

CHAPTER - 2

Problem of Reference : Meinong and Russell

CHAPTER - 2

The Problem of Reference : Meinong and Russell

Section – I

The Problem of Reference

I wish to start with a preamble before entering into the main business of this chapter in Section-II. The problem of reference has occupied a central position in analytic philosophy from the beginning of the twentieth century. Russell was concerned with the issues of referring, denoting and naming, stated in his **Theory of Descriptions** that appeared in his celebrated paper "On Denoting"¹. But it would not be quite correct to assume that Russell was the first to be concerned with the problem of reference. Plato also noted some of these problems in his *Sophist*. Two of his predecessors Alexius Meinong and Gottlob Frege were also teased by the problem. And ever since the publication of Strawson's "On Referring"² in which he criticizes Russell's theory of descriptions, there has been an active debate among the followers of Russell and Strawson. The subject of reference thus has become a lively issue in the debate between opposing schools of philosophical analysis.

The problem of reference mainly revolves around the question: "Are the sentences, containing subject terms which are non-denoting, significant? What do these terms refer to?" Russell's interest in the problem has its source in his interest in ontology. In "On Denoting", Russell points to a group of 'puzzles' to which he claims to have provided a solution. The first of the puzzles, known as the problem of Negative Existential Statements, was of utmost concern to him.

Let us consider the proposition "A differs from B". If this is true, there is a difference between A and B, which fact may be expressed in the form: "the difference between A and B subsists". But, if it is false that A differs from B then there is no difference between A and B, which fact may be expressed in the form: "the difference between A and B does not subsist". But, how can a nonentity be a subject of a proposition? ³

If a thing does not exist, it is not possible to say anything about it. On the other hand, if the proposition is about something then that something must exist. It looks as if it is always contradictory to deny the being of anything.

The puzzle is very old, at least as old as Plato. According to Plato, problems arise when we ascribe non-being to something. For example, if I say 'dragons do not exist' then the sentence seems to be about dragons. But, if the sentence is true, then there are no dragons to be about. Is then, is a sentence about nothing, meaningless? But we are all aware of what it means. Therefore, the sentence must be about something. Hence, dragons must have some kind of being in order to enable us to make statements about them.

Meinong suggested this view, which Russell initially supports. Meinong's theory of objects made central the problem of singular reference and existence. Meinong held that, we can speak and make true propositions about 'the golden mountain', 'the round square', etc. So, they must have some kind of logical being. Meinong explained that true or false statements could be made about things that do not exist.

Though Russell initially follows Meinong's line of thinking, he later rejected it. Russell accused Meinong of populating the universe with entity upon entity and took upon himself the task of decimating the metaphysical entities. In opposition to Meinong's theory of objects he framed his theory of descriptions, which he claimed solved the puzzles concerning the problems of reference.

Frege also tried to offer a solution to the problem of reference. Frege's interest in the subject comes from a desire to solve certain problems, which arise in connection with the concept of identity. Identity is a relation, which holds between objects, but only between an object and itself. The puzzle may be expressed thus: "How then can an identity statement, $a = b$ tell us anything other than just $a = a$, if $a = b$ is true?" Yet there are statements of identity, which add to our knowledge. In order to solve this problem Frege introduced a distinction between the sense of an expression and what it refers to. Roughly speaking, two expressions may differ in sense or meaning, while their referent

may be the same. Frege's famous example in this regard was 'Venus = the morning star'. Let us consider the expressions 'the evening star' and 'the morning star'. Both these expressions refer to the same object, namely, Venus; nevertheless, it was an important astronomical discovery that the morning star is identical with the evening star. To reconcile the fact that the two expressions refer to the same object with the fact that the assertion 'the evening star is identical with the evening star', is not informative, we have to recognize that the two expressions differ in 'sense', although they refer to the same 'object'. Frege held that this difference in 'sense', made identity statements like 'Morning Star is the Evening Star' informative.

Russell does not accept Frege's solution either. He argues that a problem may arise when an expression, which does not actually refer to anything, when it has no denotation, is used as a name. Russell rejected Meinong's overpopulation of the metaphysical universe because it is averse to one's sense of reality, but he rejects Frege's conventional denotation because it is purely arbitrary. Russell thought that the difficulty over identity rested not on the confusion between sense and reference of the expression but on the confusion between proper names and definite descriptions.

