

RELIGIOUS BELIEF AND LANGUAGE

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C E R T I F I C A T E

This is to certify that the work recorded in this thesis entitled "Religious Belief and Language" has been entirely carried out by Sri Debendra Kumar Pradhan under my supervision and guidance. The conditions as per rules for the Ph.D. examination of Visva-Bharati has been fulfilled by him. The thesis is worthy of consideration for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (in Philosophy) Visva-Bharati and has not been submitted for any other degree in any other university.

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of my thesis is to study the nature of religious belief and language. The study includes both the classical and modern period. The classical thinkers were mainly absorbed in the conceptual analysis of belief and knowledge. But the modern philosopher's of religion are mainly concerned about the linguistic aspect of it. In my thesis I have tried to understand and explain the views of plato, Aristotle, St Thomas Aquinas from traditional philosophers group and Wittgenstein, Russell, Moore from modern philosophers group. In my research I have shown the nature of religious belief, which is positive in its character is discussed by traditional philosophers, and have pointed out that although Wittgenstein says. title systematically about religion and the status of religious belief typically involves using of picture or a way of looking at the world and at life, in such a manner that it is constantly before the mind and so that influence the way in which we live.

My thesis has five chapters. The first chapter deals with the nature of religious belief, both the traditional and modern. The second chapter examines the scope of religious knowledge. It also contains the views of the classical and modern thinkers. The third chapter of my thesis deals with the religious belief and religious knowledge from the contemporary philosopher's point of view. I have discussed mainly Wittgenstein's position here.

The linguistic aspect of religious belief and functions are discussed in fourth chapter of my thesis. I have discussed the view of Russell, Moore, and also of Wittgenstein. The last chapter in the conclusion of my thesis which gives a survey of the contents of other four chapters, and expresses my own views on it.

CHAPTER - I

Nature of Religious Belief.

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NATURE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

A belief is more than an assertion about the existence or non-existence of some being, event or value. When one says he believes in God, he may simply mean that it is his judgement or opinion that there is a God, but he is not using the word 'belief' in any way distinguishing it from opinion, or judgement or value. To believe (in God or in any being) implies that one is prepared to act on the postulate that he is correct though he realizes that he may be wrong in his opinion or judgement. If human being held infallible knowledge, there would be no point to the word 'belief'. To believe that a friend is honest is to be prepared to treat him thus, even when complete proof is not forthcoming. Our habits of action are testimonies to the seriousness with which we take our beliefs. We believe when we assent in mind and action to a judgement known to be less than certain. Thus religious belief involves earnest expectancy, the willingness to form habits of thinking and living engendered by the conceived nature of the religious object.

To have a clearcut understanding of the belief which is more than an assertain about the existence or non-existence of some being, event or value we will have to take classical views.

From the time of Plato and Aristotle it had been differentiated as (1) Theistic and (2) non-theistic religious belief. Before coming to our subject i.e. 'the nature of religious belief' we will have some ideas about these two classical religious beliefs.

CLASSICAL THEISTIC FORM OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

"The theistic form of religious belief is one that has exercised the greatest influence on western civilization in general, and western philosophy in particular. Consequently when anyone in the west is asked 'Do you believe in God?' he assumes that the question points to the Judeo Christian concept of God. So far as the western world is concerned, theism has a double origin : the Bible and Greek Philosophy. All the divine properties are implied in the Bible, but the expression and still more amplification of them were due to the influence of Greek Philosophy."¹

1. Concept of Deity - By H.P. Owen, p.1

(c) H.P. Owen - 1971, Robert MacLchose and Co. Ltd.

The University Press, Glasgow - 1971

Now the question comes what are the properties of God ? To answer this question, we must go to the classical theism.

Theism may be defined as belief in one God, the Creator, who is infinite, self-existent, incorporeal, eternal, immutable, Impassible, Simple-perfect, Omniscient and Omnipotent.

(1) The unity of God :

The unity of God to western man throughout the history of Christendom has been taken for granted, people of all intellectual and moral types believes in many Gods (both in the members of the ancient Olympic Pantheon and in the newer deities of the mystery cults). Even those philosophers (such as plato and Stoics) who imply monotheism in some passages are uninhibitedly polytheistic in others they can even use 'God' and 'the Gods' interchangeably in the same passage without explanation.

There are three possible grounds for affirming God's unity, revelation, experience and reason. Theistic belief must in fact always be justified on one or other of these grounds, which overlaps and intermingled in many ways.

(a) The first of these grounds is obvious. The Jews affirmed the existence of one God (Yahwen), not on the score of abstract speculation, but because they believed that Yahweh had thus revealed himself to them through out their history, and especially in the pivotal events of the Exodus and the exile.

According to the New Testament this self-disclosure of the one true God was fulfilled in Christ both in his teaching on the father and in his person as the father's only son.

(b) The 2nd consists, not in the mere fact of religious experience (which has taken polytheistic forms), but in an inference from the experiences subjective aspect to its putative object. The inference runs thus, If the divine is to be the object of absolute devotion it must possess absolute being, but one among many gods can't possess such being, for he shares his nature with other gods, therefore the divine must be one.

(c) Lastly, philosophers have attempted to demonstrate Gods unity by pure reason. In this regard Aquinas has given his view to demonstrate God's unity by pure reason when we will explicate the medieval views on religious belief we will have to discuss Aquinas's position.

God the creator - According to classical theism - God created the world "out of nothing" (ex-nihilo). Two things must be noted. Two things must be noted concerning the phrase exnihil, first, it is analytic, not synthetic. It does not add anything to the idea of creation ; it merely makes the idea explicit. Secondly, 'nothing' is to be taken in the strict sense of absolute non-being or non-existence. There is no form of being that exists apart from God's creative act

Everything depends absolutely on him for its very being.

The idea of Creation is thus radically opposed to the non-theistic view of God. It is opposed to the view held in ancient world by Plato and in the modern world by A.N. Whitehead, that God imposes form on pre-existent matter which we will discuss later on. It is opposed to the ploterian theory that the world is the last in a series of emanation from the Godhead. Still more obviously it is opposed to pantheism.

Divine infinity - It is necessary to begin what is 'infinity' in classical theism. First, it does not mean that God is shapeless or formless. On the contrary he is (in terms of Aristotelian contrast) pure form, for there is no composition in his being. Secondly to say that God is infinite is not to say that he is characterless. He has the character of pure spirit.

These erroneous interpretations of divine infinity are especially apt to occur when we think of it by means of the sensory imagination, we also easily imagine (the infinite' as a shapeless and indeterminate mass (or perhaps empty space). Here , as elsewhere, we must remember that God is wholly incorporeal , so that, although we can't rid our minds completely of sense -images in thinking of him, we must ultimately negate all those properties of being that are applicable only

to matterial entities. Thirdly, and in particular we must not think of God's infinity as an infinite extension of merely human attributes. In order to arrive at a true notion of him i.e. 'infinity' we must deny all those limitations that affect created being. Therefore we very often need to use negative predicates (such as immutable) to express his infinity. But we can also use positive ones, provided they are properly interpreted. Thus God's 'simplicity' means his complete expression of all his attributes in all his acts.

Now the question that what the forms of being in which God's infinity is expressed ?

The first, primary and all determinative sign of God's infinity is his self-existence. God, however is self-existent. He does not depend upon any external factors for his being. He is wholly self-sufficient. His self-existent or self-sufficiency is the primary point of difference between him and his finite creatures. Correlatively it is the primary mark of his infinity as Thomas Aquinas remarks.

"The very fact that God's existence itself subsists without being acquired by anything and as such is limitless (Prout dicitum infinitum), distinguishes it from everything else and sets other things aside from it."²

Secondly, it is obvious that matter is general and the

2. Summa theologica - by T. Aquinas,

material body in particular are intrinsically limiting. Everything that exists in space inevitably excludes other-things that occupy other portions of space. Therefore if God is infinite he must be non-spatial and bodiless. He must be pure and spirit.

How?

God's incorporeality can also be proved from his self-existence, which (it must always be remember) is the primary work of his infinity.

No material entity can be self-existent, for each is determination or mode of being.

Thirdly, the divine eternity, in which the adjective 'eternal' can have two senses : 'everlasting' and 'timeless'. The first sense can be given either a strong or weak form. According to the strong form, the entity so designated always has existed and always will exist. According to the weak form, although the entity had a begining it will have no end. The weak form is the one that is employed in Christian statements of human immortality. Every human soul is temporal in the sense that it had a begining, but it is eternal in the sense that it will never end. Yet it is the strong form that theists have always used with reference to God. Classical theists have held that it is not sufficient to say

that God is everlasting. God, they affirm, is outside any temporal series ; he is wholly timeless. The equation of eternity with timelessness was derived from Plato.³

Fourthly, the immutability or changelessness, of God is entailed by his eternity (in the sense of timelessness) St Augustine stated the truth of his immutability in Platonic terms. St Thomas rested it in terms of Aristotle's contrast between potentiality and act. God, being self-existent, is pure act, he actualizes all his potentialities simultaneously ; hence there is no form or degree of being that he can either acquire or lose.

Fifthly, 'Divine impossibility' can be given a meaning that is nothing more than amplifications of immutability. It can mean that God is incapable of suffering change from either an external or an internal cause. But the word means particularly that he can't experience sorrow, sadness or pain. That God is impossible in this sense was an axiom of platonic theology. It was also considered to be axiomatic by Christian fathers and medieval school man.

Sixthly, the 'Divine simplicity' that if God is infinite he must be simple ; he must express his whole nature in a single act,

3. Religious Platonism - T.K. Feibleman.

(Printed in Great Britain in 12 on 13 pt type
By Urwin brothers limited.)

for if any part of his nature were not expressed he would be protanto limited. Alternatively, if there were any property that he did not express he would not be self-existent ; for self existent being a being in whom essence and existence are identical must express his whole nature simultaneously. The point can be amplified through the Aristotelian categories of potentiality and act.

If God is infinite or self existent there can't be any potentialities in his being that are not actualised, he must exist as pure, unconditioned Act. Consequently there must be perfect coincidence of all his attributes. Thus his intelligence must coincide perfectly with his will, and his justice with his love.

Aquinas states God's simplicity thus ; "Since there is no composition of quantitative parts in God, for he is not a body, nor a composition of matter and form ; nor are his nature complete substantiality distinct, nor his essence and existence, nor is there a composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accidents - it is plain that God is altogether simple and nowise composite.

If God is infinite then he is obviously perfect in being, and if he is perfect in being he must be perfect in every attribute that self-existent being possesses. Conversely if he were defec

tive in any spiritual attribute he would be defective in being, and so he would not be self-existent. As Aquinas put's it :-

"Although being an existent thing does not involve being living or wise (for nothing partaking of existence need partakes every mode of existence) nevertheless, existence itself does involve life and wisdom(for subsistent existence itself can not lack any perfection of existence).

God is omniscient, this means that God knows all things There are innumerable things that no human mind can know, or that even the most penetrating human mind can know only in an imperfect manner. But knows all things perfectly. The perfection of his knowledge is shown both in its manner and in its extent. God's knowledge is different from human knowledge. He knows all things by a direct intellectual intuitions ; as Aquinas expressed it :-

"is not reasoned or discursive though he knows all reasoning and processes. Indeed, in knowing himself he must know the nature of everything that does or can exist, for there is nothing in the world that does not pre-exist as an idea in his mind and that does not owe its being to his will."⁴

The world is merely the projection into actuality of the possibilities that his mind contains.

4. Summa Theologica - T. Aquinas,

But for omnipotence or to call God 'omnipotent' can mean either (a) that he is ruler over all things obviously if God is the infinite creator he rules over all finite things he has created (b) that he can do all things. This is the sense that is normally given to 'omnipotence' this sense, too, is required by the affirmation of infinity. If God is infinite he must be able to do all things which are in accordance with his nature. God can't do what is logically impossible (and what is contrary to reason), he can't make $4+2=7$. He can't change the principles of morality; he can't make charity wrong or cheating right. He can't violate human freedom which is a spiritual good that he himself has given.

Besides this there are four further elements in classical theism i.e. the ideas of transcendence divine immanence, divine personality and the attribution of the terms 'objective' and subjective to God. The first is that, the God of classical theism is transcendent. This objective means (a) that God is substantially distinct from the world, (b) that he does not need the world (c) that he is incomprehensible. Secondly, Immanence, which is implied in the theistic concept of creation. Theism differs from deism in its assertion that God's creative activity is continuous. Every creature at every moment depends on his immediate power for its existence. Aquinas expressed this truth thus,

"God is in all things, not, indeed, as part of their essence, or as a quality, but in the manner that an efficient cause is present to that on which it acts. God does not impart his own uncreated life to creatures. On the contrary his immanence consists precisely in their continuously dependence on his creative power. This power, moreover, is spiritual and invisible. We can't defect, or even partially comprehend God's immanence. God, as the primary cause of all things, remains perpetually concealed within them and their secondary causes.

Thirdly, if God possess the spiritual attributes then he must be personal; for these are the marks that distinguish personal from super-personal forms of being. If, then, the analogies of being and proportionately are valid we can speak of God as one who expresses in an infinite form those personal characteristic that we express finitely. As pure spirit he is the archetype of personality. Fourthly, the attribution of the terms 'objective' to God in which it has been debated in the recent year so is largely due to the influence of existentialism that whether faith is 'objective' or 'subjective' we can say from both sides ie. 'ontological' and 'epistemological'. So far as the ontological purpose is concerned, the interpretation of 'objective' and 'subjective' is clear. God is objective in the sense that he is an independently existing

reality. But he is also subjective in the sense that he is the subject of personal experience - an 'I' who can be addressed as 'thou' in prayer.

On the epistemological plane also, theism is both objective and subjective. It is objective in so far as theists claim to know God both by a direct apprehension and by descriptive statements (within the limits imposed by the analogy of proportionality). It is subjective in so far as this apprehension of God is unlikely occur and certainly can not develop without the personal attitudes of wonder humility and contemplation. The knowledge of God is also subjective in so far as the only positive meaning we can give our theistic language is the one which it has in our own finite experience.

CLASSICAL NON THEISTIC RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Classical theism rests on the belief that God is infinite that his infinity is to be understood primarily in terms of his self-existence, and that he is therefore the creator of the world ex-nihilo. But many distinguished philosophers, example Plato & Aristotle held that God is finite. They are the opinion.

Plato - his view of a finite God is contained in his 'Timaeus'. According to the myth expounded there God as the supreme craftsman, imposes on independently given matter an

order that he copies from the forms (or Ideas). His motive for doing so is that , being good and so incapable of jealousy, he wishes everything to become as like himself. Plato's God is thus doubly limited - by the forms, on the one hand, and (or necessity) on the other. In another we can say that Plato had two religions.

(1) One is a kind of supernaturalism, consistent with his idealistic philosophy and with the orphic religion.

(2) The other is a kind of naturalism consistent with his realistic philosophy and with the traditional Greek religion.

The truth seems to be that for Plato God was both, one version belonged to Plato the idealist, the other to Plato, the realist.

Now what is the Idealistic version of religion i.e the supernaturalism consistent with his idealistic philosophy?

The orphic doctrines of man centres upon the belief in immortality. The orphic eschatology is in conformity with the belief in the immortality of the soul. After death the soul of the orphic goes to Hades, repeats the formula which identifies him and asks for the cold water from the lake of memory. He drinks and then after enjoys lordship among the other heroes. The soul of the orphic in this way is saved

from the eternal return to the body, having "flown out of the sorrowful circle."⁵

According to Plato, God holds the beginning the end, and the centre of all things that exists ; God, not man, is the measure of all things. Atheists are to be punished. God is the author of good only. He never deceives or changes. There is God, then and there are gods, and there is the good. And God is good and the good is ordered by God but God is not the same as the good, but the author of good only, and the good can't be defined. Evil is the opposite of good. It does not belongs to the gods but to mortals. To escape from evil means to become like a god. Evil is due to human defects.

It has its source in the material constituent inherited from the original chaos. Human affairs are unworthy of earnest effort. Yet the righters life is the most pleasurable in the end.

Secondly the realistic version of religious belief by Plato.

There is little doubt that Plato accepted the traditional religious beliefs of his land and people. He declared that he would leave all religious matters, ie. the erection of temples, the performance of sacrifices, and other forms of worship of the gods to the Appolo or Delphine. Plato clearly believed in

5. Religious Platonism - By James K. Feibleman p.67-68

the reality of both worlds and considered God an intermediary with control over the actualization of the Ideas. He strengthened being at the cost of creation, and confined God's efforts to persuading the receptable to receive the forms, and so enters the picture after the facts, with his power greatly diminished as a result of encountering two interactable levels. God is hard to find and when we find them. He is found to be neither all-knowing nor all powerful. Furthermore, the worst impiety is that God can be wooed by prayer, to suppose that the gods do not exist, that they are careless, or that they could be bribed, are crimes. God, in fact, does not have any need of man ^{or} anything. It is improbable that the gods should feel either pleasure or its opposite. God is simply the cause or the intelligence behind the universe.

Plato sought the divine in things which were both concrete and eternal, which the Ideas assuredly were not. Indeed the only concrete things which were also eternal. So far as he could discover, were the stars, which thought to be fixed. In this way he escaped from the narrow confines of the civic religion and moved towards the cosmic without being limited to a personal conception of it. God leads towards the good life, but the good is not God. The Ideas constitute a second natural order, not super-natural order. The Ideas are not personalities and the highest Ideas is therefore not God.

One of the strongest arguments for the Greek version of realism in Plato's religion is the emphasis he gave to attempt to establish a good life on this earth. The two longest dialogues, the Republic and the laws, though both containing evidence for the belief in the immortality of the soul, are chiefly efforts to draw up the blue-prints for a successful commonwealth in this world.

According to Aristotle, the God whom he described in his 'metaphysics' is also finite. He is the first unmoved, among many celestial movers, and he does not create the world which exists eternally in independence of him. He 'moves' the world by inspiring love and desire in the 'first heaven'. But he does not love the world, or even know it, he remains wholly enveloped in the purely intellectual activity of self-contemplation. Hence, although, Aquinas, borrowed from Aristotles 'metaphysics' he modified the latter by affirming that God, having created the world 'out of nothing', directs it by his providence.

