab), and answers the questions of 'of whom' and 'with whom'. Hence *sambandha* abides in two relata, and never in either of them. The causal relation, *kāryakāraṇabhāva* entails both the relata. *ekavṛttimāna sambandha* is a causal misnomer.

Dharmakīrti appears to suggest that causal relationship is nothing but a form of *anvaya-vyatireka* mode of thinking. *Anvaya-vyatireka* consists in considering *bhāvābhavau*, that is taking both

positive and negative instances together. The assertion of causal relation is redundant. For Mill, the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference is a method finding necessary connection between cause and effect. But for the Naiyāyika would contend that *anvaya-vyatireka* and *kārya-kāraṇatā* are two different things, and not synonymous expressions.

At this point, Dharmakīrti makes a psychological move. Arguing that meaning of words and sentences depend on the intention of the speaker (*vivakṣā*), he argues that as the speaker speaks in a context, and intends or understands *anvaya-vyatireka* as *kārya-kāraṇatā*, it follows that apart from *anvaya-vyatireka*, there is no relation that could be said to be *kārya-kāraṇatā*.

Dharmakīrti further asks whether the cause and the effect are different or identical with each other. If cause and effect are different, i.e., not related to each other, to talk of relation between them is useless. Again, if they are identical, i.e., not separated, it would be senseless to talk of any relation between them. Supposing that cause and effect are taken as related through a separate entity, say R, the independent status of cause and effect would be jeopardized. This should not surprise us. For a follower of *ajātivāda* could not do otherwise.

There are many conceptual niceties in Dharmakīrti's *Sambandha Parikṣā*. We need not take all of them into account. But the main thrust of the argument appears as follows. If relation or *sambandha* is a null concept for Dharmakīrti, or for that matter any Buddhist follower of Nagarjuna, it should follow immediately that no so-called relations admitted by the realists, be it *saṃyoga* or *samavāya* would not find any room in that scheme of thought. The ontological presuppositions like *kṣaṇikatā*, *svalakṣaṇa*, unreality of

*samudaya*, etc. have been at work behind his critique of the reality of relations.

Before we close, we may take note of the arguments of Śāntarakṣita as he advances in *Tattvasamgraha*. Togetherness is not enough to establish *samavāya*, and he does not accept the *ihapratyayahetu*, the container-contained relationship defining *samavāya*<sup>3</sup>. Even if two things remain in a close contact, e.g., fruits in the basket, we are hardly entitled to infer the one from the other, nor can they be said to be inseparable in the sense of endorsing *samavāya*. The container-contained relationship does not obtain in ordinary experience<sup>4</sup>. Śāntarakṣita would only admit *saṃyoga*, instead of *samavāya* in the case of fruits in the basket.

Śāntarakṣita finds it difficult to accept such views of *samavāya*, as *ekatva*<sup>5</sup> (oneness) and *nitya*<sup>6</sup>, etc. he asks for grounds for such assertions. He holds that to admit one eternal inherence relating each and every inseparable pair should imply much inherence as there are many pairs but *not one*<sup>7</sup>. For him, *saṃyoga* should be sufficient for explaining both the separable and allegedly inseparable relations. *Samavāya* as a relation is a redundancy. Further, as for *nityatva* of *samavāya*, Śāntarakṣita argues, if *samavāya* were *nitya*, nothing would pass into annihilation<sup>8</sup>. A wrong view or notion abides in the self in *samavāya* relation. When the wrong view is overcome or destroyed, what happens to the relation? If the relation too goes off along with the wrong view, it makes no sense in saying that *samavāya* is *nitya*<sup>9</sup>. It appears that Śāntarakṣita offers this argument in *reductio ad absurdum* to that of the Naiyāyika.

## Notes and references


1. *Sambandhparikṣā, kārikā* No. 1.
2. *Sambandhparikṣā, kārikā* No. 2.
3. "*tantuṣveva patohmiṣu vīraṇeṣu kaṭaḥ punaḥ.  
ityādīhamaterbhāvātsamavāyohvagamyate*".- Verse 823.  
Śāntarakṣita (63).
4. "*tadetadihavijñānaṁ pareṣāmeva varttate.  
svasiddhāntānurāgena na dṛṣṭaṁ laukikaṁ tu tat*".- Verse 827.  
Ibid.
5. "*sarvasminbhāvavattveṣa eka eva pratīyate*".- Verse 825. Ibid.
6. "*kāraṇānupalabdheśca nityo bhāvavadeva saḥ.  
na hyasya kāraṇaṁ kiñcit pramāṇenopalakṣyate*".-Verse 826. Ibid.
7. "*yadekaḥ samavāyaḥ syāt sarvesveveva ca vastuṣu.  
kapālādiṣvapi jñānaṁ paṭādīti prasajyate*".-Verse 835. Ibid.
8. "*nīyatvenāsyā sarveḥpi nityāḥ prāptāḥ ( ghaṭādayaḥ).  
ādihāreṣu sadā teṣāṁ samavāyo na saṁsthiteḥ*".-Verse  
854. Ibid.
9. "*svādhāraissamavāyo hi teṣāmapi sadā mataḥ.  
teṣāṁ vināśabhāve tu niyatāhsyāpi nāśitā*".-Verse 856. Ibid.

## Chapter-10

### The Jaina Response to *Samavāya*.

#### I

The Jaina outlook on ontology and its philosophy of knowledge can be comprehended under realism, and in this regard, it shares a lot of views and ideas with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and realist schools. A schematic representation of Jainism may be given below in order to put its perspective amongst other philosophical views.



Jainism is distinguished by having its sources in the *Bhagavatī*, and *Āgama* literature. It is classified as a non-Vedic or heterodox school of thought, but nonetheless Jainism is a *mokṣasāstra*, the science of salvation. The path for spiritual progress, aiming at the final goal of liberation is the central tone of the *Āgamas*.

The Jainas arrange the knowledge of the world under two pairs of contrasted alternatives, *jīva* and *ajīva*. These are complementary aspects of reality, each of which suggests the other by a dialectical necessity and combines with the other into one more complex conception. These two contrasted alternatives are but two conditions of thought: all thinking implies a subject which thinks, the cogitative principle or soul. But as all thinking is thinking of something, it means that it requires a material on which the thought activity is exercised, it implies an *object* which is discriminated and understood by thought.

The Jainas speak of knowledge in five different forms:

(a) *Mati* or that form of knowledge by which a *jīva* cognizes an object through the operation of the sense-organs, all hindrances to the formation of such knowledge being removed. Other forms of knowledge being (b) *Śruti* (verbal testimony); (c) *Avadhi*, knowledge of the past; (d) *Manaparyāya*, knowledge of other minds; and (e) *Kevala*, the pure unimpeded knowledge, or knowledge of absolute, which precedes the attainment of *nirvāṇa*.

The Jainas have a number of terms in the *Āgamic* literature. These exposes senses peculiar to the Jaina point of view. *Upayoga* is a general term comprehending all activity related with consciousness. It is divided into *nirākāra upayoga* or *darśana* and *sākāra upayoga* or *jñāna*. The former is inarticulate cognition or

sensation preceding in every articulate cognition. *Jñāna* and *ajñāna* are articulate cognition, true or false. When it is true, the word particle *samyak* is prefixed to make the distinction clear.

The *Uttarādhyayanasūtra* describes knowledge as the instrument of cognizing objects. *Āvaśyaka niryukti* defines knowledge as an illuminator. Two points emerge from this definition. First, the function of knowledge is only to illumine the object which is already in existence. Knowledge does not create anything new. In holding such a view the Jainas are realists. Every quality, according to them, that becomes the object of knowledge is a reality and as such is already in existence. The objects are presented to the soul directly.

The fundamental notion of reality as hold by the *Āgamas* is expressed in the three *Mātrikapadas*. They are held as mother words giving birth to the whole system of Jaina philosophy and constitute the central theme of the entire Jaina philosophy and metaphysics. It is held that the Tirthankaras speak these three words only. The *Sthānāṅgasūtra* refers to them. They are slated in the following order. It originates, it perishes, it continues. The *Tattvārtha* describes them as the definition of reality. These three conditions of reality are not caused by any external factor. They are natural and the very essence of every existence. Hemchandra explains that everything beginning from the flickering of a candle up to the sky, possesses the same nature, i.e., change with permanence.

The *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* describes six categories or *padārthas* and three realities (*arthas*). It distinguishes *artha* or reality from *padārtha* (category), the former inheres (*samavāya*) existence in it and the latter does not. The *artha* has an external existence, and can be perceived through senses or yogic perception. On the other

hand, the categories are conceptual. They are the analytic interpretations of external and internal phenomena. The Jaina admits two types: *tattva* or *tathya*, and *dravya*. Vātsāyana explains *tattva* (category) as the true nature of an object. If the object is real, its *tattva* is reality or existence. If the object is unreal, its *tattva* is unreality or non-existence. Jainism also holds the same view. The *Uttarādhyayana* enumerates nine kinds of *tathyas*. The same *sūtra* describes *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* as the objects of knowledge which constitute the objective reality. In the Nyāya system an objective reality is included in the second category of *prameya*. According to Jainism, all the three realities of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* are included into the first two categories of *jīva* and *ajīva*.

*Dravya* is defined as the abode of *guṇas*. The *Tattvārtha* adds *paryāya* also located in the *dravya*. *Paryāya* means change which exists in all the *dravyas*. *Guṇa* and *paryāya* are the very characteristic of a *dravya*. The Nyāya conception of *karman* is different from the conception of *paryāya*. *Paryāya* is the successive stages through which a *dravya* passes.

In the Jaina view, the *guṇas* and *paryāyas* are relatively different as well as identical with the *dravya*. Yaśovijaya explains this difference by citing the example of a pearl necklace. The necklace differs from the pearls as well as their brightness. In the same way a *dravya* differs from its *guṇas* as well as *paryāyas*. He explains the identity by citing another example. The gold is not different from its brightness and the different forms of earring, bangle, etc., which undergoes. In the same way, *dravya* is not different from its *paryāyas* and *guṇas*.

The difference between *guṇa* and *paryāya* can be further explained in the following manner. A golden jar and an earthen jar

are different from each other in respect of *guṇas*. In respect of *paryāya* they are identical. On the other hand, the successive states of gold as a ring and as a bangle are different from each other in respect of *paryāya* and identical in respect of *guṇa*. *Guṇas* are related with the qualities of the stuff, which is the material cause of a thing. *Paryāyas* are different forms of the same stuff.

In contrast with *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* are relative. *Guṇa* distinguishes one *dravya* from the other *dravya*, and *paryāya* distinguishes one slate from other slate occurring successively. A cloth is different from jar, because, they possess different qualities. This difference is based on *guṇa*. The jar is different from the lump of clay, because it is different successive stage. Here, the difference is based on the *paryāya*.

For the Jaina, *guṇa* and *paryāya* are not two different entities as the Nyāya holds. They are two aspects of the same reality. One is related with numerical difference, while the other with temporal. They are interchangeable in different relation. In the Jaina epistemology, unity or uniformity is represented by *dravya* and difference, numerical as well as qualitative, by *paryāya*, *guṇas*, being mainly a differentia, are included into *paryāya*.

The qualities represented by the *guṇas* are constant. They last as long as the substance does. The qualities represented by the *paryāyas* are changeable and successive. They appear one after another. Secondly, *guṇas* are the qualities of *dravya* only; while *paryāyas* exist both in *guṇas* as well as *dravya*. Colour is *guṇa*, but different shades of black, white, red, etc. are *paryāyas* of it. Similarly, taste is *guṇa*, but different tastes of sweet, bitter, sour, etc. are *paryāyas*. In the case of *jīva*, consciousness is *guṇa*, but different cognitions are its *paryāyas*. Similarly, the change of stuff

into different shapes or forms is *dravya-paryāya*, just as the change of lump of clay into the form of a jar.

