

CHAPTER – II

Śabda as a *Pramāṇa* Distinction between *Śakyārtha* and *Lakṣyārtha*. Factors for Verbal Understanding .

It is known to us that the Naiyāyīkas have accepted four sources of valid cognition. Among these verbal testimony or *Śabda* is one. Ordinarily, the term 'śabda' means 'sound'. But in the case of *pramāṇa* it means a kind of statement. The knowledge or *pramā* attained through this *Pramāṇa* is called 'śabda-bodha' or verbal knowledge from testimony. So, *śabda* is a *pramāṇa* and 'śābda-bodha' is *pramā*.

Goutama says that word is communication of *āpta*.¹

It is of two kinds : that which refers to the object which is perceived and that which refers to the object, which is not perceived.²

The statement of a trust worthy person is called *śabda pramāṇa* (*Āptavākyam śabda*).³ According to Vātsyāyana, word is that by which an object is spoken of or made known.⁴

A trustworthy person is one who always speaks the truth. In other words, he always makes correct statement.

An *āpta* is one who has direct or intuitive knowledge of things, who wishes to make known the things as he has seen them and who is capable of speaking about them. And the word *āpta* itself means one who operates through the direct or intuitive knowledge of things. This is a common characteristic of all *āptas*, whether they are sages, *āryas* or *mlecchas*. All human activity is regulated according to the advice of *āptas*.⁵

A statement is a collection of significant words. A significant word has the power to signify something.

To discuss the relation between word and meaning philosophers have given different theories. According to the *Vaiśeṣika* view, fire is cognised from smoke by inference (*anumāna*) of cause from effect. Similarly, all cognitions are due to inference. There is no natural connection between word and meaning, but a conventional one that acts in the case of a particular sense for a particular word, just as causality directs the inference of fire from smoke.⁶

According to the older school of Nyāya the power of a word to convey its meaning comes from God's will that such or such a word is to signify such or such a thing. But to the new school of Nyāya this power comes from long established convention as well as and independent usage by an individual.

Vātsyāyana, the commentator on the Nyāya sūtras, has explained the term '*āpta*'. The person who has the intuitive knowledge of merit and intends to communicate correctly the result of his experience and who is a competent teacher is called an *āpta*.⁷

To Nyāya '*śakti*' (power) is not a new category over and above the seven categories accepted by them. But the *Mīmāṃsakas* say that we cannot include

power or *śakti* in any of the seven categories accepted by Nyāya. So they say that *śakti* is a new category. The *Mīmāṃśakas* do not accept *śakti* as 'God's will' because they do not accept God as the creator of this world. To them the signifying power is inherent in a word. A word is a sound which is a substance and its signifying power is intrinsic in it. The signifying power does not come from outside. Though the signifying power is intrinsic to the sound substance, it is not identical with that substance. It cannot be said that the signifying power is the same of any one quality of twenty-four qualities accepted by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. So the *Mīmāṃśakas* have accepted the signifying power as a new kind of entity which is different from the seven categories accepted by the *vaiśeṣikas*.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept the above view of the *Mīmāṃśakas*. According to them, the signifying power is nothing but the relation between a word and its meaning. This relation exists between a word and its significance. The signifying power or *śakti* is not intrinsic in a word. It is extrinsic. It comes from outside and it is due to some convention. This convention is a desire of a conscious being. The desire is like this : such or such a word shall stand for such or such a thing. Generally the meaning - relation is based on God's desire. In some cases this relation may be based on human being. Thus the signifying power of a word is the desire of a conscious being. So it is a quality and it is not a new category.

The truth or falsehood of verbal knowledge entirely depends upon a person who makes the statement. If a person correctly sees an object and is honest then the knowledge, communicated by him, is true. If he is otherwise then the knowledge, communicated by his statement, is false. It has been proved that a word has no natural relation to an object. Similarly, the knowledge,

communicated by a word, is not naturally true. If the words had intrinsic truth in them then the statements of a deceitful person would not have been contradicted.⁸

Though the signifying power is the relation of a word with its meaning, but we cannot call that any relation between a word and its meaning is signifying power. Because in that case, there arises the defect of over-coverage (*ativyāpti*). We all know that there is temporal relation (*Kālikasambandha*) between a word and its meaning. But we cannot call this temporal relation as a signifying power. To avoid this difficulty it is said that *śakti* is the relation between a word with its meaning and this relation serves 'the indirect determinant (*prayojaka*) of the remembrance of the entity (signified)'. It is not possible for a person to understand the meaning of a word if he only knows the relation of the word with its meaning. He should also depend on the previous knowledge of that relation. 'Understanding' the meaning of a word is an instance of memory-cognition. Our memory about something depends on the previous knowledge of that thing. By a word a thing is indicated. If we have previous knowledge of a thing that is indicated by a term, only then we can remember the thing by that term. That means, our knowledge of a thing by a term depends not only on the relation between the term with its meaning but also on the previous knowledge of that relation. So, *śakti* is the indirect determinant of the understanding or remembrance of what the word stands for.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept sentential meaning as a separate entity despite the fact that they take verbal cognition (*śabdabodha*) to be a qualificational knowledge (*viśiṣṭamati*) over and above the separate

cognitions of different word meanings. *Śabdabodha* is not a mere combination of the cognitions of different word-meanings taken together, for it involves a semantic connection between mutually expectant and compatible words. The meaning of a sentence is thus a *viśiṣṭārtha* achieved through relating the meanings of the competent words. Yet *vākyārtha* or *viśiṣṭārtha* has no independent objective status apart from the separate word-meanings.⁹

The Naiyāyikas have accepted the *Vaidika* view that the God is the creator of language. So, they have described *śakti* as the will of God.

