

## CHAPTER - IV

### A LOGICAL ILLUMINATION OF THE ADVAITA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

Without application of *visayagata pratyakṣa* in our practical life love in the true sense of the term is not possible. The extension of self or knower or *pramātā* towards an object is the cause of love towards something. The self has got some sort of elasticity and hence it is extendable without any limit. When *pramātā* or self extends himself to his son, wife, husband, brother, sister etc, he can love them. *Pramātā* is nothing but the Consciousness or Self limited by internal organ (*antahkaraṇāvacchinnacaitanya*), which is equivalent to individual being or *Jīva*. The extension of Self towards an object is the cause of love towards it. The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* has given a beautiful account of such *visayagatapratyakṣa*. It is said that husband seems to be beloved to some one not because she loves her husband but because she loves herself. (... *na vā are patyuh kāmāya patih priyo bhavati, ātmanastu kāmāya patih priyo bhavati ... etc.*) Following the same logic it can be said that we love our son, father, mother etc on account of the fact that we love our self manifested there. The 'objective factor' which is not connected with our self has nothing to bind us. It is self (reflected in the object) which has got power to bind us. Hence love remains primarily in the self and it is realised when this self remains in the object. If it is so, why is not called 'subjective perception' or perceptuality existing in self (*ātmagatapratyakṣatva*). In response to this it can be said that there is no basic difference between *Viṣayagatapratyakṣtva* (perceptuality of object) and *ātmagatapratyakṣatva* (perceptuality of subject or Self). In both the cases the process is the same. As per the criterion of *visayagatapratyakṣa* there will be sole existence of the *Pramātā* or Self (*pramātr̥sattā*) leading to the non-existence of other forms of existence (*atiriktasattākatvābhāva*)<sup>2</sup>. In this case an object or *viṣaya* is engulfed by the *pramātā*. As *pramātā* sees himself in the object, it may be called *ātmagatapratyakṣa* (self-perception). Moreover, self is the locus or *adhīsthāna* on which the object is

superimposed in the phenomenal stage. In the case of illusory cognition there must be the locus of superimposition and the superimposed object which are called *adhiṣṭhāna* and *āropya* respectively. When we have illusory cognition of snake in a piece of rope, the rope is the locus of superimposition (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and 'snake' is a superimposed object (*adhyasta*). To the Advaitins locus or *adhiṣṭhāna* is never contradicted (*avādhita*) by the subsequent cognition. In the present context the locus i.e., rope is not contradicted but the object superimposed or *adhyasta* is contradicted by the cognition of the locus. In the present case the cognition of snake is superimposed by the cognition of rope. In the same way, the Advaitins believe that Brahman or Self is the *adhiṣṭhāna* on which all the objects are superimposed. For this reason the cognitions of the phenomenal objects are contradicted, because they are sublated by the Ultimate Knowledge or Brahman.<sup>9</sup> When it is said 'Brahman is true and the world is illusory' (*Brahma satyaṁ jagamithyā*), we should carefully notice the second half of this verse which runs as follows : '*Jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*' ( i.e. an individual being is a manifestation of Brahman, not other than this). This part is supplementary to first half. Why is this world to be taken as illusory ? Because, they have to be honoured as the manifestations of Brahman or Ātman. Here '*mithyā*' does not mean the sudden vanish of all phenomenal objects, but the change of attitude to them. These phenomenal objects are illusory if they are taken as such but true if taken as the manifestation of *Brahman* or *Ātman*'.

Keeping the above clarifications in view it may be said that in the case of the perceptuality of an object (*viśayagatapratyakṣatva*) object is not vanished, but it is known as the form of self which is uncontradicted. When self covers the object, it is said to be known. Due to the coverage of self object comes under self. In this case there is not much difference in saying that object comes within self and self goes to the object and covers it. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has coined the term *viśayagatapratyakṣa* on account of the fact that *viśayagatapratyakṣa* has to be differentiated from the *Jñānagatapratyakṣa*. In the case of the latter our self is involved, because without its involvement cognition is not at all possible. In the case of the

perception of the knowledge of an object the same knower or self attains the perceptual cognition of the object after maintaining some distance with the object. In this case knower or self remains isolated from the cognition of an object known. Due to having distinction between knower (*jñātā*) and known (*jñeya*), the known object is not completely identified with the knower as in the case of *visayagatapratyakṣa*.<sup>4</sup> Had it been described as *ātmagatapratyakṣa*, it would have been unduly extended to the *jñānagatapratyakṣa*, which is also *ātmagata* due to self's involvement in it though it is of different type. In order to avoid such complications Dharmarāja had preferred to use *visayagatapratyakṣa* instead of *ātmagatapratyakṣa*.