Now a jar possesses the particular shape just as the particular colour. The shape is known as *paryāya*, while the colour is *guṇa*. The Jaina would say that all varieties, whether qualitative or numerical related with space or time, are *paryāyas*. The shape and the colour both are *paryāyas*. But there is a set of *paryāyas* which distinguish one substance from the other, and these are called *guṇas*. The *paryāya* is related with different modes or slates of the same *dravya*. The difference between *guṇa* and *paryāya* can be further ascertained on the ground that *paryāya* is a differentia based on change. It is *pariṇāma*. *Guṇas* are not *pariṇāma*. Out of the three synonyms of *paryāya*: i.e., *paryāya* and *viśeṣa* are common to both *guṇa* and *paryāya*. The third synonym *pariṇāma* is peculiar to *paryāya* only.

When we talk of *guṇa*, we mean a quality that exist in the material cause and continues in its different modes. This is why *guṇas* are related with *dravya* only. Moreover, *guṇa* does not change with the change of *paryāya*. The necklace and the bangle possess the same *guṇas*. The Jaina does not admit the destruction of all *guṇas* with the destruction of *dravya* and the emergence of all the *guṇas* with every *dravya*, as the Nyāya holds.

According to Jainism, the criterion of existence is causal efficacy. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not support this view. It holds existence as a separate category and a thing is existent when it inheres (*samavāya*) in that category. On this ground the Vaiśeṣika distinguishes a reality from other categories. He holds the first three categories, i.e., *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *karman* as realities. They inhere in the category of existence. The other categories of *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya* and *abhāva* exist by themselves. Kaṇāda calls the

reality as *artha* and category as *padārtha*. The *artha* has objective existence. It is open to perception, sensual or supersensual. *Padārtha* is merely a logical conception. Praśastapāda observes that the *padārthas* have their sole being within themselves and have the intellect as their indicator. They are not effects, not causes, have no generality or particularity, are eternal and are not expressible in the term thing.<sup>1</sup>

According to Jainism, the categories also are as objective as the realities. The only difference is that the former have no substantial existence. They are included in the very existence of their respective *dravyas*. As a matter of fact, the first two categories of Jainas, i.e., *jīva* and *ajīva*, include the entire world of reality. The remaining seven categories are different phenomena related with soul and its progress towards the final goal. They are not logical but ethical categories. The categories of the Vaiśeṣika are important in the field of epistemology. We cannot conceive an object without them. But the Jaina categories have no bearing on the problem of epistemology. They are related with ethical position of the soul.

According to the Vaiśeṣika, *guṇa* and *karman* inhere in the *dravya*. According to Jainism, they are related in the relation of identity-in-difference. The Vaiśeṣika holds them as separate entities, which inhere in the existence. According to Jainism, they are not totally separate from *dravya*. *Guṇa* and *pariyāya* along with *dravya* constitute the three objective aspects of the same reality. According to the Vaiśeṣika, the first moment of a *dravya* is free from *guṇa* and *karman*, according to Jainism, they are the very ingredients of a reality.

Jainism maintains seven standpoints or *nayas*, according to which a thing is judged. The first three of them are *dravyārthika nayas* and the remaining four as *pariyāyarthika nayas*<sup>2</sup> *Dravyārthika*

*nayas* point to universality, while *pariyāyarthika nayas* point to particularity. The first group carries the idea of one in many and the second that of many in one. These two standpoints do not contradict each other, but represent two aspects of the same reality.

Each of the ideas of generality and particularity can be further discussed in two relations, i.e., (i) in relation to time, and (ii) in relation to number. The same clay undergoes many successive stages till the jar is produced. The idea of the unity of clay in all these stages is based on vertical universality (*ūrdhvatā sāmānya*). It generates the idea of unity in many successive stages of the same object. The units that are linked together by this universality are not simultaneous but exist one after another. The experience of cowness in all the numerically different units of cows is due to horizontal universality or *tiryakāsāmānya*. Individual cows though different in number, possess a uniting link of cowness. Corresponding to these two types of universality, there are two types of particularity also. Both types of universality are presented by *dravya*. A reality is called *dravya* both when it stands as one in all the temporally or numerically different units.

The standpoint representing *dravya* is known as the *dravyārthika naya*. In the case of particularity the successive stages of temporal diversity is represented by *pariyāya* and that of space or number is represented by *guṇa*. But the standpoint representing the both *guṇa* as well as *pariyāya* is *pariyārthika*. There is no *guṇārthika*. This means that *pariyāya* is a comprehensive term which includes both types of difference. There are many references in the *Āgamas*, where numerical diversity also is expressed as *pariyāya*<sup>3</sup>.

Finally, we may touch the note on the Jaina concept of consciousness. The Jaina disagrees with the Nyāya on the following points:

(a) According to Jainism, consciousness is not a separate entity. It is the very nature of the self. It is connected with the self not through the relation *samavāya*, but that of identity-in-difference.

(b) In no state the self remains without consciousness. In the state of liberation it is freed from all contamination and attains the perfect consciousness.

(c) According to Jainism, the self is coextensive with the body. The eternity of the self does not mean total absence of change, but change with permanence.

(d) According to Jainism, all consciousness is self-luminary.

If consciousness (*buddhi*) is supposed to be absolutely distinct from the soul, the consciousness of A is in the same position of his soul as the consciousness of B. that is to say, both consciousness would be equal strangers to the soul of A, and there is no reason why his consciousness should serve him better than the consciousness of any other person, in determining the nature of things. In fact, there is no such thing as his consciousness, all consciousness being equally foreign to him.

The Nyāya tries to explain the above objection by the theory of *samavāya*. But the relation of inherence also being one, eternal and all pervasive, helps any little in this respect. It cannot fix any limitation that the thing is related with A cannot relate with B through the same relation. Moreover, according to the Nyāya, the soul also is all-pervasive. There is no reason why the consciousness generated in the soul of A is not the same relation with B or others.

Further, the Vaiśeṣika holds that the quality of a substance never changes without destruction of the substance (*Pilupāka*). The colour of a jar changes, it does not change by itself. The old colour is destroyed only when the jar also containing it, is destroyed; new colour is produced after the new jar has come into existence. If the same principle is applied in the case of consciousness the soul will become perishable. The Nyāya will have to accept the destruction of consciousness.

Even if it is accepted that inherence unites consciousness with the particular self there is another difficulty which cannot be explained. The inherence is itself a separate category and hence one would have to explain the relation between consciousness and inherence. If there is another relation to unite consciousness, and inherence in question can be put about the second relation also; ultimately it would lead to *ad infinitum*. If the first relation of inherence is self-united and does not require any other relation to be united with consciousness; where the same principle is not applied to the case of consciousness and soul also. They also can be accepted as self-united.

The Nyāya generally cites the example of light, which illuminates the object as well as itself. Similarly, inherence is capable of uniting the objects as well as itself. The soul and *buddhi* do not possess that capacity; because, they possess a different nature. The Jaina raises the same objection in the case of light also. If the light and illumination are two separate things, why the illumination is a function of light only, and is not function of other things. When we say natural capability, it cannot be explained without accepting a relation of identity between the two.

As a matter of fact a substance without quality or action, and a quality or action without substance, are inconceivable. They are essential aspects of one and the same reality. The difference between them is not physical but logical. The Nyāya view that they are separate entities related by a third entity cannot explain the position. Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* has refuted the Nyāya theory of *samavāya*. If an entity and its function are held as separate, the *samavāya* and its function of uniting the two objects also will have separate existences. They will require a second *samavāya* for their unity. The Jaina holds that a substance and its quality are self-related in a tie of identity-in-difference, and no third category is required to unite them.

## Notes and references

1. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, 1.1.4 and 8.2.3.
2. *Anuyogadvāra*, 139.
3. *Prameya Kamalamārtaṇḍa*, p. 466, and *Anuyogadvāra*, 139.

## Chapter-11

### Advaita Critique of *Samavāya*: Śamkara and his followers.

Śamkara's Critique of the relation of *samavāya* is a part of his programmed of rejection of the Vaiśeṣika thesis that the *paramāṇus* are the ultimate constituents of the world. This is technically known as *paramāṇukāraṇavāda*<sup>1</sup>. Śamkara's commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* (II.2.13) is the *locus classicus* of his critique of *samavāya*. The *Sūtra* runs as follows: *samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmyādanavas-thiteḥ*<sup>2</sup>. The *Sūtra* is interpreted as stating that the relation of *samavāya* cannot account for the creation and dissolution of the world. Śamkara presents the atomic theory and then criticizes it. Commenting on the earlier *sūtra* (i.e., II.2.12), Śamkara argues that the conjunction which takes place between the separate atoms at the time of creation is due to some action like the one required to bring about the conjunction of threads into a piece of cloth. The action implies effort on the part of the soul or the impact of one thing like wind against another tree. The effort of the soul is possible only when the mind is joined with the soul and there is impact only after the creation of the products like wind, etc. But neither is possible in the state of dissolution for them, there is neither the physical body nor any evolved product nor thing except in its atomic condition. Creation out of atoms is inexplicable. If it is said that the principle of *adr̥ṣṭa*, the unseen accumulation of merits and demerits causes the original motion of the atoms, where does it reside, in the soul or in the atoms? As a non-intelligent principle, *adr̥ṣṭa* cannot be the cause of action. Nor can it be guided by the soul for, according to the Vaiśeṣika, the soul is not intelligent. Even if it is said to reside in the soul, there will be no connection between

the principle and the atom. If the unseen principle in the soul is said to be connected with the atoms indirectly, there will be perpetual activity and perpetual creation and therefore, no dissolution at all. In the absence of any definite cause of action, there will be no activity in the atoms and so no creation. Even dissolution will be impossible in the absence of any visible cause for the separation of atoms. Rāmānuja asks whether *adr̥ṣṭa* resides in atoms or souls and rejects both views.

Before we take up considering Śaṅkara's explication of the *Sūtra* on *samavāya*, we may clarify certain critical notions.

As per the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position, *samavāya* is the relation that obtains between *avayava* and *avayavī*, *dravya* and *guṇa*, *nityadravya* and *viśeṣa*, and *jāti* and *vyakti*<sup>3</sup>. The relation is itself a *padārtha*, and from the point of view *svātmaka-svarūpa-sambandha*, it rests on the *samavāyī*. It is possible to look at *samavāya* from two angles, *padārtha dr̥ṣṭa* and *sambandha dr̥ṣṭa*. According to the latter mode of apprehension, *samavāya*, by virtue of being itself a relation, it, on its own, relates itself with the *samavāyī*. This is what is called *svātmaka-svarūpa-sambandha*.<sup>4</sup> The relata between which the relation holds are called *samavāyī*. For example, *a*, *b* are *samavāyī* in *aRb*. *Jāti* and *vyakti* are related in *samavāya* fashion, and hence both are *samavāyī* or relata of the relation. The point can be put in another fashion. The relata of the *samavāya* relation are called *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī*. The locus of the relation where the *samavāya* obtains is the *anuyogī*. In the present case, it is *vyakti*, while *jāti* is the *pratiyogī*.

It should be noted that *samavāya* does not imply identity of the relata. Advaita holds that the earthen pot is only conceptually differentiated into earthenness and potness. This is only a *vyavahārika* distinction, but *paramārtha* wise it is only earthen. The

identity incorporates the difference on the basis of identity. Advaita calls it *bhedagarbhita abheda*, and holds the relation to be *tādātmya sambandha*. The *samavāya* relationship does not annul the difference between the relata. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsakas* argue that both the difference and the identity are real, and they call it *svarūpa- sambandha*. This has partial resemblance with *samavāya*. Whereas Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits *samavāya* in order to retain the reality of the relata, Advaita endorses *tādātmya*.

