

## LAWRENCE AND THE POSTMODERN THINKERS

The frontiers of Lawrence criticism are opening up in our times onto postmodernism and post-structuralism. The dynamically contradictory nature of Lawrence's text has given, in the words of Widdowson, "a wholly new dimension in the context of postmodernity"(20). Daniel Schneider sees in Lawrence; in his attacks on idealism and logocentrism, a project allied to deconstruction's frontal assault on traditional views of knowledge and logic. David Lodge in his "Lawrence, Dostoevsky, Bakhtin: Lawrence and Dialogic Fiction" attempts at bringing Mikhail Bakhtin's theory and practice to bear on the fiction of D. H. Lawrence, especially Women in Love. Daniel O' Hara finds in the "repetitive self-cancellation" in Lawrence's Women in Love a radically more deconstructive approach than even the rhetorical postures of the deconstructive critics themselves. (Widdowson. 146) John Worthen finds, while analyzing a passage from Sons and Lovers, that rhetorical presence is by no means easy to pin down in Lawrence's fictions. But the most revealing postmodern disclaimer of meaning, truth, identity, self and being comes from Lawrence himself. In a letter written in 1913, Lawrence has said, "Don't ever mind what I say. I am a great boshier and full of fancies that interest me" (Cambridge. Vol. I. page. 503). This love of fancy is related to his love of thought adventure, a fact that we have already pointed out. Biographical writings also support Lawrence's love of adventure. Paul Eggert in his "The Biological Issue: the Lives of D. H. Lawrence" points out Lawrence's love of role-play from an early age that can be linked to the provisionality of his writing, and to his "risk-taking polarizations and extremes" which typify much of his work (Fernihough. 9). This love of adventure is also inherent in Michael Foucault's approach. In answer to a query of the interviewer J. A. Miller whether sexuality and criminality were the same, Foucault has said, "I would say, let's try and see if it isn't the same. That's the stake in the game, and if I am thinking of writing six volumes, it's precisely because it's a game!"(Power/Knowledge, 209). The sense of 'game' here chimes with Lawrence's sense of adventure he pursued so nonchalantly.

In Lawrence's criticism of culture, the word 'culture' suggests a whole that in the postmodernist fashion can be seen as a number of parts connected by ideological point of view. The assumed consistency has earlier been overlooked. The assumption of consistency derives from the idea of a writer with a stable identity speaking from a fixed centre. The destabilization of the cult figure behind Lawrence's criticism of culture is contained within the non-fictional texts. Our eclectic approach supported by Lawrence's own, is only to view and review it in the context of postmodernism.

The definition of the term 'postmodern' with all its controversial shades of meaning is beyond the scope of our study. Our concern is with the dominant ideas that are generally associated with postmodernism and post-structuralism and to see how much Lawrence the 'destabilizing' critic of culture anticipates the tropes of contemporary radicalism. Following the failure of Lawrence critics to pigeonhole Lawrence's stance within modernism of such figures as Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot, James Joyce, Wyndham Lewis and Virginia Woolf, it would surely be a worthwhile endeavour. One can agree with Bell that Lawrence was neither straightforwardly modernist nor anti-modernist, but "engaged in a parallel project" (Bell, 179). In his essay "Lawrence and Modernism", Bell proceeds to establish the set of cultural and artistic concerns of Lawrence at the centre of modernism while pushing those of Pound's, Eliot's and Joyce's to the periphery, especially in such matters as personal identity, artistic impersonality, gender, myth and truth of feeling. We argue that Lawrence's concerns have much to share rather with the leading thinkers of our times. His sense of the human personality as a process to be understood in 'inhuman' as well as in 'human' terms anticipates Levinas's idea of the 'inhuman'. "The question of impersonality is," says Bell, "perhaps the most crucial point of contrast between Lawrence and the typical proponents of modernism." (Bell, 185) T. S. Eliot's 'impersonal theory of poetry' formulated in his 1919 essay, "Tradition and Individual Talent", has a highly personal note as he insists that poetry "is not a turning loose of emotion", it is "an escape from emotion" (Eliot, 21). But Lawrence's theory of impersonality, not formulated formally but expressed in a letter to Edward Garnett, is, again according to Bell, "the non-moral awareness of a 'beyond self' which provides the ultimate imperative for all life decisions, the non-

teleological purpose of existence.” (Bell, 186). This ‘non-self’ – the repudiation of conscious self (ego)-- and the situating of the unit of life beyond the ‘totalizing’ rationality in Levinas’s sense, have taken Lawrence beyond modernism and nearer to the postmodernist philosopher, Emmanuel Levinas. Lawrence is also opposed to the modernist view that feeling requires discipline. The gendered assumptions about feeling are a modernist sub-text which the feminists have opened up. The following observation of Bell is loaded with implications that not only align him with feminists but also with the Deleuvian idea of ‘becoming woman’<sup>1</sup>:

His obvious male insecurity, the reactive misogyny, clearly comes from a man with a strong female identification which has creative as well as personal dimensions. Early reviews assumed him to be female, and Lisa Appinganesi has noted the cooption of femininity, by several male modernist writers, as a vital element in their creativity (Bell, 187)

We have already discussed the question of ‘the strong female identification’ in Lawrence in our chapter on Lawrence and feminism. Back to the modernists’ concern with ‘myths’, Eliot’s reification of myths is manifest in his approving remarks on Joyce’s use of the ‘mythic method’ as a technique. It reflects the modernists’ attitude to myths in general. But for Lawrence, myth is a mode of being, not a technique—the emergence of which is possible only when the characters, passing beyond their everyday consciousness, are at one with the impersonal.

Lawrence shares with the modernists their suspicion about ideas. Ezra Pound in his Literary Essays (341) says that “an idea has little value apart from the modality of the mind which receives it” and T. S Eliot in his obituary compliment to Henry James that he “had a mind so fine that no idea could violate it” (Egoist.5. 1. 1918).<sup>2</sup> But the affinity between Lawrence and these two modernists in this respect is only superficial. Lawrence hates ideas because they are detrimental to the life of feeling. He says, “My field is to know the feelings inside a man and to make new feelings conscious.” (Phoenix II. 567) The importance of emotional response Lawrence attaches to literary criticism pushes him beyond the limit of modernism to ‘écriture feminine’ and other such feminist aesthetics currently held by many feminist critics.

Lawrence's capacity to assume roles as pointed out by Eggert only confirms our earlier contention that Lawrence is a thought adventurer. This love of adventure in thought has perhaps prompted him to feel the spirit of places like Mexico, Australia and the Etruscan. We do not attribute this love to any psychological or pathological tendency nor to any particular philosophical predilection does Lawrence hold dear to him, but to his inordinate love of playing the game of thought from a belief in the eternal flux of life and an endless becoming like his fond symbol 'phoenix'.

