

## CHAPTER – I

### Nyāya Concepts of *Pramā* and *Pramāṇa*

All the branches of Indian philosophy have discussed about *pramā* and *pramāṇa*. In Indian philosophy *pramā* means valid cognition. *Pra* means valid and *mā* means cognition. *Pramāṇa* is the way through which we can attain valid cognition. The Ārvākas are of the opinion that valid cognition must have three characteristics – it must be true, free from doubt and novel. An invalid cognition cannot be described as *pramā*. When we perceive a snake in the piece of rope, then it is a false cognition. This false cognition cannot be called *pramā*. Here we do not know the thing as it is. Valid cognition must be free from all doubt. When we do not know a thing correctly, there is confusion in our mind about the thing. This state of cognition is called *saṁśaya*. For example, in darkness some one has seen a thing beside the road and becomes confused whether it is man or a tree. Such type of cognition cannot be called *pramā*. Again the Ārvākas feel that novelty must be present in an object, which is called *pramā*. Such type of cognition which is not already known is called *pramā*. So, the Ārvākas say that memory (*smṛti*) and recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) are not *pramā*. Because, in the both cases we are knowing a thing, which has already been known.

Thus Ārvākas say that *pramā* is such type of cognition of an object which is free from doubt, error and which is not already known.

In Nyāya philosophy, knowledge is the manifestation of object. As light manifests objects so knowledge also manifests things. In the case of knowledge object manifests, we realise this manifestation and consciousness helps us to realise this manifestation.

Knowledge (*jñāna*) or cognition (*buddhi*) is defined as apprehension (*upalabdhi*) or consciousness (*anubhava*). Nyāya being realistic, believes that knowledge reveals both the subject and the object, which are quite distinct from itself. All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects – (*arthaprakāśho buddhiḥ*). Just as a lamp manifests physical things placed before it, so knowledge reveals all objects which come before it.<sup>1</sup>

Knowledge is the manifestation of apprehension of objects. Valid knowledge is the apprehension of the real character of an object. Invalid knowledge is the apprehension of an object as it is not in its real character. Truth is correspondence of knowledge with reality. Error is disagreement of knowledge with reality. Correspondence is truth, and non-correspondence is error.<sup>2</sup>

The Naiyāyikas have used the term '*buddhi*' for knowledge or cognition or *jñāna*. They have described cognition as consciousness which is a quality and which is the ground of all linguistic usage.

*Sarvavyavahārahetuḥ guṇaḥ buddhiḥ jñānam.*<sup>3</sup>

From this definition, we find that there are three characteristics of cognition : It is a quality (*guṇa*), it is the ground of all linguistic usage (*śabdaproyoga*) and it has the attribute of *jñānatva* or consciousness. The term 'quality' (*guṇa*) has been

inserted in the definition to keep out over coverage (*ativyāpti*) in relation to time etc. If the term were omitted from the definition, then it would be as follows :

*Buddhi* is consciousness, which is the ground of all linguistic usage. In this case we should call space, time etc. as *buddhi* because these are the ground of all linguistic usages. But actually space, time etc. are not *buddhi*. If we insert the term 'guṇa' in the definition then we can overcome this difficulty because though space and time are the ground of all linguistic usage, they are not quality. Again, without the term 'which is the ground of all linguistic usage the definition would be : Cognition is consciousness, which is a *guṇa*. In this case, we may say that smell, taste etc. are also cognitions by virtue of their status of qualities (*guṇa*). But these qualities are not cognition because these are not the ground of all linguistic use. If we insert the above term in the definition, then we can avoid this difficulty.

We all know that the defining characteristic of a thing cannot be all the common properties of the thing. By which property we can differentiate or identify one thing of a class from other things of other class is called its defining mark or *lakṣaṇa*.

It is well known that the attributes shared in common by the members of a class do not all form their 'defining attribute' and do not come within the logical 'definition' of the term denoting that class. The defining mark or the *lakṣaṇa* is constituted by any one or more of the common features which will serve to differentiate and identify an entity.<sup>4</sup>

In the case of cognition, the defining mark is *jñānatva* or 'Universal Consciousness'. This universal consciousness is revealed in the internal perception

'I am conscious'. According to the Naiyāyikas, knowledge is not self-luminous. Cognition is manifested by a subsequent state of cognition, which is called *anuvyavasāya*. When someone looks at a table, at that time he has not the cognition of 'looking a table'. The knowledge of 'looking a table' arises after looking the table. This subsequent cognition is called *anuvyavasāya*. The original perception is called *vyavasāya*. The original cognition as a state of consciousness is revealed by the internal perception. As the original states of cognition are innumerable, so also their corresponding internal perceptions are innumerable.

