

CHAPTER-III

THE CONCEPT OF JÑĀNALAKṢAṆA PRATYAKṢA

Significance of Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa :

Now an effort will be made to give an account of the second type of supernormal perception called *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. The word *Jñānalakṣaṇa* means that it is the *jñāna* (i.e. cognition) which acts as the contact in this perception. Here *lakṣaṇa* means nature or *svarūpa*. The contact in which *jñāna* (knowledge) becomes an essence is called *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. This knowledge (*jñāna*) is in the form of memory. If the memory-knowledge of previously perceived object serves as the qualifier (i.e. *prakāra*) of the object present to our sense-organ then that kind of supernormal contact is called *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

Here the memory-knowledge (*smṛti*) or previous knowledge of the object concerned is the cause of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. On finding something when a person says, "I see a fragrant sandal wood", he has an immediate knowledge of its fragrance. In this case, the memory of our past experience of fragrance in the sandalwood through the olfactory organ acts as the contact between the present fragrance and the ocular organ. This is a famous example of *jñānalakṣaṇā*. The Naiyāyika points out that the seeing of 'fragrance' which is ordinarily perceived by olfactory organ cannot be explained without the help of *jñānalakṣaṇā*. So he is bound to accept the *jñānalakṣaṇā* as a *pratyāsatti*.

There is a clear distinction between the *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* and the *jñānalakṣaṇa*. In case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* the knowledge of the universal or *sāmānya* leads to the perception of the individuals in which it inheres and in *jñānalakṣaṇā* a previous knowledge of the object concerned serves as the present perception of its own object.¹

It has been argued in the Prabhā commentary that there are two types of *viṣayatā* in the case of *jñānalakṣaṇā*. When we are apprehending a piece of sandalwood and its fragrance, the phenomenon of fragrance is perceived through the relation called extra-ordinary contentness (*alaukika viṣayatā sambandha*) through the medium of another knowledge i.e. the knowledge of a piece of sandal wood through the relation of contentness (*viṣayatā sambandha*). In other words, the ordinary relation called *viṣayatā* between self and the knowledge grasped earlier gives rise to the perceptual awareness of an object which is supernormal in character through the relation called supernormal contactness. It may be said that both the contacts i.e. *jñānalakṣaṇā* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, by virtue of being the form of knowledge give rise to two different types of activities, as the limiter of contactness (*pratyāsattitāvachedaka*) is different in two cases. Though both of them seem to be the forms of knowledge, yet the results arising from them are completely different in character (*phalavaicitrya*). The knowledge of universal (*sāmānya*) leads to the knowledge of the individuals existing in different time and places, while the knowledge of a sandal wood can lead us to the knowledge of fragrance. In these cases, though the case is almost same, the effects are so. Hence, we have to accept two different cause-and-effect relations. in these two cases.²

It has been argued by Dinakara that the knowledge of fragrance in a piece of sandal wood is not possible due to the lack of contact of eye with the fragrance. The knowledge of fragrance is not also possible through *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* due to the absence of accessories connected with the collocation of causes behind the ordinary perception characterised by fragrance. In other words, if fragrance is taken as grasped by *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, we have to look for some assisting causes of the totality of causes of ordinary perception, which is not available here. Moreover, when the fragrance is taken, no other attributes existing in it are apprehended. From this, it is concluded that the knowledge of fragrance is not possible through *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. Hence, there is no other alternative than to accept *jñānalakṣaṇā* as a means of knowing it.³

The Justification of Jñānalakṣaṇā :

Śri Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, in his "*Jñānalakṣaṇa Vicārahasyam*" mentions four kinds of cases for the justification of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. The cases are : (1) recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), (2) the perception of negation (*abhāva*), (3) the visual perception of fragrance' in a piece of sandal wood (*surabhi candanam*) and (4) apperception or the knowledge of knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*). These cases cannot be explained without the acceptance or service of *jñānalakṣaṇā*. These are being explained gradually in the following :

(1) Recognition (pratyabhijñā) : In the case of recognition like 'this is that Devadatta' the perception of the 'that' is perceived through it. Here, the present knowledge of the 'that' must be possible by *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* because the 'that' is not caused by the normal contact with our senses but 'this' can be perceived through the ordinary perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*).

(2) Perception of negation (abhāva) : In the case of the perception of negation of an object as, "There is negation of the jar on the ground' there is no sense-contact with the 'jar' which is the counterpositive or absentee or negatum (*pratiyogī*) of the negation. If an object has no contact with the sense, it cannot be an object of perception. Thus, there can be no perception of the counterpositive without *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*, the distinguishing character of the perception of negation. So, the Naiyāyika accepts this as an instance of *jñānalakṣaṇā*.

(3) Visual perception of 'fragrance' in a piece of sandal wood (*surabhi candanam*) : This type of the supernormal visual perception of the fragrant sandalwood has already been explained.

