

A LOGICAL ILLUMINATION OF THE ADVAITA THEORY OF PERCEPTION : SOME PROBLEMS

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PREFACE

The research work entitled: '*A Logical illumination of the Advaita Theory of Perception*' is the result of intensive and critical study on the Advaita theory of Perception, which is unique and novel in character in comparison to the theories of perception in other systems. The work is based mainly on the analysis of the Sanskrit texts like *Vedantaparibhasa* by Dharmaraja Adhvarindra etc. Apart from this some basic texts like *Brahmasutra* with *Samkarabhasya*, *Bhamati*, *Vedantasara*, *Pancadasi*, *Tattvapradipika* known as *Citsukhi* have been consulted to highlight the Advaita position. An effort has been made to throw some light on some knotty issues in connection with the theory of perception, which is followed by some critical and evaluative remarks. The scholars and experts in this field will judge how far I am successful.

The thesis would not have found the light of the day, had there been no constant inspiration, encouragement and proper guidance from my respected teacher, Professor Raghunath Ghosh, who had spent much time and energy in supervising the whole work and teaching me the original texts. Hence I convey my heartfelt gratitude and regards to him. Professor Dikshit Gupta of Calcutta University had shown me a right path from the beginning of my carrier with his advice and guidance for which he deserves my regards. Other teachers of the Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal have extended their hands of cooperation during the period I spent in the Department as a research student. I would like to convey my regards to all of them. While I was busy with this work, my husband and small daughter had to suffer a lot due to the lack of proper attention to them. I am thankful to them for their sacrifice and sincere cooperation in the domestic and non-domestic matters.

Madhuban Mukherjee

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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

Each and every system of Indian philosophy has got some metaphysical presuppositions that are reflected in their theories of knowledge. This is the only reason which helps in formulating the principle-*mānādhinā meyasiddhih'*. That is, the establishment of the knowable entities depends on the means of knowing (*Pramāna*). This principle is true in the sense that knowable entities (*meyas*) are different in different philosophical systems. On account of this the definitions formulated by different systems are done in accordance with their presupposed entities. One could raise the problem of circularity in these cases. When a philosopher of the particular school frames a particular definition of *Pramāna*, it is, to some extent, *subjective*, but not objective as he is conditioned by the metaphysical presupposition. Unfortunately or fortunately Indian thinkers are not free from the defect of biasness. This point will be more firm-footed, if some definitions of perception are reviewed in different systems.

The definition of perception as given by the older logicians is as follows. The perceptual cognition is a cognition arising out of the contact of the sense-organ with an object which cannot be described through language (*Avyapadesya*), non-deviated (*Avyabhicāri*) and non-erroneous (*Vyavasāyatmaka*). The definition is given in such a way by the older Naiyayikas so that both determinate and indeterminate perception can come under the purview of perception. In order to indicate this the terms *Avyapadesya* and *Vyavasāyatmaka* have been introduced.

Let us look at the definition of perception by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, a follower of Advaita Vedānta school. To the Advaitins the whole world is covered by Consciousness (*Caitanya*). To the Vedantins only the connection between sense-organ and object is not perception. By virtue of the existence of Consciousness covering the whole world, the object is also covered by the same Consciousness. Though Consciousness is one in number, it has got various limiting adjuncts (*Upādhis*) like consciousness limited by an object (*Viśayacaitanya*). Consciousness limited by mental mode (*pramānacaitanya*) and Consciousness limited by mind (*Pramātrcāitanya*).

To honour these metaphysical presuppositions Dharmarāja has thought of two criteria of perceptuality - perceptuality of knowledge and perceptuality of object . If there is an identification between the Consciousness limited by mental mode and Consciousness limited by an object, there is the perceptuality of knowledge.

He has made a distinction between the perceptual knowledge of a jar and the perception of a jar. The union between *pramāṇacaitanya* and *viśayacaitanya* gives rise to the perceptual knowledge of something. In this case as *Pramātrcāitanya* remains isolated, there is the situation of knower-known relationship.² Let us see what mental mode is. When our mind (*antaḥkāraṇa*) takes the shape of an object after reaching there with the help of sense-organ, it is called mental mode (*Antaḥkāraṇavṛtti*) which is also covered by the same consciousness. Consciousness limited by mind (*Pramātrcāitanya*) being a knower perceives the knowledge of an object, but in the case of the perceptuality of an object itself, but not the knowledge is perceived. In such a case knower remains in the form of consciousness in which other two consciousness limited by an object and limited by mental mode are amalgamated.⁴ In this situation there is the absence of the existence of other forms of consciousness excepting the existence of *Pramātā*. When a person thinks that he is identified with a whole world, it is a stage of not merely an object, but a subjectified object which is not different from objectified subject essentially.

P.T.O.

Abhinavagupta has explained this state of subjectified object as the melting of the state of *Pramāṇa*.⁵ From the above deliberations it is clear that in Advaita philosophy there is no sharp distinction between epistemology and metaphysics. If we review the above theory, we can easily see that a set of metaphysical presuppositions has led Dharmarāja to formulate such a definition of perception.

Even Sankara has introduced a chapter called *Tarkapāda* only to establish his own conclusions regarding the origination of the world after refuting the views of the *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Sāṃkhayas*, Buddhist etc. In such a case also his mode of argumentation is, to some extent, bias as his mind is preconditioned by Advaitic presuppositions.

Brahman is called an embodiment of Truth, Knowledge and Infinitude.⁶ And this Truth is manifested in smaller truths. We can know these smaller truths in our ordinary life. Without these smaller truths we cannot reach to the realm of the biggest Truth which is identical with Brahman.

We see in our ordinary life that a person who is not true in his life through his work or his speech, he cannot attain the biggest Truth.

In the same way Knowledge which is nothing but Brahman is found in the knowledge of a jar etc. and the knowledge of Infinite is reflected in the finite forms of object. Through finite, related truth and knowledge having content the Infinite Brahman who is also as the embodiment of Knowledge and Truth is realised. Without the limited knowledge the unlimited one cannot be known. That is why, knowing the limited is the precondition of knowing the Unlimited. Had there been no epistemology in Advaita Vedānta, the concept of Brahman would have been taken as an absurd idea just like a hare's horn. Hence, epistemology points to the existence of Brahman. That is, it can provide us some clues through which an individual can gather confidence about the reality of Brahman and will try to realise the same.

After reading Upaniṣad one can know that there is an ultimate knowledge or Brahman which is not at all an absurd object like hare's horn. Similarly, hearing the statement of the *śruti* 'Tattvamasi' one can know the same. If it is known through *śruti*, there is no harm, as *śruti* is included under *āgama pramāṇa*. If our such belief is firm-footed through *Pramāṇa*, we may proceed to the attainment of the Ultimate Knowledge through hearing (*śravaṇa*) reflecting (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*). For this reason the epistemology plays a vital role in self-realisation.

The above-mentioned theory may be substantiated through the views

propounded by the contemporary thinkers like Rabindranath, M.K.Gandhi etc. Rabindranath believes that the Unmeasured Unlimited and Attributeless Brahman can be known through the miniature forms where there is the attribute, limited and measured form. Through the measured one, limited one and attribute, the Unmeasured Brahman is known. Rabindranath says - "*simār mājhe asīm tumi bajāo āpan sur*" and "*Rūpsāgare dub diyecchi arūpa ratan āśā kare*". In the same way, Gandhiji has told that truth is the manifestation of Truth which is God. His earlier theory - 'God is Truth' is revised by him as 'Truth is God' because one may not believe in the existence of God but may believe in the existence of Truth which is tantamount to God. The smaller truths in our life lead us to the region of Greater Truth which is Brahman.

In Indian epistemology some arguments or *pramānas* have been advanced to prove some entities. Brahman is also an entity which is not capable of being proved. From this it is essential for the Advaitins to formulate a theory of knowledge which points to the truth that there is an entity called Brahman which is not like hare's hom.

Though it has been stated earlier that the Indian philosophical systems are not free from metaphysical presuppositions, *Pramānas* are essential to prove a metaphysical entity. That is why, the principle *mānādhinā meyasiddhih* has been taken as an uniform method in philosophical enterprise. Here the term '*māna*' stands for *pramāna*, that is, the means of knowing. Just as hearing (*śravana*), reflecting (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*) are essential for the realisation of Brahman, the refutation of others' views is also essential for the substantiation of the Advaita view. In Indian philosophical tradition there is a *Pūrvapakṣa uttarapakṣa* (opponent - proponent) dialogue. A conclusion cannot be taken as substantiated if opponent's views are not properly adjudged, critically reviewed and refuted. Without refuting the *prima facie* arguments no philosophical system arrives to its conclusion. That which is a conclusive point for a system may not remain as a final because others may refute it at any time.

It is the duty of a philosopher to refute the view of the opponents to establish his own stand point. For this he must have a thorough knowledge of the logical accumen and excellence of others. The Advaitins should analyse and explain other views from their own stand-point. For this refutation the knowledge of others should have to be acquired. If we do not

have the knowledge of the external world, how can other's views on the external world be refuted ?

The *Vijñānavādins* look towards this world as the forms of Consciousness. The *Vaiśeṣikas* look towards the world as consisting of seven categories like *dryavya guna etc.* If we want to refute the attitude of others towards external objects, we have to know the nature of other objects through the mundane eye. If we do not know jar etc. as such, how do we refute them as such and prove them as the manifestations of the Brahman. The Advaitins have accepted three types of reality : *Vyavahārika sattā* (*Phenomenal reality*) *prātibhāsikasattā* (apparent reality) and *pāramārthikasattā* (absolute reality). Before coming to the stage of Absolute Reality the Advaitins have shown that there is a reality called empirical and apparent. Though the absolute reality is the ultimate goal of life according to the Advaitins, they have started with the empirical world with which the Advaita epistemology is connected. If we can know the empirical world rightly, we shall be able to transcend it ultimately. Hence, there should be a world which is mundane and hence it has become a matter of transcendence. Epistemology is essential to justify this material world.

The term '*advaita*' denotes non-dualism or monism. This monistic approach toward the phenomenal world is the primary business of the Advaita philosophers. The fundamental point in this monistic theory lies on the fact that the whole world having diversity (*nānātva*) is not really diverse (*nānā*) in the true sense of the term, but there is underlying oneness in all diversities. This true nature is reflected in the Upanishadic statement - *īha nānā[~]āsti kiñcana* i.e., in this phenomenal world there is diversity which is apparent. Real is one underlying many. Without the acceptance of diversity how can we say that within these apparent diversities there is unity. This unity is in terms of Brahman or Ātman.

There is no point in substantiating the monistic theory if there is no diversity. Whenever we look towards the external world, we find so many things like the sun, the moon, mountains, seas, fields, natural beauty, human beings, animals etc. the existence of which cannot be denied. The existence of duality is an impetus to the realisation of monism.

First, we have to see the phenomenal nature of the external objects to understand that it is false. In order to know the falsity of the phenomenal world, the awareness of it is the precondition. When a rope is known as snake, the awareness as snakesness is there, which is the precondition of

knowing its falsity. Otherwise, it would be very difficult to say what is true and what is false.

Secondly, the knowledge of duality is essential to know its falsity from the transcendental standpoint. Epistemology in Advaita Vedānta provides us a method to know the duality perfectly. It is said that in Advaita Vedānta there are three types of reality as told earlier: Phenomenal reality (*Vyavahārikasattā*) etc. Epistemology is very much concerned with the first. Because different theories of knowledge can reveal them. In our day to day behaviour an object known is to be distinguished from the *pseudo* one. How is it possible? It is possible only through the application of theories of knowledge.

Thirdly, after knowing the apparent true nature of an object a tendency to transcend ~~ent~~ these arises in one's mind. Unless one knows the phenomenal world, one cannot reach to the transcendental level. That is why, the phenomenal world can be taken as a platform on which the absolute or transcendental world is based.

Fourthly, a question may be raised in the following way. The main objective of the Advaita Vedāntins is to lead an individual to attain salvation through the realisation of Brahman or Self. As Self or Brahman is a metaphysical entity, there does not arise any direct relevance of epistemology in this matter. Hence why do the Advaitins discuss different means of knowing (*Pramāna*) in their epistemology? Following points may be put forth in defence of the Advaitins.

One cannot know Brahman without its conception. Brahman is described as attributeless (*nirguṇa*), having no limiting adjuncts (*nirupādhika*), all pervasive, not capable of being described (*anirvacanīya*). To know such an entity may seem to be impossible. That is why, the Advaitins have taken recourse to some descriptions through which Brahman can be made acquainted with the ordinary human being. Brahman, though limitless, is described as having some limit. Brahman, though attributeless and adjunctless, is described as having some attributes and adjuncts for secondary characters (*tatasthalakṣaṇa*) for easy acquaintance with Brahman.

Tatastha means that which exists near the object but not in the object. Characteristic feature is of two types: essential (*svarūpa*) and secondary (*tatastha*). The essential characteristic of an object (*svarūpalakṣaṇa*) remains in the particular object as long as the object remains.⁷ But the secondary characteristic feature is essential to give a rough picture of reality so that

one becomes acquainted with it. In Advaita Vedānta Brahman is accepted as Ultimate Reality. The Advaitins think that Brahman and *Ātman* is one and the same. When an individual realises Brahman, he becomes identified with Brahman. At this stage he sees himself in the whole world. To him there is non-duality. This universe is nothing but the Brahman. Each and every object of this world is looked upon as Brahman and hence it is illusory if it is looked as a jar etc., but not as Brahman.

In the sentence '*Tattvamasi*', the identity between the individual being (*Jīva*) and Brahman has been expressed. Here 'Brahman' has been referred to by the term '*Tat*'. What would be the characteristic of Brahman? In response to it, it can be said that the characteristic feature is of two types - essential characteristic (*Svarūpalakṣaṇa*) and secondary characteristic (*Tatasthalakṣaṇa*). The essential characteristic feature ~~feature~~ remains in the very nature of an object. The Truth, Knowledge and Infinity are essential characteristics of Brahman, as it has been stated in the *S'ruti* text.

It may be objected that a thing cannot be a characteristic feature if it does not exist in itself. Truth etc. are identical with Brahman, they cannot be the characteristic features of Brahman, since they do not exist in Brahman as attributes.

In reply, it can be said that Truth etc. can be conceived of as both the possessor of attributes (*dharmi*) and attributes (*dharma*). Bliss etc. are the attributes of Brahman. Though these (bliss etc.) are identical with Brahman, they seem to be different from that. That is to say, Truth etc. are Brahman, but they are assumed to be its attributes. Hence, these can be regarded as both⁹.

The possession of smell, for example, is the secondary characteristic of earth, as smell does not exist in atoms at the time of dissolution and at the time of its initial moment of production.

The secondary characteristic feature exists in its being the cause of the creation etc. of the Universe (*jagat*). Here the term '*jagat*' denotes all kinds of effect and the term 'creation' etc. means the creation (*janmādi*), maintenance (*sthiti*) and dissolution (*pralaya*)⁹.

The philosophers tried to give an idea of Brahman by asserting that Brahman is Truth, Brahman is knowledge and Brahman is Infinity. It cannot be said that these are not statements about Brahman but they must not be regarded as fact-stating statements which we ordinarily have. To say, that Brahman is Truth, that Brahman is knowledge and that Brahman is Infinity

is to say that Brahman is in the forms of these characteristics itself. They themselves constitute what is called Brahman (*Svarūpa lakṣaṇa*).

Though *tatasthalakṣaṇa* of Brahman cannot directly point to Brahman, it is essential for the beginners who want to know Brahman. If someone is given the real impression that Brahman is *nirguṇa* (attributeless), *nirupādhika* (having no limiting adjunct) etc., he will think that Brahman is not capable of being realised just the hare's horn. To give an impression that Brahman is not *asat* some descriptions are essential. The descriptions that Brahman is the creator, protector, destroyer of the world will certainly make the beginner believe that Brahman is real. Though to know Brahman as the creator of this world is to show him as *sopādhika* which is not its real character, it is essential to make a mental platform to receive the *Nirupādhika* Brahman. One can have the realisation of *Nirguṇa* and *Nirupādhika* Brahman through the medium of *Saguna* and *Sopādhika* Brahman. One can realise the *nirguṇa* Brahman through worship (*upāsana*), prayer etc. of the *saguna*. The worship and prayer is possible if *Saguna* Brahman is accepted. Through *Tatastha lakṣaṇa* we have an idea that He is the creator of this universe and doer of all functions, which helps us to meditate on Him. Through meditation or worship we can transcend this stage and can be identified with Brahman which is *nirguṇa* and *nirupādhika*. At this stage due to our identification we realise oneness in the whole universe which is the state of liberation. When liberation is achieved the idea of *Saguna* and *Sopādhika* Brahman like other phenomenal objects become illusory. To arrive at this stage it is highly essential to accept Brahman having unlimited power of creating the universe, which is described as the *Tatasthalakṣaṇa* of Brahman. In the *Upanisad* such a policy has been taken into account. The Upanisadic seers felt that it is not possible for an ordinary man to realise Brahman of *nirguṇa* and *nirupādhika* nature. That is why, the seers recommend the worshipping of the gods who are described as *Saguna* Brahman. Brahman is introduced to the ordinary human being as creator, protector and sustainer of the Universe like *Prajāpati* or *Hiranyagarbha* etc. This is way of uplifting human mind to receive the attributeless Brahman. In the same manner, it can be said that Brahman is described in various ways for acquaintance as told earlier. If we are not acquainted with the words, relation ^{between} with a word and its meaning, we are not able to get the meaning of the prescriptions and advice of the seers. To acquire the meaning of the Sastric injunction properly the *pramāna* i.e. *Āgama* has to be resorted to. A word and its meaning is

known through some complicated procedures like primary meaning (*Śakyārtha*) attained through potency of a word (*Śakti*), secondary or implicative meaning (*Lakṣyārtha*) through *Lakṣaṇā* i.e. implication.

Fifthly, the Upanasadic seers have suggested three methods of the self-realisation-*śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (thinking) and *nididhyāsana* (meditating). Upanisad provides us a perfect methodology of learning, as it adopts *pariprasna* (questioning) as a method of knowing the Reality.

This questioning presupposes the knowledge of something about which the question is asked. Without the knowledge of an entity no question can be granted. If an object is known fully, no question about it is entertained just a jar existing in broad day light can not be questioned. If there is no necessity of knowing something, the question about it is not entertained. So an enquiry with regard to an object is possible if the object is dubious and if there is any necessity of knowing it. *Vācaspati Mīśra* in his *Bhāmati* commentary has prescribed that *sandigdhatva* (i.e. the state of being dubious) and *saprayojanatva*. (the state of being essential) are the criteria of questionability.¹⁰

It may be argued in this connection that no one could ask question about an object if it is in totally dark or unknown. If an object is partially known and partially unknown, there arises a question about its nature. In other words, an object having having dubious character can be questioned. If an object is known in a general way (*sāmānyanta*) but not in a specific way (*viśeṣataḥ*), the question may be asked the nature of it being dubious. To have a general knowledge of an object *pramāṇa* is essential. For further knowledge in details the methods like *śravaṇa* etc are essential. So far as Brahman is concerned, the general knowledge of it should have to be acquired through *Āgama pramāṇa*. In order to realise the Reality which is confirmed through *Āgama pramāṇa* the methods have to be adopted.

If an object is known roughly, the hearing on it (*śravaṇa*) is possible.¹¹ Hence, epistemology gives a rough idea of an object in which the doubt or conflict, if any, with another *pramāṇa* is removed with the help of some favourable argument. That is, if there is any chance of contradictory view as to particular conclusion drawn by an individual, some mental effort is needed to remove this view and for this some favourable arguments have to be put forth. This method of *manana* is adopted in each and every school or science.¹²

When our minds are settled on an object due to having an accurate knowledge of it, true meditation on this is possible which is called *nididhyāsana* (meditation) without which no serious conclusion can be drawn.¹³ Hence, the *Upanisad* provides us a perfect methodology of research in any field.

Lastly, the grammarians have accepted six meanings of negation of which 'absence' is one. It has been stated by the grammarians "*Tatsādrāśyamabhāvaśca tadanyatvaṁ tadalpataḥ, aprāśastyam virodhaśca nañarthāḥ sat prakīrtitā*".¹⁴ That is, negative particle 'nañ' can be used in the sense of similarity i.e. *Sādrśya* (e.g. *abrāhmaṇa* meaning similar to Brahman^ṅ), in the sense of absence i.e. *abhāva* (e.g. *asat* meaning the absence of honesty), in the sense of mutual difference i.e. *anyatva* (e.g. *aghata* meaning different from a jar), in the sense of less quantity i.e. *alpataḥ* (e.g. *akeśi* meaning less quantity of hair), in the sense of non-suitability (*aprāśastyā*) (e.g. *asamaya* meaning improper time) and in the sense of enmity or contradiction (*virodha*) (e.g. *asura* meaning the enmity with the duties (*suravirodhi*)). Among these six meanings the second one can be applicable in the case of *Advaita* meaning the absence of duality as told earlier. Unless we have an idea of duality we cannot prove its absence. It is sensible to negate something which really exists in this world. To negate something which does not exist in this world is non-sensical. It is very much a futile exercise to prove the non-existence of an object which is absurd. This phenomenon is called *alīkapratīyogitā* — *kābhāva* i.e. an absence, the absentee of which is an absurd entity. If phenomenal existence of duality is an absurd entity, the negation of it is meaningless leading to a futile exercise. To prove the absence of duality (*advaita*) 'duality' has to be accepted as an existent object. In order to know this duality' the different means of knowing (*pramāṇa*) are very much relevant. The realisation of the absence of duality follows from the realisation of Brahman.

It has been shown earlier that metaphysical presuppositions are embedded in different theories of knowledge. Apart from this, even the theories of false cognition which are technically known as *khyātivādas* (theories of error) are formulated after keeping parity with such metaphysical presuppositions. Let us see how such presuppositions work in different theories of error.

When a rope is perceived as snake, it is described as perceived wrongly and reject our earlier cognition as a false cognition. The questions

in the following forms may generally arise. What is the factor which constitutes the falsity of the error? If the falsity ascribed to the apprehension itself or to the content known or to both apprehension and content? These questions are solved by different systems of Indian Philosophy in different ways after following their different presuppositions.

As the false apprehension is possible due to having its character as false from the nature of the content apprehended and as there is the rejection of the content after correction, the nature of false apprehension concerns primarily to the objective content rather than subjective apprehension. Hence, there lies the controversy among different philosophers regarding the nature of false content. There are six principal theories on such issues called *Asatkhyātivāda*, *Ātmakhyātivāda*, *Akhyātivāda*, *Anyathākhyātivāda*, *Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda* and *Satkhyātivāda*.

The first view - *Asatkhyātivāda* is propagated by the Buddhists who are the supporters of nihilism (*śūnyavāda*) who maintain voidness or absolute nothingness of all experiences and contents. Error, according to them, is the cognition of *asa* i.e. non-existent. In the case snake-rope illusion the snake which is falsely known is absolutely non-existence. The former exists nowhere due to its unreality while the later is partially non-existent i.e. existing in one place and non-existing in other places. Sky-flower or hare's horn etc are to be taken as absolutely non-existent objects. A jar may be a relatively non-existent entity. Because it may remain in one place and may not in other place. The imaginary or absurd entities (*alīkapadārthas*) do not exist anywhere. The imaginary fictions may be distinguished into two types - the factually non-existent and the logically impossible. The hare's horn etc belong to the first category as they do not exist as facts. A barren mother belongs to the second category i.e. it is not only non-existent but cannot but be so. According to the nihilists, when someone is in error, he sees an absolute non-existent object in any of the given two senses. When an individual perceives the rope as a snake, he sees not a snake only but a rope that has exposed itself the properties of a snake. In other words, he perceives not a snake as such, but rope-snake. But a snake which is a rope as well is an absurdity. The snake may exist, but a rope-snake is nowhere found except in cognition of the false.

