

CHAPTER II

THE ADVAITA CONCEPTS OF PRAMĀ AND PRAMĀNA

Of all the systems of Philosophy Pūrva^{Others}mīmāṃsā and Vedānta follow the Vedas, as closely as possible, the latter relying on Śruti confirmed by reason and realisation. But there is a difference between these two systems. Pūrva^{Others}mīmāṃsā is a staunch believer in the ceremonial portion or ritualistic portion of the Vedas which is called *karmakāṇḍa*, while the Advaita Vedānta lays the emphasis, and justly so, on the philosophical portion called *Jñānakāṇḍa* consisting of the Upanishads. Another point of difference between two systems that the Advaita Vedānta believes in the Vedas originated from God while the Mīmāṃsā holds that they are eternal and do not depend on any agent. The essential identity with Brahman, the unreality of the world etc have been discussed in the Advaita Vedānta. The means of attaining liberation like hearing, reflection and meditation by the qualified aspirants have been clearly shown. Incidentally, the place of worship (*upāsana*) and rites, as preparing the ground for the higher form of practice, has been indicated. There is no difficulty in harmonising these apparently conflicting standpoints, if it is considered that the scriptures provide different ways of approach to the Highest Truth according to the temperament and capacity of the aspirant. As the one and indivisible Brahman appears through the veil of *māyā*, the manifold universe will disappear at the moment a person realises his identity with Brahman, an identity that has never been lost.

In Indian Philosophy four types of human end is accepted. These human pursuits are righteousness (*dharma*), wealth or property (*artha*), object of desire (*kāma*) and liberation (*mokṣa*). Among these, liberation (*mokṣa*) is considered as Supreme human end because it alone is eternal. The eternality of liberation is sanctioned by Śruti texts - '*na sa punarāvartate*' i.e it does not return (*Chandagyopanisad* - viii, xv, 1). On the other hand, the other three that are called *trivarga* are known as transitory by direct means of knowing (*pratyakṣa*) or from the Śruti texts - '*Tadyatheha karmacito lokah kṣiyate, evamevamutra punyacito lokah kṣiyate*' i.e., as in this world the comforts attained through one's labour are exhausted, so in the other world the comforts achieved through one's good actions are exhausted

(*Chandagyopanisad* - viii. 1.6). The transitoriness of wealth (*artha*) and desire (*kāma*) is known through perception. But so far as righteousness (*dharma*) is concerned, it cannot be perceived due to its imperceptible character. Hence, the transitoriness of it is known through the above-mentioned Śruti - texts. When it is said - '*ksīṇe puṇye punaḥ martalokam viśanti*' i.e. an individual again enters the mortal world through the expiry of the result of his good deed, it also suggests the same conclusion that righteousness (*dharma*) is also noneternal in nature.

In order to get rid of this world and worldly suffering it is always advisable to attain the Supreme human pursuit called liberation or *mokṣa*. This attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*) presupposes the knowledge of the external world which has to be transcended. For this reason Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has dealt with the instrument of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). That which is the means of valid cognition is called *Pramāṇa*. The concept of *pramāṇa* would become inconceivable if the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) is not properly understood. That is why, the definition of *Pramā* i.e. valid cognition is put forth by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra at the outset of his epistemological work - *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.¹

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has provided two definitions of valid cognition (*Pramā*) after keeping the long-drawn controversy among the philosophers of different schools of Indian Philosophy regarding the validity of memory (*smṛti*) in view. He has not expressed his own opinion regarding this controversial issue. He simply gives two definitions of valid cognition (*pramā*) : one excluding memory (*smṛtivyāvṛttajm*) and another including memory (*smṛtisādhāraṇa*).

It would not be uncalled for here to say a few lines on the arguments in favour of the invalidity of memory before going to discuss the Advaita concept of *pramā*. Generally memory (*smṛti*) is defined as '*samskāramātrajanayam jñānam*' (the cognition arising out of the impression alone). The element of impression (*samskāra*) is inevitable for each and every manifestation of knowledge, but all are not memory. Most of the cases are recognitive. When a jar is known as such, it is known through the light of past experience which generated an impression in our mind. Hence, *Pratyabhijñā* (recognitive cognition) is *Samskārajanyam jñāna* (i.e. cognition generated through impression).

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has dealt at length on the definitions of valid cognition (*pramā*). He was completely aware of

the controversies on the status of recollective cognition or memory or *smṛti* in the realm of cognition. The Indian thinkers differ regarding its validity. Most of the Indian thinkers do not want to give a status of valid cognition to memory on account of the fact that in case of memory there is the chance of mistake. It has already been said that the memory is always generated by impression 'alone' (*saṃskāramātrajanya*). In *Tarkasamgraha* the term '*mātra*' has been explained as 'generated by impression not being caused by something other than the impression' (*saṃskāretarājanyatve sati saṃskārajanyatvam*)². It is true that impression serves the function of recognising an object. When we recognise a jar as such, it is known through the impression of the earlier experience of a jar. No determinate cognition (*savikalpakajñāna*) is possible without the help of earlier impression (*saṃskāra*). Hence, this type of cognition is recognitive cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) which is completely different from memory. Though some of the later thinkers have given thought in favour of the validity of memory, Dharmarāja did not want to enter into the complications initially. Hence, he did not provide any opinion of his own regarding the validity of memory. He had started his philosophical discussion on the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) in a very integrated way. He respectfully mentioned both the definitions after 'honouring the views of both the philosophers who accept or do not accept memory as a valid cognition. In this connection he did not pass his own judgement.

