

CHAPTER - III

Religious Knowledge and Belief from
Linguistic Point of View

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RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF FROM LINGUISTIC

POINT OF VIEW

Before this we have discussed about religious knowledge. Here we are concerned on knowledge and belief in general and role of language towards religious knowledge in particular.

The problem concerning the distinction between knowledge and belief in the western tradition is as old as the western philosophy which began with the ancient Greek thinkers. The Greek word for 'knowledge' like the English, can either the faculty of knowing or that which is known. One task here is to define the faculty or function of knowing though, of course, it can not be defined without reference to its object. In order to determine whether a sensation or perception is a case of knowledge, we must first, it is generally supposed, see if it has fulfilled certain characteristics laid down for the purpose. According to Plato, for example "Knowledge in infallible and the objects of knowledge must be completely real and unchanging. These are the two marks of knowledge

assumed at the outset which any candidate for title must possess.¹

The whole knowledge can not be identified with sense-perception, as claimed by Protagoras for even the simplest and most common acts of knowledge contain elements of common terms. The common terms according to Plato are called 'Forms' or 'Ideas'.

Plato proceeds to show that perception even within its own sphere, is not knowledge at all. It has already been pointed out that even the simplest act of knowledge is not possible without some elements of 'Forms' which according to Plato, are the true objects of knowledge. Though perception has the first characteristic of infallibility in a sense, it can not apprehend the second characteristic of existence and truth. "Knowledge can not reside in the impressions, but in our reflection upon them."² Thus impression, that is, per-

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1. Plato's theory of knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist (tr - with a running commentary by F. M. Cornford, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd London - 1935, pp.28-29.
 2. Ibid, 186

perceiving has no part in apprehending truth without which there can be know knowledge. Hence Plato establishes that perception and knowledge can not possibly be the same thing.

According to Kant, empirical judgements are either 'of experience' or 'of perception'. He writes "Empirical judgements, so far as they have objective validity, are judgements of experience, but those which are only subjectively valid I name mere judgements of perception."³ He thinks that the judgements of perception requires no pure concept of the understanding. When one says "the room is warm" 'Sugar is sweet' we have such judgements of perception. Such judgements Kant thinks, refer merely to feeling and they hold good only for the perceiving subject without any reference to universal validity. When Plato criticises and rejects protogoras claim that "perception is knowledge, he seems to have anticipated such judgements of perception which Kant latter points out. Thus for both Plato and Kant such sense-perceptions can never have the status of knowledge proper.

Plato points out that true judgement or right opinion or true belief can not be called knowledge. Knowledge must be

3. Immanuel Kant - "Prolegomena to Any future metaphysics
(tr - by L.W. Beak, The liberal Arts Press Inc U.S.A.
1950, pp. 45-46)

full and complete understanding, rational comprehension, and not merely instinctive belief. It must be grounded on reason not on faith. Knowledge is always accompanied by a true account of its grounds, unshakable by perception and possessed by gods and only a few among men. True belief is produced by persuasion not based on rational grounds, and can be changed by persuasion, and is possessed by all mankind.

Further according to Plato, true belief accompanied by an account or explanation also can not be identified with knowledge.

Theaetatus points out that knowledge is of what is true, and that eternal and unchanging Form or Ideas are the objects of knowledge. Knowledge is thus distinguished from 'doxa' or belief which is directed to sensibles as its objects.⁴ Here the Plato's explicit assumption is that the fact that knowledge and doxa are distinguishable implies that their respective objects are distinguishable.

In the epistemological scheme of Plato 'knowledge' is knowledge of what is real ; it is an embodiment of first principles called Forms, whereas a 'right belief at best furnishes us with general fairly reliable guides which are as they

4. Norman Gulley - "Plato's theory of knowledge" - Methuen and Co. Ltd., London 1962, p. 61

stand, arbitrary and unrelated. Thus I.M. Crombie points out "So far, the relation between knowledge and belief is that when I know I grasp some reality, and when I have sound belief I grasp, or have in mind, something what Plato likens to an of that reality."⁵

In the 'simile' the contrast between seeing objects directly and seeing them only through their images or shadows is an analogous of the relationship between 'knowing' and 'believing'.

