

Chapter-5

Definitions of *Samavāya*

In the Vaiśeṣika scheme of categories (*padārtha*) are employed to describe the reality of the empirical world, the Vaiśeṣikas avow seven categories of which inherence or *samavāya* as the sixth category. *Samavāya* is one kind of relation. The first five categories are the relata of this type of relation. There are so many relations like conjunction, self-relation, etc. which are included in the five categories except *samavāya*. *Samavāya* itself is not the relatum of the relation of *samavāya*. It is admitted as a separate category like other five categories.

In *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*, Kaṇāda defines *samavāya* as '*ihedamiti yataḥ kāryyakāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ*¹. Śaṅkara Miśra, in his '*Upaskāra*' says that in the above *sūtra* the relation between cause and effect and uncaused and non-effect means 'this subsists in this abode'; and also means the relation of inseparable entities². There are causal relation in between non-eternal substance and non-eternal quality, between non-eternal substance and action, between *avayava* and *avayavī* and between eternal substance and non-eternal quality. This follows the phrase '*kāryyakāraṇayoḥ*'. But in between substance and substancehood, between quality and quality-hood, between action and actionhood, between eternal substance and eternal quality, and between eternal substance and particularity; there is no causal relation. But according to Vaiśeṣikas, in all such cases, inherence exists. For this, they admit the term '*ayutasiddha*' to denote the relation of *samavāya*.

Praśastapāda defines *samavāya* in this way that '*ayutasiddhānāmādhāryyādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyaya-hetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ*'³, i.e. *samavāya* is such a type of relation which holds the awareness of the substratum and the superstratum that are inseparable entities. Śridhara, in his '*Nyāyakandali*', illustrates each term of the definition of *samavāya* which are as under. In this definition, there are four terms like '*ayutasiddhānām*', '*ādhāryyādhārabhūtānām*;', '*ihapratyayahetuḥ*' and '*sambandha*'. If the term '*ayutasiddhānām*', would not be added, the relation of contact (*saṁyoga*) would be included, e.g. the relation between a glass and water consists in between the substratum and the superstratum, 'the water is in the glass', i.e. 'this subsists in this abode' and a mere relation which belongs to separable entities. But if the term '*ayutasiddhānām*' is added, it would not be *ativyāpti* in the contact relation; because the terms 'glass' and 'water' are *yutasiddha* or separable entities which belongs to *saṁyoga*. But the relation between the colour and the pot is *ayutasiddha*; because the colour and the pot do not exist in separate location leaving one from another⁴. This type of relation is called *samavāya*.

Again, if we exclude the term '*ādhāryyādhārabhūtānām*' from the definition of *samavāya* laid by Praśastapāda, in the causal relation between happiness or *dharma* and unhappiness or *adharma*, we see that they belong to the soul, but they would not be the locus of the substratum and the superstratum; although they are inseparable entities, yet it cannot be said that it is *samavāya*⁵. If so, it would be *ativyāpti*. In order to resist the fault of *ativyāpti*, the term '*ādhār-yyādhārabhūtānām*' is included in the definition of *samavāya*.

Again, if we say '*ayutasiddhānāmādhāryyādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha sa samavāyaḥ*', the definition would be *ativyāpti*;

because there is a relation of 'vācya-vācaka' in between sky and sound⁶. They are inseparable entities, the substratum and the superstratum and also the relation. But in the relation between sky and sound, sound is in the sky i.e. 'it is here' cannot be said at all. So if we exclude the term '*ihapratyayahetuḥ*', it would again fall the fault of *ativyāpti*.

Lastly, if we exclude the term '*sambandha*' from this definition of *samavāya* then it would fall the fallacy of *ativyāpti*. As the relation between the colour and the pot is like *ayutasiddha*, '*ādhāryyādhāra-bhūtānām*' and '*ihapratyayahetuḥ*' and also '*sambandha*' and for this it is called *samavāya*. But the two relata i.e. the colour and the pot, they are *ayutasiddha*, *ādhār-ādheya* and *ihapratyayahetuḥ*; but they are not *sambandha* by themselves. But whenever we say to them as *sambandha*, the relation will be judged as *samavāya*.

