

CHAPTER – V

Some problems concerning verbal understanding and its method propounded by the *Naiyāyikas* and their probable solutions.

In Indian tradition there are many theories as to the method of the comprehension of meaning. I have followed mainly the theories propagated by the older *Naiyāyikas* and *Navya Naiyāyikas*. An effort has been made to give probable solutions of the problems following the line of the Indian thinkers. Sometimes I have shown my departure from the tradition.

Knowledge is of two types : immediate (*pratyakṣa*) and mediate (*parokṣa*). The latter type of knowledge is described as '*jñānakaraṇakam jñānam*', i.e. knowledge arising through the instrumentality of another knowledge. The knowledge of *vyāpti*, similarity and word serves as an instrument of inferential knowledge, knowledge through comparison and verbal comprehension respectively.¹ From this it follows that the knowledge of a *pada* becomes the instrumental cause (*kāraṇa*) of the comprehension of meaning.² The recollection of meaning of a term through the knowledge of that term is called *vyāpāra*.³ Here potency or *śakti* of a term is the medium which can favour us by way of making us recollect its meaning or denotation (*padārthānukūlavvyāpāradvārā*). In the following sentence 'The jar exists (*ghaṭo śti*), the meaning of the term 'jar' is known through the term 'jar'

and the meaning of the verb '*asti*' (to exist) is known through the usage of the particular term.

The above-mentioned definition has been formulated by the Navya Naiyāyikas as they do not agree with the definition of Gautama as '*āptopodésah śabdah*'.⁴ If the knowledge of a word or sentence comes from a reliable person or authority, it is called *pramāṇa*. But the problem is how *āptatva* of a person can be determined. The description of a *āpta* person is given as having real knowledge of an object, having no defect in sense organ etc. In other words, an individual who has no illusory cognition (*bhrama*), no carelessness (*pramāda*), no desire for cheating other (*vīpralipsā*) and weakness in sense organs (*indriyapātava*) is called *āpta*. From this it does not follow that the person is to be taken in confidence. There are many individuals who though having the above mentioned features afterwards have proved themselves *anāpta*. Hence, word from such a person cannot be taken as *pramāṇa*. Hence, this has been rejected by the Neo-thinkers.⁵

If the meaning of the term '*āptatva*' is taken as 'being locus of real knowledge which is the cause of verbal usage',⁶ it is tenable. Because, those who have the knowledge of words that are used conventionally become *āpta*. Hence, the knowledge of word (*padajñāna*) becomes the instrument of the knowledge of the meaning of a word and sentence. In other words, *padajñāna* is the instrument, the recollection of the meaning of a word is *vyāpāra* and the comprehension of sentence is the result.⁷

Though *śabda* is an independent *pramāṇa*, the method through which the verbal comprehension occurs is purely inferential in nature. An individual can know the particular meaning of a word through convention i.e. verbal usage of the old (*vr̥ddhavyavahāra*). An individual in fact infers a particular meaning of a particular word from the verbal usage of the old persons. The *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* gives a beautiful description about how a child infers the meaning. A child comes to know the primary relation (*saṁketa*) of a term with its meaning at first from the verbal usage of the old (*vr̥ddhasya śabdādadhīnavyavahārād eva*). When a man who is aware of the meaning of a term (*vyutpanna*) asks another man who also knows the meaning of the same term to bring a cow, the person who has been asked to bring a cow by the senior person (*uttamavr̥ddha*) brings it after hearing the word of the senior and realising the meaning of it. On observing the performance of the man who has been asked to bring a cow, a child draws the inference in the form : “This bringing of a cow is the result of the inclination, as it has got effortness in it, as in the case of my inclination to suck mother’s breast”.⁸ It may be argued that as it is a case of inference, there must be *vyāpti* as an instrument. What is the form of *vyāpti*? In reply, it can be said that *vyāpti* relation lies between ‘*ceṣṭātva*’ (effortness) and ‘*pravṛttijanyatva*’ (being produced by inclination). The form is : ‘Where there is *ceṣṭātva*’, there is *pravṛttijanyatva*’. The example or *udāharana* is ‘*madīyastanapānādivat*’ (i.e. as my inclination to suck mother’s breast). Then he comes to infer the state or condition of being produced by the knowledge of feasibility (by one’s effort) of which the bringing of a cow has become qualificand (*gavānayanadharmikakāryatājñānajanyatvam*) in respect of the inclination with the help of the syllogistic argument in the form : ‘The inclination to bring a cow is

produced by the knowledge of feasibility (by one's effort) of which the inclination to the same has become qualificand, as it is endowed with the property of being an inclination, as in the case of my own (inclination).⁹ Any type of inclination presupposes this type of feasibility. Then the child infers : 'The knowledge of feasibility (by one's effort) of which the bringing a cow has become qualificand, has an uncommon cause, as it is an effect as in the case of a jar.'¹⁰ As any type of effect has got its special cause, the effect in the form of bringing a cow needs some special cause. From this the child comes to know that the knowledge of the verbal usage of the old (*vrddhavyavahāra*) is the uncommon cause of the knowledge mentioned above.

Though the Navya Naiyāyikas have mentioned *vrddhavyavahāra* as the cause of verbal comprehension, it, I think, is not completely tenable. Because, the primary meaning of a term can be comprehended after being guided by the convention. But the secondary or suggestive meaning of a word may not always be comprehended from the verbal usage of the old. Because the implicative or suggestive meaning of a particular word or sentence is always context-dependent. Hence, this type of meaning may be ascertained after depending on the comprehensive capacity of a person. The suggestive meaning or implicative meaning of a word may not always be the same to all. Hence the intellectual exercise of an individual is inevitable for proper understanding of the same.

If this view is accepted, one problem may crop up. If convention or *vrddhavyavahāra* is taken as criterion of comprehending meaning of a word, the initial verbal usage of a particular word which is present at the time of the creation

of the world cannot be explained due to not having any usage of a particular word. The Naiyāyikas have come forward to explain the matter after bringing God. This is, in fact, one of the proofs for the existence of God. The syllogistic argument runs as follows : 'The initial verbal 'usages like jar etc. are done by an independent person, as it is a verbal usage, as in the case of the usages of the scripts introduced in moderns age'. This independent person is God.¹¹

Keeping this view, the Naiyāyikas have formulated the theory that a word has got some 'power' (*śakti*) of indicating its denotation which is given by God's desire. According to them, God's desire in the form : 'This particular meaning is to be understood from this particular word',¹² is the *śakti* in the form of *samketa*. If this is accepted, another problem is raised in the *Dinakarī*. If God's desire is accepted as *samketa*, it can give rise to the primary meaning,¹³ of the term 'Gangā' as well as the implicative meaning (i.e., bank) of it due to having God's desire, which will lead to the non-acceptance of *lakṣaṇa*.¹⁴ This position is defended in the following way. When the primary meaning of the term 'Gangā' is understood, the *samketa* in the form of God's desire exists in the primary meaning (*śakyārtha*), but not in the implicative meaning (*lakṣyārtha*). When 'the bank' is understood by the term 'Gangā', the *samketa* is of that type. Hence there does not arise any question of *atiprasaṅga*.