Commenting on the *Sūtra*, Śāṅkara argues that the relation of *samavāya* cannot account for the creation and dissolution of the world. A binary<sup>5</sup> which inheres in two atoms is different from them and the relation of inherence which is equally different from two atoms must be inherent in them on account of a second relation in *samavāya* and so on *ad infinitum*. If *samavāya* is said to be eternally present in the things seen here and before us, *samyoga* also may be said to be eternally connected with things which are joined together and need not depend on a further connection, *samavāya*. Both of them are different from the terms they relate.

Śāṅkara further argues that atoms may be essentially active or non-active or both or neither. If active, there will be no dissolution; if non-active, there would be no creation. Their being both is impossible because of mutual contradiction. If they were neither, their activity or non-activity would depend on an operative cause. Such causes as *adr̥ṣṭa* being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result. If they are not operative causes, permanent non-activity will result. So the atomist view is untenable.

Rāmānuja says that if the *samavāya* related is eternal, that to which the relation belongs is also eternal, and so the world is eternal.

Śamkara has raised the issue of *samavāya* again in connection of his commentary on the *Sūtra* II.2.17 and says that the distinction between *saṁyoga* or conjunction of things which can exist separately and or inherence or connection of things which are incapable of separate existence is futile since the cause which exists before the effect cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. If it is argued that it is the effect which is inherent in the cause, the quality cannot exist independently and apart. How can the quality which has not come into existence be related to the cause at all? Nor can it be said that the effect comes into existence first and is then related with the cause for this would mean that the effect exists prior to its coming into existence and is capable of separate existence. The relation between the two is conjunction and not inherence. Again, there is no proof to show that *saṁyoga* and *samavāya* are themselves actual entities beyond the things in which they exist as relations. Simply because things have names of their own and produce distinct cognitions in us, it does not follow that they are actual entities. Things have an original nature of their own before they acquire a new nature on account of their being related with other things. *Saṁyoga* and *samavāya* have no nature of their own apart from what accrues to them from the relatedness of the things. Atoms cannot enter into *saṁyoga* with each other and *saṁyoga* of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter and *saṁyoga* of the souls and *manas* cannot be the causes of cognitions for these have no parts. If we are asked to assume *samavāya* because otherwise the relation of that which abides and the abode is not possible we will be guilty of mutual dependence.

One might ask, how does Śamkara explain the relation of consciousness and its objects? For him, the relation is difficult to explain. It cannot be *saṁyoga* or contact, or *samavāya* or

inherence. Yet consciousness is related to objects. Śaṅkara suggests that the world is an appearance due to ignorance and so this appearance does not affect the cause in any way, even as a magician is not affected by the illusion, he creates for others. When the appearance of the world is said to be *anirvacanīya*, all that is meant is that it is unique. We cannot describe it as existent or non-existent. The world is said to be *sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa* and *not* non-existent.

Śaṅkara's commentary of the *Sūtra* II.1.18 takes up the issue of *samavāya* in respect of cause and effect relationship. He holds that the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from the cause can be ascertained from reasoning. Experience teaches us that if we wish to produce curd, earthen jars or gold; we do not employ clay for curds, or milk for making jars. If the effect were non-existent in the cause, all this should be possible. Besides, all the effects being non-existent in the cause, anything might come out of anything else. If it is argued that there exists in each cause power to produce a special effect, *aiśāya*, milk for curd and clay for jars, then we assume something prior to the effect which later becomes the effect. If the specific power is considered to be non-existent before its appearance, then the objection is valid that anything may come out of anything else. Is this specific power non-existent before its appearance or is it different from both cause and effect? The specific power view does not help us. If it is said that the cause and the effect do not appear different because they are held together by the connection known as *samavāya*, we have to postulate a second connection and to explain that another and so on *ad infinitum*. If the latter, the cause and the effect, will fall apart from each other and be totally unconnected, the relation of *samavāya* is unnecessary as experience tells us that cause and effect are identical. If the relation between the cause and the effect is regarded as that which exists between the parts and the whole

and if the two are said to be held together by *samavāya*, the question arises whether the who resides in all the parts simultaneously or in some parts successively. If the former exists, the whole may not be perceptible at all. The other side of a jar may not be in contact with the eyes. If the latter, we may infer the knowledge of the whole from the perception of a part. The knowledge of a part of the sword we hold in the hand makes us aware of the whole, though we have no perceptual knowledge of the whole on account of its being hidden in the sheath. The hidden parts of the sword are different from those of the sheath. Thus we introduce a new series of parts between the original parts and the whole or between the cause and the effect. To pervade the second series of parts, a third will have to be devised and so on *ad infinitum*. In short, the effect will be further and further removed from the cause. The effect as a whole cannot be said to reside in each of the parts simultaneously, for in that case, it would be more than one whole. One man cannot reside in two places at the same time. It is possible only when there are two men. The whole cannot reside in each one of the parts simultaneously in the manner in which one *sāmānya* or *jāti* of cow is said to reside in each of the cows simultaneously. For as every cow manifests the *sāmānya* or general character, every part of cause might manifest the whole of the effect. This is not invariably experienced. Besides, if the whole were to reside fully in each part, one may as well the milk of the cow from her horns. Again, if the effect be non-existent before its origination, there would be no notion of origination itself because origination implies a reference to the particular effect and the substratum in which it takes place. Unless the existence of the jar is assumed before it is produced, in the form of its cause, clay, the sentence 'the jar is produced' will have no meaning. If it is argued that origination is the connection of the effect with the existence of the cause, we ask, how can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connection with something else? Connection is

possible of two existing things only, and not one existing and one non-existent thing or of two non-existing things. Only existing things can be spoken of as having limitations. Absolute non-existence or what is altogether featureless cannot be spoken of as 'being prior to' origination. To say that the son of a barren woman was king before Purṇavarman is absurd. For, the son of a barren woman is not only non-existent but is an unreality and so no temporal limitation can be set to him. Even so, at no time will be the absolute non-existence of the effect, viz. a jar be a reality, whatever may be the efforts of the potter. If the existent can never become existent, the *asat-kārya-vādin* may ask, what the purpose of the operative causes, the potter, etc. is. If the effect exists in the cause and is non-different from it, where is the need of the potter to bring out a jar into existence? As the potter puts forth effort, one must assume the non-existence of the effect prior to its origination. To this the answer is that the operative agents arrange the cause in the form of the effect. Even the form is not absolutely new. A mere change in form does not transform one thing into an altogether different thing. People may be seen in different moods and yet they are recognized as the same. If it is argued that they are recognized as the same persons because their conditions are not separated by death, the case of the jar is different because the clay is as destroyed. Śaṅkara says that the analogy is not correct. Milk continues to exist in a different form when we say that it has become curd. Even when the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, when the seed is not seen to exist in the tree, we have to notice the earlier stages of the tree such as the sprouts, to know that they are the later stages of the seed. It is the seed which becomes visible in the form of its sprout, with the accumulation of particles of matter. It becomes invisible, not non-existent, when the sprouts change into something else.

On the *asat-kārya-vāda* the operative agents have no purpose to serve. For it, non-existence cannot be the object of every activity as the sky cannot be modified in any way by weapons. Nor can the cause clay which is said to be *samavāyī* and existent be the object of the activity of the operative agent, for if the effect which is non-existent is to arise from a cause which is different in nature then anything may arise from anything else. If it is said that the effect is nothing but the specific power of the cause, the *sat-kārya-vāda* is accepted. The effect exists prior to its origination in the form of the cause and is identical with it and so is it that everything else becomes known, when Brahman, the cause is known.

In relation to Śaṅkara's critique of *samavāya*, it would be relevant to discuss the views of some other Vedāntins. First, we take Citsukha, and later, Vyāsatīrtha.

(1) To take Citsukha's objections in the *Tattvapradīpikā* against the definitions of Praśastapāda and Udayana. The definition of inherence offered by Praśastapāda is as that the relation which holds between two inseparable entities standing as the substratum and the superstratum and gives rise the awareness 'it is here' ("*ayutasiddhānām-ādhāryyādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyah*"). Citsukha's objections against the definition of *samavāya* about the self-relation of the determinans-determinant (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya*) type between the entities like the absence of jar and the ground is *avyāpti* <sup>6</sup>. First, the self-relation (*svarūpa-sambandha*) is an inseparable relation like inherence. Secondly, any two relata of the self-relation like the absence of jar and the ground may be said as the substratum and the superstratum. Thirdly, as inherence is held to be responsible for the cognition 'it is here', so the self-relation also may be said to stand for the cause of the cognition 'it is here'. The above three possibilities related to the self-relation and inherence like the

absence of jar and the ground proves to be a case of *avyāpti*. Pratyagrūpa, in his annotation, *Nayanaprasādini*, elucidates that the locus of the ground is not anything other than the ground, and the locus of the ground is nothing but its parts which are not different from the ground<sup>7</sup>. Again in case of self-relation, the absence of a jar and the ground are to exist as substratum and superstratum like inherence. The third view holds that when the absence of jar on the ground is cognized, the cognition is certainly the cognition of 'it is here'. So there is no difference between self-relation and inherence, i.e. inherence includes the self-relation; as a result, it proves by 'it is here'<sup>8</sup> as *avyāpti*.

Now if we try to defend the relation of inherence between the cloth and its colour as two positive entities; then it is too weak a case to do. But according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, this relation is not inherence. It belongs to the self-relation. So there is no possibility to establish Praśastapāda's definition of inherence admitting the cognition 'it is here'.<sup>9</sup>

Further, if the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits that the relation between the colour and the cloth is taken as the determinans and the determinant then the defect of over *avyāpti* would be removed. But the difficulty arises in this way that all the cases of the relation between the determinans and the determinant of the inherence include the relation between the determinans and the determinant of the self-relation also<sup>10</sup>.

Citsukha raises a similar objection against Udayana's definition<sup>11</sup>. Udayana defines inherence as an eternal relation<sup>12</sup>. But Citsukha considers it as too wide or *ativyāpti*, since it over covers the self-relation of the determinans and determinant type. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's view is that the self-relation consists of the non-

eternal determinans and determinant. But Citsukha does not accept this view for two reasons:

First, it cannot prevent the *ativyāpti* of the self-relation. In the cognition of the absence of colour in air, the absence of the colour is known as determinans and air to be the determinant, and the relation between the absence of colour and an atom of air is the self-relation of the determinans and the determinant type. Now the relation between the absence of the colour and a jar is non-eternal, then the relation between the absence of the colour and a jar is also non-eternal because both possess the relation between the determinans and the determinant. So the self-relation being non-eternal is to be included inherence and that proves the defect of *ativyāpti*.

Secondly, if the relation of inherence is being eternal between two eternal relata, the relation of self-relation is also eternal in this sense that two relata are to be related with ubiquitous substances which are eternal. Here it is also proved that Udayana's definition of inherence falls under the defect of overcoverage<sup>13</sup>.

(2) Citsukha tries to prove further that there is no proof in favour of inherence. The Naiyāyikas say that perception is the proof of inherence, while the Vaiśeṣikas admit that inference is the proof of inherence<sup>14</sup>. But Citsukha rules out both the views. The Nyāya view of inherence which is recognized by perception will be rejected by Citsukha along with Vallabha, an eminent Vaiśeṣika philosopher<sup>15</sup>. Citsukha argues that if inherence is perceived then it will have to be treated either as the basis of awareness of the substratum, or as the basis of the awareness of the superstratum, or as the basis of the awareness of both the substratum and the superstratum. But he shows that none can be enough to prove the

inherence as perceptible relation. In that case inherence may be held responsible neither for the cognition of the substratum, nor for the superstratum, nor for both the substratum and the superstratum.

