

CHAPTER - IVReligious belief and Functions
of Language

A philosophical movement is a group of philosophers, active over at least one or two generations, who more or less share a style, or an intellectual origin. They who have learned more from each other than they have from others, though they may, and often do, quite vigorously disagree among themselves.

The very name, logical positivist is by welcome to some, though it is still and quite reasonable applied to all, particularly from the outside. They all accept linguistic turn wittgenstein initiated in the 'Tractatus'.

They have disagreements because they interpret and develop it in their several ways.

Yet they are all under its spell hence their common style. Thus, if names in themselves were important, it might be better to choose linguistic philosophy or philosophy of language.

For another, there is strictly speaking no such thing as the philosophy of language. Language may be studied by philologists, aestheticians, and scientists such as psychologists or sociologists. To bring these studies thoughtfully

together is well worth while. Customarily such synoptic efforts are called philosophy. There is no harm in this provided they are not mistaken for what they are not, namely technical philosophy. Rather than being philosophers are therefore, philosophies through language ; they philosophize by means of it. But then, everyday who speaks uses language as a means or tool. The point is that, the positivists, newly conscious of it, use it in a new way. Contemporary philosophy is distinguished from philosophy in the past by its intense concern with language and meaning. This concern has take different forms. The logical positivists offerd one account of the meaning of "meaning", and one programe for clarifying language. The philosophical analyses, under the influence of the wittgenstein of the "philosophical inuestigations", offer a different account and a different programe. Philosophers in both these traditions have analyzed and attempted to clarify a number of areas of discourse - the language of ethics, politics, science, metaphysics and aesthetics.

Earlier the positivist had written off religion and theology as being in large part factually meaningless or noncognitive. Philosophical analysts, however, have introduced new and challenging discussions which emphasizes a careful analysis of the uses or functions of religious concepts

and statements in the content of their use.

Both of the logical positivists and the analysts who follow the latter Wittgenstein agree that there are many uses of words in religious discourse which purport to communicate information, but which do not, uses of words which are misuses, or, which really convey only nonsense. The problem for these analysts is that of formulating a way of deciding whether a particular use of words is power or not, and whether it has factual significance or not.

The central figure in the movement of linguistic analysis is undoubtedly Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Wittgenstein develops the tentative and informal ideas of Moore and Russell on the function of analysis into a systematic position so that with him it is possible to speak, for the first time, of a philosophy of analysis.

The method of the logical positivists rests upon an arbitrary (and metaphysical) assumption that only empirically verifiable propositions fulfil the logical conditions for meaningfulness. But Wittgenstein claims that his criterion of meaning rested upon a purely formal or logical examination of the structure of language. "Nonsense", so

he claims arises through attempting to think outside the limits of language" and to say what can not be said in language. This means that philosophy in the traditional sense the investigation of the ultimate principles of thought and "reality" - is nonsense. The sole task of philosophy is a negative or critical one - "the logical clarification of thoughts".

If this is so, even any attempt to express philosophical theology is outside the "limits of language" and to say what cannot be said.

However Wittgenstein does not in the "Tractatus" exclude the concept of God as being meaningless in the strict sense, or in the sense in which the Logical positivist were to exclude any talk about God and the religious order as "nonsense". Thus, in some obscure and ambiguous remarks in the latter part of the 'Tractatus', he says 'God does not reveal himself in the world - so, it would seem, precluding any possibility of a "proof" of a transcendental God based upon a consideration of the properties of the things in the world.

Wittgenstein denied the possibility of a speculative natural theology it seems that he thought that the possibility

of God and religion could perhaps best be shown through certain moral experiences such as the awareness of sin and guilt and personal insufficiency.¹

Wittgenstein attempted to formulate a logically perfect language which contains vague and ambiguous symbols, is inaccurate. The philosopher's function is that of constructing an ideal language in which ambiguity and inaccuracy are precluded.

For Wittgenstein philosophical problems result from linguistic or conceptual confusion. For him philosophy becomes a kind of therapy, a way of leading one out of conceptual and linguistic confusions.

