

CHAPTER – IV

A Critical appreciation or refutation of the views of opponents.

The Naiyāyikas have rejected the views of *Mīmāṃṣakas* and Grammarians about the nature of *śabda*. It is already mentioned that the Naiyāyikas have accepted *śabda* as a separate *pramāṇa*. In defining *śabda-pramāṇa*, the Naiyāyikas are of the opinion : ‘*Āptavākyam śabdah. Āptah tu yathārtjavaktā*.¹ That means, an authoritative person’s statement is *śabda* and an authoritative person is one who makes correct statement. The *Mīmāṃṣakas* have divided testimony into two kinds : personal or *pauruṣeya* and impersonal or *apauruṣeya*. The words or sentences which are uttered by trust-worthy persons are called personal testimony and we may doubt about the validity of such testimony. So, according to Prabhākara, personal testimony cannot be described as *śabda-pramāṇa*. *Vedic* sentences are not uttered by any person. So, these are described as *apauruṣeya* testimony and Prabhākara said that only *Vedic* sentences are *pramāṇa*. The Naiyāyikas have criticised this view. They say that all testimony is personal. To be authoritative *śabda-pramāṇa*, a word or sentence must be uttered by a trust-worthy person. The words of trust-worthy persons may be of two types – some words are concerned about perceptible objects and some words are concerned about imperceptible objects.

These trust-worthy assertions relate to the visible world (*dr̥ṣṭārtha*) or the invisible (*adr̥ṣṭārtha*). That quinine cures fever is of the former kind, that

we gain heaven by virtue is of the latter. The words of the *ṛṣis* deal with the latter. Their statements are to be relied on, since their assertions about the verifiable world have been found to be true. The authors of the *Vedas* are *āptas*, or reliable persons, since they had an intuitive perception of the truths, love for humanity and the desire to communicate their knowledge.²

Again, testimony may be of two types – secular and scriptural. Scriptural testimony comprises of the words of God, like the *Vedas*. So they are valid. In the case of secular testimony we can say that words uttered by trust-worthy persons are valid, while words uttered by untrustworthy persons are not valid.

The Naiyāyikas have criticised the view of the *Mīmāṃśakas* that the *Vedas* are impersonal. The *Pūrva-Mīmāṃśa* system did not believe in the existence of God. According to Prabhākara, *Veda* is eternal. An eternal thing cannot be produced. But the Naiyāyikas do not accept this view. They say that all literary works like the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata* etc. are nothing but collection of words. All collection of words or all books are created by some persons. The *Vedas* are also collection of statements or words. So, there must have an author of the *Vedas*. The argument may be shown thus :

Any collection of words or statements has a personal origin.

The *Veda* is a collection of words or statements.

∴ The *Veda* has a personal origin.³

So, the *Vedas* cannot be eternal and the *Mīmāṃśakas* claim about the eternality of the *Vedas* is not right. The supporting instances of the major premise are the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata* etc. As there is no contrary instance of the major

premise so it is non-deviated. There is no fault of the minor premise as it is a statement of facts. Thus, there is no defect in the form of the above argument. So, we can say that the conclusion is true. From the above argument it is proved that the *Veda* is personal. It may be said that the above argument cannot prove that the person who has created the *Veda* is God. Here the *Mīmāṃśakas* *Mīmāṃśakas* point out that the major premise of the above argument is not unconditionally true. To be true here probans or the *hetu* must be vitiated by a '*upādhi*'. The *hetu* or probans of the above argument is 'being a statement'. The *sādhyā* and *pakṣa* of the above argument are 'being of personal origin' and '*Veda*'. The *Mīmāṃśakas* say that here the *hetu* 'being a statement' can establish the *sādhyā* only if the *hetu* is concerned with a *upādhi* or, in other words, if the *hetu* is concerned with a qualification, then it can establish the *sādhyā*. The qualification of *upādhi* here is 'being of remembered authorship'. Thus, the *Mīmāṃśakas* say that in the above argument the major premise would be thus : Wherever there is the fact of 'being a statement with remembered authorship' there is the fact of 'being of personal origin'. With this new major premise the minor premise which is 'The *Veda* is a collection of statements' cannot be applied because we cannot remember about the author of *Veda*. So, the conclusion 'The *Vedas* have a personal origin' cannot be deduced here. To deduce the above conclusion we should change the minor premise thus : 'The *Veda* is a collection of statements with remembered authorship'. If we can replace this statement in the place of the minor premise of the above argument, then we can prove that 'The *Vedas* have a personal origin'. But actually we cannot replace the above statement in the place of the minor premise. This is so because no one can remember the divine authorship of *Veda*.

