

IDENTITY AND SIMILARITY:

A CRITICAL STUDY ON THE CONCEPT OF TĀDĀTMYA IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

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By
Sangita Raha

**DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL
Raja Rammohanpur, Darjeeling,
West Bengal, India
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TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to certify that Sm. Sangita Raha of Siliguri College has carried out her research work on '*Identity and similarity: A Critical Study on the Concept of Tadatmya in Indian Philosophy*' for the PhD (Arts) degree in Philosophy of this University after maintaining the rules of the University. The thesis contains the marks of her critical and analytic thinking and hence I recommend its submission for evaluation leading to the award of the said degree. The thesis was not submitted earlier for the PhD degree in this University or any other University so far as my knowledge goes. I wish her success in life.

Raghunath Ghosh

(Professor Raghunath Ghosh),
Dean, Faculty of Arts, Commerce & Law,
(Supervisor), University of North Bengal.

**DEAN
FACULTY OF ARTS, COMMERCE & LAW
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH BENGAL**

Preface

The problem of identity (tadatmya) in different systems of Indian Philosophy has got its own character and uniqueness, which is evidenced from different types of identity found in Indian philosophical literature. The Naiyayikas have admitted absolute identity between two objects in the sense of absolute sameness while the Buddhists and Vedantins accept it in the sense of relative identity or similarity. At the same time the question of metaphysical identity or cultural identity or linguistic identity cannot be ruled out. In this doctoral dissertation an effort has been made to highlight different notions of identity and I believe that the similarity is also a kind of identity as found in aesthetics, which is followed by some critical and evaluative remarks. How far I am successful will be judged by the scholars in this field.

This thesis would not find the light of the day if I were not constantly assisted by my teacher and supervisor of the work, Professor Raghunath Ghosh, Dean, Faculty of Arts, Commerce and Law, University of North Bengal. I sincerely express my heartfelt thanks and gratitude to him. At the same time I would like to show my respectful gratitude to my other teachers of the Department like Professor Bhaswati Chakraborty, Dr. Kanti Lal Das, Dr. Jyotish Chandra Basak etc. I owe a lot to my colleagues of Siliguri College in general and Principal in particular who have encouraged me to go ahead with research work. It is needless to say that my father, mother, brother and elder sister were always with me with their blessings and best wishes while I was engaged with my research work. If I become successful in my work, it is the result of the best wishes of the seniors collectively.

Sangita Raha.
(Sm. Sangita Raha),
Siliguri College, Siliguri.

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CHAPTER – I

Introduction

The relation is a bondage through which an individual is connected to another individual and between an individual, society and nature. A man can serve the society or nature if he feels 'related' with others. The relation always exists between two relata in any type of verbal communication also. We try to relate the terms with their denotations, which are technically called *vācya-vācaka-bhāva sambandha*, that is the expressed and expresser relationship. Human feeling is of two types – relational and non-relational, which is expressed by the Naiyāyikas as *Savikalpaka* (determinate) and *Nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate). If something is known as relational, it is called *savikalpaka* or determinate, because it relates the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and qualificand (*viśeṣya*). Between these two there is a relation which is called *samsarga*. Hence the determinate is defined as a cognition abiding in three components- *viśeṣya* (qualificand), *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifier) and their relation (*samsarga*) (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya – samsargāvagāhijñānam*).¹ The indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpaka*), on the other hand, is called non-relational because the relation (*samsarga*) is not a binding factor between qualificand and qualifier (*viśeṣya-viśeṣaṇa-anavagāhijñānam*).² On account of this it is called non-relational, because it is not capable of being expressed. In relational cognition three things are apprehended. The first is qualificand, the second qualifier and the third relation. The content of cognition which is called *viśaya* exists in these three. In other words, the contentness (*viśayatā*) exists in *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣaṇa* and their relation. The first one is called contentness existing in the qualificandness (*viśeṣyataniṣṭha-viśayatā*), and contentness existing in the qualificierness (*viśeṣaṇataniṣṭha-viśayatā*) and contentness existent in relationhood (*samsargatāniṣṭha-viśayatā*).³ The contentness existing in a *samsarga* (relation)

becomes the content of our awareness. When such an awareness is not possible, there lies the non-relational which is called *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate in Nyāya. The Naiyayikas are the forerunners in establishing in fact that relation existing between two (*dviṣṭha*) is called a relation, and two objects that are conjoined with a relation are called *relata*. These *relata* are generally called sometimes *pratiyogī* and *anuyogī*. In Indian logic two objects between which a relation exists are called *relata* in the forms of *pratiyogī* and *anuyogī*. In Nyāya a dyadic relation is always accepted, but a triadic relation is not accepted in a direct way. There is a relation called indirect or *paramparā* which may be interpreted as a triadic one. When our hand is connected with a book which is again connected with the table, it is called triadic in the name of *paramparā*. In this case, hand is connected with a book which is again connected with the ground. It may be demonstrated in the following way: (hand > book) >ground. The first pair is dyadic and the next one i.e. ground is connected with the pair i.e. hand and book. It is described as *samyogajasamyoga* i.e. a contact arising out of the contact of two objects. In the same way, it can be said that the property of a stick (i.e. stickness or *dandatva*) is connected with my hand through this indirect relation called *paramparā*. In other words, this indirect relation is called *svāśrayāśrayatva* (locusness of something which is the locus of an object). In the above-mentioned case the property 'stickness' (*dandatva*) exists in its locus i.e. stick or *danda* which is connected with the hand i.e. which remains in the hand as its locus.⁴

The relation is of many types – contact (*samyoga*) inherence (*samavāya*), identity (*tādātmya*) etc. Contact (*samyoga*) is called separable relation (*yutasiddha*) while inherence (*samyoga*) is called inseparable (*ayutasiddha*). Contact (*samyoga*) remains between two objects and it is taken as a quality (*guṇa*) which by virtue of being a quality remains between two objects. But this relation is not a permanent one, because these two *relata* can be disjoined which is called *vibhāga*. But the inherence or *samavāya* is inseparable (*ayutasiddha*),

because this two relata can never be separated. Hence it is called eternal (*nitya*) because it remains in two entities. Inseparability entails a permanent relation (*nitya-sambandhah*). In order to remove the defect of *anavasthā* (*Infinite Regress*) the Naiyāyikas have accepted self-locatedness (*svātmavṛtti*) of such relation. Hence the inherence or *samavāya* is called *svātmavṛtti*.⁵

The above-mentioned point may be elaborated in the following manner. The inherence relation is described as vitiated with the defect of *anavasthā* or *Infinite Regress* in the following way. Sankara in his *bhāṣya* on the *Tarkapāḍa* section has raised the question of *anavasthā* if *samavāya* is taken as a relation. If the relata are conjoined with *samavāya* then *samavāya* may be related to one of the relata with the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) again. Let us take an example. The relation called *samavāya* is related between a jar and the colour of a jar. Another *samavāya* is related between a jar and the colour of a jar. Another *samavāya* relation is taken to be existing between *samavāya* and colour of the jar. Again, there may be another *samavāya* existing between that *samavāya* and the colour of the jar. In this way there occurs the defect called *Infinite Regress* (*anavasthā*).⁶

In order to avoid these complications the Vaiśeṣikas have come to the conclusion that *samavāya* is a relation which exists in the self (*svātmavṛtti*) or self-located (*svāśraya*). Hence, it is an eternal relation (*nityaḥsambandhah*).

The same argument is given by *Dharmakīrti* in his *Sambandhaparīkṣā*. *Dharmakīrti* has raised the question of *Infinite Regress* in the same manner. Though the Naiyāyikas had not given any argument in defence of themselves to *Dharmakīrti*, yet the above-mentioned argument can be given in favour of their standpoint. In fact, there is a point in accepting *samavāya* or inherence as a category (*padārtha*).

Relation is a connector which is called *sannikarṣa* existing between the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and qualificand (*viśeṣya*) which are the distinct from each

other (*Sambandhaḥ sannikarṣaḥ, sa ca vibhinnayorvastunorviśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaya - bhāvaprāyojyah*).⁷ The relation exists in two different objects. In the above mentioned case, one relatum is a qualifier and another one is a qualificand. That is why, the qualified cognition which is a set of the three- viz. qualifier qualificand and their relation. The whole related cognition is called a qualified cognition or *viśiṣṭadhīḥ* or *viśiṣṭapratīṭiḥ*. We may discuss here two triadic relations - *samīyogajasamīyoga* and *svāśrayāśrayatva*. The former is called contact generated through another contact which may be expounded with the help of the following example. We may see a book on the table which is connected with the ground. In this example the book is connected with the table which is again connected with the ground. The first one is a kind of contact (*samīyoga*) which gives rise to another contact (*samīyoga*) which gives rise to another contact (*samīyoga*) which is called *samīyogajasamīyoga*. That is, the second one is a contact arising out of another contact. In other words, the contact between table and the ground arises out of the contact of the table and the book. In the same way, the indirect called *svāśrayāśrayatvā* can be explained. Let us explain this in the following manner. The word 'dandī' (holder of stick) is related to the stickness (*dandatva*) through the relation called *paramparā* known as *svāśrayāśrayatva*. The term 'sva' stands for stickness or *dandatva* which is located in the stick (*danda*). The relation is very much important for knowing the exact nature of the cognition. In the Nyāya – framework the relation plays an important role, which can be interpreted in the following way. We may say that an individual may remain a particular room and at the same time he may not remain in the room. How is it possible? Both the expressions become meaningful, if a relation is inserted as an adjunct. An individual may remain in a particular room through the relation of contact (*samyoga*) and he does not remain in the same room at the same time through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Whether I belong to a particular time or space depends on the relation assumed by the Naiyayikas. That is why; they are called *sambandhins*

by the opponents jockingly. According to Professor B.K.Matilal, every relation can be said to have a relation as direction such that it may be taken as pointing from one relation to the other, but when we express a relation simply as a relation between x and y, we do not specify whether it is (a) a relation of x and y or (b) a relation of y to x. It is evident that the relation involved in (a) is not in general the same as that involved in (b). Hence to express a relation adequately, it is necessary to specify its so-called direction.⁸ For that purpose Nyāya draws a distinction between the two relata, so that whatever specific descriptions of the two relata are given, one can easily identify the relation concerned. In other words, to give the condition for the identification of a relation, we should not only mention the two relata but also indicate the 'way' in which they are related. To do so the Naiyayikas follow this procedure. If a relation is described as 'the relation of x to y' the relatum x is called the *pratiyogin* (adjunct) and the relatum y is called the *anuyogin* (subjunct) of the relation in question. In ordinary Sanskrit, the genitive case-ending usually marks off the adjunct and the 'octative case-ending the subjunct'.⁹

Generally the *sāmānyas* or *jātis* like cowness, horseness etc. are called non-relational properties because they are eternal (*nitya*) and inhered in many individuals (*anekasamaveta*). If the properties are not universals having the above-mentioned features, they are called *upādhis* or extraneous adjuncts and they are relational abstracts in the true sense of the term. The property of being a father (*pitṛtva*), being a teacher (*śikṣakatva*) etc are relational by virtue of the fact that these are not in-born properties but these are inherited properties. A man cannot be a teacher or father from the date of his birth but they are acquired in course of time. Hence these properties exist in themselves through a relation which is described by the Navya Naiyayikas as *svarūpa* or self-linking relation. If we do not find any adjunct or *anuyogī* other than the object, these properties are taken to be existing in these e.g., the fatherhood in father, teacherhood in

teacher etc. In this way innumerable number of acquired property can be cited. There are also some relative terms-like husband, wife, son, father etc. which are explained in terms of determinism (*nirūpakatva*). In the example ‘father’ – he is related to his son in terms of a relation called *nirūpakatā*. It conveys the fact that the ‘father’ is determined by ‘son’. If there were no son at all, an individual would not be said to be a father. In the same way, the son determines the father (*pitā-putra-nirūpita*). A husband stands in relation to wife and the vice-verse. In this way, between student and teacher, ruler and the ruled, etc, there lies a relation of *nirūpita-nirūpaka* – relation. Hence each and every verbal expression is relational.

Apart from these, all relative statements are called ‘relative’ in the true sense of the term because they are related to something. The term ‘wife’ is called relative, because its meaning is connected with something existing in another pole considering which the woman is called ‘wife’. Unless there was the concept of ‘husband’, it becomes meaningless. In the same way all the relative terms like ‘the first boy of the class’, ‘mother’, ‘son’, ‘teacher’ etc are so called as they are related to ‘other boys of the class’, ‘father’, ‘mother’ or ‘daughter’, ‘student’ etc. In this way other relative terms i.e., something (x) is in north of something (y), p is the enemy of q etc. Even the verbal understanding is deeply grounded on the relational statement. Keeping this aspect in view the Naiyayikas have accepted *ākāṅkṣā* or expectancy as one of the criteria of the verbal understanding. If there is no expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*) among the words of a sentence, it cannot give rise to meaning. Such a sentence is called *nirākāṅkṣa* i.e., having no expectancy. Dharmaraja Adhvarīndra in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has raised this problem and said that a sentence is called *sākāṅkṣa* or having expectancy, if we get all the necessary informations by asking some question.¹⁰ In the sentence in the form, ‘Rama is going to the forest to fulfil his father’s promise’ there is expectancy because we can get a reply of the question – ‘who

is going'? In the same way, we may get the reply of the questions – 'where is Ram^o going?' 'Why is Rama going to forest? etc. Actually these questions may be called 'relational', as they provide some answers with which they are related. For this reason, the Grammarians have enumerated seven *kāraḥas* keeping this expectancy in view. These *kāraḥas* have established some relations in a language. In response to the questions 'who', we get 'agent'. In the same way, we get various answers like object, instrument, giving something to somebody for ever, source of some object locus etc. through the usages of the second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh case-endings respectively. If it is asked from where the river Ganga is flowing, it would be said that it is flowing from the Himalayas. It is expressed in the language with the help of the fifth case-ending applied in the case of *apādanā*. If it is said, 'Tiger lives in a forest', and asked for the comprehensibility – 'where does the tiger live'? the answer can be given in the following way – 'in the forest' which is expressed with the help of seventh case-ending or locative. Particularly, the sixth case-ending (genitive) is used directly to show a relation as evidenced from the *Pāṇini-sūtra*- '*ṣaṣṭhi śeṣe*'. Here the term '*Śeṣa*' means '*avaśeṣa*' i.e. remaining thing. By applying the method of residue the grammarians have drawn our attention to the usage of sixth-ending to the places in which other case-ending cannot be applicable to other shown cases, it has to be applied in the remaining cases that are only relations. That is why, in some grammar it is prescribed that sixth case ending has to be applied to show relations like being owner (*svāmitva*), being the locus of the properties (*sattva*) etc. (*ṣaṣṭhi sambandhe*). This genitive is generally applicable to something available as reply to the question in the form 'whose', If it is said 'this umbrella belongs to Rama', it is expressed as '*Rāmasya Chatram*'. If it is asked – 'whose umbrella is this?', the answer will come – 'It is Ram^o's umbrella'. The genitive is used with the term – 'Rama', because he is related to the umbrella as an owner (*svattva*).

It may be argued that all the case-endings and *kāraḥas* are used in language in order to show the multi-dimensional relations. As language is the bearer of the thought, it has to express multi-dimensional relations in human thought. That is why; any determinate cognition (*savikalpa^k*) is called relational cognition. In order to catch hold of the intention of speaker we generally relate his words to the situation or context. It may be explained with the help of an example. Let us think a situation when a teacher is teaching in a class room in a closed room. If there is a sudden power cut, the teacher might say to the students 'Door please' (*dvāram*). Under this context a student will relate the door with a verb – 'open' (*udghātaya*) which is understood in a sentence. After sometime if there is blowing dusty storm, the same teacher will utter the same sentence – Door please (*dvāram*) to a student. In this case also the student will relate the door to the verb-'close' (*pidhehi*) after considering a different context. In the same way, the meaning of the term – *saindhava*' in a sentence – '*saindhavamānaya*' will be determined with the help of relating the term to the context. If a man utters this while taking meal. it would mean salt (*lavaṇa*). If it is uttered at time of going to the battle-field, it would mean - 'horse' (*aśva*) as the situation is favourable to this meaning.

In the same way, the intention of speaker is known from the relation with the context under which it is uttered. The intention of the speaker (*tātparya*) is known from the sentence uttered by an individual. This sentence must have relation with something. That is way, *tātparya* is defined a '*tatpratīcchayā uccaritatvam* (i.e. when an individual utters some sentence with a view to mean something, it is called *tātparya* or intention of the speaker). From this it follows that a sentence is not uttered 'unrelatedly' or arbitrarily, but to mean something. Hence, the sentence and meaning of it is invariably related. In the same way, the sentence, and its meaning is related to the speaker. Hence without relation the intention of the speaker is very difficult to know.

The above mentioned definition of *tātparyā* is somehow formulated by the Neo-thinkers. To them when a sentence is uttered to mean something, it is the intention of the speaker. There is no question of the existence of relation, but a sentence may not always be uttered. There are many signs or signals which can provide the intention of the speaker though they are not articulated. The traffic signals or Umpire's signals must bear some intention of the speaker though they do not possess the property – '*uccaritatva*' (being uttered). Hence, the Neo-thinkers have reformulated the room in a closed room. If there is a sudden power cut, the teacher might say to the students 'Door please' (*dvārami*). Under this context a student will relate the door with a verb – 'open' (*udghātaya*) which is understood in a sentence. After sometime if there is blowing dusty storm, the same teacher will utter the same sentence – 'Door please' (*dvārami*) to a student. In this case also the student will relate the door to the verb 'close' (*pidhehi*) after considering a different context. In the same way, the meaning of the term – '*sandhava*' in a sentence – *saindhavam ānaya*' will be determined with the help of relating the term to the context. If a man utters this while taking meal, it would mean salt (*lavana*). If it is said at time of going to the battle-field, it would mean – 'horse' (*asva*) as the situation is favourable to this meaning.

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book, etc. all of them are related by virtue of being their existence in the same locus (*sāmānādhikaranya*).

Apart from the above-mentioned cases we find other interesting places that are really unintelligible without the notion of relation. We may consider the following examples: 'Our house is situated in the north of the house of my friend'. In this case our understanding of the sentence depends on the relation between the north side and my friend's house, which also presupposes the cognition of south etc. from the other direction. When the Jaina-logicians prescribe the theory of *syādvāda* and *anekāntavāda*, they believe that entity is multi-dimensional. The multi-dimensional aspects of an entity have to be understood from the standpoint of multidimensional relations. From one standpoint it is called existent, from another standpoint it is called non-existent and to another standpoint it is both. Hence an object which is multidimensional is also called multi-relational. Without the presupposition of relation multiple dimension of an object is not possible. The nihilists i.e., the *śūnyavādins* of the Buddha philosophers have accepted the existence of an object endowed with the absence of the four dimensions (*catuṣkotivinirmukta*). How is an object described as *śūnya* due to having the absence of four-fold alternatives? Hence each and every object is 'relative' i.e. true from the standpoint of a particular relation and false from the other relation. Hence relation plays an important role for grasping an object in a particular time. Any theory of relativism is so called because it is true or false from the standpoint of a relation.

All the systems of Indian Philosophy accept relation as a prime factor for verbal understanding and any kind of understanding. One may raise the question of the Buddhists like Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita etc. who do not believe in the existence of relation as evidenced from *Sambandhaparīkṣā* by Dharmakīrti. In response to this way one may say that the Buddhists do not admit relation in the transcendental or *pāramārthika* level, but at the level of phenomenon

(*samvṛti*) they accept 'relation'. Otherwise, they cannot philosophise their doctrines which are very much fundamental in character. The Four Noble Truth, (*catvāri āryasatyāni*), twelve causal links (*dvādaśānidāna*), *pāñcakaraṇī* etc. are applicable to the phenomenal level of truth. To Dharmakīrti there is no 'relation' in the ultimate level of truth – '*sambandho nāsti tattvataḥ*'.¹³

Between two things we ascribe many descriptions after considering relation between them. Between two things one may be called *para* (superior), set, genus etc and the other one may be called *apara* (inferior), sub-set, species etc. The *aparā*, sub-set or species in this particular case is with reference to from other object. It may be taken as *para* set or genus if we find another one which serves as *aparā* etc. All these designations are in compare to others i.e. in relation to others.

Most of the Indian thinkers believe in the theory of the rhetorics-metaphor (*rūpaka*), simile (*upamā*), *vyatireka*, *utprekṣā* etc. where the relation between *upameya* (the object compared) and *upamāna* (the object with which something is compared) is reflected. When the face of a human being or a particular lady is compared to the moon by the expression, '*mukhacandra*' the face is taken as object compared or *upameya* and the moon is called *upamāna* i.e. object with which something is compared. Such type of analogy is possible if there is a relation between *upamāna* and *upameya*. This relation is called identity. Different rhetoric forms are accepted depending on the degrees of identity between these. When the face is taken as completely identical with the moon without making any difference, it is called *rūpaka* or metaphor in the true sense of the term. If it is said that the face is just like the moon, the term 'like' is used to express the identity which is not purely identical as found in the case of *rūpaka*. In this case (i.e. *mukham candra iva*), there is the rhetoric called *upamā*. If there is some suspicion on the relation between *upameya* and *upamāna*, there is an identity which is not of earlier type. It is called a new *alamkāra* called

utprekṣā. If it is said that the face is as if the moon, the term 'as if' bears a special significance giving rise to an *alamkāra* called *utprekṣā*. In the same way, there are many cases in our literature when the *upamāna* is taken as inferior or superior to the *upameya* or the vice-versa. A poet may say that the beautiful face of the lady cannot be compared to the autumnal full moon, because many such moons are lying on her nails of the feet ('*ke vale śāradaśāsī se mukher tulā padanakhe paḍe ācche tār katagulā*). In the case the lady's face is much more beautiful than a number of autumnal full moon and hence *upamāna* is taken as inferior to the *upameya* giving rise to a special *alamkāra* called *vyatireka*. Another example may be put forth to show the superiority of the *upameya* to *upamāna*. Youth of an individual brings happiness no doubt and hence it is compared to spring. But an individual's youth is said to be more precious than the spring. Because, the spring comes again in the next years, but one's youth if exhausted, it is for ever. Though both the youth and spring are exhaustive in nature due to their non-transcient character, the former does not come back in our whole life while the latter comes again. The poem describing this is as follows: '*Yauvan basantasama sukhamay bate dhīre dhīre ubhayera pariṇām ghate kintu punah basanter hay āgaman phire nā phire nā ār phire nā yauvan*'. Hence due to the inferiority or superiority of either *upamāna* to *upameya* or *upameya* to *upamāna* the specific rhetoric is called *vyatireka*. In all cases the relation between *upamāna* and *upameya* remains, but a subtle difference in degree gives rise to specific rhetoric in Indian Poetics. The details about this will be discussed in following chapters.

Whatever we have discussed so far can be summarized in the following way –

The Navya Nyāya (N-N) school developed a highly technical language which at one point of time became the medium of any serious discussion.

“N-N developed this language in course of developing on Epistemic Logic, the object of enquiry of which is *pramā* or true cognition. A *pramā* is necessarily intentional, individuated by its content and turns out to be intentional.

Epistemic contents are expressed in Sanskrit. Though Sanskrit grammar is very rigorous, it fails to make our cognitive structure perspicuous.

According to N-N, the basic combination which expresses a cognitive content is a locus-locatee combination of the form ‘a has f-ness’/‘f-ness in a’. (e.g., ‘Redness in flower’). In a perspicuous count of a cognitive content, the Naiyāyika would like to make explicit the connection between the flower and its colour in consonance with his own categorical framework. Sanskrit as an object language is either neutral to metaphysical questions or bears the burden of the grammarian ontology.

In object language the relation between the locus and the locatee is never specified. The rule is that whatever can be expressed in the object language ceases to be a relation but becomes the term/relatum of a relation. But the relations involved must be specified, if one wants to make the structure of a cognitive content transparent. Hence the N-N School requires a second order language where the structure of a First Order language is made explicit.

A perspicuous structure helps in distinguishing true cognition from false cognition. A true condition has a unitary qualified content (*viśiṣṭa-viṣayatā*) which a false cognition invariably lacks.

The three elements that constitute cognitive content are (a) qualificand (*viśeṣya*) (b) qualifier (*prakāra*) and (c) the cognized relation (*samsarga*) which is a qualification of the cognitive content. Thus in our example of ‘the red

flower', flower is the qualificand, redness is the qualifier and *samavāya* or inherence is the relation.

According to N-N elements of cognitive content which they try to express by their technical language can be grasped in introspection (*anuvyavasāya*). When we cognize something, some qualifiers are expressed in the object language and some are merely understood. The former is called a *prakāra* and the latter an avacchedaka (*limitor*). The limitor is the mode under which an ontological entity becomes evident in our language.

Let us suppose, you are aware of a blue pot. What will be its explicit structure? The cognition the qualifier of which is blue colour cognized under the mode of the feature of blueness, the qualificand of which is the pot cognized under the mode potness and the qualifying relation of which is the relation of inherence cognized simpliciter. Thus we arrive at the Nyāya principle of analysis of cognition; every cognition that is expressed in language has an unmentioned qualifier, which is either a universal (*jāti*) or an unanalysable property (*akhandopādhi*) and an unmentioned relation between the qualificand and the qualifier apprehended directly. It thus becomes evident that if we proceed from the side of ordinary language expression of the contents we get a due to the structure of the cognitive content but the structure cannot be fully grasped through ordinary language.

N-N classification of relations: (1) *samyoga* (2) *samavāya* (3) *svarūpa* and (4) *tādā[†]mya* or *abheda*. By another principle of classification all relations are divided into two types: (a) occurrence – exacting relations (*vṛtti-niyāmaka*) and (b) non-occurrence-exacting relations (*vṛtti-anīyāmaka*). *Samavāya* and *svarūpa* fall in the first group while identity, pervasion and indirect relations like *samavetasamavāya* fall in the second group. N-N has specified various *svarūpa* relations of which we give a list of fifteen, viz. *pratiyogitā*, *anuyogitā*,

avacchedakatā, avacchedyatā, nirūpakatā, nirūpyatā, ādhāratā, ādheyatā, samsargatā, viṣayatā, viṣayitā prayojakatā, prayojyatā, kāraṇatā, Kāryatā.