So this above method of analysis have been applied in number of areas. However, philosophical analysis have turned their attention to the language of religion. The positivist had simply dismissed religion and theology as a whole, or neatly placed it in the realm of non-cognitive. Contemporary analysis, however are beginning to examine in great detail theological concepts and religious utterances.

1. Philosophy of Religion - ed. by George L. p. 150

Alfred and Thomas A. Longford
(The Macmillan Company - New York.

Colle in mackmillan Limited - London.

Religious discourse does in fact puzzle a number of people. The analyst attempts to rid us of these puzzles and help us understand religious language. Efforts have not been directed toward a translation of religious statements into equivalent statements - the method of substitution.

For this, emphasis has been in the direction of trying to understand religious claims by examining in detail the entire context of religious discourse, the way in which religious utterances function.

To understand the functions of religious locutions, it will be better by passing through Wittgenstein Pluralistic theory of meaning. Wittgenstein develops what might be called a "pluralist" theory of meaning. Thus instead of speaking about the structure of "language" as a unitary whole, as he had done in the "Trattatus".

Wittgenstein speaks of particular 'language-game' that is to say the sets or groups of concepts which we use in talking about, for e.g. mental states are about pleasure and pain or about perception etc. The meaning of a word is now defined in terms of its use, in a particular 'language-game'

and the task of analysis is to remind us of the context in ordinary language (and of the whole 'form of life' with which it is involved) in which it is used, for there, by definition, it is used meaningfully.

Contemporary linguistic philosophy accepts as fundamental the principle the proper locus of meaning in the proposition or statement.

J.L. Evans goes so far as to claim that "it is only in the context of a sentence that a word is meaningful"² Wittgenstein much earlier asserted, "only the proposition has sense, only in the content of a proposition has a name meaning."³

All the recognized sciences were not only explores of a special subject matter but also possessors of a special method or methods developed to deal with their particular fields of study. A clearly defined methodology indeed, seemed even more than a distinct subject matter to be the primary criterion of all the genuine intellectual disciplines.

The function of Philosophy is to engage in analysis of

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2. J.L. Evans - On meaning and verification - p. 8
Mind - Vol. LXII, 1953.
 3. Wittgenstein - 'Tractatus' - p. 3.3

the meaning of language.

The early analysis of Russell, Moore and others showed clearly that great scope existed for philosophy under this new understanding of its function. Ordinary language is a subtle and sometimes misleading instrument, meanings are elusive, often hidden or confused by the language which seems to express logically acceptable propositions.

According to Ryle, "many systematically misleading expressions haunt the avenues of daily speech. Grammatically, perfect sentences, may conceal logical unmeaning."⁴

However much linguistic philosophers may otherwise disagree, they are one in the conviction that there is likely to be something problem-causing about unanalysed language which proper analysis can remove.

Now the question is that, if philosophy is concerned with meaning then what constitutes meaning?

It is the fundamental question in contemporary analytical philosophy. One conception which has emerged in response to that question is Wittgensteins conception of language-game.

4. Ryle - Systematically misleading expression - Logic and language - first series.

In 'Tractatus Logico Philosophicus' Wittgenstein was developed a theory, which is commonly called the "picture theory" of meaning. In latter-stage in ~~he~~ himself has criticised the picture theory of meaning and developed the notion of language-game.

Wittgenstein recognized that in the 'picture theory' he had imposed certain conception of meaning upon language rather than looked at language to see what in fact constitutes its meaning. He had simply prejudged the issue. He came to see the importance of overcoming prejudice and looking at the uses to which language is put.

If one does so, he discovered, one will immediately see that naming is only one of them. "Look at the sentence as its employment" said Wittgenstein. He noted that the employment of language is multifarious and multifunctional.