The first definition which excludes memory from the purview of the valid cognition runs as follows : '*pramātvamanadhi-gatāvādhitarthaviśayakajñānatvam*'. that is, a valid cognition is a cognition having some object as its content which is unacquired (*anadhigata*) and uncontradicted (*avādhita*)³. It is said that each and every valid cognition is primarily a cognition. But this cognition must have an object as its content (*arthaviśayaka*). It may be argued that if there is a cognition, it must be a cognition of something. In other words, 'cognition' means 'cognition of'. Generally there cannot be a cognition without any content (*aviśayaka*). If it is so, the term '*arthaviśayaka*' incorporated in the definition is superfluous. In response to this problem Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra is of the opinion that, so far as the Advaita Vedānta is concerned, cognition is of two types - having some content (*saviśayaka*) and having no content (*aviśayaka*). As Brahman is knowledge, Bliss and Infinitude (*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*), Brahman is equivalent to knowledge etc. Hence, it is knowledge, but having

no content. Because this is not 'the knowledge of Brahman', but Brahman itself is knowledge. That which is in the form of knowledge is the embodiment of knowledge which has no content. Apart from this there is another type of cognition which apprehends the objects existing in the mundane world. Hence, such cognition is not a bare cognition but 'cognition of something'. When we have a cognition of a jar etc, it is *saviṣayaka* or having a content like jar etc. The definition of valid cognition under consideration covers the cognition of the objects existing in the empirical world. The transcendental cognition does not come under the purview of this definition. In order to prove this or in order to exclude such knowledge from the purview of *pramā* the term '*arthaviṣayaka*' is included in the definition. Because it is the definition of valid cognition of the objects that are available in the empirical world.⁴

Now the question may arise as to the significance of the term '*anadhigata*' i.e. unacquired as an adjunct of the object. In fact, this term has been used only to exclude memory from the purview of valid cognition. The unacquired object is that which is novel or new, but not the repetition of the earlier cognition which is already acquired (*adhigata*).

If this is accepted, there would arise the problem of recognition of the earlier object as having such and such characteristics. In the case of determinate cognition (*savikalpakajñāna*) we can recognise an object as such through the light of the past impression gathered from the experience. Moreover, when we keep looking towards an object for a period of time, it is called persistent cognition (*dhārāvīhikajñāna*). If the adjunct '*anadhigata*' is kept in fact, such type of cognition would not come under the jurisdiction of valid cognition (*pramā*). If it is not taken as valid cognition, how can our day to day behaviour be explained? Because, determinate cognition is inevitable for our daily behaviour and persistent cognition is also a common phenomenon in our practical life. Hence, it is very difficult to our common sense to believe that these cognitions are not valid or these are illusory.

In response to the above mentioned problem, Dharmarāja offers a suggestion. To him the term '*anadhigata*' (unacquired) does not create any problem of the above mentioned type. To him each and every piece of cognition is new due to having difference of spatio-temporal factors. When we keep looking towards an object for a few moments, it is new in each and every moment, because a moment becomes a qualifier or differentiating factor from others. When a jar is cognised at the first moment, it is not repeated in the second, because the second moment is the adjunct which differentiates

it from the first one. In the same way, the object seen in the third moment is differentiated from the earlier ones due to having this particular span of time i.e. third moment. In this way, each and every cognition belonging to a persistent knowledge is to be taken as 'new', "novel" or unacquired (*anadhigata*).⁵

There is another significant term *avādhita* (uncontradicted) in the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) given by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra. It is said that any knowledge which is contradicted by the subsequent knowledge is called *vādhita*. The cognition of an object which is not contradicted is called *avādhita*. When a snake is known as such, it is called *avādhita*. When the same snake is known in the place of rope, it is called *vādhita*. The valid cognition should have an object as its content which must be uncontradicted. It may otherwise be explained as follows. When a snake is known as such, it is uncontradicted which is explained by the Naiyāyikas as a *tadvati tatprakāraṁ jñānam* i.e., the piece of cognition where something remains, a qualifier in an object in which that something really exists. That is, when an object called 'X' is known to be X when there is really the object 'X'. In the same way, it can be said that a cognition having snakesness as a qualifier in an object where there really a snake is (*sarpavavati sarpatvaprakāraṁ jñānam*). If, on the other hand, there is the knowledge of a snake in a piece of rope where there is no snake at all (*sarpavāvabhāvavati sarpatvaprakāraṁ jñānam*), it is called contradicted cognition or false cognition (*apramā*).

In order to distinguish a valid cognition from the invalid one, the term *avādhita* is incorporated as an adjunct of object.

It may be argued that the whole world becomes contradicted to an individual who realises the self. The whole world is nothing but the manifestation of Brahman or self as evidenced in the *Śruti*: '*sarvam khalvidam Brahma*' '*Tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti*'. When an individual realises this, he becomes identical with Self. Hence, each and every object loses its individual identity and seems to be manifestation of Self. It is said in the initial *mantra* of the *Īsopaniṣad* that the whole world is covered by Consciousness. In other words, whatever found in the phenomenal world is nothing but the manifestation of the Self (*Īśāvāsyamidam sarvam yat kiñca jagatyām jagat*).

As ontologically there is no duality, one feels one's existence in every object of the world. Hence, there cannot be any exploitation of others and

one should not feel greedy towards others' properties. There is a state when there is enjoyment through renunciation ("*tena tyaktena bhujñithā mā grdhah kasyasviddhanam*" (1st mantra of *Isōpaniṣad*)).

If this situation prevails, no object is known as having individual characteristic but as the manifestation of Brahman or Self. When a jar etc are known as ^{such} self (but not as a ^{self} jar etc), they are contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman. Hence no cognition is possible which remains uncontradicted (*avādhita*). Why is the term incorporated in the definition? In reply Dharmarāja has argued that in the transcendental stage all cognitions are contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman. Hence, the phenomenon of 'uncontradiction' is not available at all. In order to remove such problem Dharmarāja has opined that the incorporation of the term *avādhita* suggests that such cognition is limited to the phenomenal world (*vyavahārikajagat*) but not to the transcendental world. The question of object of knowledge comes if there is duality or subject-object-relationship. This duality remains under the purview of the phenomenal world.⁶