This view, I think, is not tenable. There is no necessity of bringing God in determining the meaning of a word or a sentence. The initial verbal usage of an object (e.g., jar by the word 'jar') may be introduced by a particular person, which may be followed by later generations. In fact, it is found in our everyday life that a

new object is initially described by a scientist, or by a researcher with the help of some name which is followed by others. Hence, the phenomenon of *śabdabodha* is possible even without accepting the desire of God.¹⁵ Hence, the Navya Naiyāyikas have said that the desire of an individual (but not God) in the form : ‘This meaning is to be understood from this word’ is *samkeṭa*. This power comes from the knowledge of grammar, comparison, dictionary, reliable texts, or statement of trustworthy person, from the paraphrase and usages and contiguity of well known words.¹⁶

The Naiyāyikas have accepted the knowledge of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), consistency (*yogyatā*) and contiguity (*āsatti*) as causes of the comprehension of meaning. Among these, the knowledge *ākāṅkṣā* and *āsatti* are highly essential in comprehension of the primary, implicative and suggestive meanings. So, far as ‘*yogyatā*’ is concerned, it is the cause for the comprehension of primary meaning (*śakyārtha*). If there is consistency in meaning, it is called *yogyatā* (*arthāvādhoyogyatā*). In the example ‘He is sprinkling with fire’ (*vahninā siñcati*) there is lack of *yogyatā* due to not having consistency in meaning. In other words, as sprinkling with fire is not consistent, there is lack of *yogyatā*. Though in this sentence there no *yogyatā*, it at least points us to the fact that it is an impossible phenomenon. Hence, the usages like ‘I am building castle in the air’ etc. though not having *yogyatā* can provide us some meaning through implication. Hence, for inverting some implicative meaning the inconsistency in meaning may sometimes act as promoter. When the primary meaning of a word becomes inconsistent, we

search for implicative meaning. Hence, it is not at all true that no comprehension of meaning is possible if there is lack of *yogyatā*.

It may be asked where exactly the faculty of implication exists. Does it exist in a particular word of the sentence or in the whole sentence? In reply, it can be said that in the single word implication may exist in some exceptional cases where something else is indicated. When someone says after pointing out the door 'dvāram' (door), it implies asking to close the door. In this case, though the single word is uttered (but not sentence), we get the implicative meaning. In the same way, if some one calls 'rickshaw' or 'taxi', it means 'rickshaw-puller' or 'taxi-driver' through implication. In most of the cases implication exists in the whole sentence. Whether implicative meaning is possible or not depends on the inconsistency of meaning. This inconsistency mostly lies in the sentence. When it is said 'vahninā' or 'vahninā pacati', there is no inconsistency. But inconsistency comes when the verb 'siñcati' is used in connection with the term 'vahninā'. There does not arise any inconsistency in meaning until and unless the verb 'siñcati' is incorporated.

In order to get the meaning of a sentence through implication, there must be *ākāñksā* and *āsatti*. If there is lack of expectancy and contiguity in a sentence, how can we understand that there is inconsistency of meaning? In order to know the *arthāvādhatva* (consistency of meaning) of the sentence, the structural order of it like expectancy etc. must be correct. Otherwise, it will fail to give rise to *śakyārtha* of the sentence leading to the non-apprehension of implicative meaning because, it is *śakyārtha* (direct significance) of a word which gives rise to

lakṣyārtha as per definition of *lakṣaṇā* (*śakyasambandho lakṣaṇā*). This is the uniqueness of language that it always gives some indication. As per Bhartrhari's observation, a reality which is not associated with an articulate verbal form cannot be the content of our thought and is regarded as fiction. On the other hand, a fiction such as hare's horn etc. when expressed through language appears to have existence and becomes object to logical prediction.¹⁷ Hence, the absence of an object which is absurd (*alīkapratyogika abhāva*) conveys some sense to us. Hence, like consistency, inconsistency in meaning sometimes becomes 'meaningful'.

When an individual comprehends the implicative or suggestive meaning of a sentence, the problem may be raised whether these meanings are properties of the sentence or those of speakers or readers or hearers. According to some scholars, these are the properties of the sentence. In one sense it is true. Because, the sentence must inhere power of *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā* in it. The sentence '*Gaṅgā yaṃ ghoṣaḥ*' is capable of providing both implicative and suggestive meaning. Hence, the role of language cannot be denied. A sentence though endowed with the power *lakṣaṇā* and *vyañjanā* may not be understood by the hearer or speaker. Particularly, the suggestive meaning may not always be easy to understand, it depends on the intellect of the hearer or speaker also. Moreover, the suggestive meaning of a sentence may vary from person to person. Hence, the subjective element in comprehension of meaning cannot be ignored. It reminds me the story of Lord Buddha who gives advice to his disciples with the single sentence. 'The Sun is set'. The three disciples having different *saṃskāras* have apprehended the

meaning of the sentence in three ways. Hence, in comprehension of meaning the role of both language and speaker is highly essential.

Like *ākāṅkṣā*, etc. the intention of the speaker is also essential factor in determining the meaning of a sentence. The role of *tātparya* is emphasised in *Vedānta* and *Mīmāṃsā* schools. The Naiyāyikas have not laid much importance on it. However, it bears a great importance. Some statements may seem to be non-sensical if speaker's intention is not known.

If a speaker has *vivakṣā* (intention or desire to say something), it is permissible in grammar also. One may use '*kāṣṭhāni pacanti*' (i.e., the woods cook) etc. If one desires so (*vivakṣāvasāit*). It is permissible in language though there is the violation of grammatical rules. In Nyāya also the intention or desire of speaker is honoured. Not only this, if someone has got strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), he is permitted to do so even in the case of established truth (*siddhi*).¹⁸ In the case of the syllogistic argument in the form : '*ghaṭānyonyābhāvavān paṭatvāt*' (i.e., it is endowed with the mutual absence of a jar, as it has got cloth ness), one can infer *bhedatva* of a jar from cloth 'intentionally', because the difference is easily known after looking at the cloth. If someone says - '*ghaṭa is kalaśa*', the speaker intends to say that the two entities are identical (having *bhedābhāva* or absence of *anyonyābhāva*). Some thinkers may have intention to make an artificial difference between two identical objects after using the term *iva*. In the *Vākyapadīya* Bhaṭṭhari has said that two objects, though identical, are demonstrated in such a way that one will think of their difference. But this difference is artificial in order to show the sameness of object. In '*indra iva dasyuhā bhava*' (like *Indra* become

daśyu-killer) which is addressed to *Indra*, the term *iva* shows the relation of standard and the object of comparison on the basis of an artificial difference. Where a really different object is not available as standard of comparison, the speaker may use the object of comparison as the standard in order to bring out its incomparability. As for example - ‘*rāmarāvaṇayor yuddham rāmarāvaṇayor iva*’.¹⁹ Hence, speaker’s intention has a prominent role in the use of language and in the comprehension of meaning.

So, we can say that where there is specific use of a sentence, there is some intention of the speaker. In other words, when a sentence is used, it indicates something. Hence, between sentence and its meaning there is a relation called *jñāpya-jñāpaka-bhāva* (indicator-indicated relationship). What is called *jñāpakatva*? *Jñāpakatva* is the property of being an object (*viśayatva*) of the knowledge, which has caused another knowledge.²⁰ In the case of the syllogistic argument in the form : ‘The mountain is fire-possessing, as it has got smoke’, ‘smoke’ has become an object of the knowledge which has caused the inferential knowledge of fire. In the same way, *śakyārtha* becomes *jñāpaka* (indicator) to the meaning through implication (*lakṣyārtha*) : The direct meaning of the term ‘*Gangā*’ becomes *jñāpaka* of the bank of it (which is *jñāpya* here) through the strength of *lakṣanā* (*lakṣanā-balena*). In the same way, the direct meaning of the same word may be *jñāpaka* of *śaitya-pāvanatva* (i.e., coolness and purity) of the river on the strength of *vyañjanā* (*vyañjanā-balena*). This *jñāpakatva* may be of generic and specific type. An object or a sentence (used by speaker) may be indicator of another object or some meaning which is completely unknown to the

hearer while there might be some object or sentence which may give us some information which is not at all new to us. In the case of implicative and suggestive meaning the word or sentence is used, where it is informative in the true sense of the term. But in the case of *tādātmya* (*ghaṭa* is *kalāśa* etc.), the information we get from the sentence is not as informative as the earlier sentences, as the identity of them is obvious. In spite of this we have to accept the *jñāpakatva* of the sentences, as speakers really have desire to indicate (*vivakṣā*) something.