Another puzzle about identity which can also be presented as a puzzle of reference runs thus: If a is identical with b, whatever is true of one is true of the

other and either may be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering the truth or falsehood of that proposition. Now, George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of *Waverley*; and in fact Scott was the author of *Waverley*. Hence we substitute Scott for the author of *Waverley*, and from this it follows that George IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott.

The last of the puzzles that Russell tries to solve pertains to the law of excluded middle. By the law of excluded middle, either "A is B" or "A is not B" must be true. Hence, either "The present king of France is bald" or "The present king of France is not bald" must be true. Yet, if we enumerate the things that are bald and the things that are not bald, 'the present king of France' could not be found in either of the two lists, for there is no monarchy in France at present. So, both the propositions are false, yet according to the law of excluded middle either of the two propositions must be true. Here too we are concerned with the problem of reference. Russell seeks to solve these puzzles by means of his theory of descriptions.

Strawson, in his turn, rejects what Russell thought could be a plausible solution to the problem of reference. Strawson finds in ordinary language a repository of distinctions sufficient to resolve the difficulties about referring. He criticizes Russell's denotative theory of meaning, which advocates that proper names have denotations. According to Strawson meaning is not denotation. Truth or

falsity characterises a statement, while meaning is the function of a sentence. The question of the meaning of a sentence is quite independent of the question of any true or false assertion that could be made by the use of a sentence. The sentence 'The present king of France is bald' and 'The present king of France is not bald' are both meaningful, but the statements made by their use are neither true nor false because the presupposed statement, namely, 'the present king of France exists' is false.

Reference, we thus observe, is a subject, which has intrigued philosophers and raised questions in their minds, to which they have tried to find answers over the years and the quest is still continuing.

Section – II

An Exposition of Meinong's theory of reference

Alexius von Meinong, known as one of Russell's greatest predecessors, was born in Poland in 1853 and was fitly described by Gilbert Ryle as the "infinitely courageous and pertinacious Meinong". Meinong was a philosopher who closely resembled G. E. Moore in his philosophical as well as personal outlook. Both the philosophers followed neo-realism and had an almost empirical approach to the notion of the a priori. Meinong, like Moore, was also against giving up our commonly understood notions and theories, in the face of

metaphysical questions and theories which he thought were much less tenable, and, therefore, he was also subjected to the typical Moorian faults of elementalism and atomism.

One of the ways to approach Meinong's theory of objects is to look back to the development of English realism. A discussion of Meinong's theory would also involve reference to Franz Brentano's views under whom Meinong had studied Hume's philosophy. In formulating his theory of objects, Meinong was much influenced by Brentano's doctrine of intentionality. Hence we shall make brief references to these.

Realism as a philosophical theory is opposed to idealism. The experience of absolute certainty of our own consciousness as held by Descartes, grew into subjective idealism with Berkeley, which in its turn led to Hume's scepticism of the objective foundation of knowledge and reduction of our knowledge claims to human psychology. Subjective Idealism holds that the sum total of the subject's sensations, experiences, feelings and actions make up the world or at least are an integral and essential part of our knowledge of the world. The main task of realistic philosophers is to expose the flaws of idealistic theories. They held that there should not be any confusion between the experience of an object and the object itself. Experiences and their objects are clearly distinct. The main thesis of realism is that the objects of presentation and belief are extra-mental.

In 1904, in partial support of Meinong's theory which is detailed below, Russell wrote :

... that every presentation and every belief must have an object other than itself and, except in certain cases where mental existents happen to be concerned, extra-mental; that what is commonly called perception has as its object an existential proposition, into which enters as a constituent that whose existence is concerned, and not the idea of this existent; that truth and falsehood apply not to beliefs, but to their objects; and that the object of a thought, even when this object does not exist has a Being which is in no way dependent upon its being an object of thought.⁴

It may however still seem that the distinction of objects from their presentations was not really successful, for objects have no being unless they are presented in some experience.

According to Twardowski, Meinong as also Husserl the relationship between the object and the experience of the object is rather complicated. It cannot be adequately understood without introducing the notion of content. To understand this relation it is necessary to refer to the 'content' of an expression, which stands in necessary relation with the object of an experience, but exists independently of it. By the 'content' of an experience they meant a peculiar element in an experience, which made the self-transcendent reference of an experience possible.

