


## Chapter-10

### The Jaina Response to *Samavāya*.

#### I

The Jaina outlook on ontology and its philosophy of knowledge can be comprehended under realism, and in this regard, it shares a lot of views and ideas with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and realist schools. A schematic representation of Jainism may be given below in order to put its perspective amongst other philosophical views.



Jainism is distinguished by having its sources in the *Bhagavatī*, and *Āgama* literature. It is classified as a non-Vedic or heterodox school of thought, but nonetheless Jainism is a *mokṣasāstra*, the science of salvation. The path for spiritual progress, aiming at the final goal of liberation is the central tone of the *Āgamas*.

The Jainas arrange the knowledge of the world under two pairs of contrasted alternatives, *jīva* and *ajīva*. These are complementary aspects of reality, each of which suggests the other by a dialectical necessity and combines with the other into one more complex conception. These two contrasted alternatives are but two conditions of thought: all thinking implies a subject which thinks, the cogitative principle or soul. But as all thinking is thinking of something, it means that it requires a material on which the thought activity is exercised, it implies an *object* which is discriminated and understood by thought.

The Jainas speak of knowledge in five different forms:

(a) *Mati* or that form of knowledge by which a *jīva* cognizes an object through the operation of the sense-organs, all hindrances to the formation of such knowledge being removed. Other forms of knowledge being (b) *Śruti* (verbal testimony); (c) *Avadhi*, knowledge of the past; (d) *Manaparyāya*, knowledge of other minds; and (e) *Kevala*, the pure unimpeded knowledge, or knowledge of absolute, which precedes the attainment of *nirvāṇa*.

The Jainas have a number of terms in the *Āgamic* literature. These exposes senses peculiar to the Jaina point of view. *Upayoga* is a general term comprehending all activity related with consciousness. It is divided into *nirākāra upayoga* or *darśana* and *sākāra upayoga* or *jñāna*. The former is inarticulate cognition or

sensation preceding in every articulate cognition. *Jñāna* and *ajñāna* are articulate cognition, true or false. When it is true, the word particle *samyak* is prefixed to make the distinction clear.

The *Uttarādhyayanāsūtra* describes knowledge as the instrument of cognizing objects. *Āvaśyaka niryukti* defines knowledge as an illuminator. Two points emerge from this definition. First, the function of knowledge is only to illumine the object which is already in existence. Knowledge does not create anything new. In holding such a view the Jainas are realists. Every quality, according to them, that becomes the object of knowledge is a reality and as such is already in existence. The objects are presented to the soul directly.

The fundamental notion of reality as hold by the *Āgamas* is expressed in the three *Mātrikapadas*. They are held as mother words giving birth to the whole system of Jaina philosophy and constitute the central theme of the entire Jaina philosophy and metaphysics. It is held that the Tirthankaras speak these three words only. The *Sthānāṅgasūtra* refers to them. They are slated in the following order. It originates, it perishes, it continues. The *Tattvārtha* describes them as the definition of reality. These three conditions of reality are not caused by any external factor. They are natural and the very essence of every existence. Hemchandra explains that everything beginning from the flickering of a candle up to the sky, possesses the same nature, i.e., change with permanence.

The *Vaiśeṣika sūtra* describes six categories or *padārthas* and three realities (*arthas*). It distinguishes *artha* or reality from *padārtha* (category), the former inheres (*samavāya*) existence in it and the latter does not. The *artha* has an external existence, and can be perceived through senses or yogic perception. On the other

hand, the categories are conceptual. They are the analytic interpretations of external and internal phenomena. The Jaina admits two types: *tattva* or *tathya*, and *dravya*. Vātsāyana explains *tattva* (category) as the true nature of an object. If the object is real, its *tattva* is reality or existence. If the object is unreal, its *tattva* is unreality or non-existence. Jainism also holds the same view. The *Uttarādhyayana* enumerates nine kinds of *tathyas*. The same *sūtra* describes *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* as the objects of knowledge which constitute the objective reality. In the Nyāya system an objective reality is included in the second category of *prameya*. According to Jainism, all the three realities of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* are included into the first two categories of *jīva* and *ajīva*.

*Dravya* is defined as the abode of *guṇas*. The *Tattvārtha* adds *paryāya* also located in the *dravya*. *Paryāya* means change which exists in all the *dravyas*. *Guṇa* and *paryāya* are the very characteristic of a *dravya*. The Nyāya conception of *karman* is different from the conception of *paryāya*. *Paryāya* is the successive stages through which a *dravya* passes.

In the Jaina view, the *guṇas* and *paryāyas* are relatively different as well as identical with the *dravya*. Yaśovijaya explains this difference by citing the example of a pearl necklace. The necklace differs from the pearls as well as their brightness. In the same way a *dravya* differs from its *guṇas* as well as *paryāyas*. He explains the identity by citing another example. The gold is not different from its brightness and the different forms of earring, bangle, etc., which undergoes. In the same way, *dravya* is not different from its *paryāyas* and *guṇas*.