The *Mīmāṃśakas* say that as in this case we cannot change the minor premise, so the Naiyāyikas' view about the divine origin of *Veda* is not acceptable. The *Mīmāṃśakas* say that here the *upādhi* 'being of remembered authorship' is actually an *upādhi* because it fulfils the conditions of *upādhi* which are *sādhyavyāpaka* and *sādhana-avyāpaka*. *Sādhyavyāpaka* means 'vyāpaka of the *sādhyā*'. 'The above *upādhi* is *sādhyavyāpaka*' means : wherever there is the *sādhyā* 'being of personal origin' or '*pauruṣeyatva*' there is the *upādhi* 'the fact of remembered authorship' or '*smāryamāṇa-karṭṛtva*'. That means, where the *sādhyā* i.e., '*pauruṣeyatva*' is present, the *upādhi* '*smāryamāṇa-karṭṛtva*' is also present. We should accept this. So, the above *upādhi* is *sādhyavyāpaka*. Again, the *upādhi* is '*sādhana-avyāpaka*' which means, it is not right to say that where the *hetu* or *sādhana* is present there the *upādhi* is also present. That means the presence of *hetu* in the absence of *upādhi* is called *sādhana-avyāpaka*. The *upādhi* here is *sādhana-avyāpaka* as it is not right to say that wherever there is '*vākyaṭva*' or 'the fact of being a statement' there is '*smāryamāṇa-karṭṛtva* or the fact of remembered authorship'. We should also accept this statement because it is known to us that *Veda* is a collection of statements and we cannot talk about the remembered authorship of *Veda*. It is not possible for us to remember about the author of *Veda*. Thus the quality 'being of remembered authorship' is *sādhyavyāpaka* as well as *sādhana-avyāpaka*. So, in the case of the probans of the above argument given by the Naiyāyikas, 'being of remembered authorship' or '*smāryamāṇakarṭṛtva*' is a vitiating qualification or *upādhi*. Thus the *Mīmāṃśakas* say that the above argument is not valid and the above argument cannot prove that the *Veda* is *pauruṣeya* or created by God.

But the Naiyāyikas say that the *Veda* is created by God. They say that ‘being of remembered authorship’ or ‘smārya-māṇakarṭṛtva’ is not actually an upādhi of the hetu of the above argument. This is so because ‘smāryamāṇakarṭṛtva’ is *sādhyavyāpaka* no doubt, but it is not *sādhaṇavyāpaka*. The vitiating qualification or *upādhi* here is actually *sādhaṇavyāpaka*. Because here we can certainly say that : “Whenever there is ‘the fact of being a statement’, there is ‘the fact of remembered authorship’”⁴ There is actually no uncertainty about the remembered authorship of the *Veda*, as stated by the *Mīmāṃśakas*. There was a definite tradition among the sage Goutama and his disciples that the *Vedas* have divine origin. Depending upon a *Vedic* statement which is ‘*Tasmāt tepānāt trayāḥ vedāḥ ajāyanta*’ or ‘from that thinking Being were produced the three *Vedas*’ Goutama and his disciples have claimed for ages that the *Veda* is the word of God. Thus the Naiyāyikas have rejected the view of the *Mīmāṃśakas* that the *Veda* is impersonal and they say that like other testimony, *Veda* is also personal and it is God who has created the *Veda*. The *Mīmāṃśakas* again say that the *varṇa* or letters are eternal. Every literary work is a collection of letters. The *Veda* is a literary work. So it is also a collection of letters. Every verbal or written statement is a collection of words and every word is a collection of some *varṇas*. The *varṇas* are symbolized by different letters. Thus, every statement is a collection of letter-sounds. The *Mīmāṃśakas* say that the letter sounds are eternal.