If the view of the *Vijñānavādins* which is known as *Ātmakhyātivāda* is reviewed carefully, it will be seen that they have totally rejected the view of the nihilists regarding error as a contentless cognition that cognises

nothing. To the *Vijñānavādins* such cognition of nothing must also be itself nothing. An error which is identified with the nothingness must be nothing which is not at all an error in the true sense of the term. According to the *Ātmakhyātivāda* error arises from cognising the mental as an extramental real. Blue is the cognition of the blue, but our mind in the case of error cognises it as the extramental blue. The mental fact is thus mistaken as a transcendent meaning. An object cognised is a subjective image, but this is mistakenly taken to be the cognition of an external object. The *Ātmakhyāti* which means the self-cognition of the psychic fact is imagined to be cognition of an objective trans-psychic being. Hence, error is not *asatkhyāti*, the cognition of sheer non-existent, but is the cognition of the subjective state as an objective fact.

The *Prābhākaras* who advocate the view known as *Akhyāti* refute the *Asatkhyāti* and *Ātmakhyāti* views of the Buddhists. They contend that error always involves a given element, the error arising from a confusion of what is so given with the memory-image it calls forth. Hence, error involves both representation and representation something given or presented (*grhīta*) and some representation or image which the presentation calls forth (*smṛta*). The illusory cognition occurs in the failure of the apprehension of distinction between the perceived fact and the memory-image (*yatra yadadhyāsastadvivekāgrahanivandhano bhramah*)¹⁵. In other words, there is the nonapprehension of the distinction (*vivekāgraha*) between presentation and representation which is called *akhyāti*. In the case of snake-rope-illusion the given element lies on the 'rope' and the remembered content is snake. The illusion lies on the non-distinction of the 'rope' represented as 'this' and the 'snake'. This non-distinction gives rise to confusion and leads to the false judgement - 'this is a snake'. The two facts - the given and the remembered are thus amalgamated or confused as one and certain false expectations are aroused as a consequence. The illusion is a negative non-distinguishing of the two experiences, the failure to realise their distinction and duality. From this the *Prābhākaras* believe that illusion is not a positive experience, but a negative non-distinction. Correction is the negation of this non-distinction; it is the assertion of the distinction through the cancellation of the confused non-distinction. As a result there is no positive falsity in error anywhere.¹⁶

The Naiyayikas who propound the *Anyathākhyātivāda* urge that the intrinsic positivity of error is distinct from negative non-distinguishing or *akhyāti*. Every illusion is a single complex experience, but not two things - given and remembered - are falsely confused and non-distinguished as *Prābhākaras* says : In the snake-rope illusion we are not aware of two experiences but of a single complex experience of a perceived 'this' appearing to be a 'snake'. At the time of correction a single is rejected. That is, 'this snake' that was falsely perceived through the influence of the defects of sense, media etc. The illusion is a unitary composite presentation of 'this 'snake', the 'this' being presented through the natural (*laukika*) contact of the visual sense and the object lying before it, and the 'snake' being also presented through the extra-ordinary (*alaukika*) contact of the visual sense with the 'snake' perceived elsewhere. It is an error as being a unitary presentative experience of a presented 'this' in the form of an extraordinary perception of the 'snake' with which it is objectively unconnected. The snake is perceived as a real snake, and the snake-character or feature perceived in it inheres in an elsewhere snake, i.e. not in the locus of the 'this' which is presented to the eye by natural contact but in the 'snake' that exists elsewhere. This error thus consists in a complicated perception of the extraordinarily seen snake-character of the jungle-snake as inhering in the 'this' that is seen by the external sense organ viz, the eye, by natural contact of sense and object.

Now we may look at the metaphysical presuppositions as found in the formulation of the *Anirvacanīyākhyātivāda* by Sankara. Error, according to Sankarites, involves more than ~~it~~ ^{the} experience of a false relation. It is the experience of a unitary false content, not the experience of a false relation between real contents. Sankara concludes that every error involves an unreal positivity or positive unreality. It is neither the cognition of a sheer negation as found in *Asatkhyātivāda* nor a cognition of an object existing elsewhere as found in the *Anyathākhyātivāda*. It is a positive experience and hence it is the experience of a positive content. That which is absolutely *asat* (non-existent) cannot be the content of a positive experience, while every error is a positive experience. When a rope is cognised as a snake, the status of snake is not *asat* or non-existent as we cognise it in the rope it is not *sat* (existent also) as the cognition of it is sublated by the subsequent knowledge of rope. Hence, the snake is neither existent nor non-existent

which is described as indescribable (*anīrvacanīya*). This illusory cognition is taken as a real which is of apparent type (*prātibhāsikasattā*).

Rāmānuja rejects the *Anīrvacanīyakhyātivāda* of Sankara and regards error as consisting in the apprehension of a partial truth as the whole truth. Their theory is known as *Satkhyātivāda* according to which error is neither the apprehension of the sheer nothingness nor of any indescribable object. It is simply the cognition of a partial feature as the only and the exclusive feature of an object. Thus when a rope is cognised as a snake, the cogniser perceives a real snake-feature in the rope existing before him. He does not perceive nothing nor does he perceive any elsewhere snake-character nor again any indescribable snake. On the contrary, he perceives a real 'here and now' snake-character in the object lying before him 'here and now'. His mistake consists not in perceiving anything false or unreal, but in considering the snake-character to be the only characteristics of the objects lying before. That is why, the cognition does not work in life and the cogniser acting on the suggestion of such in perfect knowlddge comes to grief in the practical affairs of life.

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2. Ādye pramānacaitanyasya viśayāvachinnacaitanyābheda its brumah Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣaparicched).
3. yatra yathā tadāgodakam chidrānirgatya kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya tadvadeva catuṣkonādyākārān bhavati. Tathā tajjasamantaḥkaranamapi cakṣurādīdvārā nirgatya ghatādiviśayadeśam gatvā ghatādiviśayākārjña parinamate. Sa eva parināmo vṛttirucyate", *Ibid.*
4. "Pramātrabhedo nama na tāvadaikyam. Kintu pramātrsattā-tiriktasattākatvābhāvah," *Ibid.*
5. *Kāvya prakāśa, Vṛtti, 4/28.*
6. 'Satyamjñānāmanantam brahma' Vedāntaparibhāṣā (viśayapariccheda)
7. "Yāvallakṣyakālamānavasthitatve sati yadvyāvartakam", *Ibid.*
8. 'Nanu svarūpasya svavṛttivābhāvena katham lakṣaṇatvamiti cenna. Svasyaiva svāpekṣayā dharmadharmibhāvakaḥkalpanayā lakṣya-lakṣaṇatvasambhavāt.'
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10. *Bhāmātī* on Adhyāsabhāṣya.
11. "Śravaṇam nāma vedāntānām advitiya brahmani tātparyāvadhāraṇānukūla mānāsī kriyā". *Vedāntaparibhāṣā (prayojana - pariccheda).*

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CHAPTER II

THE ADVAITA CONCEPTS OF PRAMĀ AND PRAMĀNA

Of all the systems of Philosophy Pūrva^{Others}mīmāṃsā and Vedānta follow the Vedas, as closely as possible, the latter relying on Śruti confirmed by reason and realisation. But there is a difference between these two systems. Pūrva^{Others}mīmāṃsā is a staunch believer in the ceremonial portion or ritualistic portion of the Vedas which is called *karmakāṇḍa*, while the Advaita Vedānta lays the emphasis, and justly so, on the philosophical portion called *Jñānakāṇḍa* consisting of the Upanishads. Another point of difference between two systems that the Advaita Vedānta believes in the Vedas originated from God while the Mīmāṃsā holds that they are eternal and do not depend on any agent. The essential identity with Brahman, the unreality of the world etc have been discussed in the Advaita Vedānta. The means of attaining liberation like hearing, reflection and meditation by the qualified aspirants have been clearly shown. Incidentally, the place of worship (*upāsana*) and rites, as preparing the ground for the higher form of practice, has been indicated. There is no difficulty in harmonising these apparently conflicting standpoints, if it is considered that the scriptures provide different ways of approach to the Highest Truth according to the temperament and capacity of the aspirant. As the one and indivisible Brahman appears through the veil of *māyā*, the manifold universe will disappear at the moment a person realises his identity with Brahman, an identity that has never been lost.

In Indian Philosophy four types of human end is accepted. These human pursuits are righteousness (*dharma*), wealth or property (*artha*), object of desire (*kāma*) and liberation (*mokṣa*). Among these, liberation (*mokṣa*) is considered as Supreme human end because it alone is eternal. The eternality of liberation is sanctioned by Śruti texts - '*na sa punarāvartate*' i.e it does not return (*Chandagyopanisad* - viii, xv, 1). On the other hand, the other three that are called *trivarga* are known as transitory by direct means of knowing (*pratyakṣa*) or from the Śruti texts - '*Tadyatheha karmacito lokah kṣiyate, evamevamutra punyacito lokah kṣiyate*' i.e., as in this world the comforts attained through one's labour are exhausted, so in the other world the comforts achieved through one's good actions are exhausted

(*Chandagyopanisad* - viii. 1.6). The transitoriness of wealth (*artha*) and desire (*kāma*) is known through perception. But so far as righteousness (*dharma*) is concerned, it cannot be perceived due to its imperceptible character. Hence, the transitoriness of it is known through the above-mentioned Śruti - texts. When it is said - '*ksīṇe puṇye punaḥ martalokam viśanti*' i.e. an individual again enters the mortal world through the expiry of the result of his good deed, it also suggests the same conclusion that righteousness (*dharma*) is also noneternal in nature.

In order to get rid of this world and worldly suffering it is always advisable to attain the Supreme human pursuit called liberation or *mokṣa*. This attainment of liberation (*mokṣa*) presupposes the knowledge of the external world which has to be transcended. For this reason Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has dealt with the instrument of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). That which is the means of valid cognition is called *Pramāṇa*. The concept of *pramāṇa* would become inconceivable if the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) is not properly understood. That is why, the definition of *Pramā* i.e. valid cognition is put forth by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra at the outset of his epistemological work - *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.¹

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has provided two definitions of valid cognition (*Pramā*) after keeping the long-drawn controversy among the philosophers of different schools of Indian Philosophy regarding the validity of memory (*smṛti*) in view. He has not expressed his own opinion regarding this controversial issue. He simply gives two definitions of valid cognition (*pramā*) : one excluding memory (*smṛtivyāvṛttajm*) and another including memory (*smṛtisādhāraṇa*).

It would not be uncalled for here to say a few lines on the arguments in favour of the invalidity of memory before going to discuss the Advaita concept of *pramā*. Generally memory (*smṛti*) is defined as '*samskāramātrajanayam jñānam*' (the cognition arising out of the impression alone). The element of impression (*samskāra*) is inevitable for each and every manifestation of knowledge, but all are not memory. Most of the cases are recognitive. When a jar is known as such, it is known through the light of past experience which generated an impression in our mind. Hence, *Pratyabhijñā* (recognitive cognition) is *Samskārajanyam jñāna* (i.e. cognition generated through impression).

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has dealt at length on the definitions of valid cognition (*pramā*). He was completely aware of

the controversies on the status of recollective cognition or memory or *smṛti* in the realm of cognition. The Indian thinkers differ regarding its validity. Most of the Indian thinkers do not want to give a status of valid cognition to memory on account of the fact that in case of memory there is the chance of mistake. It has already been said that the memory is always generated by impression 'alone' (*saṃskāramātrajanya*). In *Tarkasamgraha* the term '*mātra*' has been explained as 'generated by impression not being caused by something other than the impression' (*saṃskāretarājanyatve sati saṃskārajanyatvam*)². It is true that impression serves the function of recognising an object. When we recognise a jar as such, it is known through the impression of the earlier experience of a jar. No determinate cognition (*savikalpakajñāna*) is possible without the help of earlier impression (*saṃskāra*). Hence, this type of cognition is recognitive cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) which is completely different from memory. Though some of the later thinkers have given thought in favour of the validity of memory, Dharmarāja did not want to enter into the complications initially. Hence, he did not provide any opinion of his own regarding the validity of memory. He had started his philosophical discussion on the concept of valid cognition (*pramā*) in a very integrated way. He respectfully mentioned both the definitions after 'honouring the views of both the philosophers who accept or do not accept memory as a valid cognition. In this connection he did not pass his own judgement.

The first definition which excludes memory from the purview of the valid cognition runs as follows : '*pramātvamanadhi-gatāvādhitarthaviṣayakajñānatvam*'. that is, a valid cognition is a cognition having some object as its content which is unacquired (*anadhigata*) and uncontradicted (*avādhita*)³. It is said that each and every valid cognition is primarily a cognition. But this cognition must have an object as its content (*arthaviṣayaka*). It may be argued that if there is a cognition, it must be a cognition of something. In other words, 'cognition' means 'cognition of'. Generally there cannot be a cognition without any content (*aviṣayaka*). If it is so, the term '*arthaviṣayaka*' incorporated in the definition is superfluous. In response to this problem Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra is of the opinion that, so far as the Advaita Vedānta is concerned, cognition is of two types - having some content (*saviṣayaka*) and having no content (*aviṣayaka*). As Brahman is knowledge, Bliss and Infinitude (*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*), Brahman is equivalent to knowledge etc. Hence, it is knowledge, but having

no content. Because this is not 'the knowledge of Brahman', but Brahman itself is knowledge. That which is in the form of knowledge is the embodiment of knowledge which has no content. Apart from this there is another type of cognition which apprehends the objects existing in the mundane world. Hence, such cognition is not a bare cognition but 'cognition of something'. When we have a cognition of a jar etc, it is *saviṣayaka* or having a content like jar etc. The definition of valid cognition under consideration covers the cognition of the objects existing in the empirical world. The transcendental cognition does not come under the purview of this definition. In order to prove this or in order to exclude such knowledge from the purview of *pramā* the term '*arthaviṣayaka*' is included in the definition. Because it is the definition of valid cognition of the objects that are available in the empirical world.⁴

Now the question may arise as to the significance of the term '*anadhigata*' i.e. unacquired as an adjunct of the object. In fact, this term has been used only to exclude memory from the purview of valid cognition. The unacquired object is that which is novel or new, but not the repetition of the earlier cognition which is already acquired (*adhigata*).

If this is accepted, there would arise the problem of recognition of the earlier object as having such and such characteristics. In the case of determinate cognition (*savikalpakajñāna*) we can recognise an object as such through the light of the past impression gathered from the experience. Moreover, when we keep looking towards an object for a period of time, it is called persistent cognition (*dhārāvṛthikajñāna*). If the adjunct '*anadhigata*' is kept in fact, such type of cognition would not come under the jurisdiction of valid cognition (*pramā*). If it is not taken as valid cognition, how can our day to day behaviour be explained? Because, determinate cognition is inevitable for our daily behaviour and persistent cognition is also a common phenomenon in our practical life. Hence, it is very difficult to our common sense to believe that these cognitions are not valid or these are illusory.

In response to the above mentioned problem, Dharmarāja offers a suggestion. To him the term '*anadhigata*' (unacquired) does not create any problem of the above mentioned type. To him each and every piece of cognition is new due to having difference of spatio-temporal factors. When we keep looking towards an object for a few moments, it is new in each and every moment, because a moment becomes a qualifier or differentiating factor from others. When a jar is cognised at the first moment, it is not repeated in the second, because the second moment is the adjunct which differentiates

it from the first one. In the same way, the object seen in the third moment is differentiated from the earlier ones due to having this particular span of time i.e. third moment. In this way, each and every cognition belonging to a persistent knowledge is to be taken as 'new', "novel" or unacquired (*anadhigata*).⁵

There is another significant term *avādhita* (uncontradicted) in the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) given by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra. It is said that any knowledge which is contradicted by the subsequent knowledge is called *vādhita*. The cognition of an object which is not contradicted is called *avādhita*. When a snake is known as such, it is called *avādhita*. When the same snake is known in the place of rope, it is called *vādhita*. The valid cognition should have an object as its content which must be uncontradicted. It may otherwise be explained as follows. When a snake is known as such, it is uncontradicted which is explained by the Naiyāyikas as a *tadvati tatprakārahakam jñānam* i.e., the piece of cognition where something remains, a qualifier in an object in which that something really exists. That is, when an object called 'X' is known to be X when there is really the object 'X'. In the same way, it can be said that a cognition having snakesness as a qualifier in an object where there really a snake is (*sarpavavati sarpavaprakārahakam jñānam*). If, on the other hand, there is the knowledge of a snake in a piece of rope where there is no snake at all (*sarpavāvabhāvavati sarpavaprakārahakam jñānam*), it is called contradicted cognition or false cognition (*apramā*).

In order to distinguish a valid cognition from the invalid one, the term *avādhita* is incorporated as an adjunct of object.

It may be argued that the whole world becomes contradicted to an individual who realises the self. The whole world is nothing but the manifestation of Brahman or self as evidenced in the *Śruti* : '*sarvam khalvidam Brahma*' '*Tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti*'. When an individual realises this, he becomes identical with Self. Hence, each and every object loses its individual identity and seems to be manifestation of Self. It is said in the initial *mantra* of the *Īsopaniṣad* that the whole world is covered by Consciousness. In other words, whatever found in the phenomenal world is nothing but the manifestation of the Self (*Īśāvāsyamidam sarvam yat kinca jagatyām jagat*).

As ontologically there is no duality, one feels one's existence in every object of the world. Hence, there cannot be any exploitation of others and

one should not feel greedy towards others' properties. There is a state when there is enjoyment through renunciation ("*tena tyaktena bhujñithā mā grdhah kasyasvidghanam*" (1st mantra of *Isōpaniṣad*)).

If this situation prevails, no object is known as having individual characteristic but as the manifestation of Brahman or Self. When a jar etc are known as ^{such} self (but not as a ^{self} jar etc), they are contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman. Hence no cognition is possible which remains uncontradicted (*avādhita*). Why is the term incorporated in the definition? In reply Dharmarāja has argued that in the transcendental stage all cognitions are contradicted by the knowledge of Brahman. Hence, the phenomenon of 'uncontradiction' is not available at all. In order to remove such problem Dharmarāja has opined that the incorporation of the term *avādhita* suggests that such cognition is limited to the phenomenal world (*vyavahārikajagat*) but not to the transcendental world. The question of object of knowledge comes if there is duality or subject-object-relationship. This duality remains under the purview of the phenomenal world.⁶

■

The term '*anadhigata*' means 'unacquired' or 'novel'. Actually the term has been incorporated in order to exclude memory-cognition from the purview of the valid cognition, which is indicated by the term *smṛtivyāvṛtta*.⁷ Though Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra did not pass any judgement of his own regarding the tenability of the memory as a valid cognition, it is assumed that he was in favour of not accepting memory as a valid cognition. This assumption is grounded on his mention of the above-mentioned definition and its substantiation through some arguments. The term '*anadhigata*' means 'that which is not acquired earlier'. That which is not acquired earlier is called 'novel'. It must apprehend something new, which was not known before. Recollection is the memory of an object, which was perceived earlier. It does not add any thing new to our knowledge. It is simply reproduction of the previous perception. So it should not be regarded as strictly valid cognition. To them valid cognition acquaints us with something new. In other words, novelty is a characteristic feature of truth. From this the memory-cognition is excluded from the purview of valid cognition, no doubt, but it also excludes the recognitive cognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Memory-cognition is generated through our earlier impression alone (*samskāramātrajanya*) while recognitive cognition is caused by the impression of the past experience

associated with the presence of the object (*samskārajanya* but not *samskāramātrajanya*). If it said that the object of the cognition is *anadhigata* i.e. not known earlier, it excludes both memory and recognitive cognition, because recognitive cognition is not *anadhigata* but acquired earlier. If memory-cognition is accepted as invalid, there is some justification as the content is not verifiable due to the absence of it. Due to its non-verifiability there is every chance of committing mistake or acquiring a mistaken cognition. Hence, there is no guarantee that such cognition (*pratybhijñā*) would be veridical. But so far as recognitive cognition (*pratybhijñā*), is concerned it is not at all invalid, because it can help us to lead our day-to-day behaviour. As the term *anadhigata* is incorporated in the definition, it cannot justify the recognitive cognition, as it is already acquired (*adhigata*) and hence not new.

Keeping the earlier objection in view Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra perhaps has tried to justify the *lokavyavahāra* i.e. day-to-day behaviour in the light of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*), which does not solve the real problem. To him an object known for a period of time is called persistent cognition of the same. When we keep looking at the table, for example, it is not the same object seen for a period of time but it is, different in different moment. The table seen in the first moment is completely different from that seen in the second moment. In the same way, the table in the second moment is different from that occurring in the third. To him it is the temporal factor, which differentiates one from the other. Hence, an object existing in each and every moment is completely new (*anadhigata*), but not repeated what is already acquired (*adhigata*).⁸

This justification cannot really solve the earlier problem of recognitive cognition. If each and every object is temporally different from each other and if it is new, how is an object recognized as identical in other occasion? If it is accepted that each and every object is new or unacquired, it will lead to the non-acceptance of recognition or recognitive cognition, which is accepted as valid in Advaita Vedānta system. In other words, this definition does not cover such recognitive cognition and hence there arises the defect of *avyāpti* here. If it is accepted that, though an object is different in different moment, and hence new, there are some similarities between two pieces of cognition which make the recognition possible, these two pieces of cognition cannot be taken as completely new or novel de to having some old characters in it. When a jar is recognized as a jar in the light of the old one, it may be

said that the new is completely different from the old one as this occupies different time in compare to the old one, which also occupied a different time. When a particular sword used by Tipu Sultan, as for example, is seen by an individual in the museum and accepted as 'This is that sword used by Tipu Sultan', how is the old sword used by Tipu Sultan recognized as such? The sword used by Tipu Sultan and seen by me belongs to different time and hence they should be used as new or novel (*anadhigata*). But if it is so, how is the recognition of the sword used by Tipu Sultan possible? It is a fact that the recognition is possible and this recognition presupposes some sort of identity between them. If identity is there or if some identical features are there, these are not different or new though they belong to different time-span. Rather it would be a happier expression if it is said as acquired or *adhigata*. If the acquiredness of such cognition of sword used by Tipu Sultan is not accepted, the question of its recognition does not arise at all. Hence the term *anadhigata* as an adjunct to the object cannot justify all types of valid cognitions.

Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has already described such type of recognitive cognition as indeterminate perceptual cognitions (*nirvikalpakapratyakṣa*). It is paradoxical to the Advaitins that they have accepted unacquired or new cognition as a valid cognition (*pramā*) on the one hand and *nirvikalpaka*-perceptual cognition on the other. The acceptance of one is contradictory to another. The Advaitins have given two examples of such cognition—one from the secular world and another from the Vedic text.⁹ 'This is that Devadatta' (*so'yaṁ devadattah*) is from the secular world which points to the recognitive cognition, as the present Devadatta is identified with the past Devadatta. In other words, there is an identity between the consciousness limited by Devadatta and the consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of Devadatta as our inner organ called *antahkaraṇa* goes out of the body and assumes the form of Devadatta.¹⁰ Though the present Devadatta and past Devadatta are different in terms of time and though they are not completely identical yet there is an essential identity (*svarūpa-gatatādātmya*) between them, which entails that they are not completely unacquired (*anadhigata*). The example cited from the Upaniṣadic text bears the same import. The *Mahāvākya - Tattvamasi* (Thou art That) signifies the essential identity between two - 'Thou' (*tvam*) and 'That' (*taṁ*) i.e., *Brahman* or *Ātman*. Both are taken to be different due to having the specific characters in them. The former has got

an atomic (*anu*) power while the latter is endowed with all-pervasive power (*vibhu*). In spite of this an identity between them is asserted from the standpoint of essence (*svarūpagata*). In this case, there is the identification of the knower referred by the term 'thou' and the object referred to by the term 'That'.¹¹ In this case also the phenomenon of *anadhigatatva* does not exist, leading to the falsity of the *nirvikalpaka*-cognition or recognitive cognition. If such *nirvikalpaka*-cognition is proved as falsified, it would lead to the falsity of the *Mahāvākya* which is suicidal to the Advaitins. For, the import of the *Mahāvākyas* makes a platform to realize the Ultimate Reality. The falsity of the *Mahāvākyas* leads to the falsity of the whole metaphysical presuppositions. Hence, the term *anadhigata* creates confusion in the Advaita Vedānta system of Philosophy and it should be excluded from the definition. Moreover, the sentence '*Tattvamasi*' (Thou art That) is taken as an example of *jahadajahallakṣaṇā* (i.e., a *lakṣaṇā* which partly forsakes and accepts its primary meaning) according to some Advaitins. In this sentence the absolute identity between an individual being (*jīva*) and Brahman is rejected and essential identity between them is accepted. By virtue of being a specific type of *Lakṣaṇā* the sentence provides us a valid cognition though the character of being *anadhigata* is not there.¹² Hence, the exclusion of the term may easily be recommended from this standpoint also.

Dharmarāja Adhvarindra has made an effort to justify the fact of being unacquired by introducing the concept of persistent cognition (*dhārāvāhikajñāna*).¹³ To consider a piece of cognition as occupying a moment is an attempt to justify the theory of momentariness as accepted by the Buddhists. The Buddhists are consistent in propagating the theory of momentariness, as they believe in the theories of *svalakṣaṇa*, no-soul or permanent entities like *sāmānya* etc. For the Advaitins such a theory of momentariness is not at all supportable because the Advaitins believe in the existence of permanent Self but not in *svalakṣaṇa* etc. As the Advaitins have accepted a different set of presuppositions, the theory of momentariness does not find its entry in the Advaita framework. When the Advaitins formulate the theories of the perceptuality of cognition of an object (*jñānagatapratyakṣa*) and the perceptuality of object (*visayagatapratyakṣa*), they recommend the amalgamation of different limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) of the Consciousness like *visayacaitanya* (the Consciousness limited by object), *pramāṇacaitanya* (Consciousness limited by mental mode) etc.¹⁴ How can an amalgamated situation be a momentary one? Even if it is

accepted as momentary, how can it be known as perception of a jar or the perception of the cognition of a jar? All these problems remain unresolved if the term '*anadhigata*' is not withdrawn from the definition.

The famous commentary *Sikhāmani* has raised some of these problems. To him the term '*anadhigata*' does not mean that some thing is not caused by impression (*samskāra*), but he would like to suggest that memory-cognition is caused by the impression and there does not arise any question of over coverage to such cognition. Those who believe in the instrumentality of a sign admit that in an inferential cognition *sādhya* is inferred through a sign, which is in the form of impression, and hence a sign seen earlier is recognized elsewhere with the help of impression. From this one can raise a question of the defect of *avyāpti* to all the cases of inferential cognition (*anumitimātre*) and also to the case of recognitive cognition (*pratyabhijñā*). As all entities excepting Brahman are illusory according to the Advaitins, they are caused by the impression of earlier experience and hence the definition of *pramā* cannot be applied there due its lack of novelty (*anadhigata*) in them. In the like manner, any type of illusory cognition does not come under the purview of the valid cognition through the insertion of the term '*anadhigata*' and there arises a contingency of losing the import of the term '*avādhita*' incorporated in the definition. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, however, has tried to give an explanation of the term '*anadhigata*', which also cannot solve the problems raised earlier. The term '*anadhigata*' means something having an object invariably, which is not the property of something existing in the immediate preceding moment. (*Anadhigatatvam ca svavyavahitapūrvakṣanavrttidharmaviśayaviśayatvena niyatatvam*).¹⁵ Let us explain this with the help of an example following the line of *Maniprabhā*. Here the term '*sva*' stands for the cognition of a jar. The property existing in the immediate preceding moment is the cognition of cloth etc., the object of which is the cloth etc. The cognition in the form of a jar is endowed with the substratumness determined by the contentness of a jar, which is different from the cloth etc. (*'svamayam ghata iti jñānam tasmādvavyavahitapūrvakṣanavrttidharmah patah ityādijñānātmako dharmastasya viśayah patādistadbhinnaghataviśayatvanirūpitādhikarānatāvattvamayam ghata iti jñāne iti lakṣanasam anvayah*).¹⁶ There is the cognition of X which is endowed with the substratumness determined by having the contentness of X which is completely different from Y etc. whose property is in the form of cognition of Y etc. remaining in the immediate

preceding moment. In other words, an object is known as having substratumness determined by having the contentness of that particular object which is different from another cognition having an object occurring in the preceding moment. If there is the cognition of X endowed with the substratumness determined by having the contentness of X which is completely identical with the X occurring in the previous preceding moment, it would be taken as *adhigata* (acquired) as opposed to *anadhigata* (unacquired). Even if this interpretation of *anadhigatatva* is taken into account, memory-cognition can be excluded from the purview of *pramā*, but not other types of cognition like recognitive cognition etc. Because, in the case of recognition etc. the same object remains in the preceding moment or earlier than this. On account of this the phenomenon of recognition is possible. The problems raised earlier remain unresolved even the new interpretation of the term *anadhigata* is taken into account. If such definition is accepted for granted, the cognition in the form of Brahman being alone real the cognition of a jar etc becomes illusory and hence there arises the defect of *avyāpti*, which cannot be removed resulting in the lack of usefulness of the term *anadhigata* inserted in the definition. It may be argued that as valid memory-cognition leads us always to the successful inclination (*niyatasamvādipravṛtti*), it comes under the purview of *pramā* (valid cognition) and hence it being a defiedum of a valid cognition cannot be said that it leads to the probability of the uselessness of the term *anadhigata*. In response to this it is said that the term serves the purpose of excluding the use of something which is the qualifier of being a valid cognition other than the previously mentioned one i.e. right memory-cognition. Under such circumstances the validity of the capability of successful inclination (*samvādipravṛtityupa-yuktaprāmānyam*) would not be determined as a criterion of valid cognition. In order to indicate this, the adjunct *anadhigata* in the definition is justified. In other words, the fact of successful inclination of cognition presupposes its previous cognition, which is certainly *adhigata* in character. The mention of the term *anadhigata* at least removes the possibility of excluding successful inclination as a criterion of valid cognition.¹⁷ In this connection it may be said that if such case is excluded with use of the term *anadhigata*, what is the utility of another term *avādhita* inserted in the definition ?

In response to this Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has inserted the term *avādhita* as an adjunct of object, which entails that the cognition of an object

existing in the phenomenal world i.e. in the transmigratory state must not be contradicted or sublated by the latter cognition in the phenomenal i.e. in the transmigratory state but not in the transcendental level. It implies ^{the} factual consistency or agreement with given facts, which have an empirical reality. The Advaita Vedānta recognizes the empirical reality of the world, but not its ontological reality. The knowledge of plurality as found in the phenomenal level is contradicted by the intuition of identity of the Absolute. The term *avādhita* can test the truth of an object in the empirical level.¹⁸ The insertion of the term *avādhita* again creates some philosophical confusion in this context. How can an object be adjudged as uncontradicted? If there is cognition in the form: 'It is raining outside', the question may be raised how the truth-value of such sentence can be determined. Definitely we have to look outside whether the incident described in the sentence is true or false, which will go in favour of *parataḥprāmāṇyavāda* not accepted by the Advaitins. As they believe in the *svataḥprāmāṇyavāda* (i.e., the extrinsic validity of truth), the enquiry of the truth of a sentence cannot be experience-independent. If it is said - 'The sentence is either true or false', it can easily be said that the sentence is true without going out of the sentence i.e., intrinsically true. It is stated by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra that the validity is intrinsically known. The meaning of term *svataḥ* is as follows. The collocation of causes, which can reveal the object existing in it, can also reveal its validity if and only if there is the absence of defect.¹⁹ The substratum of it is the knowledge of *vṛtti* or mental mode, which can reveal the witness (*sākṣī*). If the cognition of *vṛtti* is apprehended, it can apprehend the validity of it also. It has already been said that the various transformations of *antaḥkaraṇaḥ* or mind are called *vṛtti*. As this *vṛtti* is known through the witness, the validity existing in it is also known through the same witness. It may be argued that if it is accepted that the validity is *svataḥ*, there does not arise any question of the doubt of validity. Because in each and every case witness will reveal the knowledge of *vṛtti* resulting in the knowledge of intrinsic validity. Under this situation there does not arise any question of the doubt of validity, which is contrary to the fact. In fact, we generally feel the doubt of validity. The previous sentence is not like this and hence the truth-value of such sentence can be determined extrinsically, which goes in favour of *parataḥprāmāṇyavāda*, which is not accepted by the Advaitins leading to a paradoxical situation. In response to this objection the Advaitins may rejoin that the term *avādhita* is incorporated in order to remove the defect of

ativyāpti (over coverage) to an illusory cognition of an indeterminate object (*anirvacanīyaviṣayabhrame' tivyāptivāranārthamuktamavādhiteti*). In spite of this the problem cannot be solved. What is to be understood by the term '*anirvacanīyaviṣaya*'? The object, which is inexpressible through language, does not come under the purview of contradiction (*vādhitatva*). If an object is mistaken as an indeterminate object, there is a chance of taking it as valid cognition. In order to exclude such cognition from the purview of valid cognition, the term *avādhita* has been incorporated. If cognition is without any description, there does not arise any question of contradiction (*vādhitatva*). In this connection it can be said that an indeterminate cognition is neither true nor false due to the absence of proper description. On account of this it is very difficult to say that there is *vādhitatva* or *avādhitatva*. Even if it is accepted that the term *anirvacanīya* is taken in the sense of some indescribable phenomena that are unseen in character, the term *avādhita* does not stand in the eye of logic. *Maniprabhā* further adds that when an individual is having an illusory cognition, the cognition of the earlier object seen in different space is acquired and hence there is the lack of the cognition of an object, which is not known earlier. As the content of an illusory cognition remains acquired due to the absence of the content, which is unacquired in nature, the adjunct *anadhigata* does not remain here. In order to exclude such cognition from the purview of valid cognition the term *avādhita* is inserted in the definition.²¹ The previously mentioned problem cannot be resolved even if this term is incorporated for this purpose for the reason mentioned earlier.

Again the term '*arthaviṣayaka*' generates some problems in the following manner. The term literally means 'having some object as its content' of cognition. A question may be raised as to the incorporation of the term '*artha*' as an adjunct to object (*viṣaya*). The *viṣayaka* means a cognition having an object, which is characterized by the adjuncts *anadhigata* and *avādhita*. Hence there is no justification for incorporating the term *artha*; rather it leads us to a kind of tautology. The expression 'the cognition must have an object as its content' means 'the cognition must have an object.' The term 'as its content' (*artha*) is, I think, superfluous, because an object always remains in cognition without being its content. In the phenomenal level the knowledge means knowledge of something. Hence the term '*viṣayaka*' instead of *arthaviṣayaka* would have been more justified. Through the insertion of the term Brahman that is Knowledge having no object

(*aviṣayaka*) can easily be excluded from the purview of the definition, which is meant for the knowledge of the phenomenal objects. However, one justification may be offered in favour of the Advaitins. In this connection, the term '*viṣayaka*' is not to be taken as 'having some object', but as 'having some relation with'. From this the term '*arthaviṣayaka*' would mean 'having some relation with content'. In other words, the *viṣayatā* in this particular context exists in the content, which is technically called *arthaniṣthaviṣayatā*. *Viṣayatā* generally exists in three places in the qualificandness called *viśeṣyatāniṣthaviṣayatā*, in the qualifierness called *viśeṣanatāniṣthaviṣayata* and in the relationness called *sansargatāniṣthaviṣayatā*. By the term '*arthaviṣayaka*' Dharmarāja wants to mean that the contentness exists in the qualificandness in the form of *artha* (*artharūpaviśeṣyatāniṣthaviṣayatā*). As the term *viṣaya* is taken in the sense of a relation, there is no scope of the defect of tautology.

In another way the problem may be solved. If external picture tallies with what is described in the sentence, it is true. If otherwise, it is false. In this way, the validity of truth is determined. This method is called *parataḥprāmānya* or extrinsic validity of truth, which is advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers, Buddhists etc. But the Advaitins believe in the intrinsic validity (*svataḥprāmānya*) of truth as their philosophy is *Śruti*-dependent. Whatever said in the *Śruti* or *Āgama* is not always verifiable. Hence, they are to be taken as true *ab initio*. Moreover, *Śruti* or *Āgama* can never be fallible as they are *apauruṣeya* or not competed by ordinary human beings. Hence they have no other alternatives than to accept their validity without any verification.

Let us come to the earlier problem of *Avādhitatva* i.e. uncontradict^{ed}ness. If truth is ascertained initially or intrinsically, it is to be presumed as *avādhita*, because there is no scope to test its uncontradictedness. If we would like to attain a confirmed cognition of its uncontradicted character, we have to wait for sometime to see whether our experience can contradict the cognition or not. If the property of being uncontradicted is verified in terms of experience, it comes under *parataḥprāmānyavāda* i.e. the theory of extrinsic validity of truth which is not ontologically accepted by the Advaitins.

In order to avoid such complications Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra emphatically says that the validity of truth must be determined intrinsically (*svataḥ*). The intrinsic nature is explained in the following manner. ~~When~~ ^A a

cognition is known to be valid through the collocation of causes through which an object existing in self in the form of *vṛtti* is known if and only if there is an absence of defect (*svatogrāhyañca doṣābhāve sati yāvatsvāśrayagrāhaka-samagrigrāhyatvam*). In Advaita Vedānta system our inner organ (*antahkaraṇa*) goes out of the body and assumes the shape of the object which is called *vṛtti* (mental mode) just as water flowing through canal etc assumes the form of canal etc. An object in the form of a mental mode is known ^{and} the validity of the mental mode is known simultaneously, which is called *svataḥprāmānya*. In this connection, it should always be borne in mind that the phrase - '*doṣābhāve sati*' (being associated with the absence of defect) is very much significant. The causal collocation i.e, *sākṣī* etc of an object in the form of mental mode can also reveal its validity if there is no impediment in the form of defects like too much proximity (*atisāmīpya*), too much remoteness (*atidūratva*), miopia etc.

If there are certain defects then there may arise the doubt of validity. Validity would follow automatically or intrinsically if there is the absence of defects and if there is an awareness of an object's own locus i.e, *vṛtti* or mental mode giving no scope to entertain the doubt of validity. In the ^{case} of doubt the cognition of mental mode is apprehended through witness, but there does not arise the cognition of validity due to having defect related to doubt.²²

It may be argued that how the invalidity of cognition (*aprāmānya*) is possible. In response to this it is said by Dhramarāja that the invalidity of a cognition is not caused by the collocation of conditions through which the cognition is originated, because it would be unduly extended to the valid cognition also. If the same collocation of conditions responsible for the origination of a particular cognition is accepted as cause of both the validity and invalidity of cognition, it would be very difficult to differentiate between *prāmānya* (validity) and *aprāmānya* (invalidity) of a cognition. If this criterion is accepted then the valid cognition would come under the purview of *apramā*. In other words, there would arise the possibility of invalidity to the valid cognition also if the above-mentioned criterion is taken for granted. Hence it is better to accept that the invalidity is always caused by some defect.²³

Now we may turn to our previous problem regarding the justifiability of inserting the term '*avādhita*' as an adjunct of *artha* i.e. object which becomes the content of cognition. From the interpretation of *svataḥprāmānya* (intrinsic validity) given above we shall have no problem of accepting intrinsic validity

of truth even though the term *avādhita* is inserted in the definition. As per the interpretation given earlier an object is to be taken as *avādhita* or uncontradicted if no defect (*doṣa*) is found on the way of our understanding. If there were any defect, the object would be taken as contradicted or *vādhita* leading to the invalidity (*aprāmānya*) of the cognition. When an object is apprehended, we shall have to be careful about the fact that there is the absence of defects (*daśābhāva*), which is the precondition of knowing the validity of the cognition. Otherwise it is to be taken as invalid. In this way all the problems may be solved.

If the Advaita view on *Pramā* is reviewed carefully, it would correspond to the Western theory of coherence. We may give a brief account of the four theories regarding truth according to the West.

According to a view, the truth of knowledge depends on its practical value. That which enjoins us with the practical object is called a right cognition. In other words, the cognition which leads us to serve some purpose or end-in-view is called a right one (*yataśca arthasiddhiḥ tat samyagjñānam - Nyāyabindu*). It is supported mainly by the Buddhist logicians like Dharmakīrti. To him the right cognition is that which reveals an object and leads to serve some purpose or successful inclination (*Tataḥ arthakriyā-samartha-vastu-pradarśakam samyagjñānam - Nyāyabindu*). In the West such theory is called pragmatic theory. A cognition of an object is said to be true if it gives rise to serve some end technically called *arthakriyākārī*. The cognitions of sky-flower etc are invalid as they cannot lead us to serve some purpose. On the other hand, the cognitions of water etc. can be taken as valid if they can lead us to the quench of thirst etc which is the pragmatic value of the cognition.

The second view is mainly forwarded by the Naiyayikas in India and known as correspondence theory of truth according to the Western philosophers. To them, the cognition of snake, for example, will be taken as valid if it occurs in a place where there is really snakesness. Such veridical cognition is defined as *tadvati tatprakāraḥam jñānam* i.e., a cognition of an object whose qualifier remains there where the qualifier really exists. We may have knowledge of a snake in two ways - there may be the knowledge of a snake in a place of snake where there is really snakesness and the same knowledge may also occur in a place where there is the absence of snakesness. The former case is known as '*tadvati tatprakāraḥam jñānam*' while the latter is called '*tadabhāvavati tatprakāraḥam jñānam*'. To know an object

as such is *pramā* or true cognition.²⁴ The same view has been expressed by Annambhatta in his *Tarkasamgraha* and *Dīpikā* (*Tadvati tatprakārah anubhava^h yathārthah*). This view corresponds to the correspondence theory of truth.

The third view is known as coherence theory of truth according to the Western thinkers which actually advocates the harmony of experience (*samvādītva*) with other experiences. In the *Tattvakaumudī Śāntarākṣita* is in favour of such view when he says '*Pramānam avisamvādijñānam*'.

There is a fourth view which resembles to the view of the Advaita school of Vedānta. According to this view, an awareness may be taken as true if it is non-contradicted (*avādhita*). This nature of uncontradictedness cannot be proved through the correspondence theory which actually depends on the method of coherence or *samvāda*. In fact, the real correspondence is inferred between knowledge and reality with the help of harmony of experience. This can ascertain that the knowledge is absolutely free from error as it is not contradicted at that time. From this it does not follow that in future any contrary experience can falsify our present cognition.

So far as the pragmatic theory of truth is concerned, it is argued by the Advaitins that from the fulfilment of our purpose (*arthakriyākāritva*) the truth of a cognition cannot be warranted. Because sometimes a false cognition can lead an individual to the successful activity. When an individual sees mistakenly that there is a jewel at a distance emitting lustre, he proceeds to the place thinking it a real silver and fortunately receives real jewel there. In this particular case the cognition of lustre in a jewel which is a false cognition leads us to the attainment of the jewel and in this way it can satisfy our purpose. Though we come to know afterwards that the earlier cognition was false yet it serves our purpose. Hence, the Advaitins are in favour of the view that only conflict with the available data can prove the falsity of a cognition. The earlier conception was that the earth is stationary and the sun moves round the earth but afterwards this idea is abandoned as it conflicts with the astronomical data. Hence if something is contradicted then its falsity is proved.²⁵ (*vādhitaviṣayatvena hi bhramatvaṃ - Tattvapradīpikā-citsukhī*, p.218, Nirnay 1915). That is why, to the Advaitins a cognition which remains as uncontradicted (*avādhita*) is alone *pramā*. That is why, the term is included as an adjunct of the object which becomes the content of *pramā*, or valid cognition.

It has been stated earlier that Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has not expressed his own opinion regarding the status of memory (*smṛti*). Hence, he has given both the definitions - one including memory and another excluding memory. There is a controversy among different schools of Indian Philosophy regarding this. The Mīmāṃsakas think that memory cannot be included under *pramā* (*na pramāṇam smṛtiḥ - Prakaraṇapañcikā - 6.3*). On the other hand, the Vaiśeṣikas are of the opinion that there are four ways of knowing-perception (*Pratyakṣa*), inference (*laingika*), memory (*smṛti*) and intuitive (*ārṣa*). These four ways of knowing are accepted by *Prasāstapāda* in his *bhāṣya* which is called *Padārthadharmasamāgraha*. (*"Vidyāpi caturvidhā - pratyakṣa-langika-smṛtyā-śalaksanā*).

Though Dharmarāja has not taken any side regarding the status of memory as *Pramā*, we may consider its acceptability as *pramā*. Let us accept a general principle that truth is the sole characteristic feature of knowledge. If it is so, memory, if remains as uncontradicted or non-dubious, may be taken as knowledge or *pramā*. The role of memory in revealing the past is inevitable. Only memory can reproduce the past faithfully. Something remembered is to be taken as true on account of the fact that it is identical with the content of the past experience represented. But there remains always a doubt whether memory can represent the past accurately or not. Considering this point different philosophers are reluctant to admit it as a means of valid cognition. Though there are problems in accepting memory as *pramā* yet it is a distinct experience which is essential in our daily life. Therefore, such experience is given a distinct name - *smṛti*. The awareness which enlightens a new content is called knowledge proper (*ambhūtiḥ*) while the awareness reproducing earlier content is called *smṛti*. Thus 'novelty' (*anadhigatatva*) has been taken as an essential quality of the content of valid cognition.

The Naiyayikas differ on the point whether *pramā* can cover the memory-cognition or not. We may discuss some of the arguments of the philosophers who have accepted *smṛti* as *pramā*.