The term '*anadhigata*' means 'unacquired' or 'novel'. Actually the term has been incorporated in order to exclude memory-cognition from the purview of the valid cognition, which is indicated by the term *smṛtivyāvṛtta*.⁷ Though Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra did not pass any judgement of his own regarding the tenability of the memory as a valid cognition, it is assumed that he was in favour of not accepting memory as a valid cognition. This assumption is grounded on his mention of the above-mentioned definition and its substantiation through some arguments. The term '*anadhigata*' means 'that which is not acquired earlier'. That which is not acquired earlier is called 'novel'. It must apprehend something new, which was not known before. Recollection is the memory of an object, which was perceived earlier. It does not add any thing new to our knowledge. It is simply reproduction of the previous perception. So it should not be regarded as strictly valid cognition. To them valid cognition acquaints us with something new. In other words, novelty is a characteristic feature of truth. From this the memory-cognition is excluded from the purview of valid cognition, no doubt, but it also excludes the recognitive cognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Memory-cognition is generated through our earlier impression alone (*samskāramātrajanya*) while recognitive cognition is caused by the impression of the past experience

associated with the presence of the object (*samskārajanya* but not *samskāramātrajanya*). If it said that the object of the cognition is *anadhigata* i.e. not known earlier, it excludes both memory and recognitive cognition, because recognitive cognition is not *anadhigata* but acquired earlier. If memory-cognition is accepted as invalid, there is some justification as the content is not verifiable due to the absence of it. Due to its non-verifiability there is every chance of committing mistake or acquiring a mistaken cognition. Hence, there is no guarantee that such cognition (*pratybhijñā*) would be veridical. But so far as recognitive cognition (*pratybhijñā*), is concerned it is not at all invalid, because it can help us to lead our day-to-day behaviour. As the term *anadhigata* is incorporated in the definition, it cannot justify the recognitive cognition, as it is already acquired (*adhigata*) and hence not new.

Keeping the earlier objection in view Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra perhaps has tried to justify the *lokavyavahāra* i.e. day-to-day behaviour in the light of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*), which does not solve the real problem. To him an object known for a period of time is called persistent cognition of the same. When we keep looking at the table, for example, it is not the same object seen for a period of time but it is, different in different moment. The table seen in the first moment is completely different from that seen in the second moment. In the same way, the table in the second moment is different from that occurring in the third. To him it is the temporal factor, which differentiates one from the other. Hence, an object existing in each and every moment is completely new (*anadhigata*), but not repeated what is already acquired (*adhigata*).⁸

This justification cannot really solve the earlier problem of recognitive cognition. If each and every object is temporally different from each other and if it is new, how is an object recognized as identical in other occasion? If it is accepted that each and every object is new or unacquired, it will lead to the non-acceptance of recognition or recognitive cognition, which is accepted as valid in Advaita Vedānta system. In other words, this definition does not cover such recognitive cognition and hence there arises the defect of *avyāpti* here. If it is accepted that, though an object is different in different moment, and hence new, there are some similarities between two pieces of cognition which make the recognition possible, these two pieces of cognition cannot be taken as completely new or novel de to having some old characters in it. When a jar is recognized as a jar in the light of the old one, it may be

said that the new is completely different from the old one as this occupies different time in compare to the old one, which also occupied a different time. When a particular sword used by Tipu Sultan, as for example, is seen by an individual in the museum and accepted as 'This is that sword used by Tipu Sultan', how is the old sword used by Tipu Sultan recognized as such? The sword used by Tipu Sultan and seen by me belongs to different time and hence they should be used as new or novel (*anadhigata*). But if it is so, how is the recognition of the sword used by Tipu Sultan possible? It is a fact that the recognition is possible and this recognition presupposes some sort of identity between them. If identity is there or if some identical features are there, these are not different or new though they belong to different time-span. Rather it would be a happier expression if it is said as acquired or *adhigata*. If the acquiredness of such cognition of sword used by Tipu Sultan is not accepted, the question of its recognition does not arise at all. Hence the term *anadhigata* as an adjunct to the object cannot justify all types of valid cognitions.

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has already described such type of recognitive cognition as indeterminate perceptual cognitions (*nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*). It is paradoxical to the Advaitins that they have accepted unacquired or new cognition as a valid cognition (*pramā*) on the one hand and *nirvikalpaka*-perceptual cognition on the other. The acceptance of one is contradictory to another. The Advaitins have given two examples of such cognition—one from the secular world and another from the Vedic text.⁹ 'This is that Devadatta' (*so'yaṁ devadattah*) is from the secular world which points to the recognitive cognition, as the present Devadatta is identified with the past Devadatta. In other words, there is an identity between the consciousness limited by Devadatta and the consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of Devadatta as our inner organ called *antahkaraṇa* goes out of the body and assumes the form of Devadatta.¹⁰ Though the present Devadatta and past Devadatta are different in terms of time and though they are not completely identical yet there is an essential identity (*svarūpa-gatatādātmya*) between them, which entails that they are not completely unacquired (*anadhigata*). The example cited from the Upaniṣadic text bears the same import. The *Mahāvākya - Tattvamasi* (Thou art That) signifies the essential identity between two - 'Thou' (*tvam*) and 'That' (*taṁ*) i.e., *Brahman* or *Ātman*. Both are taken to be different due to having the specific characters in them. The former has got

an atomic (*anu*) power while the latter is endowed with all-pervasive power (*vibhu*). In spite of this an identity between them is asserted from the standpoint of essence (*svarūpagata*). In this case, there is the identification of the knower referred by the term 'thou' and the object referred to by the term 'That'.¹¹ In this case also the phenomenon of *anadhigatatva* does not exist, leading to the falsity of the *nirvikalpaka*-cognition or recognitive cognition. If such *nirvikalpaka*-cognition is proved as falsified, it would lead to the falsity of the *Mahāvākya* which is suicidal to the Advaitins. For, the import of the *Mahāvākyas* makes a platform to realize the Ultimate Reality. The falsity of the *Mahāvākyas* leads to the falsity of the whole metaphysical presuppositions. Hence, the term *anadhigata* creates confusion in the Advaita Vedānta system of Philosophy and it should be excluded from the definition. Moreover, the sentence '*Tattvamasi*' (Thou art That) is taken as an example of *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* (i.e., a *lakṣaṇā* which partly forsakes and accepts its primary meaning) according to some Advaitins. In this sentence the absolute identity between an individual being (*jīva*) and Brahman is rejected and essential identity between them is accepted. By virtue of being a specific type of *Lakṣaṇā* the sentence provides us a valid cognition though the character of being *anadhigata* is not there.¹² Hence, the exclusion of the term may easily be recommended from this standpoint also.