There is an indefinite multiplicity of these 'original' states of cognition and correspondingly the states of internal perception of these original states have also an indefinite multiplicity. Now these original cognitive states are each of them a state of consciousness. They have, therefore, their common feature in something which is present in each of them. This something is the Universal 'Consciousness'.<sup>5</sup>

Every original cognitive state is a state of consciousness. There is a common feature which is present in every original cognitive state. This common feature is called the universal 'Consciousness'. The original state of cognition is called in Sanskrit '*jñāna*' and the common feature which is present in every original state of cognition or *jñāna* is called '*jñāna-ta*'. In English, *jñāna* is described as a state of 'consciousness', but there is no distinctive single term for '*jñāna-tva*'. Without the presence of such term *jñāna-tva* is written as 'Consciousness' where the letter 'C' should be written in capital letter. After looking some pots the universal 'potness' is revealed in the sense perception. In the same way, Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas say that the internal perception in which the cognition (*jñāna*)<sup>reveals</sup> can reveal the knowledge-hood

(*jñāna-tva*). When the universal ‘Consciousness’ (*jñāna-tva*) is called as the defining mark of cognition (*jñāna*) then the meaning of the term ‘defining mark’ is taken only to mean the common features.

According to Naiyāyikas, cognition is of two types – memory and reason.

In defining memory Naiyāyikas say that memory is the state of consciousness, which results from trace alone. The meaning of the term *saṃskāra* is mental trace.

*Saṃskāramatrajanyam jñānam smṛtiḥ.*<sup>6</sup>

In the definition of memory the three phrases, viz., ‘consciousness’, ‘which results from *saṃskāra*’ and ‘alone’ have special significance. Without the term ‘consciousness’ the definition of memory would be : Memory is the state which results from trace alone. In this case a difficulty arises. The destruction of a trace (*saṃskāradhvamsa*) also results from trace. We all know that the destruction of an effect regularly presupposes the prior existence of what is destroyed. But destruction is not memory. A thing can be destroyed if it has prior existence. A trace can be destroyed as it has prior existence. Without the phrase ‘consciousness’ the definition of memory would be too wide and the definition includes the destruction of trace in it. The insertion of the term ‘consciousness’ avoids this difficulty because though the destruction of a trace also results from trace but the destruction is not a state of consciousness. Again, without the clause ‘which results from a trace’ the definition would be ‘Memory is consciousness’. In this case also the defect of over coverage (*ativyāpti*) arises. The perception of a thing is a state of consciousness. So we should call perception as memory. But this

is not right. By the insertion of the clause 'which results from a trace' we can overcome this difficulty because though perception is a state of consciousness it is not the result of any trace. The term 'alone' in the definition has also some special significance. If the term were omitted then the definition would be : Memory is the cognition which results from trace. Here also arises the defect of over-coverage because in this case we should call recognitive perception as memory as it results from trace. For example, after looking a man when we say 'This is that Devadatta', then the term 'that' refers to a past time and place. If we can remember the experience of that past time and place only then it is possible for us to attain the present knowledge about past time and place. And that remembrance becomes possible only through a revival of the trace of past experience. So, recognitive perception also results from trace. But it is a case of perception but not of memory. Without the term 'alone' recognitive perception should have been considered as memory. But if we include the term 'alone' in the definition then we can overcome this difficulty. Because recognitive perception is not only the result of trace. In this case, sense-object contact is also necessary but memory is not the result of any sensory stimulus at all. Thus we can say that memory is only the result of trace, whereas *pratyabhijñā* is the result of both sensory stimulus and trace.

According to Nīlkaṇṭha, trace is not the sole condition of memory. Some other conditions like the presence of the subject, the relation between the soul and the *manas* etc. are also necessary for memory.

Nīlkantha points out that if the *Tarkasamgraha* definition of 'memory' as 'the cognition that results from trace alone' is taken as its face value, then it is clearly defective. For the prima-facie meaning of the definiens would be : 'the cognition that results from trace and nothing else'. And then the definition would suffer from the blemish of 'absurdity' or 'non-coverage' (*asambhava*). For though some 'trace' is a condition, it is never the sole condition of memory. There are other conditions as well, e.g., the presence of the subject, the relation between the soul and the 'means' etc. The clause 'that results from trace alone' is, therefore, to be interpreted as 'that which results from trace and not from any sensory stimulus' and not as 'that which results from trace and not from anything else'.<sup>7</sup>

A state of consciousness which is different from *smṛti* is called *anubhava*. Naiyāyikas say that *anubhava* is of two types : veridical (*yathārtha*) and non-veridical (*ayathārtha*)

*Tabbhinnam jñānam, anubhavaḥ, Sad<sup>vi</sup>vidhaḥ yathārthaḥ ayathā<sup>ṛt</sup>ḥ ca.*<sup>8</sup>

In Western philosophy, knowledge is divided into two kinds : direct or immediate cognition and indirect or mediate cognition. But the Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas divide knowledge as *smṛti* and *anubhava*. So, there is difference between the views of Western philosophers and Naiyāyikas. The Naiyāyikas say that both direct and indirect cognitions come under *anubhava*. Perception is direct cognition and inference is indirect cognition. Perception and inference both are *anubhava*.