The instrument of valid cognition (*pramā*) is called *pramāṇa* (*tatra pramākarāṇam pramāṇam - Vedāntaparibhāṣā*). Though Dharmarāja has given a particular definition of valid cognition after keeping a particular set of presuppositions in view, he remains silent about the instrumentality (*karāṇatva*) and its nature. It is accepted that he has no new view about the definition of instrument (*karāṇa*). From this it follows he has accepted the position of his opponent (*Pūrvapakṣin*) i.e. Nyāya-view which goes as

follows - '*vyāpāravat asādhāranam kāranam karanam*.' There are two types of cause for the origination of a piece of cognition - one is called *sādhāraṇa* (common) and another is *asādhāraṇa* (uncommon). The common causes are 'common' (*sādhāraṇa*) because they are necessary in all effects. A set of causes like God, self, unseen factors, time etc is essential or invariable antecedent of all types of effect. That is why, they are called common causes (*sādhāraṇa kāraṇa*). Apart from these, there are some special causes which are essential for a particular type of effect. As for example - sense-object-contact (*indriyārthasannikarṣa*) is a special cause of perceptual cognition. It is called an uncommon cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) on account of the fact that it is a cause specially required for perception, not for inferential cognition etc. In the same way, the cognition of the invariable relation (*vyāpti*) between a *hetu* and a *sādhya* is the cause only for generating inferential cognition, but not for perception etc. Hence, it is also called an uncommon cause (*asādhāraṇa kāraṇa*) which is called *karana* (instrument). The uncommon cause alone cannot give rise to an effect if it is not associated with some operative process which is technically called *vyāpāra*. An eye alone cannot reveal an object if there is no contact (*sannikarṣa*) between eye and an object. An axe may be considered as an instrument (*karana*) of cutting if it is associated with the effect of pulling upward and downward (*udyamanipātana*). Hence the operative process is called an intermediate process technically known as *vyāpāra*. It is defined in the following manner : '*Tajjanyatve sati tajjanyaajanako vyāpārah*'. An intermediate operative process is that which, being caused by something, becomes the generator of something. Let us suppose there are three things - x, y and z. If y being caused by x becomes the generator of z, y is called *vyāpāra*. If the instance of axe is taken into account, the phenomenon of lifting upward and putting downward (*udyama-nipātana*) being caused by an axe becomes the generator of the action of cutting. In the case of the cognition of the existence of *hetu* pervaded by *Vyāpti* in the *Pakṣa* is called *parāmarśa* (*vyāpyasya pakṣavṛttivadhīh parāmarśa ucyate*.²⁶ - B.1). In other words, the knowledge of the existence of the probans (*hetu*) which is qualified by invariable relation is called *parāmarśa* (*vyāptiviśiṣṭa-pakṣadharmatā-jñānam parāmarśah*).²⁷ The example is as follows '*vahnivyāpyadhūmavān parvatāh*' (i.e., the mountain is having smoke pervaded by fire). In this case, there are two pieces of cognition - the existence of probans in the subject (*pakṣa*) and of probans pervaded by invariable relation. As inferential cognition defined as a cognition arising out of *parāmarśa* (*parāmarśajanyam jñānam anumitiḥ*),

inferential cognition can be taken as a result of *parāmarśa*. Hence the role of *Parāmarśa* is intermediary, because the knowledge in the form of *Parāmarśa* being caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance becomes the generator of inferential cognition. Hence it is the *vyāpāra* of inferential cognition.

In the like manner, an uncommon cause associated with some operative process is called a *Pramāna* i.e., the means of knowing. A *Pramāna* is such type of active and uncommon cause of *pramā*.

It may be argued that memory or *smṛti* may sometimes provide us a cognition which corresponds to reality. It is said by Annambhatta that the memory is of two types - veridical and non-veridical. That which is caused by veridical *anubhava* or right cognition or *pramā* is called non-veridical ("*Smṛtirāpi dviḍhā - yatharthā ayatharthā ca iti. Pramājanyā yatharthā, apramāññyā ayatharthā*")²⁸. Hence one might think that *smṛti* sometimes becomes right cognition and sometimes not.

The above-mentioned view needs the following clarification. Annambhatta in his *Tarkasaṅgraha* has divided cognition or *buddhi* into two types - memory and *anubhava* (representative cognition) ("*sarvavyavahārahētuḥ guṇaḥ buddhiḥ jñānam sa dviḍhaḥ - smṛtiḥ anubhavaḥ ca*").²⁹ The analysis of *anubhava* i.e. representative cognition is found in the theories of knowledge i.e. perceptual cognition, inferential cognition, cognition through comparison and testimonial knowledge. In this portion he has given the division of memory.

Memory or recollective cognition is a reproductional state where we do not find any thing new or novel. What is known is the reproduction of something belonging to the past cognition. This past cognition might have been veridical or not. If it were veridical, the corresponding recollection would also be veridical if represented in an undistorted way. If it were non-veridical, the recollected entity would also be non-veridical. But it should be borne in mind that the above-mentioned varieties of memory-cognition-the veridical and the non-veridical cannot be described as *pramā* (right cognition) and *apramā* (false cognition) respectively. Because, *pramā* and *apramā* are two varieties of *anubhava* which is one of the sub-types of *Buddhi*. The other subclass of the same is memory or *smṛti*. Hence, the instrument (*kaṛaṇa*) of the veridical memory cannot be described as *pramāna* (means of valid cognition). This term *pramāna* is used only in the context of the veridical representative cognition (*yathārtha anubhava*). The Naiyāyikas have

accepted four types of *Pramā*, the instruments of which are perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*).

As Annambhatta has accepted the veridical and non-veridical memory, it indicates that he recognises a possibility of veridical memory-cognition after considering its value in our daily life. At least Anumbhatta has given thought on this aspect considering the fact that all memory-cognitions are not taken false. However, the Naiyayikas ultimately did not include it under *Pramāna* because the recollected fact is not verifiable through external factors as the event or incident is not repeated.³⁰

The definition of *Pramāna* as accepted by Nyāya is supported by Dharmarāja Adhvarindra. To him *pramāna* is of six types : perception (*pratyakṣa*), Inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), Verbal testimony (*āgama*), Presumption (*arthāpatti*) and Non-cognition (*ampalabdhi*).

9. "Nirvikalpakantu samsārgānavagāhi jñānam. Yathā 'so' yam devadattah", "Tattvamasi"-ityādivākyajanyam jñānam."

Ibid.

10. "Tathā ca so'yam devadattah iti vākyajanyajñānasya sannikrṣṭaviśayatayā vahirniḥsr̥ tāntaḥkaraṇavṛtṭyabhyupagamena devadattāvacchinnasya caitanyasya vṛtṭyavacchinnacaitanyābhinnatayā 'so' yam devadattah' iti vākyajanyajñānasya pratyakṣatvam."

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣaparicchēda).

11. "Evam tvattvamasi ityādivākyajanyajñānasyāpi, tatra pramātureva viśayatayā tadubhayabhedasya sattvāt." Ibid.

12. *Vedāntasāra*, p. 159, Edited by Kaliban Vedantavag^{īśa}..., Calcutta, 1379 (B'S)

13. "Nirūpasyāpi kālasyendriyavedyatvābhyupagamena dhārāvāhikabubdherapi pūrvapūrvajñānaviśaya-tattatkṣaṇaviśeṣa-viśayakatvena na tatrāvyāptih".

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣaparicchēda).

14. "Kim jñānagatasya pratyakṣatvasya proyojakam pṛcchasi kirhvā viśayagatasya ? Ādye pramānacaitanyasya viśayāvacchinnacaitanyābhēda iti brumah" *Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣaparicchēda).*

15. *Sikhāmani on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Edited by Swami Govinda Singh Sadhu, Bombay, p. 29, 1885.

16. *Maṇiprabhā on Sikhāmani on Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 29 (Same Edition).

17. "Nanvevam yathārthasmṛterapi niyatasamvādiravṛtṭijanakatvena pramātvallakṣyatvenānadhigatapadavaiyartham tadavasthamēvetyāsamkyetaravyāvṛtṭipramātvaprakāravavyavahārānyatara-prayojanopayogyeva prāmānyamatra nirūpaṇīyam na tu samvādiravṛtṭyupayuktaprāmānyamatra nirūpaṇīyamityanānadhigataviśeṣaṇasya sāphalyam..." Ibid, p. 32.

18. "Brahmasākṣātkārānanataram hi ghatādinām vādhaḥ, 'yasya tvasya sarvamātmaivābhūttat kena kam paśyet' iti śruteḥ. Na tu samsāradaśāyām

vādhah 'yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram paśyati' iti śruteḥ. Tathā cāvādhitapadena saṁsāradaśāyamavādhitatvam vivakṣitamiti na ghaṭā-diprāyamavyāptih".

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣapariṣheda).

19. "Svataḥsiddhaḥ svasāmagrīvirahaprayojyah" *Nṛsimhaprakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* on *Tarkasamgraha*, p. 263. , Ed. Satkari Sharma Bangiya, Chowkhamba. "svataḥsiddhaḥ itarakāraṇavirahasthale tādrśakāraṇavirahaprayukta evetyarthah" *Nilakanthaparakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* of *Tarkasamgraha* (same edition).

20. *Sikhāmani* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, pp. 16-17, Same Edition.

21. "Na ca bhramasya deśāntaravṛttijñātaviṣayakatvenānadhigatārthaviṣayakatvasyābhāvāt katham tatrāvyāptiriti vācyam. Bhramāt pūrvam bhramakālīkotpattimadanirvacanīyaraḥajatādiviṣaya-kajñānābhāvena bhramasya jñātaviṣayakatvarūpādhigata- viṣayakatvasyābhāvādanadhigatārthaviṣayakatvasya bhrame sattvāditi." *Maniprabhā* on *Sikhāmani* on *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, p. 17, Same Edition.

22. "na caivam prāmānyasaṁśāyanupapattih, tatra saṁśāyanurodhena doṣasyāpi sattvena doṣābhāvaghāṭitasvāśrayagrāhakābhāvena tatra prāmānyasyaiva agrahāt."

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Anupalabdhi Ch.)

23. "Aprāmānyantu na jñānasāmānya-sāmgrīprajoyam pramāyāmapī aprāmānyāpatteḥ, kintu doṣaprajoyam."

Ibid.

24. "Yatra yadasti tatra tasyānubhavaḥ pramā tadvati tatprakāraṇanubhavo vā."

Tattvacintāmani (Prāmānya portion).

25. 'Vādhita- viṣayatvena hi bhramatvam'.

Tattvapradīpikā-citsukhī, p. 218, Nirnay Sagar Press, Bombay, 1915.

26. *Bhāṣāpariṣheda*, Verse no. 68.

27. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on the same.

28. *Tarkasamgraha*, text no. 74.

29. Ibid

30. Gopinath Bhattacharya : *Tarkasamgraha*, p. 354, Progressive, 1983.

CHAPTER III

THE ADVAITATHEORY OF PERCEPTION

To an Advaitin the whole world is nothing but Consciousness or *ātman*. To an enlightened person who has realised Self or *ātman* or Consciousness the whole world is covered by the same conscious principle as evidenced by the Śruti texts like - '*sarvam khalvidam Brahma*' (All this is nothing but Brahman), '*Tasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhāti*' (His manifestation is found everywhere) etc. The opening Mantra of the *Kenopaniṣad* begins with the description of the world which is covered by the consciousness. Whatever found in this world is the manifestation of the Consciousness. If every thing is covered by this Consciousness or Self, there does not arise any question of exploiting others or snatching the properties of others (*Isāvāsyamidam sarvam yat kiñca jagatyām jagat/tena tyaktena bhūñjīthā mā grdhah kasyasviddhanam*¹). Under these circumstances an individual enjoys through renunciation. The roots of a human being's enjoyment are many. Some may find pleasure in torturing other, some by snatching others' properties and some by social service etc. In this context a human being is found in enjoyment through his sacrifice or renunciation (*tyaktena bhūñjīthāh*). This enjoyment though renunciation is an enjoyment *per excellence* or disinterested or non-pathological. It is possible for the man who has realised the Consciousness everywhere in this world. Such a person is a seer (*rsi*) in the true sense of the term as he 'sees' himself or his own self or consciousness to all beings - human and non-human. To him the whole world is self-related (*ātmiya*) which is expressed as '*Vasudhaiva kutumbakam*'. If he thinks himself as remaining in all, he will not be able to exploit others as it is a case of self-exploitation or self deceiving (*ātmapravañcanā*). In the same way, greed towards others property does not seem to be present in an individual's mind, as he is a realised person.

This realisation does not come into being very easily. It needs some mental training to avail this. The process of hearing (*śravaṇa*), thinking (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*) leads an individual to such state of mind. For such training the knowledge of duality must be admitted at the outset. Before reaching to the transcendental world this phenomenal world has to be understood properly. For the better understanding of the phenomenal world the Advaita epistemology plays a prominent role. To the Advaitins the phenomenal world is also not free from the Consciousness,

the Ultimate Reality accepted in the Advaita Vedānta system of Indian Philosophy. This notion of consciousness is transmitted to their theory of perception also. To Dharmarāja Advarīndra the means of valid cognition (*pramāna*) is of six types - *Pratyakṣa* (perception), *Anumāna* (Inference), *Upamāna* (comparison), *Sabda* (verbal testimony), *Arthāpathi* (presumption) and *Anupalabdhi* (Non-apprehension).

As the Advaita theory of perception presupposes some metaphysical presuppositions, their theory of perception is classified in various ways - *Jñānagata* (perceptuality of cognition) and *Viśayagata* (perceptuality of object,) *Jīvasākṣī* (witness in individual being and *Īśvarasākṣī* (witness in God), *Savikalpaka* (determinate) and *Nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate).

Normally when it is said that I know, it means 'I know of something'. Knowing without any content is not at all knowing in the true sense of the term. But in the Advaita Vedānta system there are two types of knowing - cognition of the knowledge of an object i.e., jar is the perceptuality in terms of the cognition (*jñānagatapratyakṣa*) while in the latter case there is the cognition of the object (i.e. jar) but not the cognition of a jar. To them just a cognition of jar is a matter of perception, the jar itself is also matter of perception. In the previous case an object is perceived through its cognition. It is tantamount to say that the cognition of a jar is perceived. But in the latter case the *que*-object (i.e. object without its cognition) is perceived. That is why, Dharmarāja Advarīndra has preferred to use the term *jñānagatapratyakṣa* i.e. the region of perception lies only on the cognition portion through which object comes. But when the region of perception remains in the object itself but not its cognition, it is called *Viśayagatapratyakṣa* i.e. perception of the object - rather bare object.²

Let us see how Dharmarāja, after following the Advaita view, has explained the theory of perception in terms of cognition.

As told earlier the whole world is covered by Consciousness or *Ātman*. Though 'this consciousness is one in number, we may accept some limited forms of it which are called *Upādhis* (limiting adjuncts). Though the Space (*ākāśa*) is one, we accept some limited forms of it for our usability. For example, we may say that space limited by a jar is called *ghatākāśa* (space existing in a jar). In the same way, a space limited by house and temple is called *grhākāśa* and *mathākāśa* respectively. Though Time (*Kāla*) is one, it can be used in our daily life after taking its limiting adjuncts like day, night, week, month, year, minute, hour etc. In the like manner, it can be said that

though the Consciousness is essentially not divisible, it can have the limited forms which are essential in our daily life for day to day transaction. That is why, Consciousness is of three types - (a) *Pramāṇa Caitanya* (Consciousness limited by the means of knowing) (b) *Pramātrcāitanya* (Consciousness limited by the knower) and (c) *Viṣayacāitanya* (Consciousness limited by an object).

The term '*pramāṇa*' has to be taken in a technical sense. The term *pramāṇa* denotes 'mental mode' or *antaḥkāraṇavṛtti*. According to the Advaitins our mind or inner sense-organ called *antaḥkāraṇa* is taken as a liquid substance. Water has no shape of its own, but it can take the shape of its locus. If water flows through the canal, it can take the shape of it. If it flows through the field, it will take the shape of the field. In the same way, gold can take the shape of its locus when liquidified. In the like manner, *antaḥkāraṇa* or mind goes out of an individual's body and reaches to the object and takes the shape of it which is called *vṛtti* or mental mode.⁴

The Advaitins have given a new interpretation of the Advaitic perception by way of bringing mental state (*vṛtti*) as a factor of perceptual cognition. The role of mind or inner sense-organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) has played a prominent role in this perceptual phenomenon. *Antaḥkāraṇa* by virtue of being a revealer of an object is described as follows : The mind as if takes the form of an object after going out of the body through the windows in the forms of sense-organ. Though the role of sense organ is not denied in the system, the organs like eye etc. are shown as sense-organs that are called technically *indriyas*. But mind or *antaḥkāraṇa* is not a sense organ (*indriya*) to Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, and yet it is a prime factor in perceptual cognition. The sense-organ cannot work without the help of mind which is actually transformed into the object.

This *antaḥkāraṇa* is, according to Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, not an object having no parts at all (*niravayava*). Had it been partless, there would not have any transformation (*pariṇāma*). As it is taken as having transformation, it is called an object having some parts (*sāvayava*). God, silver etc that are having parts are capable of being transformed into different ornaments like necklace, ring etc. In the like manner, mind is taken as capable of being transformed. Mind is taken as having some elastic nature. It can assume the form of an object which is called transformation or *vṛtti*. As the Consciousness is everywhere, it exists in the knower, known object and the mental mode in the form of an object. The Consciousness is cut into size

(*avacchinna*) as per the size of a knower (*pramātā*), an object (*visaya*) and the mental mode in the form of object which is technically called *pramāṇa*. Why is it called *pramāṇa*? The term '*pramāṇa*' means 'proper measurement'. The term '*māna*' means measurement and '*pra*' means 'proper'. Whether an object is properly measured or not is determined not only through object but through the mental mode in the form of an object. Without any mental mode an object can never be properly understood. An object is known properly if it is covered by the consciousness in the form of mental states. Hence it is called *pramāṇacaitanya* i.e. consciousness limited by the mental state. An object without mental mode cannot be properly measured. Hence, mental state covered by Consciousness is called *Pramāṇa* i.e., literally proper measurement.

Though an object is perceived with the help of five external sense-organs, the perceived object creates an image in the inner organ or mind. This image is called mental mode or *Vṛtti*.

In the case of the perceptual cognition of a jar (*jñānagatapratyakṣa*) the object itself and its corresponding image called *vṛtti* is amalgamated and hence the knower (*pramātā*) remains isolated from the object and its corresponding image. For this a relation called *kartr-karma* (i.e. subject-object relationship) is maintained. In such cases there is a duality which is normally found in the empirical world. Such cognition is explained in the following manner: 'I have the perceptual cognition of a jar'. If the sentence is analysed, we may get three parts - a) 'I' which is *pramātā* or knower which is no other than the Consciousness (*pramātravacchinna - caitanya*) b) jar is also a consciousness limited by it which is the content of cognition (*viśayāvacchinna-caitanya*). c) the Consciousness in the form of mental mode shaped as per the object. (*vṛtavyacchinna-caitanya*). the total amalgamation of the later two (b) and (c) leads to the region of known level (*jñeya*) and the (a) part serves the purpose of a know^{er} (*jñātā*). Hence a total distinction can be maintained two poles - *meya*-pole and *mata*-pole. Due to this there is the cognition of knowledge of an object.

The Advaitins have also accepted that the object should be 'present' (*vartamāna*) and 'capable of being perceived' (*yogya*) in both types of perception. In the case of the perceptuality of cognition of an object and the perceptuality of object the object (*visaya*) should possess such characteristic features. The term 'present' (*vartamāna*) has been taken as an adjunct of an object to exclude the past and future objects under the purview of perception. One could raise a question whether something existing in past like 'Ashok

was a king of India' or 'An earth-quake occurred in Gujrat' is capable of being perceived or not. The reply can be given in negative. For, as these are the past incidents, they cannot be perceived. The simple reason is that our mind issuing through our sense-organs cannot assume the form of the object due to its absence at the time of perception. Inner organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) can take the shape of an object if the object physically remains there. As the king Ashoka or earth-quake in Gujrat are the past incidents, they cannot be the objects of perception due to the impossibility of their physical presence.

In the like manner, there may arise a question of visualising or perceiving the phenomena like merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), etc. The Advaitins are consistent in this matter when they say that something can be perceived if it has got some perceptible character or character capable of being perceived (*yogya*). The merit, demerit etc, though real, do not come under the purview of our perception as they are not perceptible. One can not raise the question of perceptibility of atom as it is not capable of being perceived. Hence before raising the question of perceiving something we should notice whether the object-concerned is 'present' and 'capable of being perceived'.

These two adjuncts of an object are essential for both the perception of the cognition of an object and the perception of an object. In both the cases the inner organ (*antaḥkāraṇa*) serves the purpose of assuming the form of an object. If object is *ayogya* or imperceptible, it is beyond the question of our perception.

In the case of the perception of a jar which is expressed as 'this jar' the mental mode in the form of the jar is in contact with the jar. Hence the consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of a jar is identical with the consciousness in the form of a jar. In the same way the perception of the mental feelings like happiness etc can be explained. As the consciousness limited by the mental mode in the form of happiness etc. and the Consciousness limited by happiness etc are identical, we have the cognition of happiness like 'I am happy' etc. As these two limitors of the consciousness remain in the same space, the above-mentioned cognition is surely perceptual.⁶

It has been already stated that the object which is being perceived must be a 'present one' (*vartamāna*). Hence the definition cannot be applied to the recollection of the happiness in past. Because, the happiness which is recollected is a past event and the mental state in the form of recollection is

a present event, the two limiting adjuncts in the mind belong to different space, time and hence the corresponding two forms of Consciousness are different. It is not as per the criterion that two forms of Consciousness must occupy the same place and time. As in the case of the recollection of happiness which was in past we do not find the said amalgamation, it is not perceptual. In order to prevent the definition of being unduly extended to the past events the term 'present' is inserted as an adjunct of the object.⁷

It can be argued that the present righteousness or lack of righteousness can be known through perception, as they are very much 'present (*vartamāna*) in us. This cannot be taken under the purview of the perception, because they, though present, are not capable being perceived. Hence another term "*yogyatva*" (capability of being perceived) can be added as an adjunct of the object. An object may be taken as being perceived if there are two qualities - *vartamānatva* (capable of being present) and *yogyatva* (capable of being perceived). Though righteousness etc have got the character of being present, they cannot be perceived due to the lack of the second character of capability of being seen or perceived (*yogyatva*)⁸.

It may happen that though I am quite happy, I do not know as such. When it is pointed out by somebody else as 'you are happy' (*tvam sukhi*), it would be taken as perceptual cognition. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has cited another case - '*Daśamastvamasī*' (you are the tenth) which is taken as perceptual. Ten students have crossed the river at a time. When all of them reached the other side of the river, the captain of the team has started counting the heads and every time he is getting nine in stead of ten. One member of the team has drawn the attention of the captain towards the fact that he is the tenth member when he does not count every time. This attention of the captain was drawn by another member by uttering a sentence - '*daśamastvamasī*' (your are the tenth member). From this it is proved that though testimony generally gives an indirect cognition (*sābdajñāna*) sometimes it may give rise to perceptual cognition also which is called perceptual cognition caused through a sentence. It is perceptual because we can feel directly the tenth position when attention is drawn to it by a sentence.⁹

When there is a cognition in the form - 'The mountain is fiery' (*parvato vahnimān*), the cognition of the mountain is immediate (*aparokṣa*) and the cognition of fire is mediate. Because, in the former case there is an amalgamation between two forms of consciousness - viz, the consciousness

in the form of mountain i.e. object and the consciousness in the form of mental mode of the mountain. But in the later case the amalgamation between the consciousness in the form of fire and the consciousness in the form of the mental mode of fire is not possible as our mind in such case cannot go to the place of fire from the body and it cannot be transformed in the mental mode of fire. That is why, our expressions go in the following way - 'I am seeing the mountain' (*parvatam paśyāmi*) and 'I am inferring the fire' (*vahnimanuminomi*)¹⁰.