In the nineteenth century belief in a finite God was strongly advocated by John Stuart Mill in his 'Theism'. Having argued that adaptation in nature afford probability to belief in a cosmic Designer he denied that the latter is omnipotent. God, he affirmed, does not create matter but arranges it to the extent

and in the matter that its properties permit. Yet though Mill held that God is limited in power he conceded the possibility that God is limitless in intelligence.

The most sophisticated and influential formulation which the idea of a finite God has received in this century is to be found in the writings of A.N. Whitehead, who here resembles both his great Greek Predecessors. Whitehead's God has both a 'Primordial' and a 'consequent' nature. According to the former nature he imparts form and value to the world by ensuring the expression of eternal objects in temporal flux. According to the latter nature he incorporates the experiences of the world and preserves its elements of good within his memory. Whitehead's God is thus limited both by the existence of the world and by the incorporation of its experiences within his being.

But towards the age of Aquinas the nature of religious belief has been developed in a different way. For Aquinas ;

"Religious belief consists essentially in intellectual assent to the truth of certain propositions."⁶ Although practical conclusions as to how the believer should live his life follow these acts of assent, they do not constitute religious

6. Philosophy of Religion - The historic Approach - by M.J.Charlesworth, p. 84.

The Macmillan Press Ltd., London and Basingccke - 1972.

belief. To put it crudely, one is defined a religious believer if one assent to certain propositions, where as, if one does adopt the practical policies or attitude consequent upon these beliefs, one may be classed as an inconsistent or hypocritical believer, but one will still be a believer. For Aquinas, it is therefore at least possible to say without contraction,

"I believe in God but this belief makes no difference to the way I live my life", and in this sense there is for him a logical gap between religious belief and religious practice. For Kant and the Kantian of course, this furnishes grounds for a conclusive objection to the whole intellectualist position represented by Aquinas. Religious belief, they claim, is of its very nature practical, so that to say "I believe in God" is precisely to commit oneself to live in a certain way.

The Idea that belief and practice are inseparable that we can find in the writings of THOMAS MC. PHERSON in his book 'Philosophy and Religious belief'. For him that "religion has a number of elements and an adequate account of religion is hardly to be got if any of these is totally ignored. In particular, there are two elements which have been given different emphasis from time to time, namely "religious belief and religious practice". Concentration on the belief element can undoubtedly lead to a one-sided picture of religion, and the belief element

itself is not fully intelligible if separated from the practice element, as the latter is seen in participation in religious ritual or in the living of a life in accordance with certain moral policies.⁷

The same thing has been defined by 'Emile Durkheim'

Defi - "A religion is united systems of beliefs, and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden - belief and practices within write into one single moral community call a Church all those who adhere to them"⁸

It is the nature of religion as a whole that they seek to express. They proceed as if it were a sort of indivisible entity, while as a matter of fact, it is made up of parts, it is no more or less complex, system of myths, dogmas, rites and ceremonies.

Now a whole can't be defined except in relation to its parts. It will be more methodical, then, to try to characterize the various elementary phenomena of which all religion are made up.

Religious phenomena are naturally in two fundamental

7. Philosophy and religious belief - by Thomas MC Pherson
(p. 1)

8. Elementary forms of religious life - by Emile Durkheim,
(p.47)

(First Published in 1915)

How Introduction(C) George Allen and Unwin Ltd.(1976)

categories :-

(1) Beliefs and (2) rites

The first are states of opinion, and consists in representations : The Second are determined modes of action. In more accurate way that religious beliefs are the representations which express the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with each other or with profane things. Finally, rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comfort himself in the presence of these sacred objects. Now what is the sacred and profane things, this we can understand easily from Durkheim writings.

All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, present one common characteristics :- they presupposes a classifications of all things, real and ideal, of which man think, into two classes, or opposed groups generally designated by two distinct terms which are translated well enough by the words profane and sacred (profane-sacre). This division of the world into two domains, the one containing all that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the distinctive trait of religious thought ; the beliefs, myths, dogmas, and legends are either representations or systems of representations which express the nature of sacred things the virtues and powers which are attributed to them or their relations with each other and with profane things.

But by sacred things one must not understand simply those personal beings which are called gods or spirits, a rock a tree, a spring, a pebble, a piece of wood, a house in a word anything can be sacred.

The rites can be defined and distinguished from other human practices, moral practices, for example only by the special nature of their object. A moral rules prescribes certain manners of acting to us just as a rite does, but which are addressed to a different class of objects. So it is the object of the rite which must be characterized, if we are to characterize the rite itself.

Now a question arises by what general characteristics sacred things are to be distinguished from profane things? One might be tempted, first of all to define them by the place they are generally assigned in the hierarchy of things. They are naturally considered superior in dignity and power to profane things, and particularly to man, when he is only a man and has nothing sacred about him. One thinks of himself as occupying an inferior and dependent position in relation to them; and surely this conception is not without some truth. Only there is nothing in it which is really characteristic of the sacred. It is not enough that one thing be subordinated to another for the second to be sacred in regard to the first. Slaves

are inferior to their masters, subjects to their kings ; if it is sometimes, said of a man that he makes a religion of those beings or things whose eminent value and superiority of himself, he thus recognizes it is clear that in any case the word is taken in a metaphorical sense, and that there is nothing in these relations which is really religious.

On the otherhand, it must not be lost to view that there are sacred things of every degree, and that there are some in relation which a man feels himself relatively at his case. An amulet has a sacred character, yet the respect which it inspires is nothing exceptional. Even before his gods, a man is not always in such a marked state of inferiority ; for it is very frequently happened that the exercises a variable physical constraint upon them to obtain what he desires. He beats the fetich with which he is not contented, but only to reconcile himself with it again, if in the end it shows itself more docile to the wishes of its adore. To have rain, he throws stone into the spring or sacred lake where the god of rain is thought to be reside ; he believes that by this means he forces him to come out and show himself. Moreover, if it is true that man depends upon his gods is reciprocal. The gods also have need of man, without offering and sacrifice they would die. We shall even have occasion to show that this dependance of the god upon their worshipers is maintained even in the most idealistic religion.

But if a purely hierarchic distinction is a criterium at once too general and too imprecise there is nothing left with which to characterize the sacred in its relation to the profane except their heterogeneity. However, this heterogeneity is sufficient to characterize this classification of things and to distinguish it from all others, because it is very particular, it is absolute. In all the history of human thought there exists no other examples of two categories of things, so profoundly differentiated or so radically opposed to one another. The traditional opposition of good and bad is nothing besides this : for the good and the bad are only two opposed species of the same class, namely morals, just as sickness and health are two different aspects of the same order of facts, life, while the sacred and profane have always and everywhere been conceived by the human mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds between which there is nothing in common. The forces which play in one are not simply those which are met with in the other, but a little stronger, they are of different sort. In different religions, this opposition has been conceived in different ways. Here to separate these two sorts of things, it has seemed sufficient to realize them in different parts of the physical universe, there, the first have been put into an ideal and transcendental world, while the material world is left in full possession of the others. But howsoever much the

forms of the contrast may vary the fact of the contrast is universal.

This heterogeneity is even so complete that it frequently degenerates into a veritable antagonism. The two worlds are not only conceived of as separate, but as even hostile and jealous rivals of each other. Since man can't fully belong to one except on condition of having the other completely, they are exhorted to withdraw themselves completely from the profane world, in order to lead an exclusive religious life. Hence comes the monasticism which is artificially organized outside of and apart from the natural environment in which the ordinary man leads the life of this world in a different, one, closed to the first, and merely its contrary. Hence comes the mystic asceticism whose object is to root out from man all the attachment for the profane world that remains in him. From that come all the forms of religious suicide, the logical working out of this asceticism, for the only manner of full escaping the profane life is after all to forsake all life.

The opposition of these two classes manifest itself outwardly with a visible, sign by which we can easily recognize this very special classification, wherever it exists. The two classes can't even approach each other and keep their own nature at the same time.

Thus we arrive at the first criterium of religious beliefs. Undoubtedly there are secondary species within these two fundamental classes which, in their turn, are more or less incompatible with each other. But the real characteristic of religious phenomena is that they always a bypartial division of the whole universe, known and knowable into two classes which embrace all that exists, but which radically exclude each other.

Sacred things are those which the interdictions are applied and which must remain at a distance from the first. So religious beliefs are the representations which express the nature of sacred things and the relations which they sustain, either with each other or with profane things. Finally, rites are the rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should comfort himself in the presence of these sacred objects.

When a certain number of sacred things sustains relations of co-ordination or subordination with each other in such a way as to form a system having a certain unity, but which is not comprised within any other system of the same sort, the totality of these beliefs and their corresponding rites constitutes a religion. From this definition it is seen that a religion is not necessarily contained within one sole and single idea, and does not proceed from one unique principle

which, varying according to the circumstances under which it is applied, is nevertheless at bottom always the same, it is rather a whole made up of distinct and relatively individualized parts. Each homogenous group of sacred things, or even each sacred thing of some importance constitute a centre of organization about which gravitate a group of beliefs and rites or a particular cult ; there is no religion, howsoever unified it may be, which does not recognize a plurality of sacred things.

The really religious belief are always common to a determined group, which makes profession of adhering to them and of practising the rites connected with them they are not merely received individually by all the members of this group, they are something belonging to the group , and they makes it unity. The individuals which compose it feel themselves united to each other by the simple fact that they have a common faith. A society whose members are united by the fact that they think in the same way in regard to the sacred world and its relations with the profane world, and by the fact that they translate these common ideas into common practices, is what is called a church.

Like the Durkheims religious beliefs and practising , the rites where both are related ; by ignoring one of it

can undoubtedly lead to a one sided picture of religion. The belief will not be fully intelligible if separated from the practice.

There are several reasons why concentration on its belief element gives a one-sided picture of religion. The ordinary religious believer is probably not very reflective about his beliefs. He may be able to utter appropriate formulae but he may not be able very well to explain these or defend them. Indeed some times he is praised by religious leaders and teachers for the 'simplicity' of his faith, and it may be said by those who thus praise him that there is more of religious value in the acceptance of religious formulae together with the attempt to live a particular sort of life, than in the kind of close examination of these formulae that is undertaken by some philosophers and theologians. The God of the philosophers has often been contrasted with the God of the ordinary religious believer, in ways intended to suggest that the latter is nearer the centre of religion. Philosophy (even theology) is one thing, religion another. The philosopher's analytical or critical approach to religious belief may lead to failure on his part to appreciate the role that it plays in the life of ordinary religious believer ; it is likely to miss the religious point of belief. It is necessary that we

consider question about how within this religion - a given society whose religion it is the belief element is connected with the ritual element, the moral element, and the element of experience, if we ignore these questions our understanding of the belief element itself will be incomplete.

Now let us consider the question of religious experience.

Some one who has enjoyed what he would call a religious experience but who makes no attempt to describe this experience or to connect it in any way with his religious beliefs puts himself out side the possibility of discussion.

We may note that Durkheim that says he has had experience but he will not say anything at all about the nature of experience, or about whether or not it goes to confirm his previously held beliefs etc. In his opinion there is little or nothing to discuss. Many will have something even a little to say about their experience, for they will want to make them clearer to themselves let alone do others. But now we see the importance of the belief element. The effect of religious experience is generally represented as being to confirm belief, or to induce it where it did not exist before. Even more fundamentally, we can't give an account of an alleged religious experience unless we are able to say what it is an experience of. The precise form taken by religious

experience unless we are able to say what it is an experience of. The precise form taken by religious experiences, seems often to be determined by the expectations of the person having the experience ; and these expectations are shaped by his previously held beliefs, or any rate by the particular kind of religious teaching in the shape largely of imparting of propositions that he has received ; it has often been remarked that whereas both protestants and Catholics may have visions, visions in particular of the virgin mary are much less likely to occur to the former than to the latter.

It seems important for many to define religious beliefs as clearly as they can, and to produce, in some ~~cases at~~ least arguments in support of them. It is the belief element in religion that men are best able to argue about. The assumption may be involved here that religious belief is not 'rational' unless it can be argued for may be questioned. It is not necessarily 'irrational' for a man to adopt a set of beliefs for which he is not prepared to give reasons.

There is no obligation on a man always to back up his beliefs with reasons or arguments. We might find his failure to do so in a particular case irritating and we might want to call him foolish or obstinate etc., but we should not have any right to call him irrational - unless, of course, in calling him rational we merely wanted to point to the fact that he

would not give reasons, but this would be very weak sense of 'irrational'. Why should he give reasons, if he does not want to, if all he is claiming is to believe something? It would be otherwise if he were claiming knowledge (calling him 'irrational' would, for e.g. be justified, if his beliefs themselves or his reasons for them were hopelessly internally inconsistent, or if some of his reasons were clearly irrelevant to the beliefs they were supposed to support etc). The view that it is irrational to hold a belief that one can not produce evidence for or give reasons for is one that is found among both supporters and opponents of religions. A general assumption to the effect that it is never justifiable (logically) (morally) to believe anything without evidence or on insufficient evidence, has sometimes been made. Yet there seems to be good reason to assert to this. Unless, that is, 'belief' is taken as equivalent to 'knowledge'. Generally, a man may believe anything he pleases; but if, when he claims to believe, what he really means to say is that he knows, then we would usually be justified in saying that he can't be allowed to 'believe' (= know) what he pleases. (There are no doubt, knowledge claims which do not need support by arguments or reasons can properly be demanded - knowledge - and cases where they can't be belief.)

It is worth remarking that traditional natural theology

gives a force to shape the definition of religious concepts and to argue in support of religious doctrines which would simply be denied by many religious thinkers since Kant and Kierkegaard.

The 'expression "religious belief" is commonly used, to cover not only religious belief in a narrower sense (where belief can be contrasted with knowledge) but also religious knowledge (or claims thereto) religious commitment, religious faith etc. The kind of analysis that it would be appropriate to give of religious knowledge. The degree of ambiguity that there is in the expression 'religious belief', it is possible to suppose ⁿmight after the religious believer an all too easy way of escape from criticism. He might begin by defending a certain position, but if criticism of its presumed rational foundation become too destructive might retreat into an admission that the position is after all only one that he 'believes' and that therefore does not need to be supported by argument ; he might, that is, decline from an implied claim to know P, perhaps through an amendment of this to a claim merely to strongly believe P, to the position of one who just 'happens to believe' P. At all of these stages, as far as its verbal expression is concerned, his claims can be put in the form 'I believe P.'

So if a man commits himself to beliefs and assertion

about God or the supernatural, and also to morality, a way of life or a set of principles which is somehow connected with these beliefs and assertions, then he has a religion.

Here one question may arise that how the two essential features the beliefs and the way of life are connected ?

"According to wilson these beliefs or assertion and way of life are the two necessary and sufficient condition of religion. To have the idea about the connection between religious beliefs and practices, we can take different type of relation between them. There may be psychological, logical relation which is also advocated by John Wilson."¹⁰

The first relation that psychological perhaps a question more appropriate to history or anthropology than to philosophy. "If we consider for a moment of typical phrase of a primitive stage in religion, such as the Latin "numen inest" "there is something supernatural in there" - we can perhaps see how this phrase both states a belief and express an emotion. The speaker thinks and asserts that something supernatural is there he also feels awed, fearful, and abashed. We can also be more precise about the kind of belief and the kind of

10. Philosophy and religion - by John Wilson (p. 16)
 (The logic of religions belief)
 Oxford University Press, Amen House London C.4(1961)

emotion which are involved. The belief is essentially a non-scientific belief, in the sense that it is not a belief about objects or things. The primitive sages may believe that his God controls the thunder and lightning ; and this may be part of his religion ; but it would be a mistake to suppose that he is just indulging in false theories about the causes of thunder and lightning - that his belief is just bad science. It is not science at all. It is a belief in personal or semi-personal forces which (he thinks) it would be mistake to approach scientifically, that is why most primitives resist a bluff, hearty scientific approach to their religion.

"Belief and morality in religion are psychologically homogenous, being compounded of the same attitude to life."¹¹ How religion develops will depend on local conditions. It is possible for a religion to be unduly weighted either on the side of belief or on the side of moral feeling, and it is probable that most successful religions or religious rivals succeed by uniting or reuniting the two elements. In certain forms of Buddhism, for instance the moral attitude is so dominant, to the exclusion of belief, that we sometimes hesitate about using the term 'religion' at all ; where as, were it not for the sort evidence we have from the Greek tragedians

11. Ibid - p. 22

and the mystery religions, we might be tempted to think it possible for classical Greek to entertain beliefs about his many gods without any serious feelings of awe or terror.

Psychologically, then, religion arises from the encounter of our own fears and desires with the world, which gives rise both to assertions about the world and to certain feelings in ourselves. Whether there is anything in the world which can be the proper object of these assertions we are not yet in a position to say ; we do know, on the other hand, that man tend to adjust their beliefs to fit their fears and desires. In otherwords, it is psychologically probable that their feelings have moulded their beliefs, the sheer variety of beliefs is itself sufficient to vouch for him. The psychological connection between our two essential features which is clear i.e. the belief largely depend on the feelings.

Besides this psychological connection there is supposed (by religious people) to be the logical connection between belief and morality. According to Wilson, there is no doubt at all that religious people claim to derive ways of living and moral principles from their religious beliefs and assertions about the supernatural. "God is love, therefore we must love each other", "Christ was his son, therefore we must follow him", these statements show quite clearly that believers

suppose their principles to be logically reinforced by supernatural facts. "Certain things (of a supernatural kind) are so ; therefore act thus" that is a generalized form of the whole of what religion has to tell us. This point is unaffected by the endeavour on the part of some believers to use morality itself as evidence for the existence of God. For, first it is not a particular set of moral values which are used but the alleged existence of objective moral values as a whole ; believers do not first decide on their particular morality, and then adjust their concept of divinity to fit it or if they do - they do not do so deliberately, which is the present point. Secondly, the existence of a supernatural and objective set of moral values is itself a matter of belief and not of morality ; so that, the attempts is, in fact, to use one metaphysical belief to point the way of others, and not to derive judgements of fact from judgements of value. Thus, to Kant "the starry heavens above and the moral law within" are both facts which point to God.

As soon as we get to particular principles, the movement is always from what God is like, what he wants, or commands, what human beings ought to do.

