

CHAPTER III

THE ADVAITATHEORY OF PERCEPTION

To an Advaitin the whole world is nothing but Consciousness or *ātman*. To an enlightened person who has realised Self or *ātman* or Consciousness the whole world is covered by the same conscious principle as evidenced by the Śruti texts like - '*sarvam khalvidam Brahma*' (All this is nothing but Brahman), '*Tasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhāti*' (His manifestation is found everywhere) etc. The opening Mantra of the *Kenopaniṣad* begins with the description of the world which is covered by the consciousness. Whatever found in this world is the manifestation of the Consciousness. If every thing is covered by this Consciousness or Self, there does not arise any question of exploiting others or snatching the properties of others (*Isāvāsyamidam sarvam yat kiñca jagatyām jagat/tena tyaktena bhūñjīthā mā grdhah kasyasviddhanam*¹). Under these circumstances an individual enjoys through renunciation. The roots of a human being's enjoyment are many. Some may find pleasure in torturing other, some by snatching others' properties and some by social service etc. In this context a human being is found in enjoyment through his sacrifice or renunciation (*tyaktena bhūñjīthāh*). This enjoyment though renunciation is an enjoyment *per excellence* or disinterested or non-pathological. It is possible for the man who has realised the Consciousness everywhere in this world. Such a person is a seer (*rsi*) in the true sense of the term as he 'sees' himself or his own self or consciousness to all beings - human and non-human. To him the whole world is self-related (*ātmiya*) which is expressed as '*Vasudhaiva kutumbakam*'. If he thinks himself as remaining in all, he will not be able to exploit others as it is a case of self-exploitation or self deceiving (*ātmapravañcanā*). In the same way, greed towards others property does not seem to be present in an individual's mind, as he is a realised person.

This realisation does not come into being very easily. It needs some mental training to avail this. The process of hearing (*śravaṇa*), thinking (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*) leads an individual to such state of mind. For such training the knowledge of duality must be admitted at the outset. Before reaching to the transcendental world this phenomenal world has to be understood properly. For the better understanding of the phenomenal world the Advaita epistemology plays a prominent role. To the Advaitins the phenomenal world is also not free from the Consciousness,

the Ultimate Reality accepted in the Advaita Vedānta system of Indian Philosophy. This notion of consciousness is transmitted to their theory of perception also. To Dharmarāja Advarīndra the means of valid cognition (*pramāna*) is of six types - *Pratyakṣa* (perception), *Anumāna* (Inference), *Upamāna* (comparison), *Sabda* (verbal testimony), *Arthāpathi* (presumption) and *Anupalabdhi* (Non-apprehension).

As the Advaita theory of perception presupposes some metaphysical presuppositions, their theory of perception is classified in various ways - *Jñānagata* (perceptuality of cognition) and *Viśayagata* (perceptuality of object,) *Jīvasākṣī* (witness in individual being and *Īśvarasākṣī* (witness in God), *Savikalpaka* (determinate) and *Nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate).

Normally when it is said that I know, it means 'I know of something'. Knowing without any content is not at all knowing in the true sense of the term. But in the Advaita Vedānta system there are two types of knowing - cognition of the knowledge of an object i.e., jar is the perceptuality in terms of the cognition (*jñānagatapratyakṣa*) while in the latter case there is the cognition of the object (i.e. jar) but not the cognition of a jar. To them just a cognition of jar is a matter of perception, the jar itself is also matter of perception. In the previous case an object is perceived through its cognition. It is tantamount to say that the cognition of a jar is perceived. But in the latter case the *que*-object (i.e. object without its cognition) is perceived. That is why, Dharmarāja Advarīndra has preferred to use the term *jñānagatapratyakṣa* i.e. the region of perception lies only on the cognition portion through which object comes. But when the region of perception remains in the object itself but not its cognition, it is called *Viśayagatapratyakṣa* i.e. perception of the object - rather bare object.²

Let us see how Dharmarāja, after following the Advaita view, has explained the theory of perception in terms of cognition.

As told earlier the whole world is covered by Consciousness or *Ātman*. Though 'this consciousness is one in number, we may accept some limited forms of it which are called *Upādhis* (limiting adjuncts). Though the Space (*ākāśa*) is one, we accept some limited forms of it for our usability. For example, we may say that space limited by a jar is called *ghatākāśa* (space existing in a jar). In the same way, a space limited by house and temple is called *grhākāśa* and *mathākāśa* respectively. Though Time (*Kāla*) is one, it can be used in our daily life after taking its limiting adjuncts like day, night, week, month, year, minute, hour etc. In the like manner, it can be said that

though the Consciousness is essentially not divisible, it can have the limited forms which are essential in our daily life for day to day transaction. That is why, Consciousness is of three types - (a) *Pramāṇa Caitanya* (Consciousness limited by the means of knowing) (b) *Pramātrcāitanya* (Consciousness limited by the knower) and (c) *Viṣayacāitanya* (Consciousness limited by an object).

The term '*pramāṇa*' has to be taken in a technical sense. The term *pramāṇa* denotes 'mental mode' or *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti*. According to the Advaitins our mind or inner sense-organ called *antaḥkāraṇa* is taken as a liquid substance. Water has no shape of its own, but it can take the shape of its locus. If water flows through the canal, it can take the shape of it. If it flows through the field, it will take the shape of the field. In the same way, gold can take the shape of its locus when liquidified. In the like manner, *antaḥkāraṇa* or mind goes out of an individual's body and reaches to the object and takes the shape of it which is called *vṛtti* or mental mode.⁴

The Advaitins have given a new interpretation of the Advaitic perception by way of bringing mental state (*vṛtti*) as a factor of perceptual cognition. The role of mind or inner sense-organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) has played a prominent role in this perceptual phenomenon. *Antaḥkāraṇa* by virtue of being a revealer of an object is described as follows : The mind as if takes the form of an object after going out of the body through the windows in the forms of sense-organ. Though the role of sense organ is not denied in the system, the organs like eye etc. are shown as sense-organs that are called technically *indriyas*. But mind or *antaḥkāraṇa* is not a sense organ (*indriya*) to Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, and yet it is a prime factor in perceptual cognition. The sense-organ cannot work without the help of mind which is actually transformed into the object.

This *antaḥkāraṇa* is, according to Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, not an object having no parts at all (*niravayava*). Had it been partless, there would not have any transformation (*pariṇāma*). As it is taken as having transformation, it is called an object having some parts (*sāvayava*). God, silver etc that are having parts are capable of being transformed into different ornaments like necklace, ring etc. In the like manner, mind is taken as capable of being transformed. Mind is taken as having some elastic nature. It can assume the form of an object which is called transformation or *vṛtti*. As the Consciousness is everywhere, it exists in the knower, known object and the mental mode in the form of an object. The Consciousness is cut into size

(*avacchinna*) as per the size of a knower (*pramātā*), an object (*visaya*) and the mental mode in the form of object which is technically called *pramāṇa*. Why is it called *pramāṇa*? The term '*pramāṇa*' means 'proper measurement'. The term '*māna*' means measurement and '*pra*' means 'proper'. Whether an object is properly measured or not is determined not only through object but through the mental mode in the form of an object. Without any mental mode an object can never be properly understood. An object is known properly if it is covered by the consciousness in the form of mental states. Hence it is called *pramāṇacaitanya* i.e. consciousness limited by the mental state. An object without mental mode cannot be properly measured. Hence, mental state covered by Consciousness is called *Pramāṇa* i.e., literally proper measurement.

Though an object is perceived with the help of five external sense-organs, the perceived object creates an image in the inner organ or mind. This image is called mental mode or *Vṛtti*.

In the case of the perceptual cognition of a jar (*jñānagatapratyakṣa*) the object itself and its corresponding image called *vṛtti* is amalgamated and hence the knower (*pramātā*) remains isolated from the object and its corresponding image. For this a relation called *kartr-karma* (i.e. subject-object relationship) is maintained. In such cases there is a duality which is normally found in the empirical world. Such cognition is explained in the following manner: 'I have the perceptual cognition of a jar'. If the sentence is analysed, we may get three parts - a) 'I' which is *pramātā* or knower which is no other than the Consciousness (*pramātravacchinna - caitanya*) b) jar is also a consciousness limited by it which is the content of cognition (*viśayāvacchinna-caitanya*). c) the Consciousness in the form of mental mode shaped as per the object. (*vṛtavyacchinna-caitanya*). the total amalgamation of the later two (b) and (c) leads to the region of known level (*jñeya*) and the (a) part serves the purpose of a know^{er} (*jñātā*). Hence a total distinction can be maintained two poles - *meya*-pole and *mātā*-pole. Due to this there is the cognition of knowledge of an object.