Even in an inferential cognition where the subject (*pakṣa*) is not in connection with the organ, the cognition is wholly mediate. As for example, in the inferential cognition in the form 'An atom of earth has got smell, because it is earth, as is the case with a jar', the subject (i.e. atom) being imperceptible cannot come in contact with the eye or skin which can reveal substance perceptually. Hence, the cognition is not perceptual, but inferential both in respect of smell and atom. The cognition in the form - '*surabhi candanam*' (A piece of sandal wood is fragrant) is immediate in respect of the piece of sandal wood and mediate in respect of the fragrance (*saurava*). As the later i.e. fragrance is not capable of being perceived by eye, it lacks the capability or *yogyatva* of being seen. Hence, there is no *yogyatva* of being seen. Hence there is no *yogyatva* which is an essential adjunct of the object for being perceptible.¹¹

The qualifiers like *yogyatva* (capability of being seen) and *vartamānatva* (to remain in the present) are applicable to the object which is perceived (*viśayagatapratyakṣa*). When the object (but not the knowledge of an object) is perceived, there is the knower who is identical with others. How does consciousness limited by the mind in the form of a jar etc remain identical with others? Because it will go against our experience of difference in the expression - 'I am seeing it' (*ahamidam paśyāmi*).¹²

It has already been said that the perceptibility of the object is the situation of being identified with the knower (*ghatāderiśayapratyakṣam tu pramātrabhinnat-^{VAM}Vedāntaparbhāṣā, Pratyakṣa-Pariccheḍa^d*) That is, among the three types of Consciousness only one Consciousness remains there and other two forms of Consciousness are amalgamated with it. As *Pramātracaitanya* (the Consciousness limited by *Pramātā*) is nothing but the Consciousness limited by the mind (*antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-caitanya*), and as 'this form of *Caitanya* alone remains, it will go against the general expression and feeling - 'I am seeing it' (*ahamidam paśyāmi*). For, in this

expression there is the subject-object dichotomy along with the verb, the identical condition of other forms of Consciousness with the *Pramātā* (knower) is not realised here. In this particular case the term 'I' (*aham*) occupies the place of an agent (*kartā*) or subject and the term '*idaṁ*' i.e., this occupies the place of object or *karma*. These two words are conjoined with the verb 'seeing' or *paśyāmi*. In this case our perceptual expression of an object is described but there is no identity of *Pramātā* with others due to the description of subject, object etc. Hence, what is said about the perceptuality of an object cannot be maintained when it is expressed in language. Hence a problem is raised regarding the validity of the perceptuality of object ("*Nanu katham ghaṭāderantaḥkaraṇāvācchinnacaitanyābhedaḥ, 'ahamidaṁ paśyāmi' iti bhedaṇubhavavirodhāditi cet, ucāgate*". Ibid).

In response to this Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra suggests that 'the identity of *Pramātā*' does not mean 'the amalgamation of the knower' exactly. On the other hand, it means 'having no existence apart from that of the subject'. ("*Pramātrabhedaḥ nāma na tāvadaikyam kintu pramātr̥sattātiriktasattākatvābhāvaḥ*", Ibid). In this context one particular explanation of the term '*Pramātrabheda*' i.e. 'non-difference of the knower' has to be taken into account. It means there will be the existence of *Pramātā* and the existence of other objects will not come to the realm of cognizance. Since a jar etc are superimposed on the Consciousness limited by them, their existence is nothing but the existence of the Consciousness limited by the object. For, the existence of something which is superimposed is not accepted to be something over and above the existence of its substratum or locus ("*Tathā ca ghaṭādeḥ svāvācchinnacaitanye' dhyastatayā viśayacaitanyasattaiva ghaṭādisattā, adhiṣṭhānātiriktayā āropitasattāyā anangikārāt*", Ibid).

The Advaita Vedāntins, however, refute different views on the theory of perception. According to the Sāṃkhya, when a sense-organ has contact with an object, the *buddhi* issuing out of the sense-organ to the object is modified into its form and gives its mode to the self, then the self is reflected in the mental mode, is related to the object and apprehends it.

The Advaita Vedāntins refute such Sāṃkhya view in the following way. The Sāṃkhya regards the self as unmodifiable and yet holds that the self is reflected in the *buddhi* and intelligises it, or that *buddhi* intelligised by the self is reflected back in it. In both cases the self becomes modifiable. Thus the Sāṃkhya contradicts his own view that the self is immutable. He may

argue that the self merely 'sees' or knows the *buddhi* modified into the form of an object, that 'seeing' or knowing is its essence, and that it does not come over to the *buddhi*. This defence is useless because all the alternatives involved in it are untenable. The cognition which constitutes the essence of the self manifests the *buddhi* modified into the form of its object as related to the self, or it manifests the mode of the *buddhi* as unrelated to the self. The first alternative is untenable, since the self is partless and cannot come into contact with a mental mode. Further, the self is mental and cannot relate itself to a mental mode, since the self is partless and cannot come into contact with a mental mode. Further, the self is neutral and cannot relate itself to a mental mode, since in such case it would contradict its own nature. Nor a cognition can apprehend an object unrelated to the self, since then it would be able to apprehend any object unrelated to it. If proximity be said to relate an object to the self, what does proximity mean? It is either existence in the same substratum or mutual confrontation or interpretation. The first alternative is not tenable. The self and the *buddhi* cannot exist in the same substratum, like $\#$ colour and $\#$ taste. Nor is the second alternative tenable. The self is too pervasive and cannot confront $\#$ the *buddhi* modified into the form of an object. Nor is the third alternative possible. If the self and the *buddhi* interpenetrate each other, like heat and iron, the self will become modifiable. Nor can there be proximity of the self to the *buddhi* as between a substratum and its content, like the relation of a vessel to a plum, since the self is detached or unrelated. Further, there is no means of valid cognition to prove it. The self's apprehension of an object through its reflection in the *buddhi* or the intelligised *buddhi*'s reflection in the self is not perceived.¹³

$\#$ It is not also inferred due to the lack of the invariable concomitance between probans and probandum in any case which is the precondition of being inference. It cannot be said that the inference is possible through the invariable concomitance between light and an object. As these two objects are composed of parts and having motion, they can come together. But the self is partless, immovable and hence it cannot be proximate to the *buddhi*. As we do not have any evidence regarding the fact that self and *buddhi* can move each other. The movement of Self which is essentially detached, perfect and partless in character towards *Buddhi* is neither perceived nor inferred. For this reason self cannot apprehend an object through mental mode in which the self is reflected. So the Sāṅkhya-view is not tenable. In this way the Advaitins have refuted the Sāṅkhya view regarding perception.

Now the Advaitins attack the Naiyayikas for defending their own position. A cognition can reveal an object if and only if it has relation with the object. But the Naiyayikas do not admit a direct relation with it. They opine that there cannot be a relation called *samyoga* (contact) or any other relation with it. We do not accept any relation between cognition and its object directly and hence it cannot reveal the same. In response to this the Naiyayikas may rejoin that self has the relation called contact (*samyoga*) with mind, mind is related to sense-organ and sense-organ with object (*ātmā manasā samyujyate mana indriyena indriyam arthena*). As cognition which is in Self is indirectly (*paramparā*) related to the object (*artha*), there is an indirect relation between cognition and object. This argument of the Naiyayikas cannot be taken for granted. Because, all objects may be taken as indirectly connected with a cognition in the similar manner. All objects are connected with sense-organ which is again related to mind which is related to Self where the cognition remains. As cognition remains in self, all objects will be connected with it through different process as shown above. The Naiyayikas may say that just as cutting is possible through the instrumentality of an axe, cognition is generated in an object through the instrumentality of the sense-organ, but not self. But we have such an experience that the cognition of a jar is produced in me'. So the argument is not proper, as it contradicts our experience. The Naiyayikas may argue that an object connected with the sense-organ produces a cognition in the self and that any other object cannot do so. The connection of the sense-organ with an intended object generates a cognition in the self. This argument is not tenable, because an unintended bad odour in connection with nose generates a cognition in the self. A cognition is not related to an object through a series of conjunctions on account of the fact that the cognition produced by them inheres in the self and it is not related to the sense-organs. Moreover, there is no proof for the continuance of a series of conjunctions till the produced cognition generates a peculiarity (*atisāya*) in an object. The *atisāya* is produced in an object by a cognition or mental mode issuing out to the object and the cognition can reveal it. Hence a cognition cannot be related to the object through the sense-organs. It is not also true that a cognition is not related to an object through its substratum. Had it been related to Self which is all pervading, the cognition of all objects would have been revealed simultaneously. If a cognition remains in the self limited by body (*dehāvacchinna*), it would not be related to an object outside the body and

could not manifest it. If it is argued that a cognition may cognise an object without being related to it, a cognition would manifest all objects without being related to them. If it is, there would be no relation between a knowing self, knowledge and a known object. But it is our common experience that 'this is known by me'. Hence the Naiyayikas cannot account for the apprehension of an object through a cognition. So the view of the Advaitins is firmfooted.

The Advaita Vedantins have refuted the view of the Prabhākara school of Mīmāṃsā. Though the cognition is self-manifest to the Prabhākaras, there is no relation between a cognition in the self limited by body (*dehāvacchinna ātmā*) and an external object. Hence a cognition cannot manifest an object. A self-manifest object can manifest itself only but it cannot manifest a self, which is its substratum and its object. To Prabhākara a cognition cannot pervade an object because he admits that it inheres in a self limited by body (*dehāvacchinna ātmā*). By virtue of being inhered in self it can be taken as a quality of self. Hence the cognition cannot manifest an external object. Self, the locus of cognition, cannot manifest an external object because it is limited by body. A self-manifest cognition cannot manifest a self, its locus and an object, even as light manifests a lamp, its substratum and external objects. Light has rays which can spread and manifest both a lamp and external objects. But a cognition is partless and devoid of rays and hence cannot spread to a self and an external object. Hence the example already given is not appropriate. Moreover, if a cognition, which inheres in a self, manifests the self as a knower, the self becomes a knower and a known object, which is self-contradictory. The same self cannot be both a subject and an object of cognition. The question may further be raised in the following way. A cognition is produced in the entire self or in a particular region of the self. In the case of former a cognition manifests only the phenomenal self, for the real self has no particular region without a limiting condition (e.g. a body). The real self is partless. When it is limited by body, it ceases to be an ontological reality. Hence the expression 'I am' would be illusory as the word 'I' means 'the embodied self'. If the latter case is accepted, there would be no self as an object of 'I' - consciousness. Hence there can be no relation between a cognition and an object. Hence a cognition cannot apprehend an object according to Prabhākara.

The Advaita Vedantins explain the relation of the self, knowledge and object in the following manner. Knowledge is the essence of the self. As it is self-manifest, the self is also self-manifest. As knowledge is unmodifiable,

the self is also so. It is eternal, nondual and undifferentiated. It is not itself a knower, a doer, and an enjoyer or a sufferer, but these are due to superimposition (*adhyāsa*). The internal sense organ (*antahkarana*) issues out through a sense-organ to an object and is modified into its form. The self of the nature of consciousness is reflected in the mental mode and erroneously identifies itself with the mode due to superimposition and apprehends an external object. The self of the nature of consciousness being manifested in the internal sense-organ within the body and being limited by and identified with a particular mode of the internal organ is called the knower (*pramātā*). The self limited by a particular mode of the internal sense organ modified into the form of an object is called the means of valid cognition (*pramāna*). The self limited by an external object pervaded by a mode of the internal organ and identified with the object is called the object of cognition (*prameya*). The self identified with and limited by the manifestation of an object is called the result of the means of valid cognition (*pramiti*). These differences are phenomenal and due to the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*). But the self essentially is unmodifiable, undifferentiated changeless, of the nature of consciousness and the witness (*sākṣin*) that manifests all. Because the knower, the means of cognition and the known object are manifested as states of the internal organ directly by the self of witness and related to one another by it, we have the feeling 'I know this' or 'this is known by me'. These factors, being limited, unrelated to one another, cannot produce such an experience.

Vādarāyana describes the distinction of the three limiting adjuncts of consciousness in the following way. Nescience or *Avidyā* which veils the one eternal consciousness or Self appears to be the world-appearance. The internal organ is a product of nescience. The internal sense-organ within a body associated by merits and demerits of an individual self goes out through a sense organ to the external object, and is modified into its form. The part of the internal sense organ limited by a body called egoism (*aḥamkāra*) is the doer.

According to Saṃkara, there is a pure being which is a non-different unity. This pure being is conceived by indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*). On the other hand, the multiplicity of empirical objects can be apprehended by determinate perception. Hence it has an empirical validity (*vyavahārikaprāmānya*), but not metaphysical validity. Determinate perception (*savikalpa-pratyakṣa*) presupposes the application of forms

and determinations which have no foundation in reality. To an Advaitin determination is, in fact, a kind of negation. Through determinate perception one pure Being, the substratum of all empirical beings, cannot be known. Determinate perception is the synthetic relational mode of apprehending empirical objects and qualities in relation to one another.

In the phenomenon of cognition the role of recollection is not ignorable. Recollection presupposes the identity of self that had seen an object in the past and received the residual impression (*saṃskāra*) of the object. In the case of perception this impression or *saṃskāra* and an object is known. The phenomenon of recollection is possible through the revival of the impression of an object seen in the past, which is accepted by most of the philosophers belonging to Indian systems. There is only one locus of past perception, the residual impression and the present perception. This locus is self according to the Advaitins. Though our body is different in different ages, there is one unchanged factor relating all the forms of body just as a thread can bind all different flowers existing in a garland. This unchanged factor is Self.¹⁴ On account of this an individual who has seen his mother and father in the childhood can recollect at the old age. An individual can easily identify that the self represented by 'I' who has seen his parents in the old age can see his own grand sons or daughters in the old age. The underlying self in different forms of body can help an individual in recollecting the earlier experience.¹⁵

The Buddhists accept self as a series of momentary cognitions. They believe that a particular cognition receives an object, another cognition keeps its impression and another one recollects it. If this view is taken for granted then one person can perceive an object and another person can recollect it, which is practically not possible. However, the *Vijñānavādins*, a section of the Buddhists, cannot justify the fact of recollection, because they admit different momentary cognition that can apprehend an object, can retain residual impression and can recollect. The *Vijñānavādins* might argue that different forms of cognitions actually form a series (composit whole) which can be locus of perception, recollection and impression. This is also wrong according to the Advaitins. Because, they think how can there be series without the help of its individual members? If it is accepted that the members are real, it will lead to another problem. An object which is seen at the first moment may be lost in the second without leaving aside any impression. Even if it leaves some residual impression, it is destroyed in the past and

hence its recollection is not at all possible. If they admit that the residual impressions are eternal or permanent, it will go against their basic presupposition of the theory of momentariness. If the residual impressions are momentary, it is destroyed before producing some effect. Hence, recollection is not at all possible.

The Advaitins are of the opinion that Brahman is the only Reality characterised by being or existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and absolute bliss (*ānanda*). These three characteristics, being *svarūpalakṣaṇa* (essential characteristics) of Brahman, are not to be understood in terms of experience. In the empirical sense Brahman is non-being subject-objectless pure Consciousness or pure bliss which is compared to a dreamless sleep i.e., *susupti*.¹⁶ To Śamkara the Reality is one and undifferentiated being called Brahman. The perception of the difference and plurality remains until one gathers the intuitive notion of Brahman. Space, Time etc are the categories of the mind and have validity only within the limits of our empirical cognition. After transcending the empirical limit one can have the intuitive cognition of Brahman.

Samkara agrees with Kant that the categories are empirically real and hence they can never provide us a cognition of reality. But Samkara expressed his opinion which is completely different from Kant. To Samkara Reality is Brahman which is a Pure Consciousness, Pure Being and Pure Bliss which are not the predicates of Brahman but the essence of it which is capable of being known by a flash of supra-intellectual pure intuition. Samkara thinks that the apparent diversity of the world including names (*nāma*), forms (*rūpa*) etc seems to us due to the influence of nescience (*ajñāna*). In other words, Samkara thinks Brahman as an Absolute Reality which can only be known through direct and immediate cognition. The Buddhist Idealists also believe that the categories of space, time, substance etc are ideal in nature, but they are not the only Absolute Reality and Samkara will tell that everything is landed in subjectivism or mentalism like the Buddhist Idealists. But both Samkara and the Buddhists are immediatists in as much as both of them consider that immediate experience enables us to apprehend the reality. But they render their different opinions regarding the stages. Samkara regards supra-intellectual intuition or higher supra-intellectual intuition or higher immediacy as the organ of the true knowledge of Brahman, while the Buddhists accept that the lower sense-intuition or lower immediacy as the organ of the true cognition of the reality which is nothing but a series of

individual moments, real or ideal.

So far as the empirical world is concerned, Buddhists think that there is not at all any difference between the universal and the particular, substance and quality, substance and action etc, but we wrongly ascribe difference in them. An object and its name, the Buddhists suggest, is different completely, but we ascribe name etc on it falsely. According to the Buddhists, *kalpanā* or *vikalpa* or substitute is nothing but the false ascription of difference to non-difference and of non-difference to difference. The name, universal etc are, to them, the nature of conceptual construction or ideal abstraction. But Samkara thinks that there is a relation called identity in difference (*bhedābheda*) between the universal and particular, substance and qualities etc. The apparent difference between these pairs of categories is due to nescience (*avidyā*). Due to its infection of the intellect these categories are imposed on the undifferentiated Brahman which is the only reality. In the case of such superimposition which is called *adhyāsa* there are two things - the object superimposed (*adhyasta*) and the locus of superimposition (*adhiṣṭhāna*). In any case of illusion the locus or *adhiṣṭhāna* is always true. In the case of snake-rope illusion the superimposed object i.e. snake is illusory and the locus of the superimposition of snake is rope which is real by virtue of being a locus of the illusory object. In the same way, everything is superimposed on *Brahman* which is an *adhiṣṭhāna* i.e. the locus of superimposition and hence it can never be false. Samkaracharya had initially taken help of three metaphors to show that there is a clear and distinct difference between the Conscious and the unconscious. These metaphors are a) distinction between 'yusmad' (you) and 'asmad' ('I'), b) between *tamaḥ* (darkness) and *prakāśa* (light), and c) between 'viśaya' (object or properties) and *viśayī* (possessor of object or properties). Though there is a clear distinction between *ātman* and *anātman*, yet the properties of one are superimposed on the other in our day-to-day behaviour (*lokavyayahāra*). This type of imposition is called *adhyāsa* in Advaita Vedānta.¹⁷ Technically it is defined as '*smṛtirūpaḥ paraṭra pūrvadrṣṭāvabhāsa*' i.e., *adhyāsa* is nothing but an illusion in which there is recollection of something seen before and the ascription of it in a different place.¹⁸ When we see a snake in the place of rope, the idea of snake seen before occurs in our mind and we refer to it at a different place where there is no snake at all. The term '*smṛtirūpa*' incorporated in the definition suggests that there is a similarity between memory-cognition and superimposition. In the former case the impression

of the content is the sole cause (*samskāramātrajanya*) while in the later case the impression along with the physical appearance of the remembered content is present. As the remembered content, which is presented in our front, is false, the term '*smṛtirūpa*' has been used. In other words, the remembered content of snake actually is not present in front, as in such case the object is a rope.

Regarding this theory the following problems may be raised. First, the metaphor '*yusmad*' and '*asmad*' is incorrect, as these cannot show the absolute difference between two, as both of them are conscious in nature. Instead of this the terms '*idam*' and '*asmad*' are more suitable. Vācaspati Mīśra has defended Samkara by saying that the term '*idam*' may sometimes be used in the sense of '*asmad*'.¹⁹ To avoid this complication the term '*yusmad*' is used. Secondly, can self be absolutely unobjective (*aviśayaka*)? Self or Brahman is itself Knowledge as per the Śruti-'*satyam jñānam anantam Brahma*'. This Knowledge referring to Brahman is absolutely unobjective (*aviśayaka*), but at the time of *adhyāsa* this self is identified with body and it becomes objective (*viśayaka*) though temporarily (*tatastha*). Thirdly, such false ascription is quite conceivable if it occurs between two objects seen in front (*puro 'vasthita*) as in case of snake and rope. Hence the mistake between self and non-self is inconceivable, as self is not seen in front. Vācaspati resolves this problem by saying that between two unseen objects mistake is quite possible as the blue colour, which is seen, is imposed on the sky, which is not seen.²⁰ Fourthly, can illusion be taken as virtuous in our day-to-day behaviour? In reply it can be said that though in our daily life illusory cognition cannot conjoin us with our end, the illusion in the sense of superimposition leads us to the path of the Self-realization. In fact, without such mistake one cannot move forward to attain the Ultimate goal according to the Advaita Vedānta. Hence in Advaita Vedānta such *adhyāsa* is indispensable for a beginner. Fifthly, why did Samkara start his *bhāṣya* with the concept of *adhyāsa*? Samkara's philosophy is grounded on theory that the world would be taken as *adhasṭa*, because it is the manifestation of Brahman. This basic theory cannot be properly understood if the meaning of the term *adhyāsa* is not explained at the outset. Hence the concept of *Adhyāsa* is explained initially and primarily by Samkara. Lastly, it is true that there are two types of illusion a) illusory cognition of snake in a piece of rope and b) the illusory cognition of the world in terms of the realization of Brahman. One may ask which one is efficacious to the path of self-realization.

In reply it can be said that the previous case of illusion occurs in the phenomenal level while the later one is realized in the transcendental level. The snake-rope illusion in the empirical level acquaints us with the notion of false cognition through which it would be possible for an individual to feel easily the falsity of the world. When it is said that the world is superimposed at the initial level, it has to be taken as a proposition called *pratijñā*, or presupposition, which is confirmed in the conclusive level called *nigamana*, the result of realization as found in the *pañcāvayavyāya*. The validity of the truth of the statement regarding the falsity of the world is dependent on the Self-realization in the transcendental level. First, we come to know of the falsity of the world from the statement of the scriptures, which is not the result of the directly examined truth to us. The truth of it is realized i.e., the falsity of the world is directly realized just after the self-realization. As the ultimate goal of the Advaita Vedānta is the Self-realization, after which the superimposed character of the world is directly realized, the *Bhāṣya* starts with the notion of falsity. There is the identity of Brahman with all objects leading to non-dualism. There is an empirical difference but ontological identity. An individual, though empirically different from Brahman, becomes ontologically or essentially identical with Brahman.

Thus the Buddhists think that the categories appear to be of mental origin being the nature of mental constructions (*a posteriori*) while Samkara and his followers think that the categories are not of mental origin but of the nature of the Kantian (*apriori*) categories of understanding. Samkara is a transcendental or absolute Idealist while the Buddhists are subjective idealists or mentalists.

Now a question may be raised regarding the status of object of perception in the perspective of the theory of Perception. It has already been said that an object of perception is also a kind of Consciousness which is called *Viśayacaitanya*. In connection with this Dharmarāja has added an adjunct '*vartamāna*' (present) to the object of perception in general i.e. irrespective of *jñānagata* (perception of knowledge of an object) and *Viśayagata* (perception of an object) which is already discussed earlier.

Apart from the *jñānagata* and *Viśayagatapratyakṣa* we may turn our attention to another significant distinction - *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate) perception. Of these two types of perception the former is the cognition which apprehends the qualified cognition. In other words, when a cognition apprehends a piece of knowledge consisting of the

qualificand (*viśeṣya*), the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the relation abiding in these two, it is a case of *savikalpaka* or determinate cognition. As for example, the cognition - 'I know the jar' . In this case the object of cognition i.e., a jar which is related to self referred to by the term 'I'. In this particular sentence - 'I' stands for *viśeṣya* or qualificand, 'a jar' is a qualifier and between them there is a relation called *jnātrjñeya-bhāva* relation. Hence it is taken as an example of *savikalpaka* cognition which is otherwise called a relational cognition. [*Tacca pratyakṣam dvididham savikalpaka-nirvikalpakabhedāt. Tatra savikalpakam vaiśistyaṅavagāhi jñānam. Yathā-ghatamaḥam jānāmityādi-jñānam* . *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*).