A word is a series of letters, which manifest themselves in a close succession. But these letters are indestructible.⁵

It seems that they are produced, but actually this is not so. It appears that a letter or varṇa is the same though the acts of utterance are different. This sense of identity of different 'E' sounds appearing at different times is an instance of recognitive perception. The sense of identity of different 'E' sounds or recognitive perception is admitted as veridical. So we can say that the letter-sounds or varṇas have no origin at any particular time. As the letter-sounds or varṇas are not produced at any particular time, so they are eternal. The *Vedas* are the collection of letter-sounds. So, the *Vedas* cannot have an origin. Thus the *Mīmāṃsakas* say that the *Veda*, which is a collection of eternal letters, is itself also eternal. The *Vedas* are not created by any person or by God.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept the view that letters or varṇas are eternal. Annambhaṭṭa supports the view that we have definite experience of the non-eternal character of the letter-sounds. When a letter-sound 'ga' is uttered then there arises the knowledge of its production and just after that moment there arises the knowledge of its destruction. Thus the knowledge of non-eternality of letter-sounds arises in our minds.

A sound is an effect to be produced by our effort because it is experienced by us only when we make an effort so that the air within our body comes in contact with a particular part of our body and becomes separated from it. A sound is also destructible because it is not experienced after its pronunciation. We know that a sound has perished because we do not experience it as lasting even for a moment soon after it has been pronounced. A sound is an effect because we use it as an object of the verb 'to make'.⁶

But the *Mīmāṃṣakas* try to reject this view with the help of recognitive perception. Annāmbhaṭṭa does not reject such type of recognitive perception but he says that we should take the sense of 'similarity' of two or more letter-sounds instead of taking the sense of 'identity' or 'sameness' of these sounds. We should take the view that two or more letter-sounds are exactly *similar* but not *identical*. Annāmbhaṭṭa says that there is no cogent ground for rejecting the prima facie verdict of our experience of the production and destruction of the letter-sounds. Annāmbhaṭṭa thinks that in some cases we should not take recognitive perception as its face value. He gives the example of the flame of a lamp. It seems to us that the flame at every moment is the same. But this experience of us is wrong. Here we should call that the flame at every moment is *similar*, not *identical*. In different letter-sounds like 'a' there is the eternal universal 'a-ness'. The sense of identity of different 'a' sounds arises in our minds due to this eternal universal. So the letter-sounds or *varṇas* are uttered, at different times are actually not the same. When the *varṇas* are uttered, they are produced and after that they are destroyed. We think them as identical only because the eternal universal which are residing in the *varṇas*. Annāmbhaṭṭa again points out that a sentence is not a mere collection of letter-sounds or *varṇas*, but by the serial order of the *varṇas* a sentence is formed. The *Vaidika* sentiments are also nothing but the serial order of the letter-sounds or *varṇas*. The serial order of the *varṇas* is dependent on the person who is uttering them. The serial order of letter-sounds or *varṇas* of *Vaidika* statements are thus dependent on person. So, *Vaidika* statements, like other statements cannot be eternal. Thus the Naiyāyikas refute the view of the opponents that the *Veda* has no

origin. God is the creator of *Veda* and as *Vaidika* statements are created by God, so they are authoritative.

Naiyāyikas have rejected the *Mīmāṃśakas* view about *śakti*. According to *Mīmāṃśakas*, *śakti* is something inherent in a word. The *Mīmāṃśakas* say that it is not possible for us to subsume *śakti* under any of the seven categories accepted by the Nyāya-vaiśeṣikas. They say that a word is a kind of sound, which is a substance or *dravya*. The *śakti* of a term does not come from outside, but it is intrinsic to it. The *Mīmāṃśakas* say that *śakti* is not identical with the sound-substance, though *śakti* is intrinsic to it. We cannot describe the signifying power or *śakti* as a quality because we cannot identify it with any one of the 24 qualities accepted by the Vaiśeṣika school. We cannot subsume *śakti* under any one of the five remaining categories, namely *karma*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣya*, *samavāya* and *abhāva*. So, the *Mīmāṃśakas* have accepted *śakti*, as a new kind of entity and this entity is different from the seven categories of Nyāyayikas. The above view of *Mīmāṃśakas* is not accepted by the Nyāyayikas. According to the Nyāyayikas, *śakti* is nothing but the relation between a word and its meaning.

This capacity of words to mean their respective objects is called their *śakti* or potency, and it is said to be due to the will of God.⁷

Śakti is not inherent in a word. It is extrinsic i.e., it comes from outside. *Śakti* is totally external and is due to some convention. This convention is the desire of a conscious being. The meaning of a word is determined by the will of this conscious being.