Lawrence the critic of culture shows his concern with things that corroborate with those of the leading contemporary thinkers such as Jacques Lacan, Jean Baudrillard, Jean- Francois Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Mikhail Bakhtin and Giles Deleuze. Lawrence shares with them the central issues like the rejection of realist epistemology and the Enlightenment project that is built upon that epistemology, the denial of the Cartesian autonomous subject, of the transparency of language, of the accessibility of the real, of the possibility of universal foundation, and so on. With them he stresses the other, contingency, change, difference and absence of self and meaning. Like them, Lawrence has called into question the totalitarian reason and the tendency of increasing homogenization in Western Culture. Here we propose to reread the key ideas of Lawrence against the plural and provisional perspectives of postmodern condition.

Lawrence is aware and shows his concern for the increasing dominance of simulacra in Western Culture. On this point he comes very close to Jean Baudrillard, the French cultural theorist whose dominant concern is the postmodern turn to simulacra or 'hyper-reality'. For Baudrillard, we have lost all sense of authenticity and live in a world of simulation that we take to be reality: the signifier or image "bears no relation to any reality whatever" (1988, 170). Lawrence is not only aware of the simulacra but also raises many other deep issues associated with this:

Man fixes some wonderful erection of his own between himself and the wild chaos, and gradually goes bleached and stifled under the parasol. Then comes a poet, enemy of convention, and makes a slit in the umbrella: and lo!

The glimpse of chaos is a vision, a window to the sun. But after a while, getting used to the vision, and not liking the genuine draught from the chaos, commonplace man daubs a simulacrum of the window that opens on to chaos, and patches the umbrella with the painted patch of simulacrum...so that the umbrella at last looks like a glowing open firmament, of many aspects. But alas! It is all simulacrums, in innumerable patches (Phoenix. 255-256).

Lawrence's view of the world as a "wild chaos" connotes a sense that is shared by another leading French philosopher, Giles Deleuze. We shall discuss further affinity between Lawrence and Deleuze later on in this chapter. Unlike Baudrillard, who stresses the essential unreality of the culture in which we live, Lawrence attributes the unreal images to "commonplace men" counter-pointed by the "vision" of the poet. Yet the very awareness of a "glowing open firmament" suggests that Lawrence is not very far away from Baudrillard in this respect.

For Baudrillard, the dominance of simulacra in our times is symptomatic of a loss of the real. Lawrence expresses a similar view in his "Apropos of Lady Chatterley's Lover":

Never was an age more sentimental, more devoid of real feeling, than our own. Sentimentality and counterfeit feeling have become a sort of game, everybody trying to outdo his neighbour. The radio and the film are mere counterfeit emotion all the time, the current press and literature the same. People wallow in emotion: counterfeit emotion (Lady Chatterley's lover, 336).

For Baudrillard, advertising today sells us images rather than things and for Lawrence, multimedia like radio, film, press and literature are selling us emotions which are simulacra, 'counterfeit' in his version. Standing at a historical distance from Baudrillard, Lawrence has voiced the same concerns. Shortly before his death, Lawrence has voiced a deep Baudrillardian concern: "We don't to look at flesh and blood people—we want to watch their shadows on the screen. We don't want to hear

their actual voices: only transmitted through a machine” (“Men Must Work and Women as Well”, Phoenix-II, 590). In the “Study of Thomas Hardy”, although in a different context, Lawrence has said, “map appears to be more real than the land” (Phoenix, 420). Further, Lawrence has shown his awareness of man’s love of simulacra in his essay “Art and Morality” where he says that man in general sees what ‘Kodak’ has taught him to see:

whatever the image on the retina may be, it is rarely even now, the photographic image of the object which is actually taken in by the man who sees the object. He does not, even now, see himself. He sees what Kodak has taught him to see. And man, try as he may, is not a Kodak (Phoenix. 522).

Lawrence’s point here is that ‘the photographic image of the object’ falls much short of the actual ‘image on the retina’ and that the former is a drastic reduction of the latter. This lack of correspondence between the ‘actual’ and the ‘virtual’, as Baudrillard sees it, is one of the major concerns of Lawrence the critic of culture. This question assumes wider significance in the Lacanian discourse of the three-dimensional space—the Real, the Imaginary and the Symbolic which we shall discuss while exploring later in this chapter the affinity between Lawrence and Lacan. Back to our context, Lawrence’s focus on the problem is less on the autonomy of simulacra than on the individual human being’s love of simulacra: “We have learned to see and every one of us has a complete Kodak idea of himself.”(522)

The parallelism between some Lawrentian ideas with that of the French philosopher Jean-Francois Lyotard is all the more close. Lyotard’s central argument in The Postmodern Condition is that we now live in an era in which legitimizing metanarratives are in crisis and in decline. These narratives are contained in or implied by Kantianism, Hegelianism and Marxism and are set in motion since the period of the Enlightenment. These narratives argue that history is progressive, that knowledge can liberate us, and that all knowledge has a secret unity. The two of the main narratives Lyotard has attacked are those of the progressive emancipation of humanity, the Christian and the Marxist utopia on the one hand and the triumph of science on the other. Lyotard considers that such doctrine of modernity has lost the

credibility after the Second World War. "Simplifying to the extreme," says Lyotard, "I define postmodern as incredulity towards metanarratives" (1984. XIV).

Lawrence's "incredulity towards the metanarratives" is seen in his sustained denunciation of Kantian unifying ego, in his refusal to accept scientific enquiry as disinterested pursuits of truths about reality and its universal applicability, and in his rejection of any grand theory that attempts at governing life. In his cultural criticism, Lawrence has attacked Christianity for its exaltation of the spirit over the body and the gift of redemption it offers. In Phoenix, Lawrence says, "Christianity, then, is the ideal, but it is impossible. It is impossible because it makes demands greater than the man can bear" (284). In his essay on "Democracy", Lawrence has exposed the ideal of humanism. He argues, "Men are not equal, and never were, and never will be, save by the arbitrary determination of some ridiculous human ideal" (Phoenix, 701). In his view, the idea of the average is pure abstraction and a reduction of the human being to a mathematical unit. The metadiscourse of humanism is essentially faulty as its measuring unit assumes the role of a human being it is supposed to measure, Lawrence argues in the same essay. Lawrence's strong denunciation of ideals or metanarratives shows his keen awareness of the inadequacy of them. In his Defining the Postmodern, Lyotard says, "Neither economic nor political liberalism, nor the various Marxisms emerge from the sanguinary last two centuries free from the suspicion of crimes against mankind" (1986: 6). Lawrence's observation, although from a different angle, has touched upon the inefficacy of many such ideals: "The state is dead ideal. Nation is a dead ideal. Democracy and socialisms are dead ideals. They are one and all just contrivances for the supplying of the lowest material needs of a people" (Phoenix, 702).