Indeterminate or *nirvikalpaka* cognition is that which does not apprehend this relatedness, i.e., a qualified cognition consisting of the qualificand (*viśeṣya*), qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and their relation existing between them. The knowledge arising from the sentences like - 'This is that Devadatta' ('*so'yaṁ devadattaḥ*;) or 'That art Thou' (*Tattvamasī*) etc. In such case cognition arises through the ignorance of the particular feature. In the first example taken from a secular world 'this' refers to the present, and 'that' refers to the 'past' and these two are contradictory to each other. Hence we cannot say that both the Devadatts are identical. Because 'This Devadatta' may be of fifty years of age and 'That Devadatta' may be of forty years old. Hence both are not same. Similarly, in the second example taken from the Vedic world the term '*Tat*' means something past and '*tvam*' means something present. These differences have to be ignored before an individual can grasp the essential unity of the individual self and Brahman. Hence in such cases the knowledge is indeterminate [*"Nirvikalpakantu samsargānavagāhi jñānam. Yathā 'soyaṁ devadattaḥ' 'Tattvamasī' ityādivākyaṅanyam jñānam* . - *Ibid*]

It is completely different the notion of *nirvikalpaka* as admitted by the Naiyāyikas. The *nirvikalpaka*, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, is also a qualified cognition without any relation.

The Naiyāyikas have defined the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) as cognition which does not abide in the relation between qualifier and qualificand (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyānavagāhi jñānam*). When an object is known as a jar, it is the result of comprehension of the relation between qualifier and qualificand (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyānavagāhi jñānam*).²¹ In the above example an object is known as a jar, because we apprehend the relation (*samsarga*) called *samavāya* or inherence existing in between *ghatatva* (jarness) and *ghaṭa* (a jar) which are qualifier and qualificand

respectively. On the other hand, when an object is known as being ^{not} endowed with name, universal, definition etc, it is an indeterminate awareness. (*nirvikalpakajñāna*). In this case there is an awareness no doubt, but it is very difficult to express in language. The language, universal etc are the bearers of the content of awareness and hence they are called *vikalpas* or substitutes for expression. The inexpressible awareness is called *nirvikalpa* in the Nyāya system.

Though the definition given by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* seems to be same like Nyāya, we should not forget to notice a epistemo-ontological difference between these two systems. Dharmarāja has defined the *nirvikalpa* as - '*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-sāmsargānavagāhi jñānam*' - i.e., a cognition not apprehending the relation between a qualifier and a qualificand. In this case the term '*anavagāhi*' does not mean the same as understood by the Naiyayikas. To Nyāya the cognition of a qualifier and a qualificand comes through the path of their relation (*sāmsarga*). If relation is not apprehended, the qualifier and the qualificand is not also apprehended. So far as the Advaita view is concerned, the term '*nirvikalpa*' means a kind of cognition which denies the absolute identity between a qualifier and a qualificand. In this case unlike Nyāya the Advaitins accept the existence of *viśeṣya*, *viśeṣaṇa* and their essential identity (*svarūpagata aikya*), but not absolute identity. Two examples are given - one from the ordinary world and another from vedic statement. In the phenomenal world it is said 'This is that Devadatta' (*soyam devadattaḥ*). In this example 'the Devadatta' is a qualificand (*viśeṣya*) 'that Devadatta' is a qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and their essential identity. What is denied here is the absolute identity between two Devadatta referred to by the terms 'that' and 'this'. In the same way, the Mahāvākya : '*Tattvamasi*' (Thou art that) can be interpreted. This is also indeterminate to the Advaitins, because, 'this' stands for individual self (*jīvātmanā*) limited by body and 'that' refers to the Supreme Soul (*paramātmanā*). Though the absolute identity (*abheda*) is denied here, the essential identity that they are conscious is accepted between them. Due to the denial of a relation called absolute identity between them it is a case of indeterminate cognition (*nirvikalpakajñāna*) which is completely different from that of the Naiyayikas.²²

When perception occurs at the very first moment, we do not have the knowledge of an object characterised by any predicate or feature like 'This is a pot' or 'This is blue' etc. In this moment or primary moment the

perception has to be taken as indeterminate or *nirvikalpaka*. When the elements apprehended without being endowed with relation and afterwards they are related in the form of a sentence (like 'This is a pot' etc), we have a perceptual cognition of *savikalpaka* or determinate type. The existence of something in an indeterminate state (*nirvikalpaka*) is not directly perceived, but it can be logically proved, because without the acceptance of it no cognition of *savikalpaka* type is accepted. When we gather the determinate perceptual cognition of something, we can know something as a pot. When we know something as a pot, it is implied that we ascribe the attribute or universal potness on the indeterminately presented object. In other words, the relation between a qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and a qualifier (*viśeṣana*) cannot be apprehended if the non-relational entities are not presented to us. It may be assumed reasonably that before knowing a pot as such which is called determinate cognition there must be a cognition of indeterminate type (*nirvikalpaka*) between pot and potness without any relation.²³

The above-mentioned decision of the Naiyayikas is vehemently criticised by the Grammarians. According to them, there cannot be a cognition which is not expressed in language. Hence an entity which cannot be expressed through language does not exist at all. 'Something exists' means 'something expressed through language'. To them no cognition called *nirvikalpaka* or indeterminate is possible.

This view is refuted by the Mimāṃsakas and the theory of *nirvikalpaka* is substantiated. Kumārila, the founder of the Bhāṭṭa school of the Mimāṃsakas, is of the opinion that some primary indeterminate cognition of the pure object must exist. It is described as cognition like that of children or the dumb. At this stage the individuality or particularity and the generality of the same is perceived for the time being. The particular which is the locus of them is known alone at this time.²⁴ This path of Kumārila is followed by Pārthasārathi Mishra, the author of *Sāstrādīpikā*. He also said that an object of the *nirvikalpaka* stage is indefinite (*mugdha*) and multiform (*anekākāra*). It becomes definite having only one form at the *savikalpaka* stage.²⁵

The Buddhists in general and Dharmakīrti in particular admit the existence of indeterminate perception which is free from the mental constructions and non-erroneous (*kalpanāpodham abhāntam pratyakṣam* - *Nyāyabindu*, Perception chapter). They have given emphasis on the *nirvikalpaka* so much that it is the only form of *pratyakṣa* to them. When these perceptual entities are vitiated by the mental constructions (*kalpanā*)

like language, universal etc, they lose their perceptual characters that are called *svalakṣaṇas* i.e., unique particulars).

The Mīmāṃsakas think that in the stage of *nirvikalpaka* an object cannot be known as something unique (*svalakṣaṇa*). If it is not known in this way, it will be known as a particular which can not be known as indeterminate. The immediate knowledge of this kind will be known as determinate, but not indeterminate.

According to the Naiyayikas, the truth of an indeterminate cognition is beyond the determination. The object in the *nirvikalpa*-stage is neither true nor false. That is, the assignment of truth-value is not possible to the indeterminate cognition, which leads us to various philosophical problems. First, if the truth and falsity cannot be assigned to the indeterminate cognition, how can it be treated as a form of perception? If it is beyond the truth and falsity, it cannot be said that it comes within our awareness.

The Buddhists particularly Dharmakīrti and others have accepted the *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (indeterminate perception) as the real form of perception. An unique object (*svalakṣaṇa*) which is free from mental constructions (*kalpanā*) and non-erroneous (*abhrānta*) is called perception (*'kalpanāpodham abhrāntam pratyakṣam'* Nyāyabindu). In the succeeding moments when some mental constructions like name, universal etc are imposed on the uniquely singular object (*svalakṣaṇa*), it becomes *savikalpaka* or determinate which comes under the category of inference or *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (as opposed to *svalakṣaṇa*) which has got a second order reality (*samvṛtīsatya*) according to the Buddhists. This is called *samvṛtīsatya* or concealed reality because at this stage the mental constructions (*kalpanā*) cover the face of the Absolute Reality (*paramārthasatyā*).²⁸

As told earlier Bhartrhari has established a theory which is completely opposite to the view of the Buddhists. The Buddhists believe that an object loses its fundamental character when it is expressed through language. In other words, the language distorts the essential nature of an object. The real fire has got the equal efficacy, as with the help of it one's purpose of cooking etc is served. But the word 'fire' cannot do the job and hence linguistic usage has nothing to do with reality. On the other hand, Bhartrhari, a philosopher belonging to the Grammarian school, believes that nothing can be expressed without the help of language. No cognition is possible without the help of language, which ultimately leads to the conclusion that there is not a single awareness of human being which is routed through

language. Any type of cognition is revealed through the medium of language ("Na so'sti pratyayo loke yah śabdānugamadṛte/Anuviddham iva jñānam sarvaṁ śabdena bhāsatē//"*Vākya-pādiya* 1-124. Banaras Sanskrit Series). From this statement we may draw our conclusion that cognition is always *śabdānuviddha* (expressed through language). If some unreal entity is referred to, it is also through the language. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that if some unreal entity is referred to, it is also through the language. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that if some unreal entity is expressed in language, it is non-sensical in the sense that the unreal entity is an absurd entity capable of not being expressed through language. If it is said that the sky-flower or barren woman's son is absent (*khapuṣpaṁ nāsti, vandhyāputronāsti*), these are described as negations, the absentees of which are absurd entities (*alīkapratīyogikābhāva*). To Nyāya we can take the absence of that object whose absence is felt. In fact, we do not feel the absence of sky-flower or barren woman's son, because the absentees or *pratīyogins* like sky-flower, barren woman's son etc are unreal entities. In the Nyāya-categorial scheme there is no room for the absurd entities, because absurd entities are not at all entities or categories. In other words, such entities cannot be enumerated as a category or *padārtha*. An object may be taken as a *padārtha* if it is any one of the seven categories like *dravya* (substance, *guṇa* (attribute) etc. As the sky flower etc are non-existent entities, they cannot be put in the list of the categories. Hence it is *apadārtha* whose absence can never be felt. To Bhartrhari, these words have definite meaning as they generate specific cognitions in mind of human beings. People are always using such language in their day to day life to express something denoted through these. Hence they have some denotative power.

Jīvasākṣī & Īśvarasākṣī

To the Advaitins the perceptual cognition is of two types : *Jīvasākṣī* *Īśvarsākṣī*. *Jīva* means an individual being limited by inner organ (*antahkaraṇa*) [*antahkaraṇāvacchinnam caitanyam jīvaḥ*]. *Jīvasākṣī* means an individual where the same *antahkaraṇa* (inner organ) acts as limiting adjunct or *upādhi* (*antahkaraṇopahitam caitanyam jīvasākṣī*). In the same way, when *avidyā* or *māyā* becomes an adjective (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the consciousness, it is called *Īśvaraḥ* (*māyāvacchinnam caitanyam paramēśvaraḥ*). The same *māyā* or *avidyā* sometimes acts as limiting adjunct or *upādhi* of the Consciousness. Under such a situation it is called

Īśvarasākṣī (māyopahitam caitanyam Īśvarasākṣi).

If the above text is analysed, we may see that an individual is called *jīva* and *jīvasākṣī* as per the position of inner organ (*antaḥkarana*). In the same way a consciousness is called *Īśvara* and *Īśvarasākṣī* as per the real position of *Māyā* or *avidyā*. If *antaḥkarana* or *māyā* attains the place of *viśeṣana* or adjective, it is called *jīva* and *Īśvara* respectively. On the other hand, if *antaḥkarana* or *māyā* takes the place of *Upādhi* or limiting adjunct, it is said *jīvasākṣī* and *Īśvarasākṣī* respectively. Now we may turn our attention to the distinction between *Viśeṣana* and *Upādhi* from which the distinction between *jīva* and *Īśvara*, *Jīvasākṣī* and *Īśvarasākṣī* depends. For understanding we should know the proper distinction between *Upādhi* and *Viśeṣana*.

Īśvarasākṣī (witness in God) is one in number, as the *Māyā*, the limiting adjunct of the Consciousness, is one in number. It may be argued that if *Māyā* is one in number, how is the usage of the plural number added to the term '*māyā*' (i.e. *māyābhiḥ*) in the following Śruti text: '*Indro māyābhiḥ purūrūpiyate*?' (i.e. Indra had taken diverse forms due to the cosmic illusions). In reply it may be said that the plural number attached to the term '*māyā*' (*māyābhiḥ*) can be justified because the plural number suggests the diverse power of *Māyā* which is originated from the three constituents in *Māyā* like *sattva*, *rajaḥ* and *tamaḥ*. Actually the singularity of *Māyā* is evidenced through the usage - '*Māyāntu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt māyinaṃ tu Maheśvaraṃ*' (i.e. one should know *Māyā* as *Prakṛti* and the God possessing *Māyā* as *Parameśvara*).

The Consciousness which is associated with *māyā* as a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) is called *Īśvarasākṣī* which is of infinite due to the infinity of its limiting adjunct (*māyā*). God (*parameśvara*), though one in number, is known as *Brahmā*, *Viṣṇu* and *Maheśvara*, due to the diverse constituents like *sattva*, *rajaḥ* etc. of *Māyā*, the limiting adjuncts of Him. In the position of the text *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* dealing with the nature and function of perception a distinction is proposed by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra in terms of *upādhi* i.e. limiting adjunct and *viśeṣana* i.e. qualifying attribute (*viśeṣana*) being present (*vartamāna*) and being a distinguisher (*vyāvartaka*) is related to the predicate (*kāryānvayī*) while a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) being present (*vartamāna*) and being a distinguisher (*vyāvartaka*) remains unrelated to the predicate (*kāryānanvayī*).²⁷ These two are illustrated as follows: '*rūpaviśiṣṭo ghaṭo 'nityaḥ*' i.e. the coloured jar is transitory and '*kaśāśaṅkūlyavacchinnam nabhaḥ śrotram*' i.e. the ether enclosed by

auditory passage is called hearing organ. The former statement is designated as *viśeṣaṇa* (qualifying attribute) while the latter as *upādhi* (limiting adjunct).

What is to be understood by the term '*kāryānvayī*' (related to the predicate)? In reply it is said in the *Śikhāmani* that it must be related to something with which the limited object (*avacchedya*) is related. In the example '*rūpaviśiṣṭo ghaṭo 'nityah*' (ie, the coloured jar is transitory), the limiter is '*rūpa*' i.e. colour and *ghaṭa*' i.e. jar is the object (*avacchedya*). So between them there is the relation called *avacchedyāvacchedaka-bhāva sambandha* (limited-limiter-relationship). The import of the term '*kāryānvayī*' i.e. related to the predicate is explained in the *Śikhāmani* in the following manner. Relation of something i.e., *rūpa* or colour in the present case is to be admitted with something i.e., *anityatā* i.e. *transitoriness* in the present context with which the object limited (*avacchedya*) i.e. *ghaṭa* or jar in the present case is connected. Hence a term may be taken as qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) if it performs the function of differentiating after being related to the predicate (*kārya*) in the above mentioned sense (*vyāvartakam kāryānvayitve sā viśeṣaṇam paryavasati*).²⁸ In the example, *ghaṭapatau paśyati devadattah*, i.e., Devadatta sees a jar and a cloth, both the jar and cloth are related to the single verb 'seeing'. In spite of this these two cannot be ascribed as qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*) on account of the fact that they have no capability of being distinguisher (*avyāvartakatvāt*).²⁹ In the same way, the terms *vartamāna* (present) and *vyāvartaka* (distinguisher) should be explained as 'a distinguisher being present' (*vartamānatve sati vyāvartakam*). The distinguisher is related to something with which the distinguished object (*vyāvarttīya*) is related. In the present example the term '*rūpa*' (colour) being a distinguisher is related to the transitoriness (*anityatā*) with which the jar i.e. the object distinguished (*vyāvarttīya*) is related.³⁰

In the case of *upādhi* something which acts as a distinguisher being present is not related to something with which the limited or distinguished is related. In the example - *karnaśaṣkyulyavacchinnam nabhaḥ śrotram* i.e. the hearing organ is the space limited by auditory passage, the auditory passage (*karnaśaṣkūlī*) being present becomes a distinguisher and is not related to that with which the distinguished object (*vyāvarttīya*) i.e., *nabhaḥ* or space is related i.e., the hearing organ (*śrotra*).³¹

A good deal of further philosophical analysis is possible about the Vedantic distinction of *viśeṣaṇa* from *upādhi*. It is customary to distinguish definitions in the form of identity statements as stating defining features and

accidental features. The issue at our hand is how does the predicate stand in relation to the definiendum. In the case of our example of the coloured jar being declared as transitory, we should care to note that the property of *anityatva* (transitoriness) comprehends both colouredness as well as jariness. That is, the scope of the predicate extends well over the colour of the jar and the jar itself, since the jar is the locus (*adhikarana*) of the property of being coloured. How can the property be non-transitory when the locus of the property is transitory? Again, one might think away such other properties of the jar as its shape, size, weight, its material cause etc but one could explain the fact that the jar is an artefact produced in time, and hence it is *anitya* or transitory. Therefore, the predicate concerned is a defining feature of the jar.

On the other hand, to say that the ether in the auditory passage is the organ of hearing, is not to assert that either the auditory passage or the ether as such is the organ of hearing. The conjunction that something x which is qualified as being the ether in the auditory passage is the organ of hearing. There is a lack of analytic connection between something being the organ of hearing, and its being either ether or the auditory passage. It is well known that conjunction is a contingent truth-function and hence the properties of *nabhatva* (being an ether) and *karnaśaṣkuli* (auditory passage) are accidental features of the organ of hearing. It is conceivable that in a model of the ear there may be cochlea (*karnaśaṣkuli*) and ether therein, and yet it would be improper to call it the organ of hearing. Hence the absence of analyticity renders the *upādhi* - statement as non-analytic or contingent or synthetic. The qualifiers are accidental features of the organ of hearing.

Upādhi can be explained with help of some other examples. *Upādhi* is that which is capable of imposing its own attributes to the nearest object. As for example, jewel which is transparent in nature seems to be red due to the proximity of a red flower. Hence the red flower is a *upādhi* as it imposes redness on the transparent jewel. The definition of *upādhi* can easily be applied to the following case which can be verbalised as '*jabākusumasannihitah sphatikah raktah*' i.e., the jewel associated with a china rose is red. In this case the adjunct '*jabākusumasannihitah*' i.e., association with a china rose' is to be taken as *upādhi*, but not qualifying attribute as it is related to the predicate - 'red'. Because redness is ascribed to jewel associated with the china rose, but not isolately with jewel or with the property of association with the china rose. In the same way, it can be said that Self is allpervading and stationary, but our body is limited and capable of being

moved. Due to the connection of body an individual can use the language. 'I am six feet long and moving as per my desire'. In this case the Self limited by body is the *upādhi* of Self. It can also be expressed in the following manner : '*Dehāvacchinno'ham gacchāmi* i.e., 'I (Self limited by body is going) is a *upādhi* or limiting adjunct but not *viśeṣaṇa* i.e, qualifying attribute as per the definition cited. The period of time limited by the movement of the planets like the Sun etc. is called hour, night, day, week, month, year etc. (*grahatārādiparicchinnah kālah yāmāhorātramāsādayah*).³² In the same way, the direction (*dik*) limited by the rise and set of the Sun is called east, west etc.

On account of this the Naiyayikas have accepted such limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) as an indicator (*paricāyaka*).³³

In the case of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) *upādhi* is accepted as of slightly different way by the Naiyayikas. That which, being a pervader of the probandum, becomes non-pervader of the probans is called *upādhi*. In the case of inferential argument - '*Parvato dhūmavan vahneh*' (The mountain is smoke-possesing due to having fire), the conjunction of wetfuel (*adhrendhanasamyoga*) is the *upādhi*. For wherever there is smoke, there is the conjunction of wetfuel. But it is not pervaded by fire as in the case of red hot ironball.³⁴ If this *upādhi* is unknown, it will function by way of providing completely opposite cognition as we find in the case of red flower and transparent jewel. The reflectors like mirror etc are *upādhis* as they provide us an opposite cognition ie, we see our left hand as right and right as left. In the same way, if the nature of the conjunction of wetfuel is not known as *upādhi*, the invariable relation (*vyāpti*) between fire and smoke from the cognition - 'Fire is pervaded by smoke' may be imposed. If this conjunction of wetfuel is known as *upādhi* as per the above-mentioned characteristics, it ceases the power of imposing the said pervader-pervaded - relationship. That is why, *Vyāpti* is defined as a relation free from *upādhi* by a section of philosophers.

In another way, *Upādhi* or limiting adjunct can be understood. The limiting adjunct experienced in our life is called constitutive while the main entity which is free from limiting adjuncts (*niravacchinna* or *nirupādhika*) is called regulative. In the Dialectic part of the *Critique of the Pure Reason* Kant institutes a distinction between regulative and constitutive ideas in the context of cosmological ideas. By 'ideas' Kant means the set of *a priori* ideas such that are derived from Reason, the highest human faculty. One

feature of these ideas is that there can never be intuitions or facts corresponding to them. But they do regulate the ways in which certain other ideas are to be used. Freedom, Ought, Immortality of the soul, God, etc are regulative notions. The constitutive ideas always have institutions corresponding to them, and together they render knowledge possible. The *apriori* categories of the understanding are constitutive notions. They are *apriori* but intentional, and it is with their help that we can organise the world as and when we come to know it. The result of the application of constitutive ideas is variability. But the application of regulative ideas are never verifiable, but they cannot be dispensed with. They are inalienable presuppositions of human state of affairs. They are *intellectual concepts* as distinguished from regulative notions. The limiting adjuncts like *ghatākāśa* (Space limited by a jar), month, week, day, night. Consciousness limited by an object (*viśayāvacchinnacaitanya*) etc are constitutive in the sense that they have intuitions corresponding to them while the absolute entities like Time (*kāla*), Space (*ākāśa*), Consciousness (*caitanya*) etc that are free from limiting adjuncts (*nirupādhika*) are accepted as regulative on account of the fact that they are ontologically accepted but not verifiable through experience or there we do not find intuitions or facts corresponding to them. That is why, *upādhi* is called an introducer (*paricāyaka*) by the Naiyayikas.

References

1. *Īsopaniṣad*, Mantra no.1

2. "Siddhānte pratyakṣatvaprayojakam kimiticet - kim jñānagatasya pratyakṣatvasya prayojakam pṛcchasi kimvā viṣayagatasya? Ādye pramānacaitanyaviṣayāvachinnacaitanyābheda iti brumah."

Vedāntapari . . . (Pratyakṣapariccheda).

3. Tathā hi trividham caitanyam. Viṣayacaitanyam pramānacaitanyam pramātrcaitanyam ceti. Tatra ghaṭādyavachinnacaitanyam. Antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavachinnacaitanyam pramānacaitanyam. Antaḥkaraṇavachinnam caitanyam pramātrcaitanyam."

Ibid.

4. "Tatra yathā tadāgodakam chidrānnirgatya kutyātmanā kedarān praviśya tadvadeva catuskoṇādyākāram bhavati. Tathā taijasamantaḥkaraṇamapi cakṣurādi-dvārā nirgatya ghaṭādiviṣaya-deśam gatvā ghaṭādiviṣayākāreṇa parinamate. Sa eva parināmo vṛttrityucyate."