One may argue that the perception of inherence occurs when we cognize the tie between a universal and the individual having that universal; it will also be in vain. If so, then either inherence is related with a universal and the individual having that universal, or with the quality and the substance having that quality, or as a mere relation. But Citsukha argues that neither can be enough to prove the inherence as perceptible. The first alternative ultimately leads to infinite regress; because the relation between a universal and the individual having that universal, it may require another relation. Secondly, in the case of second alternative, it falls in another problem in this way that the relation between quality and substance being perceived by its quality not by a universal and the individual having that universal. Thirdly, if it is known as the relation of inherence is mere a relation, then no relation actually being cognized is absurd. The relation as a relation can be the object of knowledge and related with its relata. So 'a mere relation' cannot be presupposed to identify the inherence as perceptible relation. So Citsukha comes to the conclusion that perception is not a proof of inherence.

The Vaiśeṣika view that inference is a proof of inherence is also rejected by Citsukha<sup>16</sup>. He says that there is no such prabans to prove that inherence is cognized by inference. The Vaiśeṣikas may possibly offer an inference that the cognition of 'it is here' is preceded by some relation because it is an uncontradicted cognition of 'it is here'. In this inference, the subject (*pakṣa*) is the cognition of 'it is here' which excludes the self-relation. The prabandum (*sādhya*) of this inference is the precedence of some relation. The

prabans (*hetu*) of the inference is being the uncontradicted cognition 'it is here'. So Citsukha thinks that the relation, of which above inference is anticipated to be a proof, is not inherence. As a result, the inference may be said to suffer from the defect of asserting the asserted<sup>17</sup>.

Again the Vaiśeṣika may argue that inherence is inferred as the basic relation (*mūlāsambandha*) and on the basis of this relation, other relation would emerge<sup>18</sup>. But it is also defective, as because when we take the examples like 'the absence of a jar is on the ground' and 'the colour-inherence is in the cloth'; the prabans of an inference is known to reside in both, that which is the locus of the prabandum as well as which is not the locus of the prabandum; the inference is said to be the fallacy of *sādhāraṇa anaikāntika*<sup>19</sup>. So Citsukha concludes that inference in any such consideration is not valid as a proof of inherence.

Thus, Citsukha shows that neither perception nor inference is the proof of inherence.

In '*Tarkatāṇḍava*', Vyāsatīrtha belonging to the Mādhva school of Vedānta discusses about the notion of *varṇa*-s and has found some difficulties in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence. First, he argues against the proofs of inherence, and secondly, he estimates certain detriments of the theory of inherence.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *varṇa*-s are abridgement gauges which are non-eternal qualities of the organ of audition which is nothing but *ākāśa*<sup>20</sup>, and *ākāśa* is their inherent cause. The *varṇa*-s, therefore, exist in the *ākāśa* by the relation of inherence. But Vyāsatīrtha does not admit this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of *varṇa*. He raises the question against *varṇa*-s which is related with *ākāśa* by inherence<sup>21</sup> from the Vedānta point of view. There are two

reasons: (1) *varṇa*-s is eternal and ubiquitous substances<sup>22</sup>, and (2) there is no proof in favour of inherence<sup>23</sup>.

At first, we look over about the second objection that there is no proof of inherence. Vyāsatīrtha rejects the Nyāya view of perception as the proof of inherence<sup>24</sup>. If inherence is perceived at all, then it must be perceived as either (a) the determinans (*viśeṣaṇa*)<sup>25</sup>, or (b) the determinant (*viśeṣya*)<sup>26</sup>, or (c) something is determined by inherence-hood (*samavāyatvarūpasvarūpa*)<sup>27</sup>, or (d) the relation (*saṁsarga*)<sup>28</sup>. But ultimately he shows that in no way inherence is perceived.

The arguments are as follows:

(a) If inherence is perceived as the determinans, then the determinans are to be cognized as 'these are inherent'. But since the perception of inherence is never cognized in that way, inherence cannot be said to be expressed as the determinans<sup>29</sup>.

(b) If inherence is perceived as the determinant, then the determinant is cognized as 'inherence of these'. But since the perception of inherence is never expressed in that way, inherence cannot be said to be expressed as the determinant<sup>30</sup>.

(c) If inherence is perceived as something determined by inherence-hood, then it is cognized as 'I know inherence'. But since the perception of inherence is never expressed in that way, inherence cannot be said to be perceived as something determined by inherence-hood<sup>31</sup>.

(d) It cannot be said that inherence is perceived as a relation between a jar and its colour. But here Vyāsatīrtha suggests that the

relation between a jar and its colour and the relation between the ground and the absence of something on it are not two different kinds of relations. As between the ground and the absence of something on it is perceived by any relation other than inherence, so between a jar and its colour also is determined by any other relation other than inherence. Thus inherence cannot be said to be perceived as a relation<sup>32</sup>.

Again, Vyāsatīrtha rejects the possibility of inherence as the proof of inherence laid by the Vaiśeṣikas. If the cognition of the relation between a cloth and its threads is to be inferred by inherence, then the inference suffers from the defect of *āśrayāsiddhi* which appears the unreality of the subject (*pakṣa*). Here the thread is the material production (*upādāna*) and the cloth is the product (*upādeya*). Vyāsatīrtha comments that there is no essential difference between the two<sup>33</sup> and for this, inference is fallacious.

So, according to Vyāsatīrtha, inference is not the proof of inherence.

Now here Vyāsatīrtha cites four points of ontological inconsistencies which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence involves called '*bādhaka*'<sup>34</sup>. They are as follows:

First, Vyāsatīrtha argues that if the relation between time and its Numbers is avowed to be self-relation; the avowance of inherence is useless<sup>35</sup>; because all the cases of inherence may be elucidated by self-relation. Again, if it is avowed by inherence, then the self-relation is useless; for all the cases of self-relation may be entertained as conjunction<sup>36</sup>.

Secondly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika esteems that the relation between quality etc. in one hand and its absence on the other hand may be entertained as self-relation. Vyāsatīrtha argues that their relation is endured to be self-relation not because of that the counter-positive (*pratiyogī*) of the absence, or the object (*viśaya*) of the knowledge, is the relation; but because of that the determinans (*viśeṣaṇa*) is the relation. So by determinan-hood, the self-relation is to be included in the case of the relation between quality and substance, i.e. in between the cloth and its threads; for, according to Vyāsatīrtha, it is not justified to endure inherence as a separate relation like self-relation; rather inherence is to be a self-relation<sup>37</sup>, nothing more.

Thirdly, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, inherence is accepted to be a relation who differentiates a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) from a collective cognition (*samūhalambana-jñāna*). Vyāsatīrtha admits the distinction between the two kinds of cognition, but in order to establish, there is no admittance of inherence. For, in a relation, we see only the determinans and the determinant relation (*viśeṣaṇatāviśeṣya*) and this relation is the case of the qualificatory cognition 'the jar is coloured'; here 'colour' means determinans, and 'jar' means determinant. So the relation of inherence is over covered<sup>38</sup>.

Fourthly, inherence can neither be conceived to be related by some other relation nor can it be said to be self-related. If we may try to put another relation between inherence and its relata, then it involves infinite- regress<sup>39</sup>.

Thus, from the above discussion, we may conclude that Vyāsatīrtha's objections are more or less to be justified against the possibility of inherence. For him, inherence is not a separate relation which belongs to inconsistency.

## Notes and references

1. The atom is the smallest partless unary particle of a composite substance. It is imperceptible and further unanalysable.
2. *Vādarāyana (Vyāsa)* (39), p.511
3. "*avayavāvayavinoḥ, jātivyaktyoḥ, guṇaguṇinoḥ, kriyākriyāvatoḥ, nityadravyaviśeṣayoścayaḥ sambandhaḥ, sa samavāyaḥ*".  
-Viśvanātha (77), p. 65.
4. "*yathaiva hyaṇubhyāmātyantabhinnam sad dvyaṇukam samavāyalakṣaṇena sambandhena tābhyām sambandhyata evam samavāyohpi samavāyibhyohtyantabhinnah sansamavāyalakṣaṇenānyenaiva sambandhena samavāyibhiḥ sambandheta; atyantahedasāmyāt*". -Śāṅkara (39), p.511.
5. A binary is molecule composed of two atoms. It is the first atomic product.
6. "*na syādayutasiddhyādi samavāyasya lakṣaṇam. viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhe vyabhicārataḥ*". - Citsukha (16),p.199.
7. "*anyatarasya pṛthagāśrayāśrayitvābhāve bhavatyevāyuta-siddhiriti bhāvaḥ*". -Pratyagrupa, Ibid.
8. "*ihapratyayaśca*".-Ibid.
9. "*atha bhāvayorīdṛsaḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ tathāpīha paṭe rūpasamavāyo rūpasamavāyavānṛpaṭa iti viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāve lakṣaṇasyātivyāptiḥ. uktalakṣaṇasya tatrāpi sambhavāt*".-Ibid.
10. "*atha guṇaguṇinoḥ kriyākārayoravayavāvayavinoṣṭijātimatorviśeṣatadvatośca yaḥ sambandha ukta rūpaḥ samavāya iti cenna. tesāmevānyonyaviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvetivyāpteh*".-Ibid.

11. *"bhavatu tarhyarvācīnamatānusāreṇa nityaḥ sambandhaḥ samavāya itī lakṣaṇamīti cenna."*-Ibid., p. 200.
12. *"tathāca nityaprāptiḥ samavāya itī lakṣaṇnam sūcitam."*  
-Udayana (71), Vol. I, p. 249.
13. *"pratiyoginoranīyatvena sambandhānīyatvāpādanasya sa-mavāyepī samānatvācca"*.- Citsukha (16), p. 200.
14. Ibid.
15. *"kim punaḥ samavāyasiddhau mānam, pratyakṣama-numānam vā?"*-  
Vallabha (73), p. 704.
16. *"nānumānamapi. liṅgābhāvāt"*.- Citsukha, p. 202.
17. *"viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvādhārādheyabhāvasambandhādīnā siddhasādhanatvāt."*-Ibid.
18. *"viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyādereva mūlāsambandhapuraḥsarvatvam sisā-dhayaṣitamīti na siddhasādhanamīti cet."*-Ibid., pp. 202-3.
19. *"ihabhūtale ghaṭābhāva ityusminneva viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvapratyayehnaikāntyāt."*-Ibid., p.203.
20. *"śabdohmbaraguṇaḥ śrotragrāhyaḥ, kṣaṇīkaḥ, .....sa dvividho varṇalakṣaṇo dhvanīlakṣaṇāśca, tatra akārādirvarṇalakṣaṇaḥ."*- Praśastapāda (57), pp. 692-93.
21. *"ākāśātmakaśrotraguṇā varṇāḥ samavāyena sambandhena grhyanta itī tanna."*- Vyāsātīrtha (78), p. 444.
22. *"varṇānām nityavibhūdravyatvāt."* – Ibid.
23. *"samavāye mānābhāvācca."* – Ibid.
24. *"samavāye pratyakṣam na pramāṇam."* – Ibid.

25. "yadvā samavāyo hi viśeṣaṇatvena vā....." Rāghavendratīrtha (78), p. 445.
26. "viśeṣyatvena vā....." – Ibid.
27. "ayaṁ samavāya iti samavāyatvarūpasvarūpena vā....." – Ibid.
28. "saṁsargavidhayā vā bhāseta." – Ibid.
29. "imau saṁyuktāvityādivadimau samavetāviti.....anan-ubhavāt." – Vyāsātīrtha (78), p. 444.
30. "anayoḥ samavāya iti vā." – Ibid.
31. "samavāyaṁ jñānāmītyananuvyavasāyācca." – Ibid.
32. "rūpī ghaṭa ityādeścābhāvavadbhūtalamityādivadupapatt-eh". – Ibid.
33. "upādānopādeyābhedavāde āśrayāsiddheḥ". – Ibid., p. 445-46.
- Vyāsātīrtha assumes the basic and essential identity between the cloth and its threads. He thinks that their difference is only pragmatic, and so apparent.
34. "bādhakacatuṣṭayaṁ duṣpariharam."-Ibid., p. 474.
35. "kālasya svगतena saṁkhyāparimāṇādinā tvayāpi svarūpasambandhaḥ svīkṛta iti kiṁ tatra samavāyena". – Ibid., p. 471.
36. "yadi ca kālasya tena saha samavāyasya sattvāna svarūpasambandhaḥ tarhi kālasya ghaṭena saha saṁyogasya sattvāt svarūpasambandho na siddhet. Sāmyāt." – Ibid., pp. 471-72.
37. "viśeṣaṇatvaṁ ca guṇāderguṇyādāvapi samamiti guṇy-ādāvapi guṇādeḥ svarūpasambandhatvaṁ klṛptameveti kka samavāyasāvākāśaḥ".- Ibid.