Udayana, in his '*Kirañāvalī*', defines inherence as '*ayutasiddhānām sambandhaḥ*'. The term '*ādhāryyādhārabhūtānām*' is alternative term of '*ayutasiddhānām*'. Again, the term '*ihapratyayahetuḥ*' is the proof of inherence, nothing more. Udayana says that whatever is inseparable is proved as eternal relation. He admits as '*nityaprāptiḥsamavāyaḥ*'⁷. It means eternal relation. So the two inseparable entities belong to eternal relation, like *samavāya*, but conjunction or *saṁyoga* is not eternal relation.

Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, in his '*Prakāśatikā*', illustrates the term '*ayutasiddha*' in a crucial manner. He admits that if the two different categories are related and proved that a category cannot be detached from other category then that relation is called *ayutasiddha*. If two different categories are proved separately, yet they are related and may exist separately, that cannot be said as

ayutasiddha. For example, in case of conjunction, the two relata may be related and proved and may exist separately. For this, the conjunction is not called *ayutasiddha*. So substance and quality are two different categories and their difference is proved. The relation between substance and its quality is called *samavāya*.

When one relatum is under another relatum, whenever one relatum will not be ruined, another relatum would exist. But when the substratum is destroyed then the superstratum would be destroyed. In this case one category remains out of the other. So, except destruction, the two inseparable entities remain always jointly.

Visvanātha, in his *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, also avows the inseparable entities as inherence or *samavāya*. But he does not give any definition of *samavāya* in '*Bhāṣāpariccheda*'. Yet in his *Muktāvalī*, he gives a definition of *samavāya* as '*samavāyatvaṁ nityasambandhatvaṁ*', i.e. *samavāya* is an eternal relation. If *samavāya* is said as *sambandha* then it goes *ativyāpti* in conjunction. But according to the Vaiśeṣika, the conjunction is the non-eternal relation. On the other hand, *samavāya* is eternal relation. Again, if we admit *samavāya* as '*nityapadārtha*' then it goes to soul etc. which are *nitya* and that would be *ativyāpti*. The soul etc. is eternal but not relation at all. For this, *samavāya* is called '*nityasambandha*'. But '*nityasambandhatva*' cannot be the real definition of *samavāya*. According to the Vaiśeṣika, as conjunction (*saṁyoga*) and inherence (*samavāya*) are relations, self-relation is also a kind of relation. This type of relation has also *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī*. But there is a difference between conjunction and self-relation relating their *anuyogins* and *pratiyogins*. In case of conjunction, their *anuyogins* and *pratiyogins* are to be apart from conjunction; whereas in case of self-relation, either it is related to its *anuyogī* or to its *pratiyogī*. For example, if we say that 'there is

the absence of the colour in the sky', the relation between the absence of the colour and the sky is self-relation which is always related as *anuyogī*. Again, in case of absolute absence, the relation between absolute absence and its non-existence is self-relation which is always related to its *pratiyogī*. So if we admit *samavāya* as 'nityasambandhatva', it goes *ativyāpti* in self-relation. In eternal sky etc., the absolute absence of the soul exists in eternal self-relation. So the definiens of *samavāya* must be eternal relation without any relatedness. It can be granted that the definiens of *samavāya* is 'sambandhi bhinnatve sati nityasambandhatvam'.

Samavāya as eternal and one

According to the Vaiśeṣika, *samavāya* is eternal and one. But why is *samavāya* called eternal and one? To answer this question, the Vaiśeṣikas face an army of critics. Generally, if the two relata of a relation are non-eternal, the relation itself would be non-eternal and if the two relata of a relation are eternal, the relation would be eternal. The relation between a bird and a tree is non-eternal. This relation is called as conjunction. Again, the absolute absence of the colour in the sky belongs to a relation as eternal relation. According to the Vaiśeṣikas, all the relata of *samavāya* are either eternal or non-eternal. There are five places where *samavāya* exists; such as in between substance and quality, substance and action, universal and individual, *avayava* and *avayavī* and eternal substance and particularity. Substances are earth, water, fire, atoms of air and *avayavī* substances made by atoms, sky, time, space, soul and mind; they are eternal. The quality is divided into two: eternal and non-eternal. Action is non-eternal. Universal and particular are eternal. So atoms, sky, time, soul and mind, eternal quality, universal and particular are the eternal relata of *samavāya*. On the other hand, *dvyañukas* etc. *avayavīs*, non-eternal quality and action