Ibid

5. "Nanu niravayavasyāntaḥkaraṇasya pariṇāmātmikā vṛtṭiḥ katham ? Ittham Na tāvadantaḥkaraṇam niravayavam sādīdravyatvena sāvayavatvāt."

Ibid.

6. Sukhādyavachinnacaitanyasya tadvṛttyavachinnacaitanyasya ca niyamenaikadeśasthitopādhidvayāvachinnatvāt niyamena aham sukhi ityādijñānasya pratyakṣam". *Ibid.*

7. "Na, tatra samryamānasukhasyātītatvena smrtirūpāntaḥkaraṇavṛtter vartamānatvena tatropādhyorekadeśasthe ^{bhinnakālikatayā} sati tattadvachinnacaitanyārbhedāt; upādhyorekadeśasthe ^{ve} sati ekakālinatvasyaivopādheyābheda prayojakatvāt. ^{Yj} caikadeśasthatvamātram upādheyābheda prayojakam, tadā ' aham pūrvam sukhi' ityādismrtāvativyāptivāraṇāya vartamānatvam viṣayaviśeṣanam", *Ibid.* api svakiyadhāramādharmāu vartamānau yadāśabdādīnā jñāyate tadā tādrśāśabdajñānādāvativyāptiḥ, tatra dharmādyavachinnacaitanya-tadvṛttyavachinnacaitanyayorekatvāditi cet na, yogyatvasyāpi

viṣayaviśeṣanatvāt - *Ibid.*

9. "Na caivam api sukhasya vartamānadaśāyām, tvam sukhi ityādivākyajanyajñānasya pratyakṣata syāditi vācyam, iṣṭatvāt. 'Daśamastavamasī' ityādaḥ sannikṛṣṭaviśaye śabdādapyaparokṣajñānābhyupagamāt". *Ibid.*

10. Ataeva 'parvato vahniman ityādijñānamapi vahnyamśe parokṣam, parvatamśeparokṣam parvatādyavacchinnacaitanyasya vahirniḥṣṭāhkarānavṛtṭyavachinnacaitanyābhedaḥ; vahnyamśe tu antaḥkarānavṛtṭir nirgamanābhāvena vahnyavacchinnacaitanyasya pramānacaitanyasya ca parasparam bhedaḥ. Tathā cānubhavaḥ parvatam paśyāmi' 'vahnimanuminomi' iti. *Ibid.*

11. Asannikṛṣṭapakṣakānumitau tu sarvāmśe pi jñānam parokṣam, surabhi candanam ityādijñānamapi candanakhandaśe parokṣam, saurabhāmśe ca parokṣam, saurbhasya cakṣurindriyayogyatayā yogyatvaghāṭitasya niruktalakṣanasyābhāvāt." *Ibid.*

12. Ghaṭāderviśayasya pratyakṣantu pramātrabhinnatvam. Nanu katham ghaṭāderantaḥ-karānā-vacchinnacaitanyābhedaḥ, 'ahamidam paśyāmi' iti bhedaḥ anubhava virodhāditi cet, ucyate - *Ibid.*

13. Yadunath Sinha : *Indian Epistemology of perception*, pp. 189-191, Sinha Publishing, 1969.

14. "Tasmād yeṣu vyāvarttyamāneṣu yadanuvarttate tattebhyo bhinnam yathā kusumbhyah sūtram tathā ca bālādisāreṣu vyāvarttyamāneṣvapi parasparam ahamkāraspadamanu vartamānam tebhyo bhidyate." *Bhāmātī* on Adhyāsabhāṣya.

15. *Ibid.*

16. Deussen : *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, pp. 146-147, & 150.

17. "Yuṣmadasmatpratyayagocarayoḥ viśayaviśayinoḥ prakāśa viruddhasvabhāvayoḥ itaretarābhāvānupattau siddhāyām taddharmānam

api sūtarām itaretarabhāvanupapattih."

Adhyāsabhāsa of Samkara.

18. *Ibid.*

19. "Idamasmatpratyayagocaryoriti vaktavya yuṣmadgrahanamatyan-
tabhedopalakṣaṇārtham. Yathāhī ahamkārapratiyogī tvamkāro ... ete
bayamime bayamaśamahe iti bahūṣam prayogadarśanāditi."

Bhāmāti on *Adhyāsabhāsa*.

20. 'Tāvāt ayam ekāntena aṣṣayaḥ asmatpratyayaviṣayatvāt aparokṣatvāt
ca pratyagātmaprasiddhaḥ na ca ayam niyamah pūrovasthite eva viṣaye
viṣayāntaram adhyāsitavyam iti.

Adhyāsabhāsa of Samkara.

21. *Tarkasamgraha* with *Dipikā*, Pratyakṣa-portion.

22. "Yathā so'yam devadattastattvamsītyādivākyajanyam jñānam ... Tathā
ca so'yam devadatta iti vākyajanyajñānasya sannikṣṭaviṣayatayā
vahirniḥsrāntaḥkaraṇavṛttyabhyupagamena devadattāva-
cchinnacaitanyasya vṛttyavacchinnacaitanyābhedaḥ so'yam devadatta iti
vākyajanyajñānasya pratyakṣatvam. Evam tattvamsītyādi-vākyajanya-
jñānasyāpitra pramātureva viṣayatayā tadubhāyābhedasya sattvāt."

Vedāntaparibhāsa (Pratyakṣa-Pariccheda).

23. D.M.Datta : *The six ways of knowing*, p. 93, Calcutta University,

24. *Ślokavārtika*, Pratyakṣasūtra, kārikā, no. 112.

25. *Sāstradīpikā*, p. 41, Tarkapāda, Nirnay Sagar, 1915.

26. Raghunath Ghosh : *Relation as Real : A Critique of Dharmakīrti*, Satgura,
2001, p. 109.

27. Viśeṣanam ca kāryānvayi vyāvartakam vartamānam. Upādhiśca
kāryānvayi vyāvartako vartamānaśca. Yathā rūpavisīṣṭo ghaṭonitya ityatra
rūpam viśeṣanam. Karnāśaṣkulyavacchinnaḥ nabhaḥ srotamityatra

karnasaskulyupādhih." Dharmarāj Adhvarīndra : *Vedāntaparibhāsā* with Sikhāmani and Maniprabhā. Edited Swami Govinda Singha Sadhu, Bombay, p.89. 1885 (Sakabda). Henceforth, *Vedāntaparibhāsā*.

28. "Viśeṣaṇāñceti. kāryānvayiti, Avacchedyam yadanvayi tadanvayī^{it}arthah. Evamuttarātrāpi kāryapadam vyākhyātam. Tathā ca kāryānvayitve sati vyāvar^{on}takam viśeṣanam paryavasati".

Sikhāmani Vedāntaparibhāsā, Edited by Swami Govinda Singha Sadhu, Bombay, p. 89, 1885, Henceforth - *Sikhāmanj*.

29. "Tena ghatapatau pasyati. devadatta ityatra ghatapatayorekadarsanakriyānvayitve'pi vyāvarttakatvāna paraspara--viśeṣanatvā^pttiriti bhāvah."

Ibid.

30. "Vartamānavyāvarttakatvena = var tamanatve sati vyāvarttakatvena, avacchedyam = vyāvarttyam, yadanvayī = tena sahānvayī, tadanvayī = tena sahānvayī, uttarātrāpi = vaksyamānopādhilaksane'pi kāryānvayitve sati = avacchedyam yadanvayī tadanvayitve sati vidheyānvayitye satiti yāvat.

Maniprabhā on Sikhāmani on Vedāntaparibhāsā, Edited by Swami Govinda Singha Sadhu, Bombay, p. 89, 1885. Henceforth - *Maniprabha*.

31. "Evam uttarātrāpi kāryapadam vyākhyātam
Sikhāmani, p. 90.

Uttarātrāpi = vaksyamānopādhilaksane'pi"

Maniprabhā on Ibid.

32. "Kramākramādipratyayah... grahanaksatrādiparispandanivandhanāh, sa eva grahatārādiparispandah kāla ityucyate, tatkrta evāyam yāmahorā - tramāsādivyavahārāh." Jayanta Bhatta : *Nyāyamañjarī*, Edited by Sūryanārāyana Śuklā, chowkhamba, 1971, p. 124.

33. "Ayamevopādhih naiyāyikaih paricāyaka ityucyate"

Vedāntaparibhāsā, p. 89.

34. "Sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvamupād̄dhih... (yathā) parvato dhūmavān vahneh ityatra ādrendhanasāmyoga upād̄dhih, Yatra dhūmah tatrādrendhanasāmyoga iti sādhyavyāpakatā . Yatra vahnih tatādrendhanasāmyogā nāsti, ayogolaka ādrendhanasāmyogābhāvāt. Evam Sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpakatvādādrendhanasāmyoga upād̄dhih"

Tarkasamgraha with seven commentaries. Edited by Satkari Sarma bangiya, Chowkhamba, 1976, p. 61.

CHAPTER - IV

A LOGICAL ILLUMINATION OF THE ADVAITA THEORY OF PERCEPTION

Without application of *visayagata pratyakṣa* in our practical life love in the true sense of the term is not possible. The extension of self or knower or *pramātā* towards an object is the cause of love towards something. The self has got some sort of elasticity and hence it is extendable without any limit. When *pramātā* or self extends himself to his son, wife, husband, brother, sister etc, he can love them. *Pramātā* is nothing but the Consciousness or Self limited by internal organ (*antahkaraṇāvachinnacaitanya*), which is equivalent to individual being or *Jīva*. The extension of Self towards an object is the cause of love towards it. The *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* has given a beautiful account of such *visayagatapratyakṣa*. It is said that husband seems to be beloved to some one not because she loves her husband but because she loves herself. (... *na vā are patyuh kāmāya patih priyo bhavati, ātmanastu kāmāya patih priyo bhavati ... etc.*) Following the same logic it can be said that we love our son, father, mother etc on account of the fact that we love our self manifested there. The 'objective factor' which is not connected with our self has nothing to bind us. It is self (reflected in the object) which has got power to bind us. Hence love remains primarily in the self and it is realised when this self remains in the object. If it is so, why is not called 'subjective perception' or perceptuality existing in self (*ātmagatapratyakṣatva*). In response to this it can be said that there is no basic difference between *Viṣayagatapratyakṣtva* (perceptuality of object) and *ātmagatapratyakṣatva* (perceptuality of subject or Self). In both the cases the process is the same. As per the criterion of *visayagatapratyakṣa* there will be sole existence of the *Pramātā* or Self (*pramātr̥sattā*) leading to the non-existence of other forms of existence (*atiriktasattākatvābhāva*)². In this case an object or *viśaya* is engulfed by the *pramātā*. As *pramātā* sees himself in the object, it may be called *ātmagatapratyakṣa* (self-perception). Moreover, self is the locus or *adhīsthāna* on which the object is

superimposed in the phenomenal stage. In the case of illusory cognition there must be the locus of superimposition and the superimposed object which are called *adhiṣṭhāna* and *āropya* respectively. When we have illusory cognition of snake in a piece of rope, the rope is the locus of superimposition (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and 'snake' is a superimposed object (*adhyasta*). To the Advaitins locus or *adhiṣṭhāna* is never contradicted (*avādhita*) by the subsequent cognition. In the present context the locus i.e., rope is not contradicted but the object superimposed or *adhyasta* is contradicted by the cognition of the locus. In the present case the cognition of snake is superimposed by the cognition of rope. In the same way, the Advaitins believe that Brahman or Self is the *adhiṣṭhāna* on which all the objects are superimposed. For this reason the cognitions of the phenomenal objects are contradicted, because they are sublated by the Ultimate Knowledge or Brahman.⁹ When it is said 'Brahman is true and the world is illusory' (*Brahma satyaṁ jagamithyā*), we should carefully notice the second half of this verse which runs as follows : '*Jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ*' (i.e. an individual being is a manifestation of Brahman, not other than this). This part is supplementary to first half. Why is this world to be taken as illusory ? Because, they have to be honoured as the manifestations of Brahman or Ātman. Here '*mithyā*' does not mean the sudden vanish of all phenomenal objects, but the change of attitude to them. These phenomenal objects are illusory if they are taken as such but true if taken as the manifestation of *Brahman* or *Ātman*'.

Keeping the above clarifications in view it may be said that in the case of the perceptuality of an object (*viśayagatapratyakṣatva*) object is not vanished, but it is known as the form of self which is uncontradicted. When self covers the object, it is said to be known. Due to the coverage of self object comes under self. In this case there is not much difference in saying that object comes within self and self goes to the object and covers it. Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has coined the term *viśayagatapratyakṣa* on account of the fact that *viśayagatapratyakṣa* has to be differentiated from the *Jñānagatapratyakṣa*. In the case of the latter our self is involved, because without its involvement cognition is not at all possible. In the case of the

perception of the knowledge of an object the same knower or self attains the perceptual cognition of the object after maintaining some distance with the object. In this case knower or self remains isolated from the cognition of an object known. Due to having distinction between knower (*jñātā*) and known (*jñeya*), the known object is not completely identified with the knower as in the case of *visayagatapratyakṣa*.⁴ Had it been described as *ātmagatapratyakṣa*, it would have been unduly extended to the *jñānagatapratyakṣa*, which is also *ātmagata* due to self's involvement in it though it is of different type. In order to avoid such complications Dharmarāja had preferred to use *visayagatapratyakṣa* instead of *ātmagatapratyakṣa*.

That ^{any} type of love is self-love is again evidenced from the coinage of the term '*ātmiya*' in the sense of 'relatives' because our self is extended to them. This is the reason for bearing a soft-corner with them. If it is seen that someone is not having soft-corner to his relatives, it would be presumed that due to some reason or other our self fails to extend to them. As self is not involved, we cannot love them though they are 'relative' apparently. In the other way round it is true that someone 'feels' for some persons though they are not his 'relative'. If the reason for love is investigated, we shall see the self-extension as the ground of the same. Our love knows no bound as self is extendable to any extent. If we can extend it to the neighbours, countrymen, distressed and downtrodden people, we acquire the required ability to love them selflessly. In this way an individual can turn into a philanthropic and one can think of welfare of all human beings. The real 'feeling' only can lead a person to pray for them. This 'feeling' is again related to our self-extension. Under this situation one can pray for welfare of all in the following way :
"Sarve sukhinah santu, sarve santu nirāmayāḥ/sarve bhadrāni paśyantū, na kaścid duḥkhabhāg bhavet" (i.e, May all be happy, all be free from mental and physical disease, all see beautiful things and no one should be an abode of suffering). Such a prayer for universal welfare is possible if an individual thinks the existence of his own self to all beings. Such a view is accepted in our ancient literature - where it is said that the whole world seems to be relative to someone who has attained broadness in respect of self

("udāracaritānāntu vasudhaiva kutumbakam").

Sri Aurobindo had applied this theory to the patriots. A person can be a real patriot and sacrifice his own life for the sake of the country if and only if he can extend his self to the Nation.⁵ For this reason the patriotism is called *Desātmabodha* i.e, feeling of identity between self and country. In this case also the nation or country does not remain as isolated from the knower (*pramātā*), but the knower brings it in its own giving rise to the perceptuality of object.

Even the inanimate object can easily be brought under one's self through the same process. An object becomes very clear and desired (*iṣṭa*) due to the involvement of the Self with the same, which will find support in the following text of *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* - '*ghata iṣṭaḥ ityādi - laukika-vyapadeśo'pi saccidānandarūpabrahmaikyādhyāsāt.*')⁶. The objects like a jar etc may seem to be desired to an individual due to the imposition of self to these, which may be also be taken as perceptuality of object. A lady loves her own ornaments because they belong to her 'ownself'. In this way, any type of love or desirability is determined. It is seen in our everyday life that the objects which are in use draw our attention to these and hence we try to maintain these considering as our own things. An artist loves his or her harmonium, *sitār*, *Tanpurā* or *ghungoor* very much because his or her own self is involved with these. All these are grounded on the *viṣayagatapratyakṣa*.

The same spirit has been shown in the initial *mantra* of the *Īsopaniṣad*, which, if analysed, really illumines logically the phenomenon of *Viṣayagatapratyakṣa*. The *mantra* runs as follows : "*Īśāvāsyamidam sarvam yat kiñca jagatyām jagat/Tena tyaktena bhūñjīthā ma grādhāḥ kasyasviddhanam.*" The whole universe is covered with the Ultimate Reality or Self and hence all things whatever is there in the universe are purely covered by the Self. On account of this one should enjoy through renunciation and should not be greedy towards others properties. The first part of the *mantra* is the premise from which the second part is deduced. If an individual 'sees' his own self pervading the whole universe, there is no place, no space,

no individual, no object in this world, which does not come under the purview of the Self. Hence logically we can claim our presence everywhere in this world. Under this situation one can feel the whole world as his own self (*vasudhaiva kutumbakam*). The main outcome of this feeling is that he cannot exploit others, torture others or hate others. Because, the person whom he exploits or hates is nothing but his own self. If it is done, it is tantamount to his own exploitation or self-deceive, which is not at all desirable. This feeling prompts him to extend his love to others, resulting in 'enjoyment through renunciation' (*tyaktena bhun̄jilhā*). Who will sacrifice for others if he does not find any enjoyment in it? How is such enjoyment in renunciation possible? It is possible only through his change of attitude to the external objects ^{that} are not taken as merely objects but 'subjectified object' which is technically expressed by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra as *Viṣayagatapratyakṣa*. In such case there is no ^{essential} durability due to the existence of the Self to the objects.

In the case of *jñānagatapratyakṣa* there is a distinction between a known (*Jñātā*) and a known object (*jñeya*). By virtue of being a cognition of an object there is a knower; otherwise the knowledge of an object becomes meaningless. If it is said that there is the perceptuality of an object, it should be treated as ^{but} different from the earlier one. It is not knowledge which is perceived ^{but} the object only. Such a situation cannot give rise to knower-known-relationship (*jñātr-jñeya-bhāvasambandha*). Hence Dharmarāja Adhva^{rīndra} opines that in such cases there is only the knower in the form of Consciousness (*pramātrcāitanya*), but the other two i.e., Consciousness limited by mental mode (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) and Consciousness limited by object (*viṣayacāitanya*) ^{being} are united in the knower (*pramātā*) are absorbed in it. In this connection it is said that the amalgamation of the three is not desired (*na tāvadaikyam*), but there is only the existence of the *Pramātrcāitanya* in which other forms of Consciousness are hidden. Hence, the *Pramātrcāitanya* alone would be an object of our awareness, but other forms are the manifestation of the *pramātrcāitanya* and hence their existence does not come to our awareness.

Herein lies the metaphysical presupposition . In such case Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra is dealing with metaphysics in disguise of epistemology.

At the stage of the perceptuality of an object there is the absence of the existence of other objects excepting the existence of knower (*pramātā*). Is it not a state of liberation ? Such a situation is found temporally at the time of aesthetic enjoyment (*rasa*). Abhinavagupta has explained this state of 'subjectified object' as the melting of the state of the knower or *pramātā* (*pramātrbhāvavigalana*).⁷ Just as an object when liquidified covers many areas, in the like manner the knower can expand itself in such a way so that all objects are included in him. At this time he is not confined within himself but expanded himself to all the objects and hence objects have no other existence other than that of the knower. That is why ; an individual can enjoy aesthetic pleasure (*rasa*) as he considers the pathos etc. belonging to characters of the novel or drama as his own due to emotional involvement. This sharing of others feeling is called by Abhinavagupta as *tanmayibhavana* i.e., becoming one with other.⁸ Actually the feeling existing in an individual is transmitted to all the spectators. If each and every reader receives the same sensitivity or feeling, there is a corresponding fact, which is going on in all the hearts of the spectators (*sakala-sahṛdaya-samvāda-sālitā*). Such a phenomenon is otherwise known as 'absorption of all the audiences towards a particular object' (*sarvasāmājīkānām ekaghanatā*). To Viśvanātha also the subject i.e., *pramātā* sees himself being identified with it (*pramātā tadabhedena svātmānam pratipādyate*).¹⁰ In fact, self exists everywhere including the art-object. Hence the Aestheticians are of the opinion that the relishment itself is *rasa* (*rasanī^aṅgh^h rasah*). It is the relishment of the bliss arising out of self-knowledge (as reflected in the characters of the drama), which is called *svavidānanda* (pleasure arising from self-cognition), as if we have undertaken an activity of chewing (*carvanavyāpāra*) the bliss generating from self-knowledge. To Abhinavagupta who is chiefly influenced by the Advaitins such a chewing activity of the bliss of the self-knowledge is called *Rasa*.¹¹ This interpretation

of aesthetic experience would not have been possible, had there been no solid foundation of the perceptuality of object (*Viṣayagatapratyakṣatva*). In fact the aesthetic enjoyment is nothing but the extension of self to the object, which is called *Viṣayagatapratyakṣa*. A question may be raised whether such *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* is equivalent to the Advaita concept of liberation or not. In reply, it can be said that such perception and the aesthetic enjoyment is qualitatively same but quantitatively different. When a jar is perceived, there is the feeling of the non-duality of the self and the jar until the absorption breaks up. When such absorption does not break, an individual will see the whole world as his own self. This non-dual experience will remain forever and such situation is described as liberation according to the Advaitins. The perceptual experience of the phenomenal objects like a jar etc. occurs temporally and hence it is, though qualitatively same, quantitatively different. Both the experiences - the *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* and aesthetic experience contain disinterested pleasure arising out of self-relishment-*ātmānanda*. In fact a human being's mind is dominated by the *sattvaguna* at this situation and hence it is touched by *rajaḥ* and *tamoguna*. Due to the prominence of *sattvaguna* an individual can enjoy the self-knowledge identified with him and hence he is not touched by any other knowledge (*vedyānatarasparśasūnya*). This bliss is a highest type of *ānanda* arising from self-revelation (*svaprakāśānanda*), which is qualitatively equivalent to the taste of Brahman, but not quantitatively, as the former is transitory and the latter is eternal. That is why, such pleasure is described as *Brahmasvādasahodara*.¹² (i.e., the smaller manifestation of the taste of Brahman).

The aesthetic experience, which is very much common in each and every man's life, can be a live testimony of the existence of the perception of an object. Such an experience may be an instance to an enquirer to the fact how an object can come under the purview of the subject spontaneously through such perception. If it is possible in the aesthetic world, why is it ^{not} possible in other fields ?

The disinterestedness in aesthetic attitude has been well recognised by many. An idealist thinker has also indicated the broad implication of it in aesthetic; beauty is the expression of the Absolute spirit.

The aesthetic attitude is different from the practical. In aesthetic experience a love poem, for example, moves us with its sentiments of love which is aroused and sustained by many auxiliary feelings such as jealousy, pain, anger and joy. These acts are taken accessories to the dominant sentiment, love. The aesthetic delight is different in flavour from the ordinary one. This delight is due to expression.

We have thus two paradoxes with regard to aesthetic attitude. First, there is psychical distance or detachment of the beautiful from our ordinary needs and desires while there is also some human feeling associated with the aesthetic object. Secondly, the joy afforded by the beautiful is not ordinary joy yielded by an object satisfying some organic need-practical sensuous, intellectual or moral. We have to resolve these paradoxes. This is done by realising that the feelings associated with beautiful in art and nature are not specific affecting one personally but they are generalised feelings which one feels in an impersonal manner. The feelings accompanying an aesthetic experience are dislodged from their particular objects and individual minds and they float as universal ideal content, in the mental continuum of human culture. In a realistic attitude one holds an object as a part of his environment and relates it to other objects and to himself. In an aesthetic attitude, as the object is no longer held as real, it is not related to anything but contemplated for its own sake as a self-complete and self-dependent entity. As the object is so disengaged from its environment so the feeling associated with it is also deprived of any real source for the beholder who feels it in an impersonal and non-attached way.