Dharmarāja Adhvarindra has made an effort to justify the fact of being unacquired by introducing the concept of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*).¹³ To consider a piece of cognition as occupying a moment is an attempt to justify the theory of momentariness as accepted by the Buddhists. The Buddhists are consistent in propagating the theory of momentariness, as they believe in the theories of *svalakṣaṇa*, no-soul or permanent entities like *sāmānya* etc. For the Advaitins such a theory of momentariness is not at all supportable because the Advaitins believe in the existence of permanent Self but not in *svalakṣaṇa* etc. As the Advaitins have accepted a different set of presuppositions, the theory of momentariness does not find its entry in the Advaita framework. When the Advaitins formulate the theories of the perceptuality of cognition of an object (*jñānagatapratyakṣa*) and the perceptuality of object (*visayagatapratyakṣa*), they recommend the amalgamation of different limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) of the Consciousness like *visayacaitanya* (the Consciousness limited by object), *pramāṇacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by mental mode) etc.¹⁴ How can an amalgamated situation be a momentary one? Even if it is

accepted as momentary, how can it be known as perception of a jar or the perception of the cognition of a jar? All these problems remain unresolved if the term '*anadhigata*' is not withdrawn from the definition.

The famous commentary *Sikhāmani* has raised some of these problems. To him the term '*anadhigata*' does not mean that some thing is not caused by impression (*samskāra*), but he would like to suggest that memory-cognition is caused by the impression and there does not arise any question of over coverage to such cognition. Those who believe in the instrumentality of a sign admit that in an inferential cognition *sādhya* is inferred through a sign, which is in the form of impression, and hence a sign seen earlier is recognized elsewhere with the help of impression. From this one can raise a question of the defect of *avyāpti* to all the cases of inferential cognition (*anumitimātre*) and also to the case of recognitive cognition (*pratyabhijñā*). As all entities excepting Brahman are illusory according to the Advaitins, they are caused by the impression of earlier experience and hence the definition of *pramā* cannot be applied there due its lack of novelty (*anadhigata*) in them. In the like manner, any type of illusory cognition does not come under the purview of the valid cognition through the insertion of the term '*anadhigata*' and there arises a contingency of losing the import of the term '*avādhita*' incorporated in the definition. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, however, has tried to give an explanation of the term '*anadhigata*', which also cannot solve the problems raised earlier. The term '*anadhigata*' means something having an object invariably, which is not the property of something existing in the immediate preceding moment. (*Anadhigatatvam ca svavyavahitapūrvakṣanavrttidharmaviśayaviśayatvena niyatatvam*).¹⁵ Let us explain this with the help of an example following the line of *Maniprabhā*. Here the term '*sva*' stands for the cognition of a jar. The property existing in the immediate preceding moment is the cognition of cloth etc., the object of which is the cloth etc. The cognition in the form of a jar is endowed with the substratumness determined by the contentness of a jar, which is different from the cloth etc. (*'svamayam ghata iti jñānam tasmādvavyavahitapūrvakṣanavrttidharmah patah ityādijñānātmako dharmastasya viśayah patādistadbhinnaghataviśayatvanirūpitādhikarānatāvattvamayam ghata iti jñāne iti lakṣanasam anvayah*).¹⁶ There is the cognition of X which is endowed with the substratumness determined by having the contentness of X which is completely different from Y etc. whose property is in the form of cognition of Y etc. remaining in the immediate

preceding moment. In other words, an object is known as having substratumness determined by having the contentness of that particular object which is different from another cognition having an object occurring in the preceding moment. If there is the cognition of X endowed with the substratumness determined by having the contentness of X which is completely identical with the X occurring in the previous preceding moment, it would be taken as *adhigata* (acquired) as opposed to *anadhigata* (unacquired). Even if this interpretation of *anadhigatatva* is taken into account, memory-cognition can be excluded from the purview of *pramā*, but not other types of cognition like recognitive cognition etc. Because, in the case of recognition etc. the same object remains in the preceding moment or earlier than this. On account of this the phenomenon of recognition is possible. The problems raised earlier remain unresolved even the new interpretation of the term *anadhigata* is taken into account. If such definition is accepted for granted, the cognition in the form of Brahman being alone real the cognition of a jar etc becomes illusory and hence there arises the defect of *avyāpti*, which cannot be removed resulting in the lack of usefulness of the term *anadhigata* inserted in the definition. It may be argued that as valid memory-cognition leads us always to the successful inclination (*niyatasamvādipravṛtti*), it comes under the purview of *pramā* (valid cognition) and hence it being a defendum of a valid cognition cannot be said that it leads to the probability of the uselessness of the term *anadhigata*. In response to this it is said that the term serves the purpose of excluding the use of something which is the qualifier of being a valid cognition other than the previously mentioned one i.e. right memory-cognition. Under such circumstances the validity of the capability of successful inclination (*samvādipravṛtityupa-yuktaprāmānyam*) would not be determined as a criterion of valid cognition. In order to indicate this, the adjunct *anadhigata* in the definition is justified. In other words, the fact of successful inclination of cognition presupposes its previous cognition, which is certainly *adhigata* in character. The mention of the term *anadhigata* at least removes the possibility of excluding successful inclination as a criterion of valid cognition.¹⁷ In this connection it may be said that if such case is excluded with use of the term *anadhigata*, what is the utility of another term *avādhita* inserted in the definition ?

In response to this Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has inserted the term *avādhita* as an adjunct of object, which entails that the cognition of an object

existing in the phenomenal world i.e. in the transmigratory state must not be contradicted or sublated by the latter cognition in the phenomenal i.e. in the transmigratory state but not in the transcendental level. It implies ^{the} factual consistency or agreement with given facts, which have an empirical reality. The Advaita Vedānta recognizes the empirical reality of the world, but not its ontological reality. The knowledge of plurality as found in the phenomenal level is contradicted by the intuition of identity of the Absolute. The term *avādhita* can test the truth of an object in the empirical level.¹⁸ The insertion of the term *avādhita* again creates some philosophical confusion in this context. How can an object be adjudged as uncontradicted? If there is cognition in the form: 'It is raining outside', the question may be raised how the truth-value of such sentence can be determined. Definitely we have to look outside whether the incident described in the sentence is true or false, which will go in favour of *parataḥprāmāṇyavāda* not accepted by the Advaitins. As they believe in the *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda* (i.e., the extrinsic validity of truth), the enquiry of the truth of a sentence cannot be experience-independent. If it is said - 'The sentence is either true or false', it can easily be said that the sentence is true without going out of the sentence i.e., intrinsically true. It is stated by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra that the validity is intrinsically known. The meaning of term *svataḥ* is as follows. The collocation of causes, which can reveal the object existing in it, can also reveal its validity if and only if there is the absence of defect.¹⁹ The substratum of it is the knowledge of *vṛtti* or mental mode, which can reveal the witness (*sākṣī*). If the cognition of *vṛtti* is apprehended, it can apprehend the validity of it also. It has already been said that the various transformations of *antaḥkaraṇaḥ* or mind are called *vṛtti*. As this *vṛtti* is known through the witness, the validity existing in it is also known through the same witness. It may be argued that if it is accepted that the validity is *svataḥ*, there does not arise any question of the doubt of validity. Because in each and every case witness will reveal the knowledge of *vṛtti* resulting in the knowledge of intrinsic validity. Under this situation there does not arise any question of the doubt of validity, which is contrary to the fact. In fact, we generally feel the doubt of validity. The previous sentence is not like this and hence the truth-value of such sentence can be determined extrinsically, which goes in favour of *parataḥprāmāṇyavāda*, which is not accepted by the Advaitins leading to a paradoxical situation. In response to this objection the Advaitins may rejoin that the term *avādhita* is incorporated in order to remove the defect of