38. "api ca ghaṭarūpasamavāyā iti samūhāmbanajñānāt rūpī ghaṭa ityādibuddhervailakṣaṇyāyāvasyamaṅgīkāryeṇa rūpa-sya ghaṭena saha viśeṣaṇatāviśeṣaṇaiva viśiṣṭabu-ddhyupapattau kim samavāyena".-Ibid., pp. 472-73.
39. "samavāyasyāpi svasambandhinā saha sambandhāṅgīkāre anavasthā".-Ibid., p. 473.

## Chapter-12

### Some Debated Issues Concerning *Samavāya* with Concluding Remarks

There are some unique Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories which are not shared by any other systems. *Samavāya* is one of them. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika insists that whatever comes into the range of our experience must have its counterpart in the external world. It avers that in a cognition like 'cloth is white' and whiteness appears as an entity separate from the cloth in which it is experienced as residing. An object of our experience which is one integral whole is thus resolved into two components. If so, there must be some device to unite them once again. That device was conceived in the form of inherent relation called *samavāya*. The function of *samavāya* is to relate two entities which are inseparable. This relation, again, is held to be an external objective reality, i.e., a *padārtha*. Thus not only are there two separate objective entities, cloth and whiteness; there is, besides them, a third entity, the relation between them which is yet another objective reality. If the first five categories, substance, quality, action, etc., are the bricks of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika structure, the mortar to unite them is provided by the sixth category, *samavāya*. It is the *sine qua non* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysical structure which makes it possible for the school to hold qualities and movement (*guṇa* and *karma*) to be entities separate from their substance (*dravya*), and to hold the jar and jarness (*ghaṭa* and *ghaṭatva*) to be two realities, different in essence. Above all, it is the magic of *samavāya* which enables the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to regard threads and cloth as two different substances, and to reconcile somehow the violation of the fundamental principle that two material substances cannot occupy

the same space. It is again the miracle of *samavāya* which makes an inherent cause, say yarn, to retain its essence to itself in entirety and yet to produce, in some mysterious way, a new essence of its effect (cloth). In short, *samavāya* is a unique device to meet all the predicaments and contradictions involved in the metaphysical structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. *Samavāya* has been defined as the relation between two inseparables, *ayutasiddhas*. As to that what constitutes inseparableness is an intricate and disputed point. We propose to consider some of them in this chapter.

## I Buddhist-Nyāya Dialogue

In connection with the conception of relations a basic conflict emerges between the schools. According to the Buddhists, all reality consists of detached, disconnected and discreet bits called moments or *kṣaṇas*, and all relations of those bits of reality are only mental and unreal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds all relations to be objective realities. When one substance is connected with another, as in the case of 'a man with a stick' (*daṇḍī puruṣa*), the connection subsisting between the two substances, the man and the stick, is an objective reality existing in the external world apart from the two objects connected by it. A separate entity called *saṁyoga* is conceived as a quality, which, although by itself *one*, resides simultaneously in the two substances connected by it. The relation of *saṁyoga* subsists between two substances occupying two different spaces. *Samavāya*, on the other hand, is a relation which subsists between two entities occupying the same space. For instances, the *samavāya* relation subsists between a substance and its qualities, movement, etc., or between two substances standing in the relation of cause and effect or what is the same, in the relation of parts and their whole (*avayavas* and *avayavin*). But *samavāya* is not a quality like *saṁyoga*. It is an entity of its own

kind, a separate category. In as much as *sam̐yoga* is a quality, it resides by *samavāya* relation in the two substances which it connects. It would, thus, appear that *sam̐yoga*, which connects two substances, is itself related to them by *samavāya*. This shows how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika went on boldly heaping one reality upon another as a counterpart of every phase of our experience. This is realism with a vengeance which stands in radical conflict with the idealism of the Buddhist. But could the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika go the whole length? A question naturally arises: if a relation called *sam̐yoga* requires another relation called *samavāya*, to subsist in the substances which it relates, *samavāya* should also, by the same logic, require some other relation to subsist in the entities which are related by it. That would mean a series of relations *ad infinitum*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, therefore, declares that *samavāya* is a sort of absolute relation which does not require any other relation for its own subsistence in the objects. On this question, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was vehemently attacked by the Buddhist and others.

## II *Samavāya* and the Theory of Causation

It has been stated that the realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is based amongst other things, on its theory of causation, called the theory of 'non-existent effect' or *asat-kārya-vāda*. According to that theory, the cause and the effect, e.g., threads and cloth are two separate substances, of which the latter resides the former but inherent relation or *samavāya*. That relation makes it possible for the two different and separate substances to occupy the same space. Śrīdhara says that they appear as blended together like an iron ball and fire, *ayah-piṇḍa-vahn̐ivat* (*Nyāya Kandalī*). It is for this reason that the material cause is designated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system as *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, i.e., the cause which contains its effect

within it by *samavāya* relation. The *samavāya* relation is thus the basis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation.

The conception of *samavāya* seems to have originated in connection with the theory of causation. It explains the substance of an effect in its cause, or in other words, the subsistence of one substance in another substance in such a way that both of them occupy the same space. In all probability, the conception of *samavāya* at first originated in connection with the relation of cause and effect. Kaṇāda does not speak of qualities, movements or universals to be residing in their substances by *samavāya* relation. He defines *samavāya* as that which produces in respect of cause and effect the notion of this being contained in that: *ihedam iti yataḥ kārya-kāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*.<sup>1</sup> The *samavāya* thus makes the relation of cause and effect as that of the container and the contained, *ādihāra* and *ādheya*. It appears that once the relation of *samavāya* was established in connection with the theory of causation, its scope was extended to the subsistence of qualities, movements or universals in their substances; and at a later stage, when a separate category *viśeṣa* was formulated, it was also held to be residing in atoms or other eternal substances by the same relation. In the case of non-eternal qualities and movements reside by inherent relation, was regarded as their *samavāyi-kāraṇa* on the analogy of the 'whole' and its 'parts', 'the whole subsisting in its parts' by inherent relation or *samavāya*.

It is clear that full significance of the intricate structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics was not realized by the later writers. Viśvanātha declares that *samavāya* is assumed as a separate category for the sake of brevity (*lāghava*).<sup>2</sup> He points out if an effect were held to be subsisting in its cause, or qualities, etc., subsisting in their substances by the very nature of their substrata

(instead of *samavāya* relation), then the substrata being endless, relations would also be endless. It would thus lead to needless multiplication of assumptions, *kalpanā-gaurava*<sup>3</sup>, and therefore, for the sake of brevity, it was better to assume *one* separate relation called *samavāya*. It is, however, doubtful if the assumption of *samavāya* actually leads to brevity. As a matter of fact, acceptance of a new category involves more assumptions (*gaurava*) than the acceptance of the relation in the form of the substrata which, although endless, do not involve the assumption of a new category. The theory of *samavāya* was not conceived for the sake of brevity, as Viśvanātha says, but that it was the very basis of the entire Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysical structure.

### III Śrīdhara on *Samavāya*

Concluding his discourse on *samavāya*, Śrīdhara summarizes the theory in a *Kārikā* thus:

*Parasparopasaṁśleṣo bhinnānām yatkr̥to bhavat,  
Samavāyaḥ sa vijñeyaḥ svātantarya-pratirodhakaḥ.*<sup>4</sup>

The *Kārikā* says that relation should be understood as *samavāya* which causes different and separate entities to blend together. It precludes the independent existence of one of them. Effect, quality, movement, universal and *viśeṣa* are never found existing independently of their substrata. As for the first part of the statement that in the case of inherent relation, *samavāya*, two related entities appear as if blended together. Śrīdhara establishes the point by contrasting the nature of inherent relation, *samavāya* with that of conjunction, *saṁyoga*. It would, therefore, be desirable to note some of the points of distinction between *samavāya* and *saṁyoga*.

First, *sam̐yoga* obtains exclusively between two substances, as between a stick and a person (*daṇḍī puruṣa*) while inherent relation or *samavāya* does so (i) between two substances, as in the case of an effect residing in its cause, (ii) between a substance and a non-substance as in the case of a quality, movement, universal, or *viśeṣa* residing in a substance, and (iii) between two non-substances, as in the case of a universal residing in qualities and movement. Secondly, *sam̐yoga* exists between two substances which can be separated, whereas *samavāya* exists between two entities which cannot be separated. A man and a stick which are related by *sam̐yoga* can be separated but the cause and the effect which is related by *samavāya*, the effect cannot be separated from its cause, i.e., a cloth cannot exist independently of threads. Thirdly, there is another difference between these two kinds of relation. In the case of *samavāya*, the two entities necessarily stand in the relation of the container and the contained, *ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva*. That which cannot exist without the other is always the contained, *ādheya*, and the other which can exist independently is always the container, the substratum, e.g., effect, qualities, etc., are always the contained and the substance in which they reside is the container or the substratum. In the case of the universal residing in qualities and movement, the universal is the contained, and the qualities and movement are the container or the substrata. But in the case of *sam̐yoga*, the two substances connected by it are not necessarily in the relation of the container and the contained. In the instance of the fruits in the basket, there does exist the relation of the container and the contained, but in the instance of the two connected sticks that relation does not exist; one of them is not the substratum of the other. Praśastapāda describes and defines *samavāya* as that relation which obtains between such inseparables as are in the relation of the container and the contained, and cause the notion of the latter existing in the former. *Ayutasiddhānām-*

*ādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ.*<sup>5</sup>

In *Nyāya-Kandali*, Śrīdhara answers an opponent who raises a question as to why a universal like cow-ness be held to be different from an individual cow, when the two are not cognized as two separate objects but as only one. He says, as to the undivided cognition in the form 'this is a cow' (in which there is no distinction between the individual cow and its universal cow-ness), the cognition is due to the efficacy of *samavāya*, *samavāya samarthyaṭ*. In *samyoga*, on the other hand, there is the cognition of the relation between the two (and hence also a cognition of two) separate objects, but it is the magic power of *samavāya* that the two objects which are related by it appear as if they were blended together like an iron ball and fire, *ayaḥ-piṇḍa-vahnivat piṇḍibhūtāv pratiyete*.

What Śrīdhara brings out here is that in the case *samyoga*, the two related objects distinctly appear to be two, but in the *samavāya* relation, although in reality they are two, they appear as one, and further, it is also the peculiar nature of *samavāya* that are of the objects related by it never exist independently of the other. The question is why and how *samavāya* makes the two objects appear as one, and why, at the same time, they are also cognized as two. In the case of qualities, movement, universal and *viśeṣa* residing in a substance, the explanation may be put forward that being non-substances, they have their abode in a substance, and looked at from the point of view of their substratum, the two appear as one. The difficulty, however, arises in the case of parts and the whole, (the cause of the effect) which are held to be two substances, and which, as such, should not appear as one. The explanation of the contradiction is that the two substances when they occupy the same space appear as one for the simple reason that our intellect is habituated to think that two substances must

occupy two different spaces. Of all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers, it is only Jayanta who has explicitly laid down that the two substances related by *samavāya* occupy the same space. Occupation of the same space by two objects is conceivable when one of the objects related by *samavāya* is a substance and the other is a non-substance, e.g., quality etc. but how can it be possible in the case of two material substances (parts and the whole) to occupy the same space? The only answer that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school can give is that this miracle is wrought by *samavāya* owing to its magic power.