Just as Pāṇini has created a convention for his grammar, in which the word *vṛddhi* denotes the three vowels, *ā, ai, au*, similarly, in ordinary language, a convention is created by the first user of the language in the following manner : ‘from the word X, the object Y should be cognised’, ‘let the word X designate the object Y’. This usually takes the form of a will on the part of the first user of the language. Language learning involves learning this convention.⁸

The Naiyāyikas say that generally the conscious being on whose desire the meaning – relation is based is a super human being or God. In some cases the meaning relation may be based on human being. So, the meaning relation is based on the will of conscious being, human or Divine. So it is a quality and it is not a new category.

The *Mīmāṃsakas* say that by signifying power of a term or by the *śakti* of a term directly signified a class-character or universal and the particular things which have the class-character or the particulars coming under the universal is signified indirectly.

Words denote classes and not individuals. When we say ‘bring a cow’, we do not mean a particular cow, but any animal possessing the features of a cow. The word denotes the class or form, since it has action for its object. If individuals are denoted by words, a generic idea like “cow” would be impossible. Again, a word cannot denote all individuals, since then it would possess as many potencies as there are individuals. It cannot denote a collection of individuals, since then it would be undergoing changes, as some individuals die out and others get in. Again, if the word means a single individual only, there cannot be an eternal connection between word

and meaning, and action would be impossible, as it would be difficult to decide which individual is meant.⁹

This is so because when a term like 'cow' is uttered then we cannot understand only an object without any character, but we can understand an object having certain characters or attributes. Here what is understood is a complex of some 'character' and 'something' having that character. Our understanding of 'something having some character' presupposes our awareness of that character. When we are going to understand the meaning of a term like 'cow' then what is first presented to our mind is the universal 'cowness' which is present to all particular cows. The knowledge of particular cow having the universal 'cowness' arises afterwards. This latter knowledge does not arise directly like the knowledge of 'cowness'. That means, this latter knowledge of particular cow arises indirectly. So, by the amalgamation of two cognitions, one direct and one indirect, we can understand the meaning of a term. The *Mīmāṃsakas* opine that by the signifying power or *śakti* of a term the first knowledge arises i.e., the knowledge of universal arises by the signifying power or *śakti* of a term because the universal is at first presented to our mind after hearing a term and the knowledge of particular thing coming under the universal arises through implication. Nīlakaṇṭha observes that thinking about logical economy or *lāghava* the *Mīmāṃsakas* take the position that the signifying power of a term directly signifies the universal. The *Mīmāṃsakas* thought that if this is not so, then we should accept that by the signifying power of a term we can understand the particulars. But particulars are infinite in number and may exist at past, present and future. So, we should accept that the term 'cow' has an infinity of signifying power. From the standpoint of *lāghava* this alternative is

not satisfactory. So, the *Mīmāṃśakas* take the position that by the signifying power of a term we can understand the universal.

The Naiyāyikas have rejected this view. According to Nyāya, by the signifying power or *śakti* of a term the particulars characterised by class-character is signified. Only a class-character or universal is not signified by the signifying power of a term. If we accept the *Mīmāṃśakas* view that by the signifying power of a term the class-character or universal is signified then we cannot explain satisfactorily how the particulars come before mind. According to Nyāya, understanding the meaning of a term is a unitary thing. The *Mīmāṃśakas* view goes against this unitary thing. But if we say that the signifying power of a term signified the particulars characterised by class-character then we can avoid this difficulty. The Naiyāyikas have accepted signifying power as a unity although the unitary signifying power signified an infinity of particulars.

The Nyāya holds that a word denotes an individual bearing a genus and with a particular form or configuration. The word 'cow' denotes an individual cow bearing the genus of cow and with a particular configuration or arrangement of parts, e.g., a hunch, horns and a dewlap.¹⁰

To Annambhaṭṭa if we accept the *Mīmāṃśa* view then we cannot understand the meaning of such sentences. 'Bring a cat', 'The man is dead' etc., In the first sentence, if the verb 'bring' is applicable to the universal 'catness' then the sentence will be meaningless because it is not possible to bring the universal. In the same way, the second sentence will be meaningless if the verb 'dead' is applicable to the universal 'man-ness'. The above sentences will be meaningful if the term 'cat' signifies 'a particular cat having the class-character catness' and the

term ‘man’ signifies a particular man ‘having the class character ‘man-ness’. Thus, the Naiyāyikas prove that by the signifying power of a term what is signified is the particulars as qualified by the class-character or universal.