As we have stated, Meinong's theory of mental acts and realm of objects was influenced by Brentano's philosophy. We would now turn our attention to Brentano's doctrine of intentionality or "intentional inexistence" as he himself called it. Brentano brought in the concept of "intentional inexistence" as a general distinguishing characteristic of the mental or psychological phenomena so that it can be differentiated from physical phenomena. This "intentional inexistence" should be understood as the *direction to an object*. Brentano held that what separates all our psychological activities, activities like thinking, loving, hating and so on are, unlike physical phenomena, "directed upon" objects. There is always an 'object' of our thought or there must be something that we love, hate, desire, etc. But, the objects of these mental activities may not be real or existent. To be the object of an intentional act, objects need not be existent. So, it may be concluded that intentionality acts as the criterion of the mental, every mental activity is intentional. But this is not so in the case of physical activities. In order to be the object of a physical activity a thing must exist. To cite an example given by Chisholm, "we can desire or think about horses that don't exist, but we ride on only those that do".⁵

However, it remained doubtful whether Brentano really succeeded in distinguishing the mental from the physical phenomena. In the first place, the so called "intentional inexistence" seems to be more distinctly present in active mental states like judging or believing, but remains dormant in other passive

states where the reference to an object is not so clear. Second, from Meinong's later theories, in which he holds that a *Vorstellung* (presentation) instead of actually setting up an object before our mind, only prepares the basis for such an apprehension, we may raise the question whether the direction to an object is as important for a mental phenomenon as Brentano takes it to be.

In his later writings, however, Brentano rejected his earlier views. He refused to accept any clear distinction between "being" and "existence". The only things that could be called "objects", in his opinion, now, were individual concrete things. This inconsistency in Brentano's writings takes us to Meinong's theory of reference. It will therefore be useful to start with a distinction between *content* and *object*.

In the beginning, following Brentano, Meinong did not give much thought to the discrimination of 'content' from 'object'. For Brentano, the **content** (*Inhalt*) and **object** (*Gegenstand*) of a mental state were something, which had *intentional inexistence* in the mental state. Meinong similarly held that these were purely psychological phenomena. He said that if we thought of something that thing was the content of my thought and if its relation with my thought was enforced upon, then it was the object of my thought. As contents and objects were purely mental concepts and were always part of some basic ideas, he described them as 'immanent' or 'intentional' objects. In Meinong's view 'content' of a

presentation lay within the presentation; it was the presenting act itself; while the word 'object' may either mean an independently existing thing or may point to an image of the existing things which stays in our minds. The second object, he opines, is identical with the content. Therefore, this content is called the immanent object while the real thing is called the transcendent object. In the later years to come, Meinong, following Twardowski, changed his view and discriminated between the content and object of a thought. Hence an outline of Twardowski's view is given.

Sub-Section – (i)

Twardowski's Arguments

Twardowski, who also was a student of Brentano, argued that the intention or 'object' of a mental act could not be in any sense of the term called 'immanent' to the act. According to him, object of a mental act is always independent of the act. In order to present a clear picture of the relation between the content and object of our judgements Twardowski introduces a three-fold distinction for mental acts of presentation.

First, there is an idea as a mental act; second, there is the content of this act, which is a part of this act, and third, there is the object of this act, which is not a part of the idea, but has an indefinable relation – the so-called "intentional

relation" with the content of an idea. In other words, Twardowski distinguishes between the act of having an idea, the idea and the entity of which the idea is an idea.

In defence of this distinction, Twardowski reasoned that the content of an idea and its object were different. To prove this, he presented four reasons of which he dismissed the last one after some speculation. The first two of these reasons were the most important ones and Meinong repeats them in the exposition of his theory.

The first argument is that the content of an idea necessarily exists as an essential part of the idea whereas the existence of the object of the idea is not necessary at all. The argument, on the one hand, is based on Brentano's early theory of judgement, which says that all judgements are affirmations or denials of individual things, and on the other hand takes off from Brentano's philosophy of mind, which held that every mental act other than a presentation is based on a presentation. To take an example, when we judge that the winged horse Pegasus does not exist, there occurs the thought that the winged horse Pegasus does not exist. This thought exists and so also the idea that the winged horse Pegasus exists of which the thought consists. But, is there such a thing as the winged horse Pegasus? As there is not, it can be said that while the 'idea' exists, the 'object' does not.

In this connection, Twardowski also discusses in detail Bolzano's doctrine that ideas in whose content incompatible attributes are united cannot have an object. For example, when I think of a round square, I am having an idea, which has no corresponding object. If this were true then it will have to be accepted that the content of my idea has contradictory attributes, which is yet again a contradiction. The content being contradictory, it follows that, I am not thinking of anything --- which is absurd. Twardowski infers from this that the content of the idea is not round and square; as it surely exists and is free from all contradiction. It is the object, which has these incompatible attributes and is therefore non-existent. The content is hence distinct from the object.

