

Chapter-11

Advaita Critique of *Samavāya*: Śaṅkara and his followers.

Śaṅkara's Critique of the relation of *samavāya* is a part of his programmed of rejection of the Vaiśeṣika thesis that the *paramāṇus* are the ultimate constituents of the world. This is technically known as *paramāṇukāraṇavāda*¹. Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra* (II.2.13) is the *locus classicus* of his critique of *samavāya*. The *Sūtra* runs as follows: *samavāyābhyupagamācca sāmyādanavas-thiteḥ*². The *Sūtra* is interpreted as stating that the relation of *samavāya* cannot account for the creation and dissolution of the world. Śaṅkara presents the atomic theory and then criticizes it. Commenting on the earlier *sūtra* (i.e., II.2.12), Śaṅkara argues that the conjunction which takes place between the separate atoms at the time of creation is due to some action like the one required to bring about the conjunction of threads into a piece of cloth. The action implies effort on the part of the soul or the impact of one thing like wind against another tree. The effort of the soul is possible only when the mind is joined with the soul and there is impact only after the creation of the products like wind, etc. But neither is possible in the state of dissolution for them, there is neither the physical body nor any evolved product nor thing except in its atomic condition. Creation out of atoms is inexplicable. If it is said that the principle of *adr̥ṣṭa*, the unseen accumulation of merits and demerits causes the original motion of the atoms, where does it reside, in the soul or in the atoms? As a non-intelligent principle, *adr̥ṣṭa* cannot be the cause of action. Nor can it be guided by the soul for, according to the Vaiśeṣika, the soul is not intelligent. Even if it is said to reside in the soul, there will be no connection between

the principle and the atom. If the unseen principle in the soul is said to be connected with the atoms indirectly, there will be perpetual activity and perpetual creation and therefore, no dissolution at all. In the absence of any definite cause of action, there will be no activity in the atoms and so no creation. Even dissolution will be impossible in the absence of any visible cause for the separation of atoms. Rāmānuja asks whether *adr̥ṣṭa* resides in atoms or souls and rejects both views.

Before we take up considering Śaṅkara's explication of the *Sūtra* on *samavāya*, we may clarify certain critical notions.

As per the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position, *samavāya* is the relation that obtains between *avayava* and *avayavī*, *dravya* and *guṇa*, *nityadravya* and *viśeṣa*, and *jāti* and *vyakti*³. The relation is itself a *padārtha*, and from the point of view *svātmaka-svarūpa-sambandha*, it rests on the *samavāyī*. It is possible to look at *samavāya* from two angles, *padārtha dr̥ṣṭa* and *sambandha dr̥ṣṭa*. According to the latter mode of apprehension, *samavāya*, by virtue of being itself a relation, it, on its own, relates itself with the *samavāyī*. This is what is called *svātmaka-svarūpa-sambandha*.⁴ The relata between which the relation holds are called *samavāyī*. For example, *a*, *b* are *samavāyī* in *aRb*. *Jāti* and *vyakti* are related in *samavāya* fashion, and hence both are *samavāyī* or relata of the relation. The point can be put in another fashion. The relata of the *samavāya* relation are called *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī*. The locus of the relation where the *samavāya* obtains is the *anuyogī*. In the present case, it is *vyakti*, while *jāti* is the *pratiyogī*.

It should be noted that *samavāya* does not imply identity of the relata. Advaita holds that the earthen pot is only conceptually differentiated into earthenness and potness. This is only a *vyavahārika* distinction, but *paramārtha* wise it is only earthen. The

identity incorporates the difference on the basis of identity. Advaita calls it *bhedagarbhita abheda*, and holds the relation to be *tādātmya sambandha*. The *samavāya* relationship does not annul the difference between the relata. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsakas* argue that both the difference and the identity are real, and they call it *svarūpa- sambandha*. This has partial resemblance with *samavāya*. Whereas Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits *samavāya* in order to retain the reality of the relata, Advaita endorses *tādātmya*.

