

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

Each and every system of Indian philosophy has got some metaphysical presuppositions that are reflected in their theories of knowledge. This is the only reason which helps in formulating the principle-*mānādhinā meyasiddhih'*. That is, the establishment of the knowable entities depends on the means of knowing (*Pramāna*). This principle is true in the sense that knowable entities (*meyas*) are different in different philosophical systems. On account of this the definitions formulated by different systems are done in accordance with their presupposed entities. One could raise the problem of circularity in these cases. When a philosopher of the particular school frames a particular definition of *Pramāna*, it is, to some extent, *subjective*, but not objective as he is conditioned by the metaphysical presupposition. Unfortunately or fortunately Indian thinkers are not free from the defect of biasness. This point will be more firm-footed, if some definitions of perception are reviewed in different systems.

The definition of perception as given by the older logicians is as follows. The perceptual cognition is a cognition arising out of the contact of the sense-organ with an object which cannot be described through language (*Avyapadesya*), non-deviated (*Avyabhicāri*) and non-erroneous (*Vyavasāyatmaka*). The definition is given in such a way by the older Naiyayikas so that both determinate and indeterminate perception can come under the purview of perception. In order to indicate this the terms *Avyapadesya* and *Vyavasāyatmaka* have been introduced.

Let us look at the definition of perception by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, a follower of Advaita Vedānta school. To the Advaitins the whole world is covered by Consciousness (*Caitanya*). To the Vedantins only the connection between sense-organ and object is not perception. By virtue of the existence of Consciousness covering the whole world, the object is also covered by the same Consciousness. Though Consciousness is one in number, it has got various limiting adjuncts (*Upādhis*) like consciousness limited by an object (*Viśayacaitanya*). Consciousness limited by mental mode (*pramānacaitanya*) and Consciousness limited by mind (*Pramātrcāitanya*).

To honour these metaphysical presuppositions Dharmarāja has thought of two criteria of perceptuality - perceptuality of knowledge and perceptuality of object . If there is an identification between the Consciousness limited by mental mode and Consciousness limited by an object, there is the perceptuality of knowledge.

He has made a distinction between the perceptual knowledge of a jar and the perception of a jar. The union between *pramāṇacaitanya* and *viśayacaitanya* gives rise to the perceptual knowledge of something. In this case as *Pramātrcāitanya* remains isolated, there is the situation of knower-known relationship.² Let us see what mental mode is. When our mind (*antaḥkāraṇa*) takes the shape of an object after reaching there with the help of sense-organ, it is called mental mode (*Antaḥkāraṇavṛtti*) which is also covered by the same consciousness. Consciousness limited by mind (*Pramātrcāitanya*) being a knower perceives the knowledge of an object, but in the case of the perceptuality of an object itself, but not the knowledge is perceived. In such a case knower remains in the form of consciousness in which other two consciousness limited by an object and limited by mental mode are amalgamated.⁴ In this situation there is the absence of the existence of other forms of consciousness excepting the existence of *Pramātā*. When a person thinks that he is identified with a whole world, it is a stage of not merely an object, but a subjectified object which is not different from objectified subject essentially.

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Abhinavagupta has explained this state of subjectified object as the melting of the state of *Pramāṇa*.⁵ From the above deliberations it is clear that in Advaita philosophy there is no sharp distinction between epistemology and metaphysics. If we review the above theory, we can easily see that a set of metaphysical presuppositions has led Dharmarāja to formulate such a definition of perception.

Even Sankara has introduced a chapter called *Tarkapāda* only to establish his own conclusions regarding the origination of the world after refuting the views of the *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Sāṃkhayas*, Buddhist etc. In such a case also his mode of argumentation is, to some extent, bias as his mind is preconditioned by Advaitic presuppositions.

Brahman is called an embodiment of Truth, Knowledge and Infinitude.⁶ And this Truth is manifested in smaller truths. We can know these smaller truths in our ordinary life. Without these smaller truths we cannot reach to the realm of the biggest Truth which is identical with Brahman.

We see in our ordinary life that a person who is not true in his life through his work or his speech, he cannot attain the biggest Truth.