This above tendency among analytical philosophers acknowledge a more flexible, or more inclusive, approach to meaning than did the Logical Positivists who first launched what we have termed verificational analysis. Even former logical positivist tend to temper their early zeal by accepting the latter teaching of Ludwig Wittgenstein (himself an early shaper of positivism) that -

"There are many varieties of meaning in language and that the meaning in language, and that the meaning of an expression is best determined by examination of its use or function"⁵

But this general preferences for what we may call "functional analysis" does not itself necessarily involve a repudiation of the general position on cognitive meaning that has been advanced by verificational analysis. Functional analysis may awaken us to varieties of meaning not brought to light by verificational analysis, but there is no guarantee that these additional varieties of meaning however interesting or illuminating will have any role to play in advancing truth or understanding.

Verificational analysis finds in the statements of the empirical sciences the most adequate examples of what language really is at its best.

Ludwiyg Wittgenstein in his latter writings graphically pictures "Language proper" as something quite different from its "Sorrounding" areas of scientific precision. "Our

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5. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigation translated -
G.E. M. Anscombe - pp. 128-32
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1953).

language can be seen as an ancient city. A maze of little streets, and squares of old and new houses and of houses with additions from various periods, and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with strait regular streets and uniform houses."⁶

So we have different functions of language. Language has to do not only with our intellects but also (perhaps primarily with our emotions. It is one of our most effective means of expressing and arousing feelings.

Besides this emotive function language has also conative function.

"We do things" with words." our language, that is, can function not only to describe to establish verbal conventions and to express or evoke emotions, but also to change the situation in direct ways.

"Performative use of language of this conative sort, of which there turn out to be many, may be characterized as having a "conative" function, from the latin word for an attempt or undertaking to do something"⁷ Whenever, in the appropriate

6. Wittgenstein -Philosophical Investigation, p. 8c

7. Frederick Ferre -

Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion - p. 359

(London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1968)

circumstances language is used to make a premise or to place a bet or to take an oath or to declare a true, on the like, we find the conative dimension of meaning. And since this use of language—asserting nothing is freed from the requirements of verification or falsification.

The stress of the functional analyst on language as a "natural growth" leads to a corresponding emphasis on the essential sociolity of language, since it is only in and through society that language may be said to have "grown naturally. A private definition of a word does not form part of language because it has none of the results which are the mark of genuine linguistic uses ; such a private word would literally make no difference.

The one general character of linguistic utterance is that it has some social context or results, but in each case we find that we are violently tearing language out of its ordinary and proper role in the affairs of life.

Language for functional analysis is a complex social product with many legitimate uses.

The "theory of meaning" of functional analysis may therefore be understood a fundamentally a statement of procedures ; the meaning of language is found in its use.

Meaning then, is more adequately understood in terms of the uses or functions of language than in terms of actual or possible experiences. It may often be the function of language to refer to some experience or perceptible event, but it need not always be so. The more inclusive approach to meaning is cleanly exhibited in the philosophical practice of functional analysis.

Functional analysis insists that those who use the language under study should be allowed to express their own views as to the function of their speech. Before the poet, e.g. is told *ex cathedra* what uses his language has he should be asked how he intends to employ this words.

The empiricism on which functional analysis rightly prides itself will be preserved only if a fair hearing is given to those who are most intimately involved in the use of language under analysis.

So far as the meaning is concerned, it is argued that the meaning of a term or phrase can be discovered simply by observing the use, function or role of that term or phrase in language.

By accepting the Wittgenstein position that the meaning

of a term is the role or function or use that term in language , the term designate some sort of eternal, unchanging entity or essence nontheless this approach to meaning can provide us with a definition of religion or religious in terms of the characteristic role or function performed by sentences designated as religious.

Now the question is , what is the role or function which is the characteristic of religious belief ?

If a belief performs the function of providing an object (or objects) of devotion and all pervasive frame of orientation, then it is religion. This criterion for the phrase "religious belief" has been suggested by several philosophers.

Charles moris in his "Signs, language and behaviour" remarks that "the complicated human self has need of some focal attitude to give it orientation and the significance of religion lies in its attempt to meet this need."⁸

Professor Moris suggest that this need for a focal attitude of orientation requires the formulation a special type of discourse. Needs other than that of focal attitude

8. Chanbes Moris : "Signs, Language, and Behaviour"
(Englewood Cliffs N.J. Prentice Hall Inc 1946) p. 148.

of orientation require other specialization of common language. Each of these specializations of common language Moris calls a "Type of discourse".