Svarūpa sambandha has been defined as that relation which is essentially an accepted object or rather identical with some accepted objects on the one hand and on the other hand, it has the characteristic feature of a relation having been qualified by a particular attribute (*Kliptaḥ padārthaḥ san kiñcid-dharmoparāgena samsargatāvattvam*).

Gangeśa and most of his followers considered *viṣayatā* i.e. *viṣayānuyogika* and *jñāna-pratīyogika-sambandha* as a *svarūpa* relation. A *svarūpa* relation is identical with either or both the relata. The official N-N position is that *viṣayatā* is identical with cognition. But Raghunatha Siromani and Gadadhara Bhattacharya think that *viṣayata* should be accepted as a separate entity' relation. (*viṣayatvam padārthāntaram eva, na tu svarūpa sambandha-viśeṣa*).

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CHAPTER – II

Tādātmya as a Relation

I

A query may be made whether the identical statements like *ghaṭah ghaṭah* etc. generates any meaning or not. In this connection I would like to represent some more supplementary arguments in favour of accepting *tādātmya* relation in Navya Nyāya.

II

Though the term *Tādātmya* is used in Buddhism and *Navya Nyāya*, both the systems have taken this relation in a completely different sense which is explained here for the proper understanding the concept. Other major philosophical problems may crop up on the understanding this relation, if this part is not discussed properly.

III

The Buddhists admit that identity (*tādātmya*) is a relation, which it will lead to another assertion that there are relata, because relation only remains in two objects as far as the Buddhist view is concerned. The Buddhists have used the term *tādātmya* (*identity*) in a very restricted sense i.e. in the sense of similarity, but not in the sense of absolute sameness as understood by Navya Naiyayikas. According to them, *tādātmya* or identity is the similarity in the sense that one relatum would be less extensive than the other. The Buddhists accepts identity between *śimsapātva* (i.e. property existing in *śimsapā*, a kind of tree) and

vr̥kṣatva (treeness). It can safely be said that wherever there is *śimśapātva*, there is *vr̥kṣatva* or treeness, but not the otherwise. As the property *vr̥kṣatva* (treeness) has more extensive pervasion than *śimśapātva*, from the *śimśapātva*, one can easily infer *vr̥kṣatva* (treeness) due to having the relation in the sense of similarity (*tādātmya*) there. But, on the other hand, from the property of a tree (treeness), one cannot infer *śimśapātva* because treeness has got more extensive pervasion in the sense that we cannot tell – ‘whatever there is *vr̥kṣatva* (treeness), there is *śimśapātva* because ‘treeness’ covers all the trees in this world, not to speak of *śimśapātva*. That is why, the Buddhist concept of *tādātmya* is taken neither as completely identical nor completely non-identical, but in the sense of similarity. This relation remains between two properties called *parasāmānya* (a property existing comparatively more places) and *aparasāmānya* (a property existing comparatively in less places) and also between species and genus (e.g. *śimśapātva* and *vr̥kṣatva*). It may otherwise be called bhedabheda which means *bheda-viśiṣṭha-abheda* (i.e. identity associated with the feature of distinction). In other words, between two properties like *śimśapātva* and *vr̥kṣatva* there is both similarity and distinction. As *śimśapā* is a tree, it has similarity with tree in general, but all trees are not *śimśapā* and hence there is a distinction identity in this sense is also accepted in Indian tradition. An object covering narrower place remains in another object existing in wider places as shown above.¹

Dharmakīrti has explained the above mentioned identity as “a reason for deducing a predicate when the subject alone is by itself sufficient for that deduction, i.e. when the predicate is a part of the subject. It is, therefore, not absolute identity but it is a partial identity.”² If there is a class and a sub-class relation, it is called ‘identity’ in the above mentioned sense of the term. The relation between flower and stone, as for example, is absolutely different (*atyantabheda*) and hence the identity relation cannot be accepted. If, on the

other hand, it is accepted 'ghaṭa is a kalaśa' (i.e., a jar is a jar), there such relation cannot be accepted due to their absolute identity (*atyāntābheda*). Such type of identity is not accepted in the Navya Nyāya. Even to the Buddhists this relation is an unreal one as it comes under *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Like *tadutpatti* this relation is an unreal one as it comes under *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. Like *tadutpatti* this notion of *tādātmya* (identity) taken by the Buddhists as a means of ascertaining *Vyāpti*. Such a form of inference is not accepted by the Naiyāyikas. For, they would at most describe the properties like treeness (*vṛkṣatva*) as a form of universal called *parasāmānya* i.e. an universal covering more places than the other property like *śimśapātva* which is called *aparasāmānya* due to its existing in comparatively less places. If the former is a set, the later would be taken as a subject. There is not question of inference according to *Nyāya*. It may be taken as a perceptual cognition. On the other hand, the Buddhists cannot say this is a case of perceptual knowledge, due to their various presuppositions because to them unique sigular (*svalakṣaṇa*) is inferential which has got unreality in the sense of phenomenal reality (*samvṛtīsatyatā*). To a Buddhist logician each and every object, being individual in character (*svalakṣṇa*) is free from mental ascriptions called *kalpanā*. This object which is free from mental constructions and is of unique or momentary type is called perception. When the nature of such entity is vitiated through linguistic ascription, it is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* known as inferential cognition.

Though identity comes under *samvṛtīsatyatā*, the concept may not be understood in this sense only. Some might say that it is the case of similarity, but not identity. According to the Navya Naiyayikas, the *tādātmya* relation may be taken in the following way.

IV

The term *tādātmya* may be understood at the very beginning as the absence of bheda (difference) which is accepted as *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence). If the term *tādātmya* is replaced by the term ‘*abheda*’ it would mean an absolute absence of a bheda i.e. mutual absence. Why is *tādātmya* called *abheda*? For, it is nothing but an absence of *bheda* as it is said in the *Vyutpattivāda- abhedastādātmyam* (i.e. identity means the absence of mutual absence). Here ‘absence’ means ‘absolute absence’ (*atyantābhāva*).³

Identity (*tādātmya*) is possible only when difference (*bheda*) is excluded according to Navya Nyāya and when it is said that a jar is not a cloth (*ghaṭo na paṭah*). A jar is understood as different from a cloth. The Naiyayikas will say that in a jar there is the mutual absence of a cloth. That is, the Navya Naiyayikas can distinguish these two objects as having mutual absence of a cloth in a jar. Though the distinction is known perceptually, it can also be inferred if someone has strong desire to do it (*siṣādhayiṣā*). In this case the syllogistic argument in the form – “A cloth is possessing mutual absence from a jar, as it possesses clothness in it’ (*ghaṭānyonyābhāvavān paṭatvāt*). However, the distinction between two objects is a subject of perception or inference. If it is possible, why some sort of relation between two objects having no distinction (*bheda*) is not accepted. If *bheda* is admitted as an object of cognition, why not the case of *abheda*? The term ‘*abheda*’ would mean the constant absence (*atyantābhāva*) of *bheda* (mutual absence or *anyonyābhāva*), which may be interpreted as the absolute absence, the absentee of which is limited by mutual absences (*bheda-pratīyogika-abhāva*). It may be interpreted in another way. It is an absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) whose absentee is i.e. mutual absence (*bheda-pratīyogika-abhāva*). Both the interpretations are not tenable because if they are accepted, they lead us to the land of absurdity. If the former interpretation (*abhedo yadi bheda tvāvacchinnābhāva*) is taken into account, the absolute negation would not be available anywhere. Because the mutual negation (*bheda*)

of any object can be found everywhere, and hence the absolute negation of the *bheda* (mutual absence), the absenteness of which is limited by *bhedatva* i.e. distinctness is not possible. For, the absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) is contradictory to its absentee- the absenteness of which is limited by *bhedatva* (i.e. mutual absenceness). As an object having *anyonyābhāva* or *bheda* is available anywhere, the absolute negation of it limited by *bhedatva* is contradictory by virtue of the fact that *bheda* which is taken to be absentee limited by the property *bhedatva* is not at all possible. If it is said that there is the absolute negation of *bheda* limited by *bhedatva* is contradictory because the *bheda* limited by the limiter of *bheda* (*bhedatva*) is always available and hence to search for its absolute negation leads to absurdity (*abhedo yadi bhedatvāvacchennābhavastadāprasiddhih*).⁴ This thesis would be nullified if a single case (*vyakti*) of a constant absence exists in a particular case. That is, the absolute negation would not be found in such cases, as it has been said here that *bheda* limited by the property of being *bheda* (*bhedatva*) i.e. *bhedatvāvacchinnabheda* is general. Hence an individual manifestation of *bheda* limited by *bhedatva* would never be available, because everywhere there is a *bheda*. Even if it is accepted that an individual manifestation of *bheda* is there but not in general (*bhedatvāvacchinna*); then in this case also there is a contradiction to the absolute negation of the mutual absence of *bheda*. Because we do not find a place in this world where that is no individual manifestation of *bheda*.⁵ So the absolute negation of the mutual absence is not possible.

In order to avoid these difficulties another proposal may be suggested. In such a case the mutual absence, the absenteness of which is limited by being property of *bheda* (*bhedatvāvacchinnābhāva*), which cannot be accepted, but the mutual absence (*bheda*), the absenteness of which is another *bheda* (*bhedapratiyogitākābhāva*) can easily be accepted in order to remove the earlier difficulties. If in a particular locus there is the mutual absence of a particular

object, there may be *bheda* (mutual absence) of another object. As for example, if there is the mutual absence of a jar (*ghatabheda*), then there may be another *bheda* or mutual absence of a cloth (*patabheda*) because a particular manifestation (*vyakti*) of *bheda* may remain in another locus where there is another *bheda* as it is an absence, the absentee of which is *bheda* (*bhedapratyogitākābhāva*). Let us suppose in a particular place there is a *bheda* (mutual absence) of p; it can easily be said that there is the mutual absence of q as it is not taken as a *bheda* which is limited by *bhedatva*.

If the second interpretation (*bhedapratyogitākābhāva*) is taken as the meaning of the term *abheda* (identity), it would give rise to some erroneous cognition viz. ‘The water is blue’ (*yadi cābhedapratyogitāko ’bhāvastadā nīlam jalamityādivākyasyāpi prāmāṇyāpattih, Jale dvitvādinā nīlabhedobhayabhāvasyāpi sattvāt*)⁶ In this context, the absolute negation of *bheda* of *Nīla* (*nīlabhedābhāva*) can be found in water, because here *nīlabheda* is i.e. the absence of the *nīlabheda* having property of the conjoint two objects i.e. water and *nīlabheda* (*vyāsajyavṛttidharma*) as the limiter of the absenteeness. Water is not blue in the actual world and hence water can always be expressed as having no colour i.e. blue. This sentence would mean that there is a *bheda* or *anyonyābhāva* or *bheda* of blue (*nīlābheda*) is not found in water normally, yet it can be said to exist in water if the absolute absence of the mutual absence (*bhedābhāva*) is taken as *bhedapratyogikābhāva* i.e. an absence; the absentee of which is *bheda* or mutual absence. If we take another object (jar) with the mutual absence of blue (*jale nīlabhedaghato bhayam nāsti*), the absolute absence has got two absentees- the mutual absence of blue (*nīlabheda*) and a jar (*ghata*). In this case it can be said that the absolute negation has got ‘mutual absence of blue’ (*nīlabheda*) as its absentee. Hence, the absolute absence of the mutual absence of blue (*nīlābheda*) can be said to exist in water and for this reason the previously mentioned sentence – ‘water is blue’ refers to erroneous

content and hence one could claim its validity. Because, that which possesses the absolute negation of the mutual absence of blue in it is identical with blue. Hence the object can surely be called blue, which is actually not found in the phenomenal world. For this *asiddhi* (i.e. substantiation of something which is absurd) would surely follow.”⁷

From the foregoing discussion it can be said that identity (*tādātmya*) is nothing but non-distinction (*abheda*) which implies an uncommon property (*asādhāraṇo dharmā*) existing in the self (i.e. *sva*) i.e. a particular object. This uncommon property exists in one and only one object (*abhedastādātmyam*, *tacca svavṛttayasādhāraṇo dharmah asādhāraṇaṅca ekamātravṛttitvam*)⁸.

If the distinction of some object (*bheda*) is admitted from the another one, it will logically follow that there might be some cases where there is *abhedatva* or identity or *bhedābhāvatva* (absence of mutual absenceness) . In fact, the Buddhists have accepted the method of *apoha* (negative reasoning) depending on this phenomenon of distinction (*bheda*) of a particular from other. As for example, a cow can be known as it possesses distinction from ‘non-cow’. In the same way, they recognize a jar as such by virtue of its distinction from ‘non-jar’.

If distinction (*bheda*) of a particular object from others is admitted by the Buddhist, why would it be not admitted *abheda* (identity) in the sense which the Navya Naiyayikas have admitted. It has already been discussed that the Buddhists have accepted the term ‘*tādātmya*’ (identity) not in the sense of absolute sameness. However, there is no point in rejecting *abheda* or *tādātmya* in the sense of sameness.

If it is said – ‘Devadatta is Devadatta’ or ‘a jar is a jar’, they convey the sense of absolute sameness (*bhedābhāva*) between two objects. It has been accepted that a jar exists in itself through the relation of identity (*tādātmyasambandhena ghataḥ svasmin eva vartate*). The importance of

tādātmya as relation may easily be understood if the definition of *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence) is carefully noticed. We generally explain *anyonyābhāva* (*bheda*) with the example – ‘A jar is not a cloth’ (*ghaṭo na paṭah*) where the absentee (*pratiyogī*) is a cloth (*paṭa*). How do we know this? In reply to this question, the relation of identity for knowing an object as non-different from other is to be admitted. If it is asked why a jar is different from a cloth, because the absentee or *pratiyogī* which is a cloth (*paṭa*) does not exist in itself (*paṭa*) through the relation of *tādātmya* (*tādātmyasambandhāvaccinnapatiyogitakābhāvah*). That is, that something is different from something is known by the absence of *tādātmya* between them.

There is another significance of accepting *tādātmya* as a relation. When it is said by one – ‘Calcutta is Calcutta’ ‘Rabindranath is Rabindranath’, it cannot be ignored as having no meaning. If these sentences are uttered, these convey some meaning to the hearer. Generally, when we want to express some incomparability of some city or person, we express it with these types of identical statement. The city Calcutta has got certain characteristics of its own which cannot be compared with other cities, but with itself. The same is meaning of the second sentence ‘Rabindranath is Rabindranath’.

Such identical statements carry some weight in the case of metaphor in the sense of *Rūpaka*. When a face is identified with the moon (*mukhacandra*), the *upameya* (object which is compared) is ‘face’ which is identical with the ‘moon’, the *upamāna* (an object with which something is compared). The ascription of identification between two objects inspite of not concealing their difference (*atisāmyāt apahnutabhedayoḥ upamānopameyayoḥ abhedāropah*) is called *Rūpaka*. Sometimes the *upameya* is used as *upamāna* in order to express the incomparability of the object as pointed out by Bhāṭṛhari. In these cases due to having a strong desire (*vivakṣā*) of the speaker *upamāna* may be assumed as non-different from *upameya* though in the real world it is not true. The

identification between them is shown which is kind of artificial intellectual exercise with a view to showing the incomparability of the object. Though there is the imposition of identity (*abhedāropah*), the two objects (*upamāna* and *upameya*) are not bearing contradicting properties (*parasparaviruddhavattvena upasthāpita*).

Some Indian thinkers are interested to make an artificial difference between two identical objects after using the term 'iva'. Bhāṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* said that two objects, though identical, are demonstrated in such a way that one will think of their difference. But this difference is artificial in order to show the absolute sameness of the object. In the sentence – *Indra iva dasyuhā bhava* ' (like Indra become the *dasyu*-killer) which is addressed to Indra, the term 'iva' shows the relation of standard and the object of comparison on the basis of an artificial difference. It reminds me a romantic line said to a lover by his lady love: 'Tomar tulanā tumi ogo' (i.e. you are comparable to you alone) or 'Tumi ye tumi ogo' (you are really 'you'). Where a really different object is not available as standard of comparison, it itself is used as the standard in order to bring out its incomparability. As for example the statement '*Rāmarāvanayoryu^dḥḥam rāmarāvanayoriva*' (i.e. Rama-Ravana fight is like Rama-Ravana-fight) is also a case identity statement.¹⁰

Viśvanātha, the author of *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, has accepted the meaningfulness of such identity expression as he has accepted such statements as a form of rhetories (*alamkāra*) called *ananvaya*. When an object is imagined as having both the property of *upameya* (*upameyatva*) i.e. the object compared simultaneously is called *ananvaya* (*upamānopameyatva-mekasyaivatvananvayah*).¹¹ In short, if an object is taken as both *upameya* and *upamāna* simultaneously, it is called *ananvaya*.¹² As for example Viśvanātha has given the following example : "Rājīvamiva rājīvam jalam jalamivājani candraścandra ivātandrah śaratsamudayodyame." That is, when autumn comes

in full swing, the lotus becomes like a lotus (*rājīvam rājīvamiva*) untouched by mud, the moon becomes like the moon (*candraścandra iva*) uncovered by thick cloud.¹³ Such an expression is found in a *Bhajan*- which runs as follows:
^T*Dhumaka calata Rāmacandra* etc. It is a devotional song addressed to Ramacandra who is otherwise called Raghubara. In the last line it is said that Ramacandra has turned into the picture of Raghubara which is very much identical with the picture of Raghubara himself (*Raghubarachabiko samānāh Raghubarachabi baniyā*). In this ^{case} Ramachandra looks like the picture of Ramachandra which is comparable with its own picture. In such cases we find a beautiful picture of identity.

The Navya Naiyayikas also have used the term ‘identity’ (*tādātmya*) in such cases, but not always. They have admitted the identity between a jar (*ghaṭa*) and ‘a blue jar’ (*nīlaghaṭa*).

If the Buddhist asked Navya Naiyāyikas the reasons of accepting such a sense of identity, they might say that there is identity between ‘a jar and a blue jar’ from the general standpoint, but not specific (*sāmānyena abhedah na tu viśeṣatah*).

The Navya Naiyayikas may in other way justify the above-mentioned identity according to the general accepted principle – ‘A qualified entity is not different from a pure one’ (*viśeṣṭam śuddhānnātiricyate*). From this it is, however, proved that the *tādātmya* in the sense as taken by the Buddhists is not at all capable of being. It is also established that the statements like *ghaṭo ghaṭaḥ* bear some logical basis. Professor N.S.Dravid, following line of Gadadhara, has tried to highlight the meaninglessness of the tautology as found in the case of identical statement.¹⁴ So far as my understanding goes, the defect of tautology as found in the West is not accepted in Indian Logic. To him nothing can be supposed to be located in itself by the identity-relation although everything is

self-identical. To this point I beg to differ because each and every object becomes *abheda* with itself. The *abheda* means ‘the absence of mutual absence’ (*bhedābhava*). If it is possible logically to say that something is different (*bheda*) from something, it is quite natural or there is also a logical possibility of saying that something is not different from something. If *bheda* becomes an object of description, why not *abheda*? That an object is non different from itself is an ‘information’ in the true sense of the term, because in terms of ‘non-difference’ an object is known as different from other. In the Nyāya framework the absence called *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence) would become ‘inconceivable’ or ‘meaningless’ if there were no idea of ‘*abheda*’ i.e. the absence of mutual absence. Any idea of *bheda* presupposes the idea of *abheda*. For this reason *bheda* (*anyonyābhāva*) is defined in terms of *tādātmiasambandhāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāva* (i.e. absence, the absentness of which is, ^{not} limited by the relation of identity). Without the acceptance of identity the *anyonyābhāva* (*bheda*) cannot be admitted as a form of *abhāva* I do not know in such cases how the position of Gadādhara can be defended.

Professor Dravida argues that if the epistemic qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the epistemic qualificand (*viśeṣya*) are not different from each other, the cognition cannot be determinate at all. If in this context determinate cognition is taken as a *savikalpaka* knowledge then the definition of it may be considered carefully. It runs as follows ‘*viśeṣaṇa- viśeṣya –samsargāvagāhijñānam* (i.e a cognition in which qualifier, qualificand and their relation are revealed). In the present case of ‘A jar is a jar’, the first (‘a jar’) is to be taken as a jar existing in proximity to our eyes and the second one (‘a jar’) is to be taken as a jar seen earlier and in between these two there is a relation (*samsarga*) called *tādātmya*. Though the same word (a jar) is used as both the places, the first one may be taken as a qualificand and the second one is a qualifier and *tādātmya* (identity) is the

relation. Hence it is a case of determinate cognition. In our daily life we generally make such identity – statements in the above-mentioned sense and there is a successful communication with others. Once a friend of mine came to my house on the occasion of Saraswati pūjā in my childhood. Customarily if some guests come during this occasion, he is given some prasāda (same eatables sacrificed in the name of the goddess). When my friend was given a plate full of *prasāda*, he took a small portion of it. When he was asked the reason for not taking the rest, he answered boldly, ‘*Prasāda is Prasāda*’ I didn’t have any difficulty to understand the import of the sentence though I didn’t read philosophy at that time. He wanted to mean that *prasāda* does not lose its sanctity and purity if taken a small portion of it, because it is virtually a *prasāda* which cannot be compared with other objects. As it is *prasāda*, the quality of it is irrelevant. Hence, these statements cannot be totally ignored as meaningless.

Lastly, I would like to know from the scholars whether there is any Sanskrit term for expressing ‘tautology’. If it is translated as ‘*punarukti*’, then what may be the differentiating factors between *punarukti* and *tādātmya* (identity). It seems to me Professor Dravid did not make a distinction between these two, but in the West there is a distinction between them. However, even if the sentences like ‘*ghaṭo ghaṭah*’ is taken as a tautology, they may be taken as a virtuous one, but not vicious. Whatever stated in the form of a sentence in ~~the~~ Indian Logic is material, but not merely a formal one. Hence there is hardly any sentence which is meaningless in the context of Navya Nyāya if it possesses conditions like *ākāṅkṣā* etc. Any sentence which is determinate must be ‘relational’ which entails some meaning. The terms like hare’s horn (*śāśāṅga*) etc. do not convey any meaning as they are absurd entities (*alīka*) which do not come under any category (*padārtha*) accepted by them.

The question of nationalism and national identity is embedded in the broad context of Indian civilization. The ~~foregoing~~ discussion on the structure of

Indian society is based on a dynamic and creative vision of civilization. A civilization should be seen, not as a closed system or a finished product, but as a dynamic and unfolding process. As Kroeber has perceptively remarked, what is characteristic of any civilization is not its being but its becoming. By virtue of its characteristic pluralism and its continuously evolving synthesis, India represents a nation in the making, a nation which is continuously unfolding its civilizational potentialities. This view is reflected in a statement of Jawarharlal Nehru to the effect that Indianness is a matter of feeling, a dream, a vision, and an emotion.

The view that nationalism and national identity are rooted in a broad civilizational framework should not make us oblivious of the role of primordial, ethnic, religious and regional identities. One of the remarkable achievements of Indian civilization lies in its tolerance and accommodation of diverse identities as well as the facilitation of a creative synthesis of these identities. This has been one of the major factors in the continued survival and resilience of Indian civilization. At the same time, one should not gloss over the fact that from time to time there have been conflicts between the over-arching national identity and sub-national identities. Similarly, sub-national identities sometimes tend to acquire rather pathological overtones and thereby threaten the unity and integrity of the country. This is true of communalism as well as other fissiparous tendencies. In recent years the distinction between the two has acquired a sharper edge. This phenomenon has global manifestations, as attested by the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union and the continued ethnic strife in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the prevailing climate of increasing democratization and collective self-consciousness, ethnic and other corporate identities cannot be suppressed for too long. What is therefore required, in the global context as well as in India, is a flexible and accommodating, rather than constructive and strait-jacketed, notion of national identity.

The issue of national identity in India is reflected in the secular-democratic framework which is enshrined in the republican Constitution of the country. The ideal of national unity is reinforced by cultural pluralism and the composite heritage of the country. It is foolhardy to suppose that there is perfect harmony between national identity as it is enshrined in the Constitution and the whole corpus of Indian tradition. Indian tradition has its blind spots as well : the scourge of caste and untouchability, degradation of women, child marriage and restrictions on widow remarriage, to mention a few. What is required is a critical re-interpretation of tradition in the light of cherished national goals. Therefore, the concept of national identity should be seen as essentially an ideal-critical concept which is embedded in a broad humanistic framework.

As an ideal-critical concept, national identity is to be safeguarded from external threats as well as internal corrosion and ossification. The latter variety of threat to India's national identity has been posed by what has come to be known as the *Hindutva* syndrome. The ideology of *Hindutva*, as propounded and popularized by the right-wing political formations in contemporary India, entails three interrelated sets of fallacies. First, it presents a grossly oversimplified and distorted picture of an otherwise amorphous and pluralistic Hindu ethos. Secondly, with its accent on homogenization and regimentation and its misplaced identification between Hinduism and nationalism it tends to be xenophobic and exclusivistic, which is at variance with the spirit of Indian civilization. Thirdly, one can discern a hegemonic, tyrannical and even fascist streak-lurking behind the pseudo-nationalist rhetoric of *Hindutva*. Likewise, the political motivation of the movement is only thinly disguised.

The issue of national unit and integration is closely intertwined with cultural policy. A policy of integration, which discounts cultural pluralism and the composite character of Indian society and seeks to impose uniformity, homogenization and regimentation on the country's heterogeneous population,

will ultimately prove to be self-defeating. What is required is a humane vision of integration which would take due cognizance of India's pluralistic ethos and at the same time strengthen ^{the} long-standing bonds and inter-linkages among the people, especially at the grass roots level. Indian society is to be seen, to use K.S. Singh's evocative metaphor, as a honeycomb in which communities are engaged in vibrant interaction, sharing space, ethos and cultural traits.