The difference between *guṇa* and *paryāya* can be further explained in the following manner. A golden jar and an earthen jar

are different from each other in respect of *guṇas*. In respect of *paryāya* they are identical. On the other hand, the successive states of gold as a ring and as a bangle are different from each other in respect of *paryāya* and identical in respect of *guṇa*. *Guṇas* are related with the qualities of the stuff, which is the material cause of a thing. *Paryāyas* are different forms of the same stuff.

In contrast with *dravya*, *guṇa* and *paryāya* are relative. *Guṇa* distinguishes one *dravya* from the other *dravya*, and *paryāya* distinguishes one slate from other slate occurring successively. A cloth is different from jar, because, they possess different qualities. This difference is based on *guṇa*. The jar is different from the lump of clay, because it is different successive stage. Here, the difference is based on the *paryāya*.

For the Jaina, *guṇa* and *paryāya* are not two different entities as the Nyāya holds. They are two aspects of the same reality. One is related with numerical difference, while the other with temporal. They are interchangeable in different relation. In the Jaina epistemology, unity or uniformity is represented by *dravya* and difference, numerical as well as qualitative, by *paryāya*, *guṇas*, being mainly a differentia, are included into *paryāya*.

The qualities represented by the *guṇas* are constant. They last as long as the substance does. The qualities represented by the *paryāyas* are changeable and successive. They appear one after another. Secondly, *guṇas* are the qualities of *dravya* only; while *paryāyas* exist both in *guṇas* as well as *dravya*. Colour is *guṇa*, but different shades of black, white, red, etc. are *paryāyas* of it. Similarly, taste is *guṇa*, but different tastes of sweet, bitter, sour, etc. are *paryāyas*. In the case of *jīva*, consciousness is *guṇa*, but different cognitions are its *paryāyas*. Similarly, the change of stuff

into different shapes or forms is *dravya-paryāya*, just as the change of lump of clay into the form of a jar.

Now a jar possesses the particular shape just as the particular colour. The shape is known as *paryāya*, while the colour is *guṇa*. The Jaina would say that all varieties, whether qualitative or numerical related with space or time, are *paryāyas*. The shape and the colour both are *paryāyas*. But there is a set of *paryāyas* which distinguish one substance from the other, and these are called *guṇas*. The *paryāya* is related with different modes or slates of the same *dravya*. The difference between *guṇa* and *paryāya* can be further ascertained on the ground that *paryāya* is a differentia based on change. It is *pariṇāma*. *Guṇas* are not *pariṇāma*. Out of the three synonyms of *paryāya*: i.e., *paryāya* and *viśeṣa* are common to both *guṇa* and *paryāya*. The third synonym *pariṇāma* is peculiar to *paryāya* only.

When we talk of *guṇa*, we mean a quality that exist in the material cause and continues in its different modes. This is why *guṇas* are related with *dravya* only. Moreover, *guṇa* does not change with the change of *paryāya*. The necklace and the bangle possess the same *guṇas*. The Jaina does not admit the destruction of all *guṇas* with the destruction of *dravya* and the emergence of all the *guṇas* with every *dravya*, as the Nyāya holds.

According to Jainism, the criterion of existence is causal efficacy. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika does not support this view. It holds existence as a separate category and a thing is existent when it inheres (*samavāya*) in that category. On this ground the Vaiśeṣika distinguishes a reality from other categories. He holds the first three categories, i.e., *dravya*, *guṇa*, and *karman* as realities. They inhere in the category of existence. The other categories of *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya* and *abhāva* exist by themselves. Kaṇāda calls the

reality as *artha* and category as *padārtha*. The *artha* has objective existence. It is open to perception, sensual or supersensual. *Padārtha* is merely a logical conception. Praśastapāda observes that the *padārthas* have their sole being within themselves and have the intellect as their indicator. They are not effects, not causes, have no generality or particularity, are eternal and are not expressible in the term thing.<sup>1</sup>

According to Jainism, the categories also are as objective as the realities. The only difference is that the former have no substantial existence. They are included in the very existence of their respective *dravyas*. As a matter of fact, the first two categories of Jainas, i.e., *jīva* and *ajīva*, include the entire world of reality. The remaining seven categories are different phenomena related with soul and its progress towards the final goal. They are not logical but ethical categories. The categories of the Vaiśeṣika are important in the field of epistemology. We cannot conceive an object without them. But the Jaina categories have no bearing on the problem of epistemology. They are related with ethical position of the soul.

According to the Vaiśeṣika, *guṇa* and *karman* inhere in the *dravya*. According to Jainism, they are related in the relation of identity-in-difference. The Vaiśeṣika holds them as separate entities, which inhere in the existence. According to Jainism, they are not totally separate from *dravya*. *Guṇa* and *pariyāya* along with *dravya* constitute the three objective aspects of the same reality. According to the Vaiśeṣika, the first moment of a *dravya* is free from *guṇa* and *karman*, according to Jainism, they are the very ingredients of a reality.

