

Chapter-6

Some Arguments in favour of *Samavāya*

We now propose to consider some leading arguments in favour of *samavāya*. Earlier we discussed some critical views and arguments supporting the nature and admissibility of *samavāya*. Presently, we note review arguments offered by such thinkers as Vallabha and Gaṅgeśa.

I

Vallabha is a strong supporter of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy. In the *Nyāya-Līlavatī*, he offers some favourable arguments about the reality of inherence (*samavāya*). The Nyāya-view of inherence is that perception is the proof of inherence, whereas the Vaiśeṣika-view is the inferential cognition of inherence¹. Now the question may arise whether perception or inference can at all be taken as a proof of inherence.

The Nyāya-view that perceptual cognition like 'relation between a jar and its colour' affords the evidence of the existence of inherence². But Vallabha shows that perception cannot be the proof of inherence offering some arguments against the Nyāya-view³. First, if the perception is the proof of inherence, inherence would be as the ground of awareness of the substratum⁴. But in that condition inherence may be endured as accountable for the cognition of the substratum in both of its relata. Secondly, if the perception is the proof of inherence, inherence would be as the ground of awareness of the superstratum⁵. But in that condition inherence may be endured as accountable for the cognition of the

superstratum in both of its relata. Thirdly, if the perception is the proof of inherence, inherence would be as the ground of awareness of both the substratum and the superstratum⁶. But in that condition inherence may be endured accountable for both the cognition of the substratum and the cognition of the superstratum in both of its relata.

Further, if one says that inherence is proved by perception cognizing the knot between a universal and the individual having that universal. But this supposition is not strong enough to stand. If inherence is perceived, inherence is cognized as related with a universal and the individual having that universal⁷. But Vallabha argues that it ultimately leads to infinite regress⁸; because if so, in that case another relation is to be assumed by which inherence, it may be related with them. Secondly, if inherence is perceived, it is cognized as related with the quality and the substance having the quality, etc⁹. But in that case inherence belongs to the quality and the substance having that quality only; not between a universal and the individual having that universal¹⁰. Thirdly, if inherence is perceived, it is cognized as a mere relation¹¹. But in that case no relation is, in fact, perceived. Vallabha remarks that the cognition of a relation as a mere relation without any reference to its relata is a ridiculous case¹²; because a relation is invariably and necessarily known with reference to its relata and can be the object of knowledge. So a relation as 'a mere relation' cannot be accepted at all.

Vallabha now proceeds to examine a number of traditional inferences. They are as follows:

(1) The cognition 'it is here' proves the inferential ground in favour of the existence of inherence, according to the traditional

view¹³. Inherence is said to be inferred from the cognition 'it is here', because the cognition like 'the cloth is in its threads' cannot be reckoned for until and unless a relation is assumed to exist in between the cloth and the threads. For example, 'the bird is on the tree' is explained on the basis of the relation of conjunction. Similarly, the cognition like 'the cloth is in its threads' is to be explained on the basis of some relation. It cannot be the relation of conjunction; because it is contingent. But the relation between the cloth and its threads is not so.

Vallabha says that as a foundation of the inference of inherence the cognition of 'it is here' is not enough; because it cannot be perceived. If not, inherence cannot be the object of the cognition 'it is here'; because it can not endure to be the prabans through which inherence may be inferred. One may argue here that if it cannot be endure to be the prabans, a relation other than inherence like substratum-super stratum relation may be perceived which may be said to be an object of that cognition. But Vallabha argues that this is not arguable mainly for two reasons:

(a) If another relation is required to establish the relation of substratum-super stratum, it will go *ad infinitum*¹⁴.

(b) In that case if the substratum-super stratum relation is an object, it may endure to be the prabans that can be inferred only, not the inherence, and it will go the defect of admitting something else¹⁵.

Thus, by no means the cognition 'it is here' can serve as the foundation for the inference of inherence.