In the same way Knowledge which is nothing but Brahman is found in the knowledge of a jar etc. and the knowledge of Infinite is reflected in the finite forms of object. Through finite, related truth and knowledge having content the Infinite Brahman who is also as the embodiment of Knowledge and Truth is realised. Without the limited knowledge the unlimited one cannot be known. That is why, knowing the limited is the precondition of knowing the Unlimited. Had there been no epistemology in Advaita Vedānta, the concept of Brahman would have been taken as an absurd idea just like a hare's horn. Hence, epistemology points to the existence of Brahman. That is, it can provide us some clues through which an individual can gather confidence about the reality of Brahman and will try to realise the same.

After reading Upaniṣad one can know that there is an ultimate knowledge or Brahman which is not at all an absurd object like hare's horn. Similarly, hearing the statement of the *śruti* 'Tattvamasi' one can know the same. If it is known through *śruti*, there is no harm, as *śruti* is included under *āgama pramāṇa*. If our such belief is firm-footed through *Pramāṇa*, we may proceed to the attainment of the Ultimate Knowledge through hearing (*śravaṇa*) reflecting (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*). For this reason the epistemology plays a vital role in self-realisation.

The above-mentioned theory may be substantiated through the views

propounded by the contemporary thinkers like Rabindranath, M.K.Gandhi etc. Rabindranath believes that the Unmeasured Unlimited and Attributeless Brahman can be known through the miniature forms where there is the attribute, limited and measured form. Through the measured one, limited one and attribute, the Unmeasured Brahman is known. Rabindranath says - "*simār mājhe asīm tumi bajāo āpan sur*" and "*Rūpsāgare dub diyecchi arūpa ratan āśā kare*". In the same way, Gandhiji has told that truth is the manifestation of Truth which is God. His earlier theory - 'God is Truth' is revised by him as 'Truth is God' because one may not believe in the existence of God but may believe in the existence of Truth which is tantamount to God. The smaller truths in our life lead us to the region of Greater Truth which is Brahman.

In Indian epistemology some arguments or *pramānas* have been advanced to prove some entities. Brahman is also an entity which is not capable of being proved. From this it is essential for the Advaitins to formulate a theory of knowledge which points to the truth that there is an entity called Brahman which is not like hare's horn.

Though it has been stated earlier that the Indian philosophical systems are not free from metaphysical presuppositions, *Pramānas* are essential to prove a metaphysical entity. That is why, the principle *mānādhinā meyasiddhih* has been taken as an uniform method in philosophical enterprise. Here the term '*māna*' stands for *pramāna*, that is, the means of knowing. Just as hearing (*śravana*), reflecting (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*) are essential for the realisation of Brahman, the refutation of others' views is also essential for the substantiation of the Advaita view. In Indian philosophical tradition there is a *Pūrvapakṣa uttarapakṣa* (opponent - proponent) dialogue. A conclusion cannot be taken as substantiated if opponent's views are not properly adjudged, critically reviewed and refuted. Without refuting the *prima facie* arguments no philosophical system arrives to its conclusion. That which is a conclusive point for a system may not remain as a final because others may refute it at any time.

It is the duty of a philosopher to refute the view of the opponents to establish his own stand point. For this he must have a thorough knowledge of the logical accumen and excellence of others. The Advaitins should analyse and explain other views from their own stand-point. For this refutation the knowledge of others should have to be acquired. If we do not

have the knowledge of the external world, how can other's views on the external world be refuted ?

The *Vijñānavādins* look towards this world as the forms of Consciousness. The *Vaiśeṣikas* look towards the world as consisting of seven categories like *dryavya guna etc.* If we want to refute the attitude of others towards external objects, we have to know the nature of other objects through the mundane eye. If we do not know jar etc. as such, how do we refute them as such and prove them as the manifestations of the Brahman. The Advaitins have accepted three types of reality : *Vyavahārika sattā* (*Phenomenal reality*) *prātibhāsikasattā* (apparent reality) and *pāramārthikasattā* (absolute reality). Before coming to the stage of Absolute Reality the Advaitins have shown that there is a reality called empirical and apparent. Though the absolute reality is the ultimate goal of life according to the Advaitins, they have started with the empirical world with which the Advaita epistemology is connected. If we can know the empirical world rightly, we shall be able to transcend it ultimately. Hence, there should be a world which is mundane and hence it has become a matter of transcendence. Epistemology is essential to justify this material world.

