

Chapter-12

Some Debated Issues Concerning *Samavāya* with Concluding Remarks

There are some unique Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theories which are not shared by any other systems. *Samavāya* is one of them. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika insists that whatever comes into the range of our experience must have its counterpart in the external world. It avers that in a cognition like 'cloth is white' and whiteness appears as an entity separate from the cloth in which it is experienced as residing. An object of our experience which is one integral whole is thus resolved into two components. If so, there must be some device to unite them once again. That device was conceived in the form of inherent relation called *samavāya*. The function of *samavāya* is to relate two entities which are inseparable. This relation, again, is held to be an external objective reality, i.e., a *padārtha*. Thus not only are there two separate objective entities, cloth and whiteness; there is, besides them, a third entity, the relation between them which is yet another objective reality. If the first five categories, substance, quality, action, etc., are the bricks of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika structure, the mortar to unite them is provided by the sixth category, *samavāya*. It is the *sine qua non* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysical structure which makes it possible for the school to hold qualities and movement (*guṇa* and *karma*) to be entities separate from their substance (*dravya*), and to hold the jar and jarness (*ghaṭa* and *ghaṭatva*) to be two realities, different in essence. Above all, it is the magic of *samavāya* which enables the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to regard threads and cloth as two different substances, and to reconcile somehow the violation of the fundamental principle that two material substances cannot occupy

the same space. It is again the miracle of *samavāya* which makes an inherent cause, say yarn, to retain its essence to itself in entirely and yet to produce, in some mysterious way, a new essence of its effect (cloth). In short, *samavāya* is a unique device to meet all the predicaments and contradictions involved in the metaphysical structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. *Samavāya* has been defined as the relation between two inseparables, *ayutasiddhas*. As to that what constitutes inseparability is an intricate and disputed point. We propose to consider some of them in this chapter.

I Buddhist-Nyāya Dialogue

In connection with the conception of relations a basic conflict emerges between the schools. According to the Buddhists, all reality consists of detached, disconnected and discreet bits called moments or *kṣanas*, and all relations of those bits of reality are only mental and unreal. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, holds all relations to be objective realities. When one substance is connected with another, as in the case of 'a man with a stick' (*dandī puruṣa*), the connection subsisting between the two substances, the man and the stick, is an objective reality existing in the external world apart from the two objects connected by it. A separate entity called *samyoga* is conceived as a quality, which, although by itself *one*, resides simultaneously in the two substances connected by it. The relation of *samyoga* subsists between two substances occupying two different spaces. *Samavāya*, on the other hand, is a relation which subsists between two entities occupying the same space. For instances, the *samavāya* relation subsists between a substance and its qualities, movement, etc., or between two substances standing in the relation of cause and effect or what is the same , in the relation of parts and their whole (*avayavas* and *avayavin*). But *samavāya* is not a quality like *samyoga*. It is an entity of its own

kind, a separate category. In as much as *samyoga* is a quality, it resides by *samavāya* relation in the two substances which it connects. It would, thus, appear that *samyoga*, which connects two substances, is itself related to them by *samavāya*. This shows how the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika went on boldly heaping one reality upon another as a counterpart of every phase of our experience. This is realism with a vengeance which stands in radical conflict with the idealism of the Buddhist. But could the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika go the whole length? A question naturally arises: if a relation called *samyoga* requires another relation called *samavāya*, to subsist in the substances which it relates, *samavāya* should also, by the same logic, require some other relation to subsist in the entities which are related by it. That would mean a series of relations *ad infinitum*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, therefore, declares that *samavāya* is a sort of absolute relation which does not require any other relation for its own subsistence in the objects. On this question, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika was vehemently attacked by the Buddhist and others.

II *Samavāya* and the Theory of Causation

It has been stated that the realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika is based amongst other things, on its theory of causation, called the theory of 'non-existent effect' or *asat-kārya-vāda*. According to that theory, the cause and the effect, e.g., threads and cloth are two separate substances, of which the latter resides the former but inherent relation or *samavāya*. That relation makes it possible for the two different and separate substances to occupy the same space. Śridhara says that they appear as blended together like an iron ball and fire, *ayah-pinda-vahṇivat* (*Nyāya Kandalī*). It is for this reason that the material cause is designated in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system as *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, i.e., the cause which contains its effect

within it by *samavāya* relation. The *samavāya* relation is thus the basis of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of causation.

The conception of *samavāya* seems to have originated in connection with the theory of causation. It explains the subsistence of an effect in its cause, or in other words, the subsistence of one substance in another substance in such a way that both of them occupy the same space. In all probability, the conception of *samavāya* at first originated in connection with the relation of cause and effect. Kaṇāda does not speak of qualities, movements or universals to be residing in their substances by *samavāya* relation. He defines *samavāya* as that which produces in respect of cause and effect the notion of this being contained in that: *iḥedam iti yataḥ kārya-kāraṇayoh sa samavāyah*.¹ The *samavāya* thus makes the relation of cause and effect as that of the container and the contained, *ādhāra* and *ādheya*. It appears that once the relation of *samavāya* was established in connection with the theory of causation, its scope was extended to the subsistence of qualities, movements or universals in their substances; and at a later stage, when a separate category *viśeṣa* was formulated, it was also held to be residing in atoms or other eternal substances by the same relation. In the case of non-eternal qualities and movements reside by inherent relation, was regarded as their *samavāyi-kāraṇa* on the analogy of the 'whole' and its 'parts', 'the whole subsisting in its parts' by inherent relation or *samavāya*.