In the second argument for the distinction of content of an idea from its object, Twardowski points out that objects of ideas have different properties from their content and are very differently related to them. The content is necessarily mental, while its object is normally a spatially extended thing. For example, a mountain is a spatially extended thing, but the idea of a mountain is not.

The remaining two arguments presented by Twardowski we submit are not quite sound as they involve some fundamental mistakes. His third argument for the distinction between content and object rests on the fact that there are different descriptions of the same entity. But the argument commits the mistake of identifying the entity described by a definite description with the object

intended by the idea, which is expressed by the description. Twardowski wrongly assumes the objects of the two presentations to be the same. The two descriptions express different ideas as intentions. This argument, therefore, is not tenable.

The last argument for the distinction between content and object, which was later rejected by Twardowski himself, was originally advocated by Kerry. According to Kerry, content and object of general presentations cannot be identical, for a general presentation has only one content but many objects.

So, the fact remains that only the first two arguments are to be taken into consideration. To restate, ideas must be distinguished from their intentions, because we have ideas of entities, which do not exist. Second, ideas have to be different from their intentions for they have different properties. However, Twardowski points out that it should not be concluded that non-existent objects are devoid of properties. It is very much possible for an object to be non-existent and yet be an object of thought. This was a view, which was later considered by Meinong and found an important place in his own version of the theory of objects.

Sub-Section – (ii)

Ideal Objects and *Aussersein*

“The Theory of Objects” is considered by Chisholm, as Meinong’s most important contribution to the realm of philosophy. As has been mentioned earlier, Meinong’s theory of objects was founded upon Brentano’s theory of ‘intentionality’, which means directedness towards an object. This object meant not only what existed, but indicated also all sorts of objects that do not exist. “However, the totality of what exists, including what has existed and what will exist is infinitely small in comparison with the totality of objects of knowledge.”⁶

Meinong initially thought of constructing the theory of objects because he felt that of the different branches of knowledge that prevailed at that time, none made a proper scientific investigation of objects taken as such or raised question about objects in general. It may be countered by saying that metaphysics deals with objects as such, it enquires into being-*qua*-being. But actually metaphysics has as its subject matter only what exists. According to Meinong, metaphysics has a ‘prejudice in favour of the actual’, which leads us to believe that what is not real or does not have any kind of being can be neglected because it is not worthy of any consideration. Meinong opposed this

view and advanced his 'theory of objects', which had as its subject matter the totality of objects.

It would have been ideal to begin with a good exposition of Meinong's theory, but that would take too long. A rough sketch is attempted here. Meinong's theory of objects is about objects. What are objects? Whatever can be an object of thought is an object. This includes all objects, which have been conceived plus objects, which could have been. The tree in the back garden, the yonder mountain, I and you are objects; so is the golden mountain (To my mind 'gold mountain' would have been more appropriate). This appears to be shocking to many. As there is no golden mountain, it cannot be an object. "The golden mountain is an object" may mean, "The golden mountain is thinkable". And then no reference to an object is really called for at all. But that is not what Meinong intends for him object-hood is independent of existence. The golden mountain is a genuine object and the phrase "the golden mountain" refers to it. We do not see any golden mountain simply because it does not exist. It is a non-existent possible object. It is an object and it has the property of being possible. But what about the round square? The round square is also an object. It is an impossible object because anything both round and square is impossible. The golden mountain might have existed. Unlike the golden mountain, the round square could not exist. But that does not stop it from being an object. Meinong makes the division of objects into three classes: (i) Those, which exist, (ii) those,

which subsist, and (iii) those, which neither exists nor subsists. The golden mountain does not exist, yet it subsists in some sense. But even subsistence does not cover all objects. Some objects, such as the round square, are objects and yet do not subsist. Meinong advances two main theses in this connection. In the first place, there are "ideal objects", i.e., there are objects that do not exist and second, the theory of *Aussersein* which means, 'the principle of the independence of so-being (*Sosein*) from being (*Sein*)'.

To understand Meinong's thesis of 'ideal objects', we first have to understand his distinction between Objects 'in the strict sense' and Objectives. He proposes that apart from objects in the strict sense, there are also objects of cognitive acts like knowing, believing, supposing, etc. and these he calls objectives. According to Meinong we see a cat, which can be called an object in the strict sense, but we can only 'judge' or 'assume' the being or non-being of the cat on the mat. This being or non-being of the cat is the object of the cognitive act of 'judging' and is termed 'objective'. Objects like cat and mat exist, but objectives (e.g., being of the cat on the mat) do not exist, they subsist.