An individual feels not blindly and passively as he does in a realistic attitude but *consciously and actively*. This active and enlightened way of feeling a generalised emotion projected on an appropriate image yields a superior kind of joy (*rasa*). An emotion, either agreeable or disagreeable in

itself, is enjoyed and this delight which defeats tragic emotions and feeds on them, is of a higher kind than of the ordinary emotion of joy. Thus it is that the two paradoxes mentioned above can be solved. We can understand how in an aesthetic attitude there is both detachment and feeling and how aesthetic delight is of an extraordinary kind. This feeling of joy (disinterested) is due to our extension of Self to the object which is a kind of *viṣayagatapratyakṣa*.

Moreover, without the extension of self the pathos of others cannot be shared. It is said that the aesthetic pleasure arising out literary form of art or other forms of art cannot be enjoyed by all, but only by the appreciators called *sahṛdayas*. It is said by Abhinavagupta "yōrtho hṛdayasāmvādī tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ/Sarīram vyāpyate tena." A literary form of art is always appreciated by the appreciators alone. For being a *sahṛdaya* one should have common sharing of feeling with the object which is also a kind of *viṣayagatapratyakṣa*. To Viśvanātha poetry is a peculiarly unworldly phenomenon, an extra-ordinary creation of supernatural supernormal genius and hence it cannot be governed by the rules of ordinary human intellect. In ordinary life sorrow comes from sorrow, fear follows fear, but in the world of poetry we find pleasure deriving from the painful, horrible and terrible situations. In these cases there is some type of identity (as evidenced in *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*) between audience and the object of perception. This phenomenon of identity emerges from having self-involvement (*ekātmata*) with it. The property of being *sahṛdaya* lies in the fact of being identified with the feeling of the poet. A poet creates a literary form of art, the appreciator realises it and being a *sahṛdaya* he recreates the literary art in his own self. The aesthetic pleasure is a generalised one. The generalisation is the process of idealisation through which an individual may go from his personal emotion to the serenity of contemplation of a poetic sentiment. The poet and audience must have capacity of idealisation. For this reason a poet can present personal emotion as an impersonal aesthetic pleasure which is enjoyed by others. As this pleasure transcends the limitation of personal interests, it is disinterested universal pleasure. This pleasure is the emotional

mood revealed in a blissful knowledge free from all barriers which is the form of Brahman or Self.

To highlight such a theory the case of Vālmīki may be cited. After perceiving the separation of the curlew-couple Vālmīki became very much moved and out of his sorrow he has an emotional outburst in the form of śloka. He had an intense feeling of pathos in which he had lost himself. Due to the complete loss of personality (*pramātā* as coined by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra) he had a sense of joy out of grief. This joyful experience of pathos enjoins him with the spontaneous power of creativity. Vālmīki's grief was not this-worldly. If it were, he would have mere sympathy with the bird, which cannot provide him the power of creativity. For, this-worldly grief makes an individual idle. When an individual's vision becomes deep and clear, he receives an inspiration from within. The spontaneous poetry is called śloka because it arises from the grief due to the separation of the curlew couple and this sharing is due to extension of one's own self (*krauñcadvandvaviyogothah śokah ślokatvamāgatah*).¹⁴

To Abhinavagupta any type of the production of creative art presupposes the condition of *rasāveśā* (involvement in aesthetic sentiment) in an individual. The abiding emotion or sentiment must exist in an artist, dramatic character and spectators (in case of literary form of art). In the case of pictorial art also the same sentiment must exist among artist, pictorial presentation and the critic. Hence, the property of being *sahṛdaya* is essential for any type of art-enjoyment which is a pioneer example of *viśayagatapratyakṣa* when the hearts of the people are expanded having clear mind due to the habit of practising literature and gather the capability of being identified with the characters of drama as described (*varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā*), they are called *sahṛdayas* as they all possess the same feeling. In this context the phenomenon of *tanmayībhavana* (to be objectified) is possible through the process as shown in the perceptuality of object.¹⁵

These theories of perception are beautifully explained by Professor Bina Gupta following different commentaries on the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. In

the commentary - *Āśubodhini* it is said that the perceptuality of knowledge is the identity between consciousness limited by the object and consciousness limited by the mental mode. Under this situation it can be said that the content of such a perceptual knowledge is perceptual. In the *Paribhāṣāprakāśikā* the *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* is explained as the identity with the witness-consciousness (*sākṣyabhinnatvm*), which is expressed as *pramātrabhinnatva* in the text by Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra. 'This witness-consciousness must be associated with the mental mode in the form of an object with which its identity takes place; resulting in the perceptuality of an object.'¹⁶

Actually such type of perceptuality of object is taken as a perception in the form of *sākṣivedya* i.e. known immediately through witness. We can hear a song in two ways : the song may be heard quite unmindfully and it may be heard as if it is piercing our heart. Though both are the phenomena of hearing, there is a difference in degree. The former is a mere hearing without having impact on our psychology while the latter is piercing our heart after issuing through our external hearing organ which is described by the Vaisnavites as 'it pierces the heart after going through the external hearing organ (*'kāner bhitardiyā maramē paśila go*'). This type of perception is the real perception of object - the object is identified with the subject through its sanctity or value.

Professor Gupta has beautifully summed up this phenomenon of *viṣayagatapratyakṣa* in the following way :

"... VP's thesis - that object do not have any independent existence apart from the witness-consciousness-must be understood against the background that, in the final analysis, according to Advaita, there is only one kind of being, 'reality', which in the system of Advaita has been articulated in terms of the afore-mentioned triple modes. From the perspective of reason and empirical experience, these three levels are incommensurable; they are different qualitatively. The identity of an object with the witness-consciousness only implies that the objects do not have any independent

existence apart from the witness-consciousness. The reality of existence that pertains to the substratum is manifested in the superimposed objects as well. It is similar to the manifestation of 'thisness' of 'this is silver' in the silver itself. At the time of immediate cognition, the consciousness conditioned by the object, the mind and the mental mode are one, so the existence that pertains to the consciousness conditioned by the object is one with the consciousness conditioned by mind. Therefore, objects such as pitchers do not have any independent existence that is the essential nature of the witness-consciousness. Accordingly, the verbal usage, that is, 'pitcher is perceptual' is intelligible.¹⁷

It has been pointed that the Advaitins believe in two types of perception - *nirvikalpaka* (indeterminate) and *savikalpaka* (determinate). The determinate perception apprehends the qualifier, qualificand and their relation (*vaiśiṣṭyā-vagahijñānam*) e.g, I know the jar. While the indeterminate perception does not apprehend the relation in a cognition (*sāmsargānavagahī*), e.g. 'This is that Devadatta' or 'Thou art that' etc.¹⁸

Though it has been said that in the case of indeterminate perception there is no apprehension of the relation between qualifier and qualificand. In the previous case - 'This is that Devadatta' that Devadatta belonged to different space and time and this Devadatta belongs to another space and time. Hence, the relation between that Devadatta and this Devadatta is denied here. The specific characters of Devadatta belonging to the past are not the same in the case of present Devadatta. For this reason both are not identical. This non-identity is hinted through their absence of relation. Hence it is a kind of indeterminate perception capable of not apprehending relation (*sāmsargānavagahī*). It is to be kept in mind that the Advaitins are not referring to a perception of the ordinary experientiable type, but to a peculiar cognition which does not reveal any relation. The indeterminate cognition does not refer to the relation remaining among various factors of the content of a cognition. The same non-relational statement is found in the Mahāvākya - 'Thou art that' (*tattvamasi*). It may be argued that in the previous example, Devadatta is manifested as conditioned by spatio-temporal relations, which

are pointed out by the terms - 'this' and 'that' (*soyam*) . In reply it can be said that these terms must be taken here as indicating factors (*upalakṣana*). The statement '*Tattvamasī*' (that art thou...) does not indicate the spatio-temporal relation. On the other hand, the statement 'This is that Devadatta' (*so'yaṁ devadattah*) is made only to show that Devadatta is in Devadatta. As if this statement is made in order to refute the contrary cognition in the form of doubt whether this is the same Devadatta or not". The person is manifested in himself through his essence, but not through the manifestation of the adjectival feature.

If there is at all any identity between this and that Devadatta, it is the identity of the person in himself. A recognitive experience like this reveals the identity of the knowledge arising from two words that imply a seeming duality.¹⁹

Such type of *nirvikalpaka* perception is not accepted in the Nyāya philosophy. To the Naiyayikas such a *nirvikalpaka* cognition is non-relational in the sense that there are qualificand and qualifier but no relation. To them it is *asābda* or non-testimonial which is not capable of being expressed in language. Hence, it is metaphorised as a cognition of the children and dumb persons. The Advaitins admit a peculiar type of *nirvikalpaka* which is explained earlier.

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3. "Viṣayacaitanyañca pūrvoktaprakareṇa pramātr̥caitanyaṃ eveti
pramātr̥caitanyaṣyaiva ghatādyadhīṣṭhānatayā pramātr̥sattaiva ghatādisattā
nānyeti siddham ghatāderaparokṣatvam."
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8. *Ibid*, p. 8.
9. *Kāvyaḷoka*, *Vṛtti*, 4/28.
10. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*- 3/42-43.
11. 'Śabdasaṃnyamāna ... svasamvidānanda-carvanavyāpāra-
rasanīyarūpo rasah' *Locana on Dhvanyāloka*, 1/1.
12. Sattvodrekād akhaṇḍa-svaprakāśāṇḍacinmayah/
Vedyāntarasparśāśūnyo branmasvādasahodarah//
Lokottaracamatkarapranah kaiscit pramatrbhih// Svakaravad
abhinnatvenāyamāsvādyate rasah// Rajastamobhyāmaspr̥ṣtam manah
sattvamihocyate// *Sāhityadarpaṇa*- 3/35.
13. *Locana on Dhvanyāloka*, Ed. by Kappṣvami Sastri, Madras, 1964, pp.
77-78.
14. *Dhvanyāloka* Sloka no. 1/5.
15. "Yeṣāṃ kāvyā - nuṣīlanābhyāśavaśād manomukure
varṇanīyatanmayībhavanayogyatā te hr̥dayasamvādabhājah sahr̥dayāh"
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16. Bina gupta : *Perceiving in Advaita Vedānta*, Motilal, Delhi, 1995, p. 204.
17. Ibid, p. 206.
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CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSION

So far as Indian theories of perception are concerned the Advaita theory of perception is of peculiar in nature due to having a specific type of presuppositions admitted by them. As the world is covered by Consciousness, each and every object is nothing but the manifestation of the same. Though the Consciousness is one, its various forms are imagined as the limiting adjuncts of the same Consciousness. As there are limiting adjuncts of the Consciousness, the amalgamation of the two or three types of consciousness gives rise to the perceptuality of knowledge of an object and the perceptuality of the object. When one adjunct of Consciousness is merged with another type, it gives rise of perception in the Advaita Vedānta. When *Pramāṇacaitanya* and *Viśayacaitanya* are amalgamated keeping *Pramāṅrcaitanya* aside, it is called *jñānagatapratyakṣa* due to having *jñātr-jñeya-bhāva* (knower-known-relationship) in the cognition. When *Pramāṇa* and *Viśaya-caitanya* are merged in the knower or *Pramātā*, it is called *viśayagatapratyakṣa*. In this case self or knower is completely identified with the object leading to the knower-known-relationship. This type of perception is peculiar in the sense that they think the 'objectified subject' or 'subjectified object' is the case of perception. This perception is in the sense of *sākṣivēdya* or realisation of self in the object.

The indeterminate perception or *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* is accepted in the recognitive cognitions like 'This is that Devadatta' (*Soyam devadattah*) or 'That art thou' (*Tattvamasī*) on account of the fact that it does not reveal the relation between the two i.e., this and that Devadatta or That and thou. It has been interpreted by the Advaitins that the sentence conveys the sense the Devadatta exists in Devadatta himself or an individual Self exists in himself in the form of Brahman. But they do not admit relation between two by the term - '*vaiśiṣṭyānavagahī*'. If the meaning of the afore-said sentences are

pondered upon, it will be revealed that these are not actually relation-free. In other words, like other components the relation is also revealed in such cases due to the following reasons. First, how do we know that Devadatta exists in himself without the assumption of the relation of identity between them? Any type of recognitive cognition presupposes the relation of identity (at least in the sense of similarity) between two existing earlier and present time. To the Advaitins identity or *tādātmya* is the vital relation in the phenomenal cognition. In fact, they admit *tādātmya* in the places where there is a part and whole relation (*avavaya-avayavibhāva-sambandha*), quality and the possessor of the attribute (*gunagunibhāvasambandha*) etc. In fact, in these cases, the Vaiśeṣikas would accept *samavāya* or inherence as a relation. Hence *tādātmya* has very often been accepted by them as a relation. In the cases cited above there must be a relation of identity (*tādātmya*) in the sense of similarity between ^{them}. That is why, the recognitive cognition is possible. Secondly, though there is no absolute identity between this Devadatta and that Devadatta or an individual being and Brahman, there must be an essential identity (*svarūpatādātmya*) between them. Otherwise, the sentences could not have provided the intended meaning. Lastly, the cognition coming through the sentences are called relational in character as it is sentential in nature. A sentence becomes meaningful if there is a word, its meaning and their relation. It may again be asked whether in the words and their meaning there is *vācya-vācaka-bhāva* (i.e. expressor-expressed relationship) or not. If the answer is in positive, relation is accepted between them. If not, the sentences cannot provide the desired meaning due to the lack of *vācakatva* (expressive character) of the words. In fact, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra has accepted the meaningfulness of the sentences, which entails the existence of relation in them. Hence, the definition of *nirvikalpaka* perception as formulated by the Advaitins is hardly adequate. At least this type of definition fails to justify a *nirvikalpaka* - cognition.

Two types of perception, apart from the previously mentioned one are *Jivasākṣī*. In the same way, the consciousness qualified by *māyā* is called *Īśvara* or God (*māyāvacchinnam caitanyam paramēśvarah*). When the same

māyā remains as a limiting adjunct (*upādhi*) it is called witness in-God (*Īśvarasākṣī*). Though the distinction between a *viśeṣana* and *upādhi* has been shown clearly, it is very difficult to understand the exact position with the sense-organs. Whether inner sense-organ or *antaḥkāraṇa* remains in an individual being as an adjunct or limiting adjunct is very difficult to know. In the same way, the position or status of *māyā* in Consciousness (*caitanya*) cannot be known with the help of reasons. Without the help of intuition it is very difficult to have an idea about the status of mind in an individual being or the status of *māyā* in a Consciousness. It needs vision to know the same. If these are known transcendently, are they called the forms of perception? The phenomena of *Jīvasākṣī* and *Īśvarasākṣī* are more metaphysical in character than epistemological. Hence, the Advaitins cannot do 'pure epistemology' without the help of metaphysics.

In connection with the immediate awareness (*aparokṣajñāna*) Dhjarmarāja Adhvarīndra has pointed out that such perceptual awareness may sometimes arise from the testimony also, which is called perceptual cognition generated through verbal testimony (*śābdajanyapratyakṣa*).

It has been argued by the Advaitins that, when an individual comes to an awareness of his happiness through the utterance of the sentence 'you are happy' (*tvam sukhi*) by somebody else, would it be considered as perceptual? The answer is in the positive, as it is always desired by the Advaitins. They have put forward an example of perceptual awareness through some testimonial cognition. The story regarding this goes as follows. Ten persons were crossing a river together. The leader of the team, after crossing the river, was trying to ascertain whether all the persons have crossed the river or not. Everytime he is finding nine persons through sincere counting. They were apprehending some mishap on the river where one of the passenger may have died. After sometime an individual came forward to the person who was counting and asked whether he had counted himself. Ultimately the person pointed him out as the tenth person and said 'you are the tenth' (*dasamastvamasī*)¹. Through this the leader had an awareness that he is the tenth. This is no doubt perceptual which is

generated through the utterance of the sentence by somebody else.

Actually this type of awareness suggests a great domain of the Advaita philosophy. To the Advaitins an individual being is always free, but he does not know it. When it is pointed out that he is free from suffering through the injunction of the *Śāstra* or *Āgama* or through *śravaṇa* (hearing), *manana* (reflection) and *nididhyāsana* (meditating), he suddenly sees himself free. This freedom is not new to him, but it is acquirement of which is already acquired (*prāptasya prāptih*). A person's liberation or free is not at all a new achievement, but awareness of something which is already known. This knowing of the known is possible through the testimonial statement as found in different *Śruti*. The function of the testimony in the form of *āgama* is to make someone aware about his own position and status. It provides the true picture of human being like his freedom etc about which he did not know. Hence, perception in the field of freedom or liberation is generated through the agamic statement, which is very much significant in Indian Philosophical systems.

It has been said by the Advaitins that in the piece of cognition - '*surabhi candanam*' (sandal wood is fragrant), the cognition of sandal wood is perceptual, but the cognition of fragrance (*sourabha*) is not, as it is not capable of being visualised due to not having the criterion-*yogyatva* i.e. capability of being visualised.² As the fragrance has no capability of being perceived it is not perceptual, but it is inferential. The Naiyayikas prefer to call it an extra-ordinary or super-normal perception called *jñānalakṣaṇa* i.e. perception of something through other cognition. As soon as a sandal wood is known, it is known as having fragrance quickly due to having their invariable association. The cognition of fragrance comes to our awareness so spontaneously that we do not think that fragrance and sandal wood are different in nature. As if sandalwood and fragrance are at the same time. That is why, it (the cognition of fragrance) is given a status of perception which is of supernormal type due to not having the contact of the sense-organ with the object (*indriyarthasannikarsa*).

The Advaitins do not find any justification in admitting the cognition of fragrance as perceptual of supernormal nature, because the object (fragrance) has no capability of being perceived due to the lack of *yogyatva* here. Hence, there is no possibility of considering it as a case of perception. It is better and it comes under the law of persimony (*lāghava*) if it is accepted as inferential due to having inferential character in it. The cognition of sandalwood is taken as the probans or *hetu* through which the fragrance is inferred. In the same way, the cognitions like - 'Ice looks cold' 'fire looks hot' can be justified as perceptual so far as 'Ice' and 'Fire' are concerned and inferential so far as the facts of being cold and hot are concerned.

It has been stated in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* that our inner organ (*antaḥkarana*), after issuing from our body with the help of sense-organ, goes out of the body and assumes the form of an object just like a liquid entity. This activity is essential for having a perceptual cognition particularly in the context of Advaita Vedānta. It may be argued by the opponents that how an inner organ or *antaḥkarana* can go to the place where the object exists and assumes in form of the same.³ How can it be imagined as having the property of liquidity? The reply can be given in the following manner. The phenomenon of going out of the inner organ is a metaphorical expression. It does not literally mean that an inner organ (*antaḥkarana*) covers the space to reach the place where the object exists. It does not mean that an *antaḥkarana* really moves - because movement presupposes its activity. In fact an inner organ can reveal those objects that are in contact with the sense-organs. If an object exists beyond the reach of the sense-organ, it is not perceptible. These are excluded by the terms - '*yogyatva*' and '*bartamānatva*' incorporated as adjuncts of an object.⁴ Hence it is the function of the *antaḥkarana* to reveal those that are in proximity with the sense-organs. From this it is certain that mind or *antaḥkarana* does not go to the object far away from the knower so that it has to cover some space, which is possible if and only if it has movement as a quality. So the so called movement of *antaḥkarana* is nothing but linguistic play. It is the secondary expression - as it expresses the function in a metaphorical way. The phenomenon of the

assumption of the form of an object is also metaphorical in the sense that it means that our mind takes the object as its content so that its awareness is possible accurately. A sense-organ cannot reveal an object to the knower if mind is not associated with it. Hence the mental mode (*vṛtti*) has to be formed with the help of inner organ. This mental mode cannot have a particular size and shape as it depends on those of an object. In fact, mind has no size or shape of its own-as of a substratum. It is imagined by the philosophers that as if mind is taking the forms of the objects. In the imaginary eye of the philosopher it is nothing but a liquid substance. 'Otherwise, how can it be modified according to the shape of the object? As mind involves such functions, it cannot be taken as atomic like the Naiyāyikas. To the Advaitins it does not serve the function of a sense-organ, but it is considered as an inevitable factor of perceptual cognition. Without the mental mode in the form of an object an object is not capable of being perceived. Hence *vṛtti* is the property of mind. Like *vṛtti* there are various attributes like sharpness (*hrī*), steadiness (*dhṛṭi*), respect (*śraddhā*) etc which are associated with the mind. As an inner organ is a possessor of attributes (*dharmī*) and capable of being transformed, it is called *sāvayava* (having some parts), but not *niravayava* (partless) as admitted by the Naiyāyikas. Had it been partless in character, it would not have been transformed to a particular form which is called modification. As it is *sāvayava*, it may remain as a *dharmī* (possessor of attributes).⁵ Hence, the role of inner organ in the Advaita theory of perception is unique and novel in character. One problem may remain unsolved if this view is taken for granted. The Naiyāyikas have accepted the atomic character of mind on account of the fact that it cannot reveal two objects simultaneously (*yugapajñānanūtpattiḥ manaso liṅgam*).⁶ If the atomic character is not accepted, it would point out the fact that it can reveal two or more objects at a time. But is it possible in the practical world? Our mind can reveal one object at a time which is quite natural. How do the Advaitins explain this fact? Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra might say that, when our mind assumes the form of a jar, a jar alone is perceived, not a pot etc. Because under this situation knower can have the cognition of a jar and consciousness in the form of a

jar. If a pot is the matter of perception, our mind assumes the form of jar and its corresponding mental mode. The amalgamation of the consciousness in the form of the mental mode corresponding to a pot and consciousness in the form of a pot gives rise the perceptual cognition of a pot. Hence, there does not any question of simultaneous cognition of two objects.

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Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Pratyakṣaparicched)

2. "Surabhi candanam' ityādijñānamapi candanakhandāmśe aparokṣam saurabhāmśeca parokṣam sourabhasya cakṣurindriyāyogyatayā yogyatvaghatitasya niruktalakṣanasyābhāvāt."

Ibid.

3. Tatra tadagodakam chidrānirgatya kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya tadvadeva catuskoṇādyākāram bhavati tathā taijasamantaḥkaraṇamapi cakṣurādīdvārā nirgatya ghatādideśam gatvā ghatādiviṣayākāreṇa parinamate. Sa eva parināmo vṛttirucyate".

Vedāntaparibhāṣā (pratyakṣapariccheda).

4. "... Pūrvamham sukhītyādismṛtāvativyāptibāranāya bartamānatvam viśeṣanam deyam tatra dharmādyavacchinnacaitanyasya tadvṛttyavacchinnacaitanyayorekatvāditi cenna; yogyatvāyāpi viṣayaviśeṣanatvāt." *Ibid.*

5. "Na tāvadantaḥkaraṇam niravayavam sādīdravyatvena sāvayavatvāt... vṛttirūpajñānasya manodharmatve ca kāmah saṅkalpo vicikitsā śrādhāsradhā dhṛtiradhṛtirhrīdhibhīrityetatsarvam māna eveti śrutir mānam".

Ibid.

6. *Nayāsūtra* 1.1.1b

Ibid.

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