Now another problem will come that what is , in fact, the logical connection between them. According to Wilson this

logical connection between beliefs and principles, between assertions of fact and assertions of value would be of academic interest merely unless we had reason to suppose the beliefs and assertions to be true, or unless we thought that it was reasonable to commit ourselves to them. It turns out, then, that the reasonableness of religious commitment stands or falls by the reasonableness of commitment to religious beliefs and assertions of fact. Here it is important to remember that these beliefs and assertions form a necessary perhaps the most necessary condition for religion. Whatever kind of beliefs and assertions they are, whatever kind of truth they are supposed to hold, whatever is the appropriate method for verifying them, and whatever actual evidence for or against them, they must be genuine beliefs and assertions, in the sense that they must be logically capable of allowing us to derive a way of life or a set of principles from them: for if they are not only are they themselves in suspicion, but also the connection between them and their derived off spring is fatally severed. And this severance would be a death-blow to anything that can properly be called religion.

The something i.e. the relation between belief and a way of life can be available in Braithwait's writings. "His view has been often called reductionist. The effect of his

view is to reduce Christian religious beliefs to a combination of certain moral beliefs and certain empirical beliefs."¹²

Though 'belief' he in fact regards as a somewhat inappropriate term, for he holds that the empirical belief of religion need only to be entertained and not necessarily adhered to as true, and he holds further that the moral element is not properly a matter of moral beliefs but of practical intentions. Of the two elements the moral is the more important. It is here that Braithwaite finds the essence of religion.

The empirical elements, chiefly is a way of distinguishing between religions which seems to share the same or similar moral beliefs ; the difference is found by noting that adherents of these religions will entertain a different set of stories - the Christian a set of stories about Christ, muslim a set of stories about Mohemedan etc. The relatively minor part played by the empirical element (the stories) in Braithwaits view is seen also in the fact that the connection between the adoption of a moral policy by a religious man and his entertaining of certain exemplary stories about Christ is claimed by Braithwaite to be causal or psychological

12. Philosophy and religion - by T.M.C. Pherson (p. 42)

but not a logical one.

Braithwaites starting point is a certain view of the nature of moral beliefs. This view is one which "makes the primary use of a moral assertion that of expressing the intention of the asserter to act in a particular sort of way specified in the assertions.

The moral beliefs is an intention to behave in a certain way ; a religious belief is an intention to behave in a certain way (a moral belief) together with the entertainment of certain stories associated with the intention in the mind of the believer.

According to Richard Swinburne "Religious belief is of necessary condition of much moral action, the desirability of which, unlike that of the action of acting as if there is a God , is not the way connected with the truth or falsity of religion. A man believe that he ought to pursue an honest and upright course of life and believe that he can not do this without a religious belief (including, perhaps the belief that honestly is rewarded in the world to come). So to secure an honest course of life he may try to persuade himself that religion is true. Or it may be someone heroic moral action which a man feels that he ought to perform, but can't perform without religious belief ; and secure the

performance of which he tries to persuade himself into religious belief."¹³

Here we are concerned about the relation of belief and practice. So if belief is related with practice, then, there must have purpose which is also related with belief. If one has true beliefs he will be able to achieve his purposes without true beliefs there is no good purpose.

Many actions and states of affairs are good in some respects but bad in others. Giving large amounts of pocket money to a child is good in the respect that he will get the pleasure out of spending it, but bad in the respect that having too much money he will not learn self-discipline. There is no objective scale on which competing reasons can be weighed so as to say whether it is over-all better to do a certain action than to refrain from doing it or to do some rival action.

In so far as actions are good, they are important. What matters morally, what is of moral importance, is that a man does the action (if any) which are over all better to do than to refrain from doing. In so far as One seeks to

13. Faith and reason - by Richard Winburne, p. 85
Oxford - at the Clarendon Press - 1981.

achieve some purpose, he will consider it to some extent a good thing that he achieves that purpose ; and for that reason he must hold that his beliefs matter. For only if we have true beliefs then we will be able to achieve our purposes. I want to go to London and am confronted by two roads. If I believe that the right hand road leads to London and the left hand one does not, I shall go on the right hand road ; and if I believe that the left hand road leads to London and the right hand does not, I shall take the left-hand road. There is the logical connection between them. It then follows that I shall attain my purposes only in so far as I have true beliefs. I can't give you money unless I have a true beliefs about which pieces of paper are money or a true belief about what we can do with a signed cheque. I can't give you information unless I have true beliefs about what words mean.

If I have a duty to attain some end, I have a duty to ensure that I have a true belief about the way to attained ; (the greater the duty to acquire the true beliefs). If as a parent, I am under a moral obligation to ensure that my children are happy and well-educated, then I am morally obliged to investigate possible schools so that I arrive at a well justified belief that a certain school will provide and good education. Also it I have a duty to provide knowledge

for others (c.g. for my children when they can't obtain it for themselves), then I have duty to acquire that knowledge in order to so - and knowledge involves true belief.

The holding of true beliefs, so far as, is of importance, moral or other, because beliefs tell us the means by which ends can be achieved. This does not however seem to be the only reason ^{as to} why the holding of true beliefs is important. The holding of true beliefs seems to be valuable in itself, not merely as a means to something else. For true belief is necessary for knowledge, and knowledge is valuable in itself, and especially knowledge of things which concern the nature, origin and purpose of our particular human community ; and the nature, origin and purpose the universe itself.

"With true religious beliefs we will also fulfill our moral obligation in the way of educating our children, and from this too it follows that we have an obligation to cultivate rational beliefs about religion."¹⁴

"However W.K. Clifford in his famous 'The ethics of belief' argues that all our beliefs and the ways in which we acquire them influence others and for that reason we have a duty to complete rationality in all matters."¹⁵

14. Faith and Reason - by Richard Swinburne (p. 79)

15. The Ethics of belief - W. K. Clifford.

He writes that 'no man's belief' is private matter which concerns himself alone and that man who believes unproved and unquestioned statements for their own solace and private pleasure are perverse influence. Where a man's influence is very obvious and the responsibility is clear, as with a parent towards his children, or a teacher towards his students, or a priest towards his parishioners, this is fair enough. But surely there is a sphere of private morality in which a man may choose what to do even if some others for who he bears no responsibility who saw what he was doing might possibly be led astray thereby. And of course, outside the parent -child context, where rational adults are viewing a man's behaviour, the influence of his bad actions on them, may only be to lead them to avoid such actions in future. Clifford seems to have exaggerated a fundamentally good point.

A further reasons why it matters to acquire true beliefs about religion is that religious beliefs themselves have moral consequences. If there is a God and he has made and sustains the world and issued commands to men, men have moral obligations which they would not otherwise have. The grounds for this are as follows - men ought to acknowledge other persons with whom they come into contact, not just ignore them and this solely becomes a duty when those persons are our benefactors.

Kinds of beliefs :

Religious believers claim to believe or to know something and to possess understanding or faith or to be committed to something. They adopt several types of inquiries. What is it that is the object or objects of such claims ? What kind of knowledge belief, understanding, faith commitment etc., is claimed ? How far is belief in a religious context similar to, or, different from belief etc. elsewhere ? Are there kinds of beliefs found only in religion and not elsewhere ? How is religious belief or knowledge achieved i.e., by what methods or techniques ? Now let us take religious belief as the central concept and make reference to the others as may be necessary.

Propositional and personal belief :

The object of religious belief is sometimes a proposition (I believe that Jesus Christ is the son of God). Similarly, the object of faith is sometimes a proposition (or a number of propositions, which taken together make up a statement of the Christian faith), sometimes a person (Jesus or God). Similarly, again in the case of commitment. Let us use the term 'propositional belief' for the kind of belief exemplified by 'Jesus Christ is son of God', and the term 'personal belief' for the kind exemplified by belief in God. The expression 'personal belief' may seem to beg certain questions. Is God a person ? may not something other than persons be the object of this kind

of belief ? (For e.g. a man may say, "I believe in democracy). But the expression 'personal belief' is intended here merely as a convenient label, and no assumptions are being made about the answers to such questions as these.

What is the relation between the two types of object ? In particular, it might be wondered whether the difference between, say, 'I believe that God exists' and 'I believe in God' is any more than verbal. For someone to say that he believes in God is for him to say more than that he believes in the existence of God, it carries an implication of trust, or commitment. I believe that the Dalai Lama exists ; but I do not believe in him as the Christian believer would say he believes in God.

The beliefs of an adherent of a political party may also be partly propositional and partly personal. It is difficult to think of any third sphere of belief which shares this characteristics with religion and politics. Religion and really unequivocal cases where the two sorts of objects of belief are normally present together.

It might appear that religion is a stronger example of this than politics, in the sense that while a man's religious adherence might be said to involve him inescapably in both propositional and personal beliefs, his political adherence can much more easily be limited to propositional beliefs. But this is

probably a matter of cultural context. In Christian society, a man may adhere to the Christian religion and to the conservative party and in the case of former adherence there will probably be personal belief, and in the case of latter there probably will not. But in some other societies political adherence may involve a large element of personal belief, perhaps a much greater amount of personal belief than of propositional belief. And in the case of religion other than Christianity, the element of personal belief may be slight or non-existent (e.g. some kinds of Hinduism). The point is not that it is essential to religion or politics that they always contain a measure personal belief, but rather that it is never appropriate to say of instance of religious or political belief that it is partly personal, where as it would be inappropriate of scientific or historical beliefs (in any culture) that they should be partly personal.

Propositional belief may seem to offer the philosopher more scope for investigation than does personal belief.

Not only is the quantity of material ; but also there are a number of different types of questions that can be raised about the material ; the philosopher can concern himself with the content of the propositions, with the relations of

implications if any, between certain of them, with their character as literal or non-literal, on the grounds on which it would be reasonable to hold them ; and so on. By contrast there may seem to be little for a philosopher to say about personal belief. It may be the case that techniques applicable in the examination of propositional belief are not appropriate for the study of personal belief. At the same time, it would be surely wrong to let capacity for responding to particular investigatory techniques be the test for what is important in any field. There is a reciprocal relationship in this matter. The invention of new techniques of investigation can virtually create a new branch of study. In general, the concepts we bring to our experience can help to determine where we draws the boundary between one field of study and another, and certainly play some part in the determination of what is 'important' and what is not. The study of personal belief has not been much undertaken by philosophers ; but it would seem to be a necessary study if religious belief is under consideration.

This idea of personal belief is known as fundamental belief by John Hick.¹⁶ For him what is fundamental belief

16. Faith and Knowledge - by John Hick.

Macmillan - London, Melbourne - 1967

which is similar to personal belief ?

The fundamental beliefs are to be argued about for example, the belief that there is an external world, or that things will continue to behave as they have been observed to behave in the past, or that there are certain objective moral truths (e.g. that ~~turturer~~ and murderer are wicked). Less fundamental beliefs whether there is a table in the next room or it will rain tomorrow are possible subjects for arguments, but such arguments utilize the fundamental beliefs, about which we can't argue with profit.

Thus argument about whether there is a table in the next room already presupposes that there is an external world of tables and chairs, and that things continue to behave as they have been observed to behave in the past (e.g. tables stay where they put) and that in general, what we think we remember happened (e.g. that if ^I/think I remember having put a table in the next room, then probably I did). The fundamental beliefs form a framework within which we can argue about the less fundamental beliefs. But the fundamental beliefs are not things about which we can argue in a rational way. We just do believe these fundamental beliefs, although we have a certain freedom not to believe.

Hick claims that, whether the world is created and controlled by God is equally fundamental, and therefore not the proper subject of argument. It must be granted that if a man really did not believe in the external world or the general principle, it would be hard to devise a worthwhile argument to convince him. But in fact all men do, and therefore they have common beliefs about the world, and similar inductive standards, which enable them to advance from their present beliefs to new beliefs. There is no reason to suppose that in its closedness to rational inquiry the existence of God is as fundamental as the existence of the external world. There is no a priori reason to suppose that with common beliefs about the world and common inductive standards, men can't advance to a rational belief about the existenc of God.

The interest of the philosophers of religion in the content of religious propositional belief is partly an interest in arriving at a delimitation of the field of propositional religious belief. These religious propositional beliefs are opposed to the propositional beliefs of economists, physicists etc. They are belief about God or about Jesus of a kind authorised by the Bible, or by the tradition of the Church, or certain branches of the Church, the teachings of

the Jusus as recorded in the Bible, or as interpreted by the Church or by certain individuals. To say this is, however, hardly yet to have stated the content of Christian religious belief, but rather to have mentioned certain formal features of it. As far as the content is concerned the philosophers generally limited himself to discussing certain examples such as "God exist" 'God loves us', 'we shall survive bodily death."

It would be inappropriate for a philosopher - though not for a theologian to become too closely involved in the details of the content of Christian faith. At the same time although examples might, presumably be chosen at random (given that the subject matter can be independently delimited in some such as that just mentioned) they are infact not chosen at random. Indeed to refer, to the propositions for study by philosphers as 'examples' does them less than justice ; for it suggests that they might be replaced by other propositions without serious loss. But this is misleading. The propositions typically taken for discussion ; and as is usual in such matters, the tradition is to a large extent self-perpetuating one. The propositions in question are apt to strike the philosopher as particularly worth discussing partly for the reason that they have been already through a long past, a good deal discussed. There is also the further point that they have been presented

by , and discussed by, acknowledged authorities - the founders of religions, its prophets - or its great theologians. But the discussion would probably be justified by those who engage in it on the grounds that the propositions they discuss are in their subject matter important. And certainly, matters of life, love and death of eternal salvation or damnation and the like are matters of important.

The origin of beliefs are sometimes relevant to our assessment of its truth ; for instance if we thought - there was good reason to suppose someone's belief to be wishfully thinking or if someone were to assert something on the authority of another person notorious as a liar. Beliefs are not held in a cultural vacuum ; and not only is it the case that what people believe can not be isolated from what sort of people they are and sort of influences there have been upon them ; but neither can questions of truth always be so isolated. It is natural to want to say that from biographical or psychological facts about individuals nothing follows that can have a logical bearing upon questions about the existence or nature of God. But religion is a way of life and not just a set of beliefs ; and religious beliefs are neither fully intelligible nor easily to be labelled 'true' or 'false' in isolation from religion in all its aspects. And religious

experiences are of religious significance and not 'merely' biological or psychological significance. Indeed, that Christian mystical experiences are of Christian religious significance can hardly be denied, and it may well then seem over-intellectual to deny them, some logical relevance to religious belief ; for it is a particular application of the general assertion that beliefs are not held in a cultural vacuum that religious beliefs are not held in a religious vacuum.

CHAPTER - II

The Scope of religious Knowledge

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THE SCOPE OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

In the previous chapter we have dealt with the nature of religious belief and its classifications. In this chapter our attention will be on religious knowledge. Before explaining about religious knowledge, first attempt would be on the question what is epistemology are limits of human knowledge.

People believe there is religious knowledge. They believe that the sacred books of their religion contain knowledge or the beliefs of their religion gives the knowledge about men and the universe. They believe that these books contain wisdom to enlighten their action and to illuminede a way of life. They believe that religion can teach them things of great importance.

Here one question may arise that is religion true ? There can be no doubt religion means to be true. The religious man takes his religion seriously, as involving a true revelation of the character of the reality which is behind Phenomenn. He can not rest content with benevolent and picturesque lies or with a merely subjective feeling. He takes his religion not as a narcotic, but as a revelation of the real nature of things, so

far , at any rate, as the nature of things stands related to personal and social values.

Religion regards itself as a normal and healthy appreciation of the inner meaning of things in so far as they bear on human life.

If this is so, then is the mind of man capable of knowing ultimate reality ? Has it resources for grasping the nature of the suprasensible ? To answer this question is the task of that branch of metaphysics known as Epistemology, or the problem of the nature, origin, possibility and limits of human knowledge. It is impossible wholly to isolate the problem of knowledge from the problem of the nature of reality. They can not but overlap each other, for the views of the possibility and nature of knowledge will largely depend on the views of the nature of reality, and vice versa.

From the very early periods the thinkers have confidence in the competition of human reason as an instrument - in the discovery of truth. The philosopher like Plato, Aristotle among the ancients, Descartes Spinoza, and Hegel among the moderns do not recognize any gulf between thought and truth. For them in Spinoza's words -

"It is *prima facie*, of the nature of a thinking being to

frame true or adequate thoughts".¹

And the greatest triumphs of the human mind in science and philosophy has been inspired by this healthy truthfulness of thought in its own capacity for knowing the truth.

The faith in the competence of the mind to grasp the truth of things has not been allowed to pass unchallenged. In ancient Greece it was challenged by the Sophists and the Sceptics.

In modern times while knowledge of the Phenomenal world has made unparalleled progress, doubt or denial of the mind's capacity to know the reality behind phenomena has amounted to be a disease. Modern philosophy has been obsessed by the epistemological question. How can man get to know the world? The problem owes its origin in its acute form to the sharp distinction created by Descartes between the mind and body being conceived as two distinct substances. By his dualism of substances Descartes created a chasm between the knowing mind and the known world which philosophy has even since been trying to bridge.

It was English empiricism, beginning with Locke, that set thought on the path which led to scepticism as to the

1. Cited by E. Bosonquet - "the meeting of extremes in contemporary philosophy (1921) p. 82

possibility valid knowledge of reality. To empiricism of lockian type sense perception is the ultimate source of knowledge, and since sense perception can never lead us beyond particular facts to universal and necessary truths. For Hume universally valid knowledge is impossible what we know is not objective world but simply our own ideas.

For Locke the primary qualities (extension, motion, rest figure etc.) as inherent in the objects where as the secondary qualities (colour sounds, heat and cold etc) are not copies of things, but merely subjective sensations in us which erroneously ascribe to objects. After that Berkeley reduced the primary qualities into inner states of the mind, until there was nothing in the universe but mind and their ideas. This is known as subjective idealism or mentalism in its extreme form. Hume developed empiricism still further into radical scepticism, and resolved both the knowing mind and the known world into a succession of isolated impressions and ideas linked together by the mere habit of association. It is not depend on any universal and necessary truth. Impressions arise out of the unknown and give no ground for asserting anything of the real nature either of the self or of the world. Thus knowledge is completely dissociated from reality.

Kant finds in concrete experience, a synthesis of rational (transcendental) and empirical factors, yielding a knowledge, that is valid, indeed, within the phenomena on scientific sphere, but which is still incapable of penetrating beyond the veil to the suprasensible or "noumenal" world. Thus the subjectivity of knowledge remains, in as much as knowledge is conditioned by certain "a priori" forms and categories (space, time, causality) which have their origin in the mind itself, and can not be predicated of reality as such. Ultimate reality is forever concealed behind experience and is inaccessible to knowledge in the strict sense. We do not know the thing in itself we only know things as they appear to us.