The Advaitins have also accepted that the object should be 'present' (*vartamāna*) and 'capable of being perceived' (*yogya*) in both types of perception. In the case of the perceptuality of cognition of an object and the perceptuality of object the object (*visaya*) should possess such characteristic features. The term 'present' (*vartamāna*) has been taken as an adjunct of an object to exclude the past and future objects under the purview of perception. One could raise a question whether something existing in past like 'Ashok

was a king of India' or 'An earth-quake occurred in Gujrat' is capable of being perceived or not. The reply can be given in negative. For, as these are the past incidents, they cannot be perceived. The simple reason is that our mind issuing through our sense-organs cannot assume the form of the object due to its absence at the time of perception. Inner organ (*antaḥkarana*) can take the shape of an object if the object physically remains there. As the king Ashoka or earth-quake in Gujrat are the past incidents, they cannot be the objects of perception due to the impossibility of their physical presence.

In the like manner, there may arise a question of visualising or perceiving the phenomena like merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), etc. The Advaitins are consistent in this matter when they say that something can be perceived if it has got some perceptible character or character capable of being perceived (*yogya*). The merit, demerit etc, though real, do not come under the purview of our perception as they are not perceptible. One can not raise the question of perceptibility of atom as it is not capable of being perceived. Hence before raising the question of perceiving something we should notice whether the object-concerned is 'present' and 'capable of being perceived'.

These two adjuncts of an object are essential for both the perception of the cognition of an object and the perception of an object. In both the cases the inner organ (*antaḥkarana*) serves the purpose of assuming the form of an object. If object is *ayogya* or imperceptible, it is beyond the question of our perception.

In the case of the perception of a jar which is expressed as 'this jar' the mental mode in the form of the jar is in contact with the jar. Hence the consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of a jar is identical with the consciousness in the form of a jar. In the same way the perception of the mental feelings like happiness etc can be explained. As the consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of happiness etc. and the Consciousness limited by happiness etc are identical, we have the cognition of happiness like 'I am happy' etc. As these two limitors of the consciousness remain in the same space, the above-mentioned cognition is surely perceptual.⁶

It has been already stated that the object which is being perceived must be a 'present one' (*vartamāna*). Hence the definition cannot be applied to the recollection of the happiness in past. Because, the happiness which is recollected is a past event and the mental state in the form of recollection is

a present event, the two limiting adjuncts in the mind belong to different space, time and hence the corresponding two forms of Consciousness are different. It is not as per the criterion that two forms of Consciousness must occupy the same place and time. As in the case of the recollection of happiness which was in past we do not find the said amalgamation, it is not perceptual. In order to prevent the definition of being unduly extended to the past events the term 'present' is inserted as an adjunct of the object.⁷

It can be argued that the present righteousness or lack of righteousness can be known through perception, as they are very much 'present (*vartamāna*) in us. This cannot be taken under the purview of the perception, because they, though present, are not capable being perceived. Hence another term "*yogyatva*" (capability of being perceived) can be added as an adjunct of the object. An object may be taken as being perceived if there are two qualities - *vartamānatva* (capable of being present) and *yogyatva* (capable of being perceived). Though righteousness etc have got the character of being present, they cannot be perceived due to the lack of the second character of capability of being seen or perceived (*yogyatva*)⁸.

It may happen that though I am quite happy, I do not know as such. When it is pointed out by somebody else as 'you are happy' (*tvam sukhi*), it would be taken as perceptual cognition. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has cited another case - '*Daśamastvamasī*' (you are the tenth) which is taken as perceptual. Ten students have crossed the river at a time. When all of them reached the other side of the river, the captain of the team has started counting the heads and every time he is getting nine in stead of ten. One member of the team has drawn the attention of the captain towards the fact that he is the tenth member when he does not count every time. This attention of the captain was drawn by another member by uttering a sentence - '*daśamastvamasī*' (your are the tenth member). From this it is proved that though testimony generally gives an indirect cognition (*sābdajñāna*) sometimes it may give rise to perceptual cognition also which is called perceptual cognition caused through a sentence. It is perceptual because we can feel directly the tenth position when attention is drawn to it by a sentence.⁹

When there is a cognition in the form - 'The mountain is fiery' (*parvato vahnimān*), the cognition of the mountain is immediate (*aparokṣa*) and the cognition of fire is mediate. Because, in the former case there is an amalgamation between two forms of consciousness - viz, the consciousness

in the form of mountain i.e. object and the consciousness in the form of mental mode of the mountain. But in the later case the amalgamation between the consciousness in the form of fire and the consciousness in the form of the mental mode of fire is not possible as our mind in such case cannot go to the place of fire from the body and it cannot be transformed in the mental mode of fire. That is why, our expressions go in the following way - 'I am seeing the mountain' (*parvatam paśyāmi*) and 'I am inferring the fire' (*vahnimanuminomi*)¹⁰.

Even in an inferential cognition where the subject (*pakṣa*) is not in connection with the organ, the cognition is wholly mediate. As for example, in the inferential cognition in the form 'An atom of earth has got smell, because it is earth, as is the case with a jar', the subject (i.e. atom) being imperceptible cannot come in contact with the eye or skin which can reveal substance perceptually. Hence, the cognition is not perceptual, but inferential both in respect of smell and atom. The cognition in the form - '*surabhi candanam*' (A piece of sandal wood is fragrant) is immediate in respect of the piece of sandal wood and mediate in respect of the fragrance (*saurava*). As the later i.e. fragrance is not capable of being perceived by eye, it lacks the capability or *yogyatva* of being seen. Hence, there is no *yogyatva* of being seen. Hence there is no *yogyatva* which is an essential adjunct of the object for being perceptible.¹¹

The qualifiers like *yogyatva* (capability of being seen) and *vartamānatva* (to remain in the present) are applicable to the object which is perceived (*viśayagatapratyakṣa*). When the object (but not the knowledge of an object) is perceived, there is the knower who is identical with others. How does consciousness limited by the mind in the form of a jar etc remain identical with others? Because it will go against our experience of difference in the expression - 'I am seeing it' (*ahamidam paśyāmi*).¹²

It has already been said that the perceptibility of the object is the situation of being identified with the knower (*ghatāderiśayapratyakṣam tu pramātrabhinnat-^{VAM}Vedāntaparbhāṣā, Pratyakṣa-Pariccheḍa*) That is, among the three types of Consciousness only one Consciousness remains there and other two forms of Consciousness are amalgamated with it. As *Pramātracaitanya* (the Consciousness limited by *Pramātā*) is nothing but the Consciousness limited by the mind (*antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanya*), and as 'this form of *Caitanya* alone remains, it will go against the general expression and feeling - 'I am seeing it' (*ahamidam paśyāmi*). For, in this

expression there is the subject-object dichotomy along with the verb, the identical condition of other forms of Consciousness with the *Pramātā* (knower) is not realised here. In this particular case the term 'I' (*aham*) occupies the place of an agent (*kartā*) or subject and the term '*idaṁ*' i.e., this occupies the place of object or *karma*. These two words are conjoined with the verb 'seeing' or *paśyāmi*. In this case our perceptual expression of an object is described but there is no identity of *Pramātā* with others due to the description of subject, object etc. Hence, what is said about the perceptuality of an object cannot be maintained when it is expressed in language. Hence a problem is raised regarding the validity of the perceptuality of object ("*Nanu katham ghaṭāderantaḥkaraṇāvācchinnacaitanyābhedaḥ, 'ahamidaṁ paśyāmi' iti bhedaṇubhavavirodhāditi cet, ucāgate*". Ibid).

In response to this Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra suggests that 'the identity of *Pramātā*' does not mean 'the amalgamation of the knower' exactly. On the other hand, it means 'having no existence apart from that of the subject'. ("*Pramātrabhedaḥ nāma na tāvadaikyam kintu pramātrsattātiriktasattākatvābhāvaḥ*", Ibid). In this context one particular explanation of the term '*Pramātrabheda*' i.e. 'non-difference of the knower' has to be taken into account. It means there will be the existence of *Pramātā* and the existence of other objects will not come to the realm of cognizance. Since a jar etc are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them, their existence is nothing but the existence of the Consciousness limited by the object. For, the existence of something which is superimposed is not accepted to be something over and above the existence of its substratum or locus ("*Tathā ca ghaṭādeḥ svāvācchinnacaitanye' dhyastatayā viśayacaitanyasattaiva ghaṭādisattā, adhiṣṭhānātiriktayā āropitasattāyā anangikārāt*", Ibid).

The Advaita Vedāntins, however, refute different views on the theory of perception. According to the Sāṃkhya, when a sense-organ has contact with an object, the *buddhi* issuing out of the sense-organ to the object is modified into its form and gives its mode to the self, then the self is reflected in the mental mode, is related to the object and apprehends it.