That <sup>any</sup> type of love is self-love is again evidenced from the coinage of the term '*ātmiya*' in the sense of 'relatives' because our self is extended to them. This is the reason for bearing a soft-corner with them. If it is seen that someone is not having soft-corner to his relatives, it would be presumed that due to some reason or other our self fails to extend to them. As self is not involved, we cannot love them though they are 'relative' apparently. In the other way round it is true that someone 'feels' for some persons though they are not his 'relative'. If the reason for love is investigated, we shall see the self-extension as the ground of the same. Our love knows no bound as self is extendable to any extent. If we can extend it to the neighbours, countrymen, distressed and downtrodden people, we acquire the required ability to love them selflessly. In this way an individual can turn into a philanthropic and one can think of welfare of all human beings. The real 'feeling' only can lead a person to pray for them. This 'feeling' is again related to our self-extension. Under this situation one can pray for welfare of all in the following way : "*Sarve sukhinah santu, sarve santu nirāmayāḥ/sarve bhadrāni paśyantū, na kaścid duḥkhabhāg bhavet*" (i.e, May all be happy, all be free from mental and physical disease, all see beautiful things and no one should be an abode of suffering). Such a prayer for universal welfare is possible if an individual thinks the existence of his own self to all beings. Such a view is accepted in our ancient literature - where it is said that the whole world seems to be relative to someone who has attained broadness in respect of self

("udāracaritānāntu vasudhaiva kutumbakam").

Sri Aurobindo had applied this theory to the patriots. A person can be a real patriot and sacrifice his own life for the sake of the country if and only if he can extend his self to the Nation.<sup>5</sup> For this reason the patriotism is called *Desātmabodha* i.e, feeling of identity between self and country. In this case also the nation or country does not remain as isolated from the knower (*pramātā*), but the knower brings it in its own giving rise to the perceptuality of object.

Even the inanimate object can easily be brought under one's self through the same process. An object becomes very clear and desired (*iṣṭa*) due to the involvement of the Self with the same, which will find support in the following text of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* - '*ghata iṣṭaḥ ityādi - laukika-vyapadeśo'pi saccidānandarūpabrahmaikyādhyāsāt.*')<sup>6</sup>. The objects like a jar etc may seem to be desired to an individual due to the imposition of self to these, which may be also be taken as perceptuality of object. A lady loves her own ornaments because they belong to her 'ownself'. In this way, any type of love or desirability is determined. It is seen in our everyday life that the objects which are in use draw our attention to these and hence we try to maintain these considering as our own things. An artist loves his or her harmonium, *sitār*, *Tanpurā* or *ghungoor* very much because his or her own self is involved with these. All these are grounded on the *viṣayagatapratyaksa*.

The same spirit has been shown in the initial *mantra* of the *Īsopaniṣad*, which, if analysed, really illumines logically the phenomenon of *Viṣayagatapratyaksa*. The *mantra* runs as follows : "*Īsāvāsyamidam sarvam yat kiñca jagatyām jagat/Tena tyaktena bhūñjīthā ma grādhāḥ kasyasviddhanam.*" The whole universe is covered with the Ultimate Reality or Self and hence all things whatever is there in the universe are purely covered by the Self. On account of this one should enjoy through renunciation and should not be greedy towards others properties. The first part of the *mantra* is the premise from which the second part is deduced. If an individual 'sees' his own self pervading the whole universe, there is no place, no space,

no individual, no object in this world, which does not come under the purview of the Self. Hence logically we can claim our presence everywhere in this world. Under this situation one can feel the whole world as his own self (*vasudhaiva kutumbakam*). The main outcome of this feeling is that he cannot exploit others, torture others or hate others. Because, the person whom he exploits or hates is nothing but his own self. If it is done, it is tantamount to his own exploitation or self-deceive, which is not at all desirable. This feeling prompts him to extend his love to others, resulting in 'enjoyment through renunciation' (*tyaktena bhun̄jilhā*). Who will sacrifice for others if he does not find any enjoyment in it? How is such enjoyment in renunciation possible? It is possible only through his change of attitude to the external objects <sup>that</sup> are not taken as merely objects but 'subjectified object' which is technically expressed by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra as *Viṣayagatapratyakṣa*. In such case there is no <sup>essential</sup> durability due to the existence of the Self to the objects.