Now, I shall explain the root of *lakṣaṇā* i.e., implicative meaning which is accepted by the Naiyāyikas and other systems which accept *Śabda* or verbal comprehension as a means of right cognition. An effort will be made to evaluate critically the theories that the non-realisation of the intention of the speaker (*tātparyānupapatti*) is the root of *lakṣaṇā*, the supremacy of *tātparya* in the phenomenon of verbal comprehension, whether *yogyatānupapatti* can be taken as a the seed of *lakṣaṇā* or not etc.

Implication or *lakṣaṇā* is a relation to that which is conveyed by the potency of a word (*śakti*) due to the non-comprehensibility of the intention of the speaker (*Lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhastātparyānupapattitah*). The Naiyāyikas have pointed out the philosophical significant of intention (*tātparya*) first in the context of enquiring the seed of implicative meaning (*lakṣaṇā*). To them the non-realisation of intention or *tātparya* (*tātparyānupapatti*) is the seed of *lakṣaṇā* i.e. implicative meaning. In fact, the implicative meaning of the term *Gangā* as found in the sentence *Gangā yam ghosah* is 'the bank of the *Gangā*'. The primary meaning of the terms *ghosah* and *Gangā* are *ghosapalli* and a particular flow of water

(*Jalpravāha-viśesa*) respectively. The milk-man-colony cannot remain in a particular flow of water and hence there is non-realisation of the relation (*anvayānupapatti*) between them. This can be removed, if the 'bank of the Gangā' is taken as the meaning of the term Gangā through *lakṣaṇā*. In the same way, the implicative meaning of the term *ghosaḥ* is also possible. In the former case *lakṣaṇā* in the term Gangā is accepted, but not in the term *ghosaḥ*. In another the reverse case is accepted. If *lakṣaṇā* is accepted in either of the terms, there will not be the non-realisation in respect of relation (*anvayānupapatti*). Hence, it is admitted that the non-realisation of intention, but not of relation is the root of *lakṣaṇā*. The importance of the application of *lakṣaṇā* lies in the fact of removing the non-realisation of intention (*tātparyānupapatti*) of the speaker,²¹ which is also supported by Nageśa.²²

Now what is to be understood by the term *tātparya*? The desire of the speaker (*vyakturicchā*) is *tātparya*.²³ In other words, I have been stated that when a word or a sentence is uttered with a desire to convey something, it is called *tātparya* (*tātpratīticchayā uccaritatvam*).²⁴ When there is the utterance of a particular word with a desire to convey his own idea to others, this particular desire or intention is *tātparya*. The term *uccaritatva* is superfluous here on account of the fact that in the written statement of the dumb persons there is *tātparya* in spite of not having utterance of the same.²⁵ Moreover, there would arise the possibility of the non-attainment of the meaning of the *Vedic* texts uttered by an individual having no awareness of its meaning (*arthajñānaśunyenapurusenoccaritatvādvēdārtha pratyayābhāvaprasangāt*).²⁶

Hence it is better to accept the former definition (i.e., the intention of the speaker is *tātparya*) which is also supported by the grammarians.

If a speaker bears a particular intention to express that the fish resides in the water and utters the same sentence '*Gangāyam ghosaḥ*', the implicative meaning is to be accepted on the term *ghosaḥ* denoting fish secondarily in order to bring the realisability in *tātparya*. If a speaker, on the other hand, possesses an intention to make others aware that the milkman-colony exists on the bank of the *Gangā* and utters the same sentence, the implicative meaning has to be accepted in the term *Gangā* as per the intention of a speaker as well as for the realisability of *tātparya*. As per the intention of the speaker the implicative meaning of the terms *Gangā* and *ghosaḥ* are to be taken as 'the bank of the *Gangā*' and 'fish' respectively. Hence, the realisability of *tātparya* but not relation is the seed of *lakṣaṇā*. Moreover, this point is substantiated when the implicative meaning is accepted in the sentence - *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām* (i.e., protect the curd from crow etc.) in which there is obviously *tātparyānupapatti*, but not *anvayānupapatti*. The statements like 'We do not smoke here', 'Thanks for not smoking' etc. have no incompatibility in the relation (*anvayānupapatti*), but there is the incomprehensibility of the intention of the speaker which leads to the implicative meaning like 'Please do not smoke'. In order to incorporate all types of *lakṣaṇā* it is better to accept the non-realisability in respect of *tātparya* as *lakṣaṇā* but not otherwise. Had the incomprehensibility of relation or connection (*anvayānupapatti*) been the cause of implication, there would not have any implicative meaning in the sentence - 'Admit the stick' (*yasthiḥ praveśaya*). Because the phenomenon of admission is not inconceivable with the stick and

hence no *anvayānupapatti*. If the non-realisaibility of intention is taken as the seed of *lakṣaṇā* then the implicative meaning is applicable to such case. As the entrance of a stick in the dining hall for a feast is non-realisaible. ‘the stick holders are to be taken by the term ‘stick’ through implication.²⁷

Let us see whether the non-realisaibility of *tātparya* which is accepted as the seed of *lakṣaṇā* belongs to word alone or a group of words. Implication does not belong to a word alone but a group of words. As in the case of the example - ‘There is a milkman-colony on the deep river’, the group of two words ‘deep’ and ‘river’ refers to the ‘bank’ through implication.²⁸

It may be argued that as a group of words does not have any potency or import (*śakti*), how can it have implication, which is nothing but a form of relation to that which is conveyed by potency? In reply, it can be said that implication is the relation to that what is conveyed by potency related to a word. Just as the meaning of a word is conveyed by potency, the meaning of a sentence is also through it. Hence there is no inconsistency.²⁹

Let us examine whether the non-realisaibility of the semantic competency (*yogyatānupapatti*) may be taken as the root of implication or *lakṣaṇā*. The semantic competency (*yogyatā*) is the relation of the meaning of a word with the meaning of another (*padārthe tatra tadvattā yogyatā parikīrtita*).³⁰ Such awareness is the precondition of the verbal comprehension. The sentence - ‘sprinkling with water’ (*jalena sincati*) gives a verbal comprehension due to

having semantic competency. It is known to us that the instrumentality of water is connected with the other meaning of the word - 'sprinkling'.

In absence of such *yogyatā* verbal comprehension is not at all possible. In the sentence - 'sprinkling with fire' (*vahninā sincati*) there is no verbal comprehension, because fire cannot be an instrumental to the action of sprinkling.³¹

If there is the non-realizability of the semantic competency (*yogyatānupapatti*), it may give rise to implicative meaning. Though the sentence - 'sprinkling with fire' (*vahninā sincati*) does not provide any verbal comprehension due to the lack of *yogyatā*, it can give metaphorical or implicative meaning due to having the non-realizability of the semantic competency (*yogyatānupapatti*). We may quote a line from the *Meghnādvadha* by Madhusūdanana Datta, which has no semantic competency, and for this there is a scope for implicative meaning. The sentence goes like this - '*fuldal diyā kātilā ki vidhātā śālmolī tarubare?* i.e., does God cut the silk-cotton tree called *Sālmalī* with the petal of flower? In fact, the petal of flower cannot cut the hard tree like *Sālmalī* and hence it lacks the semantic competency. But it has got a power of referring to an implicative meaning. The sentence implies that the cutting of the said tree through flower-petal is an impossible phenomenon, which is attained through the non-realizability of *yogyatā*. In the same way, the statement - 'I am building castle in the air' refers to an absurd phenomenon through implication arising from *yogyatānupapatti*.