"Belief is thus a state in which what is present to the mind is not an objective reality, but a representation of this, namely, a proposition something that can be true or false. Knowledge is a state in which the objective reality itself is present to the mind."⁶

In essence Aristotle accepts Plato's account of knowledge, but he modified some important respects the distinction between knowledge and belief as drawn by Plato. For Aristotle knowledge in its universality relates to ideas ; it does not mean, as it does in Plato's formulation, that these ideas are ever given separately from the corresponding objects.

5. I.M. Crombie - 'Plato : The Midwife's Apprentice,' - Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London - 1964, p. 104

6. Ibid. p. 118

Aristotle points out that knowledge is not innate. As regard belief Aristotle like Plato suggests that belief can not be the same as knowledge. But his account of this distinction between the two is not based on different kinds of objects related respectively to belief and knowledge. For Aristotle what exists in any case is always the concrete objects, the concrete individuals, and all human cognitive acts of thought and judgement relate to these, directly or indirectly. He points out that, however, that, not all of these cognitive acts are of the same kind. They differ in respect of the degree of clarity involved regarding the understanding of the principles and causes in each case, which in its turn is guided by human consideration of purpose at the moment.

Besides Plato's and Aristotle's distinction of knowledge and belief, the two schools namely empiricism and rationalism answers the question i.e. "What is knowledge?" in their own respects.

On a closer examination the empiricist thesis in general that all our concept and knowledge from sense perception can not be entertained. Kant has no doubt about the contention that all our knowledge begins with experience. "But though all our knowledge begins with experience 'Kant points out it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.'"⁷

7. Kant - 'Critique of pure Reason' -(tr. N.K. Smith)
Macmillan , London 1933 , B 1.

The rationalists contend that the human understanding or intellect is the only faculty of our knowledge of objects. The concept of the understanding or 'truths of reason' are considered to be far superior to any truths grounded in sense-perception. In Plato's metaphysical epistemology, e.g. knowledge proper entirely belongs to the realm of reason completely detached from the senses. However, in reality the concepts of understanding alone can not furnish all the objects of knowledge.

In ultimate analysis, the conflict between rationalism and empiricism is sought to be reduced to the traditional dichotomy of propositions into (a) analytic 'a priori' propositions and (b) Synthetic a posteriori propositions. If such a dichotomy is taken for granted as absolute then empiricism and rationalism have much to claim as they do.

For Kant, the phenomenon of knowledge can be satisfactorily explained only if it should be both synthetic and apriori at the same time Kant's concern is with a priori Synthetic knowledge.

As regards belief, Kant's treatment is not so exhaustive. To hold that a thing is true is an occurrence in our understanding. It may rest on objective grounds, but it requires subjective causes in the mind of the individual who

makes the judgement. Such a judgement may be valid for everyone and its ground may be thus objectively sufficient. This Kant calls 'conviction'. On the other hand, if it has its grounds only in the special character of the subject, it is entitled 'persuasion'. Persuasion is a mere illusion, because the ground of the judgement, which is solely the subject is regarded as objective. Such a judgement has only private validity. Conviction has the possibility of communicating it and of finding it to be valid for all human reason.

The holding of a thing to be true, or the subjective validity of the judgement in its relation to conviction, Kant, thinks has three degrees namely, opining, believing, and knowing. Opinion is such holding of a judgement which is consciously insufficient both objectively and subjectively. In case of belief, however, our holding of the judgement is subjectively sufficient but objectively insufficient. Lastly, when the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is case of knowledge. This perhaps paves the way for many latter thinkers who maintain the view that the difference between knowledge and belief is one of degree only.

So the problem of knowledge and beliefs is one of the most baffling problems of philosophy which has since the

dawn of philosophy itself provoked the thought of many philosophers. In Modern philosophy G.E. Moore's explanation may in the main be considered to be a faithful representation of the common sense view of knowledge and belief. Though Moore is primarily concerned with an analysis of belief in general his theory is intended to explain the difference between true beliefs and false ones. In Moore's language it can be stated as "To say of this belief that it is true would be to say of it that the fact to which it refers is ... while to say of it that it is false is to say of it that the fact to which it refers simply is not."⁸

Every belief true or false two constituent elements can always be distinguished, namely, the act of belief and the object of belief or what is believed. An object of belief is also sometimes called a proposition.