All such ideals, in Lawrence's view, are bound to fail because they are static abstractions abstracted from life, negating all its multiplicity. The failure of such metanarratives, in Lawrence's view, is because of their 'absolute' character. He therefore prefers contingency to the absolute character of the grand narratives. The progressive emancipation of mankind is jeopardized by this very contingency. As Lawrence says, "There is no absolute good, there is nothing absolutely right. All things flow and change, and even the change is not absolute" (Phoenix. 536). The

'metanarratives' of Lyotard are the "great ideas" of Lawrence that claim but do not have any legitimacy. Lawrence has regretted that "we have limited our consciousness, tethered it to a few great ideas, like a goat to a post" (Phoenix. 629, my emphasis). For Lawrence, individuals are "Not a mass of homogeneity, like sunlight, but a fathomless multiplicity, like the stars at night, each one isolate in darkly singing space"(Phoenix. 634). This figurative description is characteristically Lawrentian that Lyotard does not share, but the "fathomless multiplicity" is distinctly Lyotardian.

The Lyotardian incredulity towards the metanarrative of science does also correspond to Lawrentian skepticism about the same. The claim of science to objective truth is repeatedly called into question by Lawrence. In his introduction to Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence expresses his incredulity towards science in as clear terms as those of Lyotard.

Our objective science of modern knowledge concerns itself only with phenomena, and with phenomena as regarded in their cause-and-effect relationship....Our science is a science of the dead world. Even biology never considers life, but only mechanistic functioning and apparatus of life (Fantasia. 12).

Lawrence proposes to have instead "a science in terms of life," the "the subjective science of the great pagan world," the science that "proceeds in terms of life and is established on data of living experience and of sure intuition" (Fantasia,12). Lawrence also regrets the reductive tendency in the science of medicine in The Symbolic Meaning, the earlier version of his Studies in Classic American Literature. In the opening essay titled "The Spirit of Place" Lawrence, while commenting on the didactic element in art, has said that "we reduce a man to his mere physico-functional capacity in the science of medicine" (The Symbolic Meaning, 19). Elsewhere such as in Apocalypse, Lawrence again questions the universality of science and its application, and limits them to mere "thought-forms":

All that science has taught about fire does not make fire any different. The processes of combustion are not fire, they are thought-forms. H<sub>2</sub>O is not

water, it is a thought-form derived from experiments with water. Thought-forms are thought-forms, they do not make our life. Our life is still made of elemental fire and water, earth and air: by these we live and have our being (135).

For Lawrence, these thought-forms are incapable of delivering goods for mankind for they are cut off from life in its eternal flux. They represent absolutes that do not apply to life. In his essay, "Crown", Lawrence again comments on the failure of science to live up to the demands of life:

All absolutes are prison-walls. These laws which science has invented, like conservation of energy, indestructibility of matter, gravitation, the will-to-live, survival of the fittest: and even the absolute facts like—the earth goes round the sun, or the doubtful atoms, electrons, or ether—they are all prison walls, unless we realize that we don't know what they mean (Phoenix II, 397).

In Lawrentian terms, knowledge is always subsidiary to life and always has just a functional value. The status of scientific knowledge is no better.

In Lyotard's view, the transition from modernity to postmodernity is a transition from metanarratives to 'petits recits' or mini narratives. These modest narratives "have a limited validity in place and time and that are sometimes identical with what Lyotard, borrowing from the later Wittgenstein, calls "language games" (Bertens, 247). Lawrence's love of pagan polytheism, expressed in his Apocalypse in the following lines—"To the ancient consciousness, Matter, Materia, or Substantial things are God. A great rock is God. A pool of water is God" (Apocalypse. 95), is vindicated by Lyotard in Economic Libidinale. In this book Lyotard argues that "a polytheistic religious system like that of ancient Rome has a number of advantages over monotheistic religions" (Bertens, 246). Paganism privileges heterogeneity and difference, and stands for the postmodern incommensurability—the issues that Lawrence raises in his cultural criticism. Lawrence is also aware of the 'petits recits' of which Lyotard was so articulate. In "Morality and the Novel", Lawrence

emphasizes the need for *petits recits*: “Everything is true in its own time, place and circumstance, and untrue outside of its own place, time and circumstance” (Phoenix, 528). This finds support from Lyotard as much as from a later commentator like Sheila Benhabib:

Transcendental guarantees of truth are dead; in the agonal struggle of language games there is no commensurability; there are no criteria of truth transcending local discourses, but only the endless struggle of local narratives vying with one another for legitimation (*Situating the Self*, 1992, quoted in Christopher Butler, 29).

Lyotard’s emphasis on ‘heterogeneity’ and ‘difference’ has further correspondence with Lawrence’s views. A *differend*, Lyotard writes in *The Differend*, “would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgment applicable to both arguments” (XI). This conflict beyond equitable resolution is the central point of Lawrence’s argument in his “Crown”. In this essay Lawrence argues that the existence of the unicorn depends upon the very existence of the lion and each of them is kept in a ‘stable equilibrium’ by the opposition of the other. The never-ending conflict between them, Lawrence argues, is the essential prime condition for their existence:

The lion and the unicorn are not fighting for the crown. They are fighting beneath it. And the crown is upon the fight. If they made friends and lay down side by side, the crown would fall on them both and kill them (Phoenix II, 371).

The crown is the Lawrentian symbol of the Absolute. It is not the fruit of either victory, but is the “the *raison d’être* of both” (Phoenix II, 373). In Lawrence’s view, Christianity speaks of unforgivable blasphemy by trying to make the lion lie down with the lamb and, as a consequence, destroys the opposition or conflict. Victory on either side gives only a false crown: “This is the sham crown, which the victorious lion and the victorious unicorn alike puts on its head: the crown of the sterile egoism” (Phoenix II, 380).

Lawrence's keen awareness of the necessity of otherness and difference allies him with Lyotard. In The Symbolic Meaning, he says that the classic American literature is to be understood in terms of 'otherness' and 'difference'(17), because, as he argues, "the present reality is the reality of untranslatable otherness"(17). Again like Lyotard, Lawrence sees oneness as standing in the way of real deliverance: "We must get clear of the old oneness that imprisons our real deliverance"(17). For Lyotard, as it is for Lawrence, both the structuralists and phenomenologists have left no room for desire by eliminating difference altogether: "The fundamental realm of desire is the realm of difference, of true heterogeneity," says Lyotard (Bertens, 245). Both Lawrence and Lyotard have celebrated 'difference' and 'heterogeneity' against homogeneity and oneness, local narratives against 'metanarrative'. Lawrence's concept of desire is based not on identification but on otherness. In his view lovers will meet but never merge and it is the pure maleness in man and pure femaleness in woman that constitutes the realm of desire. Lawrence argues that "the longing for identification with the beloved, without recognizing her otherness, becomes a lust" (Phoenix, 125).