ativyāpti (over coverage) to an illusory cognition of an indeterminate object (*anirvacanīyaviṣayabhraṃṣe' tivyāptivāranārthamuktamavādhiteti*). In spite of this the problem cannot be solved. What is to be understood by the term '*anirvacanīyaviṣaya*'? The object, which is inexpressible through language, does not come under the purview of contradiction (*vādhitatva*). If an object is mistaken as an indeterminate object, there is a chance of taking it as valid cognition. In order to exclude such cognition from the purview of valid cognition, the term *avādhita* has been incorporated. If cognition is without any description, there does not arise any question of contradiction (*vādhitatva*). In this connection it can be said that an indeterminate cognition is neither true nor false due to the absence of proper description. On account of this it is very difficult to say that there is *vādhitatva* or *avādhitatva*. Even if it is accepted that the term *anirvacanīya* is taken in the sense of some indescribable phenomena that are unseen in character, the term *avādhita* does not stand in the eye of logic. *Maniprabhā* further adds that when an individual is having an illusory cognition, the cognition of the earlier object seen in different space is acquired and hence there is the lack of the cognition of an object, which is not known earlier. As the content of an illusory cognition remains acquired due to the absence of the content, which is unacquired in nature, the adjunct *anadhigata* does not remain here. In order to exclude such cognition from the purview of valid cognition the term *avādhita* is inserted in the definition.²¹ The previously mentioned problem cannot be resolved even if this term is incorporated for this purpose for the reason mentioned earlier.

Again the term '*arthaviṣayaka*' generates some problems in the following manner. The term literally means 'having some object as its content' of cognition. A question may be raised as to the incorporation of the term '*artha*' as an adjunct to object (*viṣaya*). The *viṣayaka* means a cognition having an object, which is characterized by the adjuncts *anadhigata* and *avādhita*. Hence there is no justification for incorporating the term *artha*; rather it leads us to a kind of tautology. The expression 'the cognition must have an object as its content' means 'the cognition must have an object.' The term 'as its content' (*artha*) is, I think, superfluous, because an object always remains in cognition without being its content. In the phenomenal level the knowledge means knowledge of something. Hence the term '*viṣayaka*' instead of *arthaviṣayaka* would have been more justified. Through the insertion of the term Brahman that is Knowledge having no object

(*aviṣayaka*) can easily be excluded from the purview of the definition, which is meant for the knowledge of the phenomenal objects. However, one justification may be offered in favour of the Advaitins. In this connection, the term '*viṣayaka*' is not to be taken as 'having some object', but as 'having some relation with'. From this the term '*arthaviṣayaka*' would mean 'having some relation with content'. In other words, the *viṣayatā* in this particular context exists in the content, which is technically called *arthaniṣthaviṣayatā*. *Viṣayatā* generally exists in three places in the qualificandness called *viśeṣyatāniṣthaviṣayatā*, in the qualifierness called *viśeṣanatāniṣthaviṣayata* and in the relationness called *sansargatāniṣthaviṣayatā*. By the term '*arthaviṣayaka*' Dharmarāja wants to mean that the contentness exists in the qualificandness in the form of *artha* (*artharūpaviśeṣyatāniṣthaviṣayatā*). As the term *viṣaya* is taken in the sense of a relation, there is no scope of the defect of tautology.

In another way the problem may be solved. If external picture tallies with what is described in the sentence, it is true. If otherwise, it is false. In this way, the validity of truth is determined. This method is called *parataḥprāmānya* or extrinsic validity of truth, which is advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, Buddhists etc. But the Advaitins believe in the intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmānya*) of truth as their philosophy is *Śruti*-dependent. Whatever said in the *Śruti* or *Āgama* is not always verifiable. Hence, they are to be taken as true *ab initio*. Moreover, *Śruti* or *Āgama* can never be fallible as they are *apauruṣeya* or not competed by ordinary human beings. Hence they have no other alternatives than to accept their validity without any verification.

Let us come to the earlier problem of *Avādhitatva* i.e. uncontradict^{ed}ness. If truth is ascertained initially or intrinsically, it is to be presumed as *avādhita*, because there is no scope to test its uncontradictedness. If we would like to attain a confirmed cognition of its uncontradicted character, we have to wait for sometime to see whether our experience can contradict the cognition or not. If the property of being uncontradicted is verified in terms of experience, it comes under *parataḥprāmānyavāda* i.e. the theory of extrinsic validity of truth which is not ontologically accepted by the Advaitins.

In order to avoid such complications Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra emphatically says that the validity of truth must be determined intrinsically (*svataḥ*). The intrinsic nature is explained in the following manner. ~~When~~ ^A a

cognition is known to be valid through the collocation of causes through which an object existing in self in the form of *vṛtti* is known if and only if there is an absence of defect (*svatogrāhyañca doṣābhāve sati yāvatsvāśrayagrāhaka-samagrigrāhyatvam*). In Advaita Vedānta system our inner organ (*antahkaraṇa*) goes out of the body and assumes the shape of the object which is called *vṛtti* (mental mode) just as water flowing through canal etc assumes the form of canal etc. An object in the form of a mental mode is known^{and} the validity of the mental mode is known simultaneously, which is called *svataḥprāmānya*. In this connection, it should always be borne in mind that the phrase - '*doṣābhāve sati*' (being associated with the absence of defect) is very much significant. The causal collocation i.e, *sākṣī* etc of an object in the form of mental mode can also reveal its validity if there is no impediment in the form of defects like too much proximity (*atisāmīpya*), too much remoteness (*atidūratva*), miopia etc.