In the case of *jñānagatapratyakṣa* there is a distinction between a known (*Jñātā*) and a known object (*jñeya*). By virtue of being a cognition of an object there is a knower; otherwise the knowledge of an object becomes meaningless. If it is said that there is the perceptuality of an object, it should be treated as <sup>but</sup> different from the earlier one. It is not knowledge which is perceived <sup>but</sup> the object only. Such a situation cannot give rise to knower-known-relationship (*jñātr-jñeya-bhāvasambandha*). Hence Dharmarāja Adhva<sup>rīndra</sup> opines that in such cases there is only the knower in the form of Consciousness (*pramātrcāitanya*), but the other two i.e., Consciousness limited by mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) and Consciousness limited by object (*viṣayacāitanya*) <sup>being</sup> are united in the knower (*pramātā*) are absorbed in it. In this connection it is said that the amalgamation of the three is not desired (*na tāvadaikyam*), but there is only the existence of the *Pramātrcāitanya* in which other forms of Consciousness are hidden. Hence, the *Pramātrcāitanya* alone would be an object of our awareness, but other forms are the manifestation of the *pramātrcāitanya* and hence their existence does not come to our awareness.

Herein lies the metaphysical presupposition . In such case Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra is dealing with metaphysics in disguise of epistemology.

At the stage of the perceptuality of an object there is the absence of the existence of other objects excepting the existence of knower (*pramātā*). Is it not a state of liberation ? Such a situation is found temporally at the time of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*). Abhinavagupta has explained this state of 'subjectified object' as the melting of the state of the knower or *pramātā* (*pramātrbhāvavigalana*).<sup>7</sup> Just as an object when liquidified covers many areas, in the like manner the knower can expand itself in such a way so that all objects are included in him. At this time he is not confined within himself but expanded himself to all the objects and hence objects have no other existence other than that of the knower. That is why ; an individual can enjoy aesthetic pleasure (*rasa*) as he considers the pathos etc. belonging to characters of the novel or drama as his own due to emotional involvement. This sharing of others feeling is called by Abhinavagupta as *tanmayibhavana* i.e., becoming one with other.<sup>8</sup> Actually the feeling existing in an individual is transmitted to all the spectators. If each and every reader receives the same sensitivity or feeling, there is a corresponding fact, which is going on in all the hearts of the spectators (*sakala-sahṛdaya-samvāda-sālitā*). Such a phenomenon is otherwise known as 'absorption of all the audiences towards a particular object' (*sarvasāmājikānām ekaghanatā*). To Viśvanātha also the subject i.e., *pramātā* sees himself being identified with it (*pramātā tadabhedena svātmānam pratipādyate*).<sup>10</sup> In fact, self exists everywhere including the art-object. Hence the Aestheticians are of the opinion that the relishment itself is *rasa* (*rasanī<sup>a</sup>ṅgh<sup>h</sup> rasah*). It is the relishment of the bliss arising out of self-knowledge (as reflected in the characters of the drama), which is called *svavidānanda* (pleasure arising from self-cognition), as if we have undertaken an activity of chewing (*carvanavyāpāra*) the bliss generating from self-knowledge. To Abhinavagupta who is chiefly influenced by the Advaitins such a chewing activity of the bliss of the self-knowledge is called *Rasa*.<sup>11</sup> This interpretation

of aesthetic experience would not have been possible, had there been no solid foundation of the perceptuality of object (*Viṣayagatapratyakṣatva*). In fact the aesthetic enjoyment is nothing but the extension of self to the object, which is called *Viṣayagatapratyakṣa*. A question may be raised whether such *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* is equivalent to the Advaita concept of liberation or not. In reply, it can be said that such perception and the aesthetic enjoyment is qualitatively same but quantitatively different. When a jar is perceived, there is the feeling of the non-duality of the self and the jar until the absorption breaks up. When such absorption does not break, an individual will see the whole world as his own self. This non-dual experience will remain forever and such situation is described as liberation according to the Advaitins. The perceptual experience of the phenomenal objects like a jar etc. occurs temporally and hence it is, though qualitatively same, quantitatively different. Both the experiences - the *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* and aesthetic experience contain disinterested pleasure arising out of self-relishment-*ātmānanda*. In fact a human being's mind is dominated by the *sattvaguna* at this situation and hence it is touched by *rajaḥ* and *tamoguna*. Due to the prominence of *sattvaguna* an individual can enjoy the self-knowledge identified with him and hence he is not touched by any other knowledge (*vedyānatarasparśasūnya*). This bliss is a highest type of *ānanda* arising from self-revelation (*svaprakāśānanda*), which is qualitatively equivalent to the taste of Brahman, but not quantitatively, as the former is transitory and the latter is eternal. That is why, such pleasure is described as *Brahmasvādasahodara*.<sup>12</sup> (i.e., the smaller manifestation of the taste of Brahman).

