

CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

So far as Indian theories of perception are concerned the Advaita theory of perception is of peculiar in nature due to having a specific type of presuppositions admitted by them. As the world is covered by Consciousness, each and every object is nothing but the manifestation of the same. Though the Consciousness is one, its various forms are imagined as the limiting adjuncts of the same Consciousness. As there are limiting adjuncts of the Consciousness, the amalgamation of the two or three types of consciousness gives rise to the perceptuality of knowledge of an object and the perceptuality of the object. When one adjunct of Consciousness is merged with another type, it gives rise of perception in the Advaita Vedānta. When *Pramāṇacaitanya* and *Viśayacaitanya* are amalgamated keeping *Pramātrcāitanya* aside, it is called *jñānagatapratyakṣa* due to having *jñātr-jñeya-bhāva* (knower-known-relationship) in the cognition. When *Pramāṇa* and *Viśaya-cāitanya* are merged in the knower or *Pramātā*, it is called *viśayagatapratyakṣa*. In this case self or knower is completely identified with the object leading to the knower-known-relationship. This type of perception is peculiar in the sense that they think the 'objectified subject' or 'subjectified object' is the case of perception. This perception is in the sense of *sākṣivēdya* or realisation of self in the object.

The indeterminate perception or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is accepted in the recognitive cognitions like 'This is that Devadatta' (*Soyam devadattah*) or 'That art thou' (*Tattvamasī*) on account of the fact that it does not reveal the relation between the two i.e., this and that Devadatta or That and thou. It has been interpreted by the Advaitins that the sentence conveys the sense the Devadatta exists in Devadatta himself or an individual Self exists in himself in the form of Brahman. But they do not admit relation between two by the term - '*vaiśiṣṭyānavagahī*'. If the meaning of the afore-said sentences are

pondered upon, it will be revealed that these are not actually relation-free. In other words, like other components the relation is also revealed in such cases due to the following reasons. First, how do we know that Devadatta exists in himself without the assumption of the relation of identity between them? Any type of recognitive cognition presupposes the relation of identity (at least in the sense of similarity) between two existing earlier and present time. To the Advaitins identity or *tādātmya* is the vital relation in the phenomenal cognition. In fact, they admit *tādātmya* in the places where there is a part and whole relation (*avavaya-avayavibhāva-sambandha*), quality and the possessor of the attribute (*gunagunibhāvasambandha*) etc. In fact, in these cases, the Vaiśeṣikas would accept *samavāya* or inherence as a relation. Hence *tādātmya* has very often been accepted by them as a relation. In the cases cited above there must be a relation of identity (*tādātmya*) in the sense of similarity between ^{them}. That is why, the recognitive cognition is possible. Secondly, though there is no absolute identity between this Devadatta and that Devadatta or an individual being and Brahman, there must be an essential identity (*svarūpatādātmya*) between them. Otherwise, the sentences could not have provided the intended meaning. Lastly, the cognition coming through the sentences are called relational in character as it is sentential in nature. A sentence becomes meaningful if there is a word, its meaning and their relation. It may again be asked whether in the words and their meaning there is *vācya-vācaka-bhāva* (i.e. expressor-expressed relationship) or not. If the answer is in positive, relation is accepted between them. If not, the sentences cannot provide the desired meaning due to the lack of *vācakatva* (expressive character) of the words. In fact, Dharmarāja Adhvarindra has accepted the meaningfulness of the sentences, which entails the existence of relation in them. Hence, the definition of *nirvikalpaka* perception as formulated by the Advaitins is hardly adequate. At least this type of definition fails to justify a *nirvikalpaka* - cognition.

Two types of perception, apart from the previously mentioned one are *Jivasākṣī*. In the same way, the consciousness qualified by *māyā* is called *Īśvara* or God (*māyāvacchinnam caitanyam paramēśvarah*). When the same

māyā remains as a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) it is called witness in-God (*Īśvarasākṣī*). Though the distinction between a *viśeṣana* and *upādhi* has been shown clearly, it is very difficult to understand the exact position with the sense-organs. Whether inner sense-organ or *antaḥkāraṇa* remains in an individual being as an adjunct or limiting adjunct is very difficult to know. In the same way, the position or status of *māyā* in Consciousness (*caitanya*) cannot be known with the help of reasons. Without the help of intuition it is very difficult to have an idea about the status of mind in an individual being or the status of *māyā* in a Consciousness. It needs vision to know the same. If these are known transcendently, are they called the forms of perception? The phenomena of *Jīvasākṣī* and *Īśvarasākṣī* are more metaphysical in character than epistemological. Hence, the Advaitins cannot do 'pure epistemology' without the help of metaphysics.