Lawrence the critic of culture has laid bare the spuriousness and falsity of the humanist ideal. The humanist ideas of self are defined by the operations of consciousness, including rationality, free-will and self-reflection. Freud has destabilized the humanist ideal of the self. For him actions, thought, beliefs and the concepts of self are all determined by the unconscious, its drives and desires. But Freud has emphasized the conscious self or rational identity, the ego, and seeks to make it more powerful than the unconscious in order to ensure the onward march of civilization. Lawrence has expressed his doubt towards the Freudian metanarrative regarding the ego. This incredulity towards the authenticity of the ego is later on shared by Jacques Lacan, the French psychoanalyst of the mid-twentieth century.

For Lawrence, as for Lacan, the ego or 'I' self is an illusion. Lacan has described the process of how the infant forms an illusion of the self in his essay on the "Mirror Stage". Lawrence's enunciation of the same is less systematic but no less firm in its insistence of the spuriousness of the ego. Lawrence attributes the formation of the

ego to the unhealthy development of the mind that overpowers all the spontaneous dynamic activity that feeds on faulty idealism. He also attributes this, like Lacan, to man's inordinate love of his own image on the mirror-his own picture.

In Lacan's schema, there are only 'signifiers' and no 'signified', (the terms he borrows from Saussure) to which the signifiers ultimately refer and therefore there is no guarantee of some kind of meaning. There is no anchor that ultimately gives stability to the whole system. He says that the process of becoming an adult or 'self' is the process of trying to fix, to stabilize the chain of signifiers so that the meaning of 'I' is possible.

Like Freud, Lacan's infant starts out as something inseparable from its mother. This is the state of 'nature', which has to be broken up in order for 'culture' to be formed. The baby in the Mirror Stage, at the age between 6 to 8 months, will see itself in a mirror. The baby will look at its image, then look back at its mother or some other person—then again look at the mirror image. Lacan says,

The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from the insufficiency to anticipation—and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopedic—and, lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development ("The Mirror Stage", *Ecrits*: 5).

The child is thus moved from a 'fragmented body' to an 'orthopedic vision of its totality'. What really happens is an identification that is misrecognition. Lacan says, "Our experience shows that we should start...from the function of *meconnaissance*<sup>3</sup> that characterizes the ego in all its structures" (*Ecrits*, 7) This process of misrecognising one's self in the mirror image creates the ego. The ego is thus at the best a fantasy, an illusion, and not an internal sense of separate whole identity.

For Lawrence, the cognition or the first glimmerings of the mind in a child do not coincide with the formation of the ideal ego. In Lawrence's schema, direct cognition takes place when dynamic connection begins from one sympathetic centre of the two—'solar plexus' and 'lumber ganglion'. It is then polarized from the corresponding voluntary centre, either 'thoracic ganglion' or 'cardiac plexus' and the complete dynamic flow in one plane corresponds to the other to establish a whole field of consciousness. Lawrence says, "The moment there is a perfect polarized circuit between the first four poles of dynamic consciousness, at that moment does the mind, the terminal station, flash into cognition" (Fantasia, 74).

Lawrence's concept of the ego, like that of Lacan, is formed by a misrecognition. But it is not formed in childhood, as Lacan insists. Man, according to Lawrence, may fall into egoism at any stage of his life and mistake the ideal ego for a true self. In the "Crown", Lawrence says, "Once we fall into the state of egoism, we cannot change. The ego, the self-conscious ego remains fixed, a final envelop around us" (Phoenix II, 396). The ego is "man's second self" (Phoenix, 710), is the "false absolute" (Phoenix II, 381) and the "vicious circle" (Phoenix, 180). For both Lawrence and Lacan, the ego is a prison. Lawrence says,

We are all pot bound in our consciousness. We are like fish in a glass bowl, swimming round and round and gaping at our own image reflected in the walls of the infinite: the infinite being the glass bowl of our conception of life and the universe. We are prisoners inside our own conception of life and being (Phoenix, 325).

Speaking about the conception of 'freedom' of the existentialists, Lacan says, "a freedom that is never more authentic than when it is within the walls of a prison" (Ecrits, 7). Lawrence also attributes the formation of the ego to man's tendency to form a picture of himself and substituting the Real for the Imaginary. Lacan says that the child's self-concept, its ego, will never match up to its own being. Its 'imago' in the mirror is both smaller and more stable than the child, and is always 'other' than the child. Lawrence detects the tendency of forming a picture of the self, the ego, not in the baby but in a grown-up man. He says, "As soon as man became

aware of himself, he made a picture of himself. Then he began to live according to the picture. Mankind at large made a picture of itself and everyman had to conform to the picture" (Phoenix, 379). Lawrence traces the emergence of the ego to man's habit of identifying with the visual image of himself. In "Art and Morality", Lawrence says, "This is the habit we have formed: of visualizing everything. Each man to him is a picture. That is, he is a complete little objective reality, complete in himself, absolutely, in the middle of the picture" (Phoenix, 523). In the same essay he says that this habit has contributed to the development of conscious ego in man (Phoenix, 523).

In Phoenix Lawrence says that in true psychoanalysis, the psychoanalyst's task is to break "the ego-centric absolute of the individual" (379). The escape from the impasse of the ideal ego, for Lawrence, lies through getting ourselves back into touch:

Men must get back into touch. And to do so they must forfeit the vanity and the noli me tangere of their own absoluteness: also they must utterly break the present great picture of normal humanity: shatter that mirror in which we all live grimacing: and fall again into true relatedness (Phoenix, 382)

Lacan's way of bringing about a correspondence between nature (the Real) and culture (the Imaginary) lies through love: "At this juncture of nature and culture, so persistently examined by modern anthropology, psychoanalysis alone recognizes this knot of imaginary servitude, that love must always undo again, or sever" (Ecrits, 8).

Lacan's conception of the mirror stage, as a phase in which reification of the ideal ego takes place, repudiates all the philosophies relying on cogito. Lacan says, "It (the mirror stage) is an experience that leads us to oppose any philosophy directly issuing from the cogito" (Ecrits, 1). Lawrence's outright rejection of the cogito is ubiquitous in his writings. In "Pornography and Obscenity" Lawrence says, "I am what I am, not merely what I think I am" (173). He iterates the same in his poem, "Climb down, O Lordly Mind":

“Man is an altering consciousness.

Man is an altering consciousness

Only that exists which exists in my consciousness.

Cogito, ergo sum

Only that exists dynamically and unmentalised, in my blood,

Non cogito, ergo sum.

I am. I do not think I am.” (The Complete Poems, Vol. 1: 474)

Again in “Ego-bound”, a poem in the same volume, Lawrence compares the pot-bound plant with the ego-bound man and urges man to “shell off his ego” (475).