Commenting on the *Sūtra*, Śāṅkara argues that the relation of *samavāya* cannot account for the creation and dissolution of the world. A binary⁵ which inheres in two atoms is different from them and the relation of inherence which is equally different from two atoms must be inherent in them on account of a second relation in *samavāya* and so on *ad infinitum*. If *samavāya* is said to be eternally present in the things seen here and before us, *samyoga* also may be said to be eternally connected with things which are joined together and need not depend on a further connection, *samavāya*. Both of them are different from the terms they relate.

Śāṅkara further argues that atoms may be essentially active or non-active or both or neither. If active, there will be no dissolution; if non-active, there would be no creation. Their being both is impossible because of mutual contradiction. If they were neither, their activity or non-activity would depend on an operative cause. Such causes as *adr̥ṣṭa* being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result. If they are not operative causes, permanent non-activity will result. So the atomist view is untenable.

Rāmānuja says that if the *samavāya* related is eternal, that to which the relation belongs is also eternal, and so the world is eternal.

Śamkara has raised the issue of *samavāya* again in connection of his commentary on the *Sūtra* II.2.17 and says that the distinction between *saṁyoga* or conjunction of things which can exist separately and or inherence or connection of things which are incapable of separate existence is futile since the cause which exists before the effect cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. If it is argued that it is the effect which is inherent in the cause, the quality cannot exist independently and apart. How can the quality which has not come into existence be related to the cause at all? Nor can it be said that the effect comes into existence first and is then related with the cause for this would mean that the effect exists prior to its coming into existence and is capable of separate existence. The relation between the two is conjunction and not inherence. Again, there is no proof to show that *saṁyoga* and *samavāya* are themselves actual entities beyond the things in which they exist as relations. Simply because things have names of their own and produce distinct cognitions in us, it does not follow that they are actual entities. Things have an original nature of their own before they acquire a new nature on account of their being related with other things. *Saṁyoga* and *samavāya* have no nature of their own apart from what accrues to them from the relatedness of the things. Atoms cannot enter into *saṁyoga* with each other and *saṁyoga* of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter and *saṁyoga* of the souls and *manas* cannot be the causes of cognitions for these have no parts. If we are asked to assume *samavāya* because otherwise the relation of that which abides and the abode is not possible we will be guilty of mutual dependence.

One might ask, how does Śamkara explain the relation of consciousness and its objects? For him, the relation is difficult to explain. It cannot be *saṁyoga* or contact, or *samavāya* or

inherence. Yet consciousness is related to objects. Śaṅkara suggests that the world is an appearance due to ignorance and so this appearance does not affect the cause in any way, even as a magician is not affected by the illusion, he creates for others. When the appearance of the world is said to be *anirvacanīya*, all that is meant is that it is unique. We cannot describe it as existent or non-existent. The world is said to be *sad-asad-vilakṣaṇa* and *not* non-existent.

Śaṅkara's commentary of the *Sūtra* II.1.18 takes up the issue of *samavāya* in respect of cause and effect relationship. He holds that the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from the cause can be ascertained from reasoning. Experience teaches us that if we wish to produce curd, earthen jars or gold; we do not employ clay for curds, or milk for making jars. If the effect were non-existent in the cause, all this should be possible. Besides, all the effects being non-existent in the cause, anything might come out of anything else. If it is argued that there exists in each cause power to produce a special effect, *aiśaya*, milk for curd and clay for jars, then we assume something prior to the effect which later becomes the effect. If the specific power is considered to be non-existent before its appearance, then the objection is valid that anything may come out of anything else. Is this specific power non-existent before its appearance or is it different from both cause and effect? The specific power view does not help us. If it is said that the cause and the effect do not appear different because they are held together by the connection known as *samavāya*, we have to postulate a second connection and to explain that another and so on *ad infinitum*. If the latter, the cause and the effect, will fall apart from each other and be totally unconnected, the relation of *samavāya* is unnecessary as experience tells us that cause and effect are identical. If the relation between the cause and the effect is regarded as that which exists between the parts and the whole