(2) Vallabha examines another traditional view about the inference of inherence on the basis of the cognition of something as

determined by universal, etc¹⁶. When a substance is cognized as determined by quality or by action or by universal, a relation between the determinans and the determinant is inferred. For example, if the term 'man' is determined by the term 'man-ness', the inherence is inferred as the relation between the 'man' and 'man-ness'. But this argument does not appear to be a sound one for two reasons:

(a) If inherence can be made from any cognition of the determinan-determinant cases, another relation other than inherence may be inferred from it, for instance, if we say that 'there is no bird on the tree'; here the absence of a bird is cognition of the determined. There is a relation between the absence of a bird as the determinans and the tree as the determinant. Here is a relation, but that relation is called as self-relation, not inherence. So the cognition of the determined ultimately stands as the proof of a relation other than inherence¹⁷.

(b) If one argues that the relation between the determinans and the determinant is the cause of the cognition of the determined it goes further the same relation as self-relation. So inherence inferred through certain cognitions of the determined cannot prove the existence of inference at all¹⁸.

Vallabha, thus, ultimately shows that neither the cognition 'it is here' (*ihetibuddhi*), nor the cognition of something as determined by universal, etc. (*jātyādiviśiṣṭapratyaya*) can perform as a solid foundation for the inference of inherence. Besides, he introduces the third prabans as an uncontradicted usage of 'the determined'. But the determined relation fails to prove the inferential inherence; rather it goes to some other relation like 'the jar is on the ground', and nothing more.

If we take as 'the usage as determined by universal, etc.' which is uncontradicted usage of 'the determined' which has only the positive entities as its objects; the term 'usage' may be used in two senses as 'the ground is determined by the jar' follows from a relation, whereas an uncontradicted usage of 'the determined' has only the positive entities as its objects. For this, the usage as determined by universal, etc. like 'the man is determined by manness'- may be assumed to chase from a relation. So in the first case, the usage chases from the relation of conjunction, the locus of which can be substance alone, while in the second case, the usage chases from the relation of inherence which endures between all the positive categories excepting itself.

Now the word '*viśiṣṭapratyaya*' or the cognition of the determined is replaced here by the word '*viśiṣṭavyavahāra*' or the usage of 'the determined'. The word '*pratyaya*' means only the cognition, whereas the word '*vyavahāra*' means cognition as it expressed in language. The expression, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, always presupposes cognition.

The central point of the above inference, however, is that without the knowledge of any relation the usage of 'the determined' is not possible. But the opponent may say that the knowledge of some relation is not much needed for the usage of 'the determined'. In case of the usage of 'the determined', there is needed for the cognition like 'the ground is without a jar', 'the absence of the jar' and 'the ground are the objects'. Having them as the objects of the cognition are to be needed much more causes of them; so there is no need of bringing any relation for the usage of 'the determined'¹⁹.

Now Vallabha enquires the need of the inference of inherence on the basis of the pervasiveness of the relation over the usage²⁰.

The usages like 'the ground is determined by the jar' may plead in favour of the above demand. Firstly, he shows that the relation between the ground and the jar is in first place seen as the relation of perceptual cognition as a relation of conjunction and in the second stage, it is seen as there is a role of some relation in those cases where such usage occurs without the perception of any relation. For, when we say that 'a man' is determined by 'man-ness', Vallabha concedes that no relation like inherence between man-ness and the man is perceived. So this type of relation between man-ness and the man must be inherence and it is known through inference.

One may argue that if the relation between man-ness and the man is inherence, the relation between the ground and absence of a jar would be inherence also. But Vallabha argues that if so, according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, only a positive entity can have its inherent cause²¹. But the absence of a jar has no more a positive entity. Again, another problem may be raised if the relation between the ground and absence of a jar would be inherence, the destruction of the absence of a jar would be cause of the destruction of the ground which is absurd.

Thus, Vallabha comes to the conclusion that as there is no proof of inherence like perception; inference must be the proof of inherence.

II

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology, Gaṅgeśa, in his chapter on *samavāyavāda* of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, initiates a doubt whether the relation avowing between the determinans (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the determinant (*viśeṣya*) is the object of the cognitions like 'the red pot', or not. He admits that the cognitions of the determinans and

the determinant are to be well admitted but the relation between them either exists or not²².