The term '*advaita*' denotes non-dualism or monism. This monistic approach toward the phenomenal world is the primary business of the Advaita philosophers. The fundamental point in this monistic theory lies on the fact that the whole world having diversity (*nānātva*) is not really diverse (*nānā*) in the true sense of the term, but there is underlying oneness in all diversities. This true nature is reflected in the Upanishadic statement - *īha nānā[~]āsti kiñcana* i.e., in this phenomenal world there is diversity which is apparent. Real is one underlying many. Without the acceptance of diversity how can we say that within these apparent diversities there is unity. This unity is in terms of Brahman or Ātman.

There is no point in substantiating the monistic theory if there is no diversity. Whenever we look towards the external world, we find so many things like the sun, the moon, mountains, seas, fields, natural beauty, human beings, animals etc. the existence of which cannot be denied. The existence of duality is an impetus to the realisation of monism.

First, we have to see the phenomenal nature of the external objects to understand that it is false. In order to know the falsity of the phenomenal world, the awareness of it is the precondition. When a rope is known as snake, the awareness as snakesness is there, which is the precondition of

knowing its falsity. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to say what is true and what is false.

Secondly, the knowledge of duality is essential to know its falsity from the transcendental standpoint. Epistemology in Advaita Vedānta provides us a method to know the duality perfectly. It is said that in Advaita Vedānta there are three types of reality as told earlier: Phenomenal reality (*Vyavahārikasattā*) etc. Epistemology is very much concerned with the first. Because different theories of knowledge can reveal them. In our day to day behaviour an object known is to be distinguished from the *pseudo* one. How is it possible? It is possible only through the application of theories of knowledge.

Thirdly, after knowing the apparent true nature of an object a tendency to transcend ~~ent~~ these arises in one's mind. Unless one knows the phenomenal world, one cannot reach to the transcendental level. That is why, the phenomenal world can be taken as a platform on which the absolute or transcendental world is based.

Fourthly, a question may be raised in the following way. The main objective of the Advaita Vedāntins is to lead an individual to attain salvation through the realisation of Brahman or Self. As Self or Brahman is a metaphysical entity, there does not arise any direct relevance of epistemology in this matter. Hence why do the Advaitins discuss different means of knowing (*Pramāna*) in their epistemology? Following points may be put forth in defence of the Advaitins.

One cannot know Brahman without its conception. Brahman is described as attributeless (*nirguṇa*), having no limiting adjuncts (*nirupādhika*), all pervasive, not capable of being described (*anirvacanīya*). To know such an entity may seem to be impossible. That is why, the Advaitins have taken recourse to some descriptions through which Brahman can be made acquainted with the ordinary human being. Brahman, though limitless, is described as having some limit. Brahman, though attributeless and adjunctless, is described as having some attributes and adjuncts for secondary characters (*tatasthalakṣaṇa*) for easy acquaintance with Brahman.

Tatastha means that which exists near the object but not in the object. Characteristic feature is of two types: essential (*svarūpa*) and secondary (*tatastha*). The essential characteristic of an object (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*) remains in the particular object as long as the object remains.⁷ But the secondary characteristic feature is essential to give a rough picture of reality so that

one becomes acquainted with it. In Advaita Vedānta Brahman is accepted as Ultimate Reality. The Advaitins think that Brahman and Ātman is one and the same. When an individual realises Brahman, he becomes identified with Brahman. At this stage he sees himself in the whole world. To him there is non-duality. This universe is nothing but the Brahman. Each and every object of this world is looked upon as Brahman and hence it is illusory if it is looked as a jar etc., but not as Brahman.

In the sentence '*Tattvamasi*', the identity between the individual being (*Jīva*) and Brahman has been expressed. Here 'Brahman' has been referred to by the term '*Tat*'. What would be the characteristic of Brahman? In response to it, it can be said that the characteristic feature is of two types - essential characteristic (*Svarūpalakṣaṇa*) and secondary characteristic (*Tatasthalakṣaṇa*). The essential characteristic feature ~~feature~~ remains in the very nature of an object. The Truth, Knowledge and Infinitude are essential characteristics of Brahman, as it has been stated in the *S'ruti* text.

It may be objected that a thing cannot be a characteristic feature if it does not exist in itself. Truth etc. are identical with Brahman, they cannot be the characteristic features of Brahman, since they do not exist in Brahman as attributes.

In reply, it can be said that Truth etc. can be conceived of as both the possessor of attributes (*dharmi*) and attributes (*dharma*). Bliss etc. are the attributes of Brahman. Though these (bliss etc.) are identical with Brahman, they seem to be different from that. That is to say, Truth etc. are Brahman, but they are assumed to be its attributes. Hence, these can be regarded as both⁹.