In this connection it should be kept in mind that *yogyatānupapatti* may lead us to attain the implicative meaning in some cases but not in all. Hence the non-realizability of intention of the speaker (*tātparyānupapatti*) has been taken as a root of all including the place where there is the non-realizability of the semantic competency.

If the intention of the speaker is realised (*tātparyopapatti*), the primary meaning (*śakyārtha*) is known immediately there. The necessity of exploring any implicative meaning becomes inevitable if there is the non-realizability of the intention (*tātparyānupapatti*), alone which may of course, be caused by the non-realizability either of the semantic competency (*yogyatānupapatti*) or expectancy (*ākāṅksānupapatti*).

Now we may see how the non-realizability of expectancy leads us to the attainment of implicative meaning. A word must have an expectation with another word if the former is not found related without the association of another. (*vat padena vinā yasyānubhāvakatā bhavet sākāṅksā*).³² The *kāraṅkas* cannot generate relation without the help of the verb and hence there is an expectancy of *kāraṅkas* with the verb (*kriyāpadaṁ vinā kāraṅkapadaṁ nānvayabodham janayātīti tena tasyākāṅksā*).³³ If it is said 'The door please' (*dvāram*), it will provide no meaning due to the lack of expectancy with a verb. This non-realizability of expectancy gives rise to the non-realizability of intention (*tātparyānupapatti*). For this reason the verb 'close' or 'open' is brought here through implication considering the context (*prakaraṇa*) under which it is spoken.³⁴

So far as *āsttīyanupapatti* (non-realisation of contiguity) is concerned, it cannot be taken as a pointer to the non-realisation of intention (*tātparyānupapatti*) separately. If there is any such *anupapatti* here, it is not different from the non-realisation of expectancy (*ākāṅkṣānupapatti*). I think what is accepted as *āsatti* or contiguity is not essentially different from the expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*). *Āsatti* is defined as the contiguity of the words (*sannidhānam tu padāsyāsattirucyate*).³⁵

In other words, the contiguity of the terms in forms of subjunct and adjunct 'forming a relation is called *āsatti* (*anvaya-pratīyogī anuyogipadāyora vyavadhānamāsaāsatti*).³⁶ If a word is uttered in the morning and another word uttered in the noon, they cannot provide any meaning because they cannot be related at all due to having a long temporal gap. It is very difficult to apprehend the relation of both due to the non-identification of the subjunct-ness and adjunct-ness (*pratīyogitva* and *anuyogitva*) of the terms in a particular relation. When the first word is uttered in the morning, there remains an expectation of the second term which, though uttered in the noon, cannot be related to the first one as there is no criterion or scope to relate this. How do we know that the second word is in relation to the first one? The speaker might have uttered many sentences by this time about which we are least interested. Hence, if there is any lack of *āsatti*, it is nothing but the lack of *ākāṅkṣā*.

Though the Naiyāyikas have accepted four means of verbal comprehension: expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), semantic competency (*yogyatā*), contiguity (*āsatti*) and intention of the speaker (*tātparyā*), I think the fourth factor i.e., the intention of the speaker (*tātparyā*) has to be taken as the sole factor for the same. It is shown earlier that if there is the realisation of the intention (*tātparyā-upapatti*), there is

the primary meaning (*śakyārtha*). If there is the non-realisation of the intention (*tātparya-anupapatti*), the implicative meaning is to be resorted to. Hence the *tātparya* has got the prime role in understanding the meaning of a sentence, but not the other three. The sentence - 'There is a jar in the house (*gehe ghata*) is capable of generating a cognition of the relation of a jar (but not that of a cloth) in the house. Hence a sentence is said to mean the relation of a jar (but not that of cloth) in the house. It is the intention of the speaker. If a sentence does not have expectancy or semantic competency, it is understandable if the *tātparya* or intention of the speaker is realised or unrealised. In the case of unrealisability the implicative meaning is to be explored as said earlier. In fact the non-realisation of the intention in the given sentence is the seed of the implicative meaning through which the intention of the speaker is realised. In other words, the inconceivability of the intention in the primary meaning gives rise to explore the implicative meaning, which reveals the true intention (*tātparya upapatti*) of the speaker.³⁷

One can deliberately say a sentence which has no semantic competency (*yogyatā*) with a particular intention (*tātparya*) in mind or *vivaksā* (will to speak) in mind. An individual can utter, for example, the sentence --- 'The lake has fire' (*hrado vahnimān*) initially to prove indirectly that the lake cannot have fire. This type of cognition is called *āhārya-jñāna* which is defined as follows : '*virodhijñāna-kālīnecchāprayojya-jñānatvamāhāryajñānatvam*' or *vādhakālīnecchājanyam jñānam*'.³⁸ That is, the cognition which is generated out of one's own desire at the time when there is the contradictory cognition is called *āhāryajñāna*. In earlier

case it is deliberately said that the lake has fire in spite of knowing that the lake cannot have fire. Though there is no direct result for the deliberation of such artificial cognition due to the lack of semantic competency, it plays a great role in pointing out the exact nature of the object indirectly i.e. through *reductio-ad-absurdum* method (*tarka*), which is the intention of the speaker. The speaker wants to argue --- ‘If the lake has fire, it would have smoke also’ (*yadi hr̥ado vahnimān syāt tarhi dhūmavānapi syāt*). It is known through our experience that the lake has no smoke and hence it is proved that there is no fire. In the same way, it can be said that the usages that are apparently meaningless may bear some intention of the speaker.

The Naiyāyikas have pointed out the philosophical significance of intention (*Tātparya*) first in the context of enquiring the seeds of implicative meaning (*lakṣaṇā*). To them the non-realizability of intention or *tātparya* (*tātparyānupapatti*) is the seed of *lakṣaṇā* i.e. implicative meaning. In fact, the implicative meaning of the term, Gangā as found in the sentence Gangā yām ghosaḥ is the bank of the Gangā . The primary meaning of the terms ghosaḥ and Gangā are *ghosapallī* and a particular flow of water (*jalapravāha-viśesa*) respectively. The milk-man-colony cannot remain in a particular flow of water and hence there is the non-realizability of the relation (*anvayānupapatti*) between them. This can be removed, if the bank of the Gangā is taken as the meaning of the term Gangā through *lakṣaṇā*. In the same way, the implicative meaning of the term *ghosaḥ* is also possible. In the former case *lakṣaṇā* in the term Gangā is accepted, but not in the term *ghosaḥ*. In another, the reverse case is accepted. If

lakṣaṇā is accepted in either of the terms, there will not be the non-realisation in respect of relation (*anvayāmnupapatti*). If it is argued that the removal of the non-realisation of relation is the result of *lakṣaṇā*, the rule that the implicative meaning of the terms *Gaṅgā* and *ghoṣaḥ* are to be accepted becomes meaningless. In reply, it can be said that the rule becomes contradicted if it is accepted that the removal of the non-realisation of relation is both the result and seed of *lakṣaṇā*. Hence, it is admitted that the non-realisation of intention, but not of relation is the root of *lakṣaṇā*. The importance of the application of *lakṣaṇā* lies in the fact of removing the non-realisation of intention (*tātpāryāmnupapatti*) of the speaker.³⁹ which is also supported by Nāgeśa.⁴⁰