The notion of development in the Indian context should be viewed in tandem with cultural pluralism and national identity. It is worthwhile to bring out three inter-connected dimensions of development. The first of these is of a general nature. Civilizations do not emerge and develop in isolation. This has become a truism in our times, thanks to the process of globalization. In recent years, a serious rethinking of the notion of development and its linkage with human welfare has taken place. For too long development has been regarded as a fetish and modernization as the promised Messiah of mankind. The relevant question now is : development for what and for whom ? The first part of the question focuses on a holistic and integrated perspective on development, and the second underscores a people-oriented approach. Development is now seen, not as an abstract ideal, but as a correlative phenomenon involving necessary reference to ecological balance as well as human resources development. The new vision of development stresses that the development process must take into active consideration people's grass roots institutions and organizations and must enlist their initiative and participation. Furthermore, development cannot be measured in quantitative, statistical terms alone.

Since the development process must ensure the participation of people at the grass roots level and take cognizance of their perceptions and felt needs, the question of development has to be closely linked to cultural policy. The cultural policy in respect of development needs to be embedded in the framework of cultural pluralism and democratic decentralization. A corollary of ^{the} above is

that a policy which seeks to impose unitary solutions regardless of regional variations and specificities will prove to be counter-productive. Thus, though the policy for development needs to be attuned to national interests and aspirations, it can ill afford to ignore the culture-specific dimensions of development.

To conclude the interface of development and cultural identity in the Indian context has two interrelated dimensions : the pan-Indian, civilizational, on ~~the~~ ^{the} one hand, and regional –cultural, on the other. At both the macro and micro levels, the development process needs to be informed and guided by the pluralistic and composite ethos of Indian society.

Societies have risen to glorious heights and fallen amazingly low from time to time in the history of the human race. No other culture has witnessed as many highs and lows as the enduring culture of India. As we usher in the next millennium, the world stands at the threshold of a paradigm change, perhaps known to Hindus as “Yuga Parivartan.” Many a scholar and religious person like Sr Aurobindo and ~~my own Guru,~~ Swami Dayananda Saraswati of Tamil Nadu, an authority on Advaita Vedanta, have commented on this tremendous change that is occurring, whereby we are entering an era where fairness and reason will be at least predominant, if not supreme. The “Kali Yuga” brought Hitler-like figures and two world wars to humanity, while the New Era is bringing words like “Global Village” and attempts at world peace through dialogue between leaders rather than brute force. True, we are far from the ideal scenario of equality and justice for all, yet for the first time in remembered history there are at least attempts being made on a very wide scale. The activities of the United Nations, World Health Organization and the International Monetary Fund, and many non-governmental organizations, and the recent boosting of several sagging economics and currencies in Asia and South

America by the IMF are examples of thinking for and about the world as a whole.

As “Globalization” takes hold on all aspects of our lives starting with the potent area of commerce, we will see various cultures and religions having to come to terms with each other. The fact that over a half billion people are said to be living in areas other than their place of birth reflects the changing nature of present day society. Never before have so many human beings moved to so many places of this world in a relatively short span of time. When such large numbers are set in motion, they make a palpable impact on the world canvas. Humanity, as it moves, takes with it all that is part and parcel of each migrating group within it. It is a strange fact about us “humans” that we crave change, yet when confronted with the unfamiliar, go to great lengths to recreate what we sought to leave behind in the first place. The Vedic concept of a “*Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam*”, all creation is family, has helped India absorb a variety of people over many millennia, including people who came to this land to seek a friendlier, nicer place to live as well as those who came only to plunder. Our heritage has taught us to be patient beyond belief and allowed people to be elevated and assimilated slowly. It is this experience of the Indians that can and will benefit the world at large as it tries to come to grips with globalization.

At the present time, the Indian-American community is about a million strong. The spread of Indians to nearly all parts of the world has been a result of colonization, when working people were carried off as indentured labor – at least we Indians were spared the humiliation and devastating effects of slavery. In more recent times, people of Indian origin have gone voluntarily to countries for professional and skilled jobs as well as for business opportunities. The contributions of Indian immigrants have become legendary in many countries of the world, especially in the United States. This has happened to a large extent because of their high level of education, often subsidized by the government of

India. A fact that continues to perplex me, a so-called poor nation offers a very powerful, wealthy country like the U.S., many well-trained scientists in almost all fields science and technology. This is a direct tribute to India's love for knowledge and education. The impetus for this success comes at least to a great extent from our traditional values of respect, patience, and compromise. The immigrants of Indian origin have brought so many well-entrenched and useful ideas to their adopted countries which are permeating the very fabric of societies in the Western world. "Yoga" "meditation", and "vegetarianism" have become household words in a country where people three decades ago had very little understanding of these concepts, let alone practice them. The mainstream U.S. population's interest in our Sanskrit enables us in turn to maintain and pass on our philosophy to our future generations as it gives our youth a sense of acceptance.

The role of the NRI in passing on our heritage is crucial. Only if we have some understanding of our own identity we can assume to pass something on. In the last thirty years a few hundred places of worship as well as cultural institutions have been built with the help of the NRI in North America alone. The enthusiasm with which the performances of Indian music and dance are received by audiences abroad are also a testimony to the NRI's wanting to continue the relationship with their native culture. The role of visiting spiritual teachers, both the well-known and hundreds of lesser known ones, has been of immense help in keeping a focus on our precious Vedic heritage.

Within our memories, seeds of wisdom cultivated by long gone Rishi ancestors live on. Our unbroken teaching tradition keeps this knowledge ever fresh for us. Actually this wisdom in the form of stories, art forms, and a million everyday rituals, is so well-woven into the Indian way of life that to a large extent we are able to pass on quite a bit simply by following a certain mode of living which is essentially spiritual.

This brings us to a very important part of the discussion. In many countries, such as South Africa or the Caribbean Islands, the communities were segregated due to apartheid, a policy of keeping whites and non-whites separated. This was, of course, neither good for peace among people nor for bringing the world closer together. However, it helped keep certain systems alive among various groups which otherwise would have been difficult to retain. In the U.S. the situation is quite different for people immigrating in the later part of the 20th century. Since the sixties, the flower children, who were not ideal in all ways, ushered in an era of freedom of the spirit. People became aware through the “hippie” culture of certain ways of thinking and living which were looked upon by a part of traditional Western society as strange. It was a time of questioning many rules set by society, particularly in areas of dress, food, sexual morality, music, theater, dance and finally religion. So in a strange sort of way both colonization and the hippies have helped bring Asian ideas and customs to the mainstream of America. A back door entrance, it is here to stay. Actually it seems not only will it stay but it is blossoming and making itself felt in a very positive way. The first generation Indian – Americans, that is, the children of the immigrants to the U.S., have a role to play that will be of utmost value. The U.S. claims to be much more of a melting pot. It is a country that is looking at its cultural and religious survival and well-being in the long run. This we know will come from adopting not a confrontational, but a compromising outlook. A country that has over the last two hundred years demonstrated repeatedly that humanity can dream and with hard work bring any ideas to fruition. In matters spiritual and religious the West is turning more and more to the East. When the turning is completed it will have led us all to the Vedantic concept of only one “*Vastu*” – “*Brahman*” – “*nimitta-kāraṇa*” (auxiliary cause) – the cause of all creating and all dissolution leading to an ever present cycle.

The Indian-Americans have brought a lot of this priceless knowledge to society, simply by their more accepting ways and intact family structure. The Hindu and the Jewish communities both share their love of knowledge, value for education, and most importantly a non-proselytizing attitude. The Jewish community has managed to stay focused towards maintaining their identity in rather hostile environments. A far smaller but better organized group, who like the Hindu wants to live and let live. Hindus, though many times the number of Jews, are sorely lacking in organizational skills. India, being one of the few countries where neither Jews nor anyone else was ever persecuted or prevented from practicing the religion, is in a good position to work with these very admirable people to learn about developing political clou^d and teaching our values and ways to future generations.

The U.S. has so far maintained an open culture that wants to learn and absorb partly because of being a new, multi-cultural, and multi-racial country quite unlike old Europe. It is also a nation that was colonized and eventually threw out the colonizers without too much malice towards them. This heritage of colonial rule by the British and freedom without too much hostility and animosity on the part of the colonized is a shared experience between India and the U.S. After ousting the colonizers, each nation went on to establish a democratic secular society. These facts of history need to be taught to our children so they can be Americans with a confident identity of their own. To be a comfortable, contributing member of U.S. society our youth need to be in harmony with American its ideals while maintaining a strong cultural and spiritual identity that is rooted in Vedic values. Only those who have achieved this balanced self-identity seem truly at peace with themselves.

The problem arises from three main sources in passing on our legacy. One is the religious phenomena of Christian proselytizing and making young minds become fearful of going to hell. This is completely unacceptable to Hindu

thinking as we are God-loving, not God-fearing, people and do not believe in a permanent Heaven or Hell. Secondly, the U.S. emphasis on individual freedom without enough attention to the concept of responsibility, duty, and respect has created a culture where most social structures have broken down and now things seem to be somewhat out of control in areas of spirituality and family connections. This of course affects the behavior of all youth growing up in the U.S. and has to be counter-balanced by each ethnic group within itself. The third one is the most dangerous and the hardest to fix, which is the Hindu apathy towards many issues. Conceivably the long years of subjugation and almost eight hundred years of calculated attempts at destruction by invaders may have made us lose all perspective and somehow simply survive. The general attitude of our people is to dwell in our glorious past and ignore the present. This of course is a defense mechanism which was needed at a certain time to survive immense cruelties that were heaped upon our people. The new generation is not as encumbered by such problems. However, they need to be taught about who we are and why we have survived at all. The miracle is that most other cultures that were ancient, Romans and Greeks for example, are more or less gone in the sense that there is no ancient unbroken system in place. We have it only because of the foresight of our ancestors. These progenitors left us an invaluable gift but I am confident they intended for us to have a love for learning and look into our vast sacred literature as they did. The biggest hurdle for us is the lack of knowledge among our adults about everything Vedic, except some rituals which the new generation in the U.S. has a hard time relating to. It is difficult and unnecessary to maintain certain forms without an understanding in the context of the modern lifestyle. We need most of all parents who know, and by knowing, value a certain lifestyle that is conducive to what we Hindus perceive as the goal of human life. The Indian politicians in the last fifty years have totally disregarded the basic fact of one law, fairly applied to all, in one country. The time has come that this irrationality comes to an end. We need to know that

respecting all religions does not mean practicing all of them. To be a proud Hindu is not to be against any other religion. To love what is mine is not to automatically hate the ways of others. Acceptance of other ways is a strength that the Vedic culture has always promoted but in no way does it mean that everyone else can walk all over us. In fact, respect should beget respect. Every facet of human life is based on this universal principle of give and take.

In the global village, facilitated by the information age, it is imperative that we know how to make decisions. It is becoming a “smorgasbord” or a buffet in which one is inundated by every imaginable product as well as idea. The power of the mass media impacts all areas of life now, from the cultural to the religious. Growing up in Western countries presents very special challenges for the first generation children of immigrants. While Indian parents try to pursue a certain lifestyle at home, society at large does not conform to it. So the safety net that existed in a traditional culture is completely non-existent. In this scenario, well-informed parents who can put our age-old traditions in the context of the merging global village alone can help our youth see why they should adhere to the Vedic values of duty, respect, and discipline and eventually enrich our adopted land seeding them with the best we have to offer from our age old culture.

In the next millennium it will be important to preserve what is of permanent value in our heritage while absorbing other influences and making them a natural part of our own customs. For as long as we know, the Vedic culture has done a superb job of taking new ideas and making them a part of the larger Vedic vision. In fact, our Śāstra tells us to leave the Śruti untouched, while changing the Smṛiti. This may entails rewriting many of our stories that can and do convey much of our heritage in an easily absorbable manner. * The modern tools of multimedia will have to be used innovatively. Here again a cooperation between the U.S. and India has to occur. In fact, partly this is

already happening. Some of the best material about India and the Vedic culture is being published in the U.S., where people of Indian origins are working with Americans of other origins. The Vedic culture in its essence is the most appropriate philosophy for a “one world”. The only philosophy that has the ability to give a special place to each group, even each individual, while maintaining an overall cohesiveness. It provides structure along with freedom, a unique and necessary element for a universal spiritual ethics for the next century. We who have inherited and have been privileged to carry on this tradition will need to take a more active role in forging the spiritual destiny of our planet. To achieve this we will have to devote a considerable amount of time and effort to first study in depth, and then proceed to convey to others what we value and why Vedic chants like “*Sarve bhavantu sukhinah, sarve santu nirāmāyāh...*” and many others emphasizing the interconnection of all life forms are taking on a new meaning. A better understanding of quantum physics is teaching us the deeper meaning of these mantras. We are able to observe how, when one part of the universe is touched, it causes interconnected changes in all others. This makes it clear to us that nature is not simply for our use, rather we are a part, may be rather a small part, of a far larger picture.

Thus we see that the scientific research is helping us to understand our ancient convictions better and better. New books by scholars in the field of history, anthropology, astronomy are making discoveries that point to India’s the real cradle of human civilization. Our youth need to feel a special pride and a responsibility to enrich their lives while being able to contribute to the betterment of humanity.

Indiānity cannot be lost because it is a spiritual culture while staying true to the core concepts. The innermost part of us is pure spirituality which has been woven into the very fabric of the Hindu’s daily life. This is an unusual feature of the Vedic culture, as opposed to other religions, where there is a separation

between matters relating to God and everyday life, whereas the Vedic vision is that all that exists is God. Only this concept can truly convey the presence of an infinite power we call by a variety of names including God. To understand this vision is to find personal peace and a wisdom worth preserving and offering to the global village. The Indian diaspora (spreading of the people of Indian origin all over the world) is spreading this knowledge the world over. Bhārata is a *Mātā*, a mother that holds her children forever and her arms grow like the perennial banyan tree to support all who desire. The Vedic thinking has been that with the undesirable comes the desirable, along with bad, good is always there, just as day and night exist together. As we can see, our misfortunes have also opened doors and are leading us to a better time. We must use our most precious gift – that of *Karma* – free will to do the proper thing. *In this way we can search for our cultural identity.*

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Kusumapratimā on Sāhityadarpaṇah on X 137.

13. “Śaradah kālasya samudāyena sampārnbhāvena udyame pravṛttau āvirbhāve sati, rājīvam rājīvamiva padmam padmamiva atandram varṣāpaṅkādikṛta-mālinyabinām ajani, jalam jalamiva atandram kardamādimalahīnamajani, tathā candraśca candra iva atandro ghanāvaranarūpamalaśūnyah ajani jātah.” *Ibid*
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CHAPTER III

Similarity and Identity

It has already been stated that the identity relation remains between two objects conveying the same meaning just as 'ghaṭa is ghaṭa' or 'ghaṭa is kalaśa'. It has also been stated that there remains the sense of identity in the case of similarity, e.g. between *śimśapātva* and *vrkṣatva*, between blue jar and jar. Hence the similar objects are also identical to some extent. Without the sense of similarity the sense of identity is not conceivable.

The identity which remains in metaphor seems to be a main factor in the phenomenon of similarity. Aristotle admits in fact that metaphor and simile come very close to each other. To him – The simile is also a metaphor, for there is very little differences”, (*The Art of Rhetoric* III III 3). When a poet says - he rushed on like a lion, is simile, if he says – ‘a lion he rushed on’ . It is a metaphor because both are courageous; the sense is transferred and applies to someone. He further says that similes are ‘metaphors without the detail. (*Ibid*). The idea of metaphor generally emerges under the following conditions: (a) when two objects possess a common factor and they are said to be like each other or identical, as fancy may take the poet, (b) if it is admitted that both of them are similar, it is to be taken as a case of simile. If otherwise, i.e. if they are called identical, it is a case of metaphor, (c) the simile and the metaphor are basically the same, the distinction is not always stated (d) the metaphor is a more compact figure or more suited for prose, while simile is more suited to poetry.

Aristotle admits a special type of metaphor where we find analogy at he initial level. The remaining other metaphors are not free from analogy, which may be substantiated through the following examples. If it is said –‘a ship is *lying* in anchor’, the term ‘*lying*’ in anchor is said to be a specific types of lying. The phenomenon of lying is inconceivable in the case of ship which is not living

being. It is known to us that a moving creature or a living being can lie down to rest, but it is said in the case of ship also which is at rest in the harbour after anchoring itself. This usage would not have been possible, had there been similarities between these two i.e. living being and creature. These identical points help us to use metaphorical or rhetoric language.

In this chapter we shall set the notion of identity existing in the similarity. Without it the metaphorical expressions, the *alamkāras* like *utpreksā*, *ūpamā*, *rūpaka* etc. would not be possible.

Most Indian rhetoricians are agreed on the point that *rūpaka* is based on a sense of similarity between the *upameya* and the *upamāna*. With this similarity working at the base, we identify two distinctly different objects as a single one. According to earlier rhetoricians, in *rūpaka* we make the *upameya* and the *upamāna* identical or ‘non-different’ from each other, or we merely remove the difference which exists in *upamā*.²

We have already pointed out the semantic problem arising out of this. First of all, if two objects are similar to each other, they are not the same at all, but two separate entities. How then can we say that they are the same? If, on the other hand, we try to solve this problem the way Aristotle or Dandin, did, i.e., with the statement that “these two objects are the same” is only manner of speaking. What one really means is that they are similar; we are by no means close to solving it. On the contrary, this statement raises further questions: (a) if the two objects are similar, why do we not say they are similar and finish with it? (b) If mere removal of a detail constitutes the basis for accepting two separate figures, then there would be millions of others where slight alteration in detail might occur.

The primary problem, i.e, the clash between similarity and identity has been sought to be solved by some thinkers by denying the role of similarity in metaphor. Richards is of the opinion that metaphor comprises two things put

together, and the tension between them is the result of a new idea. These two things may be put together on the basis of similarity as well as disparity. He says, “As the two things put together are more remote, the tension created by them is... greater.”³ He goes on to add, “In general, there are very few metaphors in which disparities between tenor and vehicle are not as much operative as they similarity.”⁴ Max Black has conceded the comparison aspect of metaphor, but then he clearly states that there may be no proper ground for the metaphorical shift.

Although most Indian rhetoricians are in favour of similarity as the basis of the identity in metaphor, and Jagannatha excludes identity between cause and effect, e.g. , *sukham manoramāramā* (happiness is the beautiful woman) from the purview of *rūpaka*.⁵ Others are vehemently opposed to this view. Śobhakara is one of them. Having defined *rūpaka* merely as superimposition – *āropo rūpakām* – he goes on to say that one word cannot be imposed on another, nor an object on another, as they are known to be distinct. This kind of superimposition may occur only in the case of figures such as *Bhrāntimān* (error) where one object is mistaken for another, or in the case of genuine illusory knowledge (e.g. when a piece of string is mistaken for a snake). Superimposition in *rūpaka* occurs between two objects which are colcatives. Śobhākara is of the opinion that these two co-locatives, one of which is taken as the substantive and the other as the adjective, are brought together by a force of will. That is to say, in *mukham candrah*, *candra* is not imposed on *mukha*, but the determinants of both, i.e., *candratva* and *mukhatva* are brought into the same substratum, i.e., *mukha*.

This is very akin to the grammarians’ theory that the substantive and the adjective can have only one relation, that of identity, Jagannatha also recognizes this aspect, as we have discussed, in the context of co-apprehensibility in *rūpaka*. However, this analysis of *rūpaka* is an imperfect one. In all forms of

rūpaka or metaphor, similarity does operate at the base of identity, and even if two objects are brought together by force of will, there has to be some ground for this bringing together of these two particular objects. Ricouer says: “It is wrong to suppose that the notions of tension, interaction and logical contradiction make the role of resemblance superficial. On the contrary, tension, contradiction and controversion are the opposite side of reconciliation in which metaphor makes sense. This reconciliation arises from a sense of resemblance.”⁷

The primary contradiction to be faced in metaphor would then seem that two things, similar to each other, are stated to be the same. This factual contradiction has been tackled in different ways by thinkers.

Monroe Beardsley, defining metaphor on the lines of Richards, says that metaphor is a kind of attribution, which needs a subject and a modifier (a pair similar to tenor-vehicle and focus-fame). But the problem which arises here is a kind of logical absurdity, because of the incompatibility of these attributions. In such cases, the incompatibility is between designations in the primary level of meaning, so that with the help of the modifier, the reader extracts from the connotative context the secondary meanings which make a meaningful self-contradictory attribution from a self-contradictory statement.

This analysis comes very close to the Indian rhetoricians’ standpoint for accepting *lakṣaṇā* or the secondary function of word and meaning as the basis of *rūpaka*. According to Indian rhetoricians, there are three meaning – functions, viz., the primary function of *abhidhā* (denotation) that conveys the primary meaning, the secondary function of *lakṣaṇā* (indication), that operates when there is incompatibility of the primary sense with the context and by which the secondary sense is comprehended, and the literary function of *vyañjanā* or *dhvani* (suggestion) which conveys the suggested sense that is illimitable and comprises the foundation of all great literature. Of these three functions, the secondary one of *lakṣaṇā* appears to be the most complex one. Of its numerous

subdivisions, the most basic are the *śuddhā* and *gauṇī* types of *lakṣaṇā*. In *śuddhā*, the secondary function is brought into play by any relationship other than similarity, whereas in *gauṇī* the basis of the secondary function is similarity. Another subdivision is into *sāropā* and *sādhyavasānā lakṣaṇā*. The former of these concerns superimposition (*āropa*) of one object on another, while the latter concerns submersion (*adhyavasāya*) of one object under another. That is to say, in *sāropā lakṣaṇā*, both objects retain their individuality, yet are said to be identical in *sādhyavasānā*, one of the two objects is totally absent, or very much subordinate to the other in the case of *rūpaka*, identity is cognized through *gauṇī sāropā lakṣaṇā*.

Jagannātha in his *Rasagangādhara* has summed up the viewpoints of this school of thought very succinctly. According to his view, the word *candra* (moon) in the expression *mukhacandra* (moon-face) stands secondarily for *candrasadrśa* (moon-like) by *lakṣaṇā*. But in that case, in saying “*mukham candrah*” (the face is the moon), what we really mean is *mukham candrasadrśam* (the face is like the moon). Thus, arises the situation where over-extension into the scope of *upamā* is inevitable. In order to circumvent this, three alternatives were suggested by ‘the elders’.

(1) In *rūpaka*, the interpretation “*candra^ḥadrśam mukham*” enters into the initial sematic understanding based on *lakṣaṇā*. The sense of identity comes forth in the second step and this identity is the apprehension of *candratva* (moonness) in *mukha* (face) itself. But how can this be possible when ‘*mukha*’ involves ‘*mukhatva*’ (faceness) which stands in the way of the apprehension of *candratva* in *mukh*? Moreover, if we admit this possibility, then in *upamā* too, e.g., “*candrasadrśam mukham*”, we arrive at such identity. The only difference between them is that the sense of identity in *rūpaka* is achieved through the secondary function of *lakṣaṇā*, while in *upamā* it is achieved through the primary function of *abhidhā*. In order to solve this semantic anomaly, the elders

advocated that the sense of identity be cognized by the tertiary function of *vyāñjanā* (suggestion). The sense apprehended by the function of suggestion is not liable to contradiction.

This interpretation, however, is hardly convincing. It may just be possible to assume that the single word ‘*candra*’ stands for ‘moon’ by *abhidhā*, ‘moon-like’ by *lakṣaṇā* and goes somehow for an identity with the face by *vyāñjanā*. But once *mukha* along with its determinant *mukhatva* is introduced, the sense of identity strikes the rock of palpable contradiction. Thus *vyāñjanā* cannot be extended to the establishment of identity between face and moon. Moreover, such identity, if assumed at all, may be extended to the case of *upamā* as well.

(2) The scope of *lakṣaṇā* should be extended to the point of identity itself. The same function of *lakṣaṇā* that grasps ‘*candrasadrśā*’ from ‘*candra*’ extends to grasp the identity of the face and the moon. Thus, by an elongated *lakṣaṇā*, ‘*mukha*’ is imbued with the identity with ‘*candrasadrśā*’. In support of this position, the theorists consider the classic case – *gangayām ghoṣah* – the cowered station on the Gangā. Now the word ‘Gangā’ by the primary function of *abhidhā* denotes the river of that name. But a cowerd station cannot exist in a river; hence, there is incompatibility with the context. Thus we have to take recourse to *lakṣaṇā* and by this function, we grasp the sense of *tata* (bank) from Gangā refers to the bank of that river by *lakṣaṇā*. The word ‘*tata*’ (bank) is not expressed to that we may grasp the sense of coolness and sanctity in the cowerd station through the function of *vyāñjanā*. But this would not be possible if *tata* remained abstract in our understanding. So here also, *lakṣaṇā* is extended to grasp an identity between the river and its bank, so that bank is presented not as itself but as the river. Similarly, in *mukham candrah*, the function of *lakṣaṇā* goes up to similarity or *sādrśya*. This understanding cannot occur in *upamā*, for there we stop at similarity and do not go up to identity.

3. All these problems can be avoided by assuming that in *upamā* the sense of similarity is accompanied by a sense of difference, while in *rūpaka* based on *lakṣaṇā*, such an element of difference does not accompany the sense of similarity.

Appaya Dīkṣita in his *Citramīmāṃsā* has taken to pieces all the arguments in favour of the indicative element in *rūpaka*. He says that if one is to accept the secondary element of *lakṣaṇā* in *rūpaka*, there must be a basis for its operation. In an expression such as *mukhacandra* if identification between the face and the moon is to be achieved by *lakṣaṇā*, how do we arrive at such *lakṣaṇā*? In order for *lakṣaṇā* to operate, there must be an incompatibility of the primary sense with the context, and a relation between the primary and secondary senses. In this particular case, *rūpaka* operates to cognise *candratva* in *mukha*. Appaya advances six cases for the operation of *lakṣaṇā* in this instance and refutes all six.

1. Since the face cannot be the moon, the term *candratva* refers to *mukhatva* by *gaunī sārōpā lakṣaṇā*. But this explanation means that ‘moon’ really means ‘face’, so that it leads to a tautological expression : “*mukam mukham*” (the face is the face), which is absurd.