In one of his early writings Moore explains the case of a belief as an attitude of the mind towards some proposition. According to this account he divides absolutely all contents of the universe into two classes, namely, propositions on the one hand and things which are not propositions on the other. One very striking feature in Moore's

8. G.E. Moore - "Some main problems of Philosophy".

George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London - 1955, pp.255-56.

analysis is the implication that belief is always an attitude of the mind. Every belief whether it be true or false always has an object which may be called a proposition and the belief simply consists in having this proposition before the mind in one particular way in being conscious of it in the peculiar attitude which we call 'believing'.

On the positive side of Moore's theory, he discussing the nature of belief in its relation with imagination and knowledge. Some thinkers maintains that the difference between 'belief' and 'imagination' is merely one of degree. John Laird expresses a view which is almost similar to it when he remarks "The upper limit of opinion, in this sense, is belief (on something very near it)."⁹

In imagination two alternatives one may have the attitude of belief to the one and may not have the same attitude to the other. But this only means, it is printed out, that the difference simply consists in the fact that he imagines in the former more strongly and more vividly.

So writes Hume "... that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed

9. John Laird - "Knowledge, belief and opinion".
The Century Co., London - 1930, p. 167

to the latter, and not to the former ..."¹⁰ Thus he points out that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination.

For Moore knowledge is belief plus something else ; to know something is to believe it together with something else. Some Philosophers like H.A. Prichard¹¹, on the other hand maintain such a different view according to which 'to believe' and 'to know' are two such things exclusive of each other as if they are in two different watertight compartments. Like Moore, Malcolm takes points to refute the stand point of Prichard and thereby to reinstate the ordinary usage of 'know' and belief in which the two words are used interchangeably.

Another aspect of Moore's theory of belief is concerning the truth-value of a belief. Moore has clearly recognized a difference between knowledge and belief in respect of both degree and kind. On an analysis in every case of knowledge a corresponding belief of it seems to be present. This is all

10. Hume - Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of morals. Oxford University Press, London, 1957, p. 48

11. H.A. Prichard - "Knowledge and perception" Clarendon Press, Oxford 1950, pp. 58-91

that is generally presupposed in the treatment of knowledge and belief and their relation. In spite of the various explanations given by different thinkers the problem of knowledge and belief still remains, if possible to be resolved. However, it is at least clear that believing and knowing are not terms to be treated as contrary terms, or as two poles apart rather they are to be treated as correlates. Alice Ambrose points out that "the correct usage of 'believing' entails the logical possibility of knowing what is believed."¹²

It is a fact that in our common sense usage we never necessarily make belief assertion either to the exclusion of or in opposition to a knowledge assertion thereof. Thus in a belief statement there is always the logical possibility of a knowledge statement. In our common sense usage when we have a knowledge statement, we seldom take into account the corresponding belief assertion. If, however, one is questioned about the implication of such a belief statement in his established knowledge statement, he would perhaps, undoubtedly entertain the actuality of the belief statement. Moore also seems to hold

12. (The) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science -
pp. 395-417.

such a view.¹³ Such an implication of the actuality of a belief statement by a knowledge-statement has very little, practically nothing to do with our common sense ; it is rather a linguistic issue, a matter of analysis.

Now we come to Russell's view on this point. Russell discuss the problem i.e. knowledge and Belief from a purely analytical standpoint. In some content Russell employs the word 'belief' in a very wide sense thereby maintaining no clear distinction between belief as such on the one hand and knowledge proper on the other. In his essay 'Belief' Russell maintains that the whole intellectual life consists of beliefs, and of the passage from one belief to another by what is called reasoning.¹⁴

In Moore's account belief as such is not clearly disentangled from his account of true and false beliefs. But in Russell's analysis there is an attempt to analyse belief as such free from true and false beliefs. He writes "Thus although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs yet they

13. Moore - "Some Main Problems of Philosophy" - George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London - 1953, p. 274

14. Russell -(The) Analysis of mind, George Allen Unwin Ltd. London - 1921, pp. 231-52.

are in a sense extrinsic properties, for the condition of the truth of a belief is something not involving beliefs, or (in general any mind at ; but only the objects of belief. A mind which believes truly when there is a corresponding complex not involving the mind, but only its objects.¹⁵