The Naiyāyikas say that a term signifies the particular as characterised by the class character. Here there is a difference of opinion between the *Mīmāṃśakas* and the Naiyāyikas. *Mīmāṃśakas* say that a term signifies directly a universal or class-character. They say that by a term we can understand a thing, which is characterised by some qualities. But to have an awareness of 'something having some qualities' presupposes that we have previous knowledge of those qualities. So, it is clear that in understanding the meaning of a term like 'cat' what is first presented to our mind is the character which is common to all cats. 'Cat-ness' is the character which is common to all cats. So, by a term 'cat' we first understand 'cat-ness' which is a universal. After that arises the knowledge of the particular cat possessing cat-ness. This later knowledge of cat is not direct like that of the previous knowledge of cat-ness. Thus the *Mīmāṃśakas* say that we can understand the meaning of a term by the combination of two cognitions, one direct and another indirect. It is already discussed that by a term directly we can understand the universal and indirectly the particular. So, they say that by the signifying

power or *śakti* we can understand the universal and the knowledge of a particular thing arises by implication or *arthāpatti*. As at first the universal comes to our mind by signifying power they feel, we can understand the universal. If we do not accept this view then we should say that by the signifying power we can understand the particular. But particulars are infinite in number. So, we should accept an infinity of signifying power of a term. For logical economy (*lāghava*) *Mīmāṃśakas* do not accept this alternative. For the sake of logical economy by the signifying power of a term they understand the universal and the knowledge of the particulars having the universal known by implication (*arthāpatti*).

But the Naiyāyikas do not accept this view. According to the Naiyāyikas, a term signifies particulars as qualified by the universal. They say that a term signifies not only universal because in that case we cannot describe the knowledge of the particulars. The Naiyāyikas do not accept the *Mīmāṃśā* view that the particulars are known through implication. Understanding the meaning of a term is a unitary thing. Beside this, we cannot understand the meaning of such sentences like 'Bring a cow', 'A cow is dead' etc. if we accept the *Mīmāṃśā* view that by the signifying power of a term we can understand the universal. In the above cases, if we can understand the universal 'cow-ness' by the term 'cow' then the sentences will be meaningless, because we cannot bring the universal 'cow ness' or the universal 'cow-ness' cannot be dead. But if we understand the particular cow having the universal 'cow ness', only then the sentences will be meaningful. The same thing is true about all sentences. Thus, it is said that by the signifying power of a term we can understand the particulars qualified by the universal.

According to Goutama, the referent of a word (that stands for a substance) is a particular thing and that thing has a universal as well as a shape.¹⁰

Goutama expresses his preference for the view according to which the particular as endowed with its universal and shape is to be taken as constitutive of meaning. Gangesa follows Goutama in this respect.¹¹

According to Gangesa, the particular appearing as qualified by the universal constitutes meaning.¹²

The Naiyāyikas said that by *vṛddha-vyavahāra* or “the practice of experienced persons” we can understand the meaning of a word or the relation between a word and its meaning. Children learn language by observing the linguistic practice of their elders. A child observes that one elder person utters to another elder person ‘Go there’. The child also observes that after hearing the sentence the person goes to a certain place. The child thinks that before the utterance of the above sentence the latter person does not go to that place but after the utterance of the sentence the latter person goes to that place. That means, before the utterance of the above sentence there was no physical movement of the latter but the physical movement starts just after the utterance of the sentence. By looking this type of ‘agreement in presence and agreement in absence’ (*anvaya-vyatirekī*) the child thinks that there is a relation between the sentence uttered by the speaker and the physical movement done by the hearer. The physical movement of the hearer is due to his volitional activity and that volitional activity starts just after the hearer can understand the meaning of the terms uttered by the speaker. Thus the child assures that the movement of the hearer is due to his understanding of the sentence uttered by the speaker. The child also observes that the first elder person talks to the

second one 'come here and do not go there'. After hearing this sentence the second elder person comes to the place indicated by the first elder person. The child thinks that here also the second elder person's activity is due to his understanding the meaning of the sentence uttered by the first elder one. By eliminative thinking the child can understand that the activities 'come' and 'go' are indicated to the second elder person.

When an experienced person asks another experienced person to do something he utters two sentences. In one sentence a particular word finds a place. In the other sentence it is conspicuous by its absence. An inexperienced learner who listens to these two sentences notes the presence of a particular word in one of the two sentences and its absence from the other one. He watches the movement of the junior person. By the joint method of agreement and difference he makes out the meaning of the words contained in the sentences. Thus, we see that the joint method of agreement and difference helps us to determine the relation of denotation of a word.¹³

Some Indian philosophers think that by a term we can always understand something which is concerned with some activity. A child understands the meaning of a term like 'dog' which is connected with some activity. That means, by the term 'dog' we cannot only understand an animal, but we can understand an animal which is connected with some action. But the Naiyāyikas do not accept this view. To them the above view is going against our experience.

We can understand the meanings of many terms which are not connected to any sort of activity. We can understand the meanings of the terms used in the sentences like 'Ram is a good boy', 'Asoka was a great king', etc. All terms used

in the above sentences are not connected with actions. In each of the above sentences, an idea of a man originates in our mind. But there does not arise the idea of a man who is connected with some activity. So, the Naiyāyikas say that by the signifying power of a term we cannot only understand a thing which is associated with some activity.

The Nyāya accepts that *lakṣaṇā* or implicative meaning is a property of a term like *śakti*.