Sometimes the objectives itself 'can assume the function of an object in the strict sense.' For example, in the judgement, 'It is true that the antipodes exist', the objective, 'that the antipodes exist' itself acts as the object of cognitive act of judging, i.e., truth is assigned in this judgement not to the antipodes which do

exist but to the objective 'that the antipodes exist', which can only subsist. Hence, in Meinong's own words, "... every cognitive act which has an objective as its object represents thereby a cause of knowing something which do not exist."

The second theory that Meinong formulates in connection with objects is that of *Aussersein* or the theory that an object having certain characteristics is independent of its existence. This doctrine of Meinong, though later acknowledged by many philosophers as his most difficult one, nevertheless makes interesting reading. To put it simply, with the help of an example, the **round square** is round and square, though it does not exist. Further, we also make true or false assertions about non-existing objects, e.g., Unicorn. When I say, "Unicorn is a cow", I am uttering a false statement, but I am making a true assertion if I say, "Unicorn is a horse". So, the *Sosein* of Unicorn must be independent of its *Sein* because it has the characteristics of being a horse independently of whether it exists. To quote the philosopher himself --- "Any particular thing that isn't real (*Nichtseindes*) must be at least capable of serving as the object for these judgements which grasp its *Nichtsein*...."

The *Aussersein* theory of Meinong was actually devised as a solution to one of the main problems of reference, viz. the problem of negative existentials, which we discussed earlier in this chapter. The attempted solution was that, things

like Round Square, Pegasus etc. were objects, which were non-real, and they were 'beyond being and non-being'. In this connection Meinong carefully pointed out that the existence of these non-real objects was never asserted. His argument is as follows: That A is not (the *Nichtsein* of A) is an objective, as much an objective as the being of A (the *sein* of A). An objective can be an objective of being (*seinsobjektiv*) or an objective of non-being (*Nichtseinsobjektiv*). This being however must not be confused with existence.

At one time Meinong also talked about a third order of being which he ascribed to objects 'as such', which was not existence and yet was also different from subsistence. This third order of being unlike existence and subsistence was opposed to nothing. Existence is opposed to non-existence and subsistence to non-subsistence. To think of a non-being opposed to this third order of being we would have to think about a fourth kind of being and so on. It would lead to infinite regress. So, he used the term *Quasisein* to represent this oddly constituted type of being opposed to nothing. Meinong himself was not actually very satisfied with the notion of this third order of being and in his "Theory of Objects" came to the conclusion that objects 'as such' are *ausserseinend* – 'beyond being and non-being'.

Section - III

Russell's Early Views

During the early decade of the twentieth century, Russell had not yet developed the theory of descriptions. He retained a realistic ontology and this is evidenced by his defence of a liberal in *The Principles of Mathematics*, Russell wrote :

Being is that which belongs to every conceivable term, to every possible object of thought -- in short to everything that can possibly occur in any proposition, true or false, and to all such propositions themselves. Being belongs to whatever can be counted. If A be any term that can be counted as one, it is plain that A is something, and therefore that A is. 'A is not' must always be either false or meaningless. For if A were nothing, it could not be said not to be; 'A is not' implies that there is a term A whose being is denied, and hence, that A is. Thus unless 'A is not' be an empty sound, it must be false -- whatever A may be, it certainly is. Numbers, the Homeric gods, relations, chimeras and four dimensional spaces all have being, for if they were not entities of a kind, we could make no propositions about them. Thus, being is general attribute of everything, and to mention anything is to show that it is.⁷

Again he observed :

Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in a true proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term Every term has being, i.e., is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is sure to be a term; and to deny that such a thing is a term must always be false.⁸

In view of the above Russell was in total agreement with the realistic doctrines and arguments of Meinong and sympathetically reviewed his works. He said, "... I shall have the double purpose of expounding his opinions and advocating my own; *the points of agreement are so numerous and important* that the two aims can be easily combined."⁹ Consequently, his review articles "contain none of the attacks on ontological liberalism that characterise Russell's later comments on Meinong."¹⁰

This realistic thesis equipped Russell to solve the problem of negative existentials. In order to do so, Russell tried to hold one horn of the dilemma. The dilemma was that either the statement 'Pegasus does not exist' is false or it is not about Pegasus. Russell held that the statement 'Pegasus does not exist' is false, that Pegasus has some kind of being.