It would be tempting to translate '*anubhava*' as 'direct' or 'immediate' cognition. But that would be misleading. For, as will appear presently, 'mediate' knowledge also, like inference etc., comes under '*anubhava*', according to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika usage. The division of knowledge into memory and '*anubhava*' cuts across the Kantian distinction of cognition as

‘direct or immediate’ and ‘indirect or mediate’. In the absence of any tolerably precise equivalent, the Sanskrit term ‘*anubhava*’ has been retained as it is.<sup>9</sup>

In defining veridical *anubhava* Naiyāyikas formule : *Tadvati tatprakārah anubhavaḥ yathārthaḥ*.<sup>10</sup> That means a veridical *anubhava* is that which has for its determinans something ‘P’ (*tat*) when the determinandum ‘has that something’ (*tadvat*). Here determinans means *prakāra* and determinandum means *viśeṣya*. Here we see that there are two terms ‘determinans’ and ‘determinandum’ in the definition of *pramā*. If we do not understand the meanings of these two terms then we cannot describe *pramā*.

All our cognitions are cognitions of ‘something’. This ‘something’ is called the *viśeṣya* or object of cognition. The object of cognition is a combination of three things - *viśeṣya*, *prakāra* and *samsarga*. We all know that the object which is characterised by something is called *viśeṣya* and which characterises the *viśeṣya* is called *prakāra*. *Prakāra* may be called as *viśeṣaṇa*. For example, the perception of a pen is a cognition. Here the ‘object’ of perception is a complex entity. It may be described as ‘something, which is characterised by pen-ness’. The Naiyāyikas say that this ‘something’ which is characterised is called *viśeṣya* and ‘pen-ness’ which characterises the ‘something’ is called *prakāra* or *viśeṣaṇa*. Now we can take an example of an inferential cognition like ‘The hill has fire’. Here ‘the hill’ is the *viśeṣya* as it is characterised by fire and ‘fire’ is the *viśeṣaṇa* or *prakāra* as it characterises the hill. In the cases of other cognitions like knowledge by analogy and knowledge by testimony we can apply the same analogy. That means *prakāra*

and *viśeṣya* must be present in all cases of knowledge. Thus we can say that by the combination of *viśeṣya* or *prakāra* all types of knowledge are formed.

So, *pramā* or veridical cognition is that cognition which has for its *prakāra* object 'something' when the *viśeṣya* object is that which has that 'something'.

But the above definition of *pramā* is too narrow because we cannot apply this definition in many cases of true knowledge. For example, 'pot ness is in pot'. This is a true knowledge but the definition of *pramā* cannot be applied here. Here 'pot ness' is *viśeṣaṇa* or *prakāra* and 'pot' is *viśeṣya*. In this case we cannot say that the *prakāra* is in the *viśeṣya* i.e., in 'pot ness' there is 'pot' because 'pot' cannot present in 'pot ness' but 'pot ness' is always present in 'pot'. Thus the definition of *pramā* suffers the defect of *avyāpti*. To avoid this difficulty we should say that the phrase '*tadvatt*' in the definition of *pramā* does not mean 'when there is that which has the something', but the meaning of the phrase is 'when there is that which has a relation to the something'. As 'pot' has some relation with 'pot ness' so the above example comes under the definition of *pramā*.

The Naiyāyikas do not accept every type of veridical cognition as *pramā*. They say that only veridical *anubhabha* is *pramā*. The Vaiśeṣikas say that *pramā* means true cognition. But the Naiyāyikas have not accepted the opinion of the Vaiśeṣikas and other Indian thinkers that *pramā* means true cognition. They say that only true *anubhava* is *pramā*.

It is to be noted, again that it is only a veridical *anubhava* and not any and every veridical cognition that is designated as *pramā* in the Nyāya school. There may be

veridical cognition in the form of a veridical memory (*smṛti*), but that is not taken as '*pramā*' in the Nyāya school. The Sanskrit term is thus narrower in usage than the term 'true cognition'. Not that this Nyāya usage has been adopted universally in the Indian schools. In the Vaiśeṣika texts the term '*pramā*' means true cognition (*yathārtha jñāna*) and not merely true *anubhava*.

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On the other hand, *apramā* or non-veridical *anubhava* is that which has for its *prakāra* something when its *viśeṣya* has the absence of that something.

*Tadabhāvavati tatprakāraḥ anubhavaḥ ayathārthaḥ.*<sup>12</sup>

That means, non-veridical *anubhava* is one whose *viśeṣya* is characterised by the absence of *prakāra*. Here *prakāra* is something, which is absent in the *viśeṣya*. The perception of a snake in a rope is an example of non-veridical *anubhava*. In this case, 'snake-ness' is *prakāra* and 'rope' is *viśeṣya*. Snake-ness cannot present in rope. In rope there is 'rope-ness'. As the *prakāra* 'snake-ness' is not present in the *viśeṣya* 'rope' so it is a case of *apramā*.

In the above definition there is also the defect of over coverage (*ativyāpti*) because we can apply this definition in some cases of *pramā*. For example, 'This table has

conjunction with my hand'. This is a case of *pramā*. But we can apply this example in the case of *apramā*. Conjunction is un-prervasive (*avyāpyavṛtti*). All the parts of the table have not contact with my hand. Some parts of the table have conjunction with my hand. Some parts do not have the same i.e., other parts have the absence of conjunction. In the case of above knowledge, we can say that here *prakāra* or determinans is contact (*samyoga*) and *viśeṣya* or determination is 'table'. As there is the absence of contact in some parts of the table so we can say that here the *viśeṣya* table is not characterised by the *prakāra*. Thus the above example of *pramā* comes under the definition of *apramā*. Thus the above definition of *apramā* suffers the defect of over-coverage (*ativyapti*).