Lakṣaṇā, the secondary function operates when the primary function or the purport (*tātparya*) becomes incompatible with the context and brings into cognition a secondary sense related to the primary one.¹⁴

Indian philosophers (especially of the Nyāya school) give an account of this phenomenon by identifying two different ‘powers’ in a word : one is that of saying (*abhidhāna*) and the other is that of pointing, signifying or indicating (*lakṣaṇā*). The first is called the primary meaning-giving power while the second is called the secondary or indicatory meaning-giving power. By the first, the word speaks, as it were, while by the second it only indicates, and a metaphor is born.¹⁵

Like *śakti*, we can understand the meaning of a term by *lakṣaṇā*. The difference between *śakti* and *lakṣaṇā* is that by *śakti* we can understand the meaning of a term directly but with the help of *lakṣaṇā* we can understand the meaning of a term indirectly. So *śakti* is called ‘direct signifying power’ and *lakṣaṇā* is called ‘indirect signifying power’. Through the *śakti* of a term the understood meaning is called *śakya*. The Nyāya defines *lakṣaṇā* as ‘*śakya-sambandha lakṣaṇā*’.¹⁶ That means, *lakṣaṇā* is the relation of a term with its *śakya*. *Śakti* helps us to understand

the meaning of a term directly without the help of any other property, but *lakṣaṇā* helps us to understand the meaning of a term with the help of what is signified by its *śakti*. Through *lakṣaṇā* the understood meaning is called *lakṣya*. Gopinath Bhattacharya wrote, “The signifying relation that is known as ‘*lakṣaṇā*’ is indirect in as much as it is the relation of a term to something that in its turn has a close relation to the thing that is referred to by the ‘power’ that is ‘*śakti*’.”¹⁷

Generally which is directly signified by a term is called *śakyārtha*. The occasional indirect meaning of a term is called *lakṣyārtha*. Generally we can understand the meaning of a term used in a sentence by its *śakti* or direct signifying power. But in many cases it is not possible for us to understand the meaning of a term used in a sentence by its direct signifying power. In those cases if we accept the meaning directly signified by the term then the sentences will be meaningless. That means, in many cases it is not possible for us to understand the meaning of a term used in a sentence by *śakti* or direct signifying power. Thus in such cases where we cannot understand the meaning of a term through its *śakti*, there we should accept an indirect signifying power of the term which is called *lakṣaṇā*. So, sometimes *lakṣaṇā* or indirect signifying power helps us to understand the meaning of a term used in a sentence. For example, “The milkman’s hamlet is in the Gangā”. In the above sentence we can understand the meanings of all the terms by direct signifying power or by *śakti* beside the term ‘Gangā’. Because by the direct signifying power of the term ‘Gangā’ we can understand a river. Milkman’s hamlet cannot be in a river. Here the sentence will be meaningless if we take the meaning of the term ‘Gangā’ which is signified by its direct signifying power or

śakti. But we cannot say that the above sentence is meaning less. We can understand the meaning of the above sentence by taking the indirect meaning of the term 'Gangā'. It is already mentioned that by the direct signifying power of the term 'Gangā' we can understand a river which is called *śakya*. This *śakya* has a close relation with its bank, which is called *lakṣya*, and by *lakṣaṇā* we can understand *lakṣya*.

In the above sentence the term 'Gangā' is used to mean the bank of the river Gangā. The milkman's hamlet is in the bank of the river Gangā. In this way, *lakṣaṇā* helps us to understand the meaning of a term indirectly.

In some cases two unconnected things may be signified by the same term. For example, the term '*saindhava*' has two meanings. One is the horse which is found in Sindhu and the other is a kind of salt. Here it is not correct to call one as *śakyārtha* and the other as *lakṣyārtha*. The two meanings of the term are unconnected. Here we cannot apply the distinction between *śakyārtha* and *lakṣyārtha* because there is no relation between the two meanings. Such type of terms is called 'equivocal' and both the meanings of the term are called *śakyārtha* because both the meanings are signified by the direct signifying power of the term. So, in some cases we should postulate a 'multiple signifying power' (*nānā śakti*).

Thus, the relation with thing which is signified by the direct signifying power of a term is called *lakṣaṇā*. This relation may be of five types : *sāmīpya* or proximity, *saṁyoga* or conjunction, *samavāya* or inherence, *vaiparitya* or opposite ness and *kārya-kāraṇabhāva* or cause effect relation. *Śakyasambandha* may be either immediate or mediate.

The Nyāya accepts three types of *lakṣaṇā* : *jahal-lakṣaṇā*, *ajahal-lakṣaṇā* and *jāhat-ajahal-lakṣaṇā*.

In some cases we cannot understand the meaning of a sentence if we take the direct significance of a term used in that sentence. In those cases we can take the indirect significance of the term which is intimately related with direct significance. This is called *jahal-lakṣaṇā*. When we reject the direct significate of a term totally, then it is called *jahal-lakṣaṇā*. When, therefore, the 'direct significate' of a term occurring in a statement taken along with the other direct significates of the other terms occurring there in, does not make any sense, the term in question has to be taken in an 'indirect sense' to mean something that has a close connection with the direct significate. This kind of 'indirect sense' or 'indirect signifying power' of a term has been named '*jahal-lakṣaṇā*', because the indirect sense is here, 'wholly exclusive of' (*jāhat*) the 'direct significate'.¹⁸

An example of *jahal-lakṣaṇā* is : The platforms are shouting. This sentence will be meaning less if we take the direct meaning of the term 'platform'. By the direct signifying power of this term we can understand its direct meaning which is a 'life less material structure' or 'stage'. A stage cannot shout as it is life less. But the above sentence is not meaningless. The sentence will be meaningful if we take the indirect meaning of the term 'platform'. Here indirectly the term 'platform' means the persons who are standing on the stage. Directly the term 'platform' means stage and the stage is related with the persons who are standing on it. Now we can understand the meaning of the above sentence by taking this indirect meaning of the term 'platform'. Though platforms are not able to shout, but the persons who

are standing on it can shout. This is *jahal-lakṣaṇā* because here we reject the direct meaning of the term 'platform' totally. "There is milkman's hamlet in the Gangā" is also an instance of *jahal-lakṣaṇā* because here also we reject the direct meaning of the term Gangā as signified by the direct signifying power. It is already mentioned that by the direct signifying power of the same term we can understand a river. As milkman's hamlet cannot be in a river so here we reject the direct meaning as signified by the direct signifying power or *śakti* of the term totally. Now we take the indirect meaning of the term Gangā. The bank of the river is related with the river. As *śakyasambandha* is *lakṣaṇā* so here we understand this meaning (the bank of the river) by *lakṣaṇā*. The milkman's hamlet is in the bank of the river. As the direct meaning of the term is totally rejected here and a new meaning is taken, it is *jahal-lakṣaṇā*.