Now what is to be understood by the terms *tātpārya*? The desire of the speaker (*vakturicchā*) is *tātpārya*.⁴¹ In other words, it has been stated that when a word or a sentence is uttered with a desire to convey something, it is called *tātpārya* (*tatpratīticchayā uccāritatvam*).⁴² When there is the utterance of a particular word with a desire to convey his own idea to others, this particular desire or intention is *tātpārya*. The term *uccāritatva* is superfluous here on account of the fact that in the written statement of the dumb persons there is *tātpārya* in spite of not having utterance of the same. Hence, it is better to accept the former definition (i.e. the intention of the speaker is *tātpārya*) which is also supported by the grammarians.⁴³

If a speaker bears a particular intention to express that fish resides in the water and utters the same sentence (i.e. *Gaṅgā yam ghoṣaḥ*), the implicative meaning is to be accepted on the term '*ghoṣaḥ*' denoting 'fish' secondarily in order to bring the realisation in *tātpārya*. If a speaker, on the other hand, possesses an intention to

make others aware that the milkman-colony exists on the bank of the Gangā and utters the same sentence, the implicative meaning has to be accepted in the term Gangā as per the intention of a speaker as well as for the realisability of *tātparya*. As per the intention of the speaker the implicative meaning of the terms Gangā and *ghosaḥ* are to be taken as the 'bank of the Gangā' and 'fish' respectively. Hence, the realisability in respect of *tātparya* but not relation, is the seed of *lakṣaṇā*. Moreover, this point is substantiated when the implicative meaning is accepted in the sentence, *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām* (i.e. protect the card from crow etc.) in which there is obviously *tātparyānupapatti*, but not *anvayānupapatti*. In order to incorporate all types of *lakṣaṇā* it is better to accept the non-realisation in respect of *tātparya* is *lakṣaṇā* but not otherwise.

Let us see the role of *tātparya* in determining the meaning of an ambiguous sentence having various meanings. If someone utters the sentence *saindhavam ānaya*, it may mean the bringing of a horse or salt. The exact meaning of the term *saindhava* is to be determined according to the intention of the speaker uttered under a particular context.⁴⁴ That is why, the knowledge of *tātparya* is taken to be the cause of verbal comprehension. If it is so, the question may arise how a hearer will be able to know the intention of the speaker. One can know one's intention through the contact in the form of conjoined inherence (*saṁyukta samvaya*) with the mind. But through this contact the intention of others cannot be known, as such contact is not all possible with the intention existing in other selves.

It can be said in reply that in order to understand the intention of the speaker the context (*prakaraṇa*), qualifier (*viśesana*), space (*deśa*) etc serve as promoters. If in

the context of taking meal the term *saindhava* is uttered, it will mean salt. But if the context is otherwise (i.e. going to the battle-field) the same term would mean horse.⁴⁵

After hearing the sentence of the speaker uttered in a particular context, the hearer infers the intention in the following way. The term *saindhava* existing in the above mentioned sentence has got the *tātparya* in salt as it is uttered in the context taking meal (*etadvākyaghatakasaindhavapadamlavanatātparyāyakambhojanaprakarance prayuktatvāt*). In the same way, the hearer infers the *tātparya* of the same term as otherwise depending on a different context. In this way, the intention of the other person (i.e. the speaker) can be known through inference.⁴⁶

Let us consider the intention of different sentence uttered in a different context. If a teacher asks his student to do something after uttering the word *dvāram* (door) and pointing out to the door, the student may have confusion due to having multiple alternatives such as either closing or opening the door. Let us think of a situation when the door remains closed and suddenly there is a power cut. The teacher utters the term 'door' to a particular student, which would likely imply the opening of the door as the context is in favour of this. If the situation is otherwise (i.e., the door is open), and suddenly a dusty storm comes and the teacher utters the some word 'door' which would refer under this circumstance to the closing of the door. Hence, a word can give its accurate meaning only if the proper context is known by the hearer. Hence, the role of intention of the speaker dependent on the context has also to be accepted as a fundamental basis of verbal comprehension.

Dinākara has analysed the concept in the context of non-ambiguous sentence, *Tātparyā* is the intention of the speaker of conveying the sentences like 'Bring a jar' (*ghatam ānaya*) in which 'jar' has become a *prakāra* or qualifier, *karmatva* or the property of being an object attached to it has become a qualificand and superstratumness (*adheyata*) has become a relation. When there is the awareness of the sentence *ghatamānaya*, there is the knowledge of a jar, *karmatva* as denoted by the word *ghatam* and as this, being a property, remains in the substance *ghata*. Here the jar is the substratum and *karmatva* is the super stratum. This is the nature of awareness (*pratiti*) which is the intention of the speaker.⁴⁷ When a particular sentence is uttered in order to convey a particular intention, the knowledge of such intention of the speaker is the cause of verbal comprehension.⁴⁸ Rāmarudra further raises a different problem. To him ambiguity is of two types: ambiguity as involved in the sentences like *Saindhavamānya* etc. and as involved in *ghatamānaya patamānaya* etc. It may be argued that the intention of the speaker is very difficult to understand if two sentences 'Bring a jar', 'Bring a cloth' are uttered simultaneously without the copula 'and'. For there are two intentions, which leads the hearer to the land of confusion about the real intention of the speaker.⁴⁹ In order to remove this problem it is said that the particular intention of the speaker behind the utterance of a particular sentence must be taken as the cause of verbal comprehension of it. If it is said *sveto dhāvati* (i.e. the white runs), the intention of the speaker may sometimes be known as the object bearing white colour runs or sometimes as 'the dog etc run'.⁵⁰ Such an awareness of intention serves as the main factor for apprehending the meaning. If there is the doubt or confusion as to the intention of speaker or if there is the ascertainment of that

which is not intended by the speaker, the verbal comprehension from the sentence is not at all possible. Hence, the knowledge of intention has to be taken as the cause of the same.⁵¹

The context and other factors that are the promoters to the apprehension of *tātparya* cannot be taken as the cause of verbal comprehension due to the absence of common connotation in them. In other words, for verbal comprehension sometimes contexts, sometimes proximity and sometimes remoteness becomes the cause and hence there will be no common connotation in them.⁵² As all these factors like context etc. (*prakaraṇādi*) are the promoters to the origination of the knowledge of *tātparya*, the common connotation among them is possible. Hence, the knowledge of *tātparya* becomes the cause of verbal understanding as it comes under the law of parsimony.⁵³

By the term *ādi* attached to the term *prakaraṇādi*, the proximity (*samyoga*), remoteness (*dūratvam*) and co-existence (*sāhacārya*) are to be understood. When it is said, 'The jar is to be removed,' the intention is ascertained in the jar existing in front due to having proximity. In the sentence like 'Bring the jar here' the intention is ascertained in the jar existing in a distant place due to remoteness. In the sentence 'Bring the jar and cloth' the intention is ascertained in both jar and cloth due to their co-existence in the same place.⁵⁴ Apart from these Bhartṛhari has accepted a few more criteria for determining *tātparya*, such as contradiction (*virodhitā*), context (*prakaraṇa*), sign (*liṅga*), association of other word (*sabdasyanyasya sannidhih*), space (*deśa*), time (*kālah*) voice of an individual etc.⁵⁵