It is clear that full significance of the intricate structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics was not realized by the later writers. Viśvanātha declares that *samavāya* is assumed as a separate category for the sake of brevity (*lāghava*).² He points out if an effect were held to be subsisting in its cause, or qualities, etc., subsisting in their substances by the very nature of their substrata

(instead of *samavāya* relation), then the substrata being endless, relations would also be endless. It would thus lead to needless multiplication of assumptions, *kalpanā-gaurava*³, and therefore, for the sake of brevity, it was better to assume *one* separate relation called *samavāya*. It is, however, doubtful if the assumption of *samavāya* actually leads to brevity. As a matter of fact, acceptance of a new category involves more assumptions (*gaurava*) than the acceptance of the relation in the form of the substrata which, although endless, do not involve the assumption of a new category. The theory of *samavāya* was not conceived for the sake of brevity, as Viśvanātha says, but that it was the very basis of the entire Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysical structure.

III Śrīdhara on *Samavāya*

Concluding his discourse on *samavāya*, Śrīdhara summarizes the theory in a *Kārikā* thus:

*Parasparopasamśleśo bhinnānām yatkṛto bhavat,
Samavāyah sa vijñeyah svātantarya-pratirodhakah.*⁴

The *Kārikā* says that relation should be understood as *samavāya* which causes different and separate entities to blend together. It precludes the independent existence of one of them. Effect, quality, movement, universal and *viśeṣa* are never found existing independently of their substrata. As for the first part of the statement that in the case of inherent relation, *samavāya*, two related entities appear as if blended together. Śrīdhara establishes the point by contrasting the nature of inherent relation, *samavāya* with that of conjunction, *samyoga*. It would, therefore, be desirable to note some of the points of distinction between *samavāya* and *samyoga*.

First, *samyoga* obtains exclusively between two substances, as between a stick and a person (*dandī puruṣa*) while inherent relation or *samavāya* does so (i) between two substances, as in the case of an effect residing in its cause, (ii) between a substance and a non-substance as in the case of a quality, movement, universal, or *viśeṣa* residing in a substance, and (iii) between two non-substances, as in the case of a universal residing in qualities and movement. Secondly, *samyoga* exists between two substances which can be separated, whereas *samavāya* exists between two entities which cannot be separated. A man and a stick which are related by *samyoga* can be separated but the cause and the effect which is related by *samavāya*, the effect cannot be separated from its cause, i.e., a cloth cannot exist independently of threads. Thirdly, there is another difference between these two kinds of relation. In the case of *samavāya*, the two entities necessarily stand in the relation of the container and the contained, *ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva*. That which cannot exist without the other is always the contained, *ādheya*, and the other which can exist independently is always the container, the substratum, e.g., effect, qualities, etc., are always the contained and the substance in which they reside is the container or the substratum. In the case of the universal residing in qualities and movement, the universal is the contained, and the qualities and movement are the container or the substrata. But in the case of *samyoga*, the two substances connected by it are not necessarily in the relation of the container and the contained. In the instance of the fruits in the basket, there does exist the relation of the container and the contained, but in the instance of the two connected sticks that relation does not exist; one of them is not the substratum of the other. Praśastapāda describes and defines *samavāya* as that relation which obtains between such inseparables as are in the relation of the container and the contained, and cause the notion of the latter existing in the former. *Ayutasiddhānām-*

*ādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha iha pratyayahetuh sa samavāyah.*⁵

In *Nyāya-Kandalī*, Śrīdhara answers an opponent who raises a question as to why a universal like cow-ness be held to be different from an individual cow, when the two are not cognized as two separate objects but as only one. He says, as to the undivided cognition in the form 'this is a cow' (in which there is no distinction between the individual cow and its universal cow-ness), the cognition is due to the efficacy of *samavāya, samavāya samarthyāt*. In *samyoga*, on the other hand, there is the cognition of the relation between the two (and hence also a cognition of two) separate objects, but it is the magic power of *samavāya* that the two objects which are related by it appear as if they were blended together like an iron ball and fire, *ayaḥ-pindā-vahṇivat pindibhūtāv pratiyete*.

What Śrīdhara brings out here is that in the case *samyoga*, the two related objects distinctly appear to be two, but in the *samavāya* relation, although in reality they are two, they appear as one, and further, it is also the peculiar nature of *samavāya* that are of the objects related by it never exist independently of the other. The question is why and how *samavāya* makes the two objects appear as one, and why, at the same time, they are also cognized as two. In the case of qualities, movement, universal and *vīśeṣa* residing in a substance, the explanation may be put forward that being non-substances, they have their abode in a substance, and looked at from the point of view of their substratum, the two appear as one. The difficulty, however, arises in the case of parts and the whole, (the cause of the effect) which are held to be two substances, and which, as such, should not appear as one. The explanation of the contradiction is that the two substances when they occupy the same space appear as one for the simple reason that our intellect is habituated to think that two substances must

occupy two different spaces. Of all the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writers, it is only Jayanta who has explicitly laid down that the two substances related by *samavāya* occupy the same space. Occupation of the same space by two objects is conceivable when one of the objects related by *samavāya* is a substance and the other is a non-substance, e.g., quality etc. but how can it be possible in the case of two material substances (parts and the whole) to occupy the same space? The only answer that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school can give is that this miracle is wrought by *samavāya* owing to its magic power.