When the direct meaning is not rejected and we take some other things with the direct meaning then it is called *ajahal-lakṣaṇā*. By *ajahal-lakṣaṇā* we mean an indirect sense which is not wholly exclusive of the direct sense. In some cases we cannot understand the meaning of a term used in a sentence only by its direct meaning. Instead here we can understand the meaning of the term by taking some other things with the direct meaning. Such types of cases are called *ajahal-lakṣaṇā*. For example, "People with umbrellas are going". Here the composite term 'people with umbrellas' is used in an indirect sense. The direct signifying power signifies the meaning of the term as 'a group of people who have umbrellas'. But the term is used in the above sentence to mean something more than the direct meaning of the term stated above. The actual meaning of the

sentence is : A group of people are going most of whom have umbrellas. In this case we do not want to mean that all the people who are going have umbrellas but most of them have umbrellas. Here the direct meaning and the indirect meaning is taken together. The term signifies here the persons who have umbrellas and also the persons who have not umbrellas. In the above instance the verb 'going' is concerned not only with the persons who have umbrellas, but also the persons who have not umbrellas. Thus, we can understand that *ajahal-lakṣaṇā* is such type of indirect sense where the direct sense of a term is also taken together with the indirect sense. This indirect sense, however, does not function at the cost of the direct sense, it functions along with the direct power of the term. As a result, the indirect significate of the term is not, as in the first type of '*lakṣaṇā*', exclusive of the direct significate, it is inclusive of the latter.

If we reject the direct sense of a term, then it is called *jahal-lakṣaṇā* and if we accept the direct sense of a term with some other things then it is called *ajahal-lakṣaṇā*. Beside these two types of *lakṣaṇā* the Naiyāyikas have also accepted a third type which is called *jahat-ajahal-lakṣaṇā*. Here the direct meaning of a term is partly accepted and partly rejected. A *jahal-ajahal-lakṣaṇā* is such type of indirect sense that is partly exclusive and partly not exclusive of the direct sense of a term. This *lakṣaṇā* helps us to understand the meaning of a term indirectly by taking a part of the direct meaning of the term and by rejecting a part of the direct meaning of the same term.

In some cases, if we accept the direct meaning of a term totally then we cannot understand the exact meaning of the sentence where the term is used and again, if

we reject the direct meaning of the term totally then also it is not possible for us to understand the meaning of the sentence where the term is used. In those cases we should accept a part of the direct sense of the term and we should reject a part of the direct sense of the term. These cases are instances of *jahat- ajahal-lakṣaṇā*. The third type of 'lakṣaṇā' has been named 'jahat-ajahal-lakṣaṇā' or an indirect sense that is 'exclusive as well as not-exclusive' of the direct sense of a term. In other words, in this type what is indirectly signified excludes only one part but it includes another part of what is directly signified by a term.¹⁹

The *Upanisadic* dictum '*Tattvamasi*' or 'that art thou' is an instance of such type of *lakṣaṇā*. This sentence declares the identity of the finite soul with the infinite soul. Infinite soul is signified here by the direct sense of the term '*tat*' or 'that' or by the *śakti* of the term '*tat*' or 'that' we can understand the infinite spirit and by the direct signifying power or *śakti* of the term '*tvām*' or 'thou' we can understand finite spirit. If we accept these direct meanings of the terms then the above sentence will be meaningless because infinite spirit can never be identical with the finite spirit. To understand the meaning of the above sentence we should partly reject the direct meanings of the terms and we should partly accept the direct meanings of both the terms. If we reject the two qualifications 'infinite' and 'finite' from the terms and take the other parts of the terms only then we can understand the meaning of the above sentence. In that case both terms would signify consciousness or spirit. Then the equation 'That = *Thou*' or '*Tat=Tvam*' becomes intelligible to us. Now the meaning of the above sentence is intelligible to us as we have taken the indirect senses of the term (*tat* and *tvam*) by rejecting a

part of the direct senses of the terms and by accepting a part of the direct senses of the terms.

There are differences among the three types of *lakṣaṇā* mentioned above. In the case of *jahal-lakṣaṇā* the direct sense of a term is rejected and in the case of *ajahal-lakṣaṇā* the direct sense of a term is accepted with other things. On the other hand, in the case of *jahat-ajahal-lakṣaṇā* the direct sense of a term is partly accepted and partly rejected.