and if the two are said to be held together by *samavāya*, the question arises whether the whole resides in all the parts simultaneously or in some parts successively. If the former exists, the whole may not be perceptible at all. The other side of a jar may not be in contact with the eyes. If the latter, we may infer the knowledge of the whole from the perception of a part. The knowledge of a part of the sword we hold in the hand makes us aware of the whole, though we have no perceptual knowledge of the whole on account of its being hidden in the sheath. The hidden parts of the sword are different from those of the sheath. Thus we introduce a new series of parts between the original parts and the whole or between the cause and the effect. To pervade the second series of parts, a third will have to be devised and so on *ad infinitum*. In short, the effect will be further and further removed from the cause. The effect as a whole cannot be said to reside in each of the parts simultaneously, for in that case, it would be more than one whole. One man cannot reside in two places at the same time. It is possible only when there are two men. The whole cannot reside in each one of the parts simultaneously in the manner in which one *sāmānya* or *jāti* of cow is said to reside in each of the cows simultaneously. For as every cow manifests the *sāmānya* or general character, every part of cause might manifest the whole of the effect. This is not invariably experienced. Besides, if the whole were to reside fully in each part, one may as well get the milk of the cow from her horns. Again, if the effect be non-existent before its origination, there would be no notion of origination itself because origination implies a reference to the particular effect and the substratum in which it takes place. Unless the existence of the jar is assumed before it is produced, in the form of its cause, clay, the sentence 'the jar is produced' will have no meaning. If it is argued that origination is the connection of the effect with the existence of the cause, we ask, how can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connection with something else? Connection is

possible of two existing things only, and not one existing and one non-existent thing or of two non-existing things. Only existing things can be spoken of as having limitations. Absolute non-existence or what is altogether featureless cannot be spoken of as 'being prior to' origination. To say that the son of a barren woman was king before Purṇavarman is absurd. For, the son of a barren woman is not only non-existent but is an unreality and so no temporal limitation can be set to him. Even so, at no time will be the absolute non-existence of the effect, viz. a jar be a reality, whatever may be the efforts of the potter. If the existent can never become existent, the *asat-kārya-vādin* may ask, what the purpose of the operative causes, the potter, etc. is. If the effect exists in the cause and is non-different from it, where is the need of the potter to bring out a jar into existence? As the potter puts forth effort, one must assume the non-existence of the effect prior to its origination. To this the answer is that the operative agents arrange the cause in the form of the effect. Even the form is not absolutely new. A mere change in form does not transform one thing into an altogether different thing. People may be seen in different moods and yet they are recognized as the same. If it is argued that they are recognized as the same persons because their conditions are not separated by death, the case of the jar is different because the clay is as destroyed. Śaṅkara says that the analogy is not correct. Milk continues to exist in a different form when we say that it has become curd. Even when the continued existence of the cause is not perceived, when the seed is not seen to exist in the tree, we have to notice the earlier stages of the tree such as the sprouts, to know that they are the later stages of the seed. It is the seed which becomes visible in the form of its sprout, with the accumulation of particles of matter. It becomes invisible, not non-existent, when the sprouts change into something else.

On the *asat-kārya-vāda* the operative agents have no purpose to serve. For it, non-existence cannot be the object of every activity as the sky cannot be modified in any way by weapons. Nor can the cause clay which is said to be *samavāyī* and existent be the object of the activity of the operative agent, for if the effect which is non-existent is to arise from a cause which is different in nature then anything may arise from anything else. If it is said that the effect is nothing but the specific power of the cause, the *sat-kārya-vāda* is accepted. The effect exists prior to its origination in the form of the cause and is identical with it and so is it that everything else becomes known, when Brahman, the cause is known.

In relation to Śaṅkara's critique of *samavāya*, it would be relevant to discuss the views of some other Vedāntins. First, we take Citsukha, and later, Vyāsatīrtha.

(1) To take Citsukha's objections in the *Tattvapradīpikā* against the definitions of Praśastapāda and Udayana. The definition of inherence offered by Praśastapāda is as that the relation which holds between two inseparable entities standing as the substratum and the superstratum and gives rise the awareness 'it is here' ("*ayutasiddhānām-ādhāryyādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*"). Citsukha's objections against the definition of *samavāya* about the self-relation of the determinans-determinant (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya*) type between the entities like the absence of jar and the ground is *avyāpti* ⁶. First, the self-relation (*svarūpa-sambandha*) is an inseparable relation like inherence. Secondly, any two relata of the self-relation like the absence of jar and the ground may be said as the substratum and the superstratum. Thirdly, as inherence is held to be responsible for the cognition 'it is here', so the self-relation also may be said to stand for the cause of the cognition 'it is here'. The above three possibilities related to the self-relation and inherence like the