IV Jayanta on *Samavāya*

In connection with the discussion on the relation between a universal and its individuals, Jayanta introduces an opponent who declares that the very idea of a relation between two inseparables is self-contradictory. How can inseparableness, *ayuta siddhatā* and relationship be reconciled? *Katham samgacchate?* Only those objects which exist separately like a basket and plum, or a man and woman (*strī-puruṣavat vā*) can be related to one another. Inseparable things, however, being one and identical, which of them can be related to what? Another absurdity is to hold a substance and its qualities as two entities and to imagine a relation existing between them.

In *Nyāya-Manjari*, Jayanta answers the opponent in a *Kārikā*:

*Pratiti-bhedād bhedosti deśa-bhedaś tu neṣyate,
Tenātra kalpayate vṛttiḥ samavāyaḥ sa ucyate.*

In the *Kārikā*, it is said that there is certainly a difference (between parts and the 'whole', or a substance and its qualities,

etc.) which is proved on account of its being cognized by us, but the difference of the space (occupied by two such things, as parts and the 'whole', or a substance and its qualities, etc.) cannot be accepted, and, therefore, the relation of *samavāya* must be assumed in such cases.

The argument of Jayanta in a nutshell is: we directly apprehend such pairs as parts and their 'whole' or a substance and its qualities. They occupy one and the space which means that one of them subsisting in the other. It becomes, therefore, necessary to assume an extraordinary relation, i.e., *samavāya* to explain the subsistence of one of the pair in the other. Obviously, Jayanta has struck here a basic point of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position.

V Vācaspati Miśra on *Samavāya*

The *Nyāyavārtikā tātparyatikā* is Vācaspati's masterpiece in which the conflict with the Buddhist reaches its climax, and as a consequence thereof, a firm foundation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realism is laid. He is the author of the famous dictum of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school, viz., *sambid eva hi bhagavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam*.

Vācaspati adduced the following argument to establish the relation of *samavāya*. Parts and their 'whole', qualities and their substrata, movements and their substrata, universals and their individuals are experienced as mutually related, otherwise cognitions and expressions like 'cloth in the threads', 'white cloth' or 'cloth is a substance', would not be possible. If it be objected that in the instances like 'white cloth' and others there is the cognition of a common substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*), and not of any relation, it may be questioned as to what is meant by a common substratum.

If common substratum means identity, then in that case the cognition and the assertion of a second thing will be mere repetition. Intelligent people do not consider it to be a repetition, because having cognized one of the two members of a pair (parts and their 'wholes', etc.,), they want to know the other. And an object which is one cannot consist of two objects, become duality, being the substratum of difference and being invariably associated with it, cannot subsist in one object. It will involve contradiction. It is, therefore, clear that in such cases as 'white cloth', etc., there are two different objects which are mutually related; but they are experienced as having a common substratum, (i.e., identical). Without a relation between them that experience of identity will be impossible as in the case of two different objects like a cow and a horse.

Vācaspati Miśra then proceeds to explain the difference between the two kinds of subsistence. One of them is in the form of having a common substratum (*sāmānādhikaranya*), as in the above instances where the subsistence is called *samavāya* relation. The other kind of subsistence is seen in the instances like 'curd in the vessel' where the two objects are experienced as separate entities (*vaiyadhikaraṇyena*), which is case of *samyoga* relation. Vācaspati has put forward, more or less, the argument of Jayanta in a somewhat different way. According to Vācaspati, parts and the 'whole', or a substance and its qualities appear as two related objects, and despite the fact that they appear as identical, they must be regarded as separate entities on account of their being two separate cognitions and two separate expressions. And further, the two related things which appear as identical have an extraordinary relation called *samavāya* which is differentiated from connection, *samyoga*. Obviously, common substratum (*sāmānād-hikaranya*) here means nothing but the occupation of the same space.

'*Adhikaraṇa*', '*āśraya*' or '*deśa*' in the case of *samavāya* relation usually means the substratum in which something resides and not the space. For instance, parts are the *adhikarana* (substratum) of the 'whole' or the substance is the substratum of its qualities. In this sense, parts and their 'whole', or a substance and its qualities do not have a common substratum (*sāmānādhikaraṇa*), because while the 'whole' like cloth resides in its parts, the threads, the latter reside in their own parts called *aṁśus* (fibers of cotton) or, while the white colour of a cloth resides in the cloth, the latter resides in its parts, i.e., the threads, and thus the *adhikaranas* are different in both cases.

When it is said that a 'whole' in its parts, or qualities in their substance, reside by *samavāya* relation, it implies that *samavāya* which relates the two must also reside in both of them, but, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, only the container (i.e., the parts or the substance) is spoken of as *samavāyin* (i.e., containing something in it by *samavāya* relation), while the contained entity (i.e., the 'whole' or the qualities) is spoken of as *samaveta* (contained in something by *samavāya* relation). In the case of the relation called *samyoga*, there is no such distinction. In the instance of 'a man with a stick', both the 'man' and the 'stick' may be spoken of as *samyogin* (having the relation of *samyoga*) or as *samyukta* (connected by *samyoga*). The reason of this difference between *samyoga* and *samavāya* has already been explained. Praśastapāda says, rather inadvertently that the property of being *samavāyin* belongs to all the first categories: *dravyādinām pancānām samavāyitvam*.⁶ Śrīdhara corrects this statement by explaining that here the property of being *samavāyin* only means subsistence by *samavāya*: *samavāyitvam samavāya lakṣaṇā vṛttih*,⁷ i.e., the property of being *samaveta* which belongs to all the five

categories. A substance when in the form of an effect or ‘whole’ is *samaveta* in its cause (parts).