Mīmāṃsakas have accepted *Gauṇivṛtti* or figurative sense as a separate signifying power of a term. They say that we can understand the meanings of some terms indirectly but these indirect meanings are different from *lakṣaṇā*. It is already mentioned in the before that *śakyasambandha lakṣaṇā* i.e. *lakṣaṇā* is the relation of a term with its *śakya*. By the signifying power of a term or by *śakti* of a term which is signified is called *śakya*. The *Mīmāṃsakas* say that there are some terms the meanings of which can be attained indirectly though there is no *śakyasambandha*. As for example: The young scholar is fire. The *śakti* or signifying power of the term 'fire' signifies; burning substance'. So, burning substance is *śakya*. The young scholar cannot be a burning substance. The sentence will be meaningless if we take this direct meaning of the term 'fire'. Here the term is used in an indirect sense. This indirect sense is 'purity' and 'brightness'. This purity and brightness is not related directly with a burning substance or fire. So, there is no *śakyasambandha*. As there is no *śakyasambandha*, it is wrong to say that the above indirect meaning of the term 'fire is understood by *lakṣaṇā*. We can understand the meaning of the above

sentence by taking the indirect senses of the term 'fire' as 'purity' and 'brightness'. The young scholar is fire means the properties of 'purity' and 'brightness' are present in the young scholar. Thus it is clear to us that the meaning of some terms can be understood indirectly. This indirect sense is different from *lakṣaṇā*. The *Mīmāṃsā* say that in such cases we should accept a new signifying power of a term which is called *gaunivṛtti* or figurative sense. The above view is not accepted by the Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas say that such cases are also examples of *lakṣaṇā*. *Lakṣaṇā* may be immediate or mediate. *Śakyaśambandha* may be immediate or mediate. That means, in some cases we can understand the meaning of a term indirectly by the immediate relation of the term with its *śakya* and in other cases we can understand the meaning of a term indirectly by the mediate relation of the term with its *śakya*. The immediate relation of a term with its *śakya* may be of five types : *sāmīpya* (proximity), *samyoga* (conjunction), *samavāya* (inherence), *Vaiparītya* (oppositeness) and *kārya-kāraṇa* (cause-effect relation). An example of the immediate relation of a term with its *śakya* is : There is milkman's hamlet in the Gangā. By the *śakti* or signifying power of the term 'Gangā' we can understand a river which is *śakya*. The term 'Gangā' is used here to mean the bank of the river Gangā. We all know that river has immediate relation with its bank. Here the indirect sense is related with the direct sense of the term by the relation of conjunction or *samyoga*. To Nyāya besides the cases of '*gaunivṛtti*', *lakṣaṇā* means the immediate relation of a term with its *śakya*, but in the cases of '*gaunivṛtti*', *lakṣaṇā* means the mediate relation of a term with its *śakya*. In the example "The young scholar is fire" the term 'fire' is used to mean purity and brightness. By the direct signifying power of

the term 'fire' we understand ' a burning substance'. Purity and brightness present in a burning substance. The scholar has not immediate relation with the direct sense of the term 'fire' but what we indirectly understand by the term 'fire' (purity and brightness) are also the qualities of the scholar. Thus, we can say that the fire has some mediate relation to the scholar through these properties. This mediate relation is *lakṣaṇā*. Thus the Naiyāyikas try to prove that it is possible to explain in this way the instances of '*gauṇivṛtti*' by *lakṣaṇā* because in the cases of *gauṇivṛtti*, the indirect meaning of a term can be understood by the mediate relation of the term with its *śakya*. So, the Naiyāyikas do not accept *gauṇivṛtti* as a separate kind of signifying power. According to them, the so-called instances of *gauṇivṛtti* are nothing but instances of *lakṣaṇā*.

Ananda-varadhana and his followers of the '*Dhvani*' school of Indian poetics have accepted *vyañjanā* or suggestive power of a term. To them some words have *vyañjanā* or suggestive power which is different from *śakti* or signifying power and *lakṣaṇā* or indirect signifying power.

According to the *Dhvani* school, *vāñjanā* or *dhvani* as a function is primarily divided into two varieties : (a) *avivakṣitavācya*, where suggestion is based on *lakṣaṇā*, and (b) *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*, where suggestion is based on *abhidhā*.²⁰

According to them, we can understand the meaning of some words through *vyañjanā*. This *vyañjanā* may be of two types. *Vyañjanā* based on the power of a term (*śabdāsaktimūlā*) and the *vyañjanā* based on the power of what is signified by a term (*artha-śaktimūlā*). In the example "There is milkman's hamlet on the

Ganga” by the indirect signifying power or *lakṣaṇā* of the term ‘Ganga’ we can understand ‘the bank of the river Gangā. The supporters of the *Dhvani* school are of the opinion that here the term ‘Gangā’ does not signify only the bank of the river because in that case one does not use the term ‘Gangā’, but he will say. “There is milkmen’s hamlet on the bank of Gangā”. As the speaker here utters only the term ‘Gangā’, we should understand that the speaker here intends to mean something more than the bank of the river. The attributes ‘cool-ness’, ‘purity’ etc. are associated with the river Gangā. Here the speaker wants to ascribe these attributes to the milkmen’s hamlet. Now, these attributes i.e., cool ness, purity etc. can not be understood either by *śakti* or by *lakṣaṇā* of the term ‘Gangā’. But hearing the above sentence these attributes come to our mind. As these attributes do not come to our mind either by *śakti* or by *lakṣaṇā*, so we should accept a new signifying power of a term. This new signifying power is named by the *Dhvani* school as *vyañjanā*. The above example is an instance of *śabda śaktimūlā vyañjanā* because here the above meanings (purity, cool ness etc.) are based on the power (*śakti*) of the term (Gangā). The example of second type of *vyañjanā* is : *Līlākamalapatrāṇi ganayamāsa pārvati* i.e. *Pārvatī* easily counted the petals of the lotus.

The above sentence is taken from Kālidāsa’s *Kumārsambhava*. Here the author intends to mean that *Pārvatī* became ashamed of hearing her own marriage talk. We can not obtain this meaning either by the *śakti* or by the *lakṣaṇā* of any term used in the sentence. Through a different kind of signifying power of what is

meant by the statement in question the above meaning have been obtained by us which is called *artha-śaktimūlā vyañjanā*.