Wittgenstein in the Tractatus an account of knowledge in some form or other can be traced to the authors thesis of language and meaning and sense. In his 'Introduction' to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus", Russell points out that Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language. The whole function of language is to have meaning, and it only fulfills this function in proportion as it approaches to the ideal language. And it is also widely maintained that Wittgenstein sums up his perplexing philosophy in his oft-quoted epigram "All philosophy is 'Critique of language' "¹⁶

According to him, a critique of language, that is, a correct of language, is the only means to resolve all the

15. Russell - "(The) Problems of Philosophy", Oxford University Press - London -192 , p.129

16. L. Wittgenstein -"Tractatus Logico Philosophicus"
(tr. C.K. Ogden) Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London -
1922 ; 4.0311

problems of traditional philosophy. He says "most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We can not therefore answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. Here Wittgenstein concern is with language that is, factual language. He lays much emphasis on the analysis of language because for him the structure of language is a clue to the structure of reality or the world.

Language and reality are supposed to have the same logic from the formal or structural point of view. Language as a representation or picture of reality has something novel which deserves our attention.

The 'Tractatus' is solely concerned with factual propositions leaving the propositions of religion and ethics out of its scope. A proper and rigorous analysis of language, according to Wittgenstein, leads us to his elementary propositions as the ultimate components of all factual propositions.

So far from Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' is that knowledge is the understanding of the sense of a proposition which truly

represents a fact. This view is quite in conformity with one very important criterion of knowledge which is generally accepted by almost all philosophers, namely, that knowledge must be true.

For Wittgenstein knowledge seems to belong to those propositions which truly represent existent or actual atomic facts. Such a contention would be true only if it could be shown that in respect of true propositions Wittgenstein is able to draw a distinction between 'knowledge' and 'belief'.

Here we can find the difference between traditional philosophy of Plato and the logical atomism. For Plato belief and knowledge have different objects which are ultimate. Thus for Plato the objects of sense are objects of belief and the Forms or Ideas are objects of knowledge or wisdom, and these objects are in a way ultimate.

Russell and Wittgenstein do not maintain such ultimate objects. Though our knowledge is knowledge of atomic facts, these atomic facts are far from being ultimate in the sense that they have objects as their constituents.

The contribution of Wittgenstein to contemporary Philosophy, however, is of immense value. It has rightly emphasized the

need for a proper analysis of our language as a way to a clear understanding of the world. He writes "The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. The result of philosophy is not a number of philosophical propositions but to make propositions clear."¹⁷ Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' has paved the way for ordinary language philosophy.

According to some thinkers "analysis" is a kind of paraphrase, a translation from a less explicit to a more explicit form. But Wittgenstein thinks that the philosopher's real task is not to correct or return our ordinary language, but to endeavour to understand the various language-games. And to understand our language is no longer to know what it pictures but what it means, that is, what usage it has what it does, what purpose it serves, and what work it performs.¹⁸

The 'Philosophical Investigation' points to the really innumerable functions which the various words and sentences of our language perform. It is sometimes not at all easy to say

17. Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (tr G.K. Ogden) Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. London - 1922, p. 4.112

18. Wittgenstein - Philosophical Investigation (tr G.E.M. Anscombe, Macmillans Co., New York 1953, p. 264

exactly what function a particular sentence performs. Hence there is always the possibility of sentences and other utterances being misunderstood. It pointed out that if there were no possibility of misunderstanding there would be no philosophy.

The idea of language-game as a logical experimental apparatus, then emerges as a mechanism of meaning clarification. It obviously does not seek to give or find any definition of meaning, but reveals experimentally how we go about understanding or misunderstanding it actually in our use of linguistic expressions. This is the reason why Wittgenstein is concerned with expressions and locutions like 'having the same meaning' changing its meaning, etc. rather than with meaning as such. All this Wittgenstein sums up in his formula "the meaning of a word is its use in language".¹⁹

This semantic or linguistic approach can not be treated as independent theories to account for knowledge and belief

19. Ibid. p. 43

though they seem to be in sharp and irreconcilable conflict.