Be it as it may, *samavāya* must be held to be subsisting in the container, i.e., there must be *samavāya* of the ‘whole’ in its parts, or the *samavāya* of colour in a substance on account of which the parts or the substance is said to be *samavāyin* (i.e., containing something by *samavāya* relation). But here arises a difficulty. By what relation will *samavāya* itself subsist in an object? If it be by another *samavāya* or some other relation, that will lead to a process *ad infinitum*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, therefore, holds that *samavāya* does not require any other relation for its subsistence. It subsists by itself. Commenting on Praśastapāda’s characterization of *samavāya* as independent, *svatantra*, Śridhara says that *samavāya* being independent does not subsist by any other relation as *samyoga* does: *svatantrah, samyogavat sambandhāntareṇa na vartate*.⁸ It means that *samyoga*, which itself resides in the objects (which it connects) by *samavāya*, is dependent on those objects in as much as it is their quality. But *samavāya* is not a quality or property of any other object on which it may be said to be dependent; it is a separate category. The question as to the relation by which *samavāya* subsists in the container (*ādhāra*) is not, however, answered.

Moreover, if *samavāya* subsists in the container which is on that account called *samavāyin*, it should be held to be the property of the container, and there must be some relation by whom that property would subsist therein: A bold answer comes from Uddyotakara. To the question, “why is *samavāya* regarded as independent, *svatantra*,” he replies: “It is because it has no other *samavāya* relation for its subsistence. Whatever subsists elsewhere must subsist by some relation, and, therefore, *samavāya* (which has no relation for its subsistence) does not subsist anywhere:

samavāyāntarābhāvātyadpi yatra vartate tad vṛttyā tatra vartate. na ca samavāyāntaram samavāyasya vṛttir asti (*Nyāya-Vārtika*)⁹.

Uddyotakara argues that *samavāya* does not subsist anywhere because it can be designated by the term *pañcapadārtha-vṛtti*¹⁰. Whatever can be designated by that term does not subsist anywhere, as for instance, an atom (*paramāṇuvat*). That term is, however, used here in two different senses. An atom is designated by the term when it is interpreted to mean "in which there is subsistence of five categories." Here it is expounded as *Bahuvrīhi*. *Samavaya* is also designated by the same term, but in that case, it is interpreted to mean something different, i.e., the relation of five categories. Here it is expounded as *tat-puruṣa*: *pañcānām padārthānām vṛttih*. Even Vācaspati, notwithstanding his reverence for Uddyotkara, was constrained to have a fling at his argument. In that way it can be argued that because a cow and speech are both designated by the word 'go', speech should also possess horns like the cow: *mā bhūd go-śabdāsāmyena vāgādinām api viśānitvam* (*Nyāya-Vārtika-Tātparyatikā*).

Uddyotakara goes a step further, when confronted with the question, if *samavāya* does not subsist anywhere, why is there a notion of inherence or *samavāya* of cloth in the threads? He answers: that notion of subsistence of *samavāya* is an illusion: *mithyā-pratyaya evaiṣa iti* (*Nyāya-Vārtika*).

Uddyotakara, of course, is the solitary instance of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika writer who holds that *samavāya* does not subsist anywhere. Other writers merely maintain that *samavāya* does not subsist in its substratum by another relation. They never say that it does not subsist at all. Praśastapāda, however, includes *samavāya* also in the list of the entities which are subsistent (*āśrita*) in some

object: *āśritatvam cānyatra nitya-dravyebhyah*¹¹. Commenting on this inclusion, Śrīdhara says that subsistence (*āśritatva*) here means 'being cognized as dependent': *āśritatvam paratantratayopalabdhih* (*Nyāya-Kandalī*)¹². Obviously, this contradicts Śrīdhara's own statement that *samavāya* is independent (*svatantra*). The position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika has been stated by Praśastapāda: *Samavāya* has got no other relation of subsistence; it is itself in the nature of the relation of subsistence (*vṛtti*): *samavāyasya nānya vṛttir asti tasmāt svātma-vṛttih*¹³. Śrīdhara remarks: it is not true that *samavāya* which has no relation of subsistence does not subsist in an object. Being itself in the nature of a relation, it subsists in an object by itself without the need of any other relation.

VI Perception of *Samavāya*

Now we are in a position to appreciate the full significance of an *internal controversy* of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. The followers of the Nyāya school hold that *samavāya* is perceptible while, those of the Vaiśeṣika deny it: *samavāyasya pratyakṣa-varnanam nyāya-matena, Vaiśeṣikamate tu samavāyo'tindriyah* (*Tarka-Kaumudī* of *Laugākṣi-bhāskara*)¹⁴. The reason for this difference of opinion between the two allied schools is not usually appreciated. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, an object can be perceived only if it comes in contact with the sense. Senses being substances can have contact in the form of *samyoga* only with other substances. In the case of perception of non-substances i.e., qualities or universals residing in qualities, indirect contacts are postulated. For instance, in the perception of the universal, 'colour-ness' (*rūpatva*) residing in the colour of a jar, the form of the contact is inherence in a thing which is inherent in a connected substance (*samyukta samaveta samavāya*, i.e., connected inherent inherence). There is inherence (*samavāya*) of colour-ness in the colour which is inherent

(*samaveta*) in the jar (the substance) which is connected with the eye. Six kinds of such contacts are accepted in the system. The sixth of these contacts is called the relation of being an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa bhāva*) which is accepted in the case of the perception of non-existence (*abhāva*). It is held that if any object, substance or non-substance, comes into contact with the sense by any of the first five forms of contact, and if there resides in that object any non-existence as its attribute, the non-existence is perceived by the sixth form of contact, (i.e., *viśeṣaṇa bhāva*).