The Advaita Vedāntins refute such Sāṃkhya view in the following way. The Sāṃkhya regards the self as unmodifiable and yet holds that the self is reflected in the *buddhi* and intelligises it, or that *buddhi* intelligised by the self is reflected back in it. In both cases the self becomes modifiable. Thus the Sāṃkhya contradicts his own view that the self is immutable. He may

argue that the self merely 'sees' or knows the *buddhi* modified into the form of an object, that 'seeing' or knowing is its essence, and that it does not come over to the *buddhi*. This defence is useless because all the alternatives involved in it are untenable. The cognition which constitutes the essence of the self manifests the *buddhi* modified into the form of its object as related to the self, or it manifests the mode of the *buddhi* as unrelated to the self. The first alternative is untenable, since the self is partless and cannot come into contact with a mental mode. Further, the self is mental and cannot relate itself to a mental mode, since the self is partless and cannot come into contact with a mental mode. Further, the self is neutral and cannot relate itself to a mental mode, since in such case it would contradict its own nature. Nor a cognition can apprehend an object unrelated to the self, since then it would be able to apprehend any object unrelated to it. If proximity be said to relate an object to the self, what does proximity mean? It is either existence in the same substratum or mutual confrontation or interpretation. The first alternative is not tenable. The self and the *buddhi* cannot exist in the same substratum, like $\#$ colour and $\#$ taste. Nor is the second alternative tenable. The self is too pervasive and cannot confront $\#$ the *buddhi* modified into the form of an object. Nor is the third alternative possible. If the self and the *buddhi* interpenetrate each other, like heat and iron, the self will become modifiable. Nor can there be proximity of the self to the *buddhi* as between a substratum and its content, like the relation of a vessel to a plum, since the self is detached or unrelated. Further, there is no means of valid cognition to prove it. The self's apprehension of an object through its reflection in the *buddhi* or the intelligised *buddhi*'s reflection in the self is not perceived.¹³

$\#$ It is not also inferred due to the lack of the invariable concomitance between probans and probandum in any case which is the precondition of being inference. It cannot be said that the inference is possible through the invariable concomitance between light and an object. As these two objects are composed of parts and having motion, they can come together. But the self is partless, immovable and hence it cannot be proximate to the *buddhi*. As we do not have any evidence regarding the fact that self and *buddhi* can move each other. The movement of Self which is essentially detached, perfect and partless in character towards *Buddhi* is neither perceived nor inferred. For this reason self cannot apprehend an object through mental mode in which the self is reflected. So the Sāṃkhya-view is not tenable. In this way the Advaitins have refuted the Sāṃkhya view regarding perception.

Now the Advaitins attack the Naiyayikas for defending their own position. A cognition can reveal an object if and only if it has relation with the object. But the Naiyayikas do not admit a direct relation with it. They opine that there cannot be a relation called *samyoga* (contact) or any other relation with it. We do not accept any relation between cognition and its object directly and hence it cannot reveal the same. In response to this the Naiyayikas may rejoin that self has the relation called contact (*samyoga*) with mind, mind is related to sense-organ and sense-organ with object (*ātmā manasā samyujyate mana indriyena indriyam arthena*). As cognition which is in Self is indirectly (*paramparā*) related to the object (*artha*), there is an indirect relation between cognition and object. This argument of the Naiyayikas cannot be taken for granted. Because, all objects may be taken as indirectly connected with a cognition in the similar manner. All objects are connected with sense-organ which is again related to mind which is related to Self where the cognition remains. As cognition remains in self, all objects will be connected with it through different process as shown above. The Naiyayikas may say that just as cutting is possible through the instrumentality of an axe, cognition is generated in an object through the instrumentality of the sense-organ, but not self. But we have such an experience that the cognition of a jar is produced in me'. So the argument is not proper, as it contradicts our experience. The Naiyayikas may argue that an object connected with the sense-organ produces a cognition in the self and that any other object cannot do so. The connection of the sense-organ with an intended object generates a cognition in the self. This argument is not tenable, because an unintended bad odour in connection with nose generates a cognition in the self. A cognition is not related to an object through a series of conjunctions on account of the fact that the cognition produced by them inheres in the self and it is not related to the sense-organs. Moreover, there is no proof for the continuance of a series of conjunctions till the produced cognition generates a peculiarity (*atisāya*) in an object. The *atisāya* is produced in an object by a cognition or mental mode issuing out to the object and the cognition can reveal it. Hence a cognition cannot be related to the object through the sense-organs. It is not also true that a cognition is not related to an object through its substratum. Had it been related to Self which is all pervading, the cognition of all objects would have been revealed simultaneously. If a cognition remains in the self limited by body (*dehāvacchinna*), it would not be related to an object outside the body and

could not manifest it. If it is argued that a cognition may cognise an object without being related to it, a cognition would manifest all objects without being related to them. If it is, there would be no relation between a knowing self, knowledge and a known object. But it is our common experience that 'this is known by me'. Hence the Naiyayikas cannot account for the apprehension of an object through a cognition. So the view of the Advaitins is firmfooted.

The Advaita Vedantins have refuted the view of the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā. Though the cognition is self-manifest to the Prabhākaras, there is no relation between a cognition in the self limited by body (*dehāvacchinna ātmā*) and an external object. Hence a cognition cannot manifest an object. A self-manifest object can manifest itself only but it cannot manifest a self, which is its substratum and its object. To Prabhākara a cognition cannot pervade an object because he admits that it inheres in a self limited by body (*dehāvacchinna ātmā*). By virtue of being inhered in self it can be taken as a quality of self. Hence the cognition cannot manifest an external object. Self, the locus of cognition, cannot manifest an external object because it is limited by body. A self-manifest cognition cannot manifest a self, its locus and an object, even as light manifests a lamp, its substratum and external objects. Light has rays which can spread and manifest both a lamp and external objects. But a cognition is partless and devoid of rays and hence cannot spread to a self and an external object. Hence the example already given is not appropriate. Moreover, if a cognition, which inheres in a self, manifests the self as a knower, the self becomes a knower and a known object, which is self-contradictory. The same self cannot be both a subject and an object of cognition. The question may further be raised in the following way. A cognition is produced in the entire self or in a particular region of the self. In the case of former a cognition manifests only the phenomenal self, for the real self has no particular region without a limiting condition (e.g. a body). The real self is partless. When it is limited by body, it ceases to be an ontological reality. Hence the expression 'I am' would be illusory as the word 'I' means 'the embodied self'. If the latter case is accepted, there would be no self as an object of 'I' - consciousness. Hence there can be no relation between a cognition and an object. Hence a cognition cannot apprehend an object according to Prabhākara.

The Advaita Vedantins explain the relation of the self, knowledge and object in the following manner. Knowledge is the essence of the self. As it is self-manifest, the self is also self-manifest. As knowledge is unmodifiable,

the self is also so. It is eternal, nondual and undifferentiated. It is not itself a knower, a doer, and an enjoyer or a sufferer, but these are due to superimposition (*adhyāsa*). The internal sense organ (*antahkarana*) issues out through a sense-organ to an object and is modified into its form. The self of the nature of consciousness is reflected in the mental mode and erroneously identifies itself with the mode due to superimposition and apprehends an external object. The self of the nature of consciousness being manifested in the internal sense-organ within the body and being limited by and identified with a particular mode of the internal organ is called the knower (*pramātā*). The self limited by a particular mode of the internal sense organ modified into the form of an object is called the means of valid cognition (*pramāna*). The self limited by an external object pervaded by a mode of the internal organ and identified with the object is called the object of cognition (*prameya*). The self identified with and limited by the manifestation of an object is called the result of the means of valid cognition (*pramiti*). These differences are phenomenal and due to the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*). But the self essentially is unmodifiable, undifferentiated changeless, of the nature of consciousness and the witness (*sākṣin*) that manifests all. Because the knower, the means of cognition and the known object are manifested as states of the internal organ directly by the self of witness and related to one another by it, we have the feeling 'I know this' or 'this is known by me'. These factors, being limited, unrelated to one another, cannot produce such an experience.

Vādarāyana describes the distinction of the three limiting adjuncts of consciousness in the following way. Nescience or *Avidyā* which veils the one eternal consciousness or Self appears to be the world-appearance. The internal organ is a product of nescience. The internal sense-organ within a body associated by merits and demerits of an individual self goes out through a sense organ to the external object, and is modified into its form. The part of the internal sense organ limited by a body called egoism (*aḥamkāra*) is the doer.

According to Saṃkara, there is a pure being which is a non-different unity. This pure being is conceived by indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*). On the other hand, the multiplicity of empirical objects can be apprehended by determinate perception. Hence it has an empirical validity (*vyavahārikaprāmānya*), but not metaphysical validity. Determinate perception (*savikalpa-pratyakṣa*) presupposes the application of forms

and determinations which have no foundation in reality. To an Advaitin determination is, in fact, a kind of negation. Through determinate perception one pure Being, the substratum of all empirical beings, cannot be known. Determinate perception is the synthetic relational mode of apprehending empirical objects and qualities in relation to one another.