2. *Candratva* refers by *lakṣaṇā* to the special coolness and calmness that is the property of the face. Then if we say ‘*mukham candrah*’, what we mean in effect is that a special calmness on attribute of calmness belongs to the face alone, and cannot be cognized in the moon.

3. We may take *mukha* in the expression ‘*mukham candrah*’ to refer to *candra* by *lakṣaṇā*. This the exact opposite of (1) and must be rejected for the same reason.

4. This the exact opposite (2) and cognizes by ‘face’ a special calmness that belongs to the moon. This standpoint must be rejected for the same reason as (2).

5. *Lakṣaṇā* operates in order to cognise a common calmness between the face and the moon. Thus, in saying “*mukham candrah*” we actually mean, “the calmness that is present in the moon is similar to the calmness present in the face.’ But in that case, what becomes of the expression “*Sundaram mukham candrah*”, where in ‘*sundaram*’ the calmness is expressed? Again the problem of tautology.

6. The last resort is the cognition by *lakṣaṇā* of a similarity between the *upameya* and the *upamāna*. The question that inevitably arises is: what is the difference between *upamā* and *rūpaka*? Moreover, the acceptance of this viewpoint would mean tally upsetting the view of the elders who claim that similarity is cognized through suggestion.

The ‘new school’, whose views are represented by Appāya Dīkṣita and Jagannātha, totally rejected the secondary meaning function as an essential element in *rūpaka*. *Lakṣaṇā* as a meaning-function is resorted to only when there is not other alternative. But if we can do without it, it is much better to dispense with it and use the primary meaning function. According to the older view, we somehow comprehend *candra* as *condrasadrśā* and then go for identity between *candrasadrśā* and *mukha*. Thus the identity is between the primary sense of one and the secondary sense of the other. In the very first place, this upsets the substantive-adjective relation between *upameya* and *upamāna*. Secondly, this interpretation hardly explains *rūpaka*.

Therein lies the crux of the whole problem regarding metaphor. Aristotle has seen simile as an analysis of metaphor, and so indeed have many others. It is obvious that when the poet uses metaphor in preference to simile, he has some objective in mind. In everyday speech, we use metaphor because we want to use it to stress a particular point. If we refer to a man as a lion, we do not quite mean that he is like a lion; otherwise we would have said so. We deliberately and quite literally mean what we say – that he is a lion. Even those who advocate the

secondary meaning-function do so only after a tentative understanding of the identity between two objects. The secondary function is resorted to only when understanding falters due to the fact that the two objects are too distinct to be identical. The fact remains, however, that the speaker aims, definitely at the identity and not the similarity of the two objects, although he is perfectly aware of the distinct nature of the two objects; the hearer is aware of this fact as well, but still he accepts identity as its face value, without going into detailed analysis.

We might, on this occasion, hark back to Davidson; he says that if we consider the case for a literal and figurative meaning in metaphor, it can be explained as an ambiguity. But, he says, “the ambiguity in the word, if there is any, is due to the fact that in ordinary context it means one thing and in the metaphorical context it means something else, but in the metaphorical context we do not necessarily hesitate over its meaning”.⁸

Now the factual anomaly clearly emerges in a figure like this: if two things are known to be different, how can we say they are identical? Indeed, in most figures of speech, some impossible relation arises, but is accepted by the reader without demur. Commenting on the ‘impossible’ simile such as – *‘tvayi kopo mamābhāti sudhāmsāviva pāvakah’*. (anger in you seems to me like fire in the moon).⁹ Jagannatha has said that poets have the license to imagine even a fictitious relationship in the world. In this particular case, moon and fire are both established in the world. It is only their relation – the locative relation – which is not established. But the poet may easily conceive of such relationship. This is another kind of superimposition – that of the impossible on the possible.

“Why sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast’, says the White Queen to Alice.¹⁰ There are so many ‘impossible’ things we say and believe in the course of a whole day. † A thing need not exist in the world for a corresponding word to have sense. Benveniste, whose opinion we have already cited, adapts Frege’s observations on sense and reference into his

own theory of discourse. According to Frege, sense is an ingredient of meaning, while reference is not an ingredient of meaning, but may be termed denotation. As Frege says, a proper name or sign expresses its sense and also designates its reference. That is to say, the sense of “evening star” and the sense of “morning star” are not the same, but the reference of both is the same.¹¹ In other words, there is no one-to-one relationship between sense and reference. The sense of a word is relevant to the truth-value of the sentence in which it occurs. Through sense, we associate the sentence with something that stands as its reference. Now an expression may have sense, but no referent in the outside world i.e. its referent might not exist in reality, e.g. Phoenix, Unicorn etc. This does not necessarily mean that the expression does not make sense. Benveniste adapts this theory to his semantic principles. According to him, the sentence as a whole is intended by discourse and this sentence as a whole has both a sense and a reference. This underlines more than anything else the difference between semiotics and semantics, i.e., the case of intra-lingual relationship on one hand and that of the relation between the sign and the thing denoted on the other. Language is carried beyond itself, and in its extra-lingual character, it is an universalized yet individualized function. As a result of this, metaphor is seen as a process of discourse. As such, there may be a clash of senses, but not so of reference, if as we have already seen, we attribute to the metaphor a predicative function, it need have no referent in the outside world. Benveniste points out that reference in a figurative statement is different from reference in a scientific one.

There is really no expression that is totally devoid of sense Russell cites ‘Quadruplicity drinks procrastination’¹² as an example of non-significant or nonsensical sentence. But can we say it makes no sense whatsoever? Russell himself says that we cannot form an image of quadruplicity drinking procrastination. How could he say this if the sentence was totally non-significant? Russell has to admit that when Lamb addressed a Billingsgate fish-wife as a she-parall elogram, this had greater effect on her than any other

‘significant phrase’. The sentence was then clearly not ‘nonsense’. The so-called ‘non-sense’ written by Lewis Carroll and Edward Lear could not have been total non-sense, for they evoke laughter. If they were ‘nonsense’, they would evoke no response. “A significant trait of living language”, says Ricoeur in this context”.... Is the power always to push the frontier of nonsense further back? There are probably no words so incompatible that some poet could not build a bridge between them, the power to create new contextual meaning seems to be truly limitless. Attributions that appear contextual meaning seem to be truly limitless. Attributions that appear to be ‘non-sensical’ can make sense in some unexpected context. No speaker completely exhausts the connotative possibilities of his words.”¹³

The *Nyaya* school of Indian philosophy usually considers *yogyatā* (congruity or syntactical efficiency) to be an indispensable condition of meaningful expression. But if we accept the argument of the rhetoricians that poet may always conceive of impossible relationships, the element of *yogyatā* becomes redundant. The Naiyayikās would reject the statement *vahninā siñcati* (drenches with fire) as nonsensical, since the action of drenching is not consistent with fire. It is only consistent with water. But can we honestly say that it makes no sense? Even the staunch *Naiyayika*, Jagadīśa, had to admit that the lack of *yogyatā* does not stand in the way of sense in a sentence. Now ‘sentences’ must have sense, otherwise it cannot be a sentence. If, on the other hand, it makes sense, it is a sentence, despite any lack of *yogyatā*. (*Yogyatāyāh samśayasthe* pyanvayabuddherānubhavikatvāt ¹⁴: *Vahninā seka ityādyapi vākyameva, parantu vādhitārthavad ayogyam*).¹⁵ He concedes in this respect the rhetoricians standpoint of *āhāryajñāna* or deliberately enforced cognition by which any statement makes sense. If a so-called ‘nonsensical’ statement made no sense whatsoever, states Nāgeśa, we would stare baffled when we heard it, as on hearing a foreign language.¹⁶ In the *Mṛcchakatikam*, the author makes many ‘nonsensical’ comments, e.g. “I cannot clearly see the jingling of jewellery”.¹⁷

But we laugh at this statement because it is an absurd one, “Absurd” and “nonsensical” are not necessarily synonymous.

Bhartrhari has recognized the idea of *aupacārikī sattā*. The word *upacāra* means a kind of metaphor. *Aupacārikī sattā* is then a metaphorically imposed existence, not existence in the literal sense, i.e., existence in the world of reality. All social behaviour is carried on with objects projected in fiction in such a way as if the fictitious objects were real.”¹⁸ The intellectually imagined meaning is a meaning in its own right, even though it may have no existence in real life. Metaphor operates here too, so that metaphor itself may be said to constitute a basis for metaphor. Words like ‘sky-flower’, ‘rabbit-horn’ etc. which have no corresponding reality, still they make sense. This intellectual meaning or *bauddha artha* is pure sense, although there may not be a *bāhya artha*-reference or external reality. That is what counts in any statement – metaphorical or non-metaphorical.

We have already gone over Aristotle’s view that metaphor and simile are practically the same in so far as they are both based on similarity. However, while discussing poetic faults, he goes on to say that there are really two types of faults, essential or incidental, of which something properly through the lack of skill. The latter consists in stating factual impossibilities. If no essential fault occurs, the incidental fault may be countered by a particular explanation or interpretation. One such incidental ‘fault’ is the metaphorical one, which may easily be justified. “Generally speaking”, says Aristotle, “the impossible” has to be justified on grounds either of poetic effect, or of an attempt on reality, or or accepted tradition. As far as poetic effect is concerned, a convincing impossibility is preferable to an unconvincing possibility.¹⁹ It is clear, then, that though the identity of two objects is a factual impossibility, its identification, to the poet or author is not to point to similarity, but to emphasise total identity.

The chief problem that faces us is that in both metaphor and simile, the beauty of expression depends on the appreciation of a common property between two objects. The very property of having a common property is the fundamental requirement of similarity. But simile is not the paraphrase of metaphor. On the contrary, metaphor is something quite different from simile. Davidson states unequivocally that a metaphor is not an elliptical simile, for in that case, there would be no distinction in meaning between a metaphor and a simile. Again, the 'figurative' or 'special' meaning of a metaphor cannot be said to be the 'literal' meaning of a simile, for, in that case, how do we identify the simile corresponding to the given metaphor? Citing an example from Virginia Woolf that a highbrow is "a man or woman of throughbred intelligence who rides his mind at a gallop across country in pursuit of an idea." The recourse to the secondary sense in metaphor solves no problem, for it we were to say that in "her face is the moon", 'moon' stands by indication for 'moon-like', again, the whole sentence would be interpreted as, "her face is not like the moon, but is definitely like the moon", something like the assertion, "A is not B, but A is definitely B", which is the height of absurdity |

Similarity has been accepted as a basic category by several schools of Indian Philosophy. While commenting upon similarity, Jayaratha in his *Vimarsinī* commentary on the *Alamkārasarvasva* has clearly pointed out an amount anomaly that exists in similarity itself. He says that even an ordinary, everyday simile, similarity cannot ordinarily emerge. We have already stated the very property of having a common property is one of the fundamental requirements of similarity. But from where is this common factor apprehended? If we compare the moon to the face, we may state that a tender loveliness (*Iāvanya*) is the common property belonging both to the face and the moon. But the loveliness that is present in the face is different from the loveliness present in the moon. So we have two different lovelinesses, and two distinctly different objects cannot be a common factor.‡ Thus, in order to arrive at similarity, we

have to accept the possibility of an imposed identity of the two lovelinesses, and thus avoid infinite regress.²⁰ So rather than establish similarity as the basis of identity in metaphor, he establishes identity as the basis of similarity in simile | The deliberately enforced superimposition of identities is, therefore, the basic principle of various figures of speech, rather of language itself.

All these poetic expressions are based on identity more or less. Had there been no identity, there would not have been any similarity. The partial identity is called similarity and absolute identity is called identity. Both are essential in metaphorical expression in poetry and daily life. Hence we cannot ignore the fact that similarity generates us to sense of identity though not in the absolute sense.

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CHAPTER - IV

IDENTITY IN VEDANTA AND VERBAL KNOWLEDGE

The Vedantins particularly Ramanuja admits *aprthak-siddhi* (inseparability) between two things, which ultimately highlights the identity between them. Let us see how they have argued in favour of the inseparability of the objects.

Relation is an important element in any system of philosophy, Eastern or Western. For without the concept of relation neither epistemology nor metaphysics of that system can meaningfully speak of its basic problems. This is because philosophy enquires into the nature of the universe, the nature of the human soul and its destiny, and the nature of God or the Absolute, not in isolation but in their relation to one another. Again, it also enquires into the nature of matter, time, space, causality, evolution, life and mind, again, not merely in isolation but in their relation to one another. Likewise, any epistemological query has to probe into the realities of the knowing subject, the object known, the instruments through which the process of knowledge takes place and the phenomenon of knowledge itself. However, whatever the analytic approach, when knowledge is seen finally as a synthetic product, the various elements of knowledge will have to be seen in their relation to one another. Therefore, the concept of relation becomes important for philosophy. In this chapter, I would like to set Rāmānuja's concept of *prthaksiddhi-bhāva* within the general context of a philosophy of relation in Indian philosophy.

Among all the schools of Vedanta, Samkara's Advaita and Ramanuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita are conspicuous on the issue of relation. The former for its

militant rejection of relation, and the latter for its ardent advocacy of the same. Surprisingly both the attitudes are occasioned by their concern to explicate the nature of the ultimate reality. Advaita upholds the view that reality is non-relational. The non-relational reality is nothing but a pure identity (*brahma satyam*). It is pure identity because the world of conscious selves is non-different from Brahman (*jīvo brahmoiva nāparah*), while the world of the non-conscious objects is a mere 'illusion' (*jagan mithyā*). This is the quintessence of Advaitic metaphysics.

Rāmānuja, on the other hand, is of the view that Reality, if it were not to be abstract, cannot but be relational. Hence, he takes upon himself both to oppose and criticize Advaitic pure identity. He argues out that Reality cannot be a pure identity ; on the contrary, it must be a 'concrete individual' or possible only in and through the different conscious selves (*cit*) and non-conscious objects (*acit*). *Cit* and *acit* are related inseparably (*aprthaksiddhi-bhāva*) with Brahman, as the latter's mode. If Brahman is the substance, the world of selves and the objects constitute its attributes or modes. If so, the relation that exists between the substantive Brahman and the attributive self and the non-self is one of inseparability. Therefore the relation of inseparability (*aprthak-siddhi-bhāva*) may be said to constitute the pivot on which Rāmānuja's whole philosophy turns. To Rāmānuja, *aprthaksiddhi* is an inner, inseparable, vital and organic relation. Such a relation holds between substance and its attribute, between body and soul, between part and whole and also between one substance and another substance. By implication it now follows that the relation concerned 'connotes that one of the two entities related is dependent upon the other in the sense that one cannot exist without the other also existing, and that it cannot be rightly known without the other also being known at the same time.'¹ It also indicates that the relation that we are speaking of here has both metaphysical and epistemological bearings. I hope to elaborate on these implications. In the entire

gamut of Indian philosophy, it is the Naiyayikas, the radical realists that they are, who have carried on a searching analysis, on the concept of relation.

The word 'relation' literally means a 'bringing together'. What do we bring together? There should at least be two terms, if we are to speak meaningfully of relation. The terms need not be, strictly speaking, the objective entities, although this often is the case to the realists, it is sufficient even if they are mental realities irrespective of the fact whether these mental realities have a foundation in reality or not. The Sanskrit word *bhāva* clearly includes within itself not only any existent thing, object or substance but also an idea, disposition, thought or supposition.² It now may be thought that relation is what brings together the two terms, irrespective of their ontological status. To the Naiyayikas however, because of their radical realism, all relation is between their categories (*padārthas*) of substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karma*), and generality (*sāmānya*), particularly (*viśeṣa*), inherent (*samavāya*) and non-existence (*abhāva*). This is partly because, to the Naiyayikas, all relations are real things, or real 'meanings', having their objective reality and validity. Of these categories, what is of particular interest to me here is *samavāya*, which is an important relation of inherence that exists between a substance (*dravya*) and such other categories as quality, action etc. as it has certain similarities with Rāmānuja's *aprthaksiddhi-bhāva*.

Samavāya, to Nyaya, is an inseparable and eternal relation between two non-pervasive entities, of which one is said to inhere in the other. Such a relation holds good in a number of instances. The whole is in its parts, a quality or an action is in a substance, the universal is in the individual, and the particularity is in some simple eternal substance or atoms. Thus we say that the cloth, as a whole, is in its threads; the colour 'red' as a quality, is in the rose; motion, as an action belongs to the moving ball; manhood, as a universal, is in individual man;

and finally, the particularity or the distinctive character, of one mind or soul is in that mind or soul.

All these are instantiations that Nyaya place before us for the relation of inherence. The inherent cannot exist independent of the inhered substance. Nor can you know the inherent independent of the inhered substance. Nyaya is quite consistent here in presuming that our categories of knowledge are delimited by the objects of knowledge (*mānādhīna meya*).

Naiyayika is quick to point out that the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) is different from conjunction (*samyoga*), because the latter is a temporary, or non-eternal, relation between two things; the two things or the relation in conjunction, usually exists in separation from each other. Once the relation is established between them, they are temporarily brought together. For example, two balls moving from opposite directions meet at a certain place; the relation which holds between them, when they meet, is one of conjunction; it is temporary. They can once again be separated at one's sweet pleasure. Therefore, the conjunction to the Naiyayikas is, strictly speaking, a relation that is at once a quality of the terms related by it; it is not a relation of inherence.

On the other hand, *samavāya* is an inseparable and eternal relation between the relata. Here, the whole is always related to its parts, if we speak of the relation between the whole and its parts; a quality or an action is always related to some substance, if we speak of the relation between a substance and its attributes. So long as the whole exists, it must exist in the parts; so also, a quality or action exists so long as the substance in which it inheres exists. Such is also the case with the relation that obtains between the universal and its individual, between the particularity and its simple eternal substance. Thus, we see that the relation, of a whole to its parts, of any quality or action to its substance, of the universal to the individual, and of particularity to the eternal substances, is one

of inherence; and that it is not produced by the conjunction of two separate things.

We should be careful to note the one-sidedness of dependence in the relation of inherence. For it may be an eternal relation between any two entities, one of which cannot exist without the other, but the terms related by *samavāya* cannot be reversed at our sweet pleasure. It is the inherent that is dependent on the inhered; the independence of the inhered substance is implicit in the Naiyayikas definition of *dravya* itself. In contradistinction with this relation of inherence, the terms related by conjunction (*samyoga*) can be reversed at our pleasure. For in this readjustment there is a constant disjunction and conjunction in virtue of the temporal character. For example, if there is a contact with the hand. This relation of conjunction is not so much a case of one thing being in the other as one thing being in contact with the other. But the latter is the case when we say that the cloth is in the threads or sweetness is in the mango. Here the relation is manifestly one-sided dependence, for though a quality is in a substance, the substance is not in the quality.

Nyāya further holds that, though there can be more than one instantiation of *samavāya*, *samavāya* is not many. It is a single relation of inherence. This is because the same distinguishing feature characterizes the different instantiations. One *samavāya* is sufficient to relate all its relata, while conjunctions are many, since they are all characterized by temporal contacts, here the ordering of contacts can be varied. In each case the ordering of the parts is different. But in the relation of inherence, there is no variety of the ordering of the parts; inherence is more than an external; it is uncaused; hence it is an eternal relation. *Samavāya* is imperceptible, whereas *samyoga* is said to be perceptible. For we see things temporarily coming together and going as under due to the external causality, but we do not perceive the relation of inherence; rather through it we understand the mode of being. On the other hand, conjunction is caused.

Conjunction is also destroyed by disjunction of its relata; it is purely temporary. Being temporary, conjunction is an adventitious relation, whereas *samavāya* is a natural relation. All these differences have made the Naiyayikas to assign conjunction only the status of a quality, whereas *samavāya* is given the status of a separate category (*padārtha*).

But the attempt of Nyāya in explicating the nature of relation, in particular, that of the relation of inherence, has not gone unchallenged. It has been severely criticized by the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra Buddhists. I am inclined to believe that both the views of Nyāya and their Buddhist opponents are dictated by the type of metaphysics that they subscribe to. For, whereas the Naiyāyikas have allowed a true play of radical realism here, the Buddhists have attacked realism and are dictated by metaphysical idealism, have ended up with a kind of nominalism, which denied the objective reality to the category of inherenced. Let me briefly state this position, if for nothing, but to highlight the realistic inclination of Rāmānuja in subscribing to *aprthaksiddhi-bhāva*, as against all metaphysical idealisms.

Both Yogācāra and Mādhyamika Buddhists are of the view that all relations are external realities. The category of inherence, which is also a unique relation, does not have any link with the substances in which they are supposed to inhere. They are therefore nothing but a subjective fiction. The notions of the genus and the species, of substance and attribute etc., are all fictitious without corresponding realities. Indeed, there are no substances at all that fit into the definitions given by Nyāya, an eternal, changeless reality. Substances, no less than the relation of inherence, are all names devised by mind that are merely vacuous. For these names are inapplicable to reality that, at any rate, cannot be grasped by the categorical modes of knowing. But, in arriving at this same conclusion, Mādhyamikas and Yogācāras take different paths with different presupposition.

The Mādhyamika Buddhist reject every type of relation, because to them reality is non-relational. That means reality is nothing but ‘thing-in-itself’,³ a ‘point instant’. It is a genuine, unique, independent and intimate reality, that transcends all categorical models of knowing. Their ultimate reality, *śūnyatā*, is not rational ; if not rational, all the attributes that we give to it, all the relations that we conceive of in regard to the transcendental reality do not hold good, it is in an unrelated reality. They deny relations, in particular, because they believe that all relations are constructed (*kalpanā*). Relations and constructions are one and the same, and they are the fabrications of our imagination, whereas the ultimate reality exists in itself, and not in virtue of being constructed. It is the mathematical point instant. Once all relations are in this way discarded, one is impelled to conceive it as a pure identity, or *tādātmya*. According to Dignāga, all relations are inferred and, as such, they are constructed by our understanding. For such inferred relations are based on our understanding of substance quality combination, whereas a relational substance does not represent ultimate reality at all.

The above work of the Mādhyamika is explicable to us only against the backdrop of their absolutism. The categorizations of the contingent world cannot apply to the Absolute. Relations have contingent reality, therefore they cannot hold good in respect of the ultimate reality. Ultimate reality is non-relative absolute, which is independent, its counterpart is merely empirical, it is imagined reality; only the latter is interrelated and interdependent, but the former is relationless. Even from the epistemic enterprises, Dignāga draws our attention to the Mādhyamika thesis that, in the very final stage, that is the Absolute stage, the distinction between the subject and the object is so overcome that they become united. Therefore, in the end stage, there remains no difference at all. The difference is only an appearance; an undifferentiated object appears differentiated only through illusion. Whatever difference that is initially experienced is true only for the empirical world. But this view (*dr̥ṣṭi*) cannot

give us an Absolute reality that is non-differentiated. This attempt to the Mādhyamikas is basically metaphysical in flavour. They proceed with the assumption that their ultimate reality is *śūnyatā*. It is *śūnyatā* because it is the negation of all our attributions which are the vacuous constructions of our understanding. The truth consists in the separation of the mental constructs that do not apply to the Absolute.

The Yogācāras, on the other hand, are unmistakably idealists in their approach. They refute to locate the ultimate reality outside the mental; consciousness itself is the ultimate and absolute reality. All divisions within the all-absorbing consciousness are to be overcome. In the process of overcoming divisions, their axe, first of all, outside the mental realm. Accordingly, Dharmakīrti says that the essence of consciousness is undivided, because consciousness is self-transparent and self-luminous and does not connote any subject-object-relation in its construction. The distinction between the subject and the object is an illusive division within. Ultimate reality, being a single unit of the nature of consciousness, does not admit either a bifurcation, or a dichotomy, of subject and object within the ultimate reality. The implication of this metaphysical idealism is an epistemological idealism. It is now a short step to the conclusion that knowledge, which is constructed by subject and object, is illusive. Thus both the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra reject the notion of relation and advocate a pure identity (*tādātmya*) of the ultimate reality with itself.

Yet another school that is opposed to the notion of relation, for the sake of revaluing the ultimate absolute reality is Advaita Vedānta. Treatment of the Vedāntic school is of paramount importance to me, since Rāmānuja too belongs to a Vedāntic school. Regarding the nature of the reality, Advaita Vedānta too holds similar view with that of the Buddhists. To it too, the ultimate reality is non-relational. Nonetheless, it is neither the 'nihilism' of the Mādhyamika nor

the absolute idealism of the Yogācāra that we encounter here. For Advaitins are epistemologically realists, but metaphysically transcendentalists. Hence, their views deserve a closer attention.

Advaitin interprets the relational consciousness, whether internal or external, as the working of ignorance. This working impresses the empirical mind that makes knowledge of the external world possible. But this knowledge cannot give us access to the nature of Brahman, the ultimate reality, which is relationless; it is a pure consciousness, distinct from any relational consciousness. In his commentary on the Brahma-sūtra, Śaṅkara, for example, criticizes Nyāya relation of inherence (*samavāya*). Because *samavāya* is said to be an independent category, and because it relates two concepts, namely the substance and the attributes, it is objected to by Advaitin. It is asked, when *samavāya* establishes the relation between the two terms : how is it itself related to each of the terms that it relates ? How do we become aware of this relation that exists between the substance and *samavāya*, on the one hand, and between the attribute and *samavāya*, on the other ? To account for these we will be compelled to accept other *samavāya* relation. But this process of relating the relata will only lead us to an infinite regress (*anavasthā*), thus at once, demonstrating the self-contradiction, riddled with the relation of inherence. Hence, the fallacy of infinite regress led the Vedantins to reject *samavāya* relation altogether as an entity, or category, standing independent of substance and attributes.