To avoid this difficulty we can say that the actual significance of the definition of *apramā* is : A false cognition (*apramā*) is that which has for its determinans (*prakāra*) something 'p' in a certain relation 'r' (*sambandha*) to a certain aspect 'a' (*avacchedaka*) of the determinandum (*viśeṣya*), when the latter has the absence of the something 'p' in that relation 'r' to that aspect 'a'.

Now the above example of *pramā* cannot come under the definition of *apramā*. If there is no contact of my hand with the table only then we can say that the above case is an example of *apramā*. Thus, we can overcome the defect of over coverage.

Thus, valid knowledge is the knowledge that represents the real character of its object, or apprehends what exists in it. Error is the knowledge that does not represent the real character of its object, or apprehends what does not exist in it. So the knowledge which corresponds with real nature of its object

is valid, and the knowledge which does not correspond with its real character is invalid.<sup>13</sup>

The truth and falsity of knowledge consist respectively in its correspondence and non-correspondence to facts. But the test of its truth or falsity consists in inference from the success or failure of our practical activities in relation to its object (*pravṛttisāmartha* or *pravṛttisamvāda*). True knowledge leads to successful practical activity, while false knowledge ends in failure and disappointment.<sup>14</sup>

The Naiyāyikas say that veridical *anubhava* or *pramā* is of four types : *pratyakṣa*, *anumiti*, *upamiti* and *śābda*. The way through which we can attain veridical *anubhava* is also of four types : *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*. That means *pratyakṣa* is the special condition of *pratyakṣa pramā*, *anumāna* is the special condition of *anumiti*, *upamāna* is the special condition of *upamiti* and *śabda* is the special condition of *śābda*. The Naiyāyikas use the term '*karaṇa*' for special condition. In the case of *pratyakṣa* the same term (*pratyakṣa*) is used both for *pramāṇa* and *pramā*. But in other cases, the term used for *pramāṇa* and *pramā* are different. The English words perception, inference, testimony are used both for *pramāṇa* and *pramā*.

According to Nyāya, *pramāyāḥ karaṇam iti pramāṇasāmānya lakṣaṇam*.<sup>15</sup>

That means *pramāṇa* is the *karaṇa* of *pramā*. We all know that every effect has its cause. As *pramā* is an effect so it must have some cause. *Karaṇa* is also a cause. But every effect is produced with the help of many causes. All these causes are not *karaṇa*. In defining *karaṇa* Naiyāyikas have given different opinions. According

to the old Naiyāyikas, *karāṇa* is the ultimate condition or cause (*carama-kāraṇa*). Just after the presence of which cause the effect is produced is called *karāṇa*. 'Cutting a tree' is an effect. God, space, time *adr̥ṣṭa*, the presence of the cutter, sharp instrument, the contact of sharp instrument with tree etc. all these are causes of this effect. As the effect is produced just after the contact of sharp instrument with tree so it is called the *carama-kāraṇa* or terminal cause. Old Naiyāyikas have described this terminal condition (*carama-kāraṇa*) as *karāṇa*. In this way, old Naiyāyikas said that just after the presence of which thing valid *anubhava* or *pramā* is produced is called *pramāṇa*. The Neo-Naiyāyikas have given a different view about *karāṇa*. Which cause produces the effect through an intermediary is called *karāṇa*, according to them (*Vyāparavat asādhāraṇam kāraṇam karaṇam*). Being produced by something, which produces the ultimate effect of that thing, is called *vyāpāra* (*Tajjyanyatve sati tajjanyajanako vyāpārah*). The effect 'cutting a tree' will not produce without the contact of sharp instrument with tree. Sharp instrument is *karāṇa*. The contact of sharp instrument with tree is produced by sharp instrument and hence it is called *vyāpāra*. The *vyāpāra* produces the effect 'cutting a tree'. So, the Neo Naiyāyikas say that *karāṇa* means *vyāpāravatkāraṇa*. Which produces *pramā* with the help of some *vyāpāra* is called *pramāṇa*.

To explain the importance of *pramāṇa* Naiyāyikas say that *pramāṇam arthavat*. A thing is like that in the way it is manifested by *pramāṇa*. The knower can understand the meaning of a thing by *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇato'rtha pratipattau* means what we understand by *pramāṇa* is *pramā*. (*Tadevam sataḥ prakāśakam pramāṇamasadapi prakāśayatīti*). *Pramāṇa* manifests both existing objects and

non-existing objects. That means, we can understand the existence of a thing and non-existence of a thing by *pramāṇa*. (*Arthavati ca pramāṇe pramātā prameyampramiti rityarthavanti bhavanti*). When there arises valid *anubhava* through *pramāṇa* only then there can be the knower (*pramātā*) object (*prameya*) and knowledge (*pramiti*). So, *pramāṇa* is the main thing among these. After understanding the meaning of a thing by *pramāṇa* if the knower thinks that there is happiness in it, then he may accept it and if the knower thinks that there is sorrow in it then he may reject it or neglect it.