The aesthetic experience, which is very much common in each and every man's life, can be a live testimony of the existence of the perception of an object. Such an experience may be an instance to an enquirer to the fact how an object can come under the purview of the subject spontaneously through such perception. If it is possible in the aesthetic world, why is it <sup>not</sup> possible in other fields ?

The disinterestedness in aesthetic attitude has been well recognised by many. An idealist thinker has also indicated the broad implication of it in aesthetic; beauty is the expression of the Absolute spirit.

The aesthetic attitude is different from the practical. In aesthetic experience a love poem, for example, moves us with its sentiments of love which is aroused and sustained by many auxiliary feelings such as jealousy, pain, anger and joy. These acts are taken accessories to the dominant sentiment, love. The aesthetic delight is different in flavour from the ordinary one. This delight is due to expression.

We have thus two paradoxes with regard to aesthetic attitude. First, there is psychical distance or detachment of the beautiful from our ordinary needs and desires while there is also some human feeling associated with the aesthetic object. Secondly, the joy afforded by the beautiful is not ordinary joy yielded by an object satisfying some organic need-practical sensuous, intellectual or moral. We have to resolve these paradoxes. This is done by realising that the feelings associated with beautiful in art and nature are not specific affecting one personally but they are generalised feelings which one feels in an impersonal manner. The feelings accompanying an aesthetic experience are dislodged from their particular objects and individual minds and they float as universal ideal content, in the mental continuum of human culture. In a realistic attitude one holds an object as a part of his environment and relates it to other objects and to himself. In an aesthetic attitude, as the object is no longer held as real, it is not related to anything but contemplated for its own sake as a self-complete and self-dependent entity. As the object is so disengaged from its environment so the feeling associated with it is also deprived of any real source for the beholder who feels it in an impersonal and non-attached way.

An individual feels not blindly and passively as he does in a realistic attitude but *consciously and actively*. This active and enlightened way of feeling a generalised emotion projected on an appropriate image yields a superior kind of joy (*rasa*). An emotion, either agreeable or disagreeable in

itself, is enjoyed and this delight which defeats tragic emotions and feeds on them, is of a higher kind than of the ordinary emotion of joy. Thus it is that the two paradoxes mentioned above can be solved. We can understand how in an aesthetic attitude there is both detachment and feeling and how aesthetic delight is of an extraordinary kind. This feeling of joy (disinterested) is due to our extension of Self to the object which is a kind of *viṣayagatapratyakṣa*.

Moreover, without the extension of self the pathos of others cannot be shared. It is said that the aesthetic pleasure arising out literary form of art or other forms of art cannot be enjoyed by all, but only by the appreciators called *sahṛdayas*. It is said by Abhinavagupta "*yōrtho hṛdayasāmvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ/Sarīram vyāpyate tena.*" A literary form of art is always appreciated by the appreciators alone. For being a *sahṛdaya* one should have common sharing of feeling with the object which is also a kind of *viṣayagatapratyakṣa*. To Viśvanātha poetry is a peculiarly unworldly phenomenon, an extra-ordinary creation of supernatural supernormal genius and hence it cannot be governed by the rules of ordinary human intellect. In ordinary life sorrow comes from sorrow, fear follows fear, but in the world of poetry we find pleasure deriving from the painful, horrible and terrible situations. In these cases there is some type of identity (as evidenced in *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*) between audience and the object of perception. This phenomenon of identity emerges from having self-involvement (*ekātmata*) with it. The property of being *sahṛdaya* lies in the fact of being identified with the feeling of the poet. A poet creates a literary form of art, the appreciator realises it and being a *sahṛdaya* he recreates the literary art in his own self. The aesthetic pleasure is a generalised one. The generalisation is the process of idealisation through which an individual may go from his personal emotion to the serenity of contemplation of a poetic sentiment. The poet and audience must have capacity of idealisation. For this reason a poet can present personal emotion as an impersonal aesthetic pleasure which is enjoyed by others. As this pleasure transcends the limitation of personal interests, it is disinterested universal pleasure. This pleasure is the emotional

mood revealed in a blissful knowledge free from all barriers which is the form of Brahman or Self.