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika admits three objects like the determinans (*viśeṣaṇa*), the determinant (*viśeṣya*) and the relation between the above two (*saṁsarga*) in connection with the inherence (*samavāya*). But the third kind of object like the relation between the above two (*saṁsarga*), Gaṅgeśa endorses whether it would have any viability to admit it as a separate object. For instance, when we say about 'a red pot', the determinans (*viśeṣaṇa*) is 'red', the determinant (*viśeṣya*) is 'pot' that are the objects of the cognitions; but the relation between the above two (*saṁsarga*) would not be determined as the object of cognition.

In order to extradite the doubt that Gaṅgeśa takes at the starting of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*), he admits the help of this kind of inferences: the cognition like 'a red pot', etc. has the relation between the determinans and the determinant as its object, because it is a qualificatory cognition²³. In this inference, the subject (*pakṣa*) is the cognition like 'a red pot', etc.; the prabandum (*sādhya*) is 'having the determinans-the determinant relation as the object'; and the prabans (*hetu*) is 'being a qualificatory cognition'. It serves the determinans-the determinant relation as the object of qualificatory cognition. The cognition like 'a red pot' holds the relation between the red colour and the pot that is objectified along with the red colour and the pot (*samuhālabana-jñāna*) and the cognition of the red pot (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*) is left unexplained. The two cognitions are different in nature in this sense that the former is non-qualificatory cognition, while the latter is qualificatory cognition. But Gaṅgeśa raises further a problem that if so, in case of inferences like 'the ground without a pot', etc., though it is a qualificatory cognition, yet no relation would be the object of these

cognitions. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, this type of relation belongs to the self-relation (*svarūpasambandha*), not to inherence (*samavāya*); because in this type of inference, a bar plays a role. So the absence of bar (*bādhakābhāva*) is the criteria of the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) and in this way the first problem is easily removed.

Again, the opponent may argue against the proof of inherence as the absence of bar in this way that if so, it cannot be said that inherence is the object of the qualificatory cognition; because as the absence of bar is a proof of inherence, since inherence is yet to be proved, the absence of its proof may stand as a bar against having inherence as the object²⁴.

But Gaṅgeśa argues that the second problem is also solved by two reasons:

(a) If inherence would be argued that as it cannot be judged as the object of the qualificatory cognition because of non-existence of bar; there is no proof of inherence. But if it is accepted to be known as inherence must be objected.

(b) If the cognition is said to be qualificatory cognition for its having inherence as an object and a cognition is said to have inherence as its object in order to be qualificatory cognition, it falls into circular fallacy. So it cannot be said that inherence is the object of cognition.

Now a question may arise what the status of the relation between the determinans and the determinant that are the objects of that relation is; because the opponents give their response to the view of the determinans-determinant as the objects of the cognition. Gaṅgeśa tries to give his view against the opponents'

requirement that there must be some relation; but it is neither (a) a conjunction, nor (b) inherence, nor (c) a mere relation, nor (d) determinant relation²⁵.

(a) Conjunction does not belong to the relation in between the determinans and the determinant, which is an object of the qualificatory cognition. It endures solely between two substances. But qualificatory cognition bases on the determinans and the determinant which are neither substance. For instance, 'a green colour' as determined by green-ness which is a universal, i.e., determinans, and the determinant as the green colour which is a quality cannot possess any substance. So the relation cannot be conjunction.

(b) It is not inherence, because when we say 'the ground is without a pot', the absence of the pot is the determinans, the ground is the determinant and also it is qualificatory cognition, but the relation cannot be admitted as inherence.

(c) It cannot be admitted as a mere relation, because as it is proved as relation before, it cannot be counted as a proof of relation. If so, it falls in the fault of 'assertion of the asserted'.

(d) It cannot be said that the relation which is qualificatory cognition is responsible of that cognition. In this inference like 'the ground is without a pot', the determinant (*niyāmaka*) relation is self-relation; the self-relation is generally responsible for any qualificatory cognition. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is that it is inherence, but the opponent's view is that it may be called as inherence but ultimately it is self-relation. But if so, it will fall a defect called 'assertion of something else'.