It is the inherent self-contradiction within the concept of relation that has led the Advaitins to institute the relation of *tādātmya* or *svarūpa*, in place of *samavāya*. The relation between the whole and the parts has been described by the Advaitins as a case of *tādātmya*: the analogy is further expanded to explicate the relation between Brahman, the relationless ultimate, and its illusory appearance as the world and its non-difference from the self. The 'realities' of

the self and the world have been regarded by them as being identical with that of Brahman, even as the reality of the part is identical with that of the whole. The force of the argument of the Advaitins rests on this that the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika systems cannot fully explain the real nature of the substance and attributes, and of their relation, when the later admit *samavāya* to be a third category. Because the idea of substance cannot exist apart from that of the attributes, even as the idea of the attributes cannot equally exist apart from substance. Nyāya is said to commit the fallacy of mutual dependence *anyonyāśraya*, Nyāya has failed to demonstrate the clear-cut distinction between the two. They are inseparable both in our experience and in point of their existence, they may therefore be considered as the two aspects of the same entity. Substance expresses itself in attributes, and the attributes have their perfection and consummation in the substance. The two are identical in essence. Attributes exist when the substance is there ; likewise they lack existence, when the substance is not there. Hence, there is no special relation between the two, they are identical (*tādātmya*). Nyāya is mistaken in having invented a relation of inherence between the two, they are identical (*tādātmya*). Nyāya is mistaken in having invented a relation of inherence between the two. Therefore, the relation between the substance and attribute , between universal and particular etc. is said to be of identity (*tādātmya*), if at all it can be called a relation . This searching analysis is fully employed by Advaitin to revalue Brahman's ultimacy as against its illusory manifestation as the world of selves and objects. By criticizing *samavāya* relation, Advaitin shows that relations are unreal, that they hold good only for the empirical world. It is unable to grasp the transcendental reality, which is non-relational and which is ultimately real; the Absolute is supra-relational.

So far we have seen that the substantive – attributive relation, or the subject-object-relation, has been rejected both by the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra Buddhists and the Advaita Vedaitins. This is in part due to their negative and positive understanding of the nature of the reality respectively.

Whereas, to the Buddhists, the absolute reality is so intensely negative that nothing can be attributed to it, to the Advaitin, it is so intensely positive that nothing can be attributed to it. Hence, both settle down to the view that reality is non-relational ; and the relational appearance thereof are only for the illusory part of the human mind ; it is due to illusion that reality appears as relational. In contradistinction to this view, the substantive attributive relation is central to both Nyāya and Rāmānuja's philosophy. This is in part due to their realistic metaphysics : there is little wonder then that all the realists have accepted this relation in one form or another.

Despite the acceptance of the substantive-attributive relation, the meanings of Naiyāyika and Rāmānuja are here different. Naiyāyika is a *tārkika*, a logician par excellence. He arrives, by way of his logical analysis, to subscribe to his metaphysics of seven categories. Inherence (*samavāya*) is one and unique type of relation that is necessitated by, and to, his logical analysis. Given his definition of substance (*dravya*), and such other categories as activity, quality etc., an independent category of inherence (*samavāya*) cannot but be posited ; otherwise the categories would be hanging in the vacuum, and that hardly behaves his realism. But Rāmānuja in positioning his *aprthaksiddhi-bhāva* is more of an exegete than a logician; although he does possess considerable amount of logical acumen. As a Vedāntic exegete, he begins with Brahman as the concretely given, and with the world of selves and non-conscious matter as equally given within Brahman. The question then that he is faced with is : What is the relation between Brahman, *cit* and *acit* ? His positing of the substantive – attributive relation is in the service of a Vedantic hermeneutics. As I have mentioned earlier, Rāmānuja's Absolute is relational, because his conception of the Absolute is that of the concrete individual. If the ultimate reality is a concrete individual, it is not above the relational understanding. The relation which holds between Brahman and *cit*, on the one hand, and Brahman and *acit*, on the other, is an inseparable relation (*aprthaksiddhi-bhāva*). Needless to say, it is a

type of substantive attributive relation. It is an inner, inseparable, vital and organic relation, which holds between substance and its attributes.

We may now do well to compare Rāmānuja's substantive-attributive relation, that goes by the name of *aprthaksiddhi-bhāva*, with the substantive-attributive relation of Nyāya that goes by the name of inherence (*samavāya*).

Aprthaksiddhi of Rāmānuja is similar to the *samavāya* of Nyāya in regard to its recognition of the reality, mutual necessity and the distinctiveness of the relata in it. Although the Nyāya *dravyas* are many, and they admit many attributes, to Rāmānuja, the ultimate reality is one indeed, in a sense non-dual, a supreme transcendental *dravya*, but with *cit* and *acit* as its attributes, more precisely, the modes (*prakāra*). All the terms are here real and distinct, yet inseparable from one another. But there are differences between *samavāya* of Nyāya and *aprthaksiddhi* Rāmānuja, that must not be played down.

Firstly, unlike *samavāya*, *aprthaksiddhi* is not a separate entity or a category, external to the relata. *Samavāya* is what relates substance and attribute as an external link; not so *aprthaksiddhi-bhāva*; it is intrinsic to the terms related, apart from the relata, it has no separate existence. Secondly, the relata in *samavāya* remain mutually external, although they are held together in an 'extrinsic' unity by *samavāya*, which is a relation in virtue of its being a category. In order that *Samavāya* may hold good, there should be two genuinely different entities. But *aprthaksiddhi* relation is not only an intrinsic relation, but also an organic one. It rejects both identity and difference. The relation at point is obtained in the inner relatedness of one and the same substance that admits within itself an internal differentiation. Thirdly, it follows from what we have suggested above that, whereas, to the Naiyāyikas, *samavāya* being an 'external' and independent relation, is perceptible to senses, *aprthaksiddhi* relation, to Rāmānuja, being internal to the relata, is not perceptible to the senses. The type of difficulty, that Naiyāyika faces in respect of the senses

involved in the perception of *Samavāya*, is clearly obviated by Rāmānuja in considering *apr̥thak-siddhi* to be an internal and organic relation between the relata. Naiyāyika, for all his epistemological and logical acumen, is forced here to have recourse to an extra epistemological tool viz. *alaukika pratyakṣa* in the perception of the category of inherence. Rāmānuja however has not difficulty in this respect, precisely because *apr̥thak-siddhi* relation is not an item for perception. After all, being a Vedāntin, he repudiates radical realism, and in this case it has been to his own advantage. Fourthly, *Samavāya* is a 'relation merely between material substance and its attributes, while *apr̥thaksiddhi* is a relation between immaterial substance Brahman and its attributes, both immaterial and material respectively. The perspective here is not that of a material substance as it is in *Nyāya* but that of the transcendental substance of Brahman.

Finally, *samavāya* is a necessary relation for only one of the relata. Thus the red colour that inheres in the rose can not but be in the substance rose, if it ever exists. The reversal of this relation is not necessary. Rose could be red, but it need not be so. The dependence of the rose on the red colour is contingent, but that of red colour in the rose is necessary. Not so, when we come to the internal organic relation of *apr̥thaksiddhattva*. The terms here are mutually dependent, whereas *cit* and *acit*. Some of the implications of this statement will be drastic, and I do hope to address myself to them, when I come to analyse the application of this relation in Ramanuja's philosophy. Here, it is sufficient to state that *apr̥thak-siddhi* is parallel to *Samavāya* but, by no means, identical with it.

Is Relation Possible without Duality

For relation is not possible without difference (*bheda*) ; but all difference is, in the final analysis, meaningless within a non-dualistic framework. I would like to probe in depth into the central thesis of Advaita for the sake of bringing

out how Rāmānuja subjects it to a critique of his own. Such a critique of relation is necessary for Rāmānuja's realistic and pluralistic epistemology, and to some extent, to his metaphysics as well. The upshot of Rāmānuja's critique, again, determined as it is by his theory of reality, is that the pure identity advocated by Advaitin comes to be a pure nothing. For the very talk about identity is made possible only through the concept of difference. If philosophy is not to discountenance our experience, difference is what is given in our experience. Its rejection therefore would be fraught with contradictions in our philosophical enterprise. More importantly, to Rāmānuja, the Vedantic philosopher that he is, if we do not admit an internal differentiation (*svagata-bheda*) within Brahman, all knowledge of Brahman, and thereupon a Vedantic metaphysics, should prove to be impossible.

We may begin here with an exposition of Advaita's critique of relation. Advaita claims to be a philosophy that is at once an intuition of reality. How is this intuition related to the phenomenon of knowledge, the more so, because every Vedantin believes that knowledge is in the service of our understanding of reality? Knowledge in Advaita Vedānta is held to be both self-luminous and self-valid; it reveals its own existence as soon as it is born, and is not lighted up by any other illuminating factor. Its self-luminosity is referred to as an auto-illumination, (*svaparakāśatva*), hence its existence is every known (*jñātasattāka*). Further, its validity too is guaranteed by the factors which bring about knowledge, no extraneous factors are ever required to ascertain its validity (*svatah-prāmānya*). Hence Advaitin argues that the intuition of the ultimate reality is the absolute knowledge, it can only be of immediate experience; such an immediate experience of the ultimate reality is possible because the ultimate reality is pure-consciousness; its knowledge is not the one characterized by the duality of subject and object, but transcendental without a division in the consciousness.

Accordingly, Advaitin believes that Brahman, the transcendental reality, is an undifferentiated whole, an undifferentiated consciousness (*nirviśeṣa-cinmātra*). It is one and unitary in its reality; it simply is, and can not be described as such and such; in short, it transcends or sublates all relational thought. Following closely certain trends in the *Upaniṣads*, Advaitin thinks that Brahman should be conceived as acosmic (*niṣprapañca*). Its reality is not essentially related to any thing other than itself, within or without. Brahman is thus regarded as the 'wholly non-dual' or the 'wholly one', to which nothing belonging to the world can be strictly predicated of. In a sense, what the philosophers of religion speak of as the 'wholly other' pre-eminently suits Advaitic metaphysics, although Advaitin would find it repugnant to speak of any language of the 'other'. This non-predication of anything positive to Brahman is illustrated in the negative description of Brahman as 'not this, not this' (*neti-neti*). Therefore Brahman is devoid of all determinations. It is pure being, consciousness and bliss (*sat-cit-ānanda*), not in the adjectival sense, lest they may be mistaken for attributes of Brahman, but as experienced by the realized person. Therefore, Brahman is not an object of knowledge, rather it is pure knowledge itself. There is no knowing Brahman, rather there is only being Brahman. There is nothing beside, outside or within it. It cannot be described in terms of anything other than itself, because it does not enter into any relational process of knowledge. Brahman intuition is not a cognition in the form of a subject and object relation. It can only be known in a non-relational form.

It now goes without saying that criticism of relational understanding of reality is not merely a corollary of a non-dualistic metaphysics, as many Advaitins imagine, it is also one of the presupposition of the same metaphysics. We could even say that it occupies a central importance in Advaita philosophy. It is but natural, if Advaitin thinks that the supra-relational rests on the validity of this criticism of relation. What does Advaitin mean by supra-relational absolute? He means by it positively a unity transcending all differences;

negatively, it is a denial of the ultimacy of all relational forms of experience, as applied to the Absolute. Relations are true only for the empirical world but, from the metaphysical point of view, they are unreal: they do not hold good in respect of the ultimate, reality. By implication, relations cannot give us any metaphysical truth, but only practical epistemic truths that have no final metaphysical significance.

Relational experience of reality is seen to be self-contradictory, because it is an attempt to take as diverse and plural what is fundamentally one. In relational experience, terms and relations that relate the terms must be taken to be different from, and outside of, one another; their unity, if ever posited, is unintelligible at the relational level. Relational experience of the ultimate must hence in its very nature be called self-contradictory, because the ultimate would not come under the purview of any relations. For Advaita, non-contradiction (*abādhitatva*) is one of the criteria of truth, and accordingly, relational experience, which is self-contradictory in nature, cannot be the criterion of truth. Advaitin, in fact, goes to the extent of arguing that relational experience is not only self-contradictory in its essence, but also self-discrepant with the terms employed, and, in the end, indefensible. Therefore, they take relation to be neither primary nor ultimate in a metaphysical enterprise. Relational experience must fail in the end, if we ever employ it with the hope of reaching full reality, or truth.

To be fair to Advaita, it must be acknowledged that he does admit the concept of relation at the level of empirical knowledge of the world. But he refuses to give it any significance when it comes to the intuition of the transcendental reality. Indeed, relational experience, he thinks, is development, or abstraction, from a non-relational felt-whole. The latter is its basis, or pre-condition, of the former. The former should consummate again in the non-relational experience, where its inner contradictions are resolved. Therefore, the

essential pre-supposition and support of the relational experience remains throughout as the infra-relational, and the latter must give way once the higher state of identity, that transcends all relation, is reached. But, it is the trans-empirical immediate experience which is the foundation of all relational consciousness. The former is the measure of the latter and nor vice versa.

It is against this backdrop that we have to understand Samkara's contention that the subject-object implications of knowledge can neither establish nor reveal truth. For truth is abiding, it cannot be established by relational, or pragmatic, consciousness, which after all only indulges in the constructions of a realistic will.

Śaṅkara's criticism of relations has been ably supported by Sri Harṣa, a post- Śaṅkarite Advaita dialectician belonging to the eleventh century A.D. True to his task of employing the logical tools in the service of metaphysics, he takes up what may be regarded as the most general of all relations, namely the subject-object relation in knowledge for an analysis. He argues that we cannot maintain the reality of this relation independently of the terms it relates, indeed, no such relation intervenes between the subject and the object. For, if we maintain that a relation does intervene between the two, then, we are obliged to concede that it has an independent existence. In that case it would require another relation to connect the first relation with the terms of subject as well as the object. We would now be compelled to posit two more relations having independent existence. These in their turn would further require other relations to relate their own terms. The process thus leads us to *a regressus ad infinitum*. There is thus no subject-object relation at all, as distinguishable from the nature of the subject or the object in empiric epistemology. Indeed, the relation of subject and object is the essence of empiric epistemology, and the ground of concrete knowledge. But the Absolute, which is undifferentiated consciousness, does not connote any subject-object relation in its construction; we must not

introduce here any dichotomy in consciousness. For relation is something 'mysterious', which can only give us appearance and not truth.

Brahman, to the Advaitin, is the perfect being, with no trace of any becoming. All becoming is symptomatic of imperfections inherent. Hence, all the categories of finite relational knowledge are applicable only to the universe which is finite or determinate. What is more, the absolutely real Brahman would lose its self-hood, if it ever were to become an object of relational knowledge. For that very reason Brahman does not admit of any substance attribute relation which is the characteristic mark of all empirical knowledge. Likewise Brahman does not also admit of the kind of relation obtained between the part and whole; it is spoken of as the impartite (*akhandā*).

Advaitin is thus led to hold the view that truth cannot be understood; it can only be 'seen' or intuited. A vision, or intuition, of truth is none other than reality in the completest and most perfect form. Advaita denies relation on the ground that, if there should be relation (*bhāva*), then there will also be difference (*bheda*). This has serious implication to Advaita philosophy, for relational consciousness presupposes a differentiated consciousness too. To Advaita all *bheda-bhāva* refers to the truths of phenomenon (*vyāvahārika-sattā*), whereas the denial thereof refers to the transcendental truth of non-dualism (*pāramārthika-sattā*). Advaitin therefore has recourse to scriptures on the point at issue. He avers that those scriptural statements (*smṛti-vākya*), which deny difference (*bheda-niṣedha-śruti*), establish non difference (*abheda*), and show that difference (*bheda*) is not ultimately real and has only phenomenal reality (*neha nānāsti kiñcana*). The innate obscuration of pure consciousness comes somehow to divide the absolute and to distort it into the world of difference. Difference (*dvirūpa*) cannot exist by itself; it is only a distortion of reality, because Brahman is relationless, therefore differenceless. He is a 'noumenon' as it were. Therefore Advaitin is led to assert that Brahman alone is, and what is not

Brahman is 'false', as it is non-different from Brahman even as the 'false' snake is non-different from the rope in the celebrated Advaitin rope-snake illusion.

Advaitin builds on this original intuition of the relationless, differenceless Brahman. Brahman is not only without any difference (*bheda*) but he is also without any activity, or movement (*niṣkriya*), without any parts (*niravayava*), unconditioned and absolute (*nirupādhika*) and having no distinguishing element in it, a simple homogeneous entity (*nirviśeṣa*). Brahman is one indivisible (*ekam, akhaṇḍa*). In short, Brahman does not admit within itself any difference (*bheda*), either *sajātīya*, *viajātīya* or *svagata*. These are the differences that obtain between the like-entities; and the internal differentiations within a single entity. Thus all differences are denied in the absolute unity. Advaita finds no room for the many in the unity of the pure non-differentiated entity that is Brahman. If there is the 'many' we would be forced to posit relation and, ultimately, there would be an endless multiplication of relations. Further, if there is relation, and the multiplication thereof, we would be forced to posit some difference; and thereby the unity of Brahman as the homogeneous reality cannot be established. Thus, the conception of unity embracing even a resemblance of difference of any type seems to be a hopeless one.

We must not miss here the significance of Advaitin's insistence on the character of metaphysical truth as distinct from epistemic truth lest we fail to grasp his distinction between intuition and knowledge by way of modification of consciousness. A truth which is related to subject cannot be the metaphysical truth according to Advaitin, for truth is abiding, eternal, all-pervasive and non-contradictory; it is what it is by its own nature; but it should have no reference whatsoever to any conscious subject. Such a referenceless truth is the Reality that is Brahman, at once undivided. Divisions of existence in different grades do not correspond to it, they only correspond to the different epistemic forms of knowledge. But the Existence, Being as such, is Brahman; the same existence

appears as different according to different organs of apprehension, while in reality it is the same one differenceless unity of being. If it appears as divided, it is because of the principle of *māyā*. Thus, Advaita philosophy is in a sense an attempt to overthrow the divisions of existence and their empirical truths, and thereupon to establish the transcendence of being. The absolutistic philosophy that it arrives at is the conclusion that the absolute is the locus of existence, and that it does not admit the partiality of division. The truth is not the fragmented beings but the complete being, the absolute. Partial visions of absolute being cannot pass for the fullness of being; if ever a claim is made, it is error, in the sense of a seeming reality claiming to be the absolute being.

Nothing could be more unfair to Advaita than to ascribe to it the view that Advaita attempts merely a synthesis of the partial presentations of appearance and being. Reality is not a synthesis of all partial truths; the sum total of partial truths is not the Truth. On the contrary, Advaita may be said to insist on the complete denial of the partial truths. Advaitin is aware that their synthesis cannot present the reality as it is in itself. The absolute is not a synthesis, but a pure identity. It is this category of identity which is the basis of his refutation of all relations and the consequent differences. His logic is based on the concept of identity (*tādātmya*). Hence, it may be suggested that Advaitin's thought that Brahman is the 'sameness' of reality cuts at the root of all dualisms, of mind and matter, world and spirit, subject and object etc. This in part explains why Advaita does not rest satisfied with a mere refutation of the category of difference, but proceeds to assert the sameness of the Being. For it is possible that those, who reject difference, make for a doctrine of identity-cum-difference (*bhedābheda*) within a concrete universal; not for Advaitin is the fascination of a concrete universal.

Mandana Miśra,² an Advaitin of an unsurpassed logical acumen, has presented to us ^hte untenability of the concept of difference. He thinks that the

dialectic of difference is self-defeating in so far as it fails to be an intelligible concept. He likewise attacks the concept of identity-cum-difference school, and points out that this latter difference turns out to be a device for self-deception through insufficient analysis. Positively, he establishes that identity is the only intelligible concept.

Advaita is in a position to reject objectivity too, in virtue of its rejection of difference. He ingeniously shows how objectivity is a creation of difference. He argues that objectivity is self-contradictory, self-stultifying and, therefore false, because an object becomes an object to consciousness, as distinct from other objects. In other words, no object is conceivable as object except as different from other objects. Difference (*bheda*) thus enters into the very structure and meaning of an object *qua* object. But, if difference, as a category, is self-contradictory and a false appearance, the concept of objectivity too, that is based on difference, is self-contradictory, self-invalidating and false. Just as we land into an endless series of difference to explain one single difference, we land into endless objects to establish a single object. If so, objectivity is unintelligible without the idea of difference, and it too must be a false appearance that cannot qualify to be reality. Advaitin thus would conclude that an object of consciousness is other than consciousness; therefore, it is other than reality as such, it is only a false appearance of the reality of pure consciousness. Likewise objectivity, as sustained by the idea of difference, is equally self-contradictory and, therefore, a false appearance of the reality of pure consciousness.

Pure consciousness itself, however, Advaitin contends, is intrinsically indefinable, as being unknowable (*avedya*); if it ever admits of distinctions as this or that all plurality in consciousness is conditional and superimposed (*kalpita*), and thereupon in recommending the negation of all things and attributes in Brahman. Intuition transcends all limitation of empirical modifications of consciousness, only when 'knowledge' has reached its frontiers

and the ken of the empirical logic has finally died out. Only when the philosophic consciousness has risen to be transcendent, the seeming truths of divided life completely vanish; for the transcendental truth does not stand in any relation to the order of appearances. From this level of existence, the partial truths are, not only practically but also theoretically, non-existent.

One of the assumptions of Advaita, that seems to us philosophically not defensible, is its distinction between the two realms of human experience; the transcendental and the phenomenal. The critics of relation and more importantly, of difference, seem to be quite keen on maintaining the difference between the two realms of human experience, and introduce a dichotomy within the core of experience itself, with which all our philosophical enterprise should begin. What is more, the metaphysics of Advaita, I am afraid, cannot synthesize the transcendental truth and the relative truths, as the relative truths are required to be sublated ultimately in the transcendental height of existence. It is not enough to state that truth is not a matter of synthesis *but of identity*. The fact, that Advaita makes a distinction between the transcendental and empirical truths, cannot exonerate Advaita from the responsibility of relating them both to human experience. On the contrary, Advaita does not find any continuity between the higher and the lower realm of human experience. How at all would we speak of them as higher and lower, if they are not referred to a unity of experience? The transcendental truth of Advaita is not only transcendental, in the sense that it stands above the immanent order of space and time, but also in the sense that the immanent order does not really exist. How then do we begin our philosophical enterprise with something that is non-existent? On the contrary, if it is even claimed that transcendent appears as the immanent under the sway of ignorance, and therefore the latter has no ultimate significance, how can it be the starting point of our philosophical enterprise in all earnestness and seriousness?

Rāmānuja has been quick to point out the above infelicities in Advaita. He has drawn therefore no distinction between the absolute and the relative truths, between absolute and relative knowledge, in the way Advaita does. However, he too accepts the latter distinction between the absolute and the relative knowledge in another way. To him, knowledge is relative, when it has not reached its fuller development and concreteness. In the same strain, knowledge is absolute when it has reached to the concreteness of Brahman. Thus knowledge of an aspect of reality is, no doubt, relative, if it is not seen in its totality; if the absolute knowledge is to emerge, all the relations, which knowledge implies, must be seen in a completely unified system. Thus to Rāmānuja a grandiose unity in Brahman is truth. Presentations of diversity in their isolation are imperfect presentation of truth, but they are by no means false, as they are to Advaita. Such a view of truth as a grandiose unity has serious implications to Rāmānuja's metaphysics in general and, to epistemology, in particular. For Advaita, as has been already shown, denied a unity of subject and object in a synthesis, as far as his absolute truth, or knowledge, is concerned. The epistemology of Advaitin, therefore, is true of relative consciousness but not of absolute consciousness that Brahman is. But the epistemology of Rāmānuja is true of absolute consciousness as well. This is because his categories of knowledge, understood as the attributive knowledge (*dharmabhūta-jñāna*), are applicable no less to Brahman than to the individual self. By its very nature, knowledge is relational.

For Rāmānuja, truth is a complete system. Our knowledge, which is necessarily relational, is to develop the complete system within itself; otherwise it suffers from a limitation and cannot be truth at all. Therefore, metaphysics cannot remain satisfied with the whole network of knowledge spreading out in a system in its many relational aspects, and apprehending the parts in a synthesis of the whole. Since knowledge spreads out the network of relations, apprehends and synthesizes the parts of the whole, metaphysics is not immune to relations;

metaphysics too spins out a relational scheme of all forms of knowledge, and tends to transcend division and partial presentations in a complete unity. Thus, the impacting of metaphysics and epistemology is mutual. Further, since in Rāmānuja being is consciousness, the metaphysical theory cannot be dissonant with those of epistemology ; indeed, epistemology must present the complete development of knowledge in a unified system; at any rate, it must not be satisfied with the presentation of a partial aspect of the reality. All knowledge therefore must possess concreteness and definiteness, because definiteness strictly is the characteristic mark, or differentia, of knowledge. There cannot be an inchoate knowledge. If it ever lacks its differentia, it ceases to be knowledge, it remains simple apprehension. One clearly perceives the difference here between Advaita and Rāmānuja : For Advaita truth is not a synthesis at all of all partial truths, but the complete denial of them. Hence its insistence on the absolute as *identity*. Not so far Rāmānuja . The truth is the definite absolute with all its multifarious relations that are synthesized within it harmoniously.

To be sure, it is a theistic presentation of knowledge and truth. It fundamentally differs from all monistic and non-dualistic presentation of knowledge and truth. The theistic endeavour in epistemology everywhere has been largely synthetic. Not for it is the sectional presentation of reality; likewise not for it is the complete transcendence of knowledge. For one thing, the theistic reality is all inclusive, admitting within itself all phases of being. The theist argues that reality must be complete and all inclusive, and all pervasive. The seeming appearance too, in virtue of the fact of seemingness, has a reality of its own and therefore must not be completely denied. For another, the seeming presentation has its own epistemological significance, as it too is an experience, calling for a meaningful epistemological explication; it is a noetic situation that bears upon a presentation. To uphold initially that there is a presentation and in the same breath to deny it thereafter is no explanation of any

epistemic presentation. Finally, the complete denial of the presentation is also not a fact experienced by anyone. Therefore the theist with his concern for synthesis of experience refuses to make a distinction between being and presentation, for, to him, all presentations only report the being, and its modes. As such there can be no complete division eternally obtaining within truth; hence, if anybody denies the synthetic character of all presentations, it also must make all knowledge impossible.