*Pramāṇa* is the special condition or *kaṛaṇa* of *pramā*. In the above, two definitions of *kaṛaṇa* have been discussed. Annambhaṭṭa in his book *Tarasamgraha* has explained *kaṛaṇa* in a different way. According to him, *asādhāraṇam kāraṇam kaṛaṇam*. An uncommon condition is called *kaṛaṇa*. An effect is dependent on two sets of conditions : *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* and *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*. The presence of some conditions are necessary for every effect. These are called *sādhāraṇa kāraṇa* or common cause. God, space, time, *adr̥ṣṭa* etc. are such conditions. Without these conditions the presence of some conditions are necessary for each specific effect. These are called *asādhāraṇa kāraṇa* or uncommon cause. Annambhaṭṭa accepts these uncommon conditions as *kaṛaṇa*. Annambhaṭṭa's view is different from both the old and Neo-Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas view about *kaṛaṇa*. Old Naiyāyikas described *kaṛaṇa* as 'terminal condition' and Neo-Naiyāyikas described *kaṛaṇa* as a 'causal condition functioning through an intermediary. For example, cutting a piece of wood is an effect. The old Naiyāyikas say that terminal condition or the contact of a sharp instrument with

the wood is the *karāṇa* but Navya-Naiyāyikas say that ‘the thing which functions through an intermediary of *vyāpāra*’ is *karāṇa*. Here the sharp instrument is the *karāṇa* because from sharp instrument the contact between sharp instrument with wood is produced. But Annaṁbhaṭṭa’s view is different from both the above views. Annaṁbhaṭṭa described all the conditions except the common conditions are *karāṇa*. He is also not strict to his view in all cases. In the cases of *pratyakṣa*, *pramā*, *upamiti* and *śābdabodha* he has accepted *karāṇa* as *vyāpāravat kārāṇa*, but in the case of *anumity* he has accepted *karāṇa* as terminal condition. But both *vyāpāravat kārāṇa* and *carama-kārāṇa* are *asādhārana kārāṇa*. So, according to him, *karāṇa* is *asādhārana kārāṇa*.

In the case of *pratyakṣa pramā* sense organ or *indriya* is *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. In the cases of *upamiti* and *śābda*, resemblance or *śādr̥sya jñāna* is taken as *upamāna pramāṇa* and statement or *śabda* is taken as *śabda pramāṇa*. In the case of *anumiti*, *parāmarśa* is called *anumāna pramāṇa*. In describing *kārāṇa* Naiyāyikas say, that which exists uniformly before the effect is the *kārāṇa* (*kāryaniyata pūrvavṛtti karaṇam*).<sup>16</sup>

A cause is defined as an unconditional and invariable antecedent of an effect and an effect as an unconditional and invariable consequent of a cause. The same cause produces the same effect and the same effect is produced by same cause.<sup>17</sup>

If the term ‘uniformly’ were omitted from the definition then the definition of *kārāṇa* would be ‘that which exists before the effect is the *kārāṇa*. In this case

there arises the defect of *ativyāpti*. Here any antecedent event should be accepted as *kāraṇa*. For example, a *pot* is an effect. Someone wants to know the *kāraṇa* of this effect. He thinks that the ass is the *kāraṇa* of this effect because before occurring the above effect the ass brings the load of clay by which the potter has produced the *pot*. But an ass cannot be accepted as *kāraṇa* for the effect '*pot*'. Because an ass does not always bring the load of clay to produce the effect '*pot*'. Ass is not a uniform antecedent. Without the term 'uniformly' the definition of *kāraṇa* would be too wide. Then we should call any antecedent event as *kāraṇa*. By the term 'uniformly' we can overcome the above defect.

Again without the term 'existing before' the definition of *kāraṇa* would be 'cause is that which exists uniformly in relation to the effect' (*kāryaniyata vṛttikāraṇam*). In this case also the definition would be too wide. Here we should call every effect as its own cause because every effect does exist in a regular relation of self-identity (*tādātmya*) to itself. We all know that everything is self-identical with itself. Identity is a relation. Everything exists in a regular relation of self-identity to itself. As everything is self-identical with itself so an effect is also self-identical with itself. Without the term 'existing before' we can avoid the above difficulty because no effect can exist before producing that effect. Thus, by a cause we should understand something that is not only '*niyatavṛtti*', but also '*pūrvavṛtti*'.

A cause is not an irrelevant antecedent. If someone says that the colour of thread is the cause of cloth, then he is describing an irrelevant antecedent as cause. Because the colour of thread is an irrelevant antecedent to the effect - 'cloth'. Sky, space, time etc. though these are uniformly present before producing every effect, but

these should not be described as cause of the effects like cloth, chair, table etc. The presence of the above conditions is necessary for producing every effect, but as they are irrelevant so they should not be described as cause.