If there are certain defects then there may arise the doubt of validity. Validity would follow automatically or intrinsically if there is the absence of defects and if there is an awareness of an object's own locus i.e, *vṛtti* or mental mode giving no scope to entertain the doubt of validity. In the ^{case} of doubt the cognition of mental mode is apprehended through witness, but there does not arise the cognition of validity due to having defect related to doubt.²²

It may be argued that how the invalidity of cognition (*aprāmānya*) is possible. In response to this it is said by Dhramarāja that the invalidity of a cognition is not caused by the collocation of conditions through which the cognition is originated, because it would be unduly extended to the valid cognition also. If the same collocation of conditions responsible for the origination of a particular cognition is accepted as cause of both the validity and invalidity of cognition, it would be very difficult to differentiate between *prāmānya* (validity) and *aprāmānya* (invalidity) of a cognition. If this criterion is accepted then the valid cognition would come under the purview of *apramā*. In other words, there would arise the possibility of invalidity to the valid cognition also if the above-mentioned criterion is taken for granted. Hence it is better to accept that the invalidity is always caused by some defect.²³

Now we may turn to our previous problem regarding the justifiability of inserting the term '*avādhita*' as an adjunct of *artha* i.e. object which becomes the content of cognition. From the interpretation of *svataḥprāmānya* (intrinsic validity) given above we shall have no problem of accepting intrinsic validity

of truth even though the term *avādhita* is inserted in the definition. As per the interpretation given earlier an object is to be taken as *avādhita* or uncontradicted if no defect (*doṣa*) is found on the way of our understanding. If there were any defect, the object would be taken as contradicted or *vādhita* leading to the invalidity (*aprāmānya*) of the cognition. When an object is apprehended, we shall have to be careful about the fact that there is the absence of defects (*daśābhāva*), which is the precondition of knowing the validity of the cognition. Otherwise it is to be taken as invalid. In this way all the problems may be solved.

If the Advaita view on *Pramā* is reviewed carefully, it would correspond to the Western theory of coherence. We may give a brief account of the four theories regarding truth according to the West.

According to a view, the truth of knowledge depends on its practical value. That which enjoins us with the practical object is called a right cognition. In other words, the cognition which leads us to serve some purpose or end-in-view is called a right one (*yataśca arthasiddhiḥ tat samyagjñānam - Nyāyabindu*). It is supported mainly by the Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrti. To him the right cognition is that which reveals an object and leads to serve some purpose or successful inclination (*Tataḥ arthakriyā-samartha-vastu-pradarśakam samyagjñānam - Nyāyabindu*). In the West such theory is called pragmatic theory. A cognition of an object is said to be true if it gives rise to serve some end technically called *arthakriyākārī*. The cognitions of sky-flower etc are invalid as they cannot lead us to serve some purpose. On the other hand, the cognitions of water etc. can be taken as valid if they can lead us to the quench of thirst etc which is the pragmatic value of the cognition.

The second view is mainly forwarded by the Naiyayikas in India and known as correspondence theory of truth according to the Western philosophers. To them, the cognition of snake, for example, will be taken as valid if it occurs in a place where there is really snakesness. Such veridical cognition is defined as *tadvati tatprakāraḥam jñānam* i.e., a cognition of an object whose qualifier remains there where the qualifier really exists. We may have knowledge of a snake in two ways - there may be the knowledge of a snake in a place of snake where there is really snakesness and the same knowledge may also occur in a place where there is the absence of snakesness. The former case is known as '*tadvati tatprakāraḥam jñānam*' while the latter is called '*tadabhāvavati tatprakāraḥam jñānam*'. To know an object

as such is *pramā* or true cognition.²⁴ The same view has been expressed by Annambhatta in his *Tarkasamgraha* and *Dīpikā* (*Tadvati tatprakārah anubhava^h yathārthah*). This view corresponds to the correspondence theory of truth.

The third view is known as coherence theory of truth according to the Western thinkers which actually advocates the harmony of experience (*samvādītva*) with other experiences. In the *Tattvakaumudī Śāntaraksita* is in favour of such view when he says '*Pramānam avisamvādijñānam*'.

There is a fourth view which resembles to the view of the Advaita school of Vedānta. According to this view, an awareness may be taken as true if it is non-contradicted (*avādhita*). This nature of uncontradictedness cannot be proved through the correspondence theory which actually depends on the method of coherence or *samvāda*. In fact, the real correspondence is inferred between knowledge and reality with the help of harmony of experience. This can ascertain that the knowledge is absolutely free from error as it is not contradicted at that time. From this it does not follow that in future any contrary experience can falsify our present cognition.

So far as the pragmatic theory of truth is concerned, it is argued by the Advaitins that from the fulfilment of our purpose (*arthakriyākāritva*) the truth of a cognition cannot be warranted. Because sometimes a false cognition can lead an individual to the successful activity. When an individual sees mistakenly that there is a jewel at a distance emitting lustre, he proceeds to the place thinking it a real silver and fortunately receives real jewel there. In this particular case the cognition of lustre in a jewel which is a false cognition leads us to the attainment of the jewel and in this way it can satisfy our purpose. Though we come to know afterwards that the earlier cognition was false yet it serves our purpose. Hence, the Advaitins are in favour of the view that only conflict with the available data can prove the falsity of a cognition. The earlier conception was that the earth is stationary and the sun moves round the earth but afterwards this idea is abandoned as it conflicts with the astronomical data. Hence if something is contradicted then its falsity is proved.²⁵ (*vādhitaviṣayatvena hi bhramatvam - Tattvapradīpikā-citsukhī*, p.218, Nirnay 1915). That is why, to the Advaitins a cognition which remains as uncontradicted (*avādhita*) is alone *pramā*. That is why, the term is included as an adjunct of the object which becomes the content of *pramā*, or valid cognition.