#### IV Jayanta on *Samavāya*

In connection with the discussion on the relation between a universal and its individuals, Jayanta introduces an opponent who declares that the very idea of a relation between two inseparables is self-contradictory. How can inseparableness, *ayuta siddhatā* and relationship be reconciled? *Katham samgacchate?* Only those objects which exist separately like a basket and plum, or a man and woman (*strī-puruṣavat vā*) can be related to one another. Inseparable things, however, being one and identical, which of them can be related to what? Another absurdity is to hold a substance and its qualities as two entities and to imagine a relation existing between them.

In *Nyāya-Manjarī*, Jayanta answers the opponent in a *Kārikā*:

*Pratiti-bhedād bhedosti deśa-bhedas tu neṣyate,  
Tenātra kalpayate vṛttiḥ samavāyaḥ sa ucyate.*

In the *Kārikā*, it is said that there is certainly a difference (between parts and the 'whole', or a substance and its qualities,

etc.) which is proved on account of its being cognized by us, but the difference of the space (occupied by two such things, as parts and the 'whole', or a substance and its qualities, etc.) cannot be accepted, and, therefore, the relation of *samavāya* must be assumed in such cases.

The argument of Jayanta in a nutshell is: we directly apprehend such pairs as parts and their 'whole' or a substance and its qualities. They occupy one and the space which means that one of them subsisting in the other. It becomes, therefore, necessary to assume an extraordinary relation, i.e., *samavāya* to explain the subsistence of one of the pair in the other. Obviously, Jayanta has struck here a basic point of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position.

## V Vācaspati Miśra on *Samavāya*

The *Nyāyavārtikā tātparyatikā* is Vācaspati's masterpiece in which the conflict with the Buddhist reaches its climax, and as a consequence thereof, a firm foundation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism is laid. He is the author of the famous dictum of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, viz., *sambid eva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam*.

Vācaspati adduced the following argument to establish the relation of *samavāya*. Parts and their 'whole', qualities and their substrata, movements and their substrata, universals and their individuals are experienced as mutually related, otherwise cognitions and expressions like 'cloth in the threads', 'white cloth' or 'cloth is a substance', would not be possible. If it be objected that in the instances like 'white cloth' and others there is the cognition of a common substratum (*sāmānādhikarānya*), and not of any relation, it may be questioned as to what is meant by a common substratum.

If common substratum means identity, then in that case the cognition and the assertion of a second thing will be mere repetition. Intelligent people do not consider it to be a repetition, because having cognized one of the two members of a pair (parts and their 'wholes', etc.), they want to know the other. And an object which is one cannot consist of two objects, become duality, being the substratum of difference and being invariably associated with it, cannot subsist in one object. It will involve contradiction. It is, therefore, clear that in such cases as 'white cloth', etc., there are two different objects which are mutually related; but they are experienced as having a common substratum, (i.e., identical). Without a relation between them that experience of identity will be impossible as in the case of two different objects like a cow and a horse.

Vācaspati Miśra then proceeds to explain the difference between the two kinds of subsistence. One of them is in the form of having a common substratum (*sāmānādhikarānya*), as in the above instances where the subsistence is called *samavāya* relation. The other kind of subsistence is seen in the instances like 'curd in the vessel' where the two objects are experienced as separate entities (*vaiyadhikarānyena*), which is case of *saṁyoga* relation. Vācaspati has put forward, more or less, the argument of Jayanta in a somewhat different way. According to Vācaspati, parts and the 'whole', or a substance and its qualities appear as two related objects, and despite the fact that they appear as identical, they must be regarded as separate entities on account of their being two separate cognitions and two separate expressions. And further, the two related things which appear as identical have an extraordinary relation called *samavāya* which is differentiated from connection, *saṁyoga*. Obviously, common substratum (*sāmānādhikarānya*) here means nothing but the occupation of the same space.

'*Adhikaraṇa*', '*āśraya*' or '*deśa*' in the case of *samavāya* relation usually means the substratum in which something resides and not the space. For instance, parts are the *adhikaraṇa* (substratum) of the 'whole' or the substance is the substratum of its qualities. In this sense, parts and their 'whole', or a substance and its qualities do not have a common substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), because while the 'whole' like cloth resides in its parts, the threads, the latter reside in their own parts called *amśus* (fibers of cotton) or, while the white colour of a cloth resides in the cloth, the latter resides in its parts, i.e., the threads, and thus the *adhikaraṇas* are different in both cases.

When it is said that a 'whole' in its parts, or qualities in their substance, reside by *samavāya* relation, it implies that *samavāya* which relates the two must also reside in both of them, but, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, only the container (i.e., the parts or the substance) is spoken of as *samavāyin* (i.e., containing something in it by *samavāya* relation), while the contained entity (i.e., the 'whole' or the qualities) is spoken of as *samaveta* (contained in something by *samavāya* relation). In the case of the relation called *saṁyoga*, there is no such distinction. In the instance of 'a man with a stick', both the 'man' and the 'stick' may be spoken of as *saṁyogin* (having the relation of *saṁyoga*) or as *saṁyukta* (connected by *saṁyoga*). The reason of this difference between *saṁyoga* and *samavāya* has already been explained. Praśastapāda says, rather inadvertently that the property of being *samavāyin* belongs to all the first categories: *dravyādinām pancānām samavāyitvam*.<sup>6</sup> Śrīdhara corrects this statement by explaining that here the property of being *samavāyin* only means subsistence by *samavāya*: *samavāyitvam samavāya lakṣaṇā vṛttih*,<sup>7</sup> i.e., the property of being *samaveta* which belongs to all the five

categories. A substance when in the form of an effect or 'whole' is *samaveta* in its cause (parts).

Be it as it may, *samavāya* must be held to be subsisting in the container, i.e., there must be *samavāya* of the 'whole' in its parts, or the *samavāya* of colour in a substance on account of which the parts or the substance is said to be *samavāyin* (i.e., containing something by *samavāya* relation). But here arises a difficulty. By what relation will *samavāya* itself subsist in an object? If it be by another *samavāya* or some other relation, that will lead to a process *ad infinitum*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, therefore, holds that *samavāya* does not require any other relation for its subsistence. It subsists by itself. Commenting on Praśastapāda's characterization of *samavāya* as independent, *svatantra*, Śrīdhara says that *samavāya* being independent does not subsist by any other relation as *saṁyoga* does: *svatantraḥ, saṁyogavat sambandhāntareṇa na vartate*.<sup>8</sup> It means that *saṁyoga*, which itself resides in the objects (which it connects) by *samavāya*, is dependent on those objects in as much as it is their quality. But *samavāya* is not a quality or property of any other object on which it may be said to be dependent; it is a separate category. The question as to the relation by which *samavāya* subsists in the container (*ādhāra*) is not, however, answered.

Moreover, if *samavāya* subsists in the container which is on that account called *samavāyin*, it should be held to be the property of the container, and there must be some relation by whom that property would subsist therein: A bold answer comes from Uddyotakara. To the question, "why is *samavāya* regarded as independent, *svatantra*," he replies: "It is because it has no other *samavāya* relation for its subsistence. Whatever subsists elsewhere must subsist by some relation, and, therefore, *samavāya* (which has no relation for its subsistence) does not subsist anywhere:

*samavāyāntarābhāvātyadpi yatra vartate tad vṛtṭyā tatra vartate. na ca samavāyāntaram samavāyasya vṛtṭir asti (Nyāya-Vārtika)*<sup>9</sup>.

Uddyotakara argues that *samavāya* does not subsist anywhere because it can be designated by the term *pañcapadārthavṛtṭi*<sup>10</sup>. Whatever can be designated by that term does not subsist anywhere, as for instance, an atom (*paramāṇuvat*). That term is, however, used here in two different senses. An atom is designated by the term when it is interpreted to mean "in which there is subsistence of five categories." Here it is expounded as *Bahuvṛīhi*. *Samavāya* is also designated by the same term, but in that case, it is interpreted to mean something different, i.e., the relation of five categories. Here it is expounded as *tat-puruṣa: pañcānām padārthānām vṛtṭih*. Even Vācaspati, notwithstanding his reverence for Uddyotakara, was constrained to have a fling at his argument. In that way it can be argued that because a cow and speech are both designated by the word 'go', speech should also possess horns like the cow: *mā bhūd go-śabdāsāmyena vāgādinām api viśānitvam (Nyāya-Vārtika- Tātparyatikā)*.

Uddyotakara goes a step further, when confronted with the question, if *samavāya* does not subsist anywhere, why is there a notion of inherence or *samavāya* of cloth in the threads? He answers: that notion of subsistence of *samavāya* is an illusion: *mithyā-pratyaya evaiṣa iti (Nyāya-Vārtika)*.

Uddyotakara, of course, is the solitary instance of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writer who holds that *samavāya* does not subsist anywhere. Other writers merely maintain that *samavāya* does not subsist in its substratum by another relation. They never say that it does not subsist at all. Praśastapāda, however, includes *samavāya* also in the list of the entities which are subsistent (*āśrita*) in some

object: *āśritatvaṃ cānyatra nitya-dravyebhyaḥ*<sup>11</sup>. Commenting on this inclusion, Śrīdhara says that subsistence (*āśritatva*) here means 'being cognized as dependent': *āśritatvaṃ paratantratayopalabdhiḥ (Nyāya-Kandalī)*<sup>12</sup>. Obviously, this contradicts Śrīdhara's own statement that *samavāya* is independent (*svatantra*). The position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has been stated by Praśastapāda: *Samavāya* has got no other relation of subsistence; it is itself in the nature of the relation of subsistence (*vṛtti*): *samavāyasya nānya vṛttir asti tasmāt svātma-vṛttiḥ*<sup>13</sup>. Śrīdhara remarks: it is not true that *samavāya* which has no relation of subsistence does not subsist in an object. Being itself in the nature of a relation, it subsists in an object by itself without the need of any other relation.

## VI Perception of *Samavāya*

Now we are in a position to appreciate the full significance of an *internal controversy* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The followers of the Nyāya school hold that *samavāya* is perceptible while, those of the Vaiśeṣika deny it: *samavāyasya pratyakṣa-varnanam nyāya-matena, Vaiśeṣikamate tu samavāyo'tindriyaḥ (Tarka-Kaumudī of Laugākṣi-bhāskara)*<sup>14</sup>. The reason for this difference of opinion between the two allied schools is not usually appreciated. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, an object can be perceived only if it comes in contact with the sense. Senses being substances can have contact in the form of *saṃyoga* only with other substances. In the case of perception of non-substances i.e., qualities or universals residing in qualities, indirect contacts are postulated. For instance, in the perception of the universal, 'colour-ness' (*rūpatva*) residing in the colour of a jar, the form of the contact is inherence in a thing which is inherent in a connected substance (*saṃyukta samaveta samavāya*, i.e., connected inherent inherence). There is inherence (*samavāya*) of colour-ness in the colour which is inherent

(*samaveta*) in the jar (the substance) which is connected with the eye. Six kinds of such contacts are accepted in the system. The sixth of these contacts is called the relation of being an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa bhāva*) which is accepted in the case of the perception of non-existence (*abhāva*). It is held that if any object, substance or non-substance, comes into contact with the sense by any of the first five forms of contact, and if there resides in that object any non-existence as its attribute, the non-existence is perceived by the sixth form of contact, (i.e., *viśeṣaṇa bhāva*).