An effect of *kārya* is the *pratiyogī* or negatum of a *prāgabhāva* or prior-absence. The word *pratiyogī* is used in the context of *abhāva*. The *pratiyogī* is that thing which is absent. That means, if there is the absence of a pen then pen is the *pratiyogī* of this absence. *Prāgabhāva* means the absence of something before its production. An aeroplane, a chain, a table etc. these are effects. Before the production of these things there was the absence of these things i.e., there was the *prāgabhāva* of these things before their production. The above things are *pratiyogī* of this absence. After the production of *pot*, the absence vanishes.

An effect (*kārya*) is defined as the 'counter-entity of its own prior non-existence' (*prāgabhāvapratyogi*). It is the negation of its own prior-negation. It comes into being and destroys its prior non-existence. It was non-existent before its production. It did not pre-exist in its cause. It is a fresh beginning, a new creation.<sup>18</sup>

According to the Naiyāyikas, cause is of three kinds - *samavāyikāraṇa*, *asamavāyikāraṇa* and *nimittakāraṇa*. In defining *samavāyikāraṇa* the Naiyāyikas say, "that, inhering in which an effect emerges". For example, cloth is an effect. Its *samavāyikāraṇa* is the threads. By the threads a cloth is constituted. Threads are the parts of cloth. Cloth is a 'whole'. It is related to its parts i.e., the threads by the relation of inherence. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that the relation among the parts and the whole is the relation of 'inherence' or *samavāya*. Again, a thing

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is the *samavāikāraṇa* of its qualities. Thread is the *samāvāyikāraṇa* of its colour. The colour of thread is a quality and it is also an effect. As it is an effect, it must be produced by something i.e., it must have a cause. We all know that cause is a necessary antecedent and without cause an effect cannot come into being. The colour of thread cannot exist without the thread. So, thread is the *samāvāyikāraṇa* of its colour. Cloth is a substance (*dravya*) and colour is a quality (*guṇa*). Thus the Naiyāyikas describe that *dravya* is the *samavākāraṇa* of its qualities or *guṇa*.

*Asamavāyikāraṇa* is defined by the Naiyāyikas as ‘that entity which is a cause as existing in the self same object along with the effect or with the cause’. *Asamavāyikāraṇa* may be of two types : ‘that which exists in the *samāvāyikāraṇa* of an effect, along with the effect itself’ and ‘that which exists in its *samāvāyikāraṇa* along with the *samāvāyikāraṇa* of the effect. The conjunction of threads is the example of the first type of *asamavāyikāraṇa*. The *samāvāyikāraṇa* of cloth is thread. Conjunction is a quality. So it must inhere in a substance. The conjunction of threads exists in the threads by the relation of inherence. The *asamavāyikāraṇa* exists in the *samāvāyikāraṇa* of an effect. The cloth is the effect. Its *asamavāyikāraṇa* i.e. the conjunction of threads exists in its *samāvāyikāraṇa* i.e., the threads along with the effect ‘cloth’. Again, the colour of threads in the *asamavāyikāraṇa* of the colour of cloth. This is the example of second type of *asamavāyikāraṇa*. The colour of a cloth is an effect. Its *samāvāyikāraṇa* is the cloth. Its *asamavāyikāraṇa* is the colour of threads and threads are the *samāvāyikāraṇa* of its colour. Here the colour of threads or *asamavāyikāraṇa* abides in its *samāvāyikāraṇa* or threads along with the cloth,

which is the *samavāyikāraṇa* of the effect the colour of cloth. From the above discussion it is clear that *samavāyikāraṇa* is always a substance (*dravya*) and *asamavāyikāraṇa* is either a quality (*guṇa*) or an action (*kārya*).

The cause which is different from both *samavāyikāraṇa* and *asamavāyikāraṇa* is called *nimittakāraṇa*. The weaver, his activity, weaving loom, the shuttle etc. are the *nimittakāraṇa* of the effect - 'clot'.

It is already mentioned that the Naiyāyikas have accepted four types of valid cognition and four sources of knowing the valid cognition. That means, they have accepted four types of *pramā* and four types of *pramāṇa*.

The *kāraṇa* or uncommon condition of perceptual cognition or *pratyakṣa pramā* is called of *pratyakṣa pramāṇa*. Thus, we can see that the term 'pratyakṣa' is used both for valid knowledge and the source of this valid knowledge. The cognition that is attained through the relation (*sannikarṣa*) of a sense-organ (*indriya*) with some object (*artha*) is perception (*pratyakṣa*). *Pratyakṣa* is of two types- *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka*. In defining *pratyakṣa* Naiyāyikas say, "*Indriyārth sannikarṣajanyam jñānam pratyakṣam*".<sup>19</sup>

*Pratyakṣa* is defined as that knowledge which is attained through the contact of sense organ with some object. In this definition the term 'artha' means 'a real thing'. Here we should remember that perception may be valid and invalid.<sup>20</sup>

*Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam avyapadeshyam avyabhicāri vyavasayātmakam pratyakṣam*. (Nyāya-Sūtra, 1,1,4).

Goutama defines perception as ‘non-erroneous cognition which is produced by the intercourse of the sense-organs with objects, which is not associated with a name and which is well defined’. This definition of perception excludes divine and *yogic* perception which is not generated by the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. Hence Vishvanāth has defined perception as ‘direct or immediate cognition, which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition’. This definition includes ordinary as well as extra-ordinary perception and excludes inference, comparison and testimony.