Lawrence the critic of culture has also shown his awareness of the Bakhtinian theory of carnival. We here make a very sketchy study of such an awareness in Lawrence in order to map out the extent of Lawrence’s thought adventures. Bakhtin has formulated the concept of the carnival in his study of the seventeenth century prose satirist, Francois Rabelais. The concept of the carnival “is derived from the practice of medieval carnival when, in an episode of permitted licence, the people would enjoy a holiday from their labours and in the process lampoon the authorities of church and state” (Peter Brooker, 24). It is a subversive act of the lower orders. On such occasion the lower order indulged themselves in the pleasures of the BODY in eating, drinking and sexual activity. This social order, Bakhtin argues, was “adopted as a form of literary satire by Rabelais and employed what he identifies as the key features of ‘decrowning activity’, eccentricity, laughter, PARODY, profanation and ‘doubling’”(Brooker, 25)

In Apocalypse, where Lawrence rereads this Biblical episode in the title, Lawrence explains symbolical language of the supposed Apocalypticist:

The language of the text, “rejoice and make merry and send gifts to one another” suggests a pagan saturnalia...If this is what the Apocalypticist meant, it shows how intimately he follows pagan practice, for the ancient saturnalian feasts all represented the breaking, or at least the interruption of an old order of rule or law (Apocalypse, 117).

The 'breaking' or the 'interruption of an old order of rule or law' is Lawrence's version of Bakhtinian 'decrowning activity'. Lawrence is not a theoretician, but his adventuring thoughts, like the globe-trotting man in him, have ventured into many hinterlands of critical consciousness postulated and elaborated as theory later by many of our contemporaries.

Lawrence's strong opposition against the trust reposed on knowledge by the Western philosophical tradition aligns him with the contemporary French philosopher, Michel Foucault. Lawrence's concept of knowledge has interesting parallels with that of Foucault. Both of them are opposed to the status of fundamental principle given to knowledge by modern philosophy. For Lawrence, knowledge, mental knowledge to be specific, at best has only functional value, and for Foucault, "Knowledge is more likely to be 'rooted in the errors of life' than to provide an 'opening to the truth of the world'" (Bertens,138). In Lawrence's schema, knowing is subsidiary to being as knowledge has its basis in the already lived experience and therefore is incapable of coping with the demands of new experience. Foucault has also spoken of the primacy of life over theory, of reality over knowledge in the contemporary 'thematic':

we have repeatedly encountered, at least at the superficial level, in the course of most recent times, an entire thematic to the effect that it is not theory but life that matters, not knowledge but reality...and arising out of this thematic...we might describe as an insurrection of subjugated knowledges (Power/Knowledge, 81).

This "insurrection of subjugated knowledges", a project in Foucault's genealogy of knowledge, has its analogy in Lawrence which we shall discuss later.

Foucault in his Ethics has explored the origin of knowledge as a fundamental principle in modern philosophy and has found that "in theoretical philosophy from Descartes to Husserl, knowledge of the self takes on ever-increasing importance as the first step in the theory of knowledge" (2000: 228). Foucault comments that

Descartes' emphasis on the direct evidence of non-ethical subject that gives him access to truth (2000: 279) and Kant's reintroduction of "ethics as an applied form of procedural rationality" (2000: 279/280) are basically faulty. For Foucault, the emphasis on the knowing subject in modern philosophical tradition and its attempt to found knowledge in truth are inherently deluded projects. Foucault brings Kant's analytic of truth into interrogation by drawing on the arguments of the French philosopher Georges Canguilhem who argues that "this historian of rationalities himself so 'rational', is a philosopher of error"(Quoted in Bertens, 137). Since the possibility of error is intrinsic to life, rationalism has reduced the importance of coping with chance and error. Lawrence's repudiation of knowledge as 'opening to the truth of the world' is less systematic but no less categorical than that of Foucault. He is also critical of the modern philosophical tradition for its emphasis on the knowledge of the self as leading to truth. We have already pointed out Lawrence's dismissal of Cartesian subject as knower of truth. Like Foucault, Lawrence is also aware of the limitations of conceptual schemas: "Theory as theory is all right. But the moment you apply it to life, especially to the subjective life, the theory becomes mechanistic" (Phoenix, 378).

For Lawrence, knowledge is inherently contingent in its scope to open up any possibility of access to truth and therefore it has a reduced applicability to life: "human consciousness contains, as we know, not a tithe of what is, and therefore it is hopeless to proceed by a method of elimination" (Phoenix, 434).

For Lawrence, life revolves around a condition that is marked fundamentally by chance and unpredictability—a condition that reduces the importance of knowledge as foundation of truth. But it is not true that Lawrence has dismissed the importance of knowledge altogether. He says, "We don't find fault with mental consciousness....We only find fault with the One-and-Allness which is attributed to it" (Phoenix, 636). In Apocalypse Lawrence iterates this stance: "it is not Reason itself whom we have to defy, it is her myrmidons, our accepted ideas and thought-forms. Reason can adjust itself to anything" (50). Lawrence is aware of the tenuous nature of truth that the rational self has access to. Like Foucault, Lawrence argues that knowledge is necessary for the protection of individual existence: "And ever, as

his knowledge of what is past becomes greater, he wants more and more liberty to be himself. There is the necessity of self-preservation, the necessity to submerge himself in the utter mechanical movement” (Phoenix. 425).

Lawrence considers knowledge as a ‘force’ (Phoenix.431). Foucault likewise designates knowledge the important role of helping individual existence to protect itself and deal with the external world. Significantly, Foucault also gives a functional value to knowledge. His concept of knowledge is inherently Lawrentian: “Knowledge is for me that which must function as a protection of individual existence and as a comprehension of the external world. I think that’s it. Knowledge as a means of surviving by understanding” (2000: 125).

The affinity between Lawrence and Foucault is further focused by Lawrence’s argument that man’s consciousness is a manifestation of his individuality. Man’s extension of consciousness helps him understand his world better (Phoenix, 431-2). But on validation of knowledge and attempts at establishing it as a foundation of truth, both Lawrence and Foucault have expressed their reservation. They agree upon the proposition that knowledge is to be viewed in terms of limitations inherent in our ways of thinking. In *Dits et. Ecrits 3.*, Foucault has said, “Each certitude can only remain secure of a supporting ground that remains unexplored” (1994: 787).

The proposition of subjecting knowledge to the unknown as suggested by the quoted line in order that any knowledge may attain ‘certitude’ is a demand that Foucault’s own designation of knowledge fulfils. First, Foucault has not conceived knowledge in terms of ‘totality’. Second, in his genealogy of knowledge he has entertained the

claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects (Power/Knowledge, 83).