In the phenomenon of cognition the role of recollection is not ignorable. Recollection presupposes the identity of self that had seen an object in the past and received the residual impression (*saṃskāra*) of the object. In the case of perception this impression or *saṃskāra* and an object is known. The phenomenon of recollection is possible through the revival of the impression of an object seen in the past, which is accepted by most of the philosophers belonging to Indian systems. There is only one locus of past perception, the residual impression and the present perception. This locus is self according to the Advaitins. Though our body is different in different ages, there is one unchanged factor relating all the forms of body just as a thread can bind all different flowers existing in a garland. This unchanged factor is Self.¹⁴ On account of this an individual who has seen his mother and father in the childhood can recollect at the old age. An individual can easily identify that the self represented by 'I' who has seen his parents in the old age can see his own grand sons or daughters in the old age. The underlying self in different forms of body can help an individual in recollecting the earlier experience.¹⁵

The Buddhists accept self as a series of momentary cognitions. They believe that a particular cognition receives an object, another cognition keeps its impression and another one recollects it. If this view is taken for granted then one person can perceive an object and another person can recollect it, which is practically not possible. However, the *Vijñānavādins*, a section of the Buddhists, cannot justify the fact of recollection, because they admit different momentary cognition that can apprehend an object, can retain residual impression and can recollect. The *Vijñānavādins* might argue that different forms of cognitions actually form a series (composit whole) which can be locus of perception, recollection and impression. This is also wrong according to the Advaitins. Because, they think how can there be series without the help of its individual members? If it is accepted that the members are real, it will lead to another problem. An object which is seen at the first moment may be lost in the second without leaving aside any impression. Even if it leaves some residual impression, it is destroyed in the past and

hence its recollection is not at all possible. If they admit that the residual impressions are eternal or permanent, it will go against their basic presupposition of the theory of momentariness. If the residual impressions are momentary, it is destroyed before producing some effect. Hence, recollection is not at all possible.

The Advaitins are of the opinion that Brahman is the only Reality characterised by being or existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and absolute bliss (*ānanda*). These three characteristics, being *svarūpalakṣaṇa* (essential characteristics) of Brahman, are not to be understood in terms of experience. In the empirical sense Brahman is non-being subject-objectless pure Consciousness or pure bliss which is compared to a dreamless sleep i.e., *susupti*.¹⁶ To Śamkara the Reality is one and undifferentiated being called Brahman. The perception of the difference and plurality remains until one gathers the intuitive notion of Brahman. Space, Time etc are the categories of the mind and have validity only within the limits of our empirical cognition. After transcending the empirical limit one can have the intuitive cognition of Brahman.

Samkara agrees with Kant that the categories are empirically real and hence they can never provide us a cognition of reality. But Samkara expressed his opinion which is completely different from Kant. To Samkara Reality is Brahman which is a Pure Consciousness, Pure Being and Pure Bliss which are not the predicates of Brahman but the essence of it which is capable of being known by a flash of supra-intellectual pure intuition. Samkara thinks that the apparent diversity of the world including names (*nāma*), forms (*rūpa*) etc seems to us due to the influence of nescience (*ajñāna*). In other words, Samkara thinks Brahman as an Absolute Reality which can only be known through direct and immediate cognition. The Buddhist Idealists also believe that the categories of space, time, substance etc are ideal in nature, but they are not the only Absolute Reality and Samkara will tell that everything is landed in subjectivism or mentalism like the Buddhist Idealists. But both Samkara and the Buddhists are immediatists in as much as both of them consider that immediate experience enables us to apprehend the reality. But they render their different opinions regarding the stages. Samkara regards supra-intellectual intuition or higher supra-intellectual intuition or higher immediacy as the organ of the true knowledge of Brahman, while the Buddhists accept that the lower sense-intuition or lower immediacy as the organ of the true cognition of the reality which is nothing but a series of

individual moments, real or ideal.

So far as the empirical world is concerned, Buddhists think that there is not at all any difference between the universal and the particular, substance and quality, substance and action etc, but we wrongly ascribe difference in them. An object and its name, the Buddhists suggest, is different completely, but we ascribe name etc on it falsely. According to the Buddhists, *kalpanā* or *vikalpa* or substitute is nothing but the false ascription of difference to non-difference and of non-difference to difference. The name, universal etc are, to them, the nature of conceptual construction or ideal abstraction. But Samkara thinks that there is a relation called identity in difference (*bhedābheda*) between the universal and particular, substance and qualities etc. The apparent difference between these pairs of categories is due to nescience (*avidyā*). Due to its infection of the intellect these categories are imposed on the undifferentiated Brahman which is the only reality. In the case of such superimposition which is called *adhyāsa* there are two things - the object superimposed (*adhyasta*) and the locus of superimposition (*adhiṣṭhāna*). In any case of illusion the locus or *adhiṣṭhāna* is always true. In the case of snake-rope illusion the superimposed object i.e. snake is illusory and the locus of the superimposition of snake is rope which is real by virtue of being a locus of the illusory object. In the same way, everything is superimposed on Brahman which is an *adhiṣṭhāna* i.e. the locus of superimposition and hence it can never be false. Samkaracharya had initially taken help of three metaphors to show that there is a clear and distinct difference between the Conscious and the unconscious. These metaphors are a) distinction between 'yusmad' (you) and 'asmad' ('I'), b) between *tamaḥ* (darkness) and *prakāśa* (light), and c) between 'viśaya' (object or properties) and *viśayī* (possessor of object or properties). Though there is a clear distinction between *ātman* and *anātman*, yet the properties of one are superimposed on the other in our day-to-day behaviour (*lokavyayahāra*). This type of imposition is called *adhyāsa* in Advaita Vedānta.¹⁷ Technically it is defined as '*smṛtirūpaḥ paraṭra pūrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsa*' i.e., *adhyāsa* is nothing but an illusion in which there is recollection of something seen before and the ascription of it in a different place.¹⁸ When we see a snake in the place of rope, the idea of snake seen before occurs in our mind and we refer to it at a different place where there is no snake at all. The term '*smṛtirūpa*' incorporated in the definition suggests that there is a similarity between memory-cognition and superimposition. In the former case the impression

of the content is the sole cause (*samskāramātrajanya*) while in the later case the impression along with the physical appearance of the remembered content is present. As the remembered content, which is presented in our front, is false, the term '*smṛtirūpa*' has been used. In other words, the remembered content of snake actually is not present in front, as in such case the object is a rope.

Regarding this theory the following problems may be raised. First, the metaphor '*yusmad*' and '*asmad*' is incorrect, as these cannot show the absolute difference between two, as both of them are conscious in nature. Instead of this the terms '*idam*' and '*asmad*' are more suitable. Vācaspati Mīśra has defended Samkara by saying that the term '*idam*' may sometimes be used in the sense of '*asmad*'.¹⁹ To avoid this complication the term '*yusmad*' is used. Secondly, can self be absolutely unobjective (*aviśayaka*)? Self or Brahman is itself Knowledge as per the Śruti-'*satyam jñānam anantam Brahma*'. This Knowledge referring to Brahman is absolutely unobjective (*aviśayaka*), but at the time of *adhyāsa* this self is identified with body and it becomes objective (*viśayaka*) though temporarily (*tatastha*). Thirdly, such false ascription is quite conceivable if it occurs between two objects seen in front (*puro 'vasthita*) as in case of snake and rope. Hence the mistake between self and non-self is inconceivable, as self is not seen in front. Vācaspati resolves this problem by saying that between two unseen objects mistake is quite possible as the blue colour, which is seen, is imposed on the sky, which is not seen.²⁰ Fourthly, can illusion be taken as virtuous in our day-to-day behaviour? In reply it can be said that though in our daily life illusory cognition cannot conjoin us with our end, the illusion in the sense of superimposition leads us to the path of the Self-realization. In fact, without such mistake one cannot move forward to attain the Ultimate goal according to the Advaita Vedānta. Hence in Advaita Vedānta such *adhyāsa* is indispensable for a beginner. Fifthly, why did Samkara start his *bhāṣya* with the concept of *adhyāsa*? Samkara's philosophy is grounded on theory that the world would be taken as *adhasṭa*, because it is the manifestation of Brahman. This basic theory cannot be properly understood if the meaning of the term *adhyāsa* is not explained at the outset. Hence the concept of *Adhyāsa* is explained initially and primarily by Samkara. Lastly, it is true that there are two types of illusion a) illusory cognition of snake in a piece of rope and b) the illusory cognition of the world in terms of the realization of Brahman. One may ask which one is efficacious to the path of self-realization.