The Nyāyikas have accepted *lakṣaṇā*. But they have criticised the *Mīmāṃśakas* view of *gauṇīvr̥tti*. The *Mīmāṃśakas* say that sometimes we understand the meaning of a term used in a sentence indirectly, but that indirect sense is different from the indirect sense which is called *lakṣaṇā*. They have described such indirect sense as *gauṇīvr̥tti*. As for example, “The young scholar is fire”. Here the term ‘fire’ is used in an indirect sense. Here the term is used not in the sense of ‘an object, having burning property’ but in the sense of ‘purity’ and ‘brightness’. The *Mīmāṃśakas* have given the opinion that such type of indirect sense is not apprehended by *lakṣaṇā*, but by *gauṇīvr̥tti* or figurative sense. But the Nyāyikas have rejected this view. According to Nyāya, *gauṇīvr̥tti* or figurative sense is the same thing as *lakṣaṇā*. In Tarkasaṃgraha Dīpikā Annāmbhaṭṭa points out “*Gauṇī api lakṣaṇā eva, lakṣamāṇa guṇa savamdharūpā*.”¹¹ That means *gauṇīvr̥tti* is related to the qualities of a thing, which is understood by the direct signifying power of a term. According to Nīlakantha, *lakṣaṇā* is constituted by the relation to the direct significate or *śakya-sambandha*. This *śakya sambandha* may be of two types – immediate and mediate. In the cases of *gauṇīvr̥tti*, *lakṣaṇā* is a mediate relation to the direct significate, and beside *gauṇīvr̥tti*, in all other cases, *lakṣaṇā* is always an immediate relation to the direct significate. That means, in the cases of *gauṇīvr̥tti*, the *śakya-sambandha* is mediate. But *gauṇīvr̥tti* is nothing but *lakṣaṇā*. The term ‘Gangā’ in the sentence “there is hardmen’s hamlet in the Gangā” is used in the sense of ‘the bank of the

river Gangā'. The direct sense of the term 'Gangā' is 'a river'. The bank of the river is immediately related with the river. In such cases the indirect sense of a term is immediately related with its direct sense. But the Naiyāyikas say that in some cases the indirect sense may mediate related with the direct sense. For example, "The young scholar is fire". In this sentence, the term 'fire' is used to mean 'brightness' and 'purity'. The direct sense of the term is 'a burning substance'. Purity and brightness present in a burning substance. The young scholar cannot have any immediate relation with a burning substance. But through the properties of 'purity' and 'brightness' the young scholar have a mediate relation with fire. Thus the Naiyāyikas say that it is possible to explain the instances of *gaunīvr̥tti* by *lakṣaṇā*. So, it is not necessary to accept the *Mīmāṃsakas*' view of *gaunīvr̥tti* as a new kind of signifying power.

The Naiyāyikas have not accepted the view of Prābhākara *Mīmāṃsakas* about the elliptical employment of language. Certain words are found omitted from a sentence in such employment. To understand the meaning of such sentence we should supply certain words. Prābhākara *Mīmāṃsaka* accepts the view of the Naiyāyikas' that consideration of purport is a uniform condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence and says that just as consideration of purport helps us to understand the meaning of a sentence, so in case of elliptical statement we should supply the significate of a word, but not the word itself. Purport consciousness' means the consciousness of what is intended to be conveyed by an utterance. Here the things meant by certain words are intended to be conveyed, not the words themselves. So Prābhākara says that in case of elliptical language, we

should at first supply the needful significates to fill up the ellipsis. We can fill up the gaps of an elliptical statement only when we can understand the significance of the sentence as a whole. Thus, Prābhākara tries to prove that in case of elliptical statements, we should supply the appropriate significates and not the appropriate terms. Thus the Prābhākara *Mīmāṃsā* has given priority of '*arthādhyāhāra*'.