In this process the knowledge develop from early period to modern times. But on the other hand, if we have look towards religious philosophers, the vital interest is the nature of knowledge and the validity which attaches to the knowing process. For there is a cognitive element in faith and it involves a claim to know.

The distinction between the facts of sense perception and the dream or memory image, and hard experience forced him to separate between what seemed to be and what truly was.

It is true that in experience we have a subject which knows and an object which is known. Both these two are

intimately related ~~one~~ to the other. The object involves data which are given to the mind and determine the content of knowledge in the mind. Data are only data because they are experienced facts. But the content of knowledge is a mental content entirely, it is the embodiment of mental activity. There is no way outside the circle of experience and from reality supposed to transcend experience there is no way to pass within it.

"Knowledge is determined from the side of the subject, and is made possible by the mind's activity."²

For Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, knowledge is not impressed on the mind by real objects which act upon it from outside. The mind is a close sphere to external impressions and thoughts moves within its own order.

From the rationalistic theory of knowledge certain theological inferences have been drawn.

The ideas of Plato were found to lead up to and receive their place and value through a Supreme ideas, the Idea of the God ; and this he certainly seems at times to identify with God. The forms of Aristotle culminated in a perfect form,

2. The Philosophy of religion - by G. Alloway, p. 277

free of material taint , and pure spirit or God, who transcends the world but moves it as object of desire. Descartes again, found that - God was necessary to guarantee the truth of our ideas of external nature, and Spinoza postulated substance or God to embrace in one whole the double orders of thought and extension.

Religious knowledge in the proper sense of the word, neither is nor claims to be the knowledge of scientific understanding men believes in their gods because they need them, not because they can understand or explain things through them. If scientific knowing is the only form of knowing, then of course religious knowledge is an illusion.

While insisting on the unitary character of knowledge, we must not ignore the fact that the unity of knowledge is a unity in difference. The case is not so simple as Henry Jones says -

"There is only one way of knowing".³

It we have see the scientific explanation is in fact, inapplicable in the case of a Being who transcends the external order of reality , and is not to be understood through it.

3. Henry Jones - A faith that enquires - (1922) ,p. 63,79

The atmosphere in which the religious spirit moves is one of reverence, and mystery, and in the clear and cold air of scientific explanation it can not breathe freely.

Theoretical explanation has grown out of the needs of life ; religion, too, is an out come of the needs of life, but the knowledge it aspires after is knowledge of a direct and personal kind.

Viscount Haldane recognize the truth that,

"Knowledge is not always of the same kind" that there are levels or degrees in knowledge which have relations to each other, but are not reducible to each other."⁵

Reality itself has many strata ; hence our knowledge of reality, if it is to be at all adequate must have its corresponding gradation. Each new level demands a new category which is not relevant to the lower levels. And so the categories must be capable of being arranged in a ascending or hierarchical

4. Philosophy of religion - by George Galloway, pp. 310-11

5. V. Haldance - The reign of relativity - 1921, pp. 130

order according to degree of complexity and approximation to the concrete universal. In this way we ascend from the plane of pure mathematics to those respectively of physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, ethics, aesthetics religion and each new step in the ascend reveals a new phase of reality which demands new and richer categories for the understanding of it. Each category has a claim to be regarded as valid and adequate within its own frame of reference.

In religion the value judgements have always been ^{and} primary central. In relation to himself, the religious man knows the object of his reverence first and foremost as a value. He seeks to know God as the Supreme Good - who satisfy the soul, rather than as the Being who explains the universe. This knowledge is practical ; it has its motive and is concerned with the working relations of the human spirit to the Divine. The judgements of faith express what God is for us, not what he is in himself so it implies that the spiritual insight is in terms of value ; it is personal through out the frait of faith which is prompted by inner needs of a spiritual person.

The religious consciousness moves in the realm of value.

Value-judgement presuppose and rest on a Supreme-value, and this plays an important part in defining religious world view and shaping the idea of religion.

Life and its meaning will always depend on what we conceive to be best and most important i.e. on our conception of value.

For all knowledge ought to subserve the realisation of the good, and, whether in its scientific or religious aspect, it has its goal in a complete and harmonious life. It does not depend on any authoritative value or any single principle. Religious knowledge unites harmoniously with other human activities in realising human good.

The religious consciousness is committed to a belief in the objectivity of values. It believes that the Supreme values of life are not mere human conventions pitted against the nature of things, but that the ultimate ground of things as revealed to us in the universe is akin to what we recognize as the highest and best in our own experience.

Now we have the point that there are two kinds of knowledge. Firstly of all, the matter of fact knowledge

of the world, and, secondly, the practical acquaintance or familiarity gained by experience and aided by sympathetic intuition and appreciation. Such acquaintance as is well exemplified in the relation friends to one another.

The intimate knowledge which friends have one of another is not the result of a process of reasoning or scientific research, but is based on mutual confidence and affection gained through practical experience and insight. It is different from scientific knowledge which is intellectual, impersonal and unemotional. It is not information about God acquired by a strict process of induction but an acquaintance with God accompanied by a strong emotional tone as in the case of human friendship.

The distinction between knowing about and having acquaintance with, a distinction expressed in some languages by the use of two different words corresponding to the one English word "to know", such as in German "wisser", and 'kennen' in French 'savoir'. In non the less deserves the name of knowledge provided it is sufficiently ratified by individual and social experience.

Some philosophers (specially the linguistic Philosophers)

argue that philosophical problems can be cured by linguistic therapy. For them the question that "Is their religious knowledge" is pseudo problem. By actual uses of the epistemic terms like 'know' and 'true' can be resolved. All of them depend upon context.

No one use is reducible to another, we do infact, speak of religious knowledge. The word has an intelligible application in religion. To be sure, the concept "knowledge" may not perform the same function or use in religion as it does in science. But it does have a legitimate use. Our perplexities concerning religious knowledge may stem from the assumption that the concept 'knowledge' has but one meaning or use. If we rid ourselves of this initial prejudice and simply look at the various uses this concept has in various areas of discourse, we can rid ourselves of our perplexities.

The view that "Is there religious knowledge?" can not be solved simply by describing the use or uses of the concept "knowledge".

The term 'knowledge' is honorific, and many people mistakenly apply it to beliefs which do not the application.

Implicit here is a prescriptive or persuasive definition of 'knowledge'. Some such definition - some set of criteria is implicitly or explicitly appealed to whom this is applied. Now need such a definition of arbitrary and philosophically pointless. It can be viewed as one of a series of distinctions which intelligent men have felt impelled to make over the centuries and which they have conceived of as a tool for philosophical clarification.

Now the thing is that whether a given cognitive sentence constitutes knowledge involves an appeal to criteria which function as a norm for the term 'knowledge' and the problem of justifying such criteria is that of justifying a norm.

"Professor James Oliver has recognised that criteria for the term "knowledge" function normatively. These criteria amount to a set of epistemological rules, and a given sentence is to be characterized as true (or given a certain degree of credibility), if it conforms to those epistemological rules. Oliver argues that criteria for the term "knowledge" or sets of epistemological rules are devised in order to answer the fundamental and central problem of epistemology, namely, "What statements should an individual believe ?" He puts the issue in the form of a question : "Why should one be interested

in distinguishing what is true from what is false except as a means of deciding what right to be believed."⁶

Professor Oliver does insist that not all sentences are assertions (or statements) and there must be some clear meaning for a statement before the question of believing it is considered at all. He also insisting further that a sentence having some clear meaning is logically prior conditions for the adoption of attitudes of belief or disbelief toward it.

Oliver points out that although Descartes, and the rationalists generally have advocated views involving only two attitudes of belief-complete certainty and complete disbelief. People can and do take a wide range of attitudes or degrees of beliefs towards statements. Thus one problem, important but subordinate to the central problem of epistemology ; is that of providing a useful scale of degrees of belief.

We have the comprehensive classifications, among analytic, synthetic, and self-contradictory statements, among

6. Jame W. Oliver. The Problems of Epistemology -
Journal of Philosophy- Vol. 57, No. 9 (1960).

universal, existential and singular statements, and among statements in various levels of language, Distinctions have been made among statements purporting to refer to abstract entities, and those purporting to refer to supernatural beings. A comprehensive classification of all statements is a problem preliminary to the solution of the central problem of epistemology.

We have classifications of cognitive religious sentences which includes descriptive sentences, predictive sentences, explanations, historical sentences, and autobiographical sentences. We can assume that there is a scale of attitudes (including the attitudes of belief, disbelief, no opinion, and other intermediate attitudes) which one may adopt which given cognitive religious sentence.

The question of whether there is religious knowledge, or take the phrase 'religious knowledge' to designate cognitive religious sentences toward which it is appropriate to adopt an attitude of belief.

Like cognitive religious sentences in different religions the beliefs and the claims to knowledge shows that they appear to offer knowledge about a great variety of general subjects.

In different religions we can find statements proposing knowledge about the following general topics, cosmology , theology, psychology, history, ethics, proper rituals, and devotions and proper attitude for living.

Cosmology deals with the origin, structure, development or purpose of the universe. Here God or Gods are responsible for the origin. But it is not necessary. Usually the evidence for such claims to knowledge is insight or revelation guaranteed by belief in the particular religion. Cosmological statements propose facts, true or false, about the universe.

"In the Upanishads of Hinduism we find the following statements : "The whole universe come forth from Brahman , and moves in Brahman". Brahman sees all, knows all, he is knowledge itself, of him are born cosmic intelligence, name form and material cause of all created beings and things. The entire book of the Upanishads known as "Prasna" is cosmology."⁷

Theological knowledge deals with the existence and nature of a god or gods and with the relations of a god to the world and man. We can find it in Upanishad also. In

7. Upanishads - p. 18

Upanishad, "The self is the omniscient Lord. He is not born. He does not die. He is neither cause nor effect. The Ancient one is unborn, imperishable, eternal, though the body be destroyed he is not killed.

Although the early Buddhism rejected theological knowledge, the latter Buddhism accepts the theological claims, for instance ; the universal mind alone is the Budha and the sentient beings, but sentient beings are attached to particular forms and so seek for outside it.

For historical knowledge the claims contained in the world religions have some special features that distinguish them from ordinary or scientific history. But the ethical claims to knowledge inform us about what is good and what is bad, right and wrong, our moral obligations, and also about the foundations of our values.

The claims to knowledge about attitudes or kinds of behaviour appropriate to some way of life. Such attitudes are often presented in an indirect or metaphorical manner and are often connected with statements belonging to one of the other subjects of knowledge.

Unlike the other claims to knowledge, they are abundant in all the world religions. Hinduism says, "Blessed are they

that choose the good, they that choose the pleasant miss the good". I have told you the secret knowledge. Austerity, self-controll, performance of duty without attachment what is called salvation is really continence. For through continence man is freed from ignorance. And what is known as the vow of silence, that too is continence. ~~For a man through continence~~ For a man through continence realizes the self and lives in quiet contemplation. Be self controlled. Be charitable. Be compassionate.

Christianity says: 'Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. Blessed are those who mourn, for they shall be comforted.

Psychological claims to knowledge about the nature of man are found in many of the world religions. They are usually presented to make plausible some view of survival of death, or mystical way, or ethical claims or attitudes for living. "Hinduism says, "The self-existent made the senses turn outward. According man looks toward what is without, and sees not what is within".⁸ "In four Noble-Truth of Buddhism 'Existence is unhappiness (painful). Unhappiness is caused by selfish craving. Selfish craving can be destroyed.

8. Upanishad - p. 20

It can be destroyed by following the eight fold path."⁹

"For Christianity and Judaism, a vast amount of practical information about human behaviour is contained in the proverbs of Solomon,"¹⁰ and much of this depends upon the knowledge of good and evil that man acquired from the fall of man.

Faith and Knowledge

According to Y. Masih

"Faith is a matter of acting, doing, and becoming and in an existential decision for a certain kind of life. It is only by risking our persons from one hour to another that we live at all. "A life lived according to its faith creates its own verification. Faith is not a matter of scientific or intellectual cogency, but is in perfect harmony with the task of living of rational creatures. Faith is a matter of conviction in relation to a convictor. It is not a cognitive affair."¹¹

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9. The Compassionate Buddha - p.28, p.30
 10. The Holy Bible, pp. 670-80
 11. The nature of Religious knowledge - Y. Masih.
Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy,
Visva-Bharati, Santiniketan - 1971.

Faith can not be said to be knowledge, because faith is belief and belief may or may not be rational, that is may be rational, irrational, a-rational and non-rational. John Hick regards "faith" to be cognitive in as much as he thinks that a faith-proposition concerning God is verifiable in terms of post-mortem experience and so-according to him one has the right to be sure. However, knowledge properly so called has some rational justification in its favour.

"Knowledge and faith alike subserve the struggle of the human spirit to its divine goal, and they should interact with one another in the cause of spiritual progress."¹²

Faith is neither purely theoretical nor purely practical, but something both in human life. It has middle position in human life.

The advocates of simplicity who seek to reduce faith to knowledge fail, for faith can not be absorbed in the theoretical process of knowing without losing its specific character. While the contents of faith are taken to be theoretically true, they are not reached by rational

12. Philosophy of Religion - by George Galloway, p. 333

inferences, but are maintained in a practical interest.

The specific objects of faith are primarily values, which evoke the affective life, and furnishes a centre around which the feelings gather. Faith embraces facts and their relations only insofar as they are involved in the values, and necessary to support them. In its full spiritual development it is a stable attitude of mind, and a response of the whole personality to the object. In this respect it differs decidedly from mere 'belief' or 'opinion' in the sense of Plato.

Faith, on the contrary, is an act of the spiritual and self-conscious person, who affirms the religious values, and God the Supreme Value to be essential to his own soul and to the meaning of the world. It is a movement of the self, conscious and free, which expresses the needs and states the postulates of the spiritual life. Faith is so conceived, is neither practical non-wavering, but speaks of full assurance and an abiding ideal.

Knowledge itself is stimulated by faith, and ends with faith in the ideal which has inspired its partial achievement. Faith again, in the interests of spiritual life goes beyond knowledge in order to find a final ~~value~~ value and meaning in the world.

In claiming theoretical validity for its object, faith admits its affinity with knowledge. Both movement issue from the living self as it reacts on the experienced world, and are complementary aspects of its purposive activity what is important to the one can not in the end be indifferent to the other.

Aquinas discusses faith in all its aspects in "Somma Theologica". For him, faith is a propositional attitude, that is to say, it consists in asserting to proposition. This is unambiguously stated and its implications unambiguously accepted, both by Aquinas and through out the Catholic tradition. He explains that "the thing known is in the knower according to the mood of the knower" and "the mood proper to the human intellect is to know the truth by composition and division", man's knowledge of God takes the form of knowing proposition about him, through God himself is of course not a proposition but the Supreme being.

Faith, say Aquinas, occupies a position between knowledge (scientia) and opinion (opinia) and accordingly falls on a common scale with them ; and since they are both concerned with propositions, so also is faith.

The propositions which faith believes or at any rate those that are of faith absolutely. From this it follows that faith is distinguished from scientia by a difference between their objects : the objects of scientia is such as to compel the assent of the human mind, whilst the object of faith is distinguished from opinion by the subjective or psychological difference that opinion is and faith is not accompanied by an inner feeling of doubt or uncertainty.

The main aspects of Aquinas doctrine of faith, its voluntary character follows naturally. Faith is belief which is not compelling evoked by its object but which requires an act of will on the believer part. Faith is a virtue precisely because it is not compelled. Faith is belief which is not coercively evoked by intrinsic evidence but which is produced by a voluntary adhesion to divine revelation.

So "faith" is employed both as an epistemological and as a nonepistemological term. The words "fides" and "fiducia" provide conveniently self explanatory labels for the two uses. We speak, on the other hand, of faith (fides) that there is a God and that such and such propositions about him are true. Here 'faith' is cognitively, referring to a state, act, or procedure which may be compared with standard instances of

knowing and believing. On the other hand, we speak of faith "fiducia" as a trust, maintained sometimes despite contrary indications, that the divine purpose toward us is wholly good and loving. This is a religious trust which may be compared with trust or confidence in an other human person.

The view of matter today, that, faith is unevidenced or in adequately evidenced belief. To quote a typical definition,-

"The general sense is belief perhaps based on some evidence, but very firm, or at least more firm, or/ and of more extensive content, than the evidence possessed by the believer rationally warrants."¹³

Reason itself is a matter of faith. The confidence of reason in itself as the faith which lies at the root of all knowledge.

In a unified and harmonious experience there can be no such antithesis between faith and knowledge. Religious faith must not claim special privileges in the sense of immunity from rational inquiry. It must be prepared to come out into the open and allow its tenets to be subjected to critical tests like any other hypothesis.

13. A Philosophical Scrutiny of religion - by C.J. Ducasse
(New York 1953)

We can identify faith with a set of beliefs in when the belief-in-demand some sort of behaviour in accordance with them. A religious faith will be set of beliefs-in about particular sorts of objects such that certain attitudes, that is disposition to behave, will be installed in the believes.

This view of faith differs from the view that faith is a way of knowing. When faith is taken as a way of knowing then all the old conflicts between faith and reason break out, both are making knowledge claims. In this view that faith does not depend upon the foundations of morality, non does it depend on any beliefs that certain absolute values are ingredient in the world.

CHAPTER - III

Religious Knowledge and Belief from
Linguistic Point of View

CHAPTER - III

RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF FROM LINGUISTIC

POINT OF VIEW

Before this we have discussed about religious knowledge. Here we are concerned on knowledge and belief in general and role of language towards religious knowledge in particular.

The problem concerning the distinction between knowledge and belief in the western tradition is as old as the western philosophy which began with the ancient Greek thinkers. The Greek word for 'knowledge' like the English, can either the faculty of knowing or that which is known. One task here is to define the faculty or function of knowing though, of course, it can not be defined without reference to its object. In order to determine whether a sensation or perception is a case of knowledge, we must first, it is generally supposed, see if it has fulfilled certain characteristics laid down for the purpose. According to Plato, for example "Knowledge in infallible and the objects of knowledge must be completely real and unchanging. These are the two marks of knowledge

assumed at the outset which any candidate for title must possess.¹

The whole knowledge can not be identified with sense-perception, as claimed by Protagoras for even the simplest and most common acts of knowledge contain elements of common terms. The common terms according to Plato are called 'Forms' or 'Ideas'.