In reply it can be said that the previous case of illusion occurs in the phenomenal level while the later one is realized in the transcendental level. The snake-rope illusion in the empirical level acquaints us with the notion of false cognition through which it would be possible for an individual to feel easily the falsity of the world. When it is said that the world is superimposed at the initial level, it has to be taken as a proposition called *pratijñā*, or presupposition, which is confirmed in the conclusive level called *nigamana*, the result of realization as found in the *pañcāvayavyāya*. The validity of the truth of the statement regarding the falsity of the world is dependent on the Self-realization in the transcendental level. First, we come to know of the falsity of the world from the statement of the scriptures, which is not the result of the directly examined truth to us. The truth of it is realized i.e., the falsity of the world is directly realized just after the self-realization. As the ultimate goal of the Advaita Vedānta is the Self-realization, after which the superimposed character of the world is directly realized, the *Bhāṣya* starts with the notion of falsity. There is the identity of Brahman with all objects leading to non-dualism. There is an empirical difference but ontological identity. An individual, though empirically different from Brahman, becomes ontologically or essentially identical with Brahman.

Thus the Buddhists think that the categories appear to be of mental origin being the nature of mental constructions (*a posteriori*) while Samkara and his followers think that the categories are not of mental origin but of the nature of the Kantian (*apriori*) categories of understanding. Samkara is a transcendental or absolute Idealist while the Buddhists are subjective idealists or mentalists.

Now a question may be raised regarding the status of object of perception in the perspective of the theory of Perception. It has already been said that an object of perception is also a kind of Consciousness which is called *Viśayacaitanya*. In connection with this Dharmarāja has added an adjunct '*vartamāna*' (present) to the object of perception in general i.e. irrespective of *jñānagata* (perception of knowledge of an object) and *Viśayagata* (perception of an object) which is already discussed earlier.

Apart from the *jñānagata* and *Viśayagatapratyakṣa* we may turn our attention to another significant distinction - *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate) perception. Of these two types of perception the former is the cognition which apprehends the qualified cognition. In other words, when a cognition apprehends a piece of knowledge consisting of the

qualificand (*viśeṣya*), the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the relation abiding in these two, it is a case of *savikalpaka* or determinate cognition. As for example, the cognition - 'I know the jar'. In this case the object of cognition i.e., a jar which is related to self referred to by the term 'I'. In this particular sentence - 'I' stands for *viśeṣya* or qualificand, 'a jar' is a qualifier and between them there is a relation called *jnātrjñeya-bhāva* relation. Hence it is taken as an example of *savikalpaka* cognition which is otherwise called a relational cognition. [*Tacca pratyakṣam dvididham savikalpaka-nirvikalpakabhedāt. Tatra savikalpakam vaiśistyaṅavagāhi jñānam. Yathā-ghatam aham jānāmityādi-jñānam. Vedāntaparibhāṣā*].

Indeterminate or *nirvikalpaka* cognition is that which does not apprehend this relatedness, i.e., a qualified cognition consisting of the qualificand (*viśeṣya*), qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and their relation existing between them. The knowledge arising from the sentences like - 'This is that Devadatta' ('so'yam devadattaḥ;) or 'That art Thou' (*Tattvamasi*) etc. In such case cognition arises through the ignorance of the particular feature. In the first example taken from a secular world 'this' refers to the present, and 'that' refers to the 'past' and these two are contradictory to each other. Hence we cannot say that both the Devadatts are identical. Because 'This Devadatta' may be of fifty years of age and 'That Devadatta' may be of forty years old. Hence both are not same. Similarly, in the second example taken from the Vedic world the term 'Ta' means something past and 'tvam' means something present. These differences have to be ignored before an individual can grasp the essential unity of the individual self and Brahman. Hence in such cases the knowledge is indeterminate [*"Nirvikalpakantu samsargānavagāhi jñānam. Yathā 'soyam devadattaḥ' 'Tattvamasi' ityādivākyaṅanyam jñānam. - Ibid*]

It is completely different the notion of *nirvikalpaka* as admitted by the Naiyāyikas. The *nirvikalpaka*, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is also a qualified cognition without any relation.

The Naiyāyikas have defined the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) as cognition which does not abide in the relation between qualifier and qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyānavagāhi jñānam*). When an object is known as a jar, it is the result of comprehension of the relation between qualifier and qualificand (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyānavagāhi jñānam*).²¹ In the above example an object is known as a jar, because we apprehend the relation (*samsarga*) called *samavāya* or inherence existing in between *ghatatva* (jarness) and *ghaṭa* (a jar) which are qualifier and qualificand

respectively. On the other hand, when an object is known as being ^{not} endowed with name, universal, definition etc, it is an indeterminate awareness. (*nirvikalpakajñāna*). In this case there is an awareness no doubt, but it is very difficult to express in language. The language, universal etc are the bearers of the content of awareness and hence they are called *vikalpas* or substitutes for expression. The inexpressible awareness is called *nirvikalpa* in the Nyāya system.

Though the definition given by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* seems to be same like Nyāya, we should not forget to notice a epistemo-ontological difference between these two systems. Dharmarāja has defined the *nirvikalpa* as - '*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sāmsargānavagāhi jñānam*' - i.e., a cognition not apprehending the relation between a qualifier and a qualificand. In this case the term '*anavagāhi*' does not mean the same as understood by the Naiyayikas. To Nyāya the cognition of a qualifier and a qualificand comes through the path of their relation (*sāmsarga*). If relation is not apprehended, the qualifier and the qualificand is not also apprehended. So far as the Advaita view is concerned, the term '*nirvikalpa*' means a kind of cognition which denies the absolute identity between a qualifier and a qualificand. In this case unlike Nyāya the Advaitins accept the existence of *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣaṇa* and their essential identity (*svarūpagata aikya*), but not absolute identity. Two examples are given - one from the ordinary world and another from vedic statement. In the phenomenal world it is said 'This is that Devadatta' (*soyam devadattaḥ*). In this example 'the Devadatta' is a qualificand (*viśeṣya*) 'that Devadatta' is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and their essential identity. What is denied here is the absolute identity between two Devadatta referred to by the terms 'that' and 'this'. In the same way, the Mahāvākya : '*Tattvamasi*' (Thou art that) can be interpreted. This is also indeterminate to the Advaitins, because, 'this' stands for individual self (*jīvātmanā*) limited by body and 'that' refers to the Supreme Soul (*paramātmanā*). Though the absolute identity (*abheda*) is denied here, the essential identity that they are conscious is accepted between them. Due to the denial of a relation called absolute identity between them it is a case of indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) which is completely different from that of the Naiyayikas.²²

When perception occurs at the very first moment, we do not have the knowledge of an object characterised by any predicate or feature like 'This is a pot' or 'This is blue' etc. In this moment or primary moment the

perception has to be taken as indeterminate or *nirvikalpaka*. When the elements apprehended without being endowed with relation and afterwards they are related in the form of a sentence (like 'This is a pot' etc), we have a perceptual cognition of *savikalpaka* or determinate type. The existence of something in an indeterminate state (*nirvikalpaka*) is not directly perceived, but it can be logically proved, because without the acceptance of it no cognition of *savikalpaka* type is accepted. When we gather the determinate perceptual cognition of something, we can know something as a pot. When we know something as a pot, it is implied that we ascribe the attribute or universal potness on the indeterminately presented object. In other words, the relation between a qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and a qualifier (*viśeṣana*) cannot be apprehended if the non-relational entities are not presented to us. It may be assumed reasonably that before knowing a pot as such which is called determinate cognition there must be a cognition of indeterminate type (*nirvikalpaka*) between pot and potness without any relation.²³

The above-mentioned decision of the Naiyayikas is vehemently criticised by the Grammarians. According to them, there cannot be a cognition which is not expressed in language. Hence an entity which cannot be expressed through language does not exist at all. 'Something exists' means 'something expressed through language'. To them no cognition called *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate is possible.

This view is refuted by the Mimāṃsakas and the theory of *nirvikalpaka* is substantiated. Kumārila, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mimāṃsakas, is of the opinion that some primary indeterminate cognition of the pure object must exist. It is described as cognition like that of children or the dumb. At this stage the individuality or particularity and the generality of the same is perceived for the time being. The particular which is the locus of them is known alone at this time.²⁴ This path of Kumārila is followed by Pārthasārathi Mishra, the author of *Sāstrādīpikā*. He also said that an object of the *nirvikalpaka* stage is indefinite (*mugdha*) and multiform (*anekākāra*). It becomes definite having only one form at the *savikalpaka* stage.²⁵

The Buddhists in general and Dharmakīrti in particular admit the existence of indeterminate perception which is free from the mental constructions and non-erroneous (*kalpanāpodham abhāntam pratyakṣam* - *Nyāyabindu*, Perception chapter). They have given emphasis on the *nirvikalpaka* so much that it is the only form of *pratyakṣa* to them. When these perceptual entities are vitiated by the mental constructions (*kalpanā*)

like language, universal etc, they lose their perceptual characters that are called *svalakṣaṇas* i.e., unique particulars).