are the non-eternal relata of inherence. In inherence between the non-eternal substances, non-eternal qualities and non-eternal action and their universals; the *anuyogī* relata are non-eternal but the *pratiyogī* relata are eternal. On the other hand, in case of eternal substances and eternal qualities or eternal substances and particulars, the relata of inherence are eternal. Now the question may arise: how can inherence always be eternal? To answer this question, Praśastapāda says that *samavāya* is always eternal because it has no cause⁸. As essence, substancehood, etc. have no cause and for this, they are eternal; so as *samavāya* has no cause, it is eternal. Whatever uncaused or *anādi* is eternal. As *samavāya* is uncaused positive category, it is eternal. On the other hand, conjunction is with-caused because all the relata of a conjunction are the *samavāyī kāraṇa*. So the conjunction is non-eternal. Though there are some relata of inherence as non-eternal, yet they are not either *samavāyī kāraṇa* or *asamavāyī kāraṇa* and even all the eternal relata are not also the *samavāyī* or *asamavāyī kāraṇas*. For this, though the relata are either eternal or non-eternal, yet *samavāya* is always eternal.

According to the Vaiśeṣika, *samavāya* is one. But the question may arise: how can *samavāya* exist as one in both eternal and non-eternal relata? To answer this question, Praśastapāda says that as there can be the same reality⁹ in substance, quality and action, *samavāya* can also exist as one among the five categories such as substance, quality, active, universal and particular. These five categories are either *anuyogī* or *pratiyogī* of the *samavāya* but there is no change of *samavāya* as one. Now another question may arise: if *samavāya* is one in all circumstances¹⁰ and though the *samavāya* of substance and substancehood, quality and qualityhood and action and actionhood is possible, why it would not be possible to get the cognition of *samavāya* in between substance and qualityhood. To

answer this question, Praśastapāda says that on the basis of the rule of '*ādhārādheya*', there is no cognition of quality hood in substance. The '*ādhāra*' as substance belongs to the '*ādheya*' as substancehood. Again, in case of *samavāya* in between substance and quality, quality is '*ādhāra*' and substance is '*ādheya*'.

Visvanātha says that as *sparśasamavāya* and *rūpasamavāya* are the same, so *rūpatva* may go inherently in the air. In the air, *sparśa* exists as the relation of *samavāya*. But Visvanātha argues that though *sparśasamavāya* and *rūpasamavāya* are the same, yet there is no *vyañjaka* of *rūpa* in the air. For this, there may not be the cognition of *rūpasamavāya* in the air.

Notes and references

1. *Vaiśeṣika Sūtra*.- vii.2.26.
2. "...*asambaddhayovidyamānatvamayutasiddhiḥ*..."-Śaṅkara Miśra (40), p. 159.
3. *Praśastapādabhāṣya*, 2.2.9.
4. "*yutasiddhiḥ pṛthaksiddhiḥ, pṛthagavasthitirubhayorapi sambandhinoḥ parasparaparihāreṇa pṛthagāśrayāśrayitvam, sā yoyornāsti tāvayutasiddhau, toyoḥ sambandhaḥ samavāyaḥ. Yathā tantupaṭayoḥ*".- Śrīdhara (57), p. 37.

The relata of inherence are said to be inseparable in the sense that they are conceived to exist in the substratum-superstratum position occupying the same point of space.

5. "*ayutasiddhayoḥ sambandha ityucyamāne dharmasya sukhasya ca yaḥ kāryyakāraṇabhāvalakṣaṇaḥ sambandhaḥ, soḥpi samavāyaḥ prāpnotī*".- Ibid., p. 38.
6. "*vācyavācakabhāvena ca vyabhicārāt*".-Vyomaśiva (58), p. 108.
Udayana also has touched the point:
".....*vācyavācakādibhāvalakṣaṇasambandho na prasajyate. Etadeva spaṣṭayati-ādhāryyādhārabhūtānāmitī*".-Udayana (71), Vol. 1. p. 251.
7. "*prāptā eva santinā prāptā iti yāvat. teṣāṃ sambandhaḥ prāptilakṣaṇaḥ. tena saṃyogo vyavacchinnastasyāprāptipūrvakatvāt. Tathāca nityaprāptiḥ samavāya iti lakṣaṇaṃ sūcitam*".-Ibid., p. 249.
8. "*sambandhyanīyatveḥpi na saṃyogavadanīyatvaṃ bhāvavadakāraṇatvāt*".- Praśastapāda (57), p. 782.
9. "*bhāvavallīṅgāviśeṣād*".-Ibid.,p. 777.
10. "*tasmād bhāvavat sarvatraikaḥ samavāya itī*".-Ibid.