Plato proceeds to show that perception even within its own sphere, is not knowledge at all. It has already been pointed out that even the simplest act of knowledge is not possible without some elements of 'Forms' which according to Plato, are the true objects of knowledge. Though perception has the first characteristic of infallibility in a sense, it can not apprehend the second characteristic of existence and truth. "Knowledge can not reside in the impressions, but in our reflection upon them."² Thus impression, that is, per-

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1. Plato's theory of knowledge. The Theaetetus and the Sophist (tr - with a running commentary by F. M. Cornford, Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd London - 1935, pp.28-29.
 2. Ibid, 186

perceiving has no part in apprehending truth without which there can be know knowledge. Hence Plato establishes that perception and knowledge can not possibly be the same thing.

According to Kant, empirical judgements are either 'of experience' or 'of perception'. He writes "Empirical judgements, so far as they have objective validity, are judgements of experience, but those which are only subjectively valid I name mere judgements of perception."³ He thinks that the judgements of perception requires no pure concept of the understanding. When one says "the room is warm" 'Sugar is sweet' we have such judgements of perception. Such judgements Kant thinks, refer merely to feeling and they hold good only for the perceiving subject without any reference to universal validity. When Plato criticises and rejects protagoras claim that "perception is knowledge, he seems to have anticipated such judgements of perception which Kant latter points out. Thus for both Plato and Kant such sense-perceptions can never have the status of knowledge proper.

Plato points out that true judgement or right opinion or true belief can not be called knowledge. Knowledge must be

3. Immanuel Kant - "Prolegomena to Any future metaphysics
(tr - by L.W. Beak, The liberal Arts Press Inc U.S.A.
1950, pp. 45-46)

full and complete understanding, rational comprehension, and not merely instinctive belief. It must be grounded on reason not on faith. Knowledge is always accompanied by a true account of its grounds, unshakable by perception and possessed by gods and only a few among men. True belief is produced by persuasion not based on rational grounds, and can be changed by persuasion, and is possessed by all mankind.

Further according to Plato, true belief accompanied by an account or explanation also can not be identified with knowledge.

Theaetatus points out that knowledge is of what is true, and that eternal and unchanging Form or Ideas are the objects of knowledge. Knowledge is thus distinguished from 'doxa' or belief which is directed to sensibles as its objects.⁴ Here the Plato's explicit assumption is that the fact that knowledge and doxa are distinguishable implies that their respective objects are distinguishable.

In the epistemological scheme of Plato 'knowledge' is knowledge of what is real ; it is an embodiment of first principles called Forms, whereas a 'right belief at best furnishes us with general fairly reliable guides which are as they

4. Norman Gulley - "Plato's theory of knowledge" - Methuen and Co. Ltd., London 1962, p. 61

stand, arbitrary and unrelated. Thus I.M. Crombie points out "So far, the relation between knowledge and belief is that when I know I grasp some reality, and when I have sound belief I grasp, or have in mind, something what Plato likens to an of that reality."⁵

In the 'simile' the contrast between seeing objects directly and seeing them only through their images or shadows is an analogous of the relationship between 'knowing' and 'believing'.

"Belief is thus a state in which what is present to the mind is not an objective reality, but a representation of this, namely, a proposition something that can be true or false. Knowledge is a state in which the objective reality itself is present to the mind."⁶

In essence Aristotle accepts Plato's account of knowledge, but he modified some important respects the distinction between knowledge and belief as drawn by Plato. For Aristotle knowledge in its universality relates to ideas ; it does not mean, as it does in Plato's formulation, that these ideas are ever given separately from the corresponding objects.

5. I.M. Crombie - 'Plato : The Midwife's Apprentice,' -
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London - 1964, p. 104

6. Ibid. p. 118

Aristotle points out that knowledge is not innate. As regard belief Aristotle like Plato suggests that belief can not be the same as knowledge. But his account of this distinction between the two is not based on different kinds of objects related respectively to belief and knowledge. For Aristotle what exists in any case is always the concrete objects, the concrete individuals, and all human cognitive acts of thought and judgement relate to these, directly or indirectly. He points out that, however, that, not all of these cognitive acts are of the same kind. They differ in respect of the degree of clarity involved regarding the understanding of the principles and causes in each case, which in its turn is guided by human consideration of purpose at the moment.

Besides Plato's and Aristotle's distinction of knowledge and belief, the two schools namely empiricism and rationalism answers the question i.e. "What is knowledge?" in their own respects.

On a closer examination the empiricist thesis in general that all our concept and knowledge from sense perception can not be entertained. Kant has no doubt about the contention that all our knowledge begins with experience. "But though all our knowledge begins with experience 'Kant points out it does not follow that it all arises out of experience."⁷

7. Kant - 'Critique of pure Reason' -(tr. N.K. Smith)
Macmillan , London 1933 , B 1.

The rationalists contend that the human understanding or intellect is the only faculty of our knowledge of objects. The concept of the understanding or 'truths of reason' are considered to be far superior to any truths grounded in sense-perception. In Plato's metaphysical epistemology, e.g. knowledge proper entirely belongs to the realm of reason completely detached from the senses. However, in reality the concepts of understanding alone can not furnish all the objects of knowledge.

In ultimate analysis, the conflict between rationalism and empiricism is sought to be reduced to the traditional dichotomy of propositions into (a) analytic 'a priori' propositions and (b) Synthetic a posteriori propositions. If such a dichotomy is taken for granted as absolute then empiricism and rationalism have much to claim as they do.

For Kant, the phenomenon of knowledge can be satisfactorily explained only if it should be both synthetic and apriori at the same time Kant's concern is with a priori Synthetic knowledge.

As regards belief, Kant's treatment is not so exhaustive. To hold that a thing is true is an occurrence in our understanding. It may rest on objective grounds, but it requires subjective causes in the mind of the individual who

makes the judgement. Such a judgement may be valid for everyone and its ground may be thus objectively sufficient. This Kant calls 'conviction'. On the other hand, if it has its grounds only in the special character of the subject, it is entitled 'persuasion'. Persuasion is a mere illusion, because the ground of the judgement, which is solely the subject is regarded as objective. Such a judgement has only private validity. Conviction has the possibility of communicating it and of finding it to be valid for all human reason.

The holding of a thing to be true, or the subjective validity of the judgement in its relation to conviction, Kant, thinks has three degrees namely, opining, believing, and knowing. Opinion is such holding of a judgement which is consciously insufficient both objectively and subjectively. In case of belief, however, our holding of the judgement is subjectively sufficient but objectively insufficient. Lastly, when the holding of a thing to be true is sufficient both subjectively and objectively, it is case of knowledge. This perhaps paves the way for many latter thinkers who maintain the view that the difference between knowledge and belief is one of degree only.

So the problem of knowledge and beliefs is one of the most baffling problems of philosophy which has since the

dawn of philosophy itself provoked the thought of many philosophers. In Modern philosophy G.E. Moore's explanation may in the main be considered to be a faithful representation of the common sense view of knowledge and belief. Though Moore is primarily concerned with an analysis of belief in general his theory is intended to explain the difference between true beliefs and false ones. In Moore's language it can be stated as "To say of this belief that it is true would be to say of it that the fact to which it refers is ... while to say of it that it is false is to say of it that the fact to which it refers simply is not."⁸

Every belief true or false two constituent elements can always be distinguished, namely, the act of belief and the object of belief or what is believed. An object of belief is also sometimes called a proposition.

In one of his early writings Moore explains the case of a belief as an attitude of the mind towards some proposition. According to this account he divides absolutely all contents of the universe into two classes, namely, propositions on the one hand and things which are not propositions on the other. One very striking feature in Moore's

8. G.E. Moore - "Some main problems of Philosophy".

George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London - 1955, pp.255-56.

analysis is the implication that belief is always an attitude of the mind. Every belief whether it be true or false always has an object which may be called a proposition and the belief simply consists in having this proposition before the mind in one particular way in being conscious of it in the peculiar attitude which we call 'believing'.

On the positive side of Moore's theory, he discussing the nature of belief in its relation with imagination and knowledge. Some thinkers maintains that the difference between 'belief' and 'imagination' is merely one of degree. John Laird expresses a view which is almost similar to it when he remarks "The upper limit of opinion, in this sense, is belief (on something very near it)."⁹

In imagination two alternatives one may have the attitude of belief to the one and may not have the same attitude to the other. But this only means, it is printed out, that the difference simply consists in the fact that he imagines in the former more strongly and more vividly.

So writes Hume "... that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed

9. John Laird - "Knowledge, belief and opinion".
The Century Co., London - 1930, p. 167

to the latter, and not to the former ..."¹⁰ Thus he points out that the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination.

For Moore knowledge is belief plus something else ; to know something is to believe it together with something else. Some Philosophers like H.A. Prichard¹¹, on the other hand maintain such a different view according to which 'to believe' and 'to know' are two such things exclusive of each other as if they are in two different watertight compartments. Like Moore, Malcolm takes points to refute the stand point of Prichard and thereby to reinstate the ordinary usage of 'know' and belief in which the two words are used interchangeably.

Another aspect of Moore's theory of belief is concerning the truth-value of a belief. Moore has clearly recognized a difference between knowledge and belief in respect of both degree and kind. On an analysis in every case of knowledge a corresponding belief of it seems to be present. This is all

10. Hume - Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of morals. Oxford University Press, London, 1957, p. 48

11. H.A. Prichard - "Knowledge and perception" Clarendon Press, Oxford 1950, pp. 58-91

that is generally presupposed in the treatment of knowledge and belief and their relation. In spite of the various explanations given by different thinkers the problem of knowledge and belief still remains, if possible to be resolved. However, it is at least clear that believing and knowing are not terms to be treated as contrary terms, or as two poles apart rather they are to be treated as correlates. Alice Ambrose points out that "the correct usage of 'believing' entails the logical possibility of knowing what is believed."¹²

It is a fact that in our common sense usage we never necessarily make belief assertion either to the exclusion of or in opposition to a knowledge assertion thereof. Thus in a belief statement there is always the logical possibility of a knowledge statement. In our common sense usage when we have a knowledge statement, we seldom take into account the corresponding belief assertion. If, however, one is questioned about the implication of such a belief statement in his established knowledge statement, he would perhaps, undoubtedly entertain the actuality of the belief statement. Moore also seems to hold

12. (The) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science -
pp. 395-417.

such a view.¹³ Such an implication of the actuality of a belief statement by a knowledge-statement has very little, practically nothing to do with our common sense ; it is rather a linguistic issue, a matter of analysis.

Now we come to Russell's view on this point. Russell discuss the problem i.e. knowledge and Belief from a purely analytical standpoint. In some content Russell employs the word 'belief' in a very wide sense thereby maintaining no clear distinction between belief as such on the one hand and knowledge proper on the other. In his essay 'Belief' Russell maintains that the whole intellectual life consists of beliefs, and of the passage from one belief to another by what is called reasoning.¹⁴

In Moore's account belief as such is not clearly disentangled from his account of true and false beliefs. But in Russell's analysis there is an attempt to analyse belief as such free from true and false beliefs. He writes "Thus although truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs yet they

13. Moore - "Some Main Problems of Philosophy" - George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London - 1953, p. 274

14. Russell -(The) Analysis of mind, George Allen Unwin Ltd. London - 1921, pp. 231-52.

are in a sense extrinsic properties, for the condition of the truth of a belief is something not involving beliefs, or (in general any mind at ; but only the objects of belief. A mind which believes truly when there is a corresponding complex not involving the mind, but only its objects.¹⁵

Wittgenstein in the Tractatus an account of knowledge in some form or other can be traced to the authors thesis of language and meaning and sense. In his 'Introduction' to Wittgenstein's "Tractatus", Russell points out that Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language. The whole function of language is to have meaning, and it only fulfills this function in proportion as it approaches to the ideal language. And it is also widely maintained that Wittgenstein sums up his perplexing philosophy in his oft-quoted epigram "All philosophy is 'Critique of language' "¹⁶

According to him, a critique of language, that is, a correct of language, is the only means to resolve all the

15. Russell - "(The) Problems of Philosophy", Oxford University Press - London -192 , p.129

16. L. Wittgenstein -"Tractatus Logico Philosophicus"
(tr. C.K. Ogden) Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London -
1922 ; 4.0311

problems of traditional philosophy. He says "most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters, are not false, but senseless. We can not therefore answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. Here Wittgenstein concern is with language that is, factual language. He lays much emphasis on the analysis of language because for him the structure of language is a clue to the structure of reality or the world.

Language and reality are supposed to have the same logic from the formal or structural point of view. Language as a representation or picture of reality has something novel which deserves our attention.

The 'Tractatus' is solely concerned with factual propositions leaving the propositions of religion and ethics out of its scope. A proper and rigorous analysis of language, according to Wittgenstein, leads us to his elementary propositions as the ultimate components of all factual propositions.

So far from Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' is that knowledge is the understanding of the sense of a proposition which truly

represents a fact. This view is quite in conformity with one very important criterion of knowledge which is generally accepted by almost all philosophers, namely, that knowledge must be true.

For Wittgenstein knowledge seems to belong to those propositions which truly represent existent or actual atomic facts. Such a contention would be true only if it could be shown that in respect of true propositions Wittgenstein is able to draw a distinction between 'knowledge' and 'belief'.

Here we can find the difference between traditional philosophy of Plato and the logical atomism. For Plato belief and knowledge have different objects which are ultimate. Thus for Plato the objects of sense are objects of belief and the Forms or Ideas are objects of knowledge or wisdom, and these objects are in a way ultimate.

Russell and Wittgenstein do not maintain such ultimate objects. Though our knowledge is knowledge of atomic facts, these atomic facts are far from being ultimate in the sense that they have objects as their constituents.

The contribution of Wittgenstein to contemporary Philosophy, however, is of immense value. It has rightly emphasized the

need for a proper analysis of our language as a way to a clear understanding of the world. He writes "The object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. The result of philosophy is not a number of philosophical propositions but to make propositions clear."¹⁷ Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' has paved the way for ordinary language philosophy.

According to some thinkers "analysis" is a kind of paraphrase, a translation from a less explicit to a more explicit form. But Wittgenstein thinks that the philosopher's real task is not to correct or return our ordinary language, but to endeavour to understand the various language-games. And to understand our language is no longer to know what it pictures but what it means, that is, what usage it has what it does, what purpose it serves, and what work it performs.¹⁸

The 'Philosophical Investigation' points to the really innumerable functions which the various words and sentences of our language perform. It is sometimes not at all easy to say

17. Wittgenstein - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (tr G.K. Ogden) Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. London - 1922, p. 4.112

18. Wittgenstein - Philosophical Investigation (tr G.E.M. Anscombe, Macmillans Co., New York 1953, p. 264

exactly what function a particular sentence performs. Hence there is always the possibility of sentences and other utterances being misunderstood. It pointed out that if there were no possibility of misunderstanding there would be no philosophy.

The idea of language-game as a logical experimental apparatus, then emerges as a mechanism of meaning clarification. It obviously does not seek to give or find any definition of meaning, but reveals experimentally how we go about understanding or misunderstanding it actually in our use of linguistic expressions. This is the reason why Wittgenstein is concerned with expressions and locutions like 'having the same meaning' changing its meaning, etc. rather than with meaning as such. All this Wittgenstein sums up in his formula "the meaning of a word is its use in language".¹⁹

This semantic or linguistic approach can not be treated as independent theories to account for knowledge and belief

19. Ibid. p. 43

though they seem to be in sharp and irreconcilable conflict.

Upto now we are discuss about knowledge and belief by different thinkers. So far as religious belief and knowledge is concerned the linguistic analyst eliminate it. Or in otherwords the sole aim of the linguistic analysis in the begining was directed towards the elimination of metaphysics but that had its concomitant repercussion on theology and religion as well, because these also have the ontological basis.

The founders of the analytic movement - Moore and Wittgenstein did not think it necessary to devote fully to the problem of the meaning of religious language. Moore devoted only one passage to the problem of the existence of God and being embarassed by the question failed to decide whether belief in God is an article of "commonsense" or not.

Wittgenstein in his 'Tractatus' made the question to be closed one, for, according to him, the notion of God as a being outside "the limits of the world" is bound to

be nonsensical.

The linguistic analysis movement broaden the scope of philosophy. Philosopher's are concerned not only with propositions but also with sentences which express emotions and volitions. Language has been considered as a 'game' which is multiple in nature, and no limit can be put to such games a priori, because the number of games depends upon the 'moves' taken on the functions performed by sentences, which are infinite and indefinite in number. Since language as such has become the subject matter of philosophy, it includes not only the metaphysical language but all sorts of language-moral, aesthetics, religious, theological and also the language of science, history and law.

The study of language has been considered of prime importance due to various reasons. In the first, it has been found that language is the first and direct object of knowledge.

§ 9-18 80? Whatever we learn, we learn in/through language. Secondly, for all meaningful communications conceptual clarity is essential. Language in order to be intelligible and significant should not

only fulfil the conditions of syntax but also of Semantics and Pragmatics. Thirdly, it has been urged that the question of meaning can be determined and decided through the analysis of language. Fourthly, the study of language is important also because it is generally prone to be misunderstood, confused and misused. According to Ryle, there are many expressions which are "systematically misleading",²⁰ and which create confusion.

Wittgstein also observes, that most questions and propositions result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. It is a merit of Russell's to have shown that the apparent logical form of the proposition need not be the real form'.

Language disguises thought and creates confusions, pseudo problems, and puzzlement. According to Russell : -

"Everything is vague to a degree you do not realize till you have tried to make it precise, and everything precise is

20. Ryle - "Systematically misleading expression" in Logic and language (ed) Antony Flew 1st series (Oxford, Basil, Blackwell 1952).

so remote from anything , we normally think, that you can not for a moment suppose that is what we really mean when we say what we think".²¹

Analysis, thus, becomes a necessary and legitimate activity. Most questions and puzzlements are due to the misuse of concepts and misunderstanding of the logic of language. It is necessary to understand the logic of language.