Like Moris, Eric Fromm defines religion as "any system of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion".⁹

Religious belief or sentence can distinguished from beliefs or sentences of other kinds in terms of the characteristic use or function performed. That the characteristic use or function performed by a religious sentence or belief is that of providing a focal attitude of orientation and an object (or objects) of devotion. Religious beliefs which play an all pervasive role in the life of a man, a group , or culture, determining most of the attitudes and reactions of that man or that group or that culture. Beliefs performing this all pervasive function will vary and do vary from time to time, place to place, man to man, group to group, and culture to culture. This fact is a result of defining "religious belief" in terms of use and function, and our denying that there is some sort of essence designated by the terms 'religion' or "religious belief".

9. Eric Fromm - Psycho analysis and Religion
(New Haven, Yale University Press - 1950) p. 21

Linguistic analysis calls our attention to the wide variety of language-games and kinds of words. Philosophical analysis, in the words of Hook, provided a -"method which could be employed both to clarify theological usage and to preserve its autonomy against rude" requests from scientist and naturalists to talk sense as defined by the parochial criteria of the scientific and common-sensical mood of discourse. There is not a single language-game that can be laid down in advance as binding upon all who would speak ..."¹⁰

The slogan "Every statement has its own logic", has left philosophers and theologians free to look for and discover the logic peculiar to the religious mode of discourse.

Here the term "Language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life.

It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used the multiplicity of kinds of word, and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language.

10. Sidney Hook "Preface" - pp. xii-xiii in "religious experienced and truth" - ed. Sidney Hook.

(New York, New York University Press 1961)

Wittgenstein thought of a "language-game" as a whole, consisting of language and the activities with which it is woven. The expression "language-game" was intended, to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or form of life" Wittgenstein offered the following example of an elemental language-game.

At is building with building stones there are blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams. It has pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them for this purpose they use a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'. A calls them out ; B brings the stone which he has bearnt to bring at such - and -such a call- conceive this as a complete primitive language.

The language -game in which man engages have of course be come much more complicated than this but the essential point to take is that, in order to understend any peace of language one must set it within its appropriate 'language-game'.

Language is not a mirror held up to reality as Wittgenstein supposed in the 'Tractatus' or , at least, not all meaningful language is. The question to ask in order to get at the meaning of language is : what is this piece of language being used for ? What are men doing or purporting to do when they say such

things ! Words said Wittgenstein are pieces in chess and
 "the meaning of a piece is its role in the game."

"Hudson say in above respect that religious belief as
 a language -game of form of life or religious belief should
 thought of as language-game."¹¹

For understanding of a language-game philosophically
 requires to 'mapping its logical frontiers' and exposing its
 logical presuppositions.

By mapping logical frontiers means is to differentiate
 a language-game clearly from other language-games. Wittgenstein
 speaks in one place of philosophy a 'a battle against bewitch-
 ment of our intelligence by means of language'. Such bewitch-
 -ment arises when one language-games gets confused with
 another, and it is just the confusion which philosophy exists
 to dispel by mapping clearly the frontiers between language-
 games.

So far as logical presupposition is concerned, Wittgens-
 tein remarked "What we do in our language-games always
 rests on a tacit presupposition".

11. W. D. Hudson - A Philosophical approach to religion -
 (W. D. Hudson) - 1974.

Hudson remarked that "in case of every language-game, there is, concept or set of concepts which is tacitly presupposed" in the sense that it is always implied in what is said within that language-game. It is called constitutive concept of that language."¹²

In respect to religious belief, Hudson says, "the concept or set of concepts constituted it is 'God'. He claiming that, a concept or set of concepts "God" which is implicit in all religious discourse in just the way that the concept of moral obligation is implicit in all moral discourse, and the concept of a physical object in all scientific.