The followers of the Nyāya-school point out that *samavāya* is also an attribute of the object in which something resides by that relation, and that *samavāya* also, like non-existence, is perceived by the sixth kind of contact. It appears that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika conceived the sixth kind of contact mainly to uphold the perception of non-existence against the Mīmāṃsaka who emphatically denied it. According to the Mīmāṃsaka, non-existence is comprehended by a separate means of knowledge called the non-apprehension or the non-existence of apprehension (*anupalabdhi* or *abhāva pramāṇa*). In the *Tarka-bhāṣā* of Keśava Miśra, a Mīmāṃsaka opponent points out that to be an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa bhāva*) is no relation at all, because a real objective relation must be different from the objects related by it, and to be an attribute is not different from the attribute itself. Keśava Miśra does not rebut that assertion of the Mīmāṃsaka, but meets the objection by pointing out that the principle that only the objects in contact with the sense can be perceived-is applicable only in the case of positive objects. Non-existence being a negative entity may be perceived even without sense-object contact, merely by being an attribute. Now if only negative objects are perceived through the sixth contact, *samavāya* not being negative one, cannot be perceived through this form of contact. Strongly enough, Keśava Miśra himself overlooked the implication of his own statement, and true to his allegiance to the

Nyāya school, maintained, while describing the sixth kind of contact, that *samavāya* was also perceived through that *viśeṣana bhāva* contact.

The reason of the difference of opinion on this point between the two schools, in all probability, was this: The Vaiśeṣika-school, which was responsible for developing the metaphysical structure of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, realized the difficulties in explaining the subsistence of *samavāya* in an object. The Vaiśeṣika-school was conscious of the difficulty in establishing a sense-contact with the *samavāya*, and was, therefore, content to hold *samavāya* to be merely inferable. The statement of Praśastapāda to the effect that *samavāya* is itself in the nature of subsistence and has no other relation of subsistence. In the same context he says that *samavāya* is imperceptible, because it has no relation of subsistence, as is found in the universal existence (*sattā*) which resides by *samavāya* relation in the objects that are perceptible: *ata evātindriyah, sattādīnāmiva pratyakṣeṣu vṛtty-abhāvāt.*¹⁵ The Nyāya-school, on the other hand, was not fully conscious of these difficulties, and therefore, on the analogy of the perception of non-existence, it held that *samavāya* could also be perceived through the sixth form of contact.

VII *Samavāya* as One and Eternal

The category of *samavāya* having been established, the question arises whether it should be regarded as eternal or non-eternal. In the latter case, it would necessarily be multiple, and as it would be an effect (*kārya*), the question of its causation would also have to be confronted. And, as the category in question is of a positive nature, all the three causes will have to be assigned to it. In the case of non-existence which is of negative nature, the Nyāya-

Vaiśeṣika holds that all the three causes are not necessary. The operation of *nimitta kāraṇa* alone produces it.

In order to avoid the difficulties in assigning all the three causes to *samavāya*, it is held to be eternal. A category which is beset with many contradictions could only be assumed as eternal. Now, if *samavāya* is eternal, it can be one, for endless eternal *samavāyas*, each concerned with endless non-eternal effect-objects, would present many difficulties.

The *samavāya* is thus held to be eternal and one. But also some objections are raised. Praśastapāda refers to an objection: If *samavāya* is one, the *samavāya* of *dravyatva* (the universal of substance) and that of *guṇatva* (the universal of quality) being the same, the universal *dravyatva* will reside in the qualities also and *guṇatva* in the substances also. This objection is the problem of *padārtha-saṃkara-prasaṅga*. To this Praśastapāda replies as follows: Although *dravyatva* and *guṇatva* have the same relation as *samavāya*, there is the difference of potentiality of manifestation (*vyañgya-vyañjaka-śakti*)¹⁶, on account of which there will be a restriction in the relation of the container and the contained (*ādhāra* and *ādheya*).

Śrīdhara adds that the potentiality of manifesting *dravyatva* resides only in substances, and therefore, the universal *dravyatva* will reside by *samavāya* relation only in substances and nowhere else: *dravyeṣu eve dravyatvam samavaiti nānyatra* (*Nyāya Kandali*).¹⁷ It would mean that besides the universal *dravyatva* which resides in a substance, there is another attribute called "the potentiality of manifesting *dravyatva*" which also resides in substances side by side *dravyatva*. This shows how the exponents of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika were apt to any number of bold assumptions to

meet a difficult situation. Obviously, the answer of Praśastapāda to the objection in question is not convincing at all. Viśvanātha, in his *Nyāya-Siddhānta-Muktāvalī*, meets the objection that *samavāya* being one, the *samavāya* of colour should be present in the air also, by pointing out: "Although the *samavāya* of colour is present in the air, yet there is no colour in the air."¹⁸ Uddyotakara speaks of *samavāya* as *vyāpaka* in the *Nyāya-vārtika*, which can only mean all-pervading, or omnipresent in the sense of *vibhu parimāṇa*.

The problem, however, is, if air has no colour, there can be no cognition of colour. But all this is mere verbal jugglery. How can *samavāya* of colour be conceived without the presence of colour?