absence of jar and the ground proves to be a case of *avyāpti*. Pratyagrūpa, in his annotation, *Nayanaprasādini*, elucidates that the locus of the ground is not anything other than the ground, and the locus of the ground is nothing but its parts which are not different from the ground⁷. Again in case of self-relation, the absence of a jar and the ground are to exist as substratum and superstratum like inherence. The third view holds that when the absence of jar on the ground is cognized, the cognition is certainly the cognition of 'it is here'. So there is no difference between self-relation and inherence, i.e. inherence includes the self-relation; as a result, it proves by 'it is here'⁸ as *avyāpti*.

Now if we try to defend the relation of inherence between the cloth and its colour as two positive entities; then it is too weak a case to do. But according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, this relation is not inherence. It belongs to the self-relation. So there is no possibility to establish Praśastapāda's definition of inherence admitting the cognition 'it is here'.⁹

Further, if the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits that the relation between the colour and the cloth is taken as the determinans and the determinant then the defect of over *avyāpti* would be removed. But the difficulty arises in this way that all the cases of the relation between the determinans and the determinant of the inherence include the relation between the determinans and the determinant of the self-relation also¹⁰.

Citsukha raises a similar objection against Udayana's definition¹¹. Udayana defines inherence as an eternal relation¹². But Citsukha considers it as too wide or *ativyāpti*, since it over covers the self-relation of the determinans and determinant type. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika's view is that the self-relation consists of the non-

eternal determinans and determinant. But Citsukha does not accept this view for two reasons:

First, it cannot prevent the *ativyāpti* of the self-relation. In the cognition of the absence of colour in air, the absence of the colour is known as determinans and air to be the determinant, and the relation between the absence of colour and an atom of air is the self-relation of the determinans and the determinant type. Now the relation between the absence of the colour and a jar is non-eternal, then the relation between the absence of the colour and a jar is also non-eternal because both possess the relation between the determinans and the determinant. So the self-relation being non-eternal is to be included inherence and that proves the defect of *ativyāpti*.

Secondly, if the relation of inherence is being eternal between two eternal relata, the relation of self-relation is also eternal in this sense that two relata are to be related with ubiquitous substances which are eternal. Here it is also proved that Udayana's definition of inherence falls under the defect of overcoverage¹³.

(2) Citsukha tries to prove further that there is no proof in favour of inherence. The Naiyāyikas say that perception is the proof of inherence, while the Vaiśeṣikas admit that inference is the proof of inherence¹⁴. But Citsukha rules out both the views. The Nyāya view of inherence which is recognized by perception will be rejected by Citsukha along with Vallabha, an eminent Vaiśeṣika philosopher¹⁵. Citsukha argues that if inherence is perceived then it will have to be treated either as the basis of awareness of the substratum, or as the basis of the awareness of the superstratum, or as the basis of the awareness of both the substratum and the superstratum. But he shows that none can be enough to prove the

inherence as perceptible relation. In that case inherence may be held responsible neither for the cognition of the substratum, nor for the superstratum, nor for both the substratum and the superstratum.

One may argue that the perception of inherence occurs when we cognize the tie between a universal and the individual having that universal; it will also be in vain. If so, then either inherence is related with a universal and the individual having that universal, or with the quality and the substance having that quality, or as a mere relation. But Citsukha argues that neither can be enough to prove the inherence as perceptible. The first alternative ultimately leads to infinite regress; because the relation between a universal and the individual having that universal, it may require another relation. Secondly, in the case of second alternative, it falls in another problem in this way that the relation between quality and substance being perceived by its quality not by a universal and the individual having that universal. Thirdly, if it is known as the relation of inherence is mere a relation, then no relation actually being cognized is absurd. The relation as a relation can be the object of knowledge and related with its relata. So 'a mere relation' cannot be presupposed to identify the inherence as perceptible relation. So Citsukha comes to the conclusion that perception is not a proof of inherence.