The analysts hold that philosophical questions are different from scientific questions. While scientific questions are genuine factual questions, philosophical questions are only the conceptual middles. Philosophical puzzlements have their root in conceptual confusion and misunderstanding of the logic of language. As Wittgenstein remarks "Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday."²²

21. Russell - "Monist" - 1918, p. 498, quoted by Brand Blanshard, Reason and Analysis (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962) p. 128

22. Wittgenstein - Philosophical Investigation (Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1953) , p. 19

The recent trend in philosophy has its wide repercussions on Theology and Religion. The thesis of the meaningfulness of the theological and religious assertions is chiefly due to the introduction of this new method of linguistic analysis in philosophy. The analysts have urged that linguistic analysis is highly relevant to Theology and Religion, because it can put an end to many controversies and perplexities arising in the theological and religious problems are only pseudo-problems having their origin in the misuse of concepts and confusion of language 'language-games'.

If we look towards linguistic analysis, then it had some inherent difficulties and discrepancies of its own. The analysts want to remain confined only to the language scheme, and they do not want to make any metaphysical commitment. But, in fact, language is not a self-sufficient and self-complete system. It can not exist in the void. It must, at least, refer to the analyst who has to make analysis. Language can not analyse itself. It must involve a conscious agent to make analysis of sentences and to look into their organization and function. The meaning does not show off itself. It always

relates to the agent who understands the meaning.

Further it should be acknowledged that there is a circular process involved in analysis. For the analysis of some words and expressions (say A) we use other words (say B,C,D etc.) which remain unanalysed. Again for analysing B,C,D, etc. we may take help of another words and infinitum or one may come again to use the first one (i.e. A) which we aimed to analyse. This will involve circular process.

Language-schemes form a heirarchy : there are different level language-games. For e.g. ,when a common man describes the physical universe, his description is quite different from that of the scientists. Scientific language-game may appear quite different from the common sense language -game because of the difference in language strata. Language assumes many layers because of the difference in the unit of description. While the ordinary man takes a particular object to be ~~the~~ unit, the scientist takes the units of force to be the unit. It is this difference that makes language-multi-layered.

Further, religious language-game is also different from the scientific one because science are concerned only with phenomena, where as religion is concerned with the noumenon or the ground

of phenomena. In other words, the sphere of science is the sphere of Becoming, where as the sphere of religion is the sphere of Being. The sphere of Becoming is a series of conditional and relative events forming causal series. The Being underlies this chain of events and transcends unconditionality and relativity, and is the realm of the Absolute.

According to the Logical atomists the language pictures facts. Here, a statement is meaningful if it denotes some fact. The meaning of a word or statement consists in what it denotes 'what a picture represents is its sense'.

is it so?

The Sphere of science and religion are different. Science can simply give knowledge of fact, but it can not say anything about right and wrong, good and evil. It is the province of ethics and religion. Religion does not involve any knowledge, it involves only affection and conation. So, the logical atomist's view of religion can be described as "morality touched with emotion", - a definition give by, Mathew Arnold.

The essence of religion according to Russell, consists in worship, acquiescence and love.²³

23. "The essence of religion", First published in the Hibbert Journal Vol. II, Oct. 1922 : Reprint in the Basic writings of Bertrand Russell.

While these words have a dogmatic basis and a supernatural reference in the institutional religions, they have been given ethical meaning by Russell. Knowledge, goodness and love are the chief marks of religion. Russell calls 'good life' to be the religious life. "The good life is inspired by love and guided by knowledge. Knowledge and love are both indefinitely extensive ; therefore, however good a little may be, a better life can be imagined. Neither love without knowledge, nor knowledge without love can produce a good life"²⁴

The later Analysts themselves have rejected the dichotomy of analytic-synthetic propositions. With the recognition of the multiplicity of language-games, it is realized that certain expressions may not fall within the dichotomy of analytic-synthetic, and still have meaning because they have their function. It is largely true for religious expressions. They may not fall within this dichotomy and still have meaning because they may have their use. Religious assertions evoke 'discernment' and the consequent emotion and volition. When the teacher say "That thou art to his disciple, that evokes a 'discernment' in him.

24. Russell "What I belief" in the Basic Writtings of
Bartrand Russell - p. 372

Language has been conceived as a form of life and it
has been characterized as a game. The conception of language
 as a game has the following implications :-

(1) Words are merely the tools which can be used in several ways and as such, they can have several meanings. The meaning of a word is not fixed, rather it changes from game to game. The same concept can assume different meaning in different games owing to its different functions. Thus every statement has its own logic! If words do not have any fixed meaning, it is not possible to assume a priori what is the meaning of a particular concept without looking into its use or the job it is performing in any language-game. As Blanshard puts it :-

"The analytic slogan do not assume in advance that what you mean will fall into any preconceived categories at all. Do not prejudge what you mean by assumptions as to what the world must be like. Let each statement speak for itself; it may have its own kind of meaning, and that kind of meaning its own logic. The key to these varieties of meaning is language. Only through the nuances of language can we explore the manifold content of idea, impulse, and feeling that human being can express.²⁵

(ii) Any concepts and expressions have diverse functions, there can be countless language-games. No limit can be fixed a priori to the number of such games. Thus, we can not say, now, with the logical positivists that all meaningful assertions must fall within two categories, analytic and synthetic. The meaning of any assertion is determined by its function and an assertion can have innumerable functions. Through language one can describe facts, ask questions, issue commands, make requests, express emotions, and evaluate things and so on.

(iii) As every statement has own logic and has its own functions, one language-game is not to be confounded with other language-games owing to their superficial resemblance. The analysts are opposed to the paradigmatic use of words. One expression should not be taken as the model or paradigm for all other expressions because the meaning of the expressions varies in language if one game is confused with the other game. Ryle calls it "category mistake", "Category mistake" consists in combining concepts of different categories or logical type".²⁶

26. Ryle - "Category" 1938 Reprinted in logic and language series (ed) A.N. Flew (Oxford, Basil, Blackwell) 1953.

(iv) As a word or an expression is a tool, it has no significance in itself. Its meaning is determined by the rules of game. Moreover, the meaning of a word is to be determined within the language game itself not by reference to any extra linguistic or universal fact. For e.g. whether a word means a particular or universal is to be known by the way it has been used in any language-game. In the 'Tractatus' Wittgenstein held that the meaning of a word is 'particular' but in the 'Investigations' he held that the word has no meaning apart from the language-game. The meaning of a word is neither particular nor universal in itself. It is particular when used in the sense of particular and universal when used to mean the universal.

Language game is only possible if one trusts something, it is not "can trust something". The question of 'trust' or reliance is elsewhere linked in to the idea of a "system" of beliefs.

This account of trust and its connection with a system of beliefs and activities are clearly illuminating suggestions about how religious beliefs work for a person and in a community Wittgenstein remarks on how a child "learns to believe a host of things i.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs (and so) forms a system of what is believed ... Such an account

It is this last which allows the religious community continuity on different levels, with the larger non-religious community. It allows it to seem and indeed be part, if not wholly one, with the larger form of life, while maintaining, for its followers its own unique forms.

So religious persons may be scientists technicians, military officers, and politicians, even philosophers apparently without essential conflict. Although Wittgenstein often talks about religious beliefs as if they are the beliefs of individuals, in fact, as his appeal to "system" shows, he is talking about a community of believers for whom the one distinctive language-game may be expressive of a unique way of life, without denying the claims of other language-games.

One may argue that implied in the diversity and multiplicity of religious beliefs is the basis for validating and relativizing the truth of every religious belief adhered to and practiced by any primitive, traditional, or contemporary religion. Further more, one may also argue that a Wittgensteinian view of religious belief would seem to imply a similar validation and relativization of the truth of religious beliefs, since it recognizes a plurality of religious forms

fits accurately the way religious beliefs are taught and supported in religious communities. What Wittgenstein says about beliefs, generally applies then to systems of religious beliefs. 'All testing, all confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypotheses takes place already within of a system. And this system is not a more or less arbitrary and doubtful point of departure for all arguments : it belongs to the essence of what we call an argument. The system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life.'

Religious beliefs do not function the way we like to view the workings of ordinary empirical claims. There is not that cognitive posture of studied, in principled, indifference to the truth or falsity of particular propositions that characterises the ideally disengaged investigator of empirical matters. Propositions within religious systems are not allowed easily to be confronted or even challenged by empirical matters ; rather empirical matters are more likely to be tested or viewed under their rubric. The vitality of a system of belief is just its capacity to confront all aspects of the world in a special interpretation for the community that employs its distinctive language game. Thus, in turn, is tried to many other beliefs not distinct to the religious community.

of life which must be accepted. However, whether or not a Wittgenstein view of religious belief does imply the alleged validation and relativization is an issue that depends largely on our understanding and discovering of some significant aspects of the depth grammar indicative of a particular religious beliefs. Whether the religious belief in question is Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Samoan or Taoist, it is necessary to make a Wittgenstein analysis of some significant aspects of the depth grammar of religious beliefs in practice.

In order to understand what is meant by the "depth grammar"²⁷ of religious belief, it is helpful to relate the "depth grammar" of religious belief to its "surface grammar"²⁸. By the surface grammar of religious belief, we mean the recognizable way in which a constructed or uttered sentence, expressive of a religious belief, looks like in written language or sounds like

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27. Wittgenstein - "Lectures and conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious belief, ed - Cyril Barret (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1967) pp. 56,63
28. Wittgenstein - Philosophical Investigation - by G.E.M. Anascomle (New York 1968), p. 168

in spoken language. By the depth grammar of religious belief we mean the particular use made of picture projected by an accepted religious belief in conjunction with certain circumstances and surroundings what people want to picture with their religious beliefs are new ways of life and new attitudes towards his life, and the life after death, all of which will require a new language and new ways of communicating.²⁹ Unlike the surface grammar of religious belief, the depth grammar is shown by a personal commitment to a way of acting that is characterized by the willingness to live by one's convictions without the fear of death. Moreover, unlike the surface grammar of religious belief, the depth grammar requires not only linguistic and speech acts. It also requires, if not more so, pragmatic acts that can bring about the intended effects pictured by the accepted religious beliefs.

From Wittgensteinian perspective we would fail to understand the depth grammar of religious beliefs if we are predisposed to explain religious beliefs as "testable hypothesis". It is the view that our religious beliefs as

29. Englemann, Paul - "Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a memoir, tr - L. Furtmuller (Oxford 1967) p. 135

"unshakable conviction", whose acceptance need not be based on testing for their truth or plausibility. Viewed as unshakable convictions, our religious beliefs can and do change, regulate, and guide a person's whole life, even to the point of risking everything including his life. We can see that it is part of the depth grammar of our religious beliefs that they become demonstrable as unshakable convictions which have the potential to guide, change, and regulate our lives daily.

There are four significant aspects crucial to understanding the depth grammar of religious beliefs in practice. Given that the depth grammar of religious beliefs is shown by an accepted practice in connection with particular circumstances and surroundings, it is an essential and integral part of the depth grammar of religious beliefs. The four aspects are as such :-

(i) Religious beliefs in practice are not propositions which we can contradict by affirming or denying the opposite. By virtue of their non-contradictory status, religious beliefs cannot be justifiably viewed as testable hypotheses whose truth can be affirmed and/or denied, since neither their truth nor their falsity is in question. Religious

beliefs can not be contradicted because people, be they religious believers or not, tend to think in entirely different ways in which people think may and can prevent them from having the thoughts that are normally associated with certain religious beliefs.

(ii) The second aspect, we do not mean to imply that our religious beliefs are lacking in reasonability or are opposed to acceptable standards of rationality. What we mean to convey is that the connections and pictures depicted by our religious beliefs are imaginable and realizable in a non-reasonable, flexible, dynamic mode of operating that is not amenable or limited to the reasonable unreasonable dichotomy.

(iii) The third aspect, we are reminded that the demonstration of religious beliefs through commitment and action is not contingent on some supporting grounds with the guarantee of epistemological certainty or high probability. Rather our religious beliefs become exemplified in the ungrounded way we do act and live our lives daily. What this aspect shows is a non-epistemological dimension implicit in our unshakable convictions beyond which there are further grounds to which we can meaningfully appeal for an endless justification of our religious beliefs.

(iv) The fourth aspect, we have in mind the picturing

of new spiritual attitudes and new ways of life, all of which are describable and showable through learning and using a new language in connection with possible ungrounded ways of acting for believers to change and fulfil their lives under specific circumstances with this aspect, our religious beliefs are equipped, with a future oriented dimension which points to the possibility of adopting new religious beliefs that would project new attitudes, new values, and new lifestyles.

From these above implications Wittgensteinian view is defensible in two ways. Stated positively, it is defensible provided that religious beliefs are viewed depth-grammatically as unshakable convictions with the potential to bring about some describable life-changing actions and life fulfilling effects on the part of believers. Negatively, it is defensible when religious beliefs are not view as testable hypothesis whose truth and status can not be countered or contradicted with an opposite verdict. This negative way of making our Wittgensteinian view defensible seems to show a phenomenological suspension of what may be called the dialectical or normative stance in our Wittgensteinian view of religious beliefs. Accordingly, instead of imposing hypothetical explanations and terminal justifications, religious beliefs are to be acknow-

ledged and described for their meaning and value as they are embodied and shown in each believer's practice and way of acting and living.

Although Wittgensteinian view may be only partly but not fully defensible. On the one hand, the alleged whole sale validation and relativization is due largely to viewing our religious beliefs as testable hypothesis, which consequence can be eliminated by viewing depth-grammatically religious beliefs as unshakable convictions which give rise to non-contradictory non-reasonable, ungrounded ways of acting and living. On the otherhand, the descriptive emphasis of our Wittgensteinian view is made methodologically compatible with the undeniable diversity and multiplicity of religious beliefs by curtailing any attempt to subject one-sidedly to an indiscriminate scrutiny or ethnocentric speculation the life changing and life fulfilling potential of other peoples religious beliefs, rituals, and practices in which no counter judgement or normative assessment is appropriate and called for.

In this chapter we have come through, knowledge and belief in general and Religious beliefs from linguistic point of view in particular. Here although Wittgenstein talks about religious belief as individual and in his appeal to "system" he deals with the community of believers where every language game has express a unique way of life. In next chapter our concerned will be towards religious belief, and its role in life and functions of language-game elaborately.

CHAPTER - IVReligious belief and Functions
of Language

A philosophical movement is a group of philosophers, active over at least one or two generations, who more or less share a style, or an intellectual origin. They who have learned more from each other than they have from others, though they may, and often do, quite vigorously disagree among themselves.

The very name, logical positivist is by welcome to some, though it is still and quite reasonable applied to all, particularly from the outside. They all accept linguistic turn wittgenstein initiated in the 'Tractatus'.

They have disagreements because they interpret and develop it in their several ways.

Yet they are all under its spell hence their common style. Thus, if names in themselves were important, it might be better to choose linguistic philosophy or philosophy of language.

For another, there is strictly speaking no such thing as the philosophy of language. Language may be studied by philologists, aestheticians, and scientists such as psychologists or sociologists. To bring these studies thoughtfully

together is well worth while. Customarily such synoptic efforts are called philosophy. There is no harm in this provided they are not mistaken for what they are not, namely technical philosophy. Rather than being philosophers are therefore, philosophies through language ; they philosophize by means of it. But then, everyday who speaks uses language as a means or tool. The point is that, the positivists, newly conscious of it, use it in a new way. Contemporary philosophy is distinguished from philosophy in the past by its intense concern with language and meaning. This concern has take different forms. The logical positivists offered one account of the meaning of "meaning", and one programme for clarifying language. The philosophical analyses, under the influence of the wittgenstein of the "philosophical investigations", offer a different account and a different programme. Philosophers in both these traditions have analyzed and attempted to clarify a number of areas of discourse - the language of ethics, politics, science, metaphysics and aesthetics.

Earlier the positivist had written off religion and theology as being in large part factually meaningless or noncognitive. Philosophical analysts, however, have introduced new and challenging discussions which emphasizes a careful analysis of the uses or functions of religious concepts

and statements in the content of their use.

Both of the logical positivists and the analysts who follow the latter Wittgenstein agree that there are many uses of words in religious discourse which purport to communicate information, but which do not, uses of words which are misuses, or, which really convey only nonsense. The problem for these analysts is that of formulating a way of deciding whether a particular use of words is power or not, and whether it has factual significance or not.

The central figure in the movement of linguistic analysis is undoubtedly Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). Wittgenstein develops the tentative and informal ideas of Moore and Russell on the function of analysis into a systematic position so that with him it is possible to speak, for the first time, of a philosophy of analysis.

The method of the logical positivists rests upon an arbitrary (and metaphysical) assumption that only empirically verifiable propositions fulfil the logical conditions for meaningfulness. But Wittgenstein claims that his criterion of meaning rested upon a purely formal or logical examination of the structure of language. "Nonsense", so

he claims arises through attempting to think outside the limits of language" and to say what can not be said in language. This means that philosophy in the traditional sense the investigation of the ultimate principles of thought and "reality" - is nonsense. The sole task of philosophy is a negative or critical one - "the logical clarification of thoughts".

If this is so, even any attempt to express philosophical theology is outside the "limits of language" and to say what cannot be said.

However Wittgenstein does not in the "Tractatus" exclude the concept of God as being meaningless in the strict sense, or in the sense in which the Logical positivist were to exclude any talk about God and the religious order as "nonsense". Thus, in some obscure and ambiguous remarks in the latter part of the 'Tractatus', he says 'God does not reveal himself in the world - so, it would seem, precluding any possibility of a "proof" of a transcendental God based upon a consideration of the properties of the things in the world.

Wittgenstein denied the possibility of a speculative natural theology it seems that he thought that the possibility

of God and religion could perhaps best be shown through certain moral experiences such as the awareness of sin and guilt and personal insufficiency.¹

Wittgenstein attempted to formulate a logically perfect language which contains vague and ambiguous symbols, is inaccurate. The philosopher's function is that of constructing an ideal language in which ambiguity and inaccuracy are precluded.

For Wittgenstein philosophical problems result from linguistic or conceptual confusion. For him philosophy becomes a kind of therapy, a way of leading one out of conceptual and linguistic confusions.

So this above method of analysis have been applied in number of areas. However, philosophical analysis have turned their attention to the language of religion. The positivist had simply dismissed religion and theology as a whole, or neatly placed it in the realm of non-cognitive. Contemporary analysis, however are beginning to examine in great detail theological concepts and religious utterances.