The *samavāya* being eternal and one, the question arises whether it is omnipresent also. The question arises in connection with the universal also. The view called *sarva-sarva-gata vā syāt* is stated in the *Nyāya Manjari*, as against the view *pinda-sarvagatā*.¹⁹ In respect of *samavāya* such distinctions are seldom made in the treatises, nor are the answers to objections clearly defined. The universals are endless in number, and therefore, the question of omnipresence arises with reference to all of the individual universals. If the omnipresence of everyone of the endless individual universals can be contemplated, there is greater reason to accept the omnipresence of *samavāya*, which is *one* and which operates not only in the case of all universals, but also in the cases of *viśeṣas*, movements, qualities and substances, which are endless in number. If *samavāya*, besides being eternal and one, is accepted as omnipresent also, objection against the theory of *samavāya*, namely, that a relation between two inseparables is inconceivable, becomes even more impressive. For, it is not only a relation between two inseparables, but also a relation as eternal and omnipresent.

VIII Definition of *Ayutasiddhi*

The problem of the nature or definition of inseparableness lies at the root of the theory of *samavāya* and it requires some elucidation.

Obviously, any two entities which cannot be separated and are always found as if blended together are said to be inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*). But there are difficulties about it. Every object, for instance, is inseparable from all-pervading things like ether, space or time, but the relation between them is not that of *samavāya*, and therefore, they cannot be regarded as inseparables or *ayuta-siddhas*. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thus confronts the problem of finding a definition of *ayuta-siddhi*. It was defined negatively, i.e., by defining separable-ness or *yuta-siddhi*. The definition of *yuta-siddhi* is not given by Praśastapāda in the course of his preliminary treatment of *samavāya* and in the course of the examination of *samavāya* at the end of his treatise; but it occurs under the topic of disconnection (*vibhāga*).

It is held that the disconnection of cause and non-cause brings about the disconnection of effect and non-effect: *kāraṇākāraṇa-vibhāgāt* or *kāryākārya-vibhāgah*. For instance, when, on account of motion, one's hand is disconnected from a point of ether, this disconnection produces the disconnection of the body also from that point of other. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, disconnection of the hand from a particular point of ether is not the same thing as disconnection of the body from that point. They are two separate entities, the former being the cause of the latter. Here, the hand being a part of the body is the cause, and the body being the *whole* is its effect. The disconnection

between the hand (cause) and ether (non-cause) brings about the disconnection between the body (effect) and ether (non-effect). This means that when the hand moves and produces its disconnection from ether, the body does not move with it. An objection is raised that inasmuch as the body is inherent (*samaveta*, i.e., subsisting by *samavāya* relation) in its part, the hand, the two are inseparable (*ayuta-siddha*) and, therefore, they should move together, otherwise it would lead to the separability of the two. Praśastapāda says that the objection in question has been raised because the real nature of inseparable-ness has not been understood: *yutasiddhidoṣaprasangah iti. na. yuta-siddhyaparijñānāt*²⁰. He then proceeds to define "inseparable-ness" (*ayuta-siddhi*) negatively by defining separable-ness (*yuta-siddhi*). As inherent relation (*samavāya*) obtains in both eternal and non-eternal objects, inseparable-ness will also be present in both kinds of objects. Praśastapāda could not find a common definition of separable-ness which may be applicable to both the eternal and non-eternal objects. He gives two different definitions of separable-ness, one for the eternal and the other for non-eternal objects.

Separable-ness of the two eternal things has been defined by Praśastapāda as the potentiality of both or any of them to have separate movement: *sā punrdvayoranyatarasya vā pr̥thagatimattvam*.²¹ The phrase "separate movement" or *pr̥thag gatimattvam* has been explained by Śrīdhara as the movement which is the cause of connection or disconnection of two objects: *paraspara-samyoga-vibhāga-hetubhūta-karma* (*Nyāya Kandali*). For example, in the case of two eternal entities like ether and atom, the latter possesses the movement which is the cause of its connection with or disconnection from ether, and, therefore, ether and atom are separable (*yuta-siddhas*). The mutual relation, therefore, of ether and atom, or that of two atoms cannot be called to be of inherence.

But in the case, an atom and its qualities, the atom does not possess the movement which can be the cause of their connection or disconnection, and hence they are not separable, i.e., they are inseparable or *ayuta-siddhas*; and the relation between them is, therefore, that of *samavāya*.

In the case of non-eternal entities, the separable-ness has been defined as inherence in separate substrata, *yutesu āśrayesu samavāyāḥ*²². For example, a piece of cloth and a jar have their inherence in separate substrata, viz., their parts, the threads and the pot-shreds, and, therefore, the cloth and the jar are separable, and their relation is not that of inherence.

Here the question arises why should there be two different definitions, one of separable-ness of eternal objects and the other for that of the non-eternal ones. The former definition, i.e., one or both of the related objects having the potentiality of separate movements is applicable in the case of non-eternal objects also. For example, a piece of cloth and a jar can have separate movements. But Praśastapāda points out a case of non-eternal objects to which that definition does not apply. For instance, the sense-organ of touch (skin) and the body are held to be two separate objects whose relation is not that of inherence, *samavāya* but that of *samyoga*. Senses are not held to be parts of the body. Yet they cannot have separate movements. Hence, there arises the necessity of a separate definition which may cover all the cases of non-eternal objects. The new definition, viz., inherence in separate substrata is applicable to the sense-organs of touch and the body which have inherence in separate substrata, viz., their respective constituent parts. As for the definition of separable-ness of non-eternals, it is obviously not applicable to eternal objects, for the latter do not inhere in any substrata at all.