Jainism maintains seven standpoints or *nayas*, according to which a thing is judged. The first three of them are *dravyārthika nayas* and the remaining four as *pariyāyarthika nayas*<sup>2</sup> *Dravyārthika*

*nayas* point to universality, while *paryāyarthika nayas* point to particularity. The first group carries the idea of one in many and the second that of many in one. These two standpoints do not contradict each other, but represent two aspects of the same reality.

Each of the ideas of generality and particularity can be further discussed in two relations, i.e., (i) in relation to time, and (ii) in relation to number. The same clay undergoes many successive stages till the jar is produced. The idea of the unity of clay in all these stages is based on vertical universality (*ūrdhvatā sāmānya*). It generates the idea of unity in many successive stages of the same object. The units that are linked together by this universality are not simultaneous but exist one after another. The experience of cowness in all the numerically different units of cows is due to horizontal universality or *tiryakāsāmānya*. Individual cows though different in number, possess a uniting link of cowness. Corresponding to these two types of universality, there are two types of particularity also. Both types of universality are presented by *dravya*. A reality is called *dravya* both when it stands as one in all the temporally or numerically different units.

The standpoint representing *dravya* is known as the *dravyārthika naya*. In the case of particularity the successive stages of temporal diversity is represented by *paryāya* and that of space or number is represented by *guṇa*. But the standpoint representing the both *guṇa* as well as *paryāya* is *paryārthika*. There is no *guṇārthika*. This means that *paryāya* is a comprehensive term which includes both types of difference. There are many references in the *Āgamas*, where numerical diversity also is expressed as *paryāya*<sup>3</sup>.

Finally, we may touch the note on the Jaina concept of consciousness. The Jaina disagrees with the Nyāya on the following points:

(a) According to Jainism, consciousness is not a separate entity. It is the very nature of the self. It is connected with the self not through the relation *samavāya*, but that of identity-in-difference.

(b) In no state the self remains without consciousness. In the state of liberation it is freed from all contamination and attains the perfect consciousness.

(c) According to Jainism, the self is coextensive with the body. The eternity of the self does not mean total absence of change, but change with permanence.

(d) According to Jainism, all consciousness is self-luminary.

If consciousness (*buddhi*) is supposed to be absolutely distinct from the soul, the consciousness of A is in the same position of his soul as the consciousness of B. that is to say, both consciousness would be equal strangers to the soul of A, and there is no reason why his consciousness should serve him better than the consciousness of any other person, in determining the nature of things. In fact, there is no such thing as his consciousness, all consciousness being equally foreign to him.

The Nyāya tries to explain the above objection by the theory of *samavāya*. But the relation of inherence also being one, eternal and all pervasive, helps any little in this respect. It cannot fix any limitation that the thing is related with A cannot relate with B through the same relation. Moreover, according to the Nyāya, the soul also is all-pervasive. There is no reason why the consciousness generated in the soul of A is not the same relation with B or others.

Further, the Vaiśeṣika holds that the quality of a substance never changes without destruction of the substance (*Pilupāka*). The colour of a jar changes, it does not change by itself. The old colour is destroyed only when the jar also containing it, is destroyed; new colour is produced after the new jar has come into existence. If the same principle is applied in the case of consciousness the soul will become perishable. The Nyāya will have to accept the destruction of consciousness.

Even if it is accepted that inherence unites consciousness with the particular self there is another difficulty which cannot be explained. The inherence is itself a separate category and hence one would have to explain the relation between consciousness and inherence. If there is another relation to unite consciousness, and inherence in question can be put about the second relation also; ultimately it would lead to *ad infinitum*. If the first relation of inherence is self-united and does not require any other relation to be united with consciousness; where the same principle is not applied to the case of consciousness and soul also. They also can be accepted as self-united.

The Nyāya generally cites the example of light, which illuminates the object as well as itself. Similarly, inherence is capable of uniting the objects as well as itself. The soul and *buddhi* do not possess that capacity; because, they possess a different nature. The Jaina raises the same objection in the case of light also. If the light and illumination are two separate things, why the illumination is a function of light only, and is not function of other things. When we say natural capability, it cannot be explained without accepting a relation of identity between the two.

As a matter of fact a substance without quality or action, and a quality or action without substance, are inconceivable. They are essential aspects of one and the same reality. The difference between them is not physical but logical. The Nyāya view that they are separate entities related by a third entity cannot explain the position. Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* has refuted the Nyāya theory of *samavāya*. If an entity and its function are held as separate, the *samavāya* and its function of uniting the two objects also will have separate existences. They will require a second *samavāya* for their unity. The Jaina holds that a substance and its quality are self-related in a tie of identity-in-difference, and no third category is required to unite them.

## Notes and references

1. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, 1.1.4 and 8.2.3.
2. *Anuyogadvāra*, 139.
3. *Prameya Kamalamārtaṇḍa*, p. 466, and *Anuyogadvāra*, 139.