The above concept of *vyañjanā* or suggestive meaning is not accepted by Nyāya. To the Naiyāyikas, *vyañjanā* is nothing but the extension of *lakṣaṇā*. In some cases when, by the term 'Gangā' one intends to mean purity, cool ness etc. then the term is used not only in a simple indirect sense because by the simple indirect sense of the term 'Gangā' we can understand the bank of the river. According to the Naiyāyikas, in those cases the term is used in a complex indirect sense. By the complex indirect sense of the term 'Gangā' we can understand 'a cool and purifying river bank'. Thus, we can say that in the sentence 'There is milkman's hamlet in the Gangā; when the term 'Gangā' is used to mean 'a cool and purifying river bank' then we can understand the above meanings of the term by complex indirect sense and not by *vyañjanā*. That means, in the cases of *śabda-śakti-mūlā vyañjanā* a term is used in a complex indirect sense. Annambhatta says, " *Vyañjanā api śakti - lakṣaṇāntarbhūtā śabda-saktimūlā.*"²¹

That means, The 'suggestive power' which is included either under 'direct signifying power' or under 'indirect signifying power has its basis in the 'signifying power of a term'.²²

The Naiyāyikas do not accept *artha-śaktimūlā vyañjanā* also. They say that by inference we can understand the second type of suggestive we power. Through *śakti* we can understand the direct meaning of a term. After hearing some sentences we can understand the indirect meaning of them by inference. After

hearing the sentence “*Līlākamala patrāni ganyaṃāsa pārvati*”, at first we can understand the direct meaning of the sentence which is “*Pārvati* easily counted the petals of the lotus”. We can also understand that the author does not intend to mean the above sentence. Now we can understand by inference that the author here intends to mean “*Pārvati* became ashamed of hearing her own marriage talk”. In this way, the Naiyāyikas say that *arthasāktimūlā vyañjanā* can be reduced to inference.

The opponents of Nyāya are of the opinion that syntax-difficulty is the case where we should accept *lakṣaṇā* or indirect sense of a term. Sometimes it is not possible for us to understand the meaning of a sentence if we take the direct meaning of one or more terms used in the sentence. That means, the direct meaning of one or more terms used in a sentence may lead to semantic incompatibility. In those cases we should accept *lakṣaṇā*. For example, “There is milkmen’s hamlet in the Gangā”. Here the direct meaning of the term Gangā leads to this difficulty. The direct meaning of the term ‘Gangā’ is ‘a river’ and milkmen’s hamlet cannot be in a river. So, here we should accept *lakṣaṇā* or the indirect meaning of the term ‘Gangā’ which is ‘the bank of the river’. Now, the above sentence will be meaningful as the milkmen’s hamlet may be on the bank of the river Gangā. In this way, where there arises syntax difficulty or semantic incompatibility, we should accept *lakṣaṇā* of the same.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept this view. They say that in the case of purport difficulty (*tātparyānupapatti*) we should accept *lakṣaṇā*. In many cases, though

there does not arise any syntax-difficulty, but we cannot understand the exact meaning of sentences if we do not know in what purport or sense one or many terms are used in the sentences. This difficulty arises mainly in the cases of those sentences where one or more ambiguous terms are used. That means, in a sentence where one ambiguous term is used, there may not arise any syntax difficulty but if we do not know in what purport the term is used then the meaning of the sentence will not be clear to us. For example, "Bring *saindhava*". Generally, *saindhava* means the horse which is produced in the Land of Sindhu. The term *saindhava* also means one kind of salt. No syntax difficulty arises in the case of above sentence. Let us imagine a situation that someone is eating and utters the above sentence (*saindhavamānaya*). After hearing this sentence a hearer may come there to take a hybrid horse with him. Now, it is clear to us that the hearer here is unable to understand the meaning of the speaker's sentence. Because in this case, to take the term '*saindhava*' in the sense of 'horse' leads to absurdity. The absurdity is due to the fact that the purport or the sense intended to be conveyed by the speaker is missed if the term is taken in the sense of 'horse' and not 'salt'. The proper understanding (*śābda-bodha*) of a statement depends then in cases like these on realising its purport (*tātparya*) rather than its syntactical property (*anvaya*).²³

Now, it is clear to us that in the cases of ambiguous terms, we should depend on purport (*tātparya*), rather than syntactical property (*anvaya*). Thus the consideration of purport is a condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence which has ambiguous term. In the above example, from the context of eating we can understand that the purport of speaker is salt. *Tātparya* means our

will to mean a specific thing from a specific word. From the context we can understand the purport or *tātparyā*. The Naiyāyikas say that it is better to accept a uniform condition for understanding the meaning of any statement. As *tātparyā* or purport is a condition for understanding the meaning of ambiguous terms so it is a condition for understanding the meaning of any sentence like “There is milkmen’s hamlet in the Gangā” etc. We can understand this statement by the knowledge of purport or *tātparyā*. To understand the purport of the sentence we should take the term ‘Gangā’ in an indirect sense. A term is taken in an indirect sense on that occasion when we cannot understand its purport. So, in the case of purport difficulty we should accept *lakṣaṇā* of a term.