In connection with the immediate awareness (*aparokṣajñāna*) Dhjarmarāja Adhvarīndra has pointed out that such perceptual awareness may sometimes arise from the testimony also, which is called perceptual cognition generated through verbal testimony (*śābdajanyapratyakṣa*).

It has been argued by the Advaitins that, when an individual comes to an awareness of his happiness through the utterance of the sentence 'you are happy' (*tvam sukhi*) by somebody else, would it be considered as perceptual? The answer is in the positive, as it is always desired by the Advaitins. They have put forward an example of perceptual awareness through some testimonial cognition. The story regarding this goes as follows. Ten persons were crossing a river together. The leader of the team, after crossing the river, was trying to ascertain whether all the persons have crossed the river or not. Everytime he is finding nine persons through sincere counting. They were apprehending some mishap on the river where one of the passenger may have died. After sometime an individual came forward to the person who was counting and asked whether he had counted himself. Ultimately the person pointed him out as the tenth person and said 'you are the tenth' (*dasamastvamasī*)¹. Through this the leader had an awareness that he is the tenth. This is no doubt perceptual which is

generated through the utterance of the sentence by somebody else.

Actually this type of awareness suggests a great domain of the Advaita philosophy. To the Advaitins an individual being is always free, but he does not know it. When it is pointed out that he is free from suffering through the injunction of the *Śāstra* or *Āgama* or through *śrāvana* (hearing), *manana* (reflection) and *nididhyāsana* (meditating), he suddenly sees himself free. This freedom is not new to him, but it is acquirement of which is already acquired (*prāptasya prāptih*). A person's liberation or free is not at all a new achievement, but awareness of something which is already known. This knowing of the known is possible through the testimonial statement as found in different *Śruti*. The function of the testimony in the form of *āgama* is to make someone aware about his own position and status. It provides the true picture of human being like his freedom etc about which he did not know. Hence, perception in the field of freedom or liberation is generated through the agamic statement, which is very much significant in Indian Philosophical systems.

It has been said by the Advaitins that in the piece of cognition - '*surabhi candanam*' (sandal wood is fragrant), the cognition of sandal wood is perceptual, but the cognition of fragrance (*sourabha*) is not, as it is not capable of being visualised due to not having the criterion-*yogyatva* i.e. capability of being visualised.² As the fragrance has no capability of being perceived it is not perceptual, but it is inferential. The Naiyayikas prefer to call it an extra-ordinary or super-normal perception called *jñānalakṣaṇa* i.e. perception of something through other cognition. As soon as a sandal wood is known, it is known as having fragrance quickly due to having their invariable association. The cognition of fragrance comes to our awareness so spontaneously that we do not think that fragrance and sandal wood are different in nature. As if sandalwood and fragrance are at the same time. That is why, it (the cognition of fragrance) is given a status of perception which is of supernormal type due to not having the contact of the sense-organ with the object (*indriyarthasannikarsa*).

The Advaitins do not find any justification in admitting the cognition of fragrance as perceptual of supernormal nature, because the object (fragrance) has no capability of being perceived due to the lack of *yogyatva* here. Hence, there is no possibility of considering it as a case of perception. It is better and it comes under the law of persimony (*lāghava*) if it is accepted as inferential due to having inferential character in it. The cognition of sandalwood is taken as the probans or *hetu* through which the fragrance is inferred. In the same way, the cognitions like - 'Ice looks cold' 'fire looks hot' can be justified as perceptual so far as 'Ice' and 'Fire' are concerned and inferential so far as the facts of being cold and hot are concerned.

It has been stated in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* that our inner organ (*antahkarana*), after issuing from our body with the help of sense-organ, goes out of the body and assumes the form of an object just like a liquid entity. This activity is essential for having a perceptual cognition particularly in the context of Advaita Vedānta. It may be argued by the opponents that how an inner organ or *antahkarana* can go to the place where the object exists and assumes in form of the same.³ How can it be imagined as having the property of liquidity? The reply can be given in the following manner. The phenomenon of going out of the inner organ is a metaphorical expression. It does not literally mean that an inner organ (*antahkarana*) covers the space to reach the place where the object exists. It does not mean that an *antahkarana* really moves - because movement presupposes its activity. In fact an inner organ can reveal those objects that are in contact with the sense-organs. If an object exists beyond the reach of the sense-organ, it is not perceptible. These are excluded by the terms - '*yogyatva*' and '*bartamānatva*' incorporated as adjuncts of an object.⁴ Hence it is the function of the *antahkarana* to reveal those that are in proximity with the sense-organs. From this it is certain that mind or *antahkarana* does not go to the object far away from the knower so that it has to cover some space, which is possible if and only if it has movement as a quality. So the so called movement of *antahkarana* is nothing but linguistic play. It is the secondary expression - as it expresses the function in a metaphorical way. The phenomenon of the