The Naiyāyikas have rejected this view. They say that we should at first supply the words in case of an elliptical statement. Only by supplying the significates we cannot understand the meaning of a statement. If this is so, then we can understand the meaning of a statement only by the presentation of the significates of the terms by which the sentence is formed. But this is not a case.

Annambhaṭṭa explains this point with the help of an example. To fill up the gaps of an elliptical statement like '*dvāram*' we should supply the word '*pidhehi*'. After that we can understand the meaning of the statement. Here only the presentation of the significate of the term cannot help us to understand the meaning of the whole sentence. Thus, the Naiyāyikas have rejected the Prābhākara *Mīmāṃsā* view by giving priority to '*śabdādhyāhāra*'.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept the view that syntax difficulty is the occasion for accepting *lakṣaṇā*. They say that purport difficulty or *tātparyā nupapatti* is a uniform condition for understanding the meaning of all sentences.

The Naiyāyikas take the lack of cognition of purport (*tātparyānupapatti*) to be the basis of *lakṣaṇā*, not the lack of cognition of compatibility (*anvayānupapatti*). According to them, if the latter (*anvayānupapatti*) was

the basis of *lakṣaṇā* then in many cases *lakṣaṇā* would not operate at all as there would be no incompatibility. For instance, in the type of *lakṣaṇā* known as *ajahatsvārthā* (where the primary sense is not totally discarded), e.g., ‘*yastiḥ pravesaya*’ – admit the staffs. Here the word *yasti* indicates men carrying staffs by *lakṣaṇā*. But there would be no lack of compatibility with the primary sense.¹²

Purport helps us to understand the meanings of ambiguous terms occur in a statement. Purport is the intention of an utterance to convey a particular sense. By the context or *prakaraṇa* we can understand the purport of a term used in a sentence. For example, when someone says, ‘*Saindhavamānaya*’ while eating, then through the context of eating we can understand that here the term ‘*saindhava*’ is used to mean ‘salt’. Actually, the term ‘*saindhava*’ has two meanings – ‘rock salt’ and ‘a kind of hybrid horse’. After hearing the above sentence, if someone brings a horse, then the sentence will be meaningless. But from the context if someone thinks that here the speaker tries to mean ‘a kind of salt’ and thinking this if the hearer brings salt, then the sentence of the speaker will be meaningful. The Naiyāyikas say that just like the purport difficulty helps us to understand the meanings of ambiguous terms, similarly it also helps us to understand in what cases we should accept the indirect sense or *lakṣaṇā* of terms. We can understand the meanings of such sentences like ‘There is the milkmen’s hamlet on the Gangā’, ‘People with umbrellas are going’ etc. if we can know their purport and we can know their purport only if we can take some terms in their indirect senses. Thus, where purport difficulty arises, there we should accept *lakṣaṇā*.

The Naiyāyikas have also rejected the Prābhākara *Mīmāṃṣa* view that by the signifying power of a term we can understand a thing as related to another thing. In the cases of our understanding the meaning of sentences, we can understand a complex of related things. Prabhākara says that as beside the terms, there is nothing present in a sentence, so we can understand the relations of terms by the signifying power or *śakti* of the terms. That means, by the signifying power or *śākti* of terms we can understand the meanings of terms and the relations of the terms.

Prabhākara says that a person recognises the meaning of the whole sentence by hearing simply the constituent words put together syntactically: 'connected designation (by any word)' (*anvitābhidhāna*).¹³

The followers of Goutama have criticised this view. They say that the relation of terms is dependent on the order of the terms in which they are arranged in a sentence. We can understand the relations of terms after looking that how the terms are arranged in a sentence. So, by the *śakti* of terms, we cannot understand the relations, but our understanding of the relations of terms is dependent on the order of the terms. The Naiyāyikas have rejected the Prabhākara's view of *Anvitābhidhānavāda* and they have supported the view of *Abhihitānvayavāda*.