Precisely at this stage Rāmānuja clinches the issue of relation as a necessity for any knowledge, as against Advaita to whom real can never be an object of knowledge. For Rāmānuja, on the contrary, there cannot be knowledge without a reference to real. Our knowledge is always of the being, even as being is known to be a concrete being only through knowledge. In virtue of its being concrete, its tendency is to reveal itself in its complete nature; therefore every knowledge expresses its own object. Therefore, every knowledge has a reference to an object; an objectless knowledge, in the sense of being free from its object, is a chimera. Relations constitute the warp and woof of a cognitive act. In short, knowledge is essentially relational consciousness, and this relational consciousness cannot be totally false. All this goes to indicate the importance given by Rāmānuja to subject the Advaitin's critique of relation to a reverse critique, and thus to establish the truth that relation to a reverse occupies a central place in his metaphysics.

Rāmānuja criticizes the Advaitin that the latter understands of a relationless Absolute, precisely because of its being devoid of all relations, makes for an abstract and, not a concrete entity. It makes for an exclusive principle of rigid identity. Moreover, it fails to reconcile the unity with multiplicity, nay more, it ends up negating the latter to revalue the former. But, Rāmānuja asserts, reality is too rich and complex to be confined within the narrow limits of rigid identity. And his contention here is not without reasons.

A relation implies that two terms, which may be said to have been once apart from each other, are now held together . Relation therefore is the cementing bond between the two terms, while the nature of relation itself consists in its force of binding the realities; and it thus makes for unity of realities with its presence or for diversity with its absence. Rāmānuja argues that neither unity nor diversity sums up the nature of a relation itself consists in its force of binding the realities; and it thus makes for unity of realities with its presence or for diversity with its absence. Rāmānuja argues that neither unity nor diversity sums up the nature of a real; the nature of the real is constituted by both taken together. Hence he thinks that the denial of relations would in fact reduce all things to nullity. Even the ineffable reality would not be an exception to its being apprehended, if not fully comprehended, by way of its attributes; hence, the determination by way of relations is the structure of reality. Therefore an existent, having no determination, is a fiction; so, the negations of determinations make for the negation of reality itself. Moreover, Rāmānuja contends that relation, whether internal or external, is integral to the terms. Such an integral relation is the result of an internal change in the nature of terms. The denial of relations, he believes, involves a self-contradiction, if for no other reason than that such a denial is possible only by virtue of relational thought. There is no thought that operates outside the scheme of relations.

Rāmānuja's critique of the critique of relation should not be seen merely negatively. For he positively thinks that the universe with its subjective and objective aspects is the result of a self-differentiation of the absolute. Both aspects serve as members of a relational system. The ^ṣconscient (*cit*) and the inconscient (*acit*) are the finite modes of the Absolute, and have no independent existence, apart from that of the Absolute Brahman. They are internally related with Brahman. It is here that Advaitin's logic seems to have gone astray, according to Rāmānuja . Since the relation of the modes of cit and acit with Brahman is internal, and not external, it will not lead to *regressus ad infinitum*,

as Advaitin would argue. Thus Rāmānuja attributes to the supreme reality an internal variegatedness that at once makes for the internal unity of the inanimate and the animate entities within the supreme reality itself. The supreme is thought of as having an inward dispersion, a self-differentiation, within itself by an internal necessity; the internal necessity, because it follows from its own will, does not suggest any sense of unfulfilled purposes within the absolute, lest one should think of a pure spontaneity as determined by external goals.

We should carefully take note of what Rāmānuja has done here lest we should accuse Rāmānuja of abjuring his Vedāntic tradition. On the contrary, he is a Vedāntin to the fullest sense. For, to him, Brahman is the sole reality, in the sense that outside, or independent, of Him there is nothing else. Brahman is devoid of the two kinds of external distinctions. They are the external distinctions between the two unlike entities (*vijātiyā-bheda*), and between two like entities (*sajātiyā-bheda*). While the former asserts both unity and the absolute sovereignty of Brahman, and thereby negates any type of dualism, the latter asserts the uniqueness of Brahman and negates any type of pluralism at the metaphysical level and polytheism at the religious level. But, in contradistinction with Samkara. Rāmānuja admits an internal distinction (*svagata-bheda*) within Brahman. For there are within Brahman the different conscious and unconscious substances; and they can be not only mutually distinguished but also distinguished from Brahman. This internal relation is both natural (*svābhāvika*) and eternal (*sanātana*).

It however needs to be shown that Rāmānuja, far from abjuring his Vedāntic tradition, is deeply rooted in it. Reality, to Rāmānuja too, is the non-dual spirit (*advaya*). But it not a distinctionless homogeneous identity (*nirviśeṣatādātmya*), as it is to Advaita. Although it may be true that every judgement may be said to affirm identity, we must not forget here another equally important factor, namely difference. Indeed, the principles of identity and contradiction (in

this case of difference) go together because they are the two aspects of the same reality. This is because the nature of thought processes itself. Thought qualifies reality that it aims to apprehend cognitively or affectively. Thought presupposes a distinction between subject and object, but the distinctions, having been recognized as distinctions, are also integrally united, and not kept on isolated bits in the process of apprehending. Therefore, the ultimate reality cannot be a bare undifferentiated unity, but a unity that contains, and admits as such, differences which are all real. All determinations, limitation and differences are deep within the heart of it. They are also not left unorganized, but they are harmoniously coordinated. Further the differences, which are accommodated and harmoniously coordinated in this unifying principle, do not vanish at any time. It is not the case that the differences within reality are entertained only for a while and then relegated to oblivion as of no ultimate significance. Rather they are co-eval and co-eternal with the unity of the reality, even though we may say that they are subject to change from subtle to gross state in the process of evolution (*srsti*) and from the gross to the subtle state in the process of involution (*pralaya*).

Rāmānuja's Absolute then is a concrete individual. If we ever speak of it in terms of identity at all, *it is an identity in the sense of unity*, achieved in and through difference; it is an identity impregnated with differences. Thus, a relation of difference is the pivot on which his philosophy revolves. Pure identity, or bare being, of Brahman without any differentiation, is a metaphysical fiction; it has no adequacy in perceptual experience, which by its nature is relational experience. If we have referred here to perception, it is because it is the basis of all other forms of knowledge. We could as well say that all knowledge involves discrimination, and it is impossible to know an undifferentiated object; all knowledge is in and through difference. Likewise all unity is in and through, and because of, diversity that makes at once a pure

identity into a pure nothing. True to his Vedantic spirit, Rāmānuja bases his argument for the impossibility of an undifferentiated reality on *tarka*, *śruti* and *smṛti*. An undifferentiated reality cannot even be proved to exist, because all proofs are based on the assumption that the *probandum* is of some qualified character. There cannot be a proof of an undifferentiated substance in our experience. Neither *śabda* nor perception nor inference can prove the existence of an unqualified substance. Likewise neither *śruti* nor *smṛti* has ever proved its existence. In short, while, speaking negatively, there is no proof anywhere of a substance devoid of all difference, speaking positively, the only real revealed by the means of knowledge, *śruti* and *smṛti* is one characterized by difference. Therefore Advaitin's contention that all differences, therefore, all relations, are ultimately unreal, stands *eo ipso* refuted.

In virtue of the establishment of the relational character of all knowledge, Rāmānuja is in a position to argue out that Brahman as pure thought is false. On the contrary, Brahman, the supreme being, may be conceived as self, or person, or possessed of suspicious qualities because it is, as concrete real, characterized by differences. Indeed, everything experienced is found to display differences within itself, therefore all proof cannot but rest on experience. It is against this rock of experience, that is, by its nature relational, that all Advaitic arguments for an undifferentiated pure thinking should flounder. For, if Advaitin ever attempts to prove it, it will begin to display attributes; anything that is capable of being proven must have attributes. If, on the other hand, Advaitin does not care to prove it, it is reduced to a mere fanciful hypothesis, an abstraction, contradicted by experience. There cannot be a pure thinking but only thinking qualified by thought. Therefore, Brahman cannot be either a qualityless being or a pure thinking. Brahman ought to be a self characterized by thought as well as by several other attributes. It is for the same reason that Brahman cannot be regarded as pure unity; it ought rather to be a unity that includes within itself

differences. A concrete real cannot but be an unity of a plurality of aspects and modes, therefore a unity and diversity in one.

Precisely because Rāmānuja makes his philosophy a philosophy of relations, he is in a better position than any Advaitin to solve the perennial philosophical problem of the one and the many. He safeguards both one and many, true to the spirit of a healthy realism, without denying the many for the sake of affirming the one, and also without denying the one for the sake of affirming the many. This is not a rejection of the Vedantic tradition, because he makes the many the predicate of the one. Thus, we see that the problem of the one and the many is seen by Rāmānuja, not a rejection of the Vedantic tradition, because he makes the many the predicate of the one. Thus, we see that the problem of the one and the many is seen by Rāmānuja, not in their opposition, but in their marvelous complementarity. Hence, his metaphysics is non-dualistic without ceasing to be either realistic or pluralistic. The unique relation of difference, unity and mutuality between Brahman *cit* and *acit* is *aprthak-siddhi* relation. Needless to say, in order to speak of this relation, Rāmānuja had to argue for the concept of relation itself against the Advaitin. The fuller implications of the justification come to him from his conception of Brahman as the living reality with a creative urge. While Advaitin would be averse to speak of any synthesis in Brahman, Rāmānuja has no hesitation to speak of Brahman as a synthesis which does not deny differentiations; rather Brahman expresses itself through its differentiation only; Brahman is a totality without negating its parts; it is a substance without negating its attributes; it is a ground without negating its consequent; it is an integrity without negating all that makes for its integralness. Within its concrete being contain all the finite, as though the latter are the moments of its own existence. What is more, the finite is not a mere embellishment to the Infinite, for through them the latter transcends its own abstract character. Thus, to Rāmānuja, reality is a complex whole that at once

includes both unity and diversity, the oneness and the manyness, without destroying its own unicity or uniqueness.

The diversity of manyness constitutes the modes of Brahman's all inclusive reality. The modes are different from Brahman, yet they do not create any division within the integrality of his being, as Brahman is said to realize its synthetic character through the modes. The latter, on their part, do not have a distinctive existence of their own, they rather make for the 'adjectives', or modes, of the former, thus vouching for the fact that they cannot be understood without reference to Brahman, their substance. The mutuality then between the substance and the modes is complete without any contradiction between the unity and the plurality. Both are safeguarded by *aprthak-siddhi* relation. Rāmānuja's rejection of an absolutistic principle of bare identity and the affirmation of a living principle of differentiation at the very heart of identity are made possible on the basis of *samānādhikarānya*. The principle of *samānādhikarānya* makes for the co-existence of unity and diversity and their intimate relation to each other. The two are distinct and, yet not contradictories and they can be reconciled in a synthetic unity.

It may be of some interest for us here to note that the acceptance or the rejection of the concept of difference introduces not only different approaches to reality but also different modes of thinking itself. The principal law of thinking to Advaitin is the law of identity, which in its strict application, would read as 'being is being'. In its contradictory aspect, now, being and non-being are mutually exclusive. Since Brahman alone is real, everything that is thought to be real must be 'false' or non-being. Therefore, the being that is asserted is itself without any other being within or without. Rāmānuja, on the contrary, would have nothing against a principal law of thinking as identity, but it is not a bare identity. It is an identity that does not cancel within itself distinctions. It is not the contradiction of being and non-being that Rāmānuja is, interested in; it is

rather the unity of being in which the oppositions or distinctions are assimilated. He would admit within the dialectics of thought the overcoming of thesis and antithesis in an organic unity, yet not as Hegel would think. Rāmānuja thinks that it is the tendency of thought to move from abstract to concrete; therefore thought is to make the bare indeterminate cognition into determinate and concrete. Rāmānuja therefore assigns the thought the tasks of building up a concrete world of knowledge, in which all the parts are unified in a system. In asserting the principal law of thought as unity (not so much identity), while he is different from Advaitin, he is also different from Hegel, in so far as he refuses to recognize *contradiction* as a law of thought, so very vital to the Hegelian dialectics. Rāmānuja would contend that thought thinks in distinctions, and not in contradictions. The necessity of thought is to build up a unity of system, and in that system parts are seen in the whole both in their identity and distinctions. Therefore when we perceive the whole, we perceive a synthesized identity of existence; therefore it is not an abstract but concrete identity.

References

1. Vimuktātman, a great exponent of Advaita, advances at the beginning of his work, *Iṣṭha-siddhi*, some arguments to show the enigmatic nature of the subject-object relation.
2. See his *Brahmasiddhi*.

Relation of Identity and Verbal Cognition

Whenever one tries to discuss the issue of language and grammar from the Nyāya point of view, one cannot overlook Gadādhara's *Vyutpattivādah*.¹ ~~For~~ In this article my attempt is to explain Gadādhara's view regarding the verbal cognition generated by identity (Abhedānvayabodha) in some limited number of cases. The view of course has been expressed in highly technical Sanskrit language. I have tried to illuminate the Nyāya view in simple English so that those who have interest in this field, and know English but are not conversant in Sanskrit can feel at home in this field.²

With the help of Akāmksā of different terms, we try to grasp or realize the relation of the referents signified by different terms of a sentence that generates verbal cognition. The relation may be of different types and accordingly the nature of verbal cognition may vary. If the relation is that of identity then the verbal cognition is called verbal cognition generated by identity (*Abhedānvayabodha*). If the relation is that of non-identity, then the verbal cognition is called verbal cognition generated by non-identity (*Bhedānvayabodha*). For example, in the sentence '*nīlah ghatah*' ("the jar is blue) the referents of '*nīla*' and '*ghata*' are related by the relation of identity and the verbal cognition generated by this sentence is verbal cognition generated by identity (*Abhedānvayabodha*). Again, suppose there is the sentence '*ghatah na patah*' ("the jar is not cloth"). Here the referent of '*pata*' is related with the referent of '*na*' by the relation of *pratiyogitva*. Again, the referent of 'na' would be related with the referent of '*ghata*' by the relation of *āsryatva*. So the verbal cognition generated from this sentence is not verbal cognition generated by identity but a piece of verbal cognition generated by non-identity (*Bhedānvayabodha*).

Here we will discuss about *Abhedānvayabodha*. The first question which would arise in this case runs thus – where do we find this relation of identity ? In other words, is there any mark of indication which prompts us to realize that the relation of identity is operative in certain cases ? It has been suggested that whenever two *prātipadikas* have the same case-ending , then it can be said that the relation of identity persists among the referents of them.³ Again when two *prātipadikas* are compounded via samāsa then the referent of the second *prātipadika* is related with the referent of the first *prātipadika* by the relation of identity.⁴

Gadādhara, in his *Vyutpattivādah*, has said “*abhedeśca prātipadikārhe svasamānavibhaktikena svāvyavahitapūrvavartinā ca padenopasthāpitasyaiva samsargamaryādayā bhāsate* ;⁵ Suppose there is a sentence - ‘*nīlah ghatah*’ (‘the jar is blue’). Here in the Sanskrit sentence ‘*nīla*’ and ‘*ghata*’ are related by the relation of identity; Gadādhara has used the word ‘*svasamānavibhaktika*’ in the criterion and it requires explication. Before we start giving the analysis as proposed by Gadādhara, let us say something about *viśiṣṭabuddhi* or qualified cognition. In the case of any *viśiṣṭabuddhi*, there is a *viśeṣya* i.e, which is to be qualified, there is a *prāk-Gadādhara*, i.e., the qualifier and there of course is the *sambandha* or relation between them. Though *viśeṣya* and *prakāra* are generally expressed by some terms which constitute the sentence generating *viśiṣṭabuddhi*, *sambandha* usually is not expressed by any term of the sentence producing verbal cognition. Another two notions are related with the notion of *sambandha*. We often say that something (say, b) is related with some other thing (say, a). For example, if a jar is on the table, we can express it in this way – “the jar is related (or has relation) with the table.” Here jar (b) is called the *pratiyogin* and the table (a) is called the *anyogin* of the relation. The term ‘*Sva*’ here means the *anyogin* of the *sambandha* of the *viśiṣṭabuddhi* expressed by a particular sentence which is the same as the *viśiṣṭabuddhi*. The

term which expresses *viśeṣya* is accompanied by certain case-ending. The term which is accompanied by the same type of case-ending as that of a *viśeṣya* is meant by ‘*svasmānvibhaktika*’ here.⁶ Let us revert to the example already stated, viz., “*nīlah ghataḥ*” (the jar is blue). In the previous sentence ‘*nīla*’ is the term, which is accompanied by the same type of case-ending as that of ‘*ghata*’. Therefore, it is ‘*svasmānvibhaktika*’. The referent of the term ‘*ghata*’ and the referent of the term ‘*nīla*’ are related with each other by the relation of identity and we may consider the verbal cognition resulting from ‘*nīla ghataḥ*’ as a verbal cognition generated by identity. Though there is an attempt to explain the whole thing very clearly, there are many knots which need to be disentagled. Someone may vary legitimately ask what is exactly meant by the same type (i.e. *sajātiya*) of case-ending. In this particular case of a case-ending we may say that the feature which distinguishes one kind of *vibhakti* from another constitutes the character of being *sajātiya*.⁷ *Sajātiya* for the first case-ending i.e. *prathamātva*.⁸ it does not matter whether it varies according to the *vacana* or not. For example – suppose there is an application like this, “*Vedāḥ pramāṇam*” (the Vedas are proof). Here the same case-ending, viz., the first case-ending has been used after ‘*Veda*’ and after ‘*pramāṇa*’. But after ‘*Veda*’ it indicates plurality and after ‘*pramāṇa*’ it indicates singularity. Nevertheless the referent of ‘*Veda*’ and the referent of ‘*pramāṇa*’ are undoubtedly related by the relation of identity and the verbal cognition resulting from this is a verbal cognition generated by identity. *Sajātiya* may be analysed in another way. It may be said that the *sajātiya* is nothing but the feature of being presented in the same order (*samānānupūrvikatva*). For example, in the case of ‘*nīlah ghataḥ*’, ‘*ghataḥ*’ is the combination of ‘*ghata*’ and ‘*su*’. Similarly ‘*nīlah*’ is the combination of ‘*nīla*’ and ‘*su*’. As such, ‘*nīla*’ and ‘*ghataḥ*’ both are followed by ‘*su*’. So they have the same order. Hence, the referent of ‘*nīla*’ and the referent of ‘*ghata*’ are related by the relation of identity. This second analysis, however, is challenged. Because in the sentence, “*Vedāḥ pramaṇam*” we know that the referent of

‘Veda’ and the referent of ‘pramāṇa’ are related by the relation of identity, though they do not have the same order. ‘Veda’ is followed by ‘jas’, whereas ‘pramāṇa’ is followed by ‘su’. We can supply another example, “śātaim brāhmāṇāh” (there are hundred Brahmins). This application is absolutely right and according to the Sanskrit linguists the referent of ‘śāta’ and the referent of ‘brāhmāṇa’ are related by the relation of identity. But ‘śāta’ is followed by singularity, whereas ‘brāhmaṇā’ is followed by plurality. How is it possible? Answer to this type of examples runs thus. It is a rule in Sanskrit grammar that the numbers starting from twenty (20) should always be followed by singularity. The opponents may argue that though this type of cases can be dealt with, the problem still remains in the examples like ‘Vedāh pramāṇam’.⁹ Therefore, it can not be said that ‘sājātya’ means *samanānupūrvikatva* or words used in the same order. Can we not offer another solution by stating that as long as the *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa* are of the same *linga*,¹⁰ they will have the same *vacana* (i.e. both will be accompanied by, singularity or plurality, etc.)? In the case of “Vedāh pramāṇam” *Veda* is *pumlinga* whereas *pramāṇa* is *klībalinga*. Therefore, they do not have the same *vacana*. But this solution is not fruitful in many other cases. An example from *Kāvyaṣṭakāvyākhyā* can be cited in this regard – “trayah samuditāḥ hetuh” – (It purports to say that in order to create a successful *kāvya*, one has to have the capacity to write, efficiency and knowledge of *lokavyavahāra* i.e. popular usage/common sense). Here in this case ‘hetu’ is accompanied by singularity, but ‘samuditā’ is accompanied by plurality though both of them have the same *linga*. Therefore, the former solution cannot be accepted. To solve the above complication, the following may be a suggestion. The speaker complication, the following may be a suggestion. The speaker intends to communicate singularity or plurality, etc. by using the case-ending along with the term indicating *viśeṣya*. If it is not required that the case-ending with the *viśeṣaṇa* would indicate something contrary to that of the *viśeṣya*, then the same *vacana* is used even if the *lingas* differ. It all depends on

the intention of the speaker. We have already mentioned the case of “*Vedāh pramāṇam*”. Here the *viśeṣya* ‘*Veda*’ is accompanied by a case-ending indicating plurality. But the speaker intends to communicate that the *prāmāṇya* of all the Vedas is one. Therefore, case-ending indicating singularity has been attached to ‘*pramāṇa*’. There are four Vedas. So, the case-ending showing plurality has been used with the word ‘*Veda*’. Therefore, though the case-ending differs in the case of *viśeṣya* and *viśeṣaṇa*, this type of application is permissible in Sanskrit literature. According to the new criterion, the speaker intends to convey something by the case-ending attached to the subject term. If there is no need to mention a different number then the case-ending attached with the qualifier-term remains the same as that of the subject-term and indicates the same number. But if the speaker’s intention is otherwise, then the case-ending attached to the qualifier-term may be different. *Linga* may be different, nevertheless *vacana* remains the same, if the speaker’s intention is so.¹¹ In the case of “*Vedāh pramāṇam*” the *vacana* varies, and singularity is attached with ‘*pramāṇa*’ whereas plurality is attached with ‘*Veda*’. Actually the speaker intends to communicate that though there are many Vedas the *prāmāṇya* of Veda is one, and not many. This is the reason why different *vacanas* have been applied. Similar argument will be there in the case of “*śataṁ brāhmanāḥ*”, where plurality is attached with ‘*brāhmanā*’ and singularity is attached with ‘*śata*’. The term ‘hundred’ (‘*śata*’) in this context is not used severally, but collectively. For that reason a singular case-ending is attached with ‘*śata*’.

An objection may be raised against “*Vedah pramaṇām*”. *Prāmāṇya* is different in different *śabdās*. Then how is it the case that Vedas, which are concatenation of different *śabdās* have one and only one *prāmāṇya*? It may be answered that the character of being a word or wordness (*śabdatva*) is same in all the words and *prāmāṇya* which is one, is attached to that. This solution, however, is entirely provisional as it invites a serious problem. We know that in

the case of verbal cognition the objects indicated by different words of a sentence become related to generate verbal cognition. But if *prāmānya* is related with *śabdatva* then instead of resorting to the relation between different objects, an attempt is made to establish a relation between an object (*padārtha*) indicated by one word and limiter of the object (*padārthatāvachhedaka*) of the object indicated by another word. That is against *Nyāya* convention. To solve this problem let us take help of another example – “*sampanno vrīhiḥ*”. Here though ‘*vrīhi*’ is singular, the speaker’s intention is to indicate that there are many *vrīhis*. But this explanation does not help to remove the difficulty present in the former case. Therefore, another solution is proposed and accepted. A special relationship has been sought for between singularity (*ekatva*) and ‘*vrīhi*’. The *prakṛti* or root of this case-ending is ‘*vrīhi*’. The limiter or *avacchedaka* of that *vrīhi* is *vrīhitva*. This is one in number. *Ekatva* is related with *vrīhi*, which is the locus of *vrīhitva*. It may be questioned as to why *ekatva* and *vrīhitva* would not be related. We remember a rule regarding verbal cognition, if we are to answer this question. It is necessary that the objects, which are to be related in a piece of verbal cognition, should have a limiter. For example, in the case of *vrīhi*, we have *vrīhitva* as a limiter. But *vrīhitva* itself has no such limiter, at least in this case, because the universal *vrīhitva* has not been expressed by any word here and it is a dictum of the *Nyāya* philosophy that a universal, which is not expressed explicitly is to be apprehended as such and without being qualified by any other property.¹² Therefore, *ekatva* is to be related with *vrīhi* by special relation. The solution accepted in the case of “*sampannāḥ vrīhiḥ*” can be resorted to in the case of “*Vedāḥ pramāṇam*” where the same sort of problem arose. *Pramāṇatva* or *prāmānya* has no limiter, as it is not expressed by any word. Therefore, *pramāṇatva* should be related with the singularity indicated by the case ending after ‘*pramāṇa*’.

The solution suggested above does not seem to be acceptable to many. They propose an alternative. Let us explain it with the help of a concrete example like, “*sampannāh vr̄ihih*”. It has been suggested that the case-ending attached to ‘*vr̄ihi*’ does not indicate single singularity, but many. Different singularities are attached to the individual *vr̄ihis*. It is absolutely unnecessary to think that *vr̄ihitva* becomes related with *ekatva*. If this alternative be accepted, we do not have to go against the general rule that *padārtha* should be related with *padārtha* in the case of verbal cognition. Gadādhara Bhattācharya, however, does not agree with this view. He has argued that the case-ending attached to *vr̄ihi* or *pramāṇa* does not indicate simple singularity. Here singularity means technically ‘*svasajātīyaniṣṭha-bhedapratiyogitānavacchedakā*.’ Explained in terms of ordinary language, it indicates that there is no other thing of its own kind. Let imagine the situation that there are two jars on the floor. The singularity attached to jar 1 is different from the singularity attached to jar 2. The singularity or *ekatva* of jar 1 is the limiter of the *pratiyogitā* of the negation residing in jar 2. (Here the negation is the negation of *ekatva* related with jar 1). If there were only one jar, then *ekatva* attached to it could not be the limiter of the *pratiyogitā* etc., like the *ekatva* of jar. Therefore, understood in the manner of Gadādhara, ‘*ekatva*’ means *dvitīyarahitva*, i.e., which has no second of its kind or which is unique.¹³ And therefore, if *ekatva* is what is unique, then it cannot be many. Consequently, it is not possible to relate different *ekatvas* with different *vr̄ihis*. So, the explanation offered before should be restored here.