Upto now we are discuss about knowledge and belief by different thinkers. So far as religious belief and knowledge is concerned the linguistic analyst eliminate it. Or in otherwords the sole aim of the linguistic analysis in the begining was directed towards the elimination of metaphysics but that had its concomitant repercussion on theology and religion as well, because these also have the ontological basis.

The founders of the analytic movement - Moore and Wittgenstein did not think it necessary to devote fully to the problem of the meaning of religious language. Moore devoted only one passage to the problem of the existence of God and being embarassed by the question failed to decide whether belief in God is an article of "commonsense" or not.

Wittgenstein in his 'Tractatus' made the question to be closed one, for, according to him, the notion of God as a being outside "the limits of the world" is bound to

be nonsensical.

The linguistic analysis movement broaden the scope of philosophy. Philosopher's are concerned not only with propositions but also with sentences which express emotions and volitions. Language has been considered as a 'game' which is multiple in nature, and no limit can be put to such games a priori, because the number of games depends upon the 'moves' taken on the functions performed by sentences, which are infinite and indefinite in number. Since language as such has become the subject matter of philosophy, it includes not only the metaphysical language but all sorts of language-moral, aesthetics, religious, theological and also the language of science, history and law.

The study of language has been considered of prime importance due to various reasons. In the first, it has been found that language is the first and direct object of knowledge.

§ 9-18 80? Whatever we learn, we learn in/through language. Secondly, for all meaningful communications conceptual clarity is essential. Language in order to be intelligible and significant should not

only fulfil the conditions of syntax but also of Semantics and Pragmatics. Thirdly, it has been urged that the question of meaning can be determined and decided through the analysis of language. Fourthly, the study of language is important also because it is generally prone to be misunderstood, confused and misused. According to Ryle, there are many expressions which are "systematically misleading",²⁰ and which create confusion.

Wittgstein also observes, that most questions and propositions result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. It is a merit of Russell's to have shown that the apparent logical form of the proposition need not be the real form'.

Language disguises thought and creates confusions, pseudo problems, and puzzlement. According to Russell : -

"Everything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise, and everything precise is

20. Ryle - "Systematically misleading expression" in Logic and language (ed) Antony Flew 1st series (Oxford, Basil, Blackwell 1952).

so remote from anything , we normally think, that you can not for a moment suppose that is what we really mean when we say what we think".²¹

Analysis, thus, becomes a necessary and legitimate activity. Most questions and puzzlements are due to the misuse of concepts and misunderstanding of the logic of language. It is necessary to understand the logic of language.

The analysts hold that philosophical questions are different from scientific questions. While scientific questions are genuine factual questions, philosophical questions are only the conceptual middles. Philosophical puzzlements have their root in conceptual confusion and misunderstanding of the logic of language. As Wittgenstein remarks "Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday."²²

21. Russell - "Monist" - 1918, p. 498, quoted by Brand Blanshard, Reason and Analysis (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962) p. 128

22. Wittgenstein - Philosophical Investigation (Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1953) , p. 19

The recent trend in philosophy has its wide repercussions on Theology and Religion. The thesis of the meaningfulness of the theological and religious assertions is chiefly due to the introduction of this new method of linguistic analysis in philosophy. The analysts have urged that linguistic analysis is highly relevant to Theology and Religion, because it can put an end to many controversies and perplexities arising in the theological and religious problems are only pseudo-problems having their origin in the misuse of concepts and confusion of language 'language-games'.

If we look towards linguistic analysis, then it had some inherent difficulties and discrepancies of its own. The analysts want to remain confined only to the language scheme, and they do not want to make any metaphysical commitment. But, in fact, language is not a self-sufficient and self-complete system. It can not exist in the void. It must, at least, refer to the analyst who has to make analysis. Language can not analyse itself. It must involve a conscious agent to make analysis of sentences and to look into their organization and function. The meaning does not show off itself. It always

relates to the agent who understands the meaning.

Further it should be acknowledged that there is a circular process involved in analysis. For the analysis of some words and expressions (say A) we use other words (say B,C,D etc.) which remain unanalysed. Again for analysing B,C,D, etc. we may take help of another words and infinitum or one may come again to use the first one (i.e. A) which we aimed to analyse. This will involve circular process.