The possession of smell, for example, is the secondary characteristic of earth, as smell does not exist in atoms at the time of dissolution and at the time of its initial moment of production.

The secondary characteristic feature exists in its being the cause of the creation etc. of the Universe (*jagat*). Here the term '*jagat*' denotes all kinds of effect and the term 'creation' etc. means the creation (*janmādi*), maintenance (*sthiti*) and dissolution (*pralaya*)⁹.

The philosophers tried to give an idea of Brahman by asserting that Brahman is Truth, Brahman is knowledge and Brahman is Infinitude. It cannot be said that these are not statements about Brahman but they must not be regarded as fact-stating statements which we ordinarily have. To say, that Brahman is Truth, that Brahman is knowledge and that Brahman is Infinitude

is to say that Brahman is in the forms of these characteristics itself. They themselves constitute what is called Brahman (*Svarūpa lakṣaṇa*).

Though *tatasthalakṣaṇa* of Brahman cannot directly point to Brahman, it is essential for the beginners who want to know Brahman. If someone is given the real impression that Brahman is *nirguṇa* (attributeless), *nirupādhika* (having no limiting adjunct) etc., he will think that Brahman is not capable of being realised just the hare's horn. To give an impression that Brahman is not *asat* some descriptions are essential. The descriptions that Brahman is the creator, protector, destroyer of the world will certainly make the beginner believe that Brahman is real. Though to know Brahman as the creator of this world is to show him as *sopādhika* which is not its real character, it is essential to make a mental platform to receive the *Nirupādhika* Brahman. One can have the realisation of *Nirguṇa* and *Nirupādhika* Brahman through the medium of *Saguna* and *Sopādhika* Brahman. One can realise the *nirguṇa* Brahman through worship (*upāsana*), prayer etc. of the *saguna*. The worship and prayer is possible if *Saguna* Brahman is accepted. Through *Tatastha lakṣaṇa* we have an idea that He is the creator of this universe and doer of all functions, which helps us to meditate on Him. Through meditation or worship we can transcend this stage and can be identified with Brahman which is *nirguṇa* and *nirupādhika*. At this stage due to our identification we realise oneness in the whole universe which is the state of liberation. When liberation is achieved the idea of *Saguna* and *Sopādhika* Brahman like other phenomenal objects become illusory. To arrive at this stage it is highly essential to accept Brahman having unlimited power of creating the universe, which is described as the *Tatasthalakṣaṇa* of Brahman. In the *Upanisad* such a policy has been taken into account. The Upanisadic seers felt that it is not possible for an ordinary man to realise Brahman of *nirguṇa* and *nirupādhika* nature. That is why, the seers recommend the worshipping of the gods who are described as *Saguna* Brahman. Brahman is introduced to the ordinary human being as creator, protector and sustainer of the Universe like *Prajāpati* or *Hiranyagarbha* etc. This is way of uplifting human mind to receive the attributeless Brahman. In the same manner, it can be said that Brahman is described in various ways for acquaintance as told earlier. If we are not acquainted with the words, relation ^{between} with a word and its meaning, we are not able to get the meaning of the prescriptions and advice of the seers. To acquire the meaning of the Sastric injunction properly the *pramāna* i.e. *Āgama* has to be resorted to. A word and its meaning is

known through some complicated procedures like primary meaning (*Śakyārtha*) attained through potency of a word (*Śakti*), secondary or implicative meaning (*Lakṣyārtha*) through *Lakṣaṇā* i.e. implication.

Fifthly, the Upanasadic seers have suggested three methods of the self-realisation-*śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (thinking) and *nididhyāsana* (meditating). Upanisad provides us a perfect methodology of learning, as it adopts *pariprasna* (questioning) as a method of knowing the Reality.