The Mīmāṃsakas think that in the stage of *nirvikalpaka* an object cannot be known as something unique (*svalakṣaṇa*). If it is not known in this way, it will be known as a particular which can not be known as indeterminate. The immediate knowledge of this kind will be known as determinate, but not indeterminate.

According to the Naiyayikas, the truth of an indeterminate cognition is beyond the determination. The object in the *nirvikalpa*-stage is neither true nor false. That is, the assignment of truth-value is not possible to the indeterminate cognition, which leads us to various philosophical problems. First, if the truth and falsity cannot be assigned to the indeterminate cognition, how can it be treated as a form of perception? If it is beyond the truth and falsity, it cannot be said that it comes within our awareness.

The Buddhists particularly Dharmakīrti and others have accepted the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (indeterminate perception) as the real form of perception. An unique object (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is free from mental constructions (*kalpanā*) and non-erroneous (*abhrānta*) is called perception (*'kalpanāpodham abhrāntam pratyakṣam ' Nyāyabindu*). In the succeeding moments when some mental constructions like name, universal etc are imposed on the uniquely singular object (*svalakṣaṇa*), it becomes *savikalpaka* or determinate which comes under the category of inference or *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (as opposed to *svalakṣaṇa*) which has got a second order reality (*samvṛtīsatya*) according to the Buddhists. This is called *samvṛtīsatya* or concealed reality because at this stage the mental constructions (*kalpanā*) cover the face of the Absolute Reality (*paramārthasatyā*).²⁸

As told earlier Bhartrhari has established a theory which is completely opposite to the view of the Buddhists. The Buddhists believe that an object loses its fundamental character when it is expressed through language. In other words, the language distorts the essential nature of an object. The real fire has got the equal efficacy, as with the help of it one's purpose of cooking etc is served. But the word 'fire' cannot do the job and hence linguistic usage has nothing to do with reality. On the other hand, Bhartrhari, a philosopher belonging to the Grammarian school, believes that nothing can be expressed without the help of language. No cognition is possible without the help of language, which ultimately leads to the conclusion that there is not a single awareness of human being which is routed through

language. Any type of cognition is revealed through the medium of language ("Na so'sti pratyayo loke yah śabdānugamadṛte/Anuviddham iva jñānam sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsatē//"*Vākya-pāṇini* 1-124. Banaras Sanskrit Series). From this statement we may draw our conclusion that cognition is always *śabdānuviddha* (expressed through language). If some unreal entity is referred to, it is also through the language. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that if some unreal entity is referred to, it is also through the language. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that if some unreal entity is expressed in language, it is non-sensical in the sense that the unreal entity is an absurd entity capable of not being expressed through language. If it is said that the sky-flower or barren woman's son is absent (*khapuṣpaṁ nāsti, vandhyāputronāsti*), these are described as negations, the absentees of which are absurd entities (*alīkapratīyogikābhāva*). To Nyāya we can take the absence of that object whose absence is felt. In fact, we do not feel the absence of sky-flower or barren woman's son, because the absentees or *pratīyogins* like sky-flower, barren woman's son etc are unreal entities. In the Nyāya-categorial scheme there is no room for the absurd entities, because absurd entities are not at all entities or categories. In other words, such entities cannot be enumerated as a category or *padārtha*. An object may be taken as a *padārtha* if it is any one of the seven categories like *dravya* (substance, *guṇa* (attribute) etc. As the sky flower etc are non-existent entities, they cannot be put in the list of the categories. Hence it is *apadārtha* whose absence can never be felt. To Bhartrhari, these words have definite meaning as they generate specific cognitions in mind of human beings. People are always using such language in their day to day life to express something denoted through these. Hence they have some denotative power.

Jīvasākṣī & Īśvarasākṣī

To the Advaitins the perceptual cognition is of two types : *Jīvasākṣī* *Īśvarasākṣī*. *Jīva* means an individual being limited by inner organ (*antahkaraṇa*) [*antahkaraṇāvacchinnam caitanyam jīvaḥ*]. *Jīvasākṣī* means an individual where the same *antahkaraṇa* (inner organ) acts as limiting adjunct or *upādhi* (*antahkaraṇopahitam caitanyam jīvasākṣī*). In the same way, when *avidyā* or *māyā* becomes an adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the consciousness, it is called *Īśvaraḥ* (*māyāvacchinnam caitanyam paramēśvaraḥ*). The same *māyā* or *avidyā* sometimes acts as limiting adjunct or *upādhi* of the Consciousness. Under such a situation it is called

Īśvarasākṣī (māyopahitam caitanyam Īśvarasākṣi).

If the above text is analysed, we may see that an individual is called *jīva* and *jīvasākṣī* as per the position of inner organ (*antaḥkarana*). In the same way a consciousness is called *Īśvara* and *Īśvarasākṣī* as per the real position of *Māyā* or *avidyā*. If *antaḥkarana* or *māyā* attains the place of *viśeṣana* or adjective, it is called *jīva* and *Īśvara* respectively. On the other hand, if *antaḥkarana* or *māyā* takes the place of *Upādhi* or limiting adjunct, it is said *jīvasākṣī* and *Īśvarasākṣī* respectively. Now we may turn our attention to the distinction between *Viśeṣana* and *Upādhi* from which the distinction between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, *Jīvasākṣī* and *Īśvarasākṣī* depends. For understanding we should know the proper distinction between *Upādhi* and *Viśeṣana*.

Īśvarasākṣī (witness in God) is one in number, as the *Māyā*, the limiting adjunct of the Consciousness, is one in number. It may be argued that if *Māyā* is one in number, how is the usage of the plural number added to the term '*māyā*' (i.e. *māyābhiḥ*) in the following Śruti text: '*Indro māyābhiḥ purūrūpiyate*?' (i.e. Indra had taken diverse forms due to the cosmic illusions). In reply it may be said that the plural number attached to the term '*māyā*' (*māyābhiḥ*) can be justified because the plural number suggests the diverse power of *Māyā* which is originated from the three constituents in *Māyā* like *sattva*, *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*. Actually the singularity of *Māyā* is evidenced through the usage - '*Māyāntu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt māyinaṃ tu Maheśvaraṃ*' (i.e. one should know *Māyā* as *Prakṛti* and the God possessing *Māyā* as *Parameśvara*).

The Consciousness which is associated with *māyā* as a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) is called *Īśvarasākṣī* which is of infinite due to the infinity of its limiting adjunct (*māyā*). God (*parameśvara*), though one in number, is known as *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* and *Maheśvara*, due to the diverse constituents like *sattva*, *rajaḥ* etc. of *Māyā*, the limiting adjuncts of Him. In the position of the text *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* dealing with the nature and function of perception a distinction is proposed by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in terms of *upādhi* i.e. limiting adjunct and *viśeṣana* i.e. qualifying attribute (*viśeṣana*) being present (*vartamāna*) and being a distinguisher (*vyāvartaka*) is related to the predicate (*kāryānvayī*) while a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) being present (*vartamāna*) and being a distinguisher (*vyāvartaka*) remains unrelated to the predicate (*kāryānanvayī*).²⁷ These two are illustrated as follows: '*rūpaviśiṣṭo ghaṭo 'nityaḥ*' i.e. the coloured jar is transitory and '*kaśāśaṣṭakūlyavacchinnam nabhaḥ śrotram*' i.e. the ether enclosed by

auditory passage is called hearing organ. The former statement is designated as *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifying attribute) while the latter as *upādhi* (limiting adjunct).