Language-schemes form a heirarchy : there are different level language-games. For e.g. ,when a common man describes the physical universe, his description is quite different from that of the scientists. Scientific language-game may appear quite different from the common sense language -game because of the difference in language strata. Language assumes many layers because of the difference in the unit of description. While the ordinary man takes a particular object to be ~~the~~ unit, the scientist takes the units of force to be the unit. It is this difference that makes language-multi-layered.

Further, religious language-game is also different from the scientific one because science are concerned only with phenomena, where as religion is concerned with the noumenon or the ground

of phenomena. In other words, the sphere of science is the sphere of Becoming, where as the sphere of religion is the sphere of Being. The sphere of Becoming is a series of conditional and relative events forming causal series. The Being underlies this chain of events and transcends unconditionality and relativity, and is the realm of the Absolute.

According to the Logical atomists the language pictures facts. Here, a statement is meaningful if it denotes some fact. The meaning of a word or statement consists in what it denotes 'what a picture represents is its sense'.

is it so?

The Sphere of science and religion are different. Science can simply give knowledge of fact, but it can not say anything about right and wrong, good and evil. It is the province of ethics and religion. Religion does not involve any knowledge, it involves only affection and conation. So, the logical atomist's view of religion can be described as "morality touched with emotion", - a definition give by, Mathew Arnold.

The essence of religion according to Russell, consists in worship, acquiescence and love.²³

23. "The essence of religion", First published in the Hibbert Journal Vol. II, Oct. 1922 : Reprint in the Basic writings of Bertrand Russell.

While these words have a dogmatic basis and a supernatural reference in the institutional religions, they have been given ethical meaning by Russell. Knowledge, goodness and love are the chief marks of religion. Russell calls 'good life' to be the religious life. "The good life is inspired by love and guided by knowledge. Knowledge and love are both indefinitely extensive ; therefore, however good a little may be, a better life can be imagined. Neither love without knowledge, nor knowledge without love can produce a good life"²⁴

The later Analysts themselves have rejected the dichotomy of analytic-synthetic propositions. With the recognition of the multiplicity of language-games, it is realized that certain expressions may not fall within the dichotomy of analytic-synthetic, and still have meaning because they have their function. It is largely true for religious expressions. They may not fall within this dichotomy and still have meaning because they may have their use. Religious assertions evoke 'discernment' and the consequent emotion and volition. When the teacher say "That thou art to his disciple, that evokes a 'discernment' in him.

24. Russell "What I belief" in the Basic Writtings of
Bartrand Russell - p. 372

Language has been conceived as a form of life and it
has been characterized as a game. The conception of language
 as a game has the following implications :-

(1) Words are merely the tools which can be used in several ways and as such, they can have several meanings. The meaning of a word is not fixed, rather it changes from game to game. The same concept can assume different meaning in different games owing to its different functions. Thus every statement has its own logic! If words do not have any fixed meaning, it is not possible to assume a priori what is the meaning of a particular concept without looking into its use or the job it is performing in any language-game. As Blanshard puts it :-

"The analytic slogan do not assume in advance that what you mean will fall into any preconceived categories at all. Do not prejudge what you mean by assumptions as to what the world must be like. Let each statement speak for itself; it may have its own kind of meaning, and that kind of meaning its own logic. The key to these varieties of meaning is language. Only through the nuances of language can we explore the manifold content of idea, impulse, and feeling that human being can express.²⁵

(ii) Any concepts and expressions have diverse functions, there can be countless language-games. No limit can be fixed a priori to the number of such games. Thus, we can not say, now, with the logical positivists that all meaningful assertions must fall within two categories, analytic and synthetic. The meaning of any assertion is determined by its function and an assertion can have innumerable functions. Through language one can describe facts, ask questions, issue commands, make requests, express emotions, and evaluate things and so on.

(iii) As every statement has own logic and has its own functions, one language-game is not to be confounded with other language-games owing to their superficial resemblance. The analysts are opposed to the paradigmatic use of words. One expression should not be taken as the model or paradigm for all other expressions because the meaning of the expressions varies in language if one game is confused with the other game. Ryle calls it "category mistake", "Category mistake" consists in combining concepts of different categories or logical type".²⁶

26. Ryle - "Category" 1938 Reprinted in logic and language series (ed) A.N. Flew (Oxford, Basil, Blackwell) 1953.

(iv) As a word or an expression is a tool, it has no significance in itself. Its meaning is determined by the rules of game. Moreover, the meaning of a word is to be determined within the language game itself not by reference to any extra linguistic or universal fact. For e.g. whether a word means a particular or universal is to be known by the way it has been used in any language-game. In the 'Tractatus' Wittgenstein held that the meaning of a word is 'particular' but in the 'Investigations' he held that the word has no meaning apart from the language-game. The meaning of a word is neither particular nor universal in itself. It is particular when used in the sense of particular and universal when used to mean the universal.