It comes to this then that the ‘occasion for taking a term in an indirect sense (*lakṣaṇā-vīja*) is furnished by the consideration of purport and not considerations of syntax-difficulty. If purport difficulty (*tātparyānupapatti*) suffices to explain the employment of a term in an ‘indirect sense’, it is needless to invoke syntax - difficulty for that purpose.²⁴

In the case of elliptical employment of language, certain words are found omitted from a statement. To understand the meaning of such sentence we should supply some words. The Nyāya does not admit here the *Mīmāṃsā* view that in such cases we should only supply the significate of a word (*arthādhyāhāra*). *Mīmāṃsakas* standpoint here depends on the fact that consideration of purport is a uniform condition for understanding the meaning of a word. So, in the case of elliptical sentence, to fill up the ellipsis we should supply the needful significates and not

the terms corresponding to those significates. After the knowledge of a word we can understand what is meant by the word. Thus without understanding the purport of a term, we cannot use only the term to the ellipsis of an elliptical sentence. So, *Mīmāṃsakas* say that in the case of elliptical sentence, we should supply the significate of a term. But the *Naiyāyikas* refute this view. They say that we cannot understand the meaning of a sentence only by knowing the purport of the terms which are used in a sentence. In the case of understanding the meaning of sentence, there is no difference between an elliptical sentence and any other sentence. The meaning of a sentence becomes clear to us if we utter the sentence clearly. In the case of elliptical sentence we should at first supply the missing terms. Here we should not supply the missing significates because mere supply of significates cannot determine the understanding of a sentence. If so, then the presentation of significates of terms used in a sentence will lead us to understand the meaning of a sentence. But this is not the fact. For example, "Bring a pen". We cannot understand the meaning of this sentence only by the presentation of several things meant by the terms of the sentence to our mind. We should, at first, utter all the terms. In the case of an elliptical sentence like "Bring" we should first supply some words like "a pen". Without supplying these words if we supply here the significates of the words then we cannot understand the meaning of this sentence.

According to the *Naiyāyikas*, significant terms are of four types - *yaugika*, *rudha*, *yoga-rudha* and *yaugika-rudha*. *Yoga* and *rudhi* are two powers by which we can determine the meaning of a term. 'Yoga' means 'avayava śakti'. It is the signifying power that abides in the parts of a term. On the other hand, 'rudhi'

means '*samudāya śakti*'. It is the signifying power that abides in a term as a whole. When we can understand the meaning of a term by its *avayava śakti* or by the signifying power of its parts then it is called as *yougika śabda*, as for example, *pācaka*. We can understand the meaning of this term from the verb '*pac*' with the primary suffix '*naka*'. The term means 'a cook'. When we can understand the meaning of a term by its *samudāya-śakti*, then it is called *rudha* term. For example, the term '*go*' means 'cow'. When *avayava-śakti* and *samudāya śakti* of a term indicates the same thing then the term is called *yoga-rudha* term. For example, *pankaja*. This term has two parts : '*panka*' and '*ja*'. '*Panka*' means 'mud' and '*ja*' means 'that which grows out'. Here from *avayava śakti* we can understand the thing which grows out of mud and from *samudāya śakti* we can understand 'lotus'. Actually, lotus grows out of mud. So, the above term is called *yoga-rudha* term. Again, if the *samudāya śakti* of a term indicates one thing and the *avayavaśakti* of it indicates other thing, then the term is called *yougika-rudha* term as for example, *udbhid*. Here from *yogaśakti* we can understand 'plant' and from *rudhaśakti* we can understand one kind of *Vaidika* sacrifice. Thus, the Naiyāyikas have divided four types of significant words.

According to Prabhākara *Mīmāṃsā*, by the signifying power of a term we can understand a thing as related to another thing. On the other hand, Goutama thinks that by the signifying power or *śakti* we can understand a thing which is not related to another thing. Both of the schools have accepted that when we are going to understand a sentence, the first to be presented to our mind are the things meant by the several terms of the sentence and by the signifying power of the terms we

can understand those things. It is also accepted by the both schools that a sentence is a complex of related things, not a juxtaposition of unrelated things. If we do not understand the relation among the terms then we cannot understand the meaning of a sentence. Now the question is : How can we understand the relation among terms ? Prabhākara says that as there is nothing beside the component terms in a sentence, so our understanding of relation among terms becomes possible only from the terms. That means, by the signifying power of terms used in a sentence we cannot only understand some things, but we can also understand the relation among those things. We can understand the relation of terms by the signifying power. This view is called *Anvitābhīdhānavāda*. But Bhāṭṭa *Mīmāṃsakas* and *Naiyāyikas* do not accept this view. They say that we cannot understand the relation among terms used in a sentence from the terms. This relation can be understood if the terms are arranged in a certain order. We cannot understand the relation among terms like 'bring', 'a', 'pot' if we arrange them in this way : 'Pot a bring'. On the other hand, if we arrange the terms in this way 'Bring a pot', then we can understand the relation of the terms. The right arrangement of terms helps us to understand the meaning of a sentence. By the signifying power of terms we can understand their meanings and by looking the arrangements of terms we can understand relation among the meanings. This view is called *Abhihitānvayavāda*.

The *Naiyāyikas* have accepted three conditions for understanding the meaning of a sentence. These are : *ākāṃkṣā*, *yogyatā* and *sannidhi*.

Generally, the term *ākāṁkṣā* means desire. But desire is a property of conscious being, it cannot be a property of a term as a term is an unconscious thing. When the term '*ākāṁkṣā*' is used to mean a condition of *śābda-bodha* then the term is not used in the sense of desire. We cannot say that *ākāṁkṣā* is the desire of a person who is going to understand the meaning of sentence and that desire is a condition of *śābda-bodha*. Because in many cases we can understand the meaning of a sentence without such desire. To produce the awareness of the relations of significantes of terms used in a sentence, one term depends on another term. Annambhatta defines it as "*Padasyapadāntaravyatirekaprayuktānanubhāvakatvam ākāṁkṣā*".²⁵

That means, it is the inability of a word, without another word, to produce an apprehension of the relation between the two terms.

By *ākāṁkṣā* or expectancy is meant that quality of the words of a sentence by which they expect or imply one another.²⁶

Again, one word of a sentence depends on another word to produce the relation between them. This is called *ākāṁkṣā*. In other words, if we can see that it is not possible for us to understand the meaning of a word without another word, then we can say that there is *ākāṁkṣā* between them. For example, "Ram is going". Here without the term 'Ram' the term 'going' is not able to produce the relation between what is signified by the terms. So, we can say that there is *ākāṁkṣā* between the terms. So, *ākāṁkṣā* is a syntactical demand. The term 'a book', 'a dog', 'a tree' etc. these terms are devoid of *ākāṁkṣā*. So, there does not arise *śābda-bodha* from these terms.