It has been stated earlier that Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has not expressed his own opinion regarding the status of memory (*smṛti*). Hence, he has given both the definitions - one including memory and another excluding memory. There is a controversy among different schools of Indian Philosophy regarding this. The Mīmāṃsakas think that memory cannot be included under *pramā* (*na pramānam smṛtiḥ - Prakaraṇapañcikā - 6.3*). On the other hand, the Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that there are four ways of knowing-perception (*Pratyakṣa*), inference (*laingika*), memory (*smṛti*) and intuitive (*ārṣa*). These four ways of knowing are accepted by *Prāśastapāda* in his *bhāṣya* which is called *Padārthadharmasamāgraha*. (*"Vidyāpi caturvidhā - pratyakṣa-langika-smṛtyā-śalaksanā*).

Though Dharmarāja has not taken any side regarding the status of memory as *Pramā*, we may consider its acceptability as *pramā*. Let us accept a general principle that truth is the sole characteristic feature of knowledge. If it is so, memory, if remains as uncontradicted or non-dubious, may be taken as knowledge or *pramā*. The role of memory in revealing the past is inevitable. Only memory can reproduce the past faithfully. Something remembered is to be taken as true on account of the fact that it is identical with the content of the past experience represented. But there remains always a doubt whether memory can represent the past accurately or not. Considering this point different philosophers are reluctant to admit it as a means of valid cognition. Though there are problems in accepting memory as *pramā* yet it is a distinct experience which is essential in our daily life. Therefore, such experience is given a distinct name - *smṛti*. The awareness which enlightens a new content is called knowledge proper (*ambhūtiḥ*) while the awareness reproducing earlier content is called *smṛti*. Thus 'novelty' (*anadhigatatva*) has been taken as an essential quality of the content of valid cognition.

The Naiyayikas differ on the point whether *pramā* can cover the memory-cognition or not. We may discuss some of the arguments of the philosophers who have accepted *smṛti* as *pramā*.

The instrument of valid cognition (*pramā*) is called *pramāṇa* (*tatra pramākarāṇam pramāṇam - Vedāntaparibhāṣā*). Though Dharmarāja has given a particular definition of valid cognition after keeping a particular set of presuppositions in view, he remains silent about the instrumentality (*karāṇatva*) and its nature. It is accepted that he has no new view about the definition of instrument (*karāṇa*). From this it follows he has accepted the position of his opponent (*Pūrvapakṣin*) i.e. Nyāya-view which goes as

follows - '*vyāpāravat asādhāranam kāranam karanam*.' There are two types of cause for the origination of a piece of cognition - one is called *sādhāraṇa* (common) and another is *asādhāraṇa* (uncommon). The common causes are 'common' (*sādhāraṇa*) because they are necessary in all effects. A set of causes like God, self, unseen factors, time etc is essential or invariable antecedent of all types of effect. That is why, they are called common causes (*sādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). Apart from these, there are some special causes which are essential for a particular type of effect. As for example - sense-object-contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*) is a special cause of perceptual cognition. It is called an uncommon cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) on account of the fact that it is a cause specially required for perception, not for inferential cognition etc. In the same way, the cognition of the invariable relation (*vyāpti*) between a *hetu* and a *sādhya* is the cause only for generating inferential cognition, but not for perception etc. Hence, it is also called an uncommon cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) which is called *karana* (instrument). The uncommon cause alone cannot give rise to an effect if it is not associated with some operative process which is technically called *vyāpāra*. An eye alone cannot reveal an object if there is no contact (*sannikarṣa*) between eye and an object. An axe may be considered as an instrument (*karana*) of cutting if it is associated with the effect of pulling upward and downward (*udyamanipātana*). Hence the operative process is called an intermediate process technically known as *vyāpāra*. It is defined in the following manner : '*Tajjanyatve sati tajjanyaṇako vyāpārah*'. An intermediate operative process is that which, being caused by something, becomes the generator of something. Let us suppose there are three things - x, y and z. If y being caused by x becomes the generator of z, y is called *vyāpāra*. If the instance of axe is taken into account, the phenomenon of lifting upward and putting downward (*udyama-nipātana*) being caused by an axe becomes the generator of the action of cutting. In the case of the cognition of the existence of *hetu* pervaded by *Vyāpti* in the *Pakṣa* is called *parāmarśa* (*vyāpyasya pakṣavṛttivadhīh parāmarśa ucyate*.²⁶ - B.1). In other words, the knowledge of the existence of the probans (*hetu*) which is qualified by invariable relation is called *parāmarśa* (*vyāptiviśiṣṭa-pakṣadharmatā-jñānam parāmarśah*).²⁷ The example is as follows '*vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvatāh*' (i.e., the mountain is having smoke pervaded by fire). In this case, there are two pieces of cognition - the existence of probans in the subject (*pakṣa*) and of probans pervaded by invariable relation. As inferential cognition defined as a cognition arising out of *parāmarśa* (*parāmarśajanyam jñānam anumitiḥ*),

inferential cognition can be taken as a result of *parāmarśa*. Hence the role of *Parāmarśa* is intermediary, because the knowledge in the form of *Parāmarśa* being caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance becomes the generator of inferential cognition. Hence it is the *vyāpāra* of inferential cognition.

In the like manner, an uncommon cause associated with some operative process is called a *Pramāna* i.e., the means of knowing. A *Pramāna* is such type of active and uncommon cause of *pramā*.

It may be argued that memory or *smṛti* may sometimes provide us a cognition which corresponds to reality. It is said by Annambhatta that the memory is of two types - veridical and non-veridical. That which is caused by veridical *anubhava* or right cognition or *pramā* is called non-veridical ("*Smṛtirāpi dviḍhā - yatharthā ayatharthā ca iti. Pramājanyā yatharthā, apramāññyā ayatharthā*")²⁸. Hence one might think that *smṛti* sometimes becomes right cognition and sometimes not.

The above-mentioned view needs the following clarification. Annambhatta in his *Tarkasaṅgraha* has divided cognition or *buddhi* into two types - memory and *anubhava* (representative cognition) ("*sarvavyavahārahētuḥ guṇaḥ buddhiḥ jñānam sa dviḍhaḥ - smṛtiḥ anubhavaḥ ca*").²⁹ The analysis of *anubhava* i.e. representative cognition is found in the theories of knowledge i.e. perceptual cognition, inferential cognition, cognition through comparison and testimonial knowledge. In this portion he has given the division of memory.