Let us see how the intention of the Vedic sentence and *Sukāvākya* can be understood. Even the *Vedic* statements contain some intention. God who is accepted as the agent of the *Vedas* is supposed to have such intention. God's knowledge of intention can be inferred as the cause of the verbal comprehension arising from the *Vedic* sentences. It may be argued that the knowledge of intention of the teacher should be taken as the cause of the said apprehension. This view is not tenable, because the knowledge of *tātparya* of the teacher cannot be the cause of the same due to the absence of him before the initial creation. It may, again, be argued that if the dissolution is not accepted, the question of initial creation cannot be thought of. This position is also not sound, because the existence of dissolution is known from the *Vedas* and hence there is the initial creation.⁵⁶ In the same way, the Divine knowledge of *tātparya* can be said to be the cause of the verbal understanding of the sentence uttered by a parrot without any intention of its own and revealing the true picture of reality (*samvādi*).⁵⁷ The knowledge of intention of the trainer is the cause of the verbal understanding of the sentence (uttered by a parrot) which does not correspond to the reality (*visamvādakata*) For the property of being non-correspondent to the reality (*visamvādatva*) lies on the intention of the trainer, but not on that of God, as in the intention of God *visamvāditva* is not possible.⁵⁸ Hence, the knowledge of *tātparya* existing in God cannot be cause of verbal understanding of the *visamvādi* statements made by a parrot.⁵⁹

The term *samvādi* in this context has been introduced to convey that God's knowledge of intention becomes the cause of understanding the sentence (uttered by a parrot) which is *pramā*. If the parrot, on the other hand, utters the sentence *vahninā siñcati* (i.e. watering with fire), God's knowledge of intention cannot be

the cause of the same, as God does not possess any intention, which does not correspond to the reality (*visamvādicchā*). In order to exclude such sentence from the purview of the Divine intention the term *samvādi* is introduced.⁶⁰

Generally, a speaker of the sentence is supposed to have a volition in favour of what is said in the sentence (*vākyānukuta*). As the Divine volition is working behind each and every effect, it becomes favourable to what is uttered by a parrot incidentally. As a parrot cannot have intention of its own, there are no other alternatives than to accept Divine intention behind it.⁶¹

It may be argued that if context, etc are taken as the cause of the potency of a word, it (i.e. potency) should be taken as the cause of meaning and hence there is no necessity of accepting another distinct cause i.e. *tātparya*.

This view is not tenable. For, when a word or a sentence having double meaning is uttered, the intention of the speaker cannot be known due to having potency or conveying two meanings, which leads to the impossibility of verbal understanding. Hence the knowledge of intention of the speaker has to be accepted as a determining factor in verbal understanding, which has been beautifully classified by Nāgeśa.⁶²

Moreover, for understanding a non-ambiguous sentence also the intention of the speaker plays a prominent role. It determines the potency of word giving rise to sentence.

Human actions in the forms of inclination (*pravṛtti*) refraining form (*nivṛtti*) and being indifferent (*upekṣā*) are dependent on the knowledge of the intention of the speaker. If someone utters an ambiguous sentence *navakambalam ānaya* (i.e.

bring *nava* blanket or blankets), no *pravṛtti* or inclination of the hearer is possible due to the non-understanding of intention on the speaker. In this case, it is not clearly known to us what the speaker intends to say by this sentence (i.e. whether the speaker intends to have a new blanket or nine blankets denoted by the word '*nava*'), which leads us to the land of inactivity.

It may be argued that the intention or *tātparya* of the speaker may be to confuse others under certain circumstance. It may happen that the speaker wants to hide his own intention by way of confusing others deliberately so that he does not face an undesired situation. At this stage, the concealing of his own intention may be treated as his own intention. In such cases the sentence cannot provide us with the proper understanding though the knowledge of the speaker's intention is known.

To reply, it can be said that if the speaker bears an intention to hide his own intention by using an ambiguous sentence, the sentence cannot give us an accurate non-ambiguous meaning. As the speaker's intention in adopting this method of confusing others is known to us, it falls under the category of *chala*. Unless it is known or detected, we cannot be successful in philosophical debate, which leads to highest good (*nihśreyas*) of seen (*dṛṣṭa*) type. To understand the particular intention of the speaker in adopting *chala* has got a positive role in philosophical debate. The philosophical significance of the inclusion of *chala* under sixteen categories lies on the fact that a true debater should not adopt *chala* in his speech unnecessarily, and at the same time it is essential to detect the same in an opponent's speech. This detection of *chala* is also possible through the knowledge of intention of the speaker to confuse others. If the intention of the speaker is

tātparya, it can be described as such and hence it is very much important in the field of philosophical discourse.

The non-realizability of *tātparya* is the seed not only of *lakṣaṇā* but also of suggestive (*vyañjanā*) and metaphorical meaning as accepted by the rhetoricians. Moreover, *tātparya* is clearly related or identical to *vivaksā* (i.e. intention to convey something) of the speaker. In other words, it is the *vivaksā* of the speaker, which is the *tātparya* of the sentence uttered by him. A sentence which is non-sensical in a particular context may seem to be significant in another context depending on the *vivaksā* of the speaker. A word or a sentence may seem to be significant if the speaker wants to signify something by uttering this. This desire of signifying (*vivakṣā*) is the *tātparya* of the sentence. Even the sentence signifying identity (e.g., 'London is London or 'Bombay is Bombay') may seem to be non-sensical apparently, but somehow this usage finds justification if the speaker wants to signify the incompatibility of the cities like London or Bombay through this. If this *vivaksā* is taken into account, this sentence will certainly bear *tātparya*.

Though Ragnunath does not accept the absence of the absurd entities like *Śaśaśṛṅgam nāsti* etc. (which is called *alīkapratīyogikābhāva*) as real absence, it is known from the ordinary experience that such usages provide us with some information. Though the direct meaning (*śakyārtha*) of this is not possible, these usages give some implicative meaning due to the *tātparyānupapatti* in the direct meaning, which leads to exploration of some secondary meaning. Because it signifies something when it is used or uttered by someone secondarily on the strength of *tātparyānupapatti* in the direct meaning. Raghunath's position is

substantiated by assigning the following reason in favour of him. For understanding an absence the knowledge of the absentee (*pratiyogi*) is the precondition, which is not at all possible in the case of absurd entities like *Śāśaṅga*, castle in the air, etc. This view of Raghunatha. I believe, is acceptable so far as the direct meaning (*Śakyārtha*) of the sentence is concerned. But it cannot be denied that these sentences convey us some sense which is available secondarily. Otherwise, these would not have been uttered by the speaker. The utterance of a particular sentence in a particular context by an individual presupposes some *vivaksā*, which is the intention. Considering the particular aspect Dharmakīrti has accepted the importance of *vivaksā* in determining the meaning of a word or a sentence in the following *Kārikā*.

'vaktrvyāpāravisaye sortho buddhau prakāśate prāmānyam tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanivandhanam'.⁶³

This is, in the expression of a speaker the corresponding image appears in our awareness. It is constituted and evidenced by the words, but not by the meaning of the same. When someone says, 'I am building a castle in the air', the intention of the speaker is to convey to us some image about some absurd events through this sentence, and hence it is not all non-sensical.

Let us consider whether the intention of the speaker can be treated as a cause of verbal understanding only in the case of ambiguous sentences as advocated by a section of scholars. This view is not tenable. For, though in an ambiguous sentence the intention of a speaker is to be known perfectly, it is also essential for a non-ambiguous sentence also. Otherwise how can a sentence be known as 'non-

ambiguous?’ As the intention of the speaker is perfectly reflected in the language used by him, it is taken as a non-ambiguous one. When a sentence is uttered, the particular intention of a speaker is expressed there (through which he intends to convey something). Otherwise the utterance of a sentence would be of no use. Hence, the intention of the speaker cannot be denied in providing the sentence meaning though it is true that the role of it is much more prominent in the case of an ambiguous sentence. The role of *tātparya* in non-ambiguous sentences like *ghatamānaya patamānaya*, etc., has already been pointed out. The *samyoga*, distance, co-existence etc., are taken as the indicators (*jñāpaka*) of a non-ambiguous sentence.