The followers of the Nyāya-school point out that *samavāya* is also an attribute of the object in which something resides by that relation, and that *samavāya* also, like non-existence, is perceived by the sixth kind of contact. It appears that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceived the sixth kind of contact mainly to uphold the perception of non-existence against the Mīmāṃsaka who emphatically denied it. According to the Mīmāṃsaka, non-existence is comprehended by a separate means of knowledge called the non-apprehension or the non-existence of apprehension (*anupalabdhi* or *abhāva pramāṇa*). In the *Tarka-bhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, a Mīmāṃsaka opponent points out that to be an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa bhāva*) is no relation at all, because a real objective relation must be different from the objects related by it, and to be an attribute is not different from the attribute itself. Keśava Miśra does not rebut that assertion of the Mīmāṃsaka, but meets the objection by pointing out that the principle that only the objects in contact with the sense can be perceived-is applicable only in the case of positive objects. Non-existence being a negative entity may be perceived even without sense-object contact, merely by being an attribute. Now if only negative objects are perceived through the sixth contact, *samavāya* not being negative one, cannot be perceived through this form of contact. Strongly enough, Keśava Miśra himself overlooked the implication of his own statement, and true to his allegiance to the

Nyāya school, maintained, while describing the sixth kind of contact, that *samavāya* was also perceived through that *viśeṣaṇa bhāva* contact.

The reason of the difference of opinion on this point between the two schools, in all probability, was this: The Vaiśeṣika-school, which was responsible for developing the metaphysical structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, realized the difficulties in explaining the subsistence of *samavāya* in an object. The Vaiśeṣika-school was conscious of the difficulty in establishing a sense-contact with the *samavāya*, and was, therefore, content to hold *samavāya* to be merely inferable. The statement of Praśastapāda to the effect that *samavāya* is itself in the nature of subsistence and has no other relation of subsistence. In the same context he says that *samavāya* is imperceptible, because it has no relation of subsistence, as is found in the universal existence (*sattā*) which resides by *samavāya* relation in the objects that are perceptible: *ata evātindriyaḥ, sattādīnāmiva pratyakṣeṣu vṛtty-abhāvāt*.<sup>15</sup> The Nyāya-school, on the other hand, was not fully conscious of these difficulties, and therefore, on the analogy of the perception of non-existence, it held that *samavāya* could also be perceived through the sixth form of contact.

## VII *Samavāya* as One and Eternal

The category of *samavāya* having been established, the question arises whether it should be regarded as eternal or non-eternal. In the latter case, it would necessarily be multiple, and as it would be an effect (*kārya*), the question of its causation would also have to be confronted. And, as the category in question is of a positive nature, all the three causes will have to be assigned to it. In the case of non-existence which is of negative nature, the Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣika holds that all the three causes are not necessary. The operation of *nimitta kāraṇa* alone produces it.

In order to avoid the difficulties in assigning all the three causes to *samavāya*, it is held to be eternal. A category which is beset with many contradictions could only be assumed as eternal. Now, if *samavāya* is eternal, it can be one, for endless eternal *samavāyas*, each concerned with endless non-eternal effect-objects, would present many difficulties.

The *samavāya* is thus held to be eternal and one. But also some objections are raised. Praśastapāda refers to an objection: If *samavāya* is one, the *samavāya* of *dravyatva* (the universal of substance) and that of *guṇatva* (the universal of quality) being the same, the universal *dravyatva* will reside in the qualities also and *guṇatva* in the substances also. This objection is the problem of *padārtha-saṁkara-prasaṅga*. To this Praśastapāda replies as follows: Although *dravyatva* and *guṇatva* have the same relation as *samavāya*, there is the difference of potentiality of manifestation (*vyaṅgya-vyañjaka-śakti*)<sup>16</sup>, on account of which there will be a restriction in the relation of the container and the contained (*ādhāra* and *ādheya*).

Śrīdhara adds that the potentiality of manifesting *dravyatva* resides only in substances, and therefore, the universal *dravyatva* will reside by *samavāya* relation only in substances and nowhere else: *dravyeṣu eve dravyatvaṁ samavaiti nānyatra* (*Nyāya Kandali*).<sup>17</sup> It would mean that besides the universal *dravyatva* which resides in a substance, there is another attribute called "the potentiality of manifesting *dravyatva*" which also resides in substances side by side *dravyatva*. This shows how the exponents of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were apt to any number of bold assumptions to

meet a difficult situation. Obviously, the answer of Praśastapāda to the objection in question is not convincing at all. Viśvanātha, in his *Nyāya-Siddhānta-Muktāvalī*, meets the objection that *samavāya* being one, the *samavāya* of colour should be present in the air also, by pointing out: "Although the *samavāya* of colour is present in the air, yet there is no colour in the air."<sup>18</sup> Uddyotakara speaks of *samavāya* as *vyāpaka* in the *Nyāya-vārtika*, which can only mean all-pervading, or omnipresent in the sense of *vibhu parimāṇa*.

The problem, however, is, if air has no colour, there can be no cognition of colour. But all this is mere verbal jugglery. How can *samavāya* of colour be conceived without the presence of colour?

The *samavāya* being eternal and one, the question arises whether it is omnipresent also. The question arises in connection with the universal also. The view called *sarva-sarva-gata vā syāt* is stated in the *Nyāya Manjarī*, as against the view *pinḍa-sarvagatā*.<sup>19</sup> In respect of *samavāya* such distinctions are seldom made in the treatises, nor are the answers to objections clearly defined. The universals are endless in number, and therefore, the question of omnipresence arises with reference to all of the individual universals. If the omnipresence of everyone of the endless individual universals can be contemplated, there is greater reason to accept the omnipresence of *samavāya*, which is *one* and which operates not only in the case of all universals, but also in the cases of *viśeṣas*, movements, qualities and substances, which are endless in number. If *samavāya*, besides being eternal and one, is accepted as omnipresent also, objection against the theory of *samavāya*, namely, that a relation between two inseparables is inconceivable, becomes even more impressive. For, it is not only a relation between two inseparables, but also a relation as eternal and omnipresent.

## VIII Definition of *Ayutasiddhi*

The problem of the nature or definition of inseparableness lies at the root of the theory of *samavāya* and it requires some elucidation.

Obviously, any two entities which cannot be separated and are always found as if blended together are said to be inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*). But there are difficulties about it. Every object, for instance, is inseparable from all-pervading things like ether, space or time, but the relation between them is not that of *samavāya*, and therefore, they cannot be regarded as inseparables or *ayuta-siddhas*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thus confronts the problem of finding a definition of *ayuta-siddhi*. It was defined negatively, i.e., by defining separable-ness or *yuta-siddhi*. The definition of *yuta-siddhi* is not given by Praśastapāda in the course of his preliminary treatment of *samavāya* and in the course of the examination of *samavāya* at the end of his treatise; but it occurs under the topic of disconnection (*vibhāga*).

It is held that the disconnection of cause and non-cause brings about the disconnection of effect and non-effect: *kāraṇākāraṇa-vibhāgāt* or *kāryākārya-vibhāgaḥ*. For instance, when, on account of motion, one's hand is disconnected from a point of ether, this disconnection produces the disconnection of the body also from that point of ether. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, disconnection of the hand from a particular point of ether is not the same thing as disconnection of the body from that point. They are two separate entities, the former being the cause of the latter. Here, the hand being a part of the body is the cause, and the body being the *whole* is its effect. The disconnection

between the hand (cause) and ether (non-cause) brings about the disconnection between the body (effect) and ether (non-effect). This means that when the hand moves and produces its disconnection from ether, the body does not move with it. An objection is raised that inasmuch as the body is inherent (*samaveta*, i.e., subsisting by *samavāya* relation) in its part, the hand, the two are inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*) and, therefore, they should move together, otherwise it would lead to the separable-ness of the two. Praśastapāda says that the objection in question has been raised because the real nature of inseparable-ness has not been understood: *yutasiddhidoṣaprasaṅgaḥ iti. na. yuta-siddhyaparijñānāt*<sup>20</sup>. He then proceeds to define "inseparable-ness" (*ayuta-siddhi*) negatively by defining separable-ness (*yuta-siddhi*). As inherent relation (*samavāya*) obtains in both eternal and non-eternal objects, inseparable-ness will also be present in both kinds of objects. Praśastapāda could not find a common definition of separable-ness which may be applicable to both the eternal and non-eternal objects. He gives two different definitions of separable-ness, one for the eternal and the other for non-eternal objects.

Separable-ness of the two eternal things has been defined by Praśastapāda as the potentiality of both or any of them to have separate movement: *sā punrdvayoranyatarasya vā pṛthaggatimattvam*.<sup>21</sup> The phrase "separate movement" or *pṛthag gatimattvam* has been explained by Śrīdhara as the movement which is the cause of connection or disconnection of two objects: *paraspara-saṁyoga-vibhāga-hetubhūta-karma* (*Nyāya Kandalī*). For example, in the case of two eternal entities like ether and atom, the latter possesses the movement which is the cause of its connection with or disconnection from ether, and, therefore, ether and atom are separable (*yuta-siddhas*). The mutual relation, therefore, of ether and atom, or that of two atoms cannot be called to be of inherence.

But in the case, an atom and its qualities, the atom does not possess the movement which can be the cause of their connection or disconnection, and hence they are not separable, i.e., they are inseparable or *ayuta-siddhas*; and the relation between them is, therefore, that of *samavāya*.

In the case of non-eternal entities, the separable-ness has been defined as inherence in separate substrata, *yutesu āśrayesu samavāyaḥ* <sup>22</sup>. For example, a piece of cloth and a jar have their inherence in separate substrata, viz., their parts, the threads and the pot-shreds, and, therefore, the cloth and the jar are separable, and their relation is not that of inherence.

Here the question arises why should there be two different definitions, one of separable-ness of eternal objects and the other for that of the non-eternal ones. The former definition, i.e., one or both of the related objects having the potentiality of separate movements is applicable in the case of non-eternal objects also. For example, a piece of cloth and a jar can have separate movements. But Praśastapāda points out a case of non-eternal objects to which that definition does not apply. For instance, the sense-organ of touch (skin) and the body are held to be two separate objects whose relation is not that of inherence, *samavāya* but that of *samyoga*. Senses are not held to be parts of the body. Yet they cannot have separate movements. Hence, there arises the necessity of a separate definition which may cover all the cases of non-eternal objects. The new definition, viz., inherence in separate substrata is applicable to the sense-organs of touch and the body which have inherence in separate substrata, viz., their respective constituent parts. As for the definition of separable-ness of non-eternals, it is obviously not applicable to eternal objects, for the latter do not inhere in any substrata at all.

It may be pointed out that the definition of separable-ness (*yuta-siddhi*) as inherence in separate substrata is logically defective, because the word separate or *yuta* in the definition of separable-ness, *yuta-siddhi*, should not have been used. Secondly, the words 'separate substrata' are important words in the definition. They cannot mean 'different substrata' because in that case separable-ness will exist in the case of threads and cloth also. Their substrata, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, are different; the cloth resides in threads and the threads in their constituent parts, viz., the fibres of cotton or *amśus*. Śrīdhara, therefore, amends the definition and says that separable-ness in the case of non-eternals in the *inherence* of one of the related objects in a different substratum of such a kind as excludes (even indirectly) the subsistence of the other there from: *paraspara-parihareṇāna pṛthgāśrāśrayitvam sā yayornāsti tāvayutasiddhou, tayoh sambandhaḥ samavāyah*<sup>23</sup> (*Nyāya Kandalī*). In the example of threads and cloth, although they subsist in their different substrata, as stated above, one of them (threads) subsist in its parts, viz., the fibres of cotton, which (indirect) subsistence of cloth cannot be excluded. Here the cloth subsists in threads which subsist in the fibers of cotton.