Memory or recollective cognition is a reproductional state where we do not find any thing new or novel. What is known is the reproduction of something belonging to the past cognition. This past cognition might have been veridical or not. If it were veridical, the corresponding recollection would also be veridical if represented in an undistorted way. If it were non-veridical, the recollected entity would also be non-veridical. But it should be borne in mind that the above-mentioned varieties of memory-cognition-the veridical and the non-veridical cannot be described as *pramā* (right cognition) and *apramā* (false cognition) respectively. Because, *pramā* and *apramā* are two varieties of *anubhava* which is one of the sub-types of *Buddhi*. The other subclass of the same is memory or *smṛti*. Hence, the instrument (*kaṛaṇa*) of the veridical memory cannot be described as *pramāna* (means of valid cognition). This term *pramāna* is used only in the context of the veridical representative cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*). The Naiyāyikas have

accepted four types of *Pramā*, the instruments of which are perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*).

As Annambhatta has accepted the veridical and non-veridical memory, it indicates that he recognises a possibility of veridical memory-cognition after considering its value in our daily life. At least Anumbhatta has given thought on this aspect considering the fact that all memory-cognitions are not taken false. However, the Naiyayikas ultimately did not include it under *Pramāna* because the recollected fact is not verifiable through external factors as the event or incident is not repeated.³⁰

The definition of *Pramāna* as accepted by Nyāya is supported by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra. To him *pramāna* is of six types : perception (*pratyakṣa*), Inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), Verbal testimony (*āgama*), Presumption (*arthāpatti*) and Non-cognition (*ampalabdhi*).

9. "Nirvikalpakantu samsārgānavagāhi jñānam. Yathā 'so' yam devadattah", "Tattvamasi"-ityādivākyajanyam jñānam."

Ibid.

10. "Tathā ca so'yam devadattah iti vākyajanyajñānasya sannikrṣṭaviśayatayā vahirniḥsr̥ tāntaḥkaraṇavṛtṭyabhyupagamena devadattavacchinnasya caitanyasya vṛtṭyavacchinnacaitanyābhinnatayā 'so' yam devadattah' iti vākyajanyajñānasya pratyakṣatvam."

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣapariśeḍha).

11. "Evam tvattvamasi ityādivākyajanyajñānasyāpi, tatra pramātureva viśayatayā tadubhayabhedasya sattvāt." Ibid.

12. *Vedāntasāra*, p. 159, Edited by Kaliban Vedantavag^{īśa}..., Calcutta, 1379 (B'S)

13. "Nirūpasyāpi kālasyendriyavedyatvābhyupagamena dhārāvāhikabubdherapi pūrvapūrvajñānaviśaya-tattatḥṣaṇaviśeṣa-viśayakatvena na tatrāvyāptih".

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣapariśeḍha).

14. "Kim jñānagatasya pratyakṣatvasya proyojakam pṛcchasi kirhvā viśayagatasya? Ādye pramānacaitanyasya viśayāvachchinnacaitanyābheda iti brumah" *Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣapariśeḍha).*

15. *Sikhāmani on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Edited by Swami Govinda Singh Sadhu, Bombay, p. 29, 1885.

16. *Maṇiprabhā on Sikhāmani on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 29 (Same Edition).

17. "Nanvevam yathārthasmṛterapi niyatasamvādiravṛtṭijanakatvena pramātvallakṣyatvenānadhigatapadavaiyartham tadavasthamevetyāsamkyetaravyāvṛtṭipramātvaprakāravavyavahārānyatara-prayojanopayogyeva prāmānyamatra nirūpaṇīyam na tu samvādiravṛtṭyupayuktaprāmānyamatra nirūpaṇīyamityanānadhigataviśeṣaṇasya sāphalyam..." Ibid, p. 32.

18. "Brahmasākṣātkārānanataram hi ghatādinām vādhaḥ, 'yasya tvasya sarvamātmaivābhūttat kena kam paśyet' iti śruteḥ. Na tu samsāradaśāyām

vādhah 'yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram paśyati' iti śruteḥ. Tathā cāvādhitapadena saṁsāradaśāyamavādhitatvam vivakṣitamiti na ghatā-diprāyamavyāptih".

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣapariśeḍa).

19. "Svataḥsiddhaḥ svasāmagrīvirahaprayojyaḥ" *Nṛsimhaprakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* on *Tarkasāṁgraha*, p. 263. , Ed. Satkari Sharma Bangiya, Chowkhamba. "svataḥsiddhaḥ itarakāraṇavirahasthale tādrśakāraṇavirahaprayukta evetyarthah" *Nilakanthaparakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* of *Tarkasāṁgraha* (same edition).

20. *Sikhāmani* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, pp. 16-17, Same Edition.

21. "Na ca bhramasya deśāntaravṛttijñātaviṣayakatvenānadhigatārthaviṣayakatvasyābhāvāt katham tatrāvyāptiriti vācyam. Bhramāt pūrvam bhramakālīkotpattimadanirvacanīyaraḥajatādiviṣaya-kajñānābhāvena bhramasya jñātaviṣayakatvarūpādhigata-viṣayakatvasyābhāvādanadhigatārthaviṣayakatvasya bhrame sattvāditi." *Maniprabhā* on *Sikhāmani* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 17, Same Edition.

22. "na caivam prāmānyasaṁśāyanupapattih, tatra saṁśāyanurodhena doṣasyāpi sattvena doṣābhāvaghātitasvāśrayagrāhakābhāvena tatra prāmānyasyaiva agrahāt."

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Anupalabdhi Ch.)

23. "Aprāmānyantu na jñānasāmānya-sāṁgrīprajoyam pramāyāmapī aprāmānyāpatteḥ, kintu doṣaprajoyam."

Ibid.

24. "Yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā tadvati tatprakāraḥkānubhavo vā."

Tattvacintāmani (Prāmānya portion).

25. 'Vādhita-viṣayatvena hi bhramatvam'.

Tattvapradīpikā-citsukhī, p. 218, Nirnay Sagar Press, Bombay, 1915.

26. *Bhāṣāpariśeḍa*, Verse no. 68.

27. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on the same.

28. *Tarkasamgraha*, text no. 74.

29. Ibid

30. Gopinath Bhattacharya : *Tarkasamgraha*, p. 354, Progressive, 1983.