Thus, Gaṅgeśa reckons with the opponent's view that the inference produced as a proof of inherence ultimately stands nowhere. He suggests that the probandum of inference would be the adjective, *sambandhibhinnatva*; being different from the relata. The inference is made up in this way: the cognition like 'a red pot', etc. has the determinans-determinant relation which is different from its relata as its objects on the ground of the qualificatory cognition.

The opponent may not admit such inference because the probans of it does not cover the cognition of absence and the cognitions of special qualities like merit (*punya*), pleasure (*sukha*), etc. which exist in the locus of the self (*ātmā*). It cannot be said such cognitions, the relation between the determinans and the determinant is not different from the relata.

Again, another objection may be raised in this way that the probans of an inference like 'the ground is without a pot', is present in the locus of the absence of the pot (probandum); it falls into the defect of *vyabhicāri*. The probans here is exclusive and it cannot be the object of the cognition though the relation is different from the relata. So this type of inference is not enough in order to establish inherence.

Now Gaṅgeśa presents a sound argument in favour of inherence. The inference is: the qualificatory cognition in which something is known to be determined by quality, or by action, or by universal, has the relation of the determinans, which is different from the relata, as its object, because it is qualificatory cognition in which the determinans is objectless (*nirviśayaka*) and positive (*bhāva*)²⁶. Here the subject is 'the qualificatory cognition in which something is known to be determined either by quality, or by action, or by universal' (*guṇa-kriyā-jātivīśiṣṭabuddhi*). The

probandum is 'having the relation, which is different from the relata, of the determinans as its object' (*sambandhibhinnaviśeṣaṇa-sambandhaviśayatva*). The probans of the inference is 'being a qualificatory cognition in which the determinans is objectless and positive' (*nirviśayakabhāvaviśeṣaṇakaviśiṣṭa-buddhi-tva*).

Gaṅgeśa here claims the present inference as sound one. The probans of the previous inference, 'qualificatory cognition', is being extended with objectless and positive to prevent from *vyabhicāri* like 'this is known', 'the ground is without a pot', etc. But again the opponent may object that the probans in it is too weighty with a number of adjectives. Gaṅgeśa further introduces an alternative probans: '*itaranirūpaṇānirūpyaviśeṣaṇakaviśiṣṭabuddhi-tva*', i.e., being such a qualificatory cognition in which the determinans is not known without reference to something else. By this alternative addition, in case of 'the ground is without a pot' or 'this is known' involves the determinans like 'the absence of pot' or 'knowledge has got to be cognized with reference to 'the pot' or 'this' respectively. So the alternative inference prevents the probans to be deviant.

Vyāsatīrtha brings an objection against Gaṅgeśa's inference is that the inference like 'the colour of the pot is in time' is fallen in the defect of *vyabhicāra*²⁷. The cognition of colour of the pot in time is qualificatory cognition because here time is cognized to be determined by the colour of the pot. It has such a relation as its object, different from its relata. As the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is that the relation between the colour of the pot and time is self-relation (*svarūpasambandha*), Gaṅgeśa's inference does not hold such case as self-relation. For, it is qualificatory cognition, objectless and positive and is not known without reference to something else. So this inference like 'the colour of the pot in time' would be included as inherence which goes against the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology.

To answer the question of Vyāsatīrtha, Gaṅgeśa suggests some points to prevent the defect of *vyabhicāra*:

(a) The colour of a pot is a non-eternal quality which possesses in that particular pot and it is inherently related with the pot. But time is not inherent cause of the colour of the pot. So inherence does not play in case of the colour of the pot and time, rather the relation between them is self-relation.

(b) Inherence between substance and quality means that a particular quality abides only in that particular substance by which that quality is commanded. The colour of the pot is related to the pot by inherence, because the colour of the pot is the quality commanded by the pot and that pot alone, not by any other substance. So here the pot is alone a substance and other substance like time cannot be considered at all.