(4) The knowledge of knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*): In the case of the "knowledge of knowledge" (*anuvyavasāya*) e.g. "I know the pot" (*ghaṭam ahaṁ jānāmi* or *ahaṁ ghaṭajñānavān*) we have no ordinary contact of knowledge with the sense organ. Here the mind is in contact with the knowledge through the relation of *saṁyukta-*

samavāya i.e., conjoined inherence. But the mind has no ordinary contact with the pot yet it has become an object of perception. Hence, the perception of that object in the case of this *anuvyavasāya*' should be explicated by *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* (i.e. super normal connection through knowledge).

An objection may be raised here : knowledge (*jñāna*) cannot be regarded as a *sannikarṣa* or contact. A *sannikarṣa* or contact implies the relation between the sense-organ and its object. As knowledge exists in the self, it cannot stay in between the sense-organ and the object. In response to this objection, the Naiyāyika points that the word 'knowledge' means the relation of being the object of the memory-knowledge and this memory-knowledge inheres in the self which is in contact with the mind connected with the sense organ (*sva-samjukta manaḥ - samyuktātamamaveta-jñānaviṣayatvarūpa-sambandha*).

That there is the knowledge of fragrance in a sandal wood is known through *jñānalakṣaṇā* is evidenced from the following fact. If an individual finds a sandal wood or comes to know a sandal wood for the first time in his life, he has no previous experience about the concomitant 'of being a sandal wood' (*candanatva*) and 'being fragrant' (*saurabha*). Due to the lack of previous experience he will surely gather the knowledge of sandal wood alone, but not its fragrance. In the initial experience of sandal wood there is the lack of the knowledge of fragrance due to the absence of its previous knowledge. In other words, the knowledge of fragrance is not possible as *jñāna* does not work as a *sannikarṣa*. When an individual comes to know that a piece of sandal wood is fragrant', he will be in a position to know about the fragrance as soon as he perceives a piece of sandal wood, because *jñāna* which is very much present acts as a *sannikarṣa*. From this, it can easily be concluded that *jñāna* serves as a *sannikarṣa* in the case of cognitions as of the fragrance etc.

In the case of 'knowledge of knowledge' (*anuvyavasāya*), "I know the pot' (a) the contact between the knowledge and the mind is normal and (b) the contact between the pot and the mind is supernormal (*svasamyuktātamamaveta-jñānaviṣayatvarūpa-sambandha*'). So the perception of knowledge is normal and

that of the pot is supernormal. In response to this objection the Naiyāyikas advocate that an object related to another object (*svasambandhikapadārtha*) cannot be known as separated from the 'relatum' (*sambandhi*). So, in respect of the perception of non-existence e.g. 'There is no pot on the ground', the apprehension of the pot', the counter correlative of which qualifies the non-existence is not possible without a supernormal sense-contact like *jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*. In like manner, in the case of a 'desire, of an object related to another (*svasambandhikapadārtha*, e.g. I desire a pen), the perception of the object of desire is not possible without *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

Prābhākara Mimāṃsakas do not accept *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* on the basis of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). They advocate that the knowledge in the form. 'This is that' is not called 'recognition'. Two pieces of knowledge are there, such as, (a) one of the 'this' (this is a case of perception) and (b) the other of the 'that' (that is a case of memory-knowledge). These two cognitions are evolved from their concerned causes (a) the knowledge of the 'this' is caused by sense-contact and the memory-knowledge of the 'that' is due to previous experience. Hence, there is no proper argument for accepting *jñānalakṣaṇā* or *upanitabhāna* in this case.⁴ The Naiyāyikas suppose that the above two distinct cognitions are one but not distinct as it (distinction) is not revealed. In response to this Prābhākaras point out that it is not the rule that there can be no normal perception of a related object without having its object. The proper rule is that there cannot be normal perception of a related object if there is no knowledge of the relatum. Therefore, though the knowledge of the non-existence of a pot depends upon the knowledge of the pot, we cannot admit that the object of the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot would be that pot. As there is the memory-knowledge of the pot, there is no question of accepting pot as the object of the knowledge of the non-existence.