Lawrence's denunciation of the 'One-and-Allness' of knowledge is Foucault's "unitary body of a theory" from which Foucault seeks to resurrect knowledges of the 'local', 'discontinuous', 'disqualified' and 'illegitimate' character. Foucault attempts at emancipating historical knowledges from their subjection, to render them, that is capable of opposition and of struggle against the coercion of theoretical, unitary, formal and scientific discourse (Power/Knowledge, 85). Lawrence the critic of culture has a similar project. His exploration of the Mexican God in The Plumed Serpent, of the spirit of the Etruscan places in the travelogue, of the long lost subjective science in the Fantasia of the Unconscious and of the pagan way of life and of various esoteric knowledge in Apocalypse are glaring examples. The adventures of Lawrence's thought bring within its fold these subjugated knowledges of human history to counter the hegemony of unitary body of theory and to show its inadequacy. Lawrence regrets that "We always want a conclusion, an end, we always want to come, in our mental processes, to a decision, a finality, a full-stop" (Apocalypse, 93). This tendency is endemic to "the tyranny of globalizing discourses with their hierarchy and all their privileges of a theoretical avant-garde" (Power/Knowledge, 83) which Foucault seeks to eliminate. Coming back to the question of Foucauldian 'certitude' that needs an unexplored supporting ground, we find an illustration of it in Lawrence's grounding of knowledge on the unknown:

He(an individual) takes knowledge of all this past experience upon which the new tip rides quivering , he becomes again the old life, which has built itself out in the fixed tissue, he lies in line with the old movement, unconscious, of where it breaks, at the growing plasm, into something new, unknown (Phoenix, 424)

For Foucault, the anthropological sleep of the modern philosophical tradition has cost us dear. Lawrence is aware of such a gap and this awareness is manifest in his interest in anthropology. This anthropological interest serves to disrupt the unitary thought in his criticism of culture. In his Forward to the Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence says, "I am not a proper archeologist nor an anthropologist nor an ethnologist. I am not scholar of any sort. But I am very grateful to scholars

for their sound work” (10). This disclaimer only emphasizes Lawrence’s interest in anthropology.

Foucault has exalted “life over theory”, as we have quoted above. Lawrence has also celebrated life, exalting ‘to be’ over ‘to know’ in Apocalypse, “for man the vast marvel is to be alive” (149). This celebration of life and its becoming in the individual associates him with yet another French philosopher, Giles Deleuze. Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, with their insistence on ‘difference’ and ‘becoming’ have emphasized that the value of art and philosophy lies in their power to disrupt the existing mode of life and become new. Lawrence holds a similar view. The primacy of life over everything that attempts to fix it—is one of the cardinal points of Deleuze and Guattari’s argument. They, like Lawrence, argue that consciousness and spirit cannot overcome ‘difference’ and ‘becoming’ as Hegel argues. Against the tendency in Western thought to suppress and reduce difference to some grounding identity, they have posited that “Life is difference, the power to think differently, to become difference and create differences” (Colebrook, 13). Both structuralists and phenomenologists placed difference and becoming within some ground or foundation. Against them, Deleuze posits a becoming for the sake of change itself. In Deleuze’s view, capitalism has emerged from “the tendency to sameness, uniform quantification, the fixing of all becoming through one measure or territory (Colebrook, 65). His ‘untimely’ philosophy, by creating whole new lines of time, offers to disrupt the impasse of capitalism. Although Lawrence has not treated capitalism in isolation, his reading of it as one more way of totalization that invites comparison with Deleuze’s stance.

Deleuze’s concepts of ‘becoming’ and ‘difference’, of ‘immanence’ and ‘univocity’, of the Nietzschean ‘lines of flight’, ‘pre-personal singularities’ and ‘eternal return’ and above all of the preponderance of flux in the actual, the virtual and the real are the areas in which Lawrence has correspondence with Deleuze. Lawrence’s idea of history is that of ‘untimely’ in the Deleuvian sense of the term. The idea of dynamic thought in Lawrence, as posited in the Fantasia of the Unconscious, is also emphasized by Deleuze who “wanted to express the dynamism and instability of thought” (Colebrook, 4). Lawrence’s thought adventure gets a new

dimension in the light of Deleuze's emphasis on doing philosophy adventurously (Colebrook, 14).

Both Lawrence and Deleuze agree that 'difference' is the essential condition of life. The process of creation starts, for Deleuze, when certain organisms are differentiated from the chaos or flows of difference which are life. This happens prior to any organized matter or system of relations. These organisms are not closed forms but 'starta' that creates a distinction between 'inside' and 'outside'. Each organism opens out in two directions: towards the chaos and to its own limited forms (Colebrook, 77). In his "Study of Thomas Hardy", Lawrence emphasizes these two directions:

Facing both ways, like Janus, face forward in the quivering glimmering image of the unresolved, facing the unknown, and looking backward over the vast rolling tract which follows and represents the initial movement, man is given up to his dual business of being, in blindness and wonder and pure godliness, the living stuff of life itself, unresolved: and knowing with unwearying labour and unceasing success, the manner of that which has been, which is unrevealed (Phoenix, 430).

This passage shows Lawrence's close affinity with Deleuze: 'the vast tract of life which follows and represents the initial movement' resonates with Deleuze's concept of chaos while Deleuze's concept of the little form of organism is reflected in Lawrence's sense of 'quivering, glimmering image of the unresolved'. These are the two directions in which, for both Lawrence and Deleuze, each organism opens out. Lawrence's emphasis on 'difference' is again like that of Deleuze:

It seems as though one of the conditions of life is, that life shall continually and progressively differentiate itself, almost as though the differentiation were a purpose. Life starts crude and unspecified, a great Mass. And it proceeds to evolve out of that mass ever more distinct and definite particular forms, an ever multiplying number of separate species and orders (Phoenix, 431).

This process of continuous and progressive differentiation is the cardinal condition of life as Deleuze views it. For him, life proceeds by creatively maximizing its potential (Colebrook, 14). For Lawrence, as for Deleuze, perpetual flux is a necessary condition for existence, for all life is a continuous process of becoming. Lawrence says, "The final aim of everything is the achievement of itself" (Phoenix, 403). The creative maximization of life is a dominant concern of Lawrence the critic of culture. In the same essay he says,

The excess is the thing itself at its maximum of being. If it had stopped short of this excess, it would not have been at all. In this excess the plant is transfigured into flower, it achieves at least itself. The aim, the culmination of all is the red of the poppy, the flame of the phoenix (Phoenix, 402).

Like Lawrence, Deleuze has observed this power of life in smaller organisms and in their tendency to evolve, mutate and become (Colebrook.1).

Deleuze's proposition against Platonism, which is formulated in his Logic of Sense (1990), is similar to that of Lawrence. Lawrence prefers Heraclitus's idea of flux to Plato's idea of form as a convincing mode of explaining the complexities of life. Deleuze likewise overturns Platonism with the affirmation of becoming. He destabilizes the foundation of being by acknowledging "the immanence of becoming" (Colebrook, 126). Lawrence's privileging of becoming over being forms one of the ground of his criticism of the Judeo-Christian culture. In Phoenix again we come across the following passage which gives priority to becoming: "life is unfathomable and inscrutable in its motives, not to be described, having no ascribable goal save the bringing forth of the ever-changing, ever-unfolding creation" (608).