It may be pointed out that the definition of separable-ness (*yuta-siddhi*) as inherence in separate substrata is logically defective, because the word separate or *yuta* in the definition of separable-ness, *yuta-siddhi*, should not have been used. Secondly, the words 'separate substrata' are important words in the definition. They cannot mean 'different substrata' because in that case separable-ness will exist in the case of threads and cloth also. Their substrata, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, are different; the cloth resides in threads and the threads in their constituent parts, viz., the fibres of cotton or *aṁśus*. Śridhara, therefore, amends the definition and says that separable-ness in the case of non-eternals in the *inherence* of one of the related objects in a different substratum of such a kind as excludes (even indirectly) the subsistence of the other there from: *paraspara-parihareṇāna pṛthagāśrāśrayitvarī sā yayornāsti tāvayutasiddhou, tayoḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ*²³ (*Nyāya Kandalī*). In the example of threads and cloth, although they subsist in their different substrata, as stated above, one of them (threads) subsist in its parts, viz., the fibres of cotton, which (indirect) subsistence of cloth cannot be excluded. Here the cloth subsists in threads which subsist in the fibers of cotton.

It appears that so far as material substances are concerned, their separable-ness, as amended by Śridhara, is reduced to this: such material objects as occupy two different points of space are separable. For instance, the cloth and the jar occupy two different points of space, and, therefore, they are separable, but the threads and the cloth (though, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, they are two different corporeal substances) occupy the same space, and therefore, they are not separable. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika speaks of a material object having its substratum or abode (*ādhāra* or *desa*), not in space, but only in its inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa*). The Buddhist, in conformity with modern

science, holds that a characteristic of matter (*rūpa*) is its impenetrability (*sapratighatva*) which means that space occupied by one material object cannot, at the same time, be occupied by another²⁴. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, on the other hand, says with regard to four kinds of material substances (*kārya dravyas*, earth, water, etc.) that their occupying of the same place (*saṃāna-deśatā*) is precluded in the sense that only *one* material object can subsist by inherent relation, or *saṃavāya* in the same substratum. For example, cloth subsists in its cause, the threads, by *saṃavāya* relation, and therefore, no other material object can subsist in the same threads by the same relation: *dravyāṇām ekatra saṃavāyena saṃāna deśatam vyāsedhāmaḥ* (Nyāya vārtika-tātparya-tīkā by Vācaspati Miśra). But so far do the threads and the cloth occupy the same space, but the inherent cause of the threads (fibres of cotton called *amśus*) and the inherent cause of the latter and so on up to *dvaṇukas*, a whole series of material objects in the form of cause and effect-occupy the same space. It will, thus, appear that matter, as it is understood the Buddhist, is altogether excluded from the domain of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika metaphysics.

II

We now propose to reiterate some of the observations made earlier, and add a few more comparative points with a view to having an overview of the domain of thoughts concerning *saṃavāya*.

Admission or non-admission of *saṃavāya* has been epistemic as well as ontological bone of contention amongst the philosophers of various persuasions. The Buddhists raised critical points with regard to not admitting the concept of relation in general, and *saṃavāya* in particular. Apropos of their ontological position, physical objects are non-eternal, and hence *saṃavāya* viewed as

nitya could not be endorsed by them. Dharmakirti's critique of relation in the chapter on *Sambandhaparikṣā* in the *Pramāṇavārttika* is a case in point. He argues that since all entities are momentary, and moments have separate modes of existence along with other moments, how can a relation bind two disparate entities? A relation is, hence, a conceptual fiction set up by our minds, and does not enjoy an objective reality at all.²⁵ It also follows that the knowledge of relation is unreal. It can neither be affirmed on the strength of perception, nor is it available as *anumiti*. Śāntarakṣita puts forward a refutation of *samavāya* in his *Tattvasaṅgraha*, by arguing that even though one relation is destroyed, the relation cannot at all be said to persist.

The Vedāntins of the Saṃkara's school are anti-*samavāya* thinkers. They too refuse to endorse the existence of *samavāya* as an objective entity. Even the Mīmāṃsakas, both the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras, do not admit *samavāya* as an independent category that may be said to be one, eternal and *ayutasiddha*. The Bhāṭṭas are uncompromisingly against the category status of *samavāya*. Some concession is of course made by the Prābhākaras. They do admit *samavāya* as a category, though not eternal. The only relation they endorse is that of identity-cum-difference or *tādātmya*.

As per the Śāṃkhya view there obtains a catalytic or *sannidhi* relation between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*, both of which are eternal objects or *tattvas*. Nor are they eternally related. Their ontological duality constitutes *kaivalya*, the end of the evolutionary cycle.

The Jainas go a long way with Nyāya in admitting *samavāya* as an objective entity, where they do differ is in not agreeing to consider the relation as *nitya* independently of its relata. For the Jainas, no relation can be properly so-called without the terms it

relates. Apart from this partial admission of *samavāya*, their arguments resemble that of the Buddhists and the Vedāntins.

It is possible to ask now: why should the philosophers refuse to endorse or admit *samavāya* in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika fashion? What is their logical compulsion? Are they constrained by their ontological or metaphysical presuppositions and commitments?

The Buddhist view of the world as constituted by momentarily arising and perishing elements precludes the possibility of admitting any relation whatsoever. Nor can any relation subsist with momentary relata. This is the problem of metaphysics. Contrarily, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is realism, and its architectonic is structured in terms of objectively existing entities. Accordingly, for it, *samavāya* is *nitya* and one. It may be said that any pluralistic system will have to admit relations, either *tādātmya*, or *samyoga* or *samavāya*. The Buddhists cannot admit *samavāya* on the ground of their own metaphysics. When they offer a critique of relations, they do it by arguing at cross purposes. The concept of *nitya* is foreign to the Buddhist's vocabulary.