To highlight such a theory the case of Vālmīki may be cited. After perceiving the separation of the curlew-couple Vālmīki became very much moved and out of his sorrow he has an emotional outburst in the form of śloka. He had an intense feeling of pathos in which he had lost himself. Due to the complete loss of personality (*pramātā* as coined by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra) he had a sense of joy out of grief. This joyful experience of pathos enjoins him with the spontaneous power of creativity. Vālmīki's grief was not this-worldly. If it were, he would have mere sympathy with the bird, which cannot provide him the power of creativity. For, this-worldly grief makes an individual idle. When an individual's vision becomes deep and clear, he receives an inspiration from within. The spontaneous poetry is called śloka because it arises from the grief due to the separation of the curlew couple and this sharing is due to extension of one's own self (*krauñcadvandvaviyogothah śokah ślokatvamāgatah*).<sup>14</sup>

To Abhinavagupta any type of the production of creative art presupposes the condition of *rasāveśā* (involvement in aesthetic sentiment) in an individual. The abiding emotion or sentiment must exist in an artist, dramatic character and spectators (in case of literary form of art). In the case of pictorial art also the same sentiment must exist among artist, pictorial presentation and the critic. Hence, the property of being *sahṛdaya* is essential for any type of art-enjoyment which is a pioneer example of *viśayagatapratyakṣa* when the hearts of the people are expanded having clear mind due to the habit of practising literature and gather the capability of being identified with the characters of drama as described (*varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā*), they are called *sahṛdayas* as they all possess the same feeling. In this context the phenomenon of *tanmayībhavana* (to be objectified) is possible through the process as shown in the perceptuality of object.<sup>15</sup>

These theories of perception are beautifully explained by Professor Bina Gupta following different commentaries on the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. In

the commentary - *Āśubodhini* it is said that the perceptuality of knowledge is the identity between consciousness limited by the object and consciousness limited by the mental mode. Under this situation it can be said that the content of such a perceptual knowledge is perceptual. In the *Paribhāṣāprakāśikā* the *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* is explained as the identity with the witness-consciousness (*sākṣyabhinnatvm*), which is expressed as *pramātrabhinnatva* in the text by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra. 'This witness-consciousness must be associated with the mental mode in the form of an object with which its identity takes place; resulting in the perceptuality of an object.'<sup>16</sup>

Actually such type of perceptuality of object is taken as a perception in the form of *sākṣivedya* i.e. known immediately through witness. We can hear a song in two ways : the song may be heard quite unmindfully and it may be heard as if it is piercing our heart. Though both are the phenomena of hearing, there is a difference in degree. The former is a mere hearing without having impact on our psychology while the latter is piercing our heart after issuing through our external hearing organ which is described by the Vaisnavites as 'it pierces the heart after going through the external hearing organ (*'kāner bhitardiyā marame paśila go*'). This type of perception is the real perception of object - the object is identified with the subject through its sanctity or value.

Professor Gupta has beautifully summed up this phenomenon of *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* in the following way :

"... VP's thesis - that object do not have any independent existence apart from the witness-consciousness-must be understood against the background that, in the final analysis, according to Advaita, there is only one kind of being, 'reality', which in the system of Advaita has been articulated in terms of the afore-mentioned triple modes. From the perspective of reason and empirical experience, these three levels are incommensurable; they are different qualitatively. The identity of an object with the witness-consciousness only implies that the objects do not have any independent

existence apart from the witness-consciousness. The reality of existence that pertains to the substratum is manifested in the superimposed objects as well. It is similar to the manifestation of 'thisness' of 'this is silver' in the silver itself. At the time of immediate cognition, the consciousness conditioned by the object, the mind and the mental mode are one, so the existence that pertains to the consciousness conditioned by the object is one with the consciousness conditioned by mind. Therefore, objects such as pitchers do not have any independent existence that is the essential nature of the witness-consciousness. Accordingly, the verbal usage, that is, 'pitcher is perceptual' is intelligible.<sup>17</sup>

It has been pointed that the Advaitins believe in two types of perception - *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate). The determinate perception apprehends the qualifier, qualificand and their relation (*vaiśiṣṭyā-vagahijñānam*) e.g, I know the jar. While the indeterminate perception does not apprehend the relation in a cognition (*sāmsargānavagahī*), e.g. 'This is that Devadatta' or 'Thou art that' etc.<sup>18</sup>