The name *abhihitānvaya* is to be interpreted as *abhihitānā manvayaḥ* - the relation (*anvaya*) of denoted concepts (*abhihita*). In other words, isolated words which denotes specific meanings, are combined together to form a sentence and the meanings are combined to form the sentential meaning.¹⁴

According to them, a sentence is formed by the independent words arranged in a syntactical structure and sentential meaning is a get together of independent meanings organised in a syntactical meaning – structure. A sentence cannot be formed without the words. And if we do not know the meanings of words, then we cannot know the meaning of a whole sentence. The independent meanings of words are caught in a syntactical relation just after we know the meanings of independent words and then we can acquire the total meaning of a total sentence. To form a building, brick, iron and cement are necessary. But mere conglomeration of these objects cannot form a building. To form a building, these constituents are arranged and organised in a certain way. There must be a certain relation among the objects but the relation is not a constituent of the building. The relation helps the constituents to organise. We may extend this analogy in case of sentential meaning. In case of sentential meaning the relations among objects' meanings are *ākāṃsā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi*. These relations are the determining factors, which help the word meanings to organise and to relate together in a syntactical structure. The relations of word meanings are not constituent parts of sentence meaning. Thus, the Naiyāyikas say that a sentence means the totality of word-meanings related together in a syntax and a sentence does not mean the syntactical relation of word meanings. As the Bhāṭṭa *Mīmāṃsakas* believe in sentence holism, it is quite natural to them to accept *abhihitānvayavāda*. because the meaning of the whole sentence comes to us as a flash. After words, the concentration is given to the meaning of individual words in the light of the meaning attained as a whole. But the Nyāya tells us that each and every word points out some meaning, which ultimately provides us the whole sentence

meaning. Each and every word points out something, which remains in the external word as a category. Afterwards we get an amalgamated meaning. This is due to the belief in a particular set of presupposition which does not allow them to admit sentence – holism.

The *sphoṭa* theory was criticised by the *Mīmāṃsā*^{kas} and the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas have accepted the views of Kumārila *Mīmāṃsā* against *sphoṭa* theory. The Naiyāyika Jayanta was a formidable critic of *sphoṭa* theory and he has also followed Kumārila in his criticism of this doctrine.

Naiyāyikas, e.g. Jayanta, followed Kumārila in their critique of the *sphoṭa* doctrine.¹⁵

The advocates of *sphoṭa* theory says that a word or a sentence is a simple, unitary entity. A word or a sentence is a single whole, a single symbol which bears a meaning. The grammarians believe in the eternal indivisible word – essence.

The *sphoṭa* is actually the indivisible sentence. Since understanding takes place through the sentence and the sentential meaning, it is the actual *sphoṭa* or word – essence. Individual words and individual sounds are non-entities. However, the sentence, although indivisible, is analysed into imaginary divisions, i.e., words, and the indivisible sentential meaning or *pratibhā* is similarly analysed into imaginary word meaning.¹⁶

But Kumārila says that a sentence is a composite fact having different words as its components and a word is a composite fact having different letters as its components. A word or *sphoṭa* cannot be different from the constituent letters because it is not possible for us to perceive a word or *sphoṭa* which is distinct from

the letters. If the *sphoṭa* is different from the letters then the *sphoṭa* would be perceived to be a distinct entity without any reference to the letters as its constituents. But actually we perceive a group of letters. Our cognition of a word results from our cognitions of all the letters taken together by which the word is formed. We cannot say that a word is different from its constituent letters. Without the cognitions of letters the cognition of word is not possible. A word or a sentence is a composite entity and it is not a simple unity but only our cognition of this composite entity is a single act. That means, the cognitive act is one though its contents are many. By a single cognitive act we may grasp many components. It is only an appearance to talk about the unity of word - *sphoṭa* or sentence - *sphoṭa*. Misperception arises when we discuss something as 'x', which is not actually x. A word or a sentence is a multiple entity but due to misperception it appears as unity. The illusion of the unity of the content arises from the singularity of cognition. We think that a word or a sentence is a unity because it is apprehended by our final one indivisible cognitive episode. The advocates of the *sphoṭa* theory says that our perception of letters is misperception because the real word or *sphoṭa* appears as letters or group of letters. Kumārila says that a word is a composite entity consisting of letters and our perception of a word as a unity is actually an illusion. Maṇḍana Mīśra says that we cannot perceive indivisible word or sentence without the letters as our intelligence is finite. Kumārila has accepted the universal and said that the universal is apprehended along with the individual. Just as the cow universal is separate from the individual cows, similarly the *sphoṭa* is separate from the letters.