Language game is only possible if one trusts something, it is not "can trust something". The question of 'trust' or reliance is elsewhere linked in to the idea of a "system" of beliefs.

This account of trust and its connection with a system of beliefs and activities are clearly illuminating suggestions about how religious beliefs work for a person and in a community Wittgenstein remarks on how a child "learns to believe a host of things i.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs (and so) forms a system of what is believed ... Such an account

It is this last which allows the religious community continuity on different levels, with the larger non-religious community. It allows it to seem and indeed be part, if not wholly one, with the larger form of life, while maintaining, for its followers its own unique forms.

So religious persons may be scientists technicians, military officers, and politicians, even philosophers apparently without essential conflict. Although Wittgenstein often talks about religious beliefs as if they are the beliefs of individuals, in fact, as his appeal to "system" shows, he is talking about a community of believers for whom the one distinctive language-game may be expressive of a unique way of life, without denying the claims of other language-games.

One may argue that implied in the diversity and multiplicity of religious beliefs is the basis for validating and relativizing the truth of every religious belief adhered to and practiced by any primitive, traditional, or contemporary religion. Further more, one may also argue that a Wittgensteinian view of religious belief would seem to imply a similar validation and relativization of the truth of religious beliefs, since it recognizes a plurality of religious forms

fits accurately the way religious beliefs are taught and supported in religious communities. What Wittgenstein says about beliefs, generally applies then to systems of religious beliefs. 'All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypotheses takes place already within of a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all arguments : it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.'

Religious beliefs do not function the way we like to view the workings of ordinary empirical claims. There is not that cognitive posture of studied, in principled, indifference to the truth of falsity of particular propositions that characterises the ideally disengaged investigator of empirical matters. Propositions within religious systems are not allowed easily to be confronted or even challenged by empirical matters ; rather empirical matters are more likely to be tested or viewed under their rubric. The vitality of a system of belief is just its capacity to confront all aspects of the world in a special interpretation for the community that employs its distinctive language game. Thus, in turn, is tried to many other beliefs not distinct to the religious community.

of life which must be accepted. However, whether or not a Wittgenstein view of religious belief does imply the alleged validation and relativization is an issue that depends largely on our understanding and discovering of some significant aspects of the depth grammar indicative of a particular religious beliefs. Whether the religious belief in question is Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Samoan or Taoist, it is necessary to make a Wittgenstein analysis of some significant aspects of the depth grammar of religious beliefs in practice.

In order to understand what is meant by the "depth grammar"²⁷ of religious belief, it is helpful to relate the "depth grammar" of religious belief to its "surface grammar"²⁸. By the surface grammar of religious belief, we mean the recognizable way in which a constructed or uttered sentence, expressive of a religious belief, looks like in written language or sounds like

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27. Wittgenstein - "Lectures and conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious belief, ed - Cyril Barret (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1967) pp. 56,63
28. Wittgenstein - Philosophical Investigation - by G.E.M. Anascomle (New York 1968), p. 168

in spoken language. By the depth grammar of religious belief we mean the particular use made of picture projected by an accepted religious belief in conjunction with certain circumstances and surroundings what people want to picture with their religious beliefs are new ways of life and new attitudes towards his life, and the life after death, all of which will require a new language and new ways of communicating.²⁹ Unlike the surface grammar of religious belief, the depth grammar is shown by a personal commitment to a way of acting that is characterized by the willingness to live by one's convictions without the fear of death. Moreover, unlike the surface grammar of religious belief, the depth grammar requires not only linguistic and speech acts. It also requires, if not more so, pragmatic acts that can bring about the intended effects pictured by the accepted religious beliefs.