Deleuze has attacked the modern concept of the subject in philosophy. Modern philosophers from Rene Descartes to the 20<sup>th</sup> century phenomenologists argue that experience is always given to a subject. Descartes has established subjectivity by arguing that the experienced world, wherefrom we know that truth or being is open

to doubt or question except the experiencing subject. For Deleuze, the subject is one form of transcendence (Deleuze, 1990: 106) against which Deleuze posits 'univocity'. The subject in Western thought is, for Deleuze, an "image of thought" (Deleuze, 1994: 131) that is mistaken for ultimate foundation. Deleuze argues that there just 'is' experience—a pure flow of life and perception which he has called the plane of immanence—and there is no distinct perceivers (Colebrook, 74). Experience precedes the subject and the image of ourselves as distinct subjects are formed from experience. The self is formed from "larval subjects", a multiplicity of perceptions and contemplations (Colebrook, 74). Lawrence in his "Education of the People" says that the individual is not a 'mass of homogeneity', but a 'fathomless multiplicity' (Phoenix, 634). His incredulity towards the Cartesian subject we have already discussed in this chapter. On this point, the view of Lawrence enjoys the support of Deleuze. In order to counter the concept of subjectivity in modern philosophy Deleuze insists on the all-pervading sense of multiplicity and flux in life. Lawrence's priority too emphasizes the same thing: "Each thing, living or unloving, streams in its odd, intertwining flux" (Phoenix, 525). Lawrence exposes the Cartesian subject's claim of access to truth through knowledge by arguing that human consciousness contains "not a tittle of what is, and therefore it is hopeless to proceed by a method of elimination" (Phoenix, 434).

In our discussion of Lawrence-Foucault correspondence in this very chapter, we have shown that in Lawrence knowledge and knowing subjects are assigned a secondary role to play in the business of living. Life is governed by multiplicity which is all suppressed by the "One-and-Allness" of Western metaphysics. Lawrence seeks to disrupt this by subjecting knowledge and the knowing subject, formed by faulty philosophers, to the unknown, "a well-head built over a strong, perennial spring" (Phoenix, 422). The 'spring' here is the spring of the vitality of life. Both Lawrence and Deleuze propose a life in harmony with the chaotic flux from which organisms are formed by the relative reduction of difference. They also agree about the condition of becoming or maximizing the potential of life: the at-oneness with the "circumambient universe" in Lawrence's case, and with the chaos of life in Deleuze. Lawrence's supreme commitment to life is shared by Deleuze. Lawrence says, "Nothing is important but life. And for myself, I can absolutely see

life nowhere but in the living” (Phoenix, 534). For Deleuze, acts of thought, such as philosophy and literature, are active responses to life (Colebrook, 4). Philosophy responds to life by creating ‘concepts’ and art by creating ‘affects’ and ‘*percept*’. The philosophical project of Deleuze is to liberate the scope of philosophy from formation of general opinion. For Deleuze, opinion moves from a particular experience and uses it to form some whole that reduces difference and complexity. Opinion thus homogenizes desire by producing a general ‘subject’. A philosophical concept works against this generalizing tendency by expanding difference and by creating new ways of thinking (Colebrook, 16-17). Lawrence embarks on a similar project in Lady Chatterley’s Lover. In the “Apropos” he speaks against homogenization of desire and sets out to create new ways of thinking. Both Lawrence and Deleuze believe in the positivity of desire. In What is Philosophy, Deleuze and Guattari say, “The philosophy of communication is exhausted in the search for a universal liberal opinion as consensus” (1994: 146). Lawrence has expressed his strong disliking for the bland notion of ‘average man’ in his essay on Democracy. Against such ‘philosophy of communication’ Deleuze posits Nietzsche’s concept of the world in terms of “pre-personal singularities”, (Deleuze, 1990: 102) that is, in terms of chaotic and free-roaming fluxes. For Deleuze, “The task of philosophy when it creates concepts, entities, is always to extract an event from things and beings, always to give them a new event: space, time, matter, thought, the possible as events” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 167). The idea of destabilization and disruption of space, time, matter and thought is central to the philosophical project of Deleuze and Guattari. For them, philosophy is thinking the plane of immanence<sup>4</sup>. This plane of immanence is never absolute deterritorialisation<sup>5</sup> (Colebrook, 77). Thinking the plane of immanence is “thinking the power of difference and distribution which allows activities, such as art and philosophy, to think the very difference from which any world emerges” (Colebrook, 77). Philosophy deterritorialises or becomes other than itself in the hands of Deleuze and Guattari. For Deleuze, philosophy is not a philosophy of communication, but “heterogenesis” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 199). It is not just a becoming but a becoming other (hetero), and it does so in response to the other (chaos) (Colebrook, 70).

Lawrence has not directly related active thinking to becoming. But his pursuit of knowledge to its furthest limit is a precondition for taking a leap into the unknown. This deliberate act of thinking is certainly 'active' thinking in the sense of Deleuze. Lawrence says in The Symbolic Meaning: "We shall at last learn the pure lesson of knowing not to know" (49). In the same book he says, "The goal is to know how not to know" (196). Lawrence's paradoxical dictum of knowing not to know, like Deleuze's 'heterogenesis', emphasizes becoming other (other than the stable ego) in response to the other (the unknown, the 'creative mystery of life'). Lawrence's creative thinking is reflected in the naming of his own philosophy as 'pollyanalytics'<sup>6</sup> which reminds us of Deleuze's 'heterogenesis'.

In A thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari refer to life's production of 'lines of flight', where mutation and difference produce not just a progression of history but disruptions, breaks, new beginnings and monstrous births (Colebrook, 57). Lawrence is aware of such 'lines of flight' that life produces. In Apocalypse he says, "Our idea of time as a continuity, as an eternal straight line has crippled our consciousness cruelly" (97). Like Deleuze and Guattari's concept of history, Lawrence's own is marked by difference and becoming. In Movements in European History, Lawrence focuses on this aspect, although in a different language:

Inside the hearts, or souls, of men in Europe there has happened at times some strange surging, some welling-up of unknown powers. These powers that well up inside the hearts of men, these are the fountains and origins of human history. And the welling-up has no ascribable cause. It is the naked cause itself (XXVII).

The primacy of 'strange surging', of becoming, over the causes ascribed to them later, reminds us of Deleuze's contention that there just 'is' experience from which the self is organized—the point that we have mentioned earlier. For Deleuze, history attends to disruptions and therefore it is 'untimely' (Colebrook, 61-62).

For Deleuze, art and philosophy are 'untimely' by virtue of the power to create whole new lines of time or 'lines of flight' (Colebrook, 62). Art creates 'affects' and

‘Percept’ Pure ‘affect’ is ‘deterritorialisation’ (Colebrook, 59). It is the affect of impersonal becoming as it is not grounded in any agent (Colebrook, 60). Deleuze says,

The affect is impersonal and is distinct from every individual state of things: it is nonetheless singular, and can enter into singular combinations and conjunctions with other affects....The affect is independent of all determinate space-time; but it is none the less created in a history which produces it as the expressed and expression of a space or a time or a milieu (Deleuze, 1986, 98-99).