The above-mentioned view can be substantiated from the standpoint of Jayanta. *Tātparya* is the knowledge, which is endowed with the capability of expressing a particular comprehension (*tātpratīti janana yogyatva*). To him the words of a sentence can convey to us their distinct (non-related) meanings like iron-stakes and hence their construction or relation among them is not possible. These isolated meanings cannot be the meaning of a sentence as they are not related to each other. This relation is not possible through *abhidhāvṛtti*. Hence, *tātparyavṛtti* has to be accepted as a connecting factor among the word-meanings. The power of *Abhidhā* lies on giving rise to primary meaning of a word (*śuddhapadartha-visayini*) while *tātparya* gives rise to connected meaning. It has already been accepted that God’s intention is the cause of the *samvādi* sentence uttered by a parrot as a parrot cannot have an intention of its own. This view again needs thorough review. As God is taken as a *Nimttakāraṇa* of all activities. His intention etc. would have to be taken as common cause to all activities, including our utterance of word or the utterance

of sentence by a parrot. If God's intention is common cause to the *samvādi śukavākya*, it cannot be taken as an uncommon cause of verbal understanding. In fact, the sentences uttered by a parrot though valid bears no intention of its own, but on the other hand, it repeats that it imitates from others or trainer and *samavādatva* is just a co-incident. If there is any intention at all, it is of others from which it has learnt and through it the intention of that person is reflected.

Naiyāyikas do not accept suggestive meaning or *vyañjanā*. They say that *vyañjanā* is nothing but the extension of *lakṣanā*. It is not acceptable to us. Because, *vyañjanā* has got a completely different role in our day to day communication, which is not covered by mere implication. That is why, the role of suggestive meaning in literature or literacy form of art is accepted as inevitable. In fact, it is suggestion, which takes a piece of writing to the level of creative writing (*kāvya*). When it is said '*Lilākamalapatrāni ganayamāsa pārvati*' i.e. *pārvati* easily counted the petals of the lotus, it gives rise to the meaning the *pārvati* became ashamed of hearing her own marriage talk. This understanding is not merely implicative, but more than this. Such understanding is possible, had there been a separate category of meaning called *vyañjanā* or *dhvani*. That which is not expressible through words or odd to express can easily be expressed through suggestion or *dhvani*. This suggestion or *dhvani* is not merely the extension of *lakṣanā*.

Notes and References :

1. Cf. *jñānaṃ vyāptijñānaṃ sādṛśyajñānaṃ padajñānañ ca tad eva karaṇaṃ yeṣāṃ tāni jñānakaraṇakni anumityupamitiśabdāni*. – *Nyāyabodhinī* on *Tarkasaṃgraha*, p. 42. (ed. by Satkari Sharma Vangiya, Choukhamba).
2. Cf. *padajñānantu karaṇam* – *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, verse no. 81.
3. Cf. *dvāraṃ tatra padārthadhīḥ* – *Ibid*.
4. Cf. *Nyāya – Sūtra*, - 1.1.7.
5. Cf. *āptopadeśāḥ śabdah iti gautamasūtrāmuroddhāc chabdasya pramānatve doṣaḥ syādataḥ śābdabodhe padajñānaṃ kāraṇam ity abhihitam* – *muktāvalīsaṃgraha* on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (under verse no. 81).
6. Cf. *prayogahetubhūtayathārthajñānavattvam* – *Nyāyabodhinī* on *Tarkasaṃgraha*, op.cit., p.65.
7. Cf. *padajñānamkaranam, vṛttijñānasahakṛtapadajñānajanyapadārthopas hitirvyāpārah, vākyārthajñānam śābdabodhah phalam* – *Ibid*.
8. Cf. *idam gavānayanam svagocarapravṛttijanyam, ceṣṭātvāt, madiyastanapānādivat* – *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Nāmaprakarana)*. Prose portion on verse no. 20.
9. Cf. *sāgavānayanapravṛtṭiḥsvavisayadharmikakāyatājñānajanyā pravṛttitvāt nijapravṛttivat* – *Ibid*.
10. Cf. *gavānayanagocara taj jñānam asādhāraṇahetukam kāryatvāt, ghatavat* – *Ibid*.
11. Cf. *ghatādivyavahāraḥ svatantrapurusaprayojyaḥ vyavahāratvāt, ādhunikakalpitalipyādivyavahāravat* – *Dinakarī* on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (under verse no. 1), p. 29, Choukhamba edition.

12. Cf. *asmāc chabdādayam artho vodhavyaīīśvarechārūpā* – *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (under verse no. 81).
13. *A particular flow of water limited by canal brought by Bhagīratha. Cf. bhagīrathakhātāvachinnajalpravāhaviśeṣā* – Ibid.
14. Cf. *evam Gangā padajanyabodhaviṣayatvaprakārakechhāyās tīre 'pi sattvāc chaktaiva tīrabodhopapatteḥ lakṣaṇocchedāpattiḥ* – Dinakarī on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no. 81.
15. Cf. *navyāstu īsvarecchā na śakti, kintu icchaiva.* – *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse no. 81.
16. Cf. *śaktigrahaṣṭu vyākaraṇāditaḥ tathāhi śaktigrahaṁ vyākaraṇopamānakosāptavākyād vyavahārataś ca vākyasya śeṣād vivṛter vadanti sānnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāh* – Ibid.
17. Cf. *sad api vyavahārenā nupagrhitam asatā tulyam atyantāsaccaloke śaśaviṣānādiprāptāvirbhāvatirobhāvam...vācā samutthāpyamānamukhya sattāyuktam iva* – Punyarāja on *Vākyapadīya*.
18. Cf. *siṣādhayiṣāviraha-viśiṣṭā-siddhyabhāvaḥpakṣatā* – *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under verse no. 70.
19. Cf. *Vākyapadīya*, III. 14.563-566.
20. Cf. *jñāpakatvaṁ nāma jñānajanukajñānaviṣayatvam* – *Navyanyāya-bhāṣā-pradīpa*, edited by K. Tarkacharya, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1973, p.9.
21. “*Tātṭparyānupapattirlakṣaṇāvijam*”. *Tarkasaṁgraha-Dīpikā*. Henceforth, TSD.
22. “*Vastutastutātṭparyānupapattipratisandhanamevatadvījam*”. Paramalaghumanjuṣa. Henceforth. PLM.

23. “*Vakturiccha tu tātparyam parikīrtitam*”. *Bhāsāpariccheda*, verse no. 84.
24. “*Tatpratitīcchayāuccharitvarupa tātparyajñānamca vākyārthajñānahetuh*”. TSD.
25. Ibid.
26. *Vedāntaparibhasa, Āgamapāriccheda*. Henceforth - VP.
27. “*Parantu yadyanvayānupapattirlakṣaṇāvijamsyāt tada yaṣṭhih pravaśayetyādaulakṣaṇānasyāt. Yaṣṭhiṣupraveśānvayasyānupapatterabhāvāt. Teneyaṣṭhipraveśebhojanatātparyanupapattyā yaṣṭhidhāresu lakṣaṇā. Evam kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatāmityādau kākapadasya dadhyupaghātake lakṣaṇā, sarvato dadhirakṣāyāstātparyaviṣayatvāt*”. *Siddhantamuktavali* on verse no. 82.
28. “*Lakṣaṇā ca na padamātravrttih, kintu vākyavrttirapi. Yathā gambhirāyām nadyām ghosah ityatra gambhirāyām nadyām iti padadvyasamudāyasya tīre lakṣaṇā*”. V.P.
29. “*Nanu vākyasyāśaktataya katham śakyasambandharūpā lakṣaṇā? Ucyateśaktyā yat padasambandhena jñāpyate tatsambandho lakṣaṇā. Śaktijnapyāśca yathā padārthastathā vākyārtho pīti na kacidanupapattih*”. Ibid.
30. *Bhāsāpariccheda* verse no. 83. henceforth – B.P.
31. “*Ekapadārthe’ parapadārthasambandho योग्यते त्थार्थह Tajjñānābhāvacca vahinā siñcatītyādau na śābdabodhah ...vahinā siñcatītyādausekevahnikaranakatvābhāvarūpayogyataniścayenaprativandh ānnaśābdabodhah*”. *Siddhantamuktavali* on verse 83. Henceforth S.M.
32. B.P. on verse 84.
33. S.M. on verse 84.