*Pratyakṣa* is *karāṇa* of only valid perceptual cognition. *Pratyakṣa* is divided into two kinds - indeterminate or *nirvikalpaka* and determinate or *savikalpaka* (*Nisprakāraṅgam jñānam nirvikalpakaṅgam*).<sup>21</sup>

The perception that is *nisprakāraṅga* i.e., having no quantifiers is called *nirvikalpa* perception. That means the perception, which is devoid of determinans or *prakāra*, is called *nirvikalpaka*. Literally *nirvikalpaka* means the perception in which there is no *vikalpa*. *Vikalpa* means a name or a quality or a universal or a relation of ‘characteriser-characterised’ (*viśeṣaṅga-viśeṣya*). Thus, it is clear that in the case of *nirvikalpaka* perception a name or a universal etc. are not present as its object : All our perceptions are about something or about some object. In the case of *nirvikalpaka* perception we can know that something is there but we cannot know the name or the quality etc. of that object. The actuality of *nirvikalpaka* perception can be proved in this way. The cognition of a thing like ‘cow’ is due to the cognition of its determinant or *viśeṣaṅga* ‘cow ness’. We can differentiate cow from other things, as there is cow ness in it. To avoid infinite regress we should not say

that 'cow ness' is also a determinate (*viśeṣya*). Because if cow ness is a determinate, it must have a determinant (*viśeṣaṇa*). In this way, there arises infinite regress. If we say that the knowledge of cow ness is possible without the knowledge of any other determinant, then we should say that this is a case of indeterminate perception. Thus we can prove that *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa* is possible.

*Nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate perception is the primary cognition of an object and its diverse characters without any judgement to interrelate them. Suppose you look at an orange placed on the other side of your table. Immediately after the first glance, or after the first moment of contact between your eyes and the object, you apprehend something, its colour, shape etc., along with a general character called orange ness. But at the first sight, you do not think of it as yellow or round, or an orange. This kind of primary perception is called indeterminate perception.<sup>22</sup>

*Savikalpaka* perception is the cognition of an object as possessed of some character. While *nirvikalpaka* is the cognition of the existence of a thing as such, *savikalpaka* may be said to be the recognition of its nature.<sup>23</sup>

(*Saparakāram jñānam savikalpakam*).<sup>24</sup> The perception, which is *saparakāra* or associated with qualifiers is called *savikalpa*. A cognition, which has for its cognitum an appellation, a universal etc. a *viśeṣaṇa*, a *viśeṣya* or a relation is called *savikalpaka* perception. From the term '*savikalpaka*' we can understand that it is a kind of perception, which has a *vikalpa*. Name, universal, *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣaṇa*, relation etc. are *vakalpas*. 'That is Ram', 'He is black' etc. are examples of *savikalpaka* perception.

Thus we may say that *nirvikalpaka* is an indeterminate apprehension and *savikalpaka* a determinate, predicative judgement. There could not be any *savikalpaka* perception of an object without a previous *nirvikalpaka* perception of it. Unless we first knew the unrelated elements as such, we could not possibly know them as related. Unless I first perceive water, coldness, liquidity etc. I cannot come to know it as water or as cold or as liquid etc. <sup>25</sup>

(*Anumitikaraṇamanumānam. Parāmarśajanyam jñānamanumiti*).<sup>26</sup> The *karaṇa* or uncommon condition of *anumiti* is called *anumāna*. *Anumiti* results from *parāmarśa*.

Inference is mediate knowledge of an object (e.g., a fire) derived through the medium of the knowledge of a mark (e.g., a smoke) by virtue of the relation of invariable concomitance between them. It depends upon the perception of a mark and the recollection of invariable concomitance. <sup>27</sup>

After looking that there is smoke on the hill we can infer that there is fire in it. This cognition results thus : we see smoke coming out from the hill; we remember 'where there is smoke, there is fire' and we are assured that the smoke which we see comes under the rule. After this we can infer that there is fire. This inferential cognition results from the three; the seeing, the remembrance and the assurance. As after assurance inferential cognition arises so it is called the *karaṇa* of *anumiti*.

*Anumāna* (inference) is the process of ascertaining, not by perception or direct observation but through the instrumentality or medium of a mark, that a thing possesses a certain character. <sup>28</sup>

*Vyāptiviśeṣṭa pakṣadharmatājñāna* is called *pārāmarśa*. *Vyāptiviśeṣṭa* means that which is characterised by *vyāpti* and *pakṣadharmatā* means the fact of being a

feature of *pakṣa*. *Parāmarśa* is the cognition of the 'subject' of an inference as having a mark, which is characterised by the 'vyāpti' of the probandum. The hill (*pakṣa*) under reference as having smoke (the *hetu*) which is characterised by the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) of fire (the *sādhya*) is *parāmarśa*.