assumption of the form of an object is also metaphorical in the sense that it means that our mind takes the object as its content so that its awareness is possible accurately. A sense-organ cannot reveal an object to the knower if mind is not associated with it. Hence the mental mode (*vṛtti*) has to be formed with the help of inner organ. This mental mode cannot have a particular size and shape as it depends on those of an object. In fact, mind has no size or shape of its own-as of a substratum. It is imagined by the philosophers that as if mind is taking the forms of the objects. In the imaginary eye of the philosopher it is nothing but a liquid substance. 'Otherwise, how can it be modified according to the shape of the object? As mind involves such functions, it cannot be taken as atomic like the Naiyāyikas. To the Advaitins it does not serve the function of a sense-organ, but it is considered as an inevitable factor of perceptual cognition. Without the mental mode in the form of an object an object is not capable of being perceived. Hence *vṛtti* is the property of mind. Like *vṛtti* there are various attributes like sharpness (*hrī*), steadiness (*dhṛṭi*), respect (*śraddhā*) etc which are associated with the mind. As an inner organ is a possessor of attributes (*dharmī*) and capable of being transformed, it is called *sāvayava* (having some parts), but not *niravayava* (partless) as admitted by the Naiyāyikas. Had it been partless in character, it would not have been transformed to a particular form which is called modification. As it is *sāvayava*, it may remain as a *dharmī* (possessor of attributes).⁵ Hence, the role of inner organ in the Advaita theory of perception is unique and novel in character. One problem may remain unsolved if this view is taken for granted. The Naiyāyikas have accepted the atomic character of mind on account of the fact that it cannot reveal two objects simultaneously (*yugapajñānanutpattiḥ manaso liṅgam*).⁶ If the atomic character is not accepted, it would point out the fact that it can reveal two or more objects at a time. But is it possible in the practical world? Our mind can reveal one object at a time which is quite natural. How do the Advaitins explain this fact? Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra might say that, when our mind assumes the form of a jar, a jar alone is perceived, not a pot etc. Because under this situation knower can have the cognition of a jar and consciousness in the form of a

jar. If a pot is the matter of perception, our mind assumes the form of jar and its corresponding mental mode. The amalgamation of the consciousness in the form of the mental mode corresponding to a pot and consciousness in the form of a pot gives rise the perceptual cognition of a pot. Hence, there does not any question of simultaneous cognition of two objects.

REFERENCES

1. "Na caivamapi bartamānatādasāyām tvam sukhi ityadi vākyajanyajñānasya pratyakṣatvāpattiḥ syāt iti vācyam. Istatvāt 'Dāsamastvamasi ityādaḥ sannikṣṭaviṣaye śabdādapi aparokṣajñānābhyupagamāt."

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣaparicched)

2. "Surabhi candanam' ityadiññānamapi candanakhandāmśe aparokṣam saurabhāmśeca parokṣam sourabhasya cakṣurindriyāyogyatayā yogyatvaghatitasya niruktalakṣanasyābhāvāt."

Ibid.

3. Tatra tadagodakam chidrānirgatya kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya tadvadeva catuskoṇādyākāram bhavati tathā taijasamantaḥkaraṇamapi cakṣurādīdvārā nirgatya ghatādideśam gatvā ghatādiviṣayākāreṇa parinamate. Sa eva parināmo vṛttirucyate".

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (pratyakṣapariccheda).

4. "... Pūrvamham sukhītyādismṛtāvativyāptibāranāya bartamānatvam viśeṣanam deyam tatra dharmādyavacchinnacaitanyasya tadvṛttyavacchinnacaitanyayorekatvāditi cenna; yogyatvāyāpi viṣayaviśeṣanatvāt." *Ibid.*

5. "Na tāvadantaḥkaraṇam niravayavam sādīdravyatvena sāvayavatvāt... vṛttirūpajñānasya manodharmatve ca kāmah saṅkalpo vicikitsā śrādhāśrādhā dhṛtiradhṛtirhrīdhibhīrityetatsarvam māna eveti śrutir mānam".

Ibid.

6. *Nayāsūtra* 1.1.1b

Ibid.