The Vaiśeṣika view that inference is a proof of inherence is also rejected by Citsukha¹⁶. He says that there is no such prabans to prove that inherence is cognized by inference. The Vaiśeṣikas may possibly offer an inference that the cognition of 'it is here' is preceded by some relation because it is an uncontradicted cognition of 'it is here'. In this inference, the subject (*pakṣa*) is the cognition of 'it is here' which excludes the self-relation. The prabandum (*sādhya*) of this inference is the precedence of some relation. The

prabans (*hetu*) of the inference is being the uncontradicted cognition 'it is here'. So Citsukha thinks that the relation, of which above inference is anticipated to be a proof, is not inherence. As a result, the inference may be said to suffer from the defect of asserting the asserted¹⁷.

Again the Vaiśeṣika may argue that inherence is inferred as the basic relation (*mūlāsambandha*) and on the basis of this relation, other relation would emerge¹⁸. But it is also defective, as because when we take the examples like 'the absence of a jar is on the ground' and 'the colour-inherence is in the cloth'; the prabans of an inference is known to reside in both, that which is the locus of the prabandum as well as which is not the locus of the prabandum; the inference is said to be the fallacy of *sādhāraṇa anaikāntika*¹⁹. So Citsukha concludes that inference in any such consideration is not valid as a proof of inherence.

Thus, Citsukha shows that neither perception nor inference is the proof of inherence.

In '*Tarkatāṇḍava*', Vyāsatīrtha belonging to the Mādhva school of Vedānta discusses about the notion of *varṇa*-s and has found some difficulties in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence. First, he argues against the proofs of inherence, and secondly, he estimates certain detriments of the theory of inherence.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *varṇa*-s are abridgement gauges which are non-eternal qualities of the organ of audition which is nothing but *ākāśa*²⁰, and *ākāśa* is their inherent cause. The *varṇa*-s, therefore, exist in the *ākāśa* by the relation of inherence. But Vyāsatīrtha does not admit this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of *varṇa*. He raises the question against *varṇa*-s which is related with *ākāśa* by inherence²¹ from the Vedānta point of view. There are two

reasons: (1) *varṇa*-s is eternal and ubiquitous substances²², and (2) there is no proof in favour of inherence²³.

At first, we look over about the second objection that there is no proof of inherence. Vyāsatīrtha rejects the Nyāya view of perception as the proof of inherence²⁴. If inherence is perceived at all, then it must be perceived as either (a) the determinans (*viśeṣaṇa*)²⁵, or (b) the determinant (*viśeṣya*)²⁶, or (c) something is determined by inherence-hood (*samavāyatvarūpasvarūpa*)²⁷, or (d) the relation (*saṁsarga*)²⁸. But ultimately he shows that in no way inherence is perceived.

The arguments are as follows:

(a) If inherence is perceived as the determinans, then the determinans are to be cognized as 'these are inherent'. But since the perception of inherence is never cognized in that way, inherence cannot be said to be expressed as the determinans²⁹.

(b) If inherence is perceived as the determinant, then the determinant is cognized as 'inherence of these'. But since the perception of inherence is never expressed in that way, inherence cannot be said to be expressed as the determinant³⁰.

(c) If inherence is perceived as something determined by inherence-hood, then it is cognized as 'I know inherence'. But since the perception of inherence is never expressed in that way, inherence cannot be said to be perceived as something determined by inherence-hood³¹.

(d) It cannot be said that inherence is perceived as a relation between a jar and its colour. But here Vyāsatīrtha suggests that the

relation between a jar and its colour and the relation between the ground and the absence of something on it are not two different kinds of relations. As between the ground and the absence of something on it is perceived by any relation other than inherence, so between a jar and its colour also is determined by any other relation other than inherence. Thus inherence cannot be said to be perceived as a relation³².

Again, Vyāsatīrtha rejects the possibility of inherence as the proof of inherence laid by the Vaiśeṣikas. If the cognition of the relation between a cloth and its threads is to be inferred by inherence, then the inference suffers from the defect of *āśrayāsiddhi* which appears the unreality of the subject (*pakṣa*). Here the thread is the material production (*upādāna*) and the cloth is the product (*upādeya*). Vyāsatīrtha comments that there is no essential difference between the two³³ and for this, inference is fallacious.