It appears that so far as material substances are concerned, their separable-ness, as amended by Śrīdhara, is reduced to this: such material objects as occupy two different points of space are separable. For instance, the cloth and the jar occupy two different points of space, and, therefore, they are separable, but the threads and the cloth (though, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, they are two different corporeal substances) occupy the same space, and therefore, they are not separable. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika speaks of a material object having its substratum or abode (*ādhāra* or *deśa*), not in space, but only in its inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). The Buddhist, in conformity with modern

science, holds that a characteristic of matter (*rūpa*) is its impenetrability (*sapratighatva*) which means that space occupied by one material object cannot, at the same time, be occupied by another<sup>24</sup>. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, says with regard to four kinds of material substances (*kārya dravyas*, earth, water, etc.) that their occupying of the same place (*samāna-deśatā*) is precluded in the sense that only *one* material object can subsist by inherent relation, or *samavāya* in the same substratum. For example, cloth subsists in its cause, the threads, by *samavāya* relation, and therefore, no other material object can subsist in the same threads by the same relation: *dravyāṅām ekatra samavāyena samāna deśatam vyāsedhāmaḥ* (*Nyāya vārtika-tātparya-tikā* by Vācaspati Miśra). But so far do the threads and the cloth occupy the same space, but the inherent cause of the threads (fibres of cotton called *amśus*) and the inherent cause of the latter and so on up to *dvaṅukas*, a whole series of material objects in the form of cause and effect-occupy the same space. It will, thus, appear that matter, as it is understood the Buddhist, is altogether excluded from the domain of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.

## II

We now propose to reiterate some of the observations made earlier, and add a few more comparative points with a view to having an overview of the domain of thoughts concerning *samavāya*.

Admission or non-admission of *samavāya* has been epistemic as well as ontological bone of contention amongst the philosophers of various persuasions. The Buddhists raised critical points with regard to not admitting the concept of relation in general, and *samavāya* in particular. Apropos of their ontological position, physical objects are non-eternal, and hence *samavāya* viewed as

*nitya* could not be endorsed by them. Dharmakīrti's critique of relation in the chapter on *Sambandhaparikṣā* in the *Pramāṇavārttika* is a case in point. He argues that since all entities are momentary, and moments have separate modes of existence along with other moments, how can a relation bind two disparate entities? A relation is, hence, a conceptual fiction set up by our minds, and does not enjoy an objective reality at all.<sup>25</sup> It also follows that the knowledge of relation is unreal. It can neither be affirmed on the strength of perception, nor is it available as *anumiti*. Śāntarakṣita puts forward a refutation of *samavāya* in his *Tattvasaṅgraha*, by arguing that even though one relation is destroyed, the relation cannot at all be said to persist.

The Vedāntins of the Sāṅkara's school are anti-*samavāya* thinkers. They too refuse to endorse the existence of *samavāya* as an objective entity. Even the Mīmāṃsakas, both the Bhaṭṭas and the Prābhākaras, do not admit *samavāya* as an independent category that may be said to be one, eternal and *ayutasiddha*. The Bhaṭṭas are uncompromisingly against the category status of *samavāya*. Some concession is of course made by the Prābhākaras. They do admit *samavāya* as a category, though not eternal. The only relation they endorse is that of identity-cum-difference or *tādātmya*.

As per the Śāṅkhya view there obtains a catalytic or *sannidhi* relation between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, both of which are eternal objects or *tattvas*. Nor are they eternally related. Their ontological duality constitutes *kaivalya*, the end of the evolutionary cycle.

The Jainas go a long way with Nyāya in admitting *samavāya* as an objective entity, where they do differ is in not agreeing to consider the relation as *nitya* independently of its relata. For the Jainas, no relation can be properly so-called without the terms it

relates. Apart from this partial admission of *samavāya*, their arguments resemble that of the Buddhists and the Vedāntins.

It is possible to ask now: why should the philosophers refuse to endorse or admit *samavāya* in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika fashion? What is their logical compulsion? Are they constrained by their ontological or metaphysical presuppositions and commitments?

The Buddhist view of the world as constituted by momentarily arising and perishing elements precludes the possibility of admitting any relation whatsoever. Nor can any relation subsist with momentary relata. This is the problem of metaphysics. Contrarily, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is realism, and its architectonic is structured in terms of objectively existing entities. Accordingly, for it, *samavāya* is *nitya* and one. It may be said that any pluralistic system will have to admit relations, either *tādātmya*, or *saṁyoga* or *samavāya*. The Buddhists cannot admit *samavāya* on the ground of their own metaphysics. When they offer a critique of relations, they do it by arguing at cross purposes. The concept of *nitya* is foreign to the Buddhist's vocabulary.

When the Vedāntins of Śaṅkara's school argue against *samavāya* (they do indeed admit *saṁyoga* in the domain of *vyavahārika sattā*) they are under the shadow of their own metaphysical presuppositions. For them, plurality is a fiction. The unity and eternality of Brahman is the material cause of the *vivarta* or *jagat*. The two-fold reality (*sattā*) strata, *vyavahārika* and *pāramārthika* fall apart or one is sub-lated into the other. How are the two related? The answer is that the *vyavahārika* is superimposed on the *pāramārthika* substratum. Since only one of the reality strata exists, i.e., the *pāramārthika*, the *vyavahārika* is only an appearance, analogically similar to the illusory snake misperceived in the place of the rope, there cannot be any relation

between the *nitya* and the *anitya* modes of being. For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *samavāya* subsists between two real existents. This condition is hardly even fulfilled by Vedānta premises. Monism coupled with anti-pluralism, make for Vedānta, admission of *samavāya* logically impossible.

We have seen that Mīmāṃsā in both of its forms, Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara, entertains no such relation that may be at the same time one, eternal and *ayutasiddha*. Prabhākara questions the property of *nityatva*, while Kumārīla rejects the relation outright. And when who evanescent relata come together, the relation too is bound to be evanescent as well. This is what Śāntarakṣita had argued: of the two relata if one is annihilated, where does *samavāya* exist? The relation itself goes out of existence. Prabhākara further added that *samavāya* can be admitted only on the condition of *gaurava*. Whenever one admits eternity of a relation, there occurs *samavāya*, and it is so justified, and whenever one says that a relation is evanescent, there is *samyoga*. Prabhākara invests the relation with a dual role.

The Bhāṭṭas in admitting *samavāya* switches over to the relation interpreted as identity-cum-difference. But can they as realists do away with *samavāya* altogether? Will their ontology allow it? As per their relation are they not obliged to endorse the relation? But there are realists elsewhere as Moore and Russell who deny internal relation in favour of external relation. Whatever it is, one notices that a Bhāṭṭa endorses the relation of difference in consonance with Prābhākaras and Naiyāyikas on one hand, and the relation of identity like the Buddhists and the Advaitins. His arguments against *samavāya* are based upon idealistic premises on one side, and realism on the other. This double dealing puts alleged realism of the Bhāṭṭas in philosophical jeopardy.

The point that now emerges is that the Mīmāṃsakas partially concur with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in holding that there exists a type of relation between two inseparable entities. Again, in as much as they subscribe to *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*, i.e., knowledge is directly apprehended in perception, to encounter a coloured jar is to perceive it either as a jar or along with its property of being coloured. To say so is to imply partial apprehension of the given object, while the relation between the jar and its colour is indeed a direct cognition. A red apple, said Bradley, is red all over. The Mīmāṃsā view, in terms of its ontology is ill-equipped to explain *samavāya*, and can only have recourse to *tādātmya* instead.

As for Śāṅkhya dualism of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, both are eternal *tattvas* and are mutually exclusive. Speaking ontologically, *puruṣa* is so defined as to be impotent to undertake any creative adventure, though conceit and forever has its being in freedom. Contrariwise, *prakṛti*, though *nitya*, is inert and inconscient. The alleged causality constitutes in their coming together (*sannidhi* or *sāhitya*). *Puruṣa* does not at all act upon *prakṛti*. There subsists no causal relation worth the name between them, even though Śāṅkhya holds on to *pariṇāmavāda*. The effect preexists in its own cause; there is no *upādāna kāraṇa* properly so-called. Between the two eternally valid and ever distinct *tattvas* there does not obtain any *samavāya*.

*Samavāya* has been a distinct feature of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, and charted a path in metaphysics as well. Apart from *saṃyoga*, *samavāya* is a unique relation, and may be said to be "the cement of the universe", to borrow the phrase from J.L. Mackie. The two relata are *nitya* independently of the being or non-being (*abhāva*) of the relata. In no other system of Indian thought, *samavāya* belongs to the set of eternal substances like *sāmānya*. Even then these are not relationally independent; they require some

relation in order to get related with other relation. How can *jātī* and *vyakti* be related without *samavāya*? All positive *padārthas* are supervised by *samavāya*, which, of course, can stand by itself. *Samavāya* indeed is the cement of the universe, for whenever creation begins, *samavāya* relates; creation cannot take place unless action is initiated in the atom by *samavāya*. It is relation *per excellence*. Even Śāṅkhya, as absorbed in *Tantra* endorsed *samavāya* in the conception of *Ardhanārīśvara*, the biunity of the primal causes of creation.

## Notes and references

1. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, -7-2-26.
2. *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, -on Verse 11.
3. Ibid.
4. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 786, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
5. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-9.
6. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-3.
7. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 14, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
8. Ibid. p. 780.
9. Uddyotakara, *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 120-121, ed. by Dr. Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī, 1986. (Hindi).
10. Ibid. p. 121.
11. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-3
12. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 41, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
13. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-9.
14. *Tarka-Kaumudī* of Laugākṣi-bhāskara.
15. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-9.
16. Ibid.
17. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 782, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.

18. " *na ca samavāyasyaikatve vāyou rūpavattābuddhi-prasaṅgaḥ; tatra rūpasamavāyasattve'pi rūpābhāvāt.*"- *Nyāyasiddhāntamuk-tāvalī*, on Verse 11.
19. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 774, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
20. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-5.
21. Ibid.
22. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-5.
23. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 37, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
24. Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception of Buddhism*, p.11.
25. " *sambandhaḥ kalpanākṛtaḥ sambandhacintā*,"- *Pramāṇa Vārttika*, III. 237.

## A note on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-Mīmāṃsā linkage

Kumārīla did not recognize a radical difference between the universal and its particulars. According to him, the two are different as well as non-different. Nor does he accept the relation of inherence between a universal and its particulars. According to him, the relation is that of identity of the two which are different and non-different: *bhedābheda-rūpam tādātmyam*. With regard to the contradiction involved in this position it was said that the nature of things could not be questioned. The merit of Kumārīla's theory, however, is that it steers clear of all the difficulties raised in connection with the subsistence of the universal in its particulars. It follows that Kumārīla will go no way in admitting the reality of *samavāya* relation. Jayanta actually lays a charge at the door of the Kumārīla school, and says that the venerable one (Kumārīla) formulated his theory, as if out of fear of the difficulties involved in the various alternatives regarding the subsistence of the universal: *etat tu vṛtti-vikalpādibhyo bibhya-tevabhyupagataṁ tatra bhavatā* (*Nyāya Manjarī*, Part I, line 16).

The view of Prabhākara school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā is similar to that of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Prabhākara maintains that the universal is different from its particulars in which it subsists by *samavāya* relation. He also holds that the universals are directly perceived: *jātir āśrayato bhinnā pratyakṣajñāna-gocara* (Quoted in the *Prabhākara school of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* by Ganganath Jha, p.95). But the *samavāya* relation, according to him, is neither *one* nor eternal. It is born anew in the case of every entity related by *samavāya*. In this connection, it may be noted that (i) according to

the Kumārīla school, the relation between the universal and its particulars is that of identity (*tādātmya*), (ii) according to Prabhākara, it is *samavāya*, but is non-eternal, (iii) according to the Vaiśeṣika, it is *samavāya* which is *one* and eternal, but not perceptible, and (iv) according to the Nyāya, it is *samavāya* which is one and eternal, and also perceptible.

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