This questioning presupposes the knowledge of something about which the question is asked. Without the knowledge of an entity no question can be granted. If an object is known fully, no question about it is entertained just a jar existing in broad day light can not be questioned. If there is no necessity of knowing something, the question about it is not entertained. So an enquiry with regard to an object is possible if the object is dubious and if there is any necessity of knowing it. *Vācaspati Mīśra* in his *Bhāmāṭī* commentary has prescribed that *sandigdhatva* (i.e. the state of being dubious) and *saprayojanatva*. (the state of being essential) are the criteria of questionability.¹⁰

It may be argued in this connection that no one could ask question about an object if it is in totally dark or unknown. If an object is partially known and partially unknown, there arises a question about its nature. In other words, an object having having dubious character can be questioned. If an object is known in a general way (*sāmānyanta*) but not in a specific way (*viśeṣataḥ*), the question may be asked the nature of it being dubious. To have a general knowledge of an object *pramāṇa* is essential. For further knowledge in details the methods like *śravaṇa* etc are essential. So far as Brahman is concerned, the general knowledge of it should have to be acquired through *Āgama pramāṇa*. In order to realise the Reality which is confirmed through *Āgama pramāṇa* the methods have to be adopted.

If an object is known roughly, the hearing on it (*śravaṇa*) is possible.¹¹ Hence, epistemology gives a rough idea of an object in which the doubt or conflict, if any, with another *pramāṇa* is removed with the help of some favourable argument. That is, if there is any chance of contradictory view as to particular conclusion drawn by an individual, some mental effort is needed to remove this view and for this some favourable arguments have to be put forth. This method of *manana* is adopted in each and every school or science.¹²

When our minds are settled on an object due to having an accurate knowledge of it, true meditation on this is possible which is called *nididhyāsana* (meditation) without which no serious conclusion can be drawn.¹³ Hence, the *Upanisad* provides us a perfect methodology of research in any field.

Lastly, the grammarians have accepted six meanings of negation of which 'absence' is one. It has been stated by the grammarians "*Tatsādrāśyamabhāvaśca tadanyatvaṁ tadalpataṁ, aprāśastyam virodhaśca nañarthā śat prakīrtitā*".¹⁴ That is, negative particle 'nañ' can be used in the sense of similarity i.e. *Sādrśya* (e.g. *abrāhmaṇa* meaning similar to Brahman^ṁ), in the sense of absence i.e. *abhāva* (e.g. *asat* meaning the absence of honesty), in the sense of mutual difference i.e. *anyatva* (e.g. *aghata* meaning different from a jar), in the sense of less quantity i.e. *alpataṁ* (e.g. *akeśi* meaning less quantity of hair), in the sense of non-suitability (*aprāśastyā*) (e.g. *asamaya* meaning improper time) and in the sense of enmity or contradiction (*virodha*) (e.g. *asura* meaning the enmity with the duties (*suravirodhi*)). Among these six meanings the second one can be applicable in the case of *Advaita* meaning the absence of duality as told earlier. Unless we have an idea of duality we cannot prove its absence. It is sensible to negate something which really exists in this world. To negate something which does not exist in this world is non-sensical. It is very much a futile exercise to prove the non-existence of an object which is absurd. This phenomenon is called *alīkapratīyogitā* — *kābhāva* i.e. an absence, the absentee of which is an absurd entity. If phenomenal existence of duality is an absurd entity, the negation of it is meaningless leading to a futile exercise. To prove the absence of duality (*advaita*) 'duality' has to be accepted as an existent object. In order to know this duality' the different means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) are very much relevant. The realisation of the absence of duality follows from the realisation of Brahman.

It has been shown earlier that metaphysical presuppositions are embedded in different theories of knowledge. Apart from this, even the theories of false cognition which are technically known as *khyātivādas* (theories of error) are formulated after keeping parity with such metaphysical presuppositions. Let us see how such presuppositions work in different theories of error.

When a rope is perceived as snake, it is described as perceived wrongly and reject our earlier cognition as a false cognition. The questions

in the following forms may generally arise. What is the factor which constitutes the falsity of the error? If the falsity ascribed to the apprehension itself or to the content known or to both apprehension and content? These questions are solved by different systems of Indian Philosophy in different ways after following their different presuppositions.

As the false apprehension is possible due to having its character as false from the nature of the content apprehended and as there is the rejection of the content after correction, the nature of false apprehension concerns primarily to the objective content rather than subjective apprehension. Hence, there lies the controversy among different philosophers regarding the nature of false content. There are six principal theories on such issues called *Asatkhyātivāda*, *Ātmakhyātivāda*, *Akhyātivāda*, *Anyathākhyātivāda*, *Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda* and *Satkhyātivāda*.