Prābhākaras point out that knowledge is self-manifesting (*svaprakāśa*) and hence they do not admit apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) and therefore, there is no ground accepting *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* on the basis of *anuvyavasāya*. It has been said above that it is the knowledge which serves as the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. If knowledge alone serves as *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*, any person may attain

supernormal perception of any object with the help of any cognition. But this does not happen. So mere knowledge is not *sannikarṣa*. But when *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is occurred, the knowledge in a self which is connected with mind through sense organ is called the *sannikarṣa* here. When we acquire the knowledge of fragrance in a piece of sandal wood with the help of our eyes, the memory-knowledge of fragrance inheres in our selves which are connected with our minds conjoined with our eyes and that knowledge exists in the fragrance through the relation of contentness (*viśayatā*). Such knowledge (i.e. this type of knowledge of fragrance) inherent in self which is connected with mind which is again connected with eye is called *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

Refutation of the perceptuality of 'Surabhi candanam' as both visual and alfactory:

If someone admit that both qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) are the object of one single knowledge, we should present an example of knowledge in the form "fragrant sandal wood" to him because fragrance is not perceived through eyes and there is no power of an olfactory organ to perceive a substance (*dravya*). Therefore, to perceive fragrance or sandal wood with the aid of both the organs is not possible because it is very essential to perceive both the substrata for the apprehension of their relations or contacts. An opponent says that the single cognition, "fragrant sandal wood" comes from any of the two organs-visual organ and olfactory organ. It is supported in the following way with an instance of an apperception, such as, "A jar which was seen earlier is remembered now" and so it is said "This is that jar". Here since the knowledge of the 'this' is due to sense-contact, so it is a present knowledge. As the perceptual knowledge of the 'that' is generated by *sannikarṣa* or previous experience, so it is called past knowledge. In this direction some (the Prābhākara Mimāṃsakas) say that here two types of knowledge are there - one comes from visual organ (eye) and the other from olfactory organ (nose) and the objects of the cognitions are substance (*dravya*) and fragrance (*saurava*) respectively.

This type of support is not correct because knowledge is a composite whole , it has no part. If knowledge is connected with parts, it can be said that one part of it comes from visual organ(eye) and the other from olfactory organ (nose). So, if knowledge is partless, or it is produced from two sense-organs and if both fragrance and object (i.e. sandalwood) are the object of it, it is to be admitted that the perception of fragrance also is possible by visual organ or the object (i.e. sandal wood) will be perceived by olfactory organ also. For, a thing which is perceived by a particular sense-organ is the object applicable to apprehend it (i.e. sense organ) . Besides, we know that mind is atomic, so it cannot be connected with two sense-organs simultaneously.⁵ Therefore, practically, even without willing, we shall have to admit that at first we perceive the fragrance only by olfactory organ and we can know the sandal wood through the contact of eye with it afterwards. This rule is applied even for the knowledge of qualificand (*viśeṣya*). From this, it can be inferred that though “fragrant sandalwood” is a perceptual knowledge, yet it is the knowledge related to its qualificand or *viśeṣya* as its object (*viśeṣyaviṣayakajñāna*). In like manner, the knowledge in the form ‘two objects’ also is related to its qualificand as its object because it is also the knowledge related to qualificand (*viśeṣyajñāna*) though it is perceptual.

The phrase ‘being perceptual’ (*pratyakṣatve sati*) has been included in order to exclude the inferential cognitions. If it is argued that the substratum of the knowledge of the qualificand is taken as the nature of substance, the knowledge of it would arise even if qualifier is not there. By virtue of being a cause the qualifier gives rise to the knowledge of qualificand. As it is absent in this case, the knowledge of qualificand does not arise at all. It can not be said that the knowledge of the qualificand exists in the nature of an object, but it is called qualified. This phenomenon of qualifiedness (*viśiṣṭatā*) remains in an object which is different from its own essence as we find in the case of the knowledge of *danḍī* i.e. an individual having some stick. In this case, there is neither the knowledge of an individual nor the knowledge of the conjunction of the stick. But in this case an individual endowed with some extraneous character is referred to. ‘Being endowed with the stick’ (*danḍopasarjanatva*) is the differentiating factor of him from others. For this reason a qualifier is always called a

differentiator (*bhedaka*). By virtue of being qualificand the stick attached with the individual differentiates this particular individual from others. This is the essential difference between *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*. The same function of differentiation is done by the *Upalakṣaṇa* also, but this is not due to the prior awareness of it. In the case of the knowledge of *dandī* the knowledge of *danda* is a pre-requisite. In the same way, in the case of *jaṭābhistāpasam* (a saint is known by his clotted hair), the 'clotted hair' is the prerequisite of such awareness. In spite of this, this case is not same as the earlier one. Because, in this context, the clotted hair' (*jaṭā*) is not embedded in the word 'tāpasa' as we find in the case of 'dandī' in which the meaning of *danda* is inherent. As an individual with a stick is completely differentiated from another one without a stick an individual holding of stick is more, basic and the knowledge of 'stick' has become a pre-requisite. Hence, the knowledge in the form 'Dandī puruṣaḥ' is nothing but the result of the combination of two pieces of knowledge - *visesya* and *visesana*. In the same way, it can be said that the knowledge in the form - *Surabhi candanam* (sandal wood is fragrant) is the result of perception as it comes through *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*. Though sandal wood (*candanam*) is perceptually cognised, the fragrance, though not connected with our nose, comes to our awareness through the relation called *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*. Hence, there is no question of accepting the knowledge of fragrance as an inferential one, as advocated by the opponents. And thus, the opponents' view that the perception of fragrant sandalwood is due to both the sense-organs - visual (eye) and olfactory (nose) has been refuted by Śridhara.⁶