1. Philosophy of Religion - ed. by George L. p. 150

Alfred and Thomas A. Longford
(The Macmillan Company - New York.

Colleins Macmillan Limited - London.

Religious discourse does in fact puzzle a number of people. The analyst attempts to rid us of these puzzles and help us understand religious language. Efforts have not been directed toward a translation of religious statements into equivalent statements - the method of substitution.

For this, emphasis has been in the direction of trying to understand religious claims by examining in detail the entire context of religious discourse, the way in which religious utterances function.

To understand the functions of religious locutions, it will be better by passing through Wittgenstein Pluralistic theory of meaning. Wittgenstein develops what might be called a "pluralist" theory of meaning. Thus instead of speaking about the structure of "language" as a unitary whole, as he had done in the "Trattatus".

Wittgenstein speaks of particular 'language-game' that is to say the sets or groups of concepts which we use in talking about, for e.g. mental states are about pleasure and pain or about perception etc. The meaning of a word is now defined in terms of its use, in a particular 'language-game'

and the task of analysis is to remind us of the context in ordinary language (and of the whole 'form of life' with which it is involved) in which it is used, for there, by definition, it is used meaningfully.

Contemporary linguistic philosophy accepts as fundamental the principle the proper locus of meaning in the proposition or statement.

J.L. Evans goes so far as to claim that "it is only in the context of a sentence that a word is meaningful"² Wittgenstein much earlier asserted, "only the proposition has sense, only in the content of a proposition has a name meaning."³

All the recognized sciences were not only explores of a special subject matter but also possessors of a special method or methods developed to deal with their particular fields of study. A clearly defined methodology indeed, seemed even more than a distinct subject matter to be the primary criterion of all the genuine intellectual disciplines.

The function of Philosophy is to engage in analysis of

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2. J.L. Evans - On meaning and verification - p. 8
Mind - Vol. LXII, 1953.
 3. Wittgenstein - 'Tractatus' - p. 3.3

the meaning of language.

The early analysis of Russell, Moore and others showed clearly that great scope existed for philosophy under this new understanding of its function. Ordinary language is a subtle and sometimes misleading instrument, meanings are elusive, often hidden or confused by the language which seems to express logically acceptable propositions.

According to Ryle, "many systematically misleading expressions haunt the avenues of daily speech. Grammatically, perfect sentences, may conceal logical unmeaning."⁴

However much linguistic philosophers may otherwise disagree, they are one in the conviction that there is likely to be something problem-causing about unanalysed language which proper analysis can remove.

Now the question is that, if philosophy is concerned with meaning then what constitutes meaning ?

It is the fundamental question in contemporary analytical philosophy. One conception which has emerged in response to that question is Wittgensteins conception of language-game.

4. Ryle - Systematically misleading expression - Logic and language - first series.

In 'Tractatus Logico Philosophicus' Wittgenstein was developed a theory, which is commonly called the "picture theory" of meaning. In latter-stage in ~~he~~ himself has criticised the picture theory of meaning and developed the notion of language-game.

Wittgenstein recognized that in the 'picture theory' he had imposed certain conception of meaning upon language rather than looked at language to see what in fact constitutes its meaning. He had simply prejudged the issue. He came to see the importance of overcoming prejudice and looking at the uses to which language is put.

If one does so, he discovered, one will immediately see that naming is only one of them. "Look at the sentence as its employment" said Wittgenstein. He noted that the employment of language is multifarious and multifunctional.

This above tendency among analytical philosophers acknowledge a more flexible, or more inclusive, approach to meaning than did the Logical Positivists who first launched what we have termed verificational analysis. Even former logical positivist tend to temper their early zeal by accepting the latter teaching of Ludwig Wittgenstein (himself an early shaper of positivism) that -

"There are many varieties of meaning in language and that the meaning in language, and that the meaning of an expression is best determined by examination of its use or function"⁵

But this general preferences for what we may call "functional analysis" does not itself necessarily involve a repudiation of the general position on cognitive meaning that has been advanced by verificational analysis. Functional analysis may awaken us to varieties of meaning not brought to light by verificational analysis, but there is no guarantee that these additional varieties of meaning however interesting or illuminating will have any role to play in advancing truth or understanding.

Verificational analysis finds in the statements of the empirical sciences the most adequate examples of what language really is at its best.

Ludwiyg Wittgenstein in his latter writings graphically pictures "Language proper" as something quite different from its "Sorrounding" areas of scientific precision. "Our

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5. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigation translated -
G.E. M. Anscombe - pp. 128-32
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1953).

language can be seen as an ancient city. A maze of little streets, and squares of old and new houses and of houses with additions from various periods, and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with strait regular streets and uniform houses."⁶

So we have different functions of language. Language has to do not only with our intellects but also (perhaps primarily with our emotions. It is one of our most effective means of expressing and arousing feelings.

Besides this emotive function language has also conative function.

"We do things" with words." our language, that is, can function not only to describe to establish verbal conventions and to express or evoke emotions, but also to change the situation in direct ways.

"Performative use of language of this conative sort, of which there turn out to be many, may be characterized as having a "conative" function, from the latin word for an attempt or undertaking to do something"⁷ Whenever, in the appropriate

6. Wittgenstein -Philosophical Investigation, p. 8c

7. Frederick Ferre -

Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion - p. 359

(London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1968)

circumstances language is used to make a premise or to place a bet or to take an oath or to declare a true, on the like, we find the conative dimension of meaning. And since this use of language—asserting nothing is freed from the requirements of verification or falsification.

The stress of the functional analyst on language as a "natural growth" leads to a corresponding emphasis on the essential sociolity of language, since it is only in and through society that language may be said to have "grown naturally. A private definition of a word does not form part of language because it has none of the results which are the mark of genuine linguistic uses ; such a private word would literally make no difference.

The one general character of linguistic utterance is that it has some social context or results, but in each case we find that we are violently tearing language out of its ordinary and proper role in the affairs of life.

Language for functional analysis is a complex social product with many legitimate uses.

The "theory of meaning" of functional analysis may therefore be understood a fundamentally a statement of procedures ; the meaning of language is found in its use.

Meaning then, is more adequately understood in terms of the uses or functions of language than in terms of actual or possible experiences. It may often be the function of language to refer to some experience or perceptible event, but it need not always be so. The more inclusive approach to meaning is cleanly exhibited in the philosophical practice of functional analysis.

Functional analysis insists that those who use the language under study should be allowed to express their own views as to the function of their speech. Before the poet, e.g. is told *ex cathedra* what uses his language has he should be asked how he intends to employ this words.

The empiricism on which functional analysis rightly prides itself will be preserved only if a fair hearing is given to those who are most intimately involved in the use of language under analysis.

So far as the meaning is concerned, it is argued that the meaning of a term or phrase can be discovered simply by observing the use, function or role of that term or phrase in language.

By accepting the Wittgenstein position that the meaning

of a term is the role or function or use that term in language , the term designate some sort of eternal, unchanging entity or essence nontheless this approach to meaning can provide us with a definition of religion or religious in terms of the characteristic role or function performed by sentences designated as religious.

Now the question is , what is the role or function which is the characteristic of religious belief ?

If a belief performs the function of providing an object (or objects) of devotion and all pervasive frame of orientation, then it is religion. This criterion for the phrase "religious belief" has been suggested by several philosophers.

Charles moris in his "Signs, language and behaviour" remarks that "the complicated human self has need of some focal attitude to give it orientation and the significance of religion lies in its attempt to meet this need."⁸

Professor Moris suggest that this need for a focal attitude of orientation requires the formulation a special type of discourse. Needs other than that of focal attitude

8. Charles Moris : "Signs, Language, and Behaviour"
(Englewood Cliffs N.J. Prentice Hall Inc 1946) p. 148.

of orientation require other specialization of common language. Each of these specializations of common language Moris calls a "Type of discourse".

Like Moris, Eric Fromm defines religion as "any system of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion".⁹

Religious belief or sentence can distinguished from beliefs or sentences of other kinds in terms of the characteristic use or function performed. That the characteristic use or function performed by a religious sentence or belief is that of providing a focal attitude of orientation and an object (or objects) of devotion. Religious beliefs which play an all pervasive role in the life of a man, a group , or culture, determining most of the attitudes and reactions of that man or that group or that culture. Beliefs performing this all pervasive function will vary and do vary from time to time, place to place, man to man, group to group, and culture to culture. This fact is a result of defining "religious belief" in terms of use and function, and our denying that there is some sort of essence designated by the terms 'religion' or "religious belief".

9. Eric Fromm - Psycho analysis and Religion
(New Haven, Yale University Press - 1950) p. 21

Linguistic analysis calls our attention to the wide variety of language-games and kinds of words. Philosophical analysis, in the words of Hook, provided a -"method which could be employed both to clarify theological usage and to preserve its autonomy against rude" requests from scientist and naturalists to talk sense as defined by the parochial criteria of the scientific and common-sensical mood of discourse. There is not a single language-game that can be laid down in advance as binding upon all who would speak ..."¹⁰

The slogan "Every statement has its own logic", has left philosophers and theologians free to look for and discover the logic peculiar to the religious mode of discourse.

Here the term "Language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life.

It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used the multiplicity of kinds of word, and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language.

10. Sidney Hook "Preface" - pp. xii-xiii in "religious experienced and truth" - ed. Sidney Hook.

(New York, New York University Press 1961)

Wittgenstein thought of a "language-game" as a whole, consisting of language and the activities with which it is woven. The expression "language-game" was intended, to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity or form of life" Wittgenstein offered the following example of an elemental language-game.

At is building with building stones there are blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams. It has pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them for this purpose they use a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'. A calls them out ; B brings the stone which he has bearnt to bring at such - and -such a call- conceive this as a complete primitive language.

The language -game in which man engages have of course be come much more complicated than this but the essential point to take is that, in order to understend any peace of language one must set it within its appropriate 'language-game'.

Language is not a mirror held up to reality as Wittgenstein supposed in the 'Tractatus' or , at least, not all meaningful language is. The question to ask in order to get at the meaning of language is : what is this piece of language being used for ? What are men doing or purporting to do when they say such

things ! Words said Wittgenstein are pieces in chess and
 "the meaning of a piece is its role in the game."

"Hudson say in above respect that religious belief as
 a language -game of form of life or religious belief should
 thought of as language-game."¹¹

For understanding of a language-game philosophically
 requires to 'mapping its logical frontiers' and exposing its
 logical presuppositions.

By mapping logical frontiers means is to differentiate
 a language-game clearly from other language-games. Wittgenstein
 speaks in one place of philosophy a 'a battle against bewitch-
 ment of our intelligence by means of language'. Such bewitch-
 -ment arises when one language-games gets confused with
 another, and it is just the confusion which philosophy exists
 to dispel by mapping clearly the frontiers between language-
 games.

So far as logical presupposition is concerned, Wittgens-
 tein remarked "What we do in our language-games always
 rests on a tacit presupposition".

11. W. D. Hudson - A Philosophical approach to religion -
 (W. D. Hudson) - 1974.

Hudson remarked that "in case of every language-game, there is, concept or set of concepts which is tacitly presupposed" in the sense that it is always implied in what is said within that language-game. It is called constitutive concept of that language."¹²

In respect to religious belief, Hudson says, "the concept or set of concepts constituted it is 'God'. He claiming that, a concept or set of concepts "God" which is implicit in all religious discourse in just the way that the concept of moral obligation is implicit in all moral discourse, and the concept of a physical object in all scientific.

God, or the divine, is conceived in many differing forms within religious belief as a whole and even at different stages of development within a given religious tradition.

The remarks about how religious explanations and experiences are constituted by the concept of God, show how the religious and unbeliever differ from one another. The difference between them is that they have what Wittgenstein calls "different pictures". One important point which he brings out is that this kind of disagreement having different pictures - can not be

12. W.D. Hudson - "A Philosophical approach to Religion" -p. 13

resolved in any ordinary way.

Religious belief shows itself not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating for all in his (the believes) life.

So we have different language-game and it has different functions. But there are philosophers who in essence accept Ayer's and Flew's contention that the verification principle excludes religious locutions from having descriptive meaning of any kind.

Verification principle may be of considerable usefulness in many contexts, but it is utterly misunderstood if it is taken as "the" criterion for judging the meaningfulness of all language. An embarrassing example of an assertion which not meaningful when tested by the verification principle is - the assertion of verification principle itself.

The statement that the meaning of any proposition will be found either in verbal rules (if the proposition is analytic) or in equivalent statements referring to actual or possible sense-experience (if the proposition is synthetic) seems to be asserting a fact not offering a definition or rule of usage.

But if the verification principle is not itself analytic what actual or possible sense-experiences could be relevant

to its verification or falsification ? No such experience will even in principle be relevant to the task ? Indeed, sense experience can not even recognize the elementary logical distinction between 'analytic' and 'synthetic' statements ~~quo~~ marks on paper or noises uttered by a larynx, much less can it verify assertions about the logical character of their significance. On the basis of the verification principle, therefore, the verification principle is devoid of literal meaning.

Without a wider theory of meaning the verification principle is self-stultifying, but ~~if~~ such a theory can be supplied, the verification principle may be retained as a useful instrument for dealing with language which intends to refer to perceptible events or for deciding whether or not statements are "empirically" informative. But in that capacity the verification principle which somehow sits in judgement upon all discourse, including theological, ethical, and other non-empirical languages, it is one ~~tool~~ among others and like all tools, it may not be an appropriate one for all jobs.

"What we have here is not really a criterion of meaningfulness, but a criterion of empiricability."¹³

13. R.M. Hane - Religion and Moral - "Faith and Logic" - p. 17.7

The limited range of the verification principle, on which verification analysis rests may explain the failure of this form of linguistic analysis to appreciate the comprehensibility of a wide variety of linguistic uses not amenable to this criterion of meaning. The single-minded devotion of verification analysis to the verification principle of meaning has resulted in a unfortunately narrow concept of the nature and function of perfectly significant language. In this, verification analysis has restricted itself by its dogmatic apriorism.

But this way (through verification principle) of looking religious locutions misinterprets their proper function which is, that of declaring a certain attitude to life and to the world.

When we see them in this light all the difficulties about the verification and falsification of religious propositions simply vanish, for as declarations of intention or attitude they are perfectly meaningful even though they are not verifiable or falsifiable in the strict sense.

According to Braithwaite, religious locutions are neither statements about empirical facts, nor scientific hypotheses nor necessary propositions. However, this does not mean that they are therefore meaningless, any more than the fact moral

utterances not about empirical facts means that they are meaningless. In fact, religious utterances are similar to moral statements in that they declare an intention to act in a certain way.¹⁴

Braithwaite in his book "An empiricist view of religious belief" says-

"Primarily declarations of adherence to a policy of action, declarations of commitment to a way of life, "an agapeistic" way of life as he calls it, that is to say, the way of life St. Paul proposes in the First Epistle to the corinthian (ch. 13).¹⁵

Nevertheless, if religious assertions do not function as factual assertions, they do function quite meaningfully as "blik"s. Hare invents the term 'Blik' to describe certain basic metaphysical attitudes towards the world.

A more advanced version of Braithwaite's position has been put forward by Hare. Hare begins by admitting that religious statements can not be assertions, for if they were we would have to admit the possibility of evidence counting

14. Braithwaite - "Belief and action" in proceeding of the Aristotelian Society" - Supp. Vol. XX - 1946, p. 1-19

15. Braithwaite - 'An empiricists view of religious belief' p. 14

against their truth, that is to say we would have to admit that it was logically possible that God does not exist - or does not have the attributes which he is held to have.¹⁶

In a latter essay, Hare admits that religious belief involves "belief in the truth of certain factual statements but he says that these facts that religious discourse deals with are "perfectly ordinary empirical facts" what makes them "religious" is the fact that "our whole way of living is organised round them ; they have for us value relevance, importance, which they would not have if we were atheists. It is then our attitude to the empirical facts which is expressed in religious utterances.

Religious utterances are neither verifiable nor falsifiable ; nevertheless they are meaningful in so far as they make a difference to the way a person acts and feels, that is, to his behaviour. As Malcom puts it -

"The man who believes that his sins will be forgiven if he is truly repentant, might there by be saved from despair. What he believes has, for him, no verification and falsification, yet the belief makes a great deal of

16. "Theology and Falsification" in "New Essays in Philosophical theology" - ed. A. Flew and A. Macintyre - p. 99 (London 1955)

| difference to his action and feeling."¹⁷

These above three philosopher namely Breithwaite, Hare and Malcome were known as reductionist analyst of religious belief. As against this reductionist view tried to show that religious locotions have their own Sui generis meaning. This idea has developed in respect of Wittgensteins 'language-games' and "forms of life". In his "Philosophical investigations" he proposes a theory of meaning according to which the meaning of any location can only be determined by the use on function on role it has within the context of a given 'language-game'. The whole set of interrelated concepts that are involved in Science, eg. or in morality or in aesthetics appreciation, or in a more particular sense - in talking about persons, telling a joke, reporting an event, describing an object giving an account of a dream etc. And these language-games are themselves involved with what Wittgenstein calls "form of life".

Wittgenstein says "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him, meaning by this that , although a lion might make suitable speech sounds, it could not be said to

17. Faith and the Philosophers - ed. J.Hick , p. 110
(London 1964)

Macmillan and Co.Ltd.

New York St Martin's Press, 1964.

have made an intelligible utterance. For the whole context in which those sounds might be made differs too radically from that in which human beings use those sounds to make intelligible utterances. It is these general contexts that Wittgenstein calls "forms of life".¹⁸

There is then no such thing as language 'tout court' but rather particular 'language-games', and similarly there is no general criterion of the meaningfulness of language, but each language-game has its own criterion of meaningfulness proper to it which can only be discovered by looking at the "form of life" in which it is involved. These forms of life, for Wittgenstein, can not be themselves be justified in any way, they are given, and there is a sense in which one has simply to choose to accept or to reject them. Thus Wittgenstein says : "What has to be accepted , the given, is - so one could say forms of life.

Although Wittgenstein himself says little systematically about religion and the status of religious locutions, he suggests tentatively that religious belief typically involves using of picture or a way of looking at the world and at

18. Cf. G. Pitcher "The Philosophy of Wittgenstein"- p.243 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1964)

life, in such a manner that it is constantly before the mind and so that influences the way in which we live.