From Wittgensteinian perspective we would fail to understand the depth grammar of religious beliefs if we are predisposed to explain religious beliefs as "testable hypothesis". It is the view that our religious beliefs as

29. Englemann, Paul - "Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a memoir, tr - L. Furtmuller (Oxford 1967) p. 135

"unshakable conviction", whose acceptance need not be based on testing for their truth or plausibility. Viewed as unshakable convictions, our religious beliefs can and do change, regulate, and guide a person's whole life, even to the point of risking everything including his life. We can see that it is part of the depth grammar of our religious beliefs that they become demonstrable as unshakable convictions which have the potential to guide, change, and regulate our lives daily.

There are four significant aspects crucial to understanding the depth grammar of religious beliefs in practice. Given that the depth grammar of religious beliefs is shown by an accepted practice in connection with particular circumstances and surroundings, it is an essential and integral part of the depth grammar of religious beliefs. The four aspects are as such :-

(i) Religious beliefs in practice are not propositions which we can contradict by affirming or denying the opposite. By virtue of their non-contradictory status, religious beliefs cannot be justifiably viewed as testable hypotheses whose truth can be affirmed and/or denied, since neither their truth nor their falsity is in question. Religious

beliefs can not be contradicted because people, be they religious believers or not, tend to think in entirely different ways in which people think may and can prevent them from having the thoughts that are normally associated with certain religious beliefs.

(ii) The second aspect, we do not mean to imply that our religious beliefs are lacking in reasonability or are opposed to acceptable standards of rationality. What we mean to convey is that the connections and pictures depicted by our religious beliefs are imaginable and realizable in a non-reasonable, flexible, dynamic mode of operating that is not amenable or limited to the reasonable unreasonable dichotomy.

(iii) The third aspect, we are reminded that the demonstration of religious beliefs through commitment and action is not contingent on some supporting grounds with the guarantee of epistemological certainty or high probability. Rather our religious beliefs become exemplified in the ungrounded way we do act and live our lives daily. What this aspect shows is a non-epistemological dimension implicit in our unshakable convictions beyond which there are further grounds to which we can meaningfully appeal for an endless justification of our religious beliefs.

(iv) The fourth aspect, we have in mind the picturing

of new spiritual attitudes and new ways of life, all of which are describable and showable through learning and using a new language in connection with possible ungrounded ways of acting for believers to change and fulfil their lives under specific circumstances with this aspect, our religious beliefs are equipped, with a future oriented dimension which points to the possibility of adopting new religious beliefs that would project new attitudes, new values, and new lifestyles.

From these above implications Wittgensteinian view is defensible in two ways. Stated positively, it is defensible provided that religious beliefs are viewed depth-grammatically as unshakable convictions with the potential to bring about some describable life-changing actions and life fulfilling effects on the part of believers. Negatively, it is defensible when religious beliefs are not view as testable hypothesis whose truth and status can not be countered or contradicted with an opposite verdict. This negative way of making our Wittgensteinian view defensible seems to show a phenomenological suspension of what may be called the dialectical or normative stance in our Wittgensteinian view of religious beliefs. Accordingly, instead of imposing hypothetical explanations and terminal justifications, religious beliefs are to be acknow-

ledged and described for their meaning and value as they are embodied and shown in each believer's practice and way of acting and living.

Although Wittgensteinian view may be only partly but not fully defensible. On the one hand, the alleged whole sale validation and relativization is due largely to viewing our religious beliefs as testable hypothesis, which consequence can be eliminated by viewing depth-grammatically religious beliefs as unshakable convictions which give rise to non-contradictory non-reasonable, ungrounded ways of acting and living. On the otherhand, the descriptive emphasis of our Wittgensteinian view is made methodologically compatible with the undeniable diversity and multiplicity of religious beliefs by curtailing any attempt to subject one-sidedly to an indiscriminate scrutiny or ethnocentric speculation the life changing and life fulfilling potential of other peoples religious beliefs, rituals, and practices in which no counter judgement or normative assessment is appropriate and called for.

In this chapter we have come through, knowledge and belief in general and Religious beliefs from linguistic point of view in particular. Here although Wittgenstein talks about religious belief as individual and in his appeal to "system" he deals with the community of believers where every language game has express a unique way of life. In next chapter our concerned will be towards religious belief, and its role in life and functions of language-game elaborately.