Affect opens the line of time to disruption, giving an ‘untimely time’ (Colebrook, 61)

Lawrence’s use of ‘affect’ qualifies his literature as ‘minor literature’—the literature that, in Deleuze’s view, disrupts and dislocates tradition and creates ‘lines of flight’. Though Lawrence’s awareness of his production of ‘affect’ in his novels as ‘affect’ in Deleuze’s sense of the term is uncertain, it is not difficult for us to recognize this awareness in an oft-quoted letter written on June 5, 1914 to Edward Garnett. In that letter Lawrence has written as an explanatory note on his novel The Rainbow—

You must not look in my novel for the old stable ego—of the character. There is another ego, according to whose action the individual is unrecognizable, and passes through, as it were, allotropic states which it needs a deeper sense than any we have been used to exercise, to discover, are states of the same pure single element of carbon. The ordinary novel would trace the history of the diamond—but I say, ‘Diamond, what! This is carbon’. And my diamond may be coal or soot, and my theme is carbon (quoted in Gamini Salgado’s A Preface to Lawrence, 114).

The ‘unrecognizable individual characters’, passing through ‘allotropic states’, are ‘affects’ that disrupts and dislocates our territorialized world and open on to a

'virtual' world and in the process facilitates our becoming other than what we are. The ordinary novel is 'major' literature in Deleuvian sense as it becomes 'expressive' and not 'creative' of identity (Colebrook, 104). In the same letter Lawrence says, "Somehow that which is physic—the non-human, in humanity, is more interesting to me than the old-fashioned human element" (Salgado, <sup>1986!</sup>114). The 'non-human' here is what Deleuze refers to as 'impersonal' in the extract we have quoted few lines back.

For Deleuze, the power of difference in literature is the power of life that helps to think of the plane of immanence. Art opens the door to becoming by taking us for a flight from perceptions to 'percept' and affections to 'affect' wherefrom we have our rebirth. As Deleuze and Guattari have it,

By means of the material, the aim of art is to wrest the ~~percept~~ from perceptions of objects and that states of perceiving subject, to wrest the affect from affections as the transition from one state to another: to extract the block of sensations, a pure being of sensations (Deleuze And Guattari, 1996: 167).

Lawrence has shown such awareness in him in the letter quoted above.

Deleuze's concept of the 'eternal return', which he has derived from Nietzsche, posits that "time is eternal only in its power to always produce new, over and over again—with no origin and no end"(Colebrook, 60). Lawrence's concept of 'eternal return' is dominant in his non-fictional writings. His favourite symbol of the mythical bird, phoenix, illustrates his concept of 'eternal return' of difference and newness:

The phoenix grows up to maturity and fullness of wisdom, it attains to fatness and wealth—and all things desirable, only to burst into flame and expire is ash and the flame and the ash are the be-all and the end-all, and the fatness and wisdom and wealth are but the fuel spent (Phoenix, 401).

This bursting into flame and expiring in ash are the inherent nature of life as Lawrence and Deleuze see it. The idea of eternal return is suggested by the 'leap' that, Lawrence insists, the individual must take periodically in order to facilitate his rebirth like the mythical bird: "Life is traveling to the edge of knowledge, then a leap taken" (Phoenix II, 374). This insistence on becoming is seen in his conscious subordination of individuality to 'flux' of life: "Our ready-made individuality, our identity is no more than an accidental cohesion in the flux of time" (Phoenix II, 384).

Deleuze emphasizes the importance, among other things, of literature in facilitating becoming—becoming other. Such 'others' include becoming woman, becoming animal etc.. We have discussed Deleuze's concept of becoming woman in our chapter on Lawrence and feminism. Here we briefly discuss Deleuze's idea of becoming animal. "Becoming animal is a feel for the animal movements, perceptions and becomings: imagine seeing the world as dog, a beetle or a mole" (Colebrook, 136). Our perception is drawn to the animal, Deleuze argues, not because we feel empathy for it, but because it represents difference, it is anomaly. Lawrence's attitude towards the world is also free from empathy. In a piece of writing on a pet dog, included in Phoenix, Lawrence writes, "He (the dog) should have stayed outside human limits, we should have stayed outside canine limits. Nothing is more fatal than the disaster of too much love" (Phoenix, 21).

We have spent so much space for Deleuze in this chapter because Lawrence the thought adventurer has a vital correspondence with Deleuze who has done his philosophy adventurously. Lawrence is adventurous in the sense that his adventures are grounded only on becoming. The adventures of his thought emphasize the inherent difference and becoming in life. For him time is not a linear but circular movement which he continually disrupts by surrendering the fixity and stability of his tools to the unknown in order to make a different start in different directions. In Phoenix, Lawrence says,

In his adventure of self-consciousness a man must come to the limits of himself and become aware of something beyond him. He must be self-

conscious enough to know his own limits, and to be aware of that which surpasses him (Phoenix, 185).

The awareness of what surpasses Lawrence—the chaos, or the ‘fathomless multiplicity’—is the area of the unknown on which his thought adventures are based. This basis gives at least a tentative ‘certitude’—‘certitude’ of which Foucault has spoken—to his thought. Even if there is no meaning of what he says, he does not care. The playfulness of Lawrentian approach to meaning aligns him again with Deleuze: “It is fantastic to deny meaning when meaning is there, as it is to invent meaning when there is none. And it is much duller. For the invented meaning may still have a life of its own” (Apocalypse, 56).

The quest for life in anything and validation and maximization of life in everything—life in its perennial difference and preternatural becoming—have associated Lawrence with Giles Deleuze in a profound sense of the term.

## NOTES

- 1 In Deleuze's schema, 'becoming woman' is a privileged status. "The privileged status of becoming-woman is that woman is the turning away from the closed image of man; if there is another mode of becoming then becoming lacks any single ground or subject. The second reason for the importance of becoming-woman has to do with the impersonal and unbounded nature of sexual desire" (Colebrook, 140).
2. The lines quoted from Ezra Pound's Literary Essays and from "Egoist" are quoted in "Notes" by Bell (Bell, 195).
3. The sense of 'meconnaissance' is of a 'failure to recognize' or 'misreconstruction', as Alan Sheridan, the translator of Lacan's *Ecrits* says in his note (Lacan, 2001: XIII)
4. The plane of 'immanence' is, in the schema of Deleuze and Guattari, the outside or 'pre-philosophical' element in any philosophy. Thinking the plane of immanence is not just to perceive a world but to think the very difference from which any world emerges (Colebrook, 77).
5. 'Deterritorialization' frees a possibility or event from its actual origins. It occurs when an event of becoming escapes or detaches from its original territory.
6. Lawrence has called his philosophy as pseudo-philosophy or 'pollyanalytics' on page 15 of his "Forward" to Fantasia of the Unconscious.