If only it is said that inferential cognition results from *parāmarśa* alone then there arises the defect of over-coverage. Because in that case we should call *samśayottara pratyakṣa* (i.e., perception after doubt) as inference as it results from *parāmarśa*. Sometime we may look a thing from a distance and we may not sure what the thing is. We may confuse whether the thing is a man or a stump of a tree as the thing appears with the features which are common to both a man and a stump. We may think that 'the thing before us has hands, legs etc. which are uniform associate (*vyāpya*) of the features of a man'. After that we may attain the cognition that the thing before us is a man. This cognition results from *parāmarśa*. So we should call it anumiti. But it is a case of perception. To avoid this difficulty the Naiyāyikas said that inferential cognition results from *parāmarśa* accompanied by *pakṣatā*. The absence of certainty that is accompanied by the absence of desire to infer is called *pakṣatā*. If there is certainty that the *sādhya* is in the *pakṣa*, then inferential cognition cannot arise. So, the certain knowledge of *sādhya* is a bar to arise inferential cognition. But in that case also inferential cognition may arise if there is the desire to infer. The desire to infer is here the stimulant (*uttejaka*). Thus the absence of certainty that is accompanied by the absence of the desire to infer is a casual condition for inferential cognition. It is described as *pakṣatā*. In the case of *samsayottara-pratyakṣa*, though the absence of certainty is present, there is also

the desire to infer. This is not the case where there is the absence of certainty that is accompanied by the absence of the desire to infer. So, we cannot say that *samsayottara-pratyakṣa* results from *parāmarśa* accompanied by *pakṣatā*.

Inference is of two kinds : (1) inference for oneself and (2) inference for others. The first kind of inference is a psychological process which does not require the formal statement of its different members.<sup>29</sup>

This is the psychological analysis of inference for oneself. The second kind of inference is intended for convincing others. It is a demonstrative inference.  
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Goutama speaks of three kinds of inference - *pūrvavat*, *sheṣavat* and *sāmānyatodrṣṭa*. The first two are based on causation and the last one on mere co-existence.<sup>31</sup>

Another classification of inference gives us the *kevalānvayi*, *kevalavyatireki* and *anvayavyatireki* inferences. It is based on the nature of *vyāpti* and on the different methods of establishing it.<sup>32</sup>

The third kind of *pramāṇa* accepted by Nyāya is *upamāna*. (*upamitikaraṇam upamānam. Saṃjñā-saṃjñīsambandha jñānam upamitiḥ*).<sup>33</sup> That means, the special condition for *upamiti* is *upamāna*. *Upamiti* is described as the relation between a term (*saṃjñā*) and what it signified (*saṃjñī*). *Sādrśya-jñāna* or the ‘cognition of similarity’ is the special condition for *upamity*. For example, a person wants to know the meaning of the term ‘*gavaya*’. A forester tells him that a *gavaya* is like a cow. He then goes to a forest and looks a cow-like animal. He remembers the forester’s statement that a *gavaya* is like a cow. After that he

comes to know that the animal before him is a *gavaya*. This knowledge is called *upamity*.

Now, *upamāna* is just this way of knowing the denotation of words, or the relation between names and the objects denoted by them.

Suppose you do not know what “saxophone” means. You may be told by a musician : “A saxophone is a musical instrument something like a U shaped trumpet”. If, on subsequently seeing a saxophone, you are able to give its name, it will be clear that you understand what “saxophone” means.<sup>34</sup>

Now, *upamāna* is just this way of knowing the denotation of words, or the relation between names and the objects denoted by them.<sup>35</sup>

Here knowledge of similarity is *upamāna*, which is the special condition of *upamity*. In the case of *upamity* the knowledge ‘a *gavaya* is like a cow’ stands for verbal knowledge of similarity. The perception of a thing like a cow stands for perceptual knowledge of similarity. The remembrance of the statement ‘a *gavaya* is like a cow’ stands for memory knowledge of similarity. Philosophers are divided on the question : which knowledge of similarity is *upamāna*? Govardhanācārya in his *Nyāyabodhinī* says that the verbal knowledge ‘a *gavaya* is like a cow’ is *upamāna pramāṇa* and the memory cognition is the *vyāpāra*. On the other hand, Chanraja Simha in his book *Padakṛtyam* says that the perceptual knowledge of similarity is *upamāna pramāṇa* and memory cognition is *vyāpāra*.

Nyāya have accepted *Śabda* or *Āgama* as the fourth kind of valid knowledge. Its special means or *karana* is called *śabda*. *Śabda pramāṇa* is defined as a statement of a trustworthy person. A trustworthy person is one who always speaks the truth.

Testimony may be of two kinds : *Vaidika* and secular (*laukika*). *Vaidika* testimony is perfect and infallible as the *Vedas* are spoken by God. 'But-*laukika* testimony may be valid or invalid. Those *laukika* testimonies are valid which are spoken by trustworthy persons. A sentence is a collection of words and a word is that which has power to convey its meaning. The ancient Nyāya says that the power of a word to convey its meaning comes from God. But the later Nyāya says that this power comes from long established convention.

Thus the Naiyāyikas have accepted four types of *pramā* (*pratyakṣa*, *anumiti*, *upamiti* and *śābda*) and four types of *pramāṇa* (*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *śabda*).

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