So, according to Vyāsatīrtha, inference is not the proof of inherence.

Now here Vyāsatīrtha cites four points of ontological inconsistencies which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of inherence involves called '*bādhaka*'³⁴. They are as follows:

First, Vyāsatīrtha argues that if the relation between time and its Numbers is avowed to be self-relation; the avowance of inherence is useless³⁵; because all the cases of inherence may be elucidated by self-relation. Again, if it is avowed by inherence, then the self-relation is useless; for all the cases of self-relation may be entertained as conjunction³⁶.

Secondly, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika esteems that the relation between quality etc. in one hand and its absence on the other hand may be entertained as self-relation. Vyāsatīrtha argues that their relation is endured to be self-relation not because of that the counter-positive (*pratiyogī*) of the absence, or the object (*viśaya*) of the knowledge, is the relation; but because of that the determinans (*viśeṣaṇa*) is the relation. So by determinan-hood, the self-relation is to be included in the case of the relation between quality and substance, i.e. in between the cloth and its threads; for, according to Vyāsatīrtha, it is not justified to endure inherence as a separate relation like self-relation; rather inherence is to be a self-relation³⁷, nothing more.

Thirdly, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, inherence is accepted to be a relation who differentiates a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) from a collective cognition (*samūhalambana-jñāna*). Vyāsatīrtha admits the distinction between the two kinds of cognition, but in order to establish, there is no admittance of inherence. For, in a relation, we see only the determinans and the determinant relation (*viśeṣaṇatāviśeṣya*) and this relation is the case of the qualificatory cognition 'the jar is coloured'; here 'colour' means determinans, and 'jar' means determinant. So the relation of inherence is over covered³⁸.

Fourthly, inherence can neither be conceived to be related by some other relation nor can it be said to be self-related. If we may try to put another relation between inherence and its relata, then it involves infinite- regress³⁹.

Thus, from the above discussion, we may conclude that Vyāsatīrtha's objections are more or less to be justified against the possibility of inherence. For him, inherence is not a separate relation which belongs to inconsistency.

Notes and references

1. The atom is the smallest partless unary particle of a composite substance. It is imperceptible and further unanalysable.
2. *Vādarāyana (Vyāsa)* (39), p.511
3. "*avayavāvayavinoḥ, jātivyaktyoḥ, guṇaguṇinoḥ, kriyākriyāvatoḥ, nityadravyaviśeṣayoścayaḥ sambandhaḥ, sa samavāyaḥ*".
-Viśvanātha (77), p. 65.
4. "*yathaiva hyaṇubhyāmātyantabhinnam sad dvyaṇukam samavāyalakṣaṇena sambandhena tābhyām sambandhyata evam samavāyohpi samavāyibhyoḥtyantabhinnah sansamavāyalakṣaṇenānyenaiva sambandhena samavāyibhiḥ sambandheta; atyantabhedasāmyāt*". -Śāṅkara (39), p.511.
5. A binary is molecule composed of two atoms. It is the first atomic product.
6. "*na syādayutasiddhyādi samavāyasya lakṣaṇam. viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhe vyabhicārataḥ*". - Citsukha (16),p.199.
7. "*anyatarasya pṛthagāśrayāśrayitvābhāve bhavatyevāyuta-siddhiriti bhāvaḥ*". -Pratyagrupa, Ibid.
8. "*ihapratyayaśca*".-Ibid.
9. "*atha bhāvayorīdṛsaḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ tathāpīna paṭe rūpasamavāyo rūpasamavāyavānṛpaṭa iti viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāve lakṣaṇasyātivyāptiḥ. uktalakṣaṇasya tatrāpi sambhavāt*".-Ibid.
10. "*atha guṇaguṇinoḥ kriyākārayoravayavāvayavinorjātijātimatorviśeṣatadvatośca yaḥ sambandha ukta rūpaḥ samavāya iti cenna. tesāmevānyonyaviśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvetivyāpteh*".-Ibid.