Now, when we were trying to indicate when and where the relation of identity would hold, we have used the term ‘*svasamānavibhaktika*’ (i.e. having the same kind of case-ending as its own) and explained it. A relation of identity can be established between the referents of two terms if the same kind of case-ending is attached to both. Suppose, there is a sentence, “*dadhi sundaram*”. A

relation of identity should hold between *dadhi* and *sundara*. But the requirement for this is that the terms '*dadhi*' and '*sundara*' should have the same case-ending. But in this case no case-ending is attached to *dadhi*, which is the *viśeṣya* in the sentence, "*dadhi sundaram*". Similar is the case with "*viśeṣya*" in the sentence, "*dadhi sundaram*". Similar is the case with "*idam dadhi*", where *dadhi* is considered to be *viśesana*. Here also the relation of identity holds between *idam* and *dadhi*; but no case-ending is attached to '*dadhi*'. In fact in both the cases the case-ending has been abolished according to the rule of grammar. What should be the reading of '*svasamānavibhaktika*' in this case? It has been suggested that here we should search or look for the abolished case-ending and we should imagine that the case-ending has actually been abolished.

Thus, Gadādhara has pushed the discussion to new and newer cases suggesting novel solutions. We have selected a very little portion of his thinking and tried to explain that. His view regarding the informative and non-informative identity statements may be compared with that of Frege's view. These two great men do not think alike. However, we, the common people, are benefited by every piece of thinking they did.

References

1. M. Hiriyanna, *The Essentials of Indian Philosophy*, George Allen & Unwin India Pvt. Ltd., 1949, p. 177.
 2. V.S.Apte, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*; Motilal Banarasi Dass, 1975.
 3. Not in the Kantian but in an absolutistic sense.
 4. Bhattacharya, Gadadhara. *Vyutpattivādah* (Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Varanasi, 1973).
 4. *Ākāṃkṣā – With Special Reference to Navya Nyāya System*, by Brinda Sen, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata – 6, 2004).
1. In order to understand what is a *prātipadika*, we would have to have some conception of Sanskrit grammar. According to the Sanskrit grammarians, *sārthaka* (meaningful) terms can be of three kinds.

(i) *prakrit* of the root-word.

(ii) *Pratyaya* and

(iii) *nipāta*

Prakrita-pratyayaścaiva nipātaśceti sā tridhā – Jadadīśa Tarkālamkāra, *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* (The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi – 1, 1973) p. 29.

Under the head *napāta*, fall words like preposition and particle, e.g., *na* (no.) *tu* (but), *ca* (and), etc. Under the head *pratyaya*, fall words like case-endings, nominal suffixes and verbal suffixes. And under the head *prakrit* fall the root-words. In Sanskrit, there are two sorts of root-word (1) *nāma* or *prātipadika* i.e., root words that are not verbs, i.e. nouns, e.g. 'ghata' (jar) and (2) *dhātu* or the crude form of a substantive is nothing but a noun at its inflected state, has been suggested in *Sabadaśaktiprakāśikā* of

Jagadīśā “*prakṛtin vibhajate - niruktaprakṛtirdhedhā nāmadhātuprabhedatah/yat prātipadikam proktam tannamno nātiricyate..* (p. 68) Nominal suffixes are added with pratipadikas.

2. “The word *samāsa* means abridgement (*samāsana*) of two or more words into one (*ekapadibhṛva*). Panini does not prove any definition of *samāsa* however, lays bare the fundamental principles involved in the process of the said abridgement and the result thereof. He thereby indicates the nature of *samasa*. The sutra reads, ‘*samarthah padavidhih*’ – (Pāṇini II I:)” – that is “Any two or more words do not form a compound. The words involved are to be mutually connected”. When thus combined, the meanings of the component words involved no longer remain liable to independent comprehension. Only in the combined sense the compounded form is to be used. *Samāsa* therefore, has two aspects, viz. mutually connected words (*vigraha*) likely to develop into a single syntactical unit and the said syntactical unit (*vr̥tti*) as well. The mutually connected words prior to the formation of a syntactical unit are arranged in the form of a sentence (*vākya*), known as the analysis of compound (*vigrahavākya* or *vyāsavākya*). In other words, the sentence that conveys the meaning of a syntactical unit (*vr̥tti*) is called the sentence of analysis and the syntactical unit (*vr̥tti*) is otherwise known as *padavidhi*”. (K.N.Chatterjee, *Word and its Meaning - A New Perspective* (Chawkhambha Orientalia, Varanasi – 90) pp. 171-74). An example of *samāsa* : the compound form *rājapurūṣa* (*rājñah puruṣah*) conveys the combined sense of a man under a king and not of a king or man severally.

3. Bhattacharya, Gadadhara, *Vyutpattivādah*, (Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Varanasi – 1973, p. 9.

4. *svasamānavibhaktikatvam ca, svaprakṛṭavibhaktisājātya-vibhaktikatvam, Ibid, p.11.*
5. There are 21 name case-endings in Sanskrit language, which can accompany a noun, e.g. su, au, jas, etc. Among these case-endings the first there are called the first case-ending. The 4th, 5th and 6th are called the second case ending etc. There are total seven types of case-endings . Each is a group of three – the first indicating singularity (*ekavacana*), the second indicating duality (*dvivacana*) and the girst indicating plurality (*bahuvacana*). So it is clear from this that the case-ending may be the same though the *vacana* may vary.
6. *Sājātyam ca vibhaktivibhājakaprathamātvādinā, Ibid., p. 11.*
7. *nanu vimśatyādyāḥ śadaikatve ityūśāsanāt śatam brahmaṇā ityādeh sādhutvepi vedāḥ pramāṇamityādayaḥ katham prayogāḥ – Ibid, p. 16.*
8. 'Linga' can be approximately translated as gender. This is classified in Sanskrit grammar into three types – *pum, stri* and *kliba*.
9. *Yatra viśeṣyavācakapadottarvibhaktitāparyaviṣayasamkhyāvairuddha-samkhyāyāḥ, Ibid. p.18.*
10. *Yadi ca svāśrayaprakṛtyarthatāvachchedakavatvaśmbandhena prakṛtyarthe evaikatvānvayah, vṛihitvajāteh svarūpata vṛihyādipadaśakyatāvachchedakatayā anvayitāvachchedakarūpena in nupasthitestatrapadārthāntarasyānvayanupapatteriti manyate ... Ibid, p.35.*
11. *Yatahsvasajātyaniṣhabhedapratiyogitānavachchedakaikatvarūpasajany advittayarahitatvameka vacanārthaḥ natvekatvamātram, Ibid, p. 35.*

12. "Some Problems regarding the identity statements: in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Poona, Volume XIII, Nos. 3 and 4, July-Sept. and Oct-Dec., 86, pp. 271-288.

CHAPTER V

SOME CRITICAL AND EVALUATIVE REMARKS

First, the concept of identity between *upamāna* (object with which something is imposed) and *upameya* (the object compared) has been accepted in order to show sometimes the incomparability (*atulanīyatva*) of the object. In such cases *Upamāna* is accepted as *Upamāna* due to not having any other object which is comparable to the object (i.e. a jar is a jar – *ghaṭo ghaṭah*). In this case no distinction is admitted between these two – a jar placed as *upameya* and the same placed as *upamāna*. Though the object is the same existing in the place of *upamāna* and *upameya*, there is a hypothetical *bheda* or distinction between two. The logic behind such deliberation lies on the fact that a particular object is indirectly described as having no object comparable to it. The comparison, though not necessary, is sometimes done to express its complete identity with itself. That is why, it is called *āhārya* or intentional. Though a hypothetical comparison is intentional, it is illusory. This illusory cognition leads us to the attainment of right cognition and hence it may be treated as having some instrumental value. When a jar is intentionally described as a jar, there is no illusion, because both *upamāna* and *upameya* refer to the same object and the ‘copula’ is the indicator of their identity. It is, to some extent, deliberate from the speaker’s standpoint. On the other hand, if an individual thinks that the face is identified with the moon (*mukhacandra*), there is also the strongest desire of the speaker to describe it in such a way. In such an expression some identity between them from the standpoint of glamour (*Iāvanya*) in them. One may could raise a question : in the former case (a jar = a jar) there is an absolute identity while in the latter case (face = moon), there is a partial identity, because in such cases the *upameya* is not identical with the *upamāna* in all aspects, but they are similar only in terms of glamour, which may be described as a partial identity. In

order to have a logical clarification we may refer here to Frege, a celebrated Western Logician, who makes the distinction between sense and reference of a proper name in order to deal with a puzzle in identity. Let us ask : is identity really a relation ? If it is true, is it related between objects or between names or sign of objects ? If the former case is true, the statement $a=b$, is equivalent to the statement ' $a=a$ ', because 'a' and 'b' are two names of the same object like *vyāghra is vyāghra* is a tautology and *'śārdula is a vyāghra* is informative. Frege has formulated the sentence showing identity between two in the following manner. 'The Morning star is the Evening star'. The truth of the above sentence is moon from the astronomical discovery. However, Frege is reluctant to accept that identity relation remains between names or signs of objects because in such a case ' $a=b$ ' would signify that the names 'a' and 'b' stand for the same thing.

The above-mentioned standpoint of Frege can be explained further in the following ways. Because two names 'a' for a and 'b' for b work on the basis of convention. However, the treatment 'The Morning star = the Evening Star' provides us some information about the planet venus but not arbitrary use of the names. The cognitive difference between the two identity statements: 'The Morning star = Evening star' and "The Morning Star is the Morning Star' is due to Frege's distinction between sense and reference of proper names, the reference of an expression is the referent or the object named or denoted by it while the sense of the expression is mode of presentation. In case of 'the Morning Star is the Morning Star' the reference of 'the Morning Star' is the planet Venus and the sense of 'the Morning Star' is the mode of presentation in the form of the property of shining in the sky.

Due to the tautological character of the sentence no information is gained. However, the Morning Star – the Evening Star' is informative because of the difference in the senses though the referent is the same planet venus.'

In Indian Philosophy particularly in *Navya Nyāya* the concept of identity is always informative unlike Frege. Because there is no tautology in such cases in *Navya Nyāya*. Both the expressions – ‘ghaṭo ghaṭah’ and *ghaṭah kalaśah* would have to be taken as connected with identity relation due to having some informative power in both of them. If they had no information power, how would we know that they are connected with the relation of identity or an expression characterized by the *Tādātmyā* relation (*tādatmyasambandhā - vaccinna*) ?

Secondly, it has already been said earlier that the relation of identity as found in the case of metaphor (*rūpaka*) or simile (*upamā*) etc. is in the sense of similarity. When ‘face’ is described as moon by the term ‘*mukhacandra*’, the face is identified with the moon. It is a kind of deliberate identification, which is called *āhārya*. When we deliberately superimpose something on something inspite of knowing their complete distinction, it is called *āhārya* cognition which is defined as follows : ‘*vādhakālīnecchāprajoyatvam āhāryam*’ i.e. a deliberate superimposition (of some object on some other object) inspite of knowing that it is contradictory is called *āhāryatva*. That is, though it is known by an individual that a face can never be the moon, he feels a strong intention to impose an identity between face and moon. Being induced by strong will (*icchāprajoyiya*) he identifies deliberately, though he knows very well from the common sense level that these can never be identical. The concept of *Tarkā* is also based on this deliberate superimposition called *āhārya*- cognitions are illusory from the epistemic point of view, yet they are sometimes inevitable. ^{if it is said that had I been a bird, I would have} flown from here to there, it is a kind of *āhārya*-cognition as it remains in the domain ^{of} imagination.³ But looking towards our practical life we know very well that we are not birds and hence cannot fly from one place to another. The hypothetical *āhārya* –cognition, though not *pramā* (valid cognition) itself, can conjoin a person to know something through it. In the same way, it can be said that, though hypothetically it is accepted the identity between face and the

moon, they are not the same from the practical standpoint. Hence, it is known that the identity is not absolute, but partial (i.e. in the sense of similarity). From the *āhārya*-cognition of identity, we at least attain the cognition of similarity between the two. Hence, *āhārya*-cognition, though *apramā* or illusory, can help us to attain the cognition of similarity i.e. glamour or *lāvanya* in the case of face and the moon. That is why, *āhārya*-cognitions are said by the Naiyāyikas as promoter to *pramāṇa*, though not *pramā* itself (*pramāṇānāmanugrāhakah*).⁴ From this we may draw our conclusion that such type of identity which is called *āhārya* has got some philosophical and methodological value in our life.

Thirdly, there are various types of identity-absolute and partial. In the later case we find the evidence of great genius of our rhetoricians. A partial identity involves various stages or steps or proportions through which different rhetories or *alamkāras* come into being as pointed out earlier. If a poet thinks that there is an absolute identity between face and the moon having no cognition of distinction, it gives rise to *rūpaka* or metaphor. If it is said that the face is not the Moon, but like the moon, the term 'rūpa' makes them separated and hence it cannot be said that face is the moon, but is like the moon. It entails that some distance is maintained though having *sādharmya* (similarity) between them. If a poet wants to emphasise on more distance between the face and the moon, he will use *utprekṣā*. At this time the face will be described as the moon, but between their identity there is some suspicion expressed through the term 'iva' (i.e. as if). These subtle distinctions between *upameya* and *upamāna* lead to various types of *alamkāra*, which shows the talent of Indian thinkers. From this we can easily assume the mental status, which is connected to analyticity of their argument. Hence in partial identity we find various forms formulated keeping various situations in view in our society. It has enormously enriched our literature and logical structure of our common languages also.

Fourthly, the expression of identity is the result of an individual's intention. In Indian tradition an individual is always given an autonomy of expression. If he thinks that something is incomparable with other thing, he is given freedom to use a proposition showing identity of something with itself. If the speaker desires to say that a face is like the moon, or same as moon or identical with the moon, he is allowed to superimpose the properties of the moon on 'face'. Because, a human being's linguistic expression presupposes some hidden intention behind it. This intention is always honoured in our tradition. That is why, a speaker's intention called *tātparya* is taken as one of the criteria of a sentence for being meaningful. The relations like identity, self-linking (*svarūpa*) etc are invented by the speakers after keeping some purpose in view or to express some facts very precisely and very logically. Each and every utterance of a sentence by a human being has got some intention behind it, as it has got some capacity to indicate its understanding (*tatpratīṭijananayogyatā*).⁵ The Grammarians have also admitted an individuals autonomy of expression when they accept *vivakṣā* (will to speak) as the cause of expression. Now a question may be raised, how far can we exercise our freedom. Can we exercise our full freedom ? Can we say whatever we wish ? In reply, it can be said that it is purely impossible to say anything to refer anything. If it would be the case, there would not have been any rules regarding the use of language. In such a way no communication in our society is not possible leading to a chaotic situation in the society. No dictionary or lexical meaning would not have been appropriate in the use, which is not desirable due to having some undesirable consequences in our life. Hence, an individual will have an autonomy of will after keeping the science of sound and meaning in view. If a speaker uses the term 'horse', it would not mean 'cow', because the science of word and meaning does not permit. But by the term 'Gangā' one could mean 'the bank of the 'Ganga' by secondary implication if a speaker wants to do. In the same way, we can interpret a sentence or words if we wish. But this interpretation is

dependent. ~~On~~^{on} some conditions like the incomprehensibility of the primary meaning, context (*prakaraṇa*) etc. This meaning interpreted as per the will of the speaker is not arbitrary, but depending on various factors. That is why, the will to speak or *vivakṣā* does not give scope a gentleman to say whatever he wants without considering the context etc. It can be said that a man can use the sentence '*Sthālī pacati*' (a pot cooks) though it is not grammatically correct. The grammatically correct use is *sthālyā pacati* with instrumental case-ending etc can be justified as per the will of the speaker. But the radical change of the meaning out of *vivakṣā* is not admissible, which is beautifully explained through the following metaphor. '*Vivakṣā*' has to be taken as a housewife (*kūlabadhū*) who can exert her freedom with the specified domain after maintaining the rules of the family. She can be *kūlabadhū* but not *kūlaṭa* who does not maintain the rules of a family and exerts her freedom which comes under *svecchācarā* i.e. action whatever she wants without any bindings. Such a *kulaṭā* is not desirable at all. Hence, such type of will to speak is not also desirable.

In Indian tradition the phenomenon of metaphor represents the absolute identity between two objects *upamāna* and *upameya*. This *alamkāra* called *rūpaka* can be translated as metaphor. The imposition of identity (*abhedāropa*) between the object considered as well-standard (*upamāna*) and the subject of description (*upameya*) is called *rūpaka*. It remains in the representation of the subject of description, which is not concealed, as identified with another well known standard (*Rūpakamrūpitāropād viṣaye nirapahnave*).⁶ The subject is an entity on which something is superimposed. On the other hand, *viṣaya* is the subject superimposed on another i.e. moon which is a *viṣaya* as it is imposed on *face*. In other words, *vis^aya* or *up^uameya* is 'face' which is identical with the 'moon'. In this case the distinction between these is not concealed inspite of excessive similarity. The ascription of the identification between two objects inspite of not concealing their difference (*atisāmyāt anapahnutabhedayoh upamānopameyayoh abhedāropah*) is *rūpaka*. Though two objects (face and

the moon) possess different opposite properties and though their distinction is generally known, yet sometimes there is hypothetical ascription of identity in order to show their extreme similarity (*kālpanikābhedāropah*).⁷ In this case there is an identity which is of imaginary type. But when it is said – *ghaṭo ghaṭah*, this identity is of real type. Herein lies the difference between two types of identity.

The present paper deals with Samkara's arguments on refuting *samavāya* as a relation. The Nyāya –Vaiśeṣikas have accepted *samavāya* or inherence as a relation, which persists between a part and whole (*avayava-avayavī*), universal and individual (*jāti-vyakti*), action and locus of action (*kriyā-kriyāvān*), attribute and the locus of attribute (*guṇa-guṇī*), etc. This relation is inseparable (*ayutasiddha*), one and eternal, Samkara, in his *bhāṣya*, has refuted *samavāya* as a relation for various reasons. An attempt will be made to defend the arguments of Samkara and highlight his position. So that *tādātmye* is established.

Śamkara while pointing out some defects against the *asatkāryavāda* is of the opinion that the separate existence of an effect without its cause is not at all possible and hence, it is better to accept the relation of identity (*tādātmya*) between a cause and an effect, substance and quality, etc. due to the lack of distinction between them. To Śamkara *tādātmya* means an internal identity between two objects though they are appeared to be different (*bhedena pratiyamānatve sati abhinnatvam tādātmyam*). In a clay-model, of this, there is an awareness of identity between them so far as clay-model, there is an awareness of identity between them so far as clayness is concerned. Hence, identity marked by distinction (*bhedagarbhitah abheda*).⁸

If the relation of inherence were accepted between two i.e., substance and quality etc., there would arise the defect of *infinite regress* (*anavasthā*) in the following way. If a relation called *samyoga* is accepted between two objects i.e., a pen and a table, it will lead to *anavasthā* or *infinite regress*. One could

logically accept another relation called *anavasthāḥ* or inherence between contact or *samyoga* and table, as contact or *anavasthā* is taken as a quality (*guṇa*) and table as a possessor or quality (*guṇī*). It may again lead us to accept further relation between *samavāya* and another relatum i.e., a table and in this way there arises the defect of *infinite regress (anavasthā)*.⁹ If 'R' is different from both 'a' and 'b' then another relation R₁ will have to be postulated in order to relate R with 'a' and 'b'. Like third man argument it would be tiresomely regressive. This leads to Samkara to argue that there is nothing besides relata and hence, the relation is a null notion.¹⁰

If, on the other hand, the relation of inherence is not at all accepted between cause and effect, quality and substance, etc., they would remain as 'unrelated' or separated (*anabhyupagamyamāne ca vicchedaprasangah*).¹¹

It may be said that inherence or *samavāya*, being a separate relation, can relate the entities without depending on other relation and hence, there is no question of *infinite regress or anavasthā*.¹² In reply, it is said by the Advaitins that contact by virtue of being a relation could relate the entities without depending on in^hference which is not possible, because contact by virtue of being a quality must need inherence or *samavāya*. As there is an awareness of identity between earth and pot, it can be said that an effect i.e., a jar, is existent in the form of a cause i.e., earth or clay, but non-existent in the form of an effect or jar.¹³

The *Vaiśeṣikas* have described inherence (*samavāya*) as an inseparable relation (*ayutasiddhasambandha*). When two entities remain without any separability and locating on each other, they are called *ayutasiddha* or inseparable entity. Between quality and substance, quality is located in the substance being dependent on it and hence, they are *ayutasiddha*. In other words, when an entity exists, it remains as being related with another (*yayoḥ dvayoḥ madhye ekam avinaśyadavaśam aparāśrītam eva avatiṣṭhate tau ayutasiddhau*).

Such a situation is called *ayutasiddha*, which remains between attribute and quality, a part and whole, universal and individual etc.

Śamkara has refuted the notion of *ayutasiddhi*, which is tantamount to the refutation of *samavāya*. He raises a question : what does the term *ayutasiddhatā* mean ? Is it remaining in the same space (*aprthagdeśatā*) or remaining in the same time (*aprthakkālatā*) or having the same nature (*aprthaksvabhāvatvam*)?¹⁴

The first alternative is not tenable. If it is in the form of remaining in the same space, it will go against the conclusion of the *Vaiśeṣikas*. It is accepted by the *Vaiśeṣikas* that the cloth produced from thread remains in the same space occupied by thread, but not in cloth. But the qualities like whiteness, etc. of a cloth are admitted as existing in the cloth, but not in threads. To Kaṇāda, a substance generates another substance and an attribute generates another attribute. This theory fails if the above-mentioned case is taken for consideration. If it were accepted that the qualities like redness, etc. of a cloth remain in a cloth, it would have to be admitted that both attribute (*guṇa*) and substance (*dravya*) remain in the same space (*aprthagdeśatā*). But it will go against the basic presupposition of the *Vaiśeṣikas* that substance generates another substance and attribute generates another attribute. Hence, the first alternative of the meaning of the term *ayutasiddhatā* is not taken for granted.¹⁵

The second interpretation is also not acceptable. If the term *ayutasiddhatā* means the existence of the two entities at the same time (*aprthakkālatā*), the right and left horns of a cow would have to be taken as inseparable (*ayutasiddhā*) due to their simultaneous existence. It would be equally unacceptable to the *Vaiśeṣikas* because between two horns, there is no part and whole (*avayavāvayavi-bhāva*) or attribute and possessor of attribute (*guṇa-guṇībhāva*) relations.¹⁶

The third alternative does not stand in the eye of logic, because if two entities like substance and quality were having same nature, they would not be

taken as different due to their identicality (*tādātmya*). Hence, it is better to accept the relation of identity between these substance and quality.¹⁷

The *Vaiśeṣikas* are of the view that the relation remaining in two separate entities is called *samyoga* (contact) while the relation remaining as inseparable is called *samavāya*. If the existence of an effect with a cause, which always exists before, is taken for granted, the phenomenon of inseparability in the sense of remaining in the same time cannot be accepted. Hence, the view of the *Vaiśeṣikas* is not logical.¹⁸

The *Vaiśeṣikas* may further argue by redefining the term *ayutasiddhi* in the following way. Remaining as an effect in its cause which is *Yutasiddha* during the span of time beginning from its coming into being to just before its destruction is called *ayutasiddhi*. Between the first half of a jar (*kapāla*) and a jar, a jar is an effect which remains in its locus i.e., first half of a jar which is separable from its origination to the pre-destructive stage. Hence, they are called having an inseparable relation (*ayutasiddhasambandha*). Though an effect and a cause are essentially different yet they seem to be identical due to the grace of their inseparability through *samavāya*.¹⁹

In reply, Samkara argues that an effect is a non-existent entity before its relation with a cause. If an effect is a non-existent entity, how can it be related to cause? For, relation is always presupposes the existence of two relata.²⁰ That is why, a peculiar relation called *nirūpita-nirūpaka-bhāva*, a form of self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandh*) has been accepted by the Naiyāyikas between cause and effect. A cause is a determinator (*nirūpaka*) to an effect, which is called determined (*nirūpita*), and hence, there is the existence of the said relation. As the property of being determinator (*nirūpakatva*) is not an inborn one but acquired afterwards, it is a kind of self-linking relation as mentioned above. The main contention of the argument is that an effect cannot exist before its relation

to cause. If an effect is non-existent, it cannot be related to cause, because relation is always *dviṣṭha* (remaining in two).

If it is said that an effect being substantiated as an existent entity is related to its cause, it is also not tenable for the following reason. If an effect is substantiated as an existent entity before its relation to its cause, there cannot be the existence of inseparability, which will lead to contradict their own statement : ‘the conjunction and disjunction do not remain between a cause and an effect due to (*kāraṇayoh samyogavibhāgau na vidyate – Vaiśeṣikasūtra – 7.2.13*).²¹

It may be argued by the *Vaiśeṣikas* that, when a cloth is produced, it remains without any action as per the principle – a produced object remains attributeless and actionless for a single moment. Contact or *samyoga* is produced due to an action existing in both the relata and either of the relata. Due to the absence of action in a newly produced effect, i.e., cloth, there cannot remain the relation of contact between a cloth and thread, its cause. Hence, the relation of *samavāya* has to be accepted between them.

Śamkara replies that contact or *samyoga* is accepted as the relation of actionless newly produced effect with other all-pervading entities like space, etc., but not as *samavāya*. In the like manner, the relation of a cloth with its cause must be taken as contact but not as inherence.²² Apart from this, Śamkara has argued in favour of not accepting both contact and inherence as relations²³ by virtue of being an entity relation has to remain being related to another relation, which needs to be related to another one. In this way, there would be arise the defect of *infinite regress (anavasthā)*. If it is said that relation remains between relata without being dependent or related to these, there does not arise any question of *infinite regress*, but it will lead to another problem. Generally a relation is admitted to relate the relata and to regulate them. If it is accepted that a relation being unrelated to the relata can relate them and regulate them, this work of regulation may be performed by indifferent objects like jar, cloth, etc.;

because they are like contact, etc. unrelated to the relata. If it were accepted that the function of regulation might be performed by something, which is purely unrelated, the contact, which is not connected with horse and car, would have regulated a car, which is not connected with the horse. In the same way, ^tThe relation called inherence being unrelated to jar and its first half would have regulated the cognition of identity between them. These will lead us the land of absurdity. Hence, no relation either in the form of contact or inherence has to be accepted as real.