What is the utility of accepting *jñānalakṣaṇa* as a *sannikarṣa*? In reply, it may be said that in the case of 'sandalwood is fragrant' (*surabhi candanam*), the visual perception is possible so far as the piece of sandal wood is concerned. After this, the phenomenon of fragrance is not capable of being known through the same visual sense-organ due to the absence of the eye with it. Though the fragrance is inherited with sandal wood which is again connected (conjoined) with sense organ, it cannot directly be apprehended through the visual organ due to the lack of *sannikarṣa* with it. Hence, the knowledge of fragrance is not known through direction visual perception, but through *jñānalakṣaṇā*.⁷

It may be argued why the fragrance is not apprehended through *saṁyukta-samavāya* type of ordinary *sannikarṣa* (*laukikasannikarṣa*). For, this type of *sannikarṣa* is enumerated as one of the six types as found in Nyāya. In reply, it may be said that when a jar is conjoined with the eye, the red-colour inhered in it is simultaneously perceived by the same sense-organ, there is no question of taking the help of memory. But in the present case though sandal wood is connected with the eye, the fragrance inhered in the sandal wood is not capable of being known simultaneously through the same sense organ due to the lack of the said *sannikarṣa*. From this it follows that though there is a character of *saṁyukta-samavāya*, it cannot be taken as a *sannikarṣa* due to the above mentioned difficulty.

If we do not admit this type of *sannikarṣa* or contact, visual perception of fragrance in a piece of sandal wood, that of silver etc. relating to some other place at the time of error, mental perception of external *vyavasāya* (i.e. knowledge) in *anuvayavasāya* (apperception or knowledge of knowledge) will not be occurred, because there is no contact of eyes with fragrance or silver relating to some other place and external objects for the mental perception of these things.⁸ Here the contact means the *hetu* or link or cause of the said mental perception. Though there is a relation called conjoined inherence between fragrance and visual organ, it cannot be regarded as a *sannikarṣa* (contact) which is a cause (*hetu*) of a perception. Hence, we should admit *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* for the exposition of the perceptions mentioned above. So it is said : *Surabhi candanamiti jñāna^e sourabhasya bhānam katham syāt ?*⁹

Again, if *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is not admitted, how is the knowledge of fragrance in the perception like fragrant sandalwood possible ? Although the cognition of fragrance is attained by *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, yet the perception of fragrance will be possible by *jñānalakṣaṇa*¹⁰ In like manner, where a cloud of dust is known as smoke, the knowledge of the cloud of dust as smoke in *anuvayavasāya* (apperception i.e. the knowledge of knowledge) arises through the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* (the connection based on knowledge).

The theory of error propounded by the Naiyāyikas is called *anyathākhyāti-vāda* which is referred to by them for the substantiation of the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* and for the refutation of the prābhākara view. According to them, two pieces of knowledge alone cannot cause volition (pravṛtti). So, in the case of recognition and error, if one particular piece of determinate knowledge is not accepted, there can be no volition for picking up the object lying before one, e.g., a conch-shell (*sūkti*) which is falsely perceived as a piece of silver (*rajata*). Thus for the justification of the volition for picking up the object in the present case, *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* must be admitted. There can be no volition without the knowledge of the conduciveness to desired object (*iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*). Hence in the case of the illusory perception such as, 'This is silver', the inferential knowledge 'conduciveness to desired' as the following is to be accepted: This is a means to the attainment of my desired object on previous occasions. Such inferential knowledge is possible only for those who recognise *anyathākhyāti*. In the case of erroneous knowledge, the persons who do not admit one particular piece of determinate knowledge and yet, recognise two pieces of knowledge experiential and previous have no of silverhood in the object perceived and there can be no such inferential knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* (i.e., Conduciveness to what is desired).

According to *prācīna* (ancient) *naiyāyikas*, determinate knowledge is the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* but the Neo-Naiyāyikas point out that either determinate or indeterminate knowledge may be regarded as the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. If indeterminate knowledge, the old Naiyāyikas advocate, is regarded as the *sannikarṣa*, then we shall have to admit the absurd position of the validity of indeterminate knowledge. But it is not possible. The cause of 'the perception of knowledge is the contact known as conjoined inherence with the mind' (*manaḥsam'yuktasamavāya*). This contact is attended by the presence of all the conditions necessary for the manifestation of the object. But in the case of indeterminate knowledge there is no *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* as the condition for the manifestation of the object, although there is the normal contact called conjoined-inherence with the mind with that knowledge. Indeterminate knowledge being *nisprakāra* (unqualified