The first view - *Asatkhyātivāda* is propagated by the Buddhists who are the supporters of nihilism (*śūnyavāda*) who maintain voidness or absolute nothingness of all experiences and contents. Error, according to them, is the cognition of *asa* i.e. non-existent. In the case snake-rope illusion the snake which is falsely known is absolutely non-existence. The former exists nowhere due to its unreality while the later is partially non-existent i.e. existing in one place and non-existing in other places. Sky-flower or hare's horn etc are to be taken as absolutely non-existent objects. A jar may be a relatively non-existent entity. Because it may remain in one place and may not in other place. The imaginary or absurd entities (*alīkapadārthas*) do not exist anywhere. The imaginary fictions may be distinguished into two types - the factually non-existent and the logically impossible. The hare's horn etc belong to the first category as they do not exist as facts. A barren mother belongs to the second category i.e. it is not only non-existent but cannot but be so. According to the nihilists, when someone is in error, he sees an absolute non-existent object in any of the given two senses. When an individual perceives the rope as a snake, he sees not a snake only but a rope that has exposed itself the properties of a snake. In other words, he perceives not a snake as such, but rope-snake. But a snake which is a rope as well is an absurdity. The snake may exist, but a rope-snake is nowhere found except in cognition of the false.

If the view of the *Vijñānavādins* which is known as *Ātmakhyātivāda* is reviewed carefully, it will be seen that they have totally rejected the view of the nihilists regarding error as a contentless cognition that cognises

nothing. To the *Vijñānavādins* such cognition of nothing must also be itself nothing. An error which is identified with the nothingness must be nothing which is not at all an error in the true sense of the term. According to the *Ātmakhyātivāda* error arises from cognising the mental as an extramental real. Blue is the cognition of the blue, but our mind in the case of error cognises it as the extramental blue. The mental fact is thus mistaken as a transcendent meaning. An object cognised is a subjective image, but this is mistakenly taken to be the cognition of an external object. The *Ātmakhyāti* which means the self-cognition of the psychic fact is imagined to be cognition of an objective trans-psychic being. Hence, error is not *asatkhyāti*, the cognition of sheer non-existent, but is the cognition of the subjective state as an objective fact.

The *Prābhākaras* who advocate the view known as *Akhyāti* refute the *Asatkhyāti* and *Ātmakhyāti* views of the Buddhists. They contend that error always involves a given element, the error arising from a confusion of what is so given with the memory-image it calls forth. Hence, error involves both representation and representation something given or presented (*grhīta*) and some representation or image which the presentation calls forth (*smṛta*). The illusory cognition occurs in the failure of the apprehension of distinction between the perceived fact and the memory-image (*yatra yadadhyāsastadvivekāgrahanivandhano bhramah*)¹⁵. In other words, there is the nonapprehension of the distinction (*vivekāgraha*) between presentation and representation which is called *akhyāti*. In the case of snake-rope-illusion the given element lies on the 'rope' and the remembered content is snake. The illusion lies on the non-distinction of the 'rope' represented as 'this' and the 'snake'. This non-distinction gives rise to confusion and leads to the false judgement - 'this is a snake'. The two facts - the given and the remembered are thus amalgamated or confused as one and certain false expectations are aroused as a consequence. The illusion is a negative non-distinguishing of the two experiences, the failure to realise their distinction and duality. From this the *Prābhākaras* believe that illusion is not a positive experience, but a negative non-distinction. Correction is the negation of this non-distinction; it is the assertion of the distinction through the cancellation of the confused non-distinction. As a result there is no positive falsity in error anywhere.¹⁶

The Naiyayikas who propound the *Anyathākhyātivāda* urge that the intrinsic positivity of error is distinct from negative non-distinguishing or *akhyāti*. Every illusion is a single complex experience, but not two things - given and remembered - are falsely confused and non-distinguished as *Prābhākaras* says : In the snake-rope illusion we are not aware of two experiences but of a single complex experience of a perceived 'this' appearing to be a 'snake'. At the time of correction a single is rejected. That is, 'this snake' that was falsely perceived through the influence of the defects of sense, media etc. The illusion is a unitary composite presentation of 'this 'snake', the 'this' being presented through the natural (*laukika*) contact of the visual sense and the object lying before it, and the 'snake' being also presented through the extra-ordinary (*alaukika*) contact of the visual sense with the 'snake' perceived elsewhere. It is an error as being a unitary presentative experience of a presented 'this' in the form of an extraordinary perception of the 'snake' with which it is objectively unconnected. The snake is perceived as a real snake, and the snake-character or feature perceived in it inheres in an elsewhere snake, i.e. not in the locus of the 'this' which is presented to the eye by natural contact but in the 'snake' that exists elsewhere. This error thus consists in a complicated perception of the extraordinarily seen snake-character of the jungle-snake as inhering in the 'this' that is seen by the external sense organ viz, the eye, by natural contact of sense and object.