What is to be understood by the term '*kāryānvayī*' (related to the predicate)? In reply it is said in the *Śikhāmani* that it must be related to something with which the limited object (*avacchedya*) is related. In the example '*rūpaviśiṣṭo ghaṭo 'nityah*' (ie, the coloured jar is transitory), the limiter is '*rūpa*' i.e. colour and '*ghaṭa*' i.e. jar is the object (*avacchedya*). So between them there is the relation called *avacchedyāvacchedaka-bhāva sambandha* (limited-limiter-relationship). The import of the term '*kāryānvayī*' i.e. related to the predicate is explained in the *Śikhāmani* in the following manner. Relation of something i.e., *rūpa* or colour in the present case is to be admitted with something i.e., *anityatā* i.e. *transitoriness* in the present context with which the object limited (*avacchedya*) i.e. *ghaṭa* or jar in the present case is connected. Hence a term may be taken as qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) if it performs the function of differentiating after being related to the predicate (*kārya*) in the above mentioned sense (*vyāvartakam kāryānvayitve sā viśeṣaṇam paryavasati*).²⁸ In the example, *ghatapaṭau paśyati devadattah*, i.e., Devadatta sees a jar and a cloth, both the jar and cloth are related to the single verb 'seeing'. In spite of this these two cannot be ascribed as qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) on account of the fact that they have no capability of being distinguisher (*avyāvartakatvāt*).²⁹ In the same way, the terms *vartamāna* (present) and *vyāvartaka* (distinguisher) should be explained as 'a distinguisher being present' (*vartamānatve sati vyāvartakam*). The distinguisher is related to something with which the distinguished object (*vyāvarttya*) is related. In the present example the term '*rūpa*' (colour) being a distinguisher is related to the transitoriness (*anityatā*) with which the jar i.e. the object distinguished (*vyāvarttya*) is related.³⁰

In the case of *upādhi* something which acts as a distinguisher being present is not related to something with which the limited or distinguished is related. In the example - *karnaśaṣkyulyavacchinnam nabhaḥ śrotram* i.e. the hearing organ is the space limited by auditory passage, the auditory passage (*karnaśaṣkūlī*) being present becomes a distinguisher and is not related to that with which the distinguished object (*vyāvarttya*) i.e., *nabhaḥ* or space is related i.e., the hearing organ (*śrotra*).³¹

A good deal of further philosophical analysis is possible about the Vedantic distinction of *viśeṣaṇa* from *upādhi*. It is customary to distinguish definitions in the form of identity statements as stating defining features and

accidental features. The issue at our hand is how does the predicate stand in relation to the definiendum. In the case of our example of the coloured jar being declared as transitory, we should care to note that the property of *anityatva* (transitoriness) comprehends both colouredness as well as jariness. That is, the scope of the predicate extends well over the colour of the jar and the jar itself, since the jar is the locus (*adhikarana*) of the property of being coloured. How can the property be non-transitory when the locus of the property is transitory? Again, one might think away such other properties of the jar as its shape, size, weight, its material cause etc but one could explain the fact that the jar is an artefact produced in time, and hence it is *anitya* or transitory. Therefore, the predicate concerned is a defining feature of the jar.

On the other hand, to say that the ether in the auditory passage is the organ of hearing, is not to assert that either the auditory passage or the ether as such is the organ of hearing. The conjunction that something x which is qualified as being the ether in the auditory passage is the organ of hearing. There is a lack of analytic connection between something being the organ of hearing, and its being either ether or the auditory passage. It is well known that conjunction is a contingent truth-function and hence the properties of *nabhatva* (being an ether) and *karnaśaṣkuli* (auditory passage) are accidental features of the organ of hearing. It is conceivable that in a model of the ear there may be cochlea (*karnaśaṣkuli*) and ether therein, and yet it would be improper to call it the organ of hearing. Hence the absence of analyticity renders the *upādhi* - statement as non-analytic or contingent or synthetic. The qualifiers are accidental features of the organ of hearing.

Upādhi can be explained with help of some other examples. *Upādhi* is that which is capable of imposing its own attributes to the nearest object. As for example, jewel which is transparent in nature seems to be red due to the proximity of a red flower. Hence the red flower is a *upādhi* as it imposes redness on the transparent jewel. The definition of *upādhi* can easily be applied to the following case which can be verbalised as '*jabākusumasannihitah sphatikah raktah*' i.e., the jewel associated with a china rose is red. In this case the adjunct '*jabākusumasannihitah*' i.e., association with a china rose' is to be taken as *upādhi*, but not qualifying attribute as it is related to the predicate - 'red'. Because redness is ascribed to jewel associated with the china rose, but not isolately with jewel or with the property of association with the china rose. In the same way, it can be said that Self is allpervading and stationary, but our body is limited and capable of being

moved. Due to the connection of body an individual can use the language. 'I am six feet long and moving as per my desire'. In this case the Self limited by body is the *upādhi* of Self. It can also be expressed in the following manner : '*Dehāvacchinno'ham gacchāmi* i.e., 'I (Self limited by body is going) is a *upādhi* or limiting adjunct but not *viśeṣaṇa* i.e, qualifying attribute as per the definition cited. The period of time limited by the movement of the planets like the Sun etc. is called hour, night, day, week, month, year etc. (*grahatārādiparicchinnah kālah yāmāhorātramāsādayah*).³² In the same way, the direction (*dik*) limited by the rise and set of the Sun is called east, west etc.

On account of this the Naiyayikas have accepted such limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) as an indicator (*paricāyaka*).³³

In the case of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) *upādhi* is accepted as of slightly different way by the Naiyayikas. That which, being a pervader of the probandum, becomes non-pervader of the probans is called *upādhi*. In the case of inferential argument - '*Parvato dhūmavan vahneh*' (The mountain is smoke-possesing due to having fire), the conjunction of wetfuel (*adhrendhanasamyoga*) is the *upādhi*. For wherever there is smoke, there is the conjunction of wetfuel. But it is not pervaded by fire as in the case of red hot ironball.³⁴ If this *upādhi* is unknown, it will function by way of providing completely opposite cognition as we find in the case of red flower and transparent jewel. The reflectors like mirror etc are *upādhis* as they provide us an opposite cognition ie, we see our left hand as right and right as left. In the same way, if the nature of the conjunction of wetfuel is not known as *upādhi*, the invariable relation (*vyāpti*) between fire and smoke from the cognition - 'Fire is pervaded by smoke' may be imposed. If this conjunction of wetfuel is known as *upādhi* as per the above-mentioned characteristics, it ceases the power of imposing the said pervader-pervaded - relationship. That is why, *Vyāpti* is defined as a relation free from *upādhi* by a section of philosophers.

In another way, *Upādhi* or limiting adjunct can be understood. The limiting adjunct experienced in our life is called constitutive while the main entity which is free from limiting adjuncts (*niravacchinna* or *nirupādhika*) is called regulative. In the Dialectic part of the *Critique of the Pure Reason* Kant institutes a distinction between regulative and constitutive ideas in the context of cosmological ideas. By 'ideas' Kant means the set of *a priori* ideas such that are derived from Reason, the highest human faculty. One

feature of these ideas is that there can never be intuitions or facts corresponding to them. But they do regulate the ways in which certain other ideas are to be used. Freedom, Ought, Immortality of the soul, God, etc are regulative notions. The constitutive ideas always have institutions corresponding to them, and together they render knowledge possible. The *apriori* categories of the understanding are constitutive notions. They are *apriori* but intentional, and it is with their help that we can organise the world as and when we come to know it. The result of the application of constitutive ideas is variability. But the application of regulative ideas are never verifiable, but they cannot be dispensed with. They are inalienable presuppositions of human state of affairs. They are *intellectual concepts* as distinguished from regulative notions. The limiting adjuncts like *ghatākāśa* (Space limited by a jar), month, week, day, night. Consciousness limited by an object (*viśayāvacchinnacaitanya*) etc are constitutive in the sense that they have intuitions corresponding to them while the absolute entities like Time (*kāla*), Space (*ākāśa*), Consciousness (*caitanya*) etc that are free from limiting adjuncts (*nirupādhika*) are accepted as regulative on account of the fact that they are ontologically accepted but not verifiable through experience or there we do not find intuitions or facts corresponding to them. That is why, *upādhi* is called an introducer (*paricāyaka*) by the Naiyayikas.

References

1. *Īsopaniṣad*, Mantra no.1

2. "Siddhānte pratyakṣatvaprayojakam kimiticet - kim jñānagatasya pratyakṣatvasya prayojakam pṛcchasi kimvā viṣayagatasya? Ādye pramānacaitanyaviṣayāvachinnacaitanyābheda iti brumah."

Vedāntapari . . . (Pratyakṣapariccheda).

3. Tathā hi trividham caitanyam. Viṣayacaitanyam pramānacaitanyam pramātrcaitanyam ceti. Tatra ghaṭādyavachinnacaitanyam. Antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavachinnacaitanyam pramānacaitanyam. Antaḥkaraṇavachinnam caitanyam pramātrcaitanyam."

Ibid.

4. "Tatra yathā tadāgodakam chidrānnirgatya kutyātmanā kedarān praviśya tadvadeva catuskoṇādyākāram bhavati. Tathā taijasamantaḥkaraṇamapi cakṣurādi-dvārā nirgatya ghaṭādiviṣaya-deśam gatvā ghaṭādiviṣayākāreṇa parinamate. Sa eva parināmo vṛttrityucyate."

Ibid

5. "Nanu niravayavasyāntaḥkaraṇasya pariṇāmātmikā vṛtṭiḥ katham ? Ittham Na tāvadantaḥkaraṇam niravayavam sādīdravyatvena sāvayavatvāt."