God, or the divine, is conceived in many differing forms within religious belief as a whole and even at different stages of development within a given religious tradition.

The remarks about how religious explanations and experiences are constituted by the concept of God, show how the religious and unbeliever differ from one another. The difference between them is that they have what Wittgenstein calls "different pictures". One important point which he brings out is that this kind of disagreement having different pictures - can not be

12. W.D. Hudson - "A Philosophical approach to Religion" -p. 13

resolved in any ordinary way.

Religious belief shows itself not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating for all in his (the believes) life.

So we have different language-game and it has different functions. But there are philosophers who in essence accept Ayer's and Flew's contention that the verification principle excludes religious locutions from having descriptive meaning of any kind.

Verification principle may be of considerable usefulness in many contexts, but it is utterly misunderstood if it is taken as "the" criterion for judging the meaningfulness of all language. An embarrassing example of an assertion which not meaningful when tested by the verification principle is - the assertion of verification principle itself.

The statement that the meaning of any proposition will be found either in verbal rules (if the proposition is analytic) or in equivalent statements referring to actual or possible sense-experience (if the proposition is synthetic) seems to be asserting a fact not offering a definition or rule of usage.

But if the verification principle is not itself analytic what actual or possible sense-experiences could be relevant

to its verification or falsification ? No such experience will even in principle be relevant to the task ? Indeed, sense experience can not even recognize the elementary logical distinction between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' statements ~~quo~~ marks on paper or noises uttered by a larynx, much less can it verify assertions about the logical character of their significance. On the basis of the verification principle, therefore, the verification principle is devoid of literal meaning.

Without a wider theory of meaning the verification principle is self-stultifying, but ~~if~~ such a theory can be supplied, the verification principle may be retained as a useful instrument for dealing with language which intends to refer to perceptible events or for deciding whether or not statements are "empirically" informative. But in that capacity the verification principle which somehow sits in judgement upon all discourse, including theological, ethical, and other non-empirical languages, it is one ~~tool~~ among others and like all tools, it may not be an appropriate one for all jobs.

"What we have here is not really a criterion of meaningfulness, but a criterion of empiricability."¹³

13. R.M. Hane - Religion and Moral - "Faith and Logic" -
p. 17.7

The limited range of the verification principle, on which verification analysis rests may explain the failure of this form of linguistic analysis to appreciate the comprehensibility of a wide variety of linguistic uses not amenable to this criterion of meaning. The single-minded devotion of verification analysis to the verification principle of meaning has resulted in a unfortunately narrow concept of the nature and function of perfectly significant language. In this, verification analysis has restricted itself by its dogmatic apriorism.

But this way (through verification principle) of looking religious locutions misinterprets their proper function which is, that of declaring a certain attitude to life and to the world.

When we see them in this light all the difficulties about the verification and falsification of religious propositions simply vanish, for as declarations of intention or attitude they are perfectly meaningful even though they are not verifiable or falsifiable in the strict sense.

According to Braithwaite, religious locutions are neither statements about empirical facts, nor scientific hypotheses nor necessary propositions. However, this does not mean that they are therefore meaningless, any more than the fact moral

utterances not about empirical facts means that they are meaningless. In fact, religious utterances are similar to moral statements in that they declare an intention to act in a certain way.¹⁴

Braithwaite in his book "An empiricist view of religious belief" says-

"Primarily declarations of adherence to a policy of action, declarations of commitment to a way of life, "an agapeistic" way of life as he calls it, that is to say, the way of life St. Paul proposes in the First Epistle to the corinthian (ch. 13).¹⁵

Nevertheless, if religious assertions do not function as factual assertions, they do function quite meaningfully as "blik"s. Hare invents the term 'Blik' to describe certain basic metaphysical attitudes towards the world.