11. *"bhavatu tarhyarvācīnamatānusāreṇa nityaḥ sambandhaḥ samavāya itī lakṣaṇamīti cenna."*-Ibid., p. 200.
12. *"tathāca nityaprāptiḥ samavāya itī lakṣaṇnam sūcitam."*
-Udayana (71), Vol. I, p. 249.
13. *"pratiyoginoranīyatvena sambandhānīyatvāpādanasya sa-mavāyepī samānatvācca"*.- Citsukha (16), p. 200.
14. Ibid.
15. *"kim punaḥ samavāyasiddhau mānam, pratyakṣama-numānam vā?"*-
Vallabha (73), p. 704.
16. *"nānumānamapi. liṅgābhāvāt"*.- Citsukha, p. 202.
17. *"viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvādhārādheyabhāvasambandhādīnā siddhasādhanatvāt."*-Ibid.
18. *"viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyādereva mūlāsambandhapuraḥsarvatvam sisā-dhayaṣītamīti na siddhasādhanamīti cet."*-Ibid., pp. 202-3.
19. *"ihabhūtale ghaṭābhāva ityusminneva viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvapratyayehnaikāntyāt."*-Ibid., p.203.
20. *"śabdohmbaraguṇaḥ śrotragrāhyaḥ, kṣaṇīkaḥ,sa dvividho varṇalakṣaṇo dhvanīlakṣaṇāśca, tatra akārādirvarṇalakṣaṇaḥ."*- Praśastapāda (57), pp. 692-93.
21. *"ākāśātmakaśrotraguṇā varṇāḥ samavāyena sambandhena grhyanta itī tanna."*- Vyāsātīrtha (78), p. 444.
22. *"varṇānām nityavibhūdravyatvāt."* – Ibid.
23. *"samavāye mānābhāvācca."* – Ibid.
24. *"samavāye pratyakṣam na pramāṇam."* – Ibid.

25. "yadvā samavāyo hi viśeṣaṇatvena vā....." Rāghavendratīrtha (78), p. 445.
26. "viśeṣyatvena vā....." – Ibid.
27. "ayaṁ samavāya iti samavāyatvarūpasvarūpena vā....." – Ibid.
28. "saṁsargavidhayā vā bhāseta." – Ibid.
29. "imau saṁyuktāvityādivadimau samavetāviti.....anan-ubhavāt." – Vyāsātīrtha (78), p. 444.
30. "anayoḥ samavāya iti vā." – Ibid.
31. "samavāyaṁ jñānāmītyananuvyavasāyācca." – Ibid.
32. "rūpī ghaṭa ityādeścābhāvavadbhūtalamityādivadupapatt-eh". – Ibid.
33. "upādānopādeyābhedavāde āśrayāsiddheḥ". – Ibid., p. 445-46.
- Vyāsātīrtha assumes the basic and essential identity between the cloth and its threads. He thinks that their difference is only pragmatic, and so apparent.
34. "bādhakacatuṣṭayaṁ duṣpariharam."-Ibid., p. 474.
35. "kālasya svagatena saṁkhyāparimāṇādinā tvayāpi svarūpasambandhaḥ svikṛta iti kiṁ tatra samavāyena". – Ibid., p. 471.
36. "yadi ca kālasya tena saha samavāyasya sattvāna svarūpasambandhaḥ tarhi kālasya ghaṭena saha saṁyogasya sattvāt svarūpasambandho na siddhet. Sāmyāt." – Ibid., pp. 471-72.
37. "viśeṣaṇatvaṁ ca guṇāderguṇyādāvapi samamiti guṇy-ādāvapi guṇādeḥ svarūpasambandhatvaṁ kṛptameveti kka samavāyasyāvakāśaḥ".- Ibid.

38. "api ca ghaṭarūpasamavāyā iti samūhāmbanajñānāt rūpī ghaṭa ityādibuddhervailakṣaṇyāyāvasyamaṅgīkāryeṇa rūpa-sya ghaṭena saha viśeṣaṇatāviśeṣaṇaiva viśiṣṭabu-ddhyupapattau kim samavāyena".-Ibid., pp. 472-73.
39. "samavāyasyāpi svasambandhinā saha sambandhāṅgīkāre anavasthā".-Ibid., p. 473.