Notes and references

1. "*kiṃ punaḥ samavāyasiddhau mānam, pratyakṣamanumānam vā?*" – Vallabha (73), p. 704.
2. "*nyāyanaye tu pratyakṣa eva samavāyaḥ.....*" –Ibid., p.718.
3. "*iha tantuṣu paṭa ityatra pratyakṣamasti iti cenna. vicārāsahatvāt.*" –Ibid., p. 704.
4. "*nādyāḥ. ubhayatrāpi iheti pratiti prasaṅgāt.*" –Ibid.
5. "*na dvitīyāḥ. ubhayatrāpyādheyabuddhiprāpteḥ.*" –Ibid.
6. "*na tṛtīyāḥ. ubhayatrāpyubhayabuddhiprasakteḥ.*" –Ibid.
7. "*atrānubhave hi samavāyastadiyatvena vāhnu bhūyate,.....*" –Ibid.
8. "*nādyāḥ. tadiyatvasya sambandhāntaratvenānavasthāpātāt.*" –Ibid.
9. "*anyadiyatvena vā,.....*" –Ibid.
10. "*netaraḥ. anyatraivasambandhabodhaprasaṅgāt.*" –Ibid.
pp. 704-05.
11. "*sambandhasvarūpamātreṇa vā.*" –Ibid.

12. *"na tṛitīyaḥ. Kkacidapi sambandhapratyayānupap
atteḥ."* -Ibid., p.705.
13. *"ihetibuddhirliṅgamiti cet."* -Ibid., p.706.
14. *"duṣitatvāt,....."* - Ibid.
15. *"padārthāntarasvīkāraprasaṅgācca."* -Ibid.
16. *"jātyādiviśiṣṭapratyayayo liṅgamiti cenna."* -Ibid., pp.
706-07.
17. *"viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvasya sambandhāntarasya
svīkāraprasaṅgāt."* -Ibid., p.707.
18. *"tata eva viśiṣṭa bodhotpattau samavāyānanumān
aprasaṅgācca"* -Ibid.
19. *"asati sambandhāvabhāse viśiṣṭavyavahāraḥ kuta iti
cet guṇadravyaviśayāt buddhiviśeṣāditi brūmaḥ aghaṭam
bhūtalamityatra ghaṭābhāvabhūtalaviṣa-yādbuddhiviśeṣādīva".*
-Ibid., pp.710-11.
20. *"na hi tathāsati viśiṣṭavyavahārajanakatvena
sambandhānumānam, api tu tadvyāpakatvena"* -Ibid.
21. *"tathāsati dhvaṁsasya samavāyikāraṇavattve (na)
bhāvatvāpatteḥ"* -Ibid., pp.711-12.
22. *"vipratipattiśca śuklaḥ paṭa iti pratītiḥ viśeṣaṇa
viśeṣyasambandhaviśayā na veti"* -Gaṅgeśa (24), p.640.
23. *"niloghaṭa ityādyanubhavo viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyasamba-
ndhaviśayaḥ viśiṣṭapratītitvāt daṇḍijñānava-diti..."* -Ibid. -pp.640-41.
24. *"bādhakābhāvasya sādhatkavavat sādhakābhāvasya
bādhakstvāt"* -Ibid.

25. *"sambandhaśca na samyogaḥ samavāyo vānyataro vā
bādhādasiddhervā. nāpi sambandhamātram, jñāpakatvādinā
siddhasāadhanāt. nāpyaviśiṣṭavyavṛttaviśiṣṭajñānaniyāmakaḥ,
abhāvajñānādāviva svarūpasambandhenārthāntaratvāt".-Ibid., p.
642.*
26. *"navyāstu guṇa-kriyā-jātivīśiṣṭabuddhiḥ
sambandhibhinnavīśeṣaṇasam- bandhaviṣayā
nirviṣayakabhāvaviśeṣaṇakaviśiṣṭabuddhitvāt
itaranirūpaṇ-ānirūpyaviśeṣaṇakaviśiṣṭabuddhitvādvā....."-Ibid., p. 651.*
27. *"kāle ghaṭarūpamityādipratītau vyabhicārāt".-Vyāsātīrtha
(78), p.449.*