Ākāṅkṣā is this mutual need that the words of a sentence have for one another in order to express a complete sense.²⁷

Yogyatā is also a necessary condition for understanding the meaning of a sentence. *Yogyatā* means *anvaya-yogyatā*. To understand the meaning of a sentence, the terms of the sentence must be capable of being related. *Yogyatā* is the absence of bar to the presence of intended relation among the meanings of several terms. To Annambhatta, "*Arthābādhaḥ yogyatā*".²⁸ *Yogyatā* is the absence of incompatibility among what is signified by the several terms of a sentence. For example, "he is writing with his hand". From this sentence there arises *śābda-bodha* as there is *yogyatā* in this sentence. Here there is the absence of incompatibility among what is signified by the several terms of the sentence. On the other hand, in the sentence, "He is watering with fire", there is the absence of *yogyatā*. Here we find the presence of incompatibility between the terms 'watering' with 'fire'. 'Watering' means 'sprinkling with water' and such sprinkling is not possible by fire.

The term 'watering' is not capable of being related with 'fire'. So, there is the absence of *yogyatā* between this two terms and as there is the absence of *yogyatā*, there does not arise *śābda-bodha* from this sentence.

Sannidhi means the utterance of the words in a sentence without delay. If the words of a sentence are uttered at long intervals, then there can not arise *śābda-bodha*. Annambhatta defines it in the following way : "*Padānām avilambena uccāranam sannidhiḥ*".²⁹ That means, *sannidhi* is the utterance of the terms of a

sentence without delay. If the words of a sentence are uttered without delay then their significates arise immediately in our mind.

If there is to be an intelligible sentence then its constituent words must be continuous with one another in time or space. Spoken words cannot make a sentence when separated by long intervals of time. Similarly, written words cannot construct a sentence when they are separated by long intervals of space.³⁰

For example, "He is a man". If the words of this sentence are uttered one by one without long intervals then we can understand the meaning of this sentence as there is *sannidhi* among the words. On the other hand, if the same terms are uttered at long intervals, then there is the absence of *sannidhi* and in that case we cannot understand the meaning of the sentence.

To Nyāya verbal statements may be of two types *Vaidika* and *laukika*. The statements uttered in *Veda* are called *Vaidika*. According to the Naiyāyikas, all *Vaidika* statements are *pramāṇas* as the *Veda* is created by God. God is all pervading. He is free from error. As *vaidikavākyas* are the statements of God, so they are *pramāṇas*. On the other hand, *laukika vākyas* may be of two types : some are uttered by reliable persons and some are uttered by non-reliable persons.

Testimony is of two kinds - *Vaidika* and secular (*laukika*). The *Vaidika* testimony is perfect and infallible because the *Vedas* are spoken by God; secular testimony, being the words of human beings who are liable to error, is not infallible. Only the words of trust worthy persons who always speak the truth are valid; others are not.³¹

A reliable or trustworthy person is one who is free from illusion (*bhrama*), defect of sense - organs (*kāraṇapaṭavātā*), desire of cheating others (*vipralipsā*) etc. Only those *laukika* statements are *pramāṇa* which are uttered by trust worthy persons.

The *Mīmāṃsā* does not accept the view that the *Veda* is created by God. They say that the *Veda* is eternal and an eternal thing cannot be produced by anyone. But the Naiyāyikas say that like *Rāmāyana*, *Mahābhārat* etc. *Vedas* are also the collection of statements and all collection of statements are originated by some persons. As these works are created by some conscious being so there works cannot be eternal. The argument of Naiyāyikas can be shown thus.

All collection of statements have personal origin, like *Rāmāyana*, *Mahābhārat* etc.

The *Veda* is a collection of statements.

The *Veda* has a personal origin.

The *Mīmāṃsakas* say that the above argument is not valid. The major premise of this argument is not unconditionally true. If the probans of this inference i.e. 'collection of statements' is concerned with the *upādhi* 'being of remembered authorship', then the above inference may be true. In the cases of the *Rāmāyana*, the *Mahābhārat* etc. we can remember their author. But as we cannot remember the author of *Veda*, so the above inference is wrong and *Veda* is eternal. But Naiyāyikas do not accept this view. Goutama and others had come to know through *yoga* that *Veda* is the creation of God. There is on the contrary a definite tradition among Goutama and his disciples that the *Veda* is of divine origin. They

have been claiming for ages that the *Veda* is the word of God and they have been claiming it on the strength of the *Vaidika* dictum ‘from that thinking (*tepāna*) being were produced the three *Vedas*; (*Tasmāt tepānāt trayah vedāḥ ajāyanta*)’.³² Every production is dependent on its producer. So, *Vedas* are also produced by God. Thus the *Naiyāyikas* have proved that *Vedas* are created by God and so all *Vaidikavākyas* are *pramāṇas*.

The *Vaiśeṣikas* do not accept *śabda* as a separate kind of *pramāṇa*. They say that *śabda* is nothing but *anumāna* because the knowledge of relation between what is signified by the terms of a statement can be obtained from inference. But the *Naiyāyikas* say that *Vaiśeṣika* view goes against the direct verdict of internal perception of the mental state called ‘understanding a statement’. After hearing a sentence we understand it and feel that we are having such understanding. In this case the mental state appears to us not as *anumiti* but as *śabda-bodha*. From the internal perception of mental status of understanding a statement we may come to know that in such cases we are getting knowledge from *śabda* or word. So, the *Naiyāyikas* have accepted *śabda* as a separate kind of *pramāṇa*.

CHAPTER – II

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