But soon after this view was expressed, Russell violently rejected it for being totally incompatible with his sense of reality. He vehemently criticised Meinong, accusing him of overpopulating the Universe with entity upon entity. In doing so, I feel that Russell was influenced by thirteenth century philosopher William Ockham. I think that in order to condemn Meinong's theory Russell used a kind of Ockham's razor. The principle of parsimony, which came to be known, as the famous Ockham's razor is associated with the name of William Ockham (1285–1347), an English Franciscan dubbed the 'More than Subtle Doctor'.

Ockham's razor, that is, the principle of parsimony, is a principle towards maintaining simplicity in any kind of theory construction. This simplicity may vary in the form of reducing kinds of entities admitted, or the number of presupposed axioms or to the characteristics of curves drawn between data points. Though this kind of methodology was already found in Aristotle, the tag, "entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity"¹¹, became associated with William Ockham, because it captures the spirit of his philosophical conclusions.

On most metaphysical issues, Ockham followed Aristotle. He was a nominalist and thought that to give Universals the status of real things other than names and concepts would be 'the worst error of philosophy'. Ockham rejects not only Platonism but also "modern realist" doctrines, which advocate that nature enjoys a double mode of existence and is Universal in the intellect but numerically, multiplied in particulars. Ockham's stand is that only individuals exist, generality being but a matter of significance. In a more refined version of his theory, species and genera are identified with certain mental qualities called concepts or intention of the mind. Ontologically there are individuals too, like everything else. Each individual mind has its own individual concepts. A generic concept naturally has many different individuals. The concept 'horse', for instance, naturally signifies all singular horses. The upshot of Ockham's

theory of Universals is that it purports to validate science as objective knowledge without postulating mysterious universal entities 'out there'. Occam's Razor is not just a kind of philosophical economy campaign; that is like describing a sculptor as a man who gets rid of unnecessary chips of marble. It is not, as suggested by Wittgenstein, a rule of symbolism. It is not even merely a rule for securing a greater chance of accuracy in philosophical calculations. Russell's use of Occam's Razor was not only a means to an end but part of something which was a motive in itself; a passion for impersonal truth.¹²

Opponents of this kind of principle of simplification who thought that parsimony was being carried too far, formulated an "anti-razor" where admitting fewer entities was not sufficient. They thought that more entities were required to establish any theory.

For Russell the method of philosophy was analysis; Ockham's Razor was part of this method. Through this method Russell wanted to gain certain and absolute knowledge. Russell thought that minimum number of premises and entities reduced the risk of error. "That is the advantage of Occam's Razor, that it diminishes your risk of error."¹³

So, we observe that later, supporting Ockham, Russell, picked the other horn of the dilemma, i.e. 'Pegasus does not exist' is not about Pegasus and in order to establish this, devised his theory of descriptions. How far Russell was justified

in criticising Meinong and how much he succeeded in solving the problems of reference through his theory of descriptions will be discussed in the chapters to come.

...

Notes and References on Chapter 2 :

1. B.Russell, "On Denoting", *Mind*, Vol. 14,1905, pp. 479-93, reprinted in *Logic And Knowledge*, R.C.Marsh (ed.), London: Routledge, 1994.
2. P. F. Strawson, "On Referring", *Mind*, 1950, reprinted in R.R. Ammerman (ed.), *Classics of Analytic Philosophy*, New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1965.
3. "On Denoting", *op.cit.*, p. 48.
4. B. Russell, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions". First published in *Mind*, n.s.13 in three parts, 1904. Reprinted in B. Russell, *Essays in Analysis*, D.Lackey (ed.), London : George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1973.
5. "The Theory of Objects" in *Realism & the Background of Phenomenology*, R. Chisholm (ed.), Free Press of Glencoe, 1960, p. 78. (All quotations of Meinong taken from this book unless otherwise specified.)
6. *Ibid*
7. B. Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, George Allen and Unwin, 1985, p. 449.
8. Quoted in B. Russell, *Essays in Analysis*, *op.cit.*, p.17.
9. B. Russell, "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", *op.cit.*, p. 21. Emphasis mine.
10. Editor's Introduction, *Ibid*, *op.cit.*, pp. 17-18.
11. *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* R. Audi (ed.), USA, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 543 - 544.
12. A.Wood, Summary and Introduction of Russell's Philosophy (incomplete) included in *My Philosophical Development*, *op.cit.*, p. 198.
13. B. Russell, "Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in *Logic And Knowledge*, *op.cit.*, quoted *Ibid*.

•••