It may again be argued that from the usages – ‘A jar and a cloth are mutually conjoined’, ‘A cloth is inhered in thread’, etc., it is known that the terms ‘contact’ and ‘inherence’ have been used as distinct from the relata and specific cognitions of these are attained. This is a common experience from which their separate existence from the relata has to be accepted.

Śamkara again argues that the relata like jar, cloth, etc. seem to be relations like contact, etc. due to the change of situation. When two entities (viz. two fingers) are put without gap, it is called contact or *samyoga*. When two entities (viz, a jar and its blue colour) remain absolutely without any gap between them, it is called *samavaya*. Hence, it is the change of situation in the arrangement of the relata which gives rise to contact and inherence and they have no separate existence apart from that of the relata.

It is not possible for the Advaitins to accept relation as a category of real, because they would like to safeguard the absolute oneness of Brahman. Reality is non-relational that is nothing but a pure identity to them. It implies that the whole world is completely non-different from Brahman (*jīvo brahmaiva nāparah*).

The term ‘relation’ literally means ‘bringing together’. Hence , there should be at least two terms if we want to say meaningfully of relation as evidenced from the definition – ‘*dviṣṭhah sambandhah*’. The Advaitins interpret

the relational consciousness as the manifestation of ignorance. This can convince our empirical mind, which make the knowledge of the external world possible. Such cognition cannot reveal the Ultimate Reality, which is relationless and pure consciousness.

It is inherent self-contradiction within the concept of relation that has led the Advaitins to institute the relation of *samavāya*. The relation between the whole and its part are described by Samkara as a case of *tādātmya*, which is based on the relation between Brahman, the relationless ultimate, and its illusory appearance as the world and its non-difference from the self.

The Advaitins attacks the Naiyāyikas on their assertion that the relation called *samavāya* exists between substance and attribute. But the idea of substance cannot exist apart from that of the attributes and the vice-versa leading to the fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). The Naiyāyikas are not in a position to show distinction between two and hence, they are inseparable both in our experience and their existence. That is, they are considered as two aspects of the same entity. Substance expresses itself in attributes, which remain in substance. These two are identical in essence and hence, there is no special relation other than identity (*tādātmya*).

By providing that relations including *samavāya* are unreal the Advaitins want to show that they hold good only for the empirical or phenomenal world. They cannot grasp the transcendental reality which is non-relational and supra-relational. Moreover, relation is not possible without difference (*bheda*) but all differences cannot be accepted within a non-dualistic framework. Brahman is not an object of knowledge; rather it is pure knowledge itself. Hence, Brahman is called knowledge without any content (*aviśayakā*). It cannot be described through a relation and hence, it does not enter into any relational process of knowledge. Brahman-intuition is not cognition in the form of a subject and object relation. It can only be known in a non-relational form. Samkara means

by supra-relational absolute a unity transcending all differences; it is a denial of the ultimacy of all relational forms of experience. Relational experience of the ultimate must be called self-contradictory, because the ultimate would not come under the purview of any relations. The Adaitins think that non-contradiction or *avādhitatva* is one of the criteria of valid cognition or *pramā* as evidenced from the definition of it (*pramā*) given by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra in the form : *pramātvamanadhigatāvādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvam*, i.e., valid cognition is a cognition having some object, which is uncontradicted and unacquired.²⁴ Relational experience is self-contradictory. Relational experience is a development or abstraction from a non-relational whole. The latter is its basis or precondition of the former.

Moreover, there is no eternal object except Brahman, which leads to assert that there is no *samavāya*, which is taken to be eternal (*samavāyāsiddhyābrahmākṣhilaprapāṅcasyāyanityatā.....*).²⁵

It may be argued by the *Nyāya – Vaiśeṣikas* that the question of *infinite regress* (*anavasthā*) on the event of accepting *samavāya* does not arise at all; because to them the relation called inherence (*samavāya*) remains between contact (*samyoga*) and a relation i.e., table no doubt, but no further relation existing between inherence (*samavāya*) and the relatum i.e., table is admissible. For, inherence or *samavāya* has not locus as we find in the case of contact (*samyoga*). Contact being inhered in the two loci becomes the generator of the relation between them. This cannot be true in the case of inherence or *samavāya*. In order to avoid *infinite regress* as in itself, but not in other loci (*samavāyasya nānyā vṛttirasti tasmāt svātmavṛttih*).²⁶ Though quality, action, etc. are taken as relata, they are not at all substrata (*āśraya*) and hence, *samavāya* is stated to be having no locus (*anāśrita*). Moreover, contact of by virtue of being a quality remains in the relatum through inherence, but inherence, not being a quality or

property of an object, cannot be related to something. Hence, there does not arise any question of *infinite regress* (*anavasthā*).

In response to this the Advaitins might say that, though the *Naiyāyikas* have refuted the charge of *Infinite Regress* in this manner, this position also has no solid foundation. If inherence can stay between attribute and a possessor of attribute, etc. in the initial case, why is it not in the other cases? It may appear to us that they have invented this type of logic after thinking the possibility of raising the defect of *anavasthā* by the Advaitins and Buddhists particularly Dharmakīrti. But this point has no solid logical foundation. Though in this way they have tried to make some patchwork, they are completely failure in establishing the eternality and unity of *samavāya*. It has been asked by the opponents that if *samavāya* were one, there would have been the cognition of colour in the air. But such cognition does not at all arise. In response of this the *Vaiśeṣikas* are of the opinion that though the inherence of colour exists in the air, yet this is not cognized due to the lack of the colour, the manifestor of the same (*tatra rūpasamavāyastve 'pi rūpābhāvāt*).²⁷ For when a particular entity is known to be absent, there is a feeling of the characteristic remaining between the ground and the absence, which is eternal. Hence, even the ground where a jar is brought is felt as having the same absence due to the eternality of *samavāya*.²⁸ Though it seems to be true logically, do we really feel the absence of an object when it is brought in a particular locus? An unemployed man may feel the absence of money no doubt, but does he feel the same economic crisis when he gets job? Obviously, it is not. He can at best remember the fact of the absence of money, which is not as real as the feeling of the absence of money due to not having the same at present. Moreover, if this standpoint of the *Naiyāyikas* is taken into account, it may create problem in the case of *prāgabhāva* also which is taken as having an end but no beginning (*anādiḥ sāntah*). There is a prior absence or *prāgabhāva* of a jar before its production. As we have a feeling of absence of a jar in a particular point of time, it would remain as such even after

the jar is produced in the same logic, which is not possible for the Naiyāyikas. For, an effect (*kārya*) is defined by them as an absentee of the prior absence (*kāryam prāgabhāvapratiyogi*). From this, it follows that without the complete annihilation of the prior absence an effect cannot come into being. If the above-mentioned position of the Naiyāyikas is accepted, it must lead us to contradiction. Hence, it is not at all correct to say that the relation called *samavāya* is eternal. In this way, the Advaitins can deny the *samavāya* as a relation. On denial of *samanya* the Advaitins have admitted *Tādātmya* (identity), which will serve the function of *samavāya*.

Some modern writers in their enthusiasm to interpret *tādātmya* as essential identity have come across a certain paradox in the form of 'a blue pot = a pot'. Matilal acknowledges Prof. Ingalls' discovery of the paradox. Potter thinks that such a paradox of essential identity implies a conceptual flaw in the Nyāya framework. I wish to examine the views of these thinkers in the sequel.

On Ingalls (1951 : 69-70) view it is generally accepted in Navya-Nyāya that "a blue pot = a pot". In this proposition the relation '=' subsists between the qualificands expressed on either side of it. The referent of the expression 'pot' is the type or framework that subsists in all knowledges of pots. 'According to Nyaya if one does not accept above identity, one must admit that a blue pot is not a pot.' However, the acceptance of the identity leads to certain difficulties. For instance, it would be an obvious fallacy if a blue pot is always substituted for a pot. On this point potter agrees with Ingalls. In the given identity statement the known entities pot and blue pot are not absolutely identical; consequently 'blue pot' is in applicable to many entities or pots. Ingalls says : "Navya-Naiyayikas are forced to keep constant guard against contradictions arising from (above statement) It is because of this theorem that we have in Navya-Nyāya what at first looks impossible; 'x is essentially

identical with y' used both where we should say 'x contains (or implies) y' and where we should say 'x is contained in (is implied by) y'.

Resolution of the paradox

In this context, I wish to argue that above interpretation does not reflect the spirit of the Navya-Nyaya theory of identity. As I have already pointed out (: 228), both absolute identity and essential identity fit in the Nyaya theory of identity, i.e., to say that Naiyāyikas use 'tādātmya' sometime in the sense of absolute identity and also as essential identity. Above interpretation of essential identity confuses absolute identity with essential identity. According to absolute identity in terms of non-difference (*abheda*), "a blue pot" is necessarily identical with itself; consequently 'the blue pot = the blue pot' or 'This pot = the blue pot'. In this formulation the qualificands are completely identical and there is a satisfaction of the principle of identity that x and y are identical if and only if every attribute of x is an attribute of y and conversely. However, in case of 'a blue pot = pot' there is no satisfaction of the principle of absolute identity, but it satisfies the principle of relative identity (or essential identity) that a blue pot is necessarily a pot or a blue pot is a member of the class of pots. Accordingly essential identity captures the sense of set membership relation between individuals and their class. If *tādātmya* as essential identity is understood as set-membership relation then the following do not hold good; (i) that it would be an obvious fallacy that in a given identity statement 'a blue pot' is always substituted for 'a pot' and (ii) it is impossible that x (a blue pot) implies y (a pot) and conversely. Since (i) and (ii) are false, there is no contradiction in Nyāya theory of essential identity. The falsity of (ii) becomes obvious if the textual position '*na hi bhavati nīlo ghaṭo ghaṭānya iti* ॥ (a blue pot cannot be other than a pot), is properly understood. Accordingly a blue pot implies a pot but a pot does not imply a blue pot. That is to say that x is a blue pot if x has

blueness and potness and y is a pot if y has potness. Thus, potness is common to x (a blue pot) and y (a pot). Therefore x is essentially identical with y.

18 It is to be noted that the notion of tādātmya as absolute identity has been used by Naiyayikas to define an absential notion like mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*) : *anyonyābhāvatvaṁ tādātmya-sambandhā - vaccinna-pratiyogitākābhāvatvaṁ* and it has been noticed by the authors like Ingalls (1951 : 68) and Potter; Oddly enough the characterization of mutual absence is taken for the definition of tādātmya. In case of an absential cognition “pot is not cloth”, there is a denial of an identity between pot and cloth. Accordingly ‘pot is pot’ and ‘cloth is cloth’. Symbolically, $-(x=y)$ if true then $x=x ; y=y$ and $(x=y)$ otherwise $(x=y)$. In other words, if $(x=y)$ is false then $x=y$ is true. Suppose there is denial of relation of essential identity ($=$) instead of absolute identity ($=$) between x and y. In that case the formula ‘ $-(x=y)$, implies that x is not the same as y. But the usual example ‘ghato pato na’ (pot^{is not}cloth) does not fit in the schema of essential identity. Because *anyonyābhāva* implies difference (*bheda*) and the denial of *bheda* is *abheda* or non-difference. *Tādātmya* as absolute identity is a basic form of relation for very object, event and relation etc. are capable of being individuated on the basis of absolute identity.

From the above analysis of the definitions d_1, d_2 it is clear that *tādātmya-sambandha* captures the sense of absolute identity in western logical theory. However, it is necessary to reformulate the definition of *tādātmya* in terms of d_1, d_2 and d_3 for comprehensive understanding. The necessity of reformulation arises in order to synthesise d_1, d_2 and d_3 in order that they function as necessary and sufficient conditions for the relation of identity (*tādātmya-sambandha*). Accordingly x is identical with itself if and only if (i) x is non-different (*abheda*) with itself, (ii) x has uncommon or specific property occurring in x only. (*sva-vṛtty asādhāraṇa-dharmah-eka mātra-vṛttivāṁ*), (iii) x is characterized by self-property (*tadvṛttidharma-viśeṣah*).

In this formulation, (i) appears as a negative condition compared to (ii) and (iii) as positive conditions of identity.

However, in case of relative or essential identity the defining properties are as follows :

X is essentially identical with y if and only if

(i) x is (not completely) different from y, (ii) x and y possess certain common properties (*samānādhikaranyam*), (iii) x is not characterized by self-property (*tadvṛttidharmāviśeṣah*)

3. *Tādātmya-sambandha* as relation of absolute identity having the scheme (x) ($x=x$) provides a basic principle of reason in human discourse. And the principle of identity holds good for all possible worlds, i.e., to say that in every logically possible world no contradiction is involved in it. The law of identity is necessary for the articulations about things relations, properties etc. Aristotle recognized the importance of the concept of identity in the formulation of fundamental logical principles of thought which are involved in every reflective inquiry. Principle of identity as, if anything is A than it is A does not deny the possibility of change and also does not affirm that if something is green then it will always remain green. However, the law of identity does imply that if anything whatsoever in some definite context has some determinate character than it must have that character only.

For comprehensive understanding of the notion of *tādātmya* it is necessary to consider function of *tādātmya* in other systems like Advaita-Vedānta, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Mīmāṃsā systems. In Advaita-vedānta '*tādātmya*' functions as *samavāya-sambandha* of *Nyāya* system, for it holds good between substance and its attribute, universal and particular. Consequently the relation implies inseparable relation between two relata.⁹ In the Advaita theory of

prepositions the concept of tādātmya is implicit. Statements like ‘this is that Devadatta’ and ‘you are that’ (*tattvam asi*) are considered to be identity statements. The referring expressions of the first identity statements. The referring expressions of the first identity statements have the same referent but different modes of presentations as sense (*pravṛtti-nimitta*). That is to say that the referent of the words ‘this’ and ‘that Devadatta’ is the same person.¹⁰ However, the identity statement is informative, hence, it is an instance of essential identity. It is to be noted that the judgement does not imply absolute identity because of incompatible attributes possessed by the same individual at different times at different places. And the only way according to which the judgement is to be interpreted as valid is to understand the identity of the substantive Devadatta by eliminating the contingent (or changing) or accidental attributes of Devadatta. Similarly, the great sentence (mahavakya) ‘*thou art that*’ (*tat tvam asi*) is to be understood where ‘thou’ means an individual consciousness while ‘that’ means universal consciousness and the identity is due to deducting the two incompatible determinants ‘individual’ and ‘universal’ from both sides so that consciousness as the common denominator is the same. But it may be asked whether the relationship between thou, i.e., an individual soul, and that, i.e., cosmic soul is one of identity-indifference? Prof. Hiriyanna (1973 : 369-70) gives an interesting analysis. It may appear that the relation in question is one of identity-in-difference but such a conception will not do because it is against the spirit of Advaitic conception of non-dualistic reality. Hiriyanna illustrates the point by stating that let M and N be two entities between which the relation of identity exists. It may be said that neither M and N are identical nor they are different. It may mean that M is both N and non-N and that N similarly is both M and non-M and in that case, there is the violation of the law of non-contradiction. ‘If M and N do not constitute an identity in difference directly, it may be thought that they do so mediately through features or elements in them and some of which are identical and others are different.

Thus, we may say that M and N possess one or more common features which may be represented by a and, at the same time, exhibit differences represented by x and y respectively. According to this explanation, what is identical is quite distinct, from what is different ; yet the entities, viz., M and N, by virtue of such features, it may be said, are identical with and at the same time, different from each other. Prof. Hiriyanna thinks that such an explanation merely shifts the difficulty to another set of things, because if M and N are characterized by ax and ay respectively, there is no satisfactory explanation regarding, the relation between a thing and its characteristics. The relation between M and ax cannot be one of identity because in that case, the distinction between a and x would vanish, nor can a and x be different from M. So ultimately identity-in-difference is the only relation between these.

However, it is desirable to have some clear idea about identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*) as advocated by Kumarilabhata. According to Kumarila, every dravya is eternal even though its forms or attributes may change. For example, the clay that we see before manufacturing into a jar, at another time into a saucer; it may be red or brown, but in all these transformations the same material persists. Accordingly dravya endures and its modes appear and disappear; consequently things are not self-identical entities excluding all difference. This view implies parinama-vada, according to which the relation between the material cause and effect is one of identity-in-difference (*bhedābheda*). It is also interesting to find out whether Ramanuja like Kumarila advocates *bhedābheda* view, for Ramāṅṅuja does not admit identity of any kind whatsoever between the entities supposed to be distinct and the unity affirmed seems to be of complex whole. Ramanuja's view may be illustrated by taking a common example like a 'blue lotus'. Blueness as a quality is distinct from its substance locus. The complexity of a lotus being blue includes within itself the quality of blueness spoken of as unity. Ramanuja in contradistinction

with Advaitins recognizes a real blueness. In the proposition 'The lotus is blue', the quality of blueness necessarily points to some substance to which it belongs.

The identity that is expressed by the proposition is of the complex nature, because the two terms 'blue' and 'lotus' have distinct meaning but refer to the same substance (~~prākārya~~ *advaita*). Thus, in the alleged identity statement viśeṣaṇas or qualities are also included. According to Ramanuja, the identity of the soul and Brahman is different from Advaitic, identity of soul and Brahman. According to Ramanuja, all this are modes (*prakāra*) or forms of God. Ramanuja's interpretation of Upanisadic maxim 'Tattvam asi' implies that the term 'tvam' which commonly stands for the jīva really points to God as the inner self (*antaryamin*) of jīva and its physical body is like a mode; and the term 'tat' refers to the same God as the cause of the universe. Thus, the identity meant by 'Tattvan asi' is of two complexes namely – God as the indweller of the Jīva and God as the cause of source of the universe. Consequently though the world and the individual souls are real and distinct, the Absolute or God in which they are included is one. However, Advaitins view that the relation between saguna-brahman and its constitutive elements are unique or as *tadatmya* which are not to be characterized as identity-in-difference. Saguna-brahman includes not merely reality but also appearance. The element of reality in it is the ultimate of Advaita or non-duality. According to Advaitic interpretation, the *mahāvākya* like 'Tattva masi' implies the identity pointing to non-dual state of reality. Datta's (1972:324) analysis of the identity statement 'A is identical with B', in the context of Advaitic treatment implies that if *a_m* and *b_m* are the properties of A and B respectively, it is not the case that *a_m* is identical with *b_m* because *a* and *b* are different determinants; and after the sublation of 'a' and 'b' the identity in respect of 'm' alone is asserted. Consequently such identity statements are called as akhandārthakavāykas; such sentences are about the existence of a single content. But in case of ordinary judgements one content is

applied to another content or two different elements are related to each other. In case of every judgement having the forms 's is p', p i.e., predicate is referred to subjects' and normally such prepositions are called categorical propositions. But there are also other types of propositions which are relational propositions having the form SrP and an identity statement is relational statement. Datta thinks that Advaita conception of identity implies non-categorical but *akhandārthaka* type of statement in which a thing is uniquely related to itself.

It is interesting to note that the law of identity is also implied by the law of non-contradiction (*abādha*) as formulated by Sankara. The law of non-contradiction as formulated by Sankara¹¹ is as follows : Contradictory predicates cannot inhere in the same subject (*na b̄ ekasmin dharmiṇi yugapat (sad asatvadi) viruddhadharma-samāveśah sambhavati*). Since this law constitutes one of the fundamental laws of thought, Sankara appeals to this law in setting the controversies of rival schools. And the characteristics of being non-contradiction is also a feature of reality.

From the above discussion it is possible to deduce the following consequences. The concept of *tādātmya* functions as absolute identity and essential identity. Essential identity presupposes absolute identity which is a fundamental notion for articulation of any plausible theory in human discourse.

Even in modern western philosophy thinker like Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Frege, Quine and others have recognized the importance of the theory of identity meaning that an object is the same with itself. Identity notion implies one of the basic laws of reasoning [(x) (x=x)]. It is generally accepted view that G. Frege set the stage for modern researches into subject of identity in connection with semantics.

4. Logic of Identity Statements

In Indian logical theory it is possible to distinguish necessary identity and contingent identity based on the dual nature of identity and contingent identity based on the dual nature of identity as absolute and essential identity. For example, the sentence 'Devadatta is Devadatta' is an instance of absolute or necessary identity, and contingent identity is expressed through 'Devadatta is the eldest son of Aruna'. Since Indian conception of identity as non-difference (*abheda*) captures the sense of absolute identity in contemporary logic.

Frege the founder of modern western logical theory deals with a puzzle about identity (=). He introduces the distinction between sense and reference of a proper name in an identity statement. If relation of identity holds good between objects then the statement 'a=b' is the same as 'a=a' [if (a=b) is true]. Even though a and b are the two names of the same object they differ in their cognitive contents. If a=ab is true then it is highly informative. For example, the truth of the identity statement 'Morning star is evening star' is acknowledged through astronomical discovery. The cognitive difference between the two identity statements : 'Morning star = Evening star' and 'Morning star = Morning star' is evening star' is due to Frege's distinction between sense and reference of proper names; the reference of an expression is the referent or the object named or denoted namely the planet Venus and sense of expression is mode of presentation ; the sense of the expression 'Morning star' is the property of shining in the eastern sky early in the morning. According to Indian view the statement 'Morning star = Evening star' is analogous to the statement "this Devadatta is that Devadatta" which is implied by 'this is that Devadatta.'

An interesting aspect of Navya-Nyaya logical theory consists of the treatment of identity even in negative discourse. That is to say that *īdātmya-*

sambandha as relation of identity functions in case of absential statements also. Following formulas of identity are implied in the Nyaya theory of identity.

$$(i) \quad a = \neg\neg a \quad (ii) \quad \neg a = \neg\neg\neg a; \quad (iii) \quad \neg\neg\neg\neg a = \neg\neg a$$

Since absence (*abhāva*) has been recognized as one of the categories (*padārtha*), there is a necessity of identity for precise articulation of reality in relation to *abhāva* and *bhāva padārthās*. Consequently relation of identity plays a cardinal role in the explication of ontological, logical, epistemological and semantical categories.

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4. *Vātsyāyanabhāṣya* on Sutra no. 1.1.1.
5. *Dharmarāja Adhvarindra : Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, (Āgamapariśeṣa).
6. *Sāhityadarpana, Ch. X.*
7. “*Rūpayati upamānopameyayorabhedāropanam Karotīti rūpakam*” *Kusumapratimā* on *Sāhityadarpana, Ch. X.*
8. ‘*api ca kāryakāranayoh dravyaguṇādinām ca āśvamahiṣavat bhedabuddhyabhāvāt tādātmyam abhyupagantavyam*’, *Śamkarabhāṣya* on *Sutra- 2.1.17.*
9. ‘*samavāyākalpanāyām api samavśāyasya samavāyibhiḥ sambandha abhyupagamane tasya tasya anyah anyah sambandhaḥ kalpayitavyah iti anavasthāprasangaḥ*’, Ibid.
10. ‘Raghunath Ghosh : *Relation as Real : A Critique of Dharmakṛiti*, Satguru Publications, Delhi, p. 51, 2001.
11. ‘*anabhyupagamamāne ca vicchedaprasangaḥ*’, Ibid.
12. ‘*atha samavāyah svayam sambandharūpatvāt anapekṣya eva aparam Sambandham sambandhyate*’, *Samkarabhāṣya* on *Sutra 2.1.17.*

13. 'samyogo'pi tarhi svayam sambandharūpatvāt anapekṣya eva samavāyam Sambandhyeta, tādātmyapratiteśca dravyaguṇādīnśām samavāyakalpanārthakyam', Ibid.
14. 'tat punaḥ ayutasiddhatvam aprthagdeśatvam vā, aprthaksvabhāvatvam vā', Ibid, on Sutra no. 2.2.16.
15. 'sarvathāpi na upapadyate. Aprthagdeśatve tāvat svābhyupagamah virudhyeta. Katham ? tantvārabdhah hi paṭaḥ tanatudeśah abhyupagamyante, na tu paṭadeśah, tathā ca āhuh – 'dravyāni drvyāntaram ārabhante guṇāśca guṇāntaram iti. Tantavah hi kāraṇadravyāni kāryadravyam paṭam ārabhante, tantugataśca guṇaḥ śuktādayah kāryadravye paṭe śuklādiguṇāntaram ārabhante iti hi te abhupagacchanti. Sah abhyupagamah dravyaguṇayoh aprthagdeśatve abhyupagmyamāne vādyeta', Ibid.
16. 'aprthakkālatvam ayutasiddhatvam ucyeta, savyadakṣiṇayoh ayutasiddhatvam praśajyeta,' Ibid.
17. 'tathā aprthaksvabhāvattve tu ayutasiddhatve na dravyaguṇayoh ātmabhedah sambhavati, tasya tādātmyanaiva pratiyamānatvāt, Ibid.
18. 'yutasiddhayoh sambandhaḥ samyogah, ayutasiddhayośca samavāyah iti ayam abhyupagamah mṛṣā eva teṣām, prāksiddhsya kāryāt kāraṇasya ayutasiddhatvānupapatteh,' Ibid.
19. 'atha anyatarāpekṣah eva ayam abhyupagamah syāt ayutasiddhasya kāryasya kāraṇena sambandhah samavāyah', Ibid.
20. 'evamapi prāgasiddhasya alabhātmakasya kāryasya kāraṇena sambandhah na upapadyate, dvayayattatvāt sambandhasya.' Ibid.
21. 'Siddham bhūtvā sambandhyate iti cet ? prākkāraṇasambandhāt kāryasya siddhau abhyupagamyamānāyām ayutasiddhabhāvāt Iti duruktam syāt.' Ibid.

22. 'yathā ca utapannamātrsyā akriyasya kāryadrivysya bibhubhih ākāsādibhih dravyārambhāih sambandhah samyogah eva abhyupagamyate, na samavāyah, evam kārandravyenāpi sambandhah samyogah eva syat, na samavāyah'. Ibid.
23. 'nāpi samyoga samavāyasya va sambandhasya sambandhivyatirekena astitve kincit pramānam asti', Ibid.
24. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyaksapariccheda)*.
25. Ibid.
26. *Prasastapādabhāṣya*, Ed. By K.C. Chattopadhyaya, Sanskrit University, Varanasi, p. 784, 1963.
27. 'na ca samavāyasattve 'pi rūpābhāvā. *Siddhāntamuktāvali* on verse no. 11.
28. Ibid.

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