Now we may look at the metaphysical presuppositions as found in the formulation of the *Anirvacanīyākhyātivāda* by Sankara. Error, according to Sankarites, involves more than ~~it~~ ^{the} experience of a false relation. It is the experience of a unitary false content, not the experience of a false relation between real contents. Sankara concludes that every error involves an unreal positivity or positive unreality. It is neither the cognition of a sheer negation as found in *Asatkhyātivāda* nor a cognition of an object existing elsewhere as found in the *Anyathākhyātivāda*. It is a positive experience and hence it is the experience of a positive content. That which is absolutely *asat* (non-existent) cannot be the content of a positive experience, while every error is a positive experience. When a rope is cognised as a snake, the status of snake is not *asat* or non-existent as we cognise it in the rope it is not *sat* (existent also) as the cognition of it is sublated by the subsequent knowledge of rope. Hence, the snake is neither existent nor non-existent

which is described as indescribable (*anīrvacanīya*). This illusory cognition is taken as a real which is of apparent type (*prātibhāsikasattā*).

Rāmānuja rejects the *Anīrvacanīyakhyātivāda* of Sankara and regards error as consisting in the apprehension of a partial truth as the whole truth. Their theory is known as *Satkhyātivāda* according to which error is neither the apprehension of the sheer nothingness nor of any indescribable object. It is simply the cognition of a partial feature as the only and the exclusive feature of an object. Thus when a rope is cognised as a snake, the cogniser perceives a real snake-feature in the rope existing before him. He does not perceive nothing nor does he perceive any elsewhere snake-character nor again any indescribable snake. On the contrary, he perceives a real 'here and now' snake-character in the object lying before him 'here and now'. His mistake consists not in perceiving anything false or unreal, but in considering the snake-character to be the only characteristics of the objects lying before. That is why, the cognition does not work in life and the cogniser acting on the suggestion of such in perfect knowlddge comes to grief in the practical affairs of life.

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2. Ādye pramānacaitanyasya viśayāvachinnacaitanyābheda its brumah Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣaparicched).
3. yatra yathā tadāgodakam chidrānirgatya kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya tadvadeva catuṣkonādyākārān bhavati. Tathā tajjasamantaḥkaranamapi cakṣurādīdvārā nirgatya ghatādiviśayadeśam gatvā ghatādiviśayākārjña parinamate. Sa eva parināmo vṛttirucyate", *Ibid.*
4. "Pramātrabhedo nama na tāvadaikyam. Kintu pramātrsattā-tiriktasattākatvābhāvah," *Ibid.*
5. *Kāvya prakāśa, Vṛtti, 4/28.*
6. 'Satyamjñānāmanantam brahma' Vedāntaparibhāṣā (viśayapariccheda)
7. "Yāvallakṣyakālamānavasthitatve sati yadvyāvartakam", *Ibid.*
8. 'Nanu svarūpasya svavṛttivābhāvena katham lakṣaṇatvamiti cenna. Svasyaiva svāpekṣayā dharmadharmibhāvakaḥkalpanayā lakṣya-lakṣaṇatvasambhavāt.'
Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Viśayapariccheda)
9. "Prakṛte ca jagajjanmādikāraṇatvam. Atrā jagatpadena kāryyajātam vivakṣitam, kāraṇatvañca kaṭṛtvamato'vidyādau nātivyāptih".
Ibid
10. *Bhāmātī* on Adhyāsabhāṣya.
11. "Śravaṇam nāma vedāntānām advitīya brahmani tātparyāvadhāraṇānukūla mānāsī kriyā". *Vedāntaparibhāṣā (prayojana - pariccheda).*

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12. Mananaṁ nāma śabdāvadhārite'rthe mānāntaravirodhasāmkāyāṁ tannirākaranaṅkūlatarkātmakajñānanajako vyāpārah". *Ibid.*
13. "Nididhyāsanāṁ nāmanādidurvāsanayā viśayeṣvākṛṣyamānasya cittasya viśayebhyo pakṛṣyātma-viśayakasthairyaṅkūlo vyāpārah", *Ibid.*
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