34. “Dvāramityatrādhyāharamvināpratiyogyalābhātnasvārthānvayānubhāva katvam”. *Tattvacintāmani (Śabdakhanda)*. “dvāramityatretiadhyaharam vineti anayatīyadipadadhyāhāram vinā na svārtheti na dvārakarmakānayanānukūlakṛtimānityanvayavodhakajanakatvamityarthah atrahetumahapratiyogyalabhaditikanibhutanvayapratiyogyupasthitercbh avadityarthah”. *Māthuri on Tattvacintāmanih (Sabdakhandā)*.
35. *B.P* verse no. 82.
36. *S.M*, verse no. 82.
37. “Gehe ghatah iti gehe ghatasamsargapratījānanayogyam na tu paṭasamsargapratījānanayogyamiti tadvākyaṁ ghatasamsargaparam na tu paṭasamsargaparamityucyate”. *V. P. (Agamapāriccheda)*.
38. *Nyāyakosa* - M.M. Bhimacharya Jhalkikar (ed), BORI, Pune, 1928, p. 136.
39. *Tātparyānupapattirlaksanāvijam. Tarkasaṅgraha-Dīpika*. Henceforth TSD.
40. *Vastutastutātparyānupapattipratisandhānamevātadvijam. Paramalaghumañjusā*, henceforth, PLM.
41. *Vakturicchā tu tātparyam parikīrtitam. Bhāsāpāriccheda*. Verse No. 84.
42. *Tatpratīticchayā uccaritatvarūpatātparyajñānam ca vākyaṁrthajñānahetuh*, TSD.
43. *Nānārthasthale loke tātparyantu etatpadam vākyaṁ va etadarthapratyayāya mayoccaryate iti prayokturicchārūpam. PLM*.
44. *Yadi, tātparyajñānam kāranam na syāt tadā saindhavamānāyetyādau kvacidaśvasya kvacillavansasya bodha iti na syāt. Siddhāntamuktāvali* on verse No. 84.
45. *Prakaranādīkam tātparyagrāhakam TSD. Tātparyaniyāmakam ca loke prakaraṇādīkameva ato bhojanaprakaraṇe saidhavāmanāyetyukte saindhavapadena lavaṇapratyayah, yuddhāvasare savpratyayah PLM*.
46. *Adhyapanā* on TSD by N.C. Goswami.

47. *Ghatamānayetyādukarmatvaviśesyakādheyatāsamsargakaghata-
prakāarakapratīticchā vaktustātparyam.* Dinākari on S.M. on verse no. 84.
48. *Tādṛśecchayoccaritamidam vākyamityākāarakam śrotustātparyajñānam
śābdabodhe kāranam.* Ibid.
49. *Tatracaghatamānaya patamānayetī vākyādvaya prayogasthale
vakturicchādvayajnanot kasmāt vākyāt kidṛśastasya bodho bhavatīti
nirnetumaśakyam.* Rāmarudrī.
50. *Tatra kadācidchetagunaviśistasya kadācit kukkurāderbodhasya tātparyā
jñānaniyamvatvāt.* Dinākari on S.M. on verse 84.
51. *Tātparyasamśaye vyatirekaniścāye vā śābdabodhānūdayacchābdabodhe
tātparyajñānam kāranam.* Dinākari on S. on verse 84.
52. *Na ca tātparyagrāhakanam prakaranādinam śābdabodha-
kāranatvamastvīti Vācyam tesāmananugamāt.* Siddhāntamuktīvalī on
Verse 84.
53. *Tātparyajñāna – janakatvena tesāmanugame tu tātparyajñānameva
lāghavāt kāraṇamastu.* Ibid.
54. *Samyogah sānnidhyam, viyogah dūratvam. Sāhacaryamekadeśavrttitvam.
Ghato pasāraniya ityādāu samīpasthe ghate tātparyagrahah samīpyāt.
Ghatamānayetyādau ghatapadasya dūrasthe ghate tātparyāgraho dūratvat.
Ghatam patañcānayetyādau ghatapatapadayorekadeśavrttighatapatayoh
sāhacaryāt.* Rāmarudrī on Dinākari on S.M. verse 84.
55. *Samyoga viprayogaśca sāhacaryam virodhitā arthaḥ prakaraṇam liogam
śābdasyānyasya sannidhiḥ sāmartyamucitah deśo kālo vyaktīśvarādayah
śābdasyānavacchede viśesasmrtihetavaḥ.* Vākyapadīya 2/315-316.

56. *Itthamca vedasthale'pi tātparyā janānārthamiśvaraḥ kalpyate. Na ca tatrādhyāpakatātparyajñānamkāraṇamītijñānam, sargādvadhyāpakābhāvāt. Na ca pralaya eva nāstīti kutah śargadiriti vācyam. Pralayasyāgameṣu pratipādyatvāt. Siddhantamuktavali on verse 84.*
57. *Śukīya tātparyābhāvena agatyā īśvarasyaivavaktrtva-svīkarāditi mantavyam. Rāmarudrī on Dinākarī on S.M. verse no. 84.*
58. *Īśvarecchāyām visamvāditvāditvābhāvāditi bhāvah. Dinākarī on S.M. verse 84.*
59. *Itthañca śukavyākyepi īśvarīyatātparyajñānam kāraṇam Visamvādiśukavākye tu śikṣayitureva tātparyajñānam kāraṇam vācyam. Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse 84. Henceforth S.M.*
60. *Pramājanaketyarthah idam ca vahninā siñcatītiśukavākyajanyaśābdabodhe īśvarīyatātparyajñānam na hetuh, Īśvarasya. Visamvādicchāpatteri-tyatastādrśavākyavyudāsārthamuktam. Rāmarudrī on Dinākarī on S.M. verse 84.*
61. *Vākyānukūlprayatnavata eva vaktrtvena īśvaraprayamasya kāryamātrānukūlatvenaśukavākyānukūlatvāditi bhāvah. Śukīyatātparyābhāvena agatyā īśvarasyaiva, vaktrtvasvīkarāditi mantavyam. Ibid.*
62. *Nanu prakaranādīṅnam śaktinīyamakatve śaktyaiva nirvāhe kim tātparyeneti cenna. Asmacchabdārthadvayaviśesyako bodho jāyate arthadvaye śaktisattvāt tātparyam kveti janima ityanubhavavirodhat. PLM.*
63. *Pramānavārtika.*
Nirapeksaprayogeyahśalākākalpanābhāvāt & Tadanvitābhīdhānetu padāntaramarthakam & Abhidhātrmata śaktih padānām svārthanishhata tesām tātparyāśaktistu samsargamavadhi. Nyāyamañjari, pp. 370-72, Choukhamba 1936.