When the Vedāntins of Śaṅkara's school argue against *samavāya* (they do indeed admit *samyoga* in the domain of *vyavahārika sattā*) they are under the shadow of their own metaphysical presuppositions. For them, plurality is a fiction. The unity and eternality of Brahman is the material cause of the *vivarta* or *jagat*. The two-fold reality (*sattā*) strata, *vyavahārika* and *pāramārthika* fall apart or one is sub-lated into the other. How are the two related? The answer is that the *vyavahārika* is superimposed on the *pāramārthika* substratum. Since only one of the reality strata exists, i.e., the *pāramārthika*, the *vyavahārika* is only an appearance, analogically similar to the illusory snake misperceived in the place of the rope, there cannot be any relation

between the *nitya* and the *anitya* modes of being. For Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *samavāya* subsists between two real existents. This condition is hardly even fulfilled by Vedānta premises. Monism coupled with anti-pluralism, make for Vedānta, admission of *samavāya* logically impossible.

We have seen that Mīmāṃsā in both of its forms, Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara, entertains no such relation that may be at the same time one, eternal and *ayutasiddha*. Prabhākara questions the property of *nityatva*, while Kumārīla rejects the relation outright. And when who evanescent relata come together, the relation too is bound to be evanescent as well. This is what Śāntarakṣita had argued: of the two relata if one is annihilated, where does *samavāya* exist? The relation itself goes out of existence. Prabhākara further added that *samavāya* can be admitted only on the condition of *gaurava*. Whenever one admits eternality of a relation, there occurs *samavāya*, and it is so justified, and whenever one says that a relation is evanescent, there is *samyoga*. Prabhākara invests the relation with a dual role.

The Bhāṭṭas in admitting *samavāya* switches over to the relation interpreted as identity-cum-difference. But can they as realists do away with *samavāya* altogether? Will their ontology allow it? As per their relation are they not obliged to endorse the relation? But there are realists elsewhere as Moore and Russell who deny internal relation in favour of external relation. Whatever it is, one notices that a Bhāṭṭa endorses the relation of difference in consonance with Prābhākaras and Naiyāyikas on one hand, and the relation of identity like the Buddhists and the Advaitins. His arguments against *samavāya* are based upon idealistic premises on one side, and realism on the other. This double dealing puts alleged realism of the Bhāṭṭas in philosophical jeopardy.

The point that now emerges is that the Mīmāṃsakas partially concur with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika in holding that there exists a type of relation between two inseparable entities. Again, in as much as they subscribe to *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda*, i.e., knowledge is directly apprehended in perception, to encounter a coloured jar is to perceive it either as a jar or along with its property of being coloured. To say so is to imply partial apprehension of the given object, while the relation between the jar and its colour is indeed a direct cognition. A red apple, said Bradley, is red all over. The Mīmāṃsā view, in terms of its ontology is ill-equipped to explain *samavāya*, and can only have recourse to *tādātmya* instead.

As for Śāṃkhya dualism of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, both are eternal *tattvas* and are mutually exclusive. Speaking ontologically, *puruṣa* is so defined as to be impotent to undertake any creative adventure, though conceit and forever has its being in freedom. Contrariwise, *prakṛti*, though *nitya*, is inert and inconsceint. The alleged causality constitutes in their coming together (*sannidhi* or *sāhitya*). *Puruṣa* does not at all act upon *prakṛti*. There subsists no causal relation worth the name between them, even though Śāṃkhya holds on to *parināmavāda*. The effect preexists in its own cause; there is no *upādāna kāraṇa* properly so-called. Between the two eternally valid and ever distinct *tattvas* there does not obtain any *samavāya*.

Samavāya has been a distinct feature of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, and charted a path in metaphysics as well. Apart from *saṃyoga*, *samavāya* is a unique relation, and may be said to be "the cement of the universe", to borrow the phrase from J.L. Mackie. The two relata are *nitya* independently of the being or non-being (*abhāva*) of the relata. In no other system of Indian thought, *samavāya* belongs to the set of eternal substances like *sāmānya*. Even then these are not relationally independent; they require some

relation in order to get related with other relation. How can *jātī* and *vyakti* be related without *samavāya*? All positive *padārthas* are supervised by *samavāya*, which, of course, can stand by itself. *Samavāya* indeed is the cement of the universe, for whenever creation begins, *samavāya* relates; creation cannot take place unless action is initiated in the atom by *samavāya*. It is relation *per excellence*. Even Śāṃkhya, as absorbed in *Tantra* endorsed *samavāya* in the conception of *Ardhanārīśvara*, the biunity of the primal causes of creation.

Notes and references

1. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, -7-2-26.
2. *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, on Verse 11.
3. Ibid.
4. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 786, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
5. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-9.
6. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-3.
7. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 14, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
8. Ibid. p. 780.
9. Uddyotakara, *Nyāyavārttika*, p. 120-121, ed. by Dr. Śrīnivāsa Śāstrī, 1986. (Hindi).
10. Ibid. p. 121.
11. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-3
12. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 41, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
13. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-9.
14. *Tarka-Kaumudī* of Laugākṣi-bhāskara.
15. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-9.
16. Ibid.
17. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 782, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.

18. "na ca samavāyasyaikatve vāyou rūpavattābuddhi-prasārigaḥ;
tatra rūpasamavāyasattve'pi rūpābhāvāt."- *Nyāyasiddhāntamuk-*
tāvalī, on Verse 11.
19. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 774, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
20. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-5.
21. Ibid.
22. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, -2-2-5.
23. Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, p. 37, Ganganath Jha Granthamālā, 1963.
24. Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception of Buddhism*, p.11.
25. "sambandhaḥ kalpanākṛtaḥ sambandhacintā,"- *Pramāṇa Vārttika*, III. 237.