A more advanced version of Braithwaite's position has been put forward by Hare. Hare begins by admitting that religious statements can not be assertions, for if they were we would have to admit the possibility of evidence counting

14. Braithwaite - "Belief and action" in proceeding of the Aristotelian Society" - Supp. Vol. XX - 1946, p. 1-19

15. Braithwaite - 'An empiricists view of religious belief' p. 14

against their truth, that is to say we would have to admit that it was logically possible that God does not exist - or does not have the attributes which he is held to have.¹⁶

In a latter essay, Hare admits that religious belief involves "belief in the truth of certain factual statements but he says that these facts that religious discourse deals with are "perfectly ordinary empirical facts" what makes them "religious" is the fact that "our whole way of living is organised round them; they have for us value relevance, importance, which they would not have if we were atheists. It is then our attitude to the empirical facts which is expressed in religious utterances.

Religious utterances are neither verifiable nor falsifiable; nevertheless they are meaningful in so far as they make a difference to the way a person acts and feels, that is, to his behaviour. As Malcom puts it -

"The man who believes that his sins will be forgiven if he is truly repentant, might there by be saved from despair. What he believes has, for him, no verification and falsification, yet the belief makes a great deal of

16. "Theology and Falsification" in "New Essays in Philosophical theology" - ed. A. Flew and A. Macintyre - p. 99 (London 1955)

| difference to his action and feeling."¹⁷

These above three philosopher namely Breithwaite, Hare and Malcome were known as reductionist analyst of religious belief. As against this reductionist view tried to show that religious locotions have their own Sui generis meaning. This idea has developed in respect of Wittgensteins 'language-games' and "forms of life". In his "Philosophical investigations" he proposes a theory of meaning according to which the meaning of any location can only be determined by the use on function on role it has within the context of a given 'language-game'. The whole set of interrelated concepts that are involved in Science, eg. or in morality or in aesthetics appreciation, or in a more particular sense - in talking about persons, telling a joke, reporting an event, describing an object giving an account of a dream etc. And these language-games are themselves involved with what Wittgenstein calls "form of life".

Wittgenstein says "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him, meaning by this that , although a lion might make suitable speech sounds, it could not be said to

17. Faith and the Philosophers - ed. J.Hick , p. 110
(London 1964)

Macmillan and Co.Ltd.

New York St Martin's Press, 1964.

have made an intelligible utterance. For the whole context in which those sounds might be made differs too radically from that in which human beings use those sounds to make intelligible utterances. It is these general contexts that Wittgenstein calls "forms of life".¹⁸

There is then no such thing as language 'tout court' but rather particular 'language-games', and similarly there is no general criterion of the meaningfulness of language, but each language-game has its own criterion of meaningfulness proper to it which can only be discovered by looking at the "form of life" in which it is involved. These forms of life, for Wittgenstein, can not be themselves be justified in any way, they are given, and there is a sense in which one has simply to choose to accept or to reject them. Thus Wittgenstein says : "What has to be accepted , the given, is - so one could say forms of life.

Although Wittgenstein himself says little systematically about religion and the status of religious locutions, he suggests tentatively that religious belief typically involves using of picture or a way of looking at the world and at

18. Cf. G. Pitcher "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein"- p.243
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964)

life, in such a manner that it is constantly before the mind and so that influences the way in which we live.

Suppose somebody made this guidance for life believing in the last judgement. Whenever he does any thing this is before this mind. In a way, how are we to know whether to say he believes this will happen or not? Asking him is not enough. He will probably say he has (No) proof. But he has what we might call an unshakable belief. It will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating for in all his life.¹⁹

In this sense Hudson remarks that "The religious forms of life is one of those forms of life that" seem to be definitive of humanity in the sense that it is essential to our concept of man, as man, that he should engage in them."²⁰

So, now, the religious language is meaningful and intelligible and only be determined from within the religious

19. Lectures and conversation on Aesthetics Psychology and religious belief. -ed. O.C. Barret, pp. 53-59 (Oxford, 1966).

20. W.D. Hudson - Ludwig Wittgenstein "The bearing of His Philosophy upon religious belief" - p. 71 London - 1968.

language-game. Peter Winch says that there is norm for intelligibility in general criterion of logic, he goes on, are not a direct gift of God, but arise out of, are only intelligible in the context of ways of living or modes of social life as such. Science is such a mode and religion is another.