Though it has been said that in the case of indeterminate perception there is no apprehension of the relation between qualifier and qualificand. In the previous case - 'This is that Devadatta' that Devadatta belonged to different space and time and this Devadatta belongs to another space and time. Hence, the relation between that Devadatta and this Devadatta is denied here. The specific characters of Devadatta belonging to the past are not the same in the case of present Devadatta. For this reason both are not identical. This non-identity is hinted through their absence of relation. Hence it is a kind of indeterminate perception capable of not apprehending relation (*sāmsargānavagahī*). It is to be kept in mind that the Advaitins are not referring to a perception of the ordinary experientiable type, but to a peculiar cognition which does not reveal any relation. The indeterminate cognition does not refer to the relation remaining among various factors of the content of a cognition. The same non-relational statement is found in the Mahāvākya - 'Thou art that' (*tattvamasi*). It may be argued that in the previous example, Devadatta is manifested as conditioned by spatio-temporal relations, which

are pointed out by the terms - 'this' and 'that' (*soyam*) . In reply it can be said that these terms must be taken here as indicating factors (*upalakṣana*). The statement '*Tattvamasī*' (that art thou...) does not indicate the spatio-temporal relation. On the other hand, the statement 'This is that Devadatta' (*so'yaṁ devadattah*) is made only to show that Devadatta is in Devadatta. As if this statement is made in order to refute the contrary cognition in the form of doubt whether this is the same Devadatta or not". The person is manifested in himself through his essence, but not through the manifestation of the adjectival feature.

If there is at all any identity between this and that Devadatta, it is the identity of the person in himself. A recognitive experience like this reveals the identity of the knowledge arising from two words that imply a seeming duality.<sup>19</sup>

Such type of *nirvikalpaka* perception is not accepted in the Nyāya philosophy. To the Naiyayikas such a *nirvikalpaka* cognition is non-relational in the sense that there are qualificand and qualifier but no relation. To them it is *asābda* or non-testimonial which is not capable of being expressed in language. Hence, it is metaphorised as a cognition of the children and dumb persons. The Advaitins admit a peculiar type of *nirvikalpaka* which is explained earlier.

## References

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* - 4-5-321-6.
2. "Pramātrabhedo nāma pramātr̥sattātirikta-sattākatvābhāvah".  
*Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Pratyakṣapariccheda).
3. "Viṣayacaitanyañca pūrvoktaprakareṇa pramātr̥caitanyaṃ eveti  
pramātr̥caitanyaṣyaiva ghatādyadhīṣṭhānatayā pramātr̥sattaiva ghatādisattā  
nānyeti siddham ghatāderaparokṣatvam."  
*Ibid.*
4. "Ādye pramānacaitanyaṣya viṣayacaitanyābheda iti brumah."  
*Ibid*
5. Sri Aurobindo : *Life Divine*, p. Pondicherry.
6. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Viṣayapariccheda.
7. Dr. Sudhir Kumar Dasgupta : *Kāvyaḷoka*, Vol.I, A. Mukherjee & Co. Calcutta,  
1386 (B.S.) , p. 92.
8. *Ibid*, p. 8.
9. *Kāvyaḷoka*, *Vṛtti*, 4/28.
10. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*- 3/42-43.
11. 'Śabdasaṃnyamāna ... svasamvidānanda-carvanavyāpāra-  
rasanīyarūpo rasah' *Locana on Dhvanyāḷoka*, 1/1.
12. Sattvodrekād akhaṇḍa-svaprakāśāṇḍacinmayah/  
Vedyāntarasparśāśūnyo branmasvādasahodarah//  
Lokottaracamatkarapranah kaiscit pramatrbhih// Svakaravad  
abhinnatvenāyamāsvādyate rasah// Rajastamobhyāmaspr̥ṣtam manah  
sattvamihocyate// *Sāhityadarpaṇa*- 3/35.
13. *Locana on Dhvanyāḷoka*, Ed. by Kappṣvami Sastri, Madras, 1964, pp.  
77-78.
14. *Dhvanyāḷoka* Sloka no. 1/5.
15. "Yeṣāṃ kāvyā - nuṣīlanābhyāśavaśād manomukure  
varnaniyatanmayibhavanayogyatā te hr̥dayasamvādabhājah sahr̥dayāḥ"  
*Locana on Dhvanyāḷoka*, 1/1.

16. Bina gupta : *Perceiving in Advaita Vedānta*, Motilal, Delhi, 1995, p. 204.
17. Ibid, p. 206.
18. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (Pratyaksapariccheda).
19. Bina gupta : *Perceiving in Advaita Vedānta*, Motilal, Delhi, 1995, pp. 227-29.