The *Mīmāṃśakas* say that a word is formed by letters and a sentence is formed by words. A word is a sequence of letters and a sentence which is a sequence of words is also a sequence of letters. According to them, the sound-units or letters are eternal. But the sequences of letters are man-made. So words or sentences are not eternal. This view goes against the usual *Mīmāṃśakas* view that like the letters, the words and sentences are also eternal. By the contacts of the different parts of the vocal organ, words and sentences are only manifested and these are not created by us. Kumāriḷa points out that the sequence cannot be an essential qualifier of the letters, and hence 'the sequence of letters' has to be interpreted as a group of letters 'superficially indicated' by a particular sequence. To use the Indian logical terminology, the sequence is not the *viśeṣaṇa* but an *upalakṣaṇa*. The sequence created by the human agency is only a 'pointer' to the word, it is a part of it, for the word is uncreated. Therefore, Kumāriḷa asserts, the sequence which is non-eternal is not a property of the word (*padadharmā*), and hence the word does not become impermanent thereby.¹⁷

Jayanta and other Naiyāyikas in their criticism of *ṣphoṭa* theory have followed Kumāriḷa *Vātsāyana* told that by *pratisandhāna* or 'connective recollective cognition' of different heard letters or sound-units a word is determined. The heard letters or sound-units are momentary realities. Jayanta said that a sentence is a cluster of words and a word is a cluster of letters. *Mīmāṃśakas* say that the letters are eternal but the letters may be manifested differently depending upon our pronunciation of them. But the Naiyāyikas do not accept the view that the letters are eternal. A word is produced when we utter it and it is destroyed after our

utterance. So, each utterance of a letter like 'ga' creates a distinct entity. The universal g-hood is present in all g. Due to this universal g-hood or due to the similarity between two utterances we think that all the gs are the same g. The Naiyāyikas point out that the *Mīmāṃṣakas* view that the letters are eternal and the difference of utterance is due to the difference of manifestation is very much close to the grammarians' view of letter – *sphoṭa*. But the *Mīmāṃṣakas* do not accept the letter – *sphoṭa*. Regarding the concurrence of different letters the Naiyāyikas have accepted the solution of Kumāriḷa. The solution is : “memory-impressions left behind by different utterances of former letters can concur with the direct perception of the last letter whence the meaning of the word would be revealed”¹⁸ or, the word-meaning may be generated from the connective-recollective cognition of all letters together in a sequence.

CHAPTER – IV

1. Annambhaṭṭa : *Tarkasaṃgraha*, Text No. 66.
2. S. Radhakrishnan : *Indian Philosophy*, Centenary Edition, Volume – 2, published by S.K. Mukherjee, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, p. 110.
3. Gopinath Bhattacharya (ed.) : *Tarkasaṃgraha Dīpīka on Tarkasaṃgraha*, Progress Publishers, Calcutta, 1994, p. 309.
4. Ibid., : p. 311.
5. Janaki Vallabha Bhattacharyya : *Nyāya Mañjarī (The Compendium of Indian Speculative Logic)*, Motilal, 1978, Volume – 1, p. 427.
6. Ibid., : p. 428.
7. Satish Chandra Chatterjee and Dhirendramohan Datta : *An Introduction To Indian Philosophy*, published by Calcutta University, eighth edition, p. 200.
8. Bimal Krishna Motilal : *The Word and the World*, published by Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 29.
9. S. Radhakrishnan : *Indian Philosophy*, Centenary Edition, Volume – II, published by S.K. Mukherjee, Oxford University, p.391.
10. Jadunath Sinha : *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, published by J.N. Sen, Calcutta, 2nd edn., 1985, p. 207.
11. Annambhaṭṭa : *Tarkasaṃgraha Dīpīka*, Text No. 66.
12. Dr. Bijoya Goswami : *Meaning and Interpretation in Ancient India*, published by Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata – 700 006, first edition, March 2002, page no. 33.

13. Bimal Krishna Motilal : *The Word and the World*, published by Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 108.
14. Dr. Bijoya Goswami : *Meaning and Interpretation in Ancient India*, published by Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata – 700 006, first edition, March 2002, page no. 60.
15. Bimal Krishna Motilal : *The Word and the World*, published by Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 102.
16. Dr. Bijoya Goswami : *Meaning and Interpretation in Ancient India*, published by Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Kolkata – 700 006, first edition, March 2002, pp. 47- 48.
17. Bimal Krishna Motilal : *The Word and the World*, published by Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 102.
18. Ibid., : p. 103.