"The notion of 'reality' itself, and of 'accordance with reality' of 'truth' and 'rationality' and 'intelligibility' also have meaning only within particular language-games."²¹

Like Winch D.Z. Phillops remarks "A typical religious belief such as the Last Judgement is not, an hypothesis on scientific conjecture but rather a "frame work within which the believer meets fortune, misfortune, and the evil that he finds in his own life and in life about him."²²

In Wittgenstein description believing in the last judgement is to have a picture before one's mind so that it

21. American Philosophical Society - 1 (1964), p. 307-29

22. J.R. Jones and D.Z. Phillips "Belief and logic of belief" - A Discussion in "Sophia " -ixi (1970)

regulates ones actions. This picture is not invented by the believer does not stand in judgement on it. The believer does not want to say that he measures these pictures and finds that they are all right or finds that they are wanting. On the contrary the believers wish to claim that it is not they who measure them ; they are the measure in terms of which they judge themselves.

So, the analyst take for granted Wittgenstein's theory that meaning can only be determined by reference to specific language games and forms of life, and they also suppose that the theory can extended without difficulty to the religious sphere, so that we can speak of the religious language-game and the religious form of life within which religious locations have their own peculiar meaning.

Those who employ functional analysis of religious belief or theological discourse seek more to understand the genuine use (or uses) of this language than to condemn its misuses. The tendency among these analysts is often single out one or more familiar functions of language as the 'real' logic of theological language. Theological discourse become failure when compet with science as an experimental 'empirical' language. The premise of functional analysis stated here by J.B. Coats,

that -

"Logic, if it is to have a useful bearing on life, must provide a justification for many of the ways in which men actually reason, seeing that that reason can not be entirely fallacious as it serves them not too badly in numberless Situations"²³

The logic of theological speech can find its justification in doing a different job from that of the logic of science. As Coates puts it "there are other positive uses of a belief in God which satisfy deeply felt needs to-day and do not seem to those who find benefit from them to express anything superstitious or unreasonable."²⁴

About the 'uses' of theistic belief, Coates suggests that the employment of religious phrases helps one to feel "more reassured about the world" by speaking of its relations to "another (better) world" and to feel more "at home" in this world by speaking of it as "created by a loving hand".

23. Coates - "God and the Positivists" "The Hibbert Journal" - p. 226

24. Ibid. p. 227

Sentences from the theological vocabulary like "God made the world" do not function, then, in the same way as "When made St Paul's : Scientific statements derive their meaning from referring to things and events, but theological statements function entirely within the existing "theocentric life" one learns the real meaning of 'theocentric life' by an examination of their function or their 'cash value' on what they sum up, in that life'.²⁵

As we have already pointed out Braithwaits view that, a statement need not itself be empirically verifiable, but that is used in a particular way is always a straight forwardly empirical proposition. The result of such inquiry, show that, the primary element in this use is that the religious assertion is used as a moral assertion.

The 'ethical' function of theological speech are not intent as are the verificational analyse on reducing ethical discourse to the mere expressing of emotional approval or disapproval. The ethical statements function as the expression

25. Leon "The meaning of Religious Propositions" - The Hibbert Journal - p. 151

of an intention to act in certain way under certain circumstances. Moral discourse is conative rather than purely emotive ; when one makes an ethical assertion one is in fact "subscribing to a policy of action" one is engaging in an act of "self - commitment" to a general pattern of behaviour.

R.M. Hare agrees that while theological speech has an important moral component the ethical function is not the distinctive function of theological statements. "The moral judgement, as we may say, arise out of the religious belief ; they do not constitute it."²⁶ What is distinct about theological assertion is the belief-content-then ; or, to be more precise, it is to be found in what is believed. This content of belief is distinctive, to Hare because although it is similar to ordinary factual belief in some respects, it is radically different from such factual belief in others.

26. Hare "Faith and Logic" - p. 180