Ibid.

6. Sukhādyavachinnacaitanyasya tadvṛttyavachinnacaitanyasya ca niyamenaikadeśasthitopādhidvayāvachinnatvāt niyamena aham sukhi ityādijñānasya pratyakṣam". *Ibid.*

7. "Na, tatra samryamānasukhasyātītatvena smrtirūpāntaḥkaraṇavṛtter vartamānatvena tatropādhyorekadeśasthe ^{bhinnakālikatayā} sati tattadvachinnacaitanyārbhedāt; upādhyorekadeśasthe ^{ve} sati ekakālinatvasyaivopādheyābheda prayojakatvāt. ^{Yjādi} caikadeśasthatvamātram upādheyābheda prayojakam, tadā ' aham pūrvam sukhi' ityādismrtāvativyāptivāraṇāya vartamānatvam viṣayaviśeṣanam", *Ibid.* api svakiyadhāramādharmāu vartamānau yadāśabdādīnā jñāyate tadā tādrśāśabdajñānādāvativyāptiḥ, tatra dharmādyavachinnacaitanya-^{tanya-} tadvṛttyavachinnacaitanyayorekatvāditi cet na, yogyatvasyāpi

viṣayaviśeṣanatvāt - *Ibid.*

9. "Na caivam api sukhasya vartamānadaśāyām, tvam sukhi ityādivākyajanyajñānasya pratyakṣata syāditi vācyam, iṣṭatvāt. 'Daśamastavamasī' ityādaṁ sannikṛṣṭaviśaye śabdādapyaparokṣajñānābhyupagamāt". *Ibid.*

10. Ataeva 'parvato vahniman ityādijñānamapi vahnyamśe parokṣam, parvatamśeparokṣam parvatādyavacchinnacaitanyasya vahirniḥṣṭāhkarānavṛtṭyavachinnacaitanyābhedaḥ; vahnyamśe tu antaḥkaraṇavṛtṭir nirgamanābhāvena vahnyavacchinnacaitanyasya pramānacaitanyasya ca parasparam bhedaḥ. Tathā cānubhavaḥ parvatam paśyāmi' 'vahnimanuminomi' iti. *Ibid.*

11. Asannikṛṣṭapakṣakānumitau tu sarvāmśe pi jñānam parokṣam, surabhi candanam ityādijñānamapi candanakhandaśe parokṣam, saurabhāmśe ca parokṣam, saurbhasya cakṣurindriyayogyatayā yogyatvaghāṭitasya niruktalakṣanasyābhāvāt." *Ibid.*

12. Ghaṭāderviśayasya pratyakṣantu pramātrabhinnatvam. Nanu katham ghaṭāderantaḥ-karaṇā-vacchinnacaitanyābhedaḥ, 'ahamidam paśyāmi' iti bhedaṁnubhavavirodhāditi cet, ucyate - *Ibid.*

13. Yadunath Sinha : *Indian Epistemology of perception*, pp. 189-191, Sinha Publishing, 1969.

14. "Tasmād yeṣu vyāvarttyamāneṣu yadanuvarttate tattebhyo bhinnam yathā kusumbhyah sūtram tathā ca bālādisāreṣu vyāvarttyamāneṣvapi parasparamahamkāraspadamanu vartamānam tebhyo bhidyate." *Bhāmātī* on Adhyāsabhāṣya.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Deussen : *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 146-147, & 150.

17. "Yuṣmadasmatpratyayagocarayoḥ viśayaviśayinoḥ prakāśa viruddhasvabhāvayoḥ itaretarābhāvānupattau siddhāyām taddharmānam

api sūtarām itaretarabhāvanupapattih."

Adhyāsabhāsa of Samkara.

18. *Ibid.*

19. "Idamasmatpratyayagocaryoriti vaktavya yuṣmadgrahanamatyantabhedopalakṣaṇārtham. Yathāhī ahamkārapratiyogī tvamkāro ... ete bayamime bayamaśamahe iti bahūṣam prayogadarśanāditi."

Bhāmāti on *Adhyāsabhāsa*.

20. 'Tāvāt ayaṁ ekāntena aṣayaḥ asmatpratyayaviśayatvāt aparokṣatvāt ca pratyagātmaprasiddhah na ca ayaṁ niyamah pūrovasthite eva viśaye viśayāntaram adhyāsitavyaṁ iti.

Adhyāsabhāsa of Samkara.

21. *Tarkasamgraha* with *Dipikā*, Pratyakṣa-portion.

22. "Yathā so'yaṁ devadattastattvamasītyādivākyajanyaṁ jñānam ... Tathā ca so'yaṁ devadatta iti vākyajanyaññānasya sannikṛṣṭaviśayatayā vahirniḥsrāntaḥkaraṇavṛttyabhyupagamena devadattāvacchinnacaitanyasya vṛttyavacchinnacaitanyābhedaṇa so'yaṁ devadatta iti vākyajanyaññānasya pratyakṣatvam. Evaṁ tattvamsītyādi-vākyajanyaññānasyāpitra pramātureva viśayatayā tadubhāyābhedasya sattvāt."

Vedāntaparibhāsa (Pratyakṣa-Pariccheda).

23. D.M.Datta : *The six ways of knowing*, p. 93, Calcutta University,

24. *Ślokavārtika*, Pratyakṣasūtra, kārikā, no. 112.

25. *Sāstradīpikā*, p. 41, Tarkapāda, Nirnay Sagar, 1915.

26. Raghunath Ghosh : *Relation as Real : A Critique of Dharmakīrti*, Satgura, 2001, p. 109.

27. Viśeṣaṇam ca kāryānvayi vyāvartakam vartamānam. Upādhiśca kāryānvayi vyāvartako vartamānaśca. Yathā rūpaviśiṣṭo ghaṭonitya ityatra rūpam viśeṣaṇam. Karnāśaṣkulyavacchinnaṁ nabhaḥ srotamityatra

karnasaskulyupādhih." Dharmarāj Adhvarīndra : *Vedāntaparibhāsā* with Sikhāmani and Maniprabhā. Edited Swami Govinda Singha Sadhu, Bombay, p.89. 1885 (Sakabda). Henceforth, *Vedāntaparibhāsā*.

28. "Viśeṣaṇāñceti. kāryānvayiti, Avacchedyam yadanvayi tadanvayī^{it}arthah. Evamuttarātrāpi kāryapadam vyākhyātam. Tathā ca kāryānvayitve sati vyāvar^{on}takam viśeṣanam paryavasati".

Sikhāmani Vedāntaparibhāsā, Edited by Swami Govinda Singha Sadhu, Bombay, p. 89, 1885, Henceforth - *Sikhāmanj*.

29. "Tena ghatapatau pasyati. devadatta ityatra ghatapatayorekadarsanakriyānvayitve'pi vyāvarttakatvāna paraspara--viśeṣanāvā^pttiriti bhāvah."

Ibid.

30. "Vartamānavyāvarttakatvena = var tamanatve sati vyāvarttakatvena, avacchedyam = vyāvarttyam, yadanvayī = tena sahānvayī, tadanvayī = tena sahānvayī, uttarātrāpi = vaksyamānopādhilaksane'pi kāryānvayitve sati = avacchedyam yadanvayī tadanvayitve sati vidheyānvayitye satiti yāvat.

Maniprabhā on Sikhāmani on Vedāntaparibhāsā, Edited by Swami Govinda Singha Sadhu, Bombay, p. 89, 1885. Henceforth - *Maniprabha*.

31. "Evam uttarātrāpi kāryapadam vyākhyātam
Sikhāmani, p. 90.

Uttarātrāpi = vaksyamānopādhilaksane'pi"

Maniprabhā on Ibid.

32. "Kramākramādipratyayah... grahanaksatrādiparispandanivandhanāh, sa eva grahatārādiparispandah kāla ityucyate, tatkrta evāyam yāmahorā - tramāsādivyavahārāh." Jayanta Bhatta : *Nyāyamañjarī*, Edited by Sūryanārāyana Śuklā, chowkhamba, 1971, p. 124.

33. "Ayamevopādhih naiyāyikaih paricāyaka ityucyate"

Vedāntaparibhāsā, p. 89.

34. "Sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvamupād̄dhih... (yathā) parvato dhūmavān vahneh ityatra ādrendhanasāmyoga upād̄dhih, Yatra dhūmah tatrādrendhanasāmyoga iti sādhyavyāpakatā . Yatra vahnih tatādrendhanasāmyogā nāsti, ayogolaka ādrendhanasāmyogābhāvāt. Evam Sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvādādrendhanasāmyoga upād̄dhih"

Tarkasamgraha with seven commentaries. Edited by Satkari Sarma bangiya, Chowkhamba, 1976, p. 61.