Suppose somebody made this guidance for life believing in the last judgement. Whenever he does any thing this is before this mind. In a way, how are we to know whether to say he believes this will happen or not? Asking him is not enough. He will probably say he has (No) proof. But he has what we might call an unshakable belief. It will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regulating for in all his life.¹⁹

In this sense Hudson remarks that "The religious forms of life is one of those forms of life that" seem to be definitive of humanity in the sense that it is essential to our concept of man, as man, that he should engage in them."²⁰

So, now, the religious language is meaningful and intelligible and only be determined from within the religious

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19. Lectures and conversation on Aesthetics Psychology and religious belief. -ed. O.C. Barret, pp. 53-59 (Oxford, 1966).
20. W.D. Hudson - Ludwig Wittgenstein "The bearing of His Philosophy upon religious belief" - p. 71 London - 1968.

language-game. Peter Winch says that there is norm for intelligibility in general criterion of logic, he goes on, are not a direct gift of God, but arise out of, are only intelligible in the context of ways of living or modes of social life as such. Science is such a mode and religion is another.

"The notion of 'reality' itself, and of 'accordance with reality' of 'truth' and 'rationality' and 'intelligibility' also have meaning only within particular language-games."²¹

Like Winch D.Z. Phillops remarks "A typical religious belief such as the Last Judgement is not, an hypothesis on scientific conjecture but rather a "frame work within which the believer meets fortune, misfortune, and the evil that he finds in his own life and in life about him."²²

In Wittgenstein description believing in the last judgement is to have a picture before one's mind so that it

21. American Philosophical Society - 1 (1964), p. 307-29

22. J.R. Jones and D.Z. Phillips "Belief and logic of belief" - A Discussion in "Sophia " -ixi (1970)

regulates ones actions. This picture is not invented by the believer does not stand in judgement on it. The believer does not want to say that he measures these pictures and finds that they are all right or finds that they are wanting. On the contrary the believers wish to claim that it is not they who measure them ; they are the measure in terms of which they judge themselves.

So, the analyst take for granted Wittgenstein's theory that meaning can only be determined by reference to specific language games and forms of life, and they also suppose that the theory can extended without difficulty to the religious sphere, so that we can speak of the religious language-game and the religious form of life within which religious locatons have their own peculiar meaning.

Those who employ functional analysis of religious belief or theological discourse seek more to understand the genuine use (or uses) of this language than to condemn its misuses. The tendency among these analysts is often single out one or more familiar functions of language as the 'real' logic of theological language. Theological discourse become failure when compet with science as an experimental 'empirical' language. The premise of functional analysis stated here by J.B. Coats,

that -

"Logic, if it is to have a useful bearing on life, must provide a justification for many of the ways in which men actually reason, seeing that that reason can not be entirely fallacious as it serves them not too badly in numberless situations"²³

The logic of theological speech can find its justification in doing a different job from that of the logic of science. As Coates puts it "there are other positive uses of a belief in God which satisfy deeply felt needs to-day and do not seem to those who find benefit from them to express anything superstitious or unreasonable."²⁴

About the 'uses' of theistic belief, Coates suggests that the employment of religious phrases helps one to feel "more reassured about the world" by speaking of its relations to "another (better) world" and to feel more "at home" in this world by speaking of it as "created by a loving hand".

23. Coates - "God and the Positivists" "The Hibbert Journal" - p. 226

24. Ibid. p. 227

Sentences from the theological vocabulary like "God made the world" do not function, then, in the same way as "When made St Paul's : Scientific statements derive their meaning from referring to things and events, but theological statements function entirely within the existing "theocentric life" one learns the real meaning of 'theocentric life' by an examination of their function or their 'cash value' on what they sum up, in that life'.²⁵

As we have already pointed out Braithwaits view that, a statement need not itself be empirically verifiable, but that is used in a particular way is always a straight forwardly empirical proposition. The result of such inquiry, show that, the primary element in this use is that the religious assertion is used as a moral assertion.

The 'ethical' function of theological speech are not intent as are the verificational analyse on reducing ethical discourse to the mere expressing of emotional approval or disapproval. The ethical statements function as the expression

25. Leon "The meaning of Religious Propositions" - The Hibbert Journal - p. 151

of an intention to act in certain way under certain circumstances. Moral discourse is conative rather than purely emotive ; when one makes an ethical assertion one is in fact "subscribing to a policy of action" one is engaging in an act of "self - commitment" to a general pattern of behaviour.

R.M. Hare agrees that while theological speech has an important moral component the ethical function is not the distinctive function of theological statements. "The moral judgement, as we may say, arise out of the religious belief ; they do not constitute it."²⁶ What is distinct about theological assertion is the belief-content-then ; or, to be more precise, it is to be found in what is believed. This content of belief is distinctive, to Hare because although it is similar to ordinary factual belief in some respects, it is radically different from such factual belief in others.

26. Hare "Faith and Logic" - p. 180

CHAPTER - V

Conclusion

CHAPTER - V

Conclusion

In this last chapter of my thesis I am trying to give an outline of the other four chapters of my work and to show the outcome of it.

Here I have tried to show the nature of religious belief in particular from classical periods to modern times. Next attempt has gone through the nature of religious knowledge. With regards to linguistic analyst school, it is the question that whether religious belief is meaningful or not, if it is, then what way it has meaning? Is it true that, the criterion of verification principle is the only criterion of meaningfulness? The present study deals with all these above problems.

A belief is nothing more than an assertion about the existence or non-existence of some being, event or value. We can not use the word 'belief' by distinguishing it from opinion, judgement or value. Religious belief involves earnest expectancy, the willingness to form habits of thinking and living engendered by the conceived nature of the religious object.

In the beginning of this study we have gone through the nature of classical religious belief onwards. From the time of Plato and Aristotle it had been differentiated as theistic and

non-theistic religious belief.

Classical theism rests on the belief that God is infinite that his infinity is to be understood primarily in terms of his self-existence, and that he is therefore the creator of the world ex-nihilo. But the Philosophers like Plato and Aristotle held that God is finite.

Plato's God is thus doubly limited by the form on the one hand, and (or necessity) on the other. In another we can say that Plato had two religions. One is a kind of supernaturalism, consistent with his idealistic philosophy and with the orphic religion. The other is a kind of naturalism consistent with his realistic philosophy and with the traditional Greek religion.

In 'metaphysics' the God whom Aristotle described is also finite. He is the first unmoved among many celestial movers, and he does not create the world which exists eternally in independence of him. He 'moves' the world by inspiring love and desire in the 'first heaven'. In the nineteenth century, belief in a finite God was strongly advocated by John Stuart Mill in his "Theism". But Whitehead resembles of finite God both his great Greek predecessors. For him God has both a 'primordial' and a 'consequent' nature.

But towards the age of Aquinas the nature of religious

belief has been developed in a different way. Religious belief consists essentially in intellectual assent to the truth of certain propositions.

Religious belief they claim is of its very nature practical, so that to say 'I believe in God' is precisely to commit oneself to live in a certain way. According to T. Mc. Pherson that belief and practice are inseparable. For him religion has a number of elements and an adequate account of religious is hardly to be got if any of these is totally ignored concentration on the belief element can undoubtedly lead to a one sided picture of religion and the belief element itself is not fully intelligible if separated from the practice element, as the latter is seen in participation in religious ritual or in the living of a life in accordance with certain moral policies. The same thing is defined by Durkheim that religion is a united system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things.

If a man commits himself to beliefs and assertion about God or the supernatural, and also to morality, a way of life or set of principles which is somehow connected with these beliefs and assertion, then he has a religion. So the two essential features - the beliefs and the way of life are related in two ways, namely psychological and logical.

Religious belief is of necessary condition of much moral

action. A man believe that he ought to pursue an honest and upright course of life and believe that he can not do this without a religious belief (including perhaps the belief that honesty is rewarded in the world to come). So to secure an honest course of life he may try to persuade himself that religion is true.

Belief are not held in a cultural vaccum, and not only is the case that what people believe can't be isolated from what sort of people they are and sort of influences there have been upon them, but neither can questions of truth always be so isolated. Religion is a way of life and not just a set of beliefs; and religious beliefs are neither fully intelligible nor easily to be labelled 'true' or 'false' in isolation from religion in all its aspects.

Towards religious knowledge people believe there is religious knowledge. They believe that the sacred books of their religion contain knowledge or the beliefs of their religion gives the knowledge about men and the universe. They believe that these books contain wisdom to enlighten their action and to illuminate a way of life.

Man takes his religion not as a narcotic but as a revelation of the real nature of things, so far, at any rate, as the nature of things stands related to personal and social values.

Religion regards itself as a normal and healthy appreciation of the inner meaning of thing in so far as they bear on human life.

It is impossible to wholly to isolate the problem of knowledge from the problem of the nature of reality. From the ancient periods, the thinkers have confidence in the competition of human reason as an instrument in the discovery of truth. The two sources of knowledge i.e. empiricism and rationalism developed in their respective way. From the rationalistic theory of knowledge certain theological inferences have been drawn.

The ideas of Plato were found to lead upto and receive their place and value through a Supreme ideas, the Idea of the ~~God~~ and this he certainly seems at times to identify with God. The Forms of Aristotle culminated in a perfect form, free from material taint, and pure spirit, or God, who transcends the world but moves it as object of desire. Descartes again, found that God was necessary to guarantee the truth of our ideas of external nature, and Spinoza postulated substance or God to embrace in one whole the double orders of thought and extension.

Religious knowledge in the proper sense of the word, neither is nor claims to be the knowledge of scientific understanding, men believes in their gods or explain things through them. If scientific knowing is the only form of knowing , then

of course religious knowledge is an illusion.

Religion is an outcome of the needs of life, but the knowledge it aspires after is knowledge of direct and personal kind. There are levels or degrees in knowledge which have relations to each other, but are not reducible to each other. Reality itself has many strata, hence our knowledge of reality.

In religion the value judgements have always been primary and central. The judgements of faith express what God is for us not what he is in himself, so it implies that the spiritual insight is in terms of value. So from this we can divide knowledge into two kinds, (1) the knowledge of world (2) the practical acquaintance or familiarity gained by experience and aided by sympathetic intuition and appreciation. Such acquaintance as is well exemplified in the relation friends to one another.

By distinguishing faith and knowledge, it is said that faith is a matter of acting (doing and becoming and in an existential decision for a certain kind of life. The specific objects of faith are primarily values, which evoke the affective life and furnishes a centre around which the feelings gather.

The modern philosophers, namely Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein defined knowledge and belief from linguistic point of view.

On the otherside the logical positivist eliminate religious belief as nonsense. It has no meaning. It is a pseudo-Problem. There are philosophers who in essence accept Ayer's and Flew's contention that the verification principle excludes religious locutions from having descriptive meaning of any kind. Verification principle may be of considerable usefulness in many contents, but it is utterly misunderstood, if it is taken as "the" criterion for judging the meaningfulness of all language. To understand it clearly we can take a simple example. e.g. By 'litre' we can measure only the liquid objects. It is not possible to measure ~~other~~ objects except water, oil, etc.

The limited range of the verification principle, on which verificational analysis rests may explain the failure of this form of linguistic analysis to appreciate the comprehensibility of a wide variety of linguistic uses not amenable to this criterion of meaning. The single minded devotion of verificational analysis to the verification principle of meaning has resulted in a unfortunately narrow concept of the nature and function of perfectly significant language. In this verification analysis has restricted itself by its dogmatic apriorism.

The linguistic analysis movement broader the scope of philosophy. Philosopher's are concerned not only with propositions, but also with sentences which express emotions and

volitions. Language has been considered as a 'game' which is multiple in nature, and no limit can be to such games depends upon the 'moves' taken or the functions performed by sentences which are infinite and indefinite number. Since language as such has become the subject matter of philosophy it includes not only the metaphysical language, but theological and also the language of science, history and law.

Analysis becomes a necessary and legitimate activity. Most questions and puzzlements are due to the misuse of concepts and misunderstanding of the logic of language. It is necessary to understand the logic of language.

The controversies and perplexities arising in theological and religious problems are only pseudo-problems having their origin in the misuse of concepts and confusions of language "language-games".

Languages schemes forms heirarchy, there are different level language-game. Religious language-game also different from scientific one, because science are concerned only with phenomena, where as religion is concerned with noumenon or the ground of phenomena. In otherwords, the sphere of science is the sphere of Becoming, where as the sphere of religion is the sphere of Being.

Science can simply give knowledge of fact, but it can not

say anything about right and wrong ; good and evil. It is the province of ethics and religion. Knowledge, goodness and love are the chief marks of religion. Russell calls 'good life' to be the religious life.

With the recognition of the multiplicity of language games it is realized that certain expressions may not fall within the dichotomy of analytic-synthetic propositions, and still have meaning because they have their function. So contemporary philosophy is distinguished from philosophy in the past by its intense concern with language and meaning. Philosophical analysts, however, have introduced new and challenging discussions which emphasizes a careful analysis of the uses or function of religious concepts and statements in the content of their use.

The central figure in the movement of linguistic analysis is undoubtedly Ludwig Wittgenstein. He develops the tentative and informal ideas of Moore and Russell on the function of analysis into a systematic positions so that with him it is possible to speak, for the first time, of a philosophy of analysis.

For Wittgenstein philosophical problems result from linguistic or conceptual confusion. For him philosophy becomes a kind of therapy, a way leading one out of conceptual and linguistic confusions. Contemporary analysis, however, are

beginning to examine in great detail theological concepts and religious utterances.

To understand the functions of religious locutions, it will be better by passing through Wittgenstein "Pluralistic" theory of meaning. Thus instead of speaking about the structure of 'language' as a whole, as he had done in the 'Tractatus'.

Wittgenstein speaks of particular 'language-game' that is to say the sets or groups of concepts which we use in talking about, for e.g. mental states are about pleasure and pain or about perception etc. The meaning of a word is now defined in terms of its use, in a particular language-game, and the task of analysis is to remind us of the context in ordinary language (and of the whole 'form of life' with which it is involved in which it is used, for there, by definition, it is used meaningfully.

Now the question is that, if philosophy is concerned with meaning then what constitutes meaning? It is the fundamental question in contemporary analytic philosophy. One conception which has emerged in response to that question is Wittgenstein's conception of language.

Ludwig Wittgenstein in his latter Writings graphically pictures 'language-proper' as something quite different from its surrounding areas of scientific precision. Our language can

be seen as an ancient city. A maze of little streets and squares old and new houses and of houses with additions from various periods and than surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs, strait, regular streets and uniform houses.

So we have different functions of language. Language has to do not only with our intellects but also (perhaps primarily) with our emotions. It in one of our most effective means of expressing and feelings. Besides this emotive language has also conative function.

Language for functional analysis is a complex social product with many legitimate uses. The 'theory of meaning' of functional analysis may therefore be understood fundamentally a statement of procedures ; the meaning of language is found in its use.

Here one question may arise that what is the role or function which is the characteristic of religious belief ?

If a belief perform the function of providing an object (or objects) of devotion and all pervasive frame of orientation, then it is religion. In this respect Charles Morris remarks that "the complicated human-self has need of some focal attitude to give it orientation and the significance of religion lies in its attempt to meet this need. He suggest that this need for a focal attitude of orientation requires the formulation a special type of discourse.

The characteristic use or function performed by a religious sentence or belief is that of providing a focal attitude of orientation and an object (or objects) of devotion. Religious belief which play an all pervasive role in the life of a man, a group, or culture, determining most of the attitudes and reactions of that man or that group or that culture. Beliefs performing this all pervasive function will vary and do vary from time to time, place to place, man to man, group to group, and culture to culture. This fact is a result - of determining 'religious belief' in terms of use and function, and our denying that - there is some sort of essence designated by the 'religion' or religious beliefs.

The slogan "Every statement has its own logic" has left philosophers and theologians free to look for and discuss the logic peculiar to the religious mode of discourse. It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used the multiplicity of kinds of word, and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language.

Hudson remarked that 'in case of every language-game - there is, concept or set of concepts which is tacitly presupposed in the sense that it is always implied in what said within that language-game. It is called constitutive concept of that language.

In respect of religious belief, He says "the concept or set of concepts constituted it is 'God'. He claiming that a concept or set of concepts 'God' which is implicit in all religious discourse in just the way that the concept of moral obligation is implicit in all moral discourses, and the concept of a physical object in all scientific.

Religious belief shows itself not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary ground for belief, but rather by regulating for all in his (the believers) life.

There is no such thing as language 'tout court' but rather particular 'language-games' and similarly there is no general criterion of the meaningfulness of language, but each language-game has its own criterion of meaningfulness proper to it which can only be discovered by looking at the 'form of life' in which it is involved. These forms of life, for Wittgenstein, can not be themselves be justified in any way, they are given, and there is a sense in which one has simply to choose to accept or to reject them. Thus, Wittgenstein says : "what has to be accepted, the given, is - so one would say forms of life".

Although Wittgenstein says little systematically about religion and the status of religious locutions, he suggests tentatively that religious belief typically involves using of picture or a way of looking at the world and at life , in such

a manner that it is constantly before the mind and so that influence the way in which we live.

Wittgenstein expressed certain views of religion and interpreted "religious belief" and "religious truth", his attitude is summed up by Pears:

"A religious tenet is not a factual hypothesis, but something which affects our thoughts and actions in a different way. This sort of view of religion fits very naturally into his later philosophy : the meaning of religious proposition is not a function of what would have to be the case if it were true , but a function of the difference that of makes to the lives of those who maintain it."¹

In his lectures on religious belief for instance, Wittgenstein said :

Suppose somebody made this guidance for his life : believing in the last Judgement whenever he does anything, this is before his mind. In a way, how are we to know whether to say he believes this will happen or not ?

1. Pears W.D. - "Wittgenstein" (1971) p. 174.

Asking him is not enough. He will probably say he has proof. But he has what you might call an unshakable belief. It will show, not by reasoning or by appeal to ordinary grounds for belief but rather by regulating for all in his life."¹

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Qs or Pts of Crit

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Spelling/grammatical mistakes

pp. iii, 1, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 22,
23, 30, 32, 46, 47, 91, 102, 114, 116, 117,
118, 138

'Everyday' in pl of 'everybody' (117)

'power' u u a 'proper' (118)

'absention' u u 'assertion' (138)

'might' u u 'right' (32)

'title' u u 'little' (iii)

'marry?' u u 'Mary' (30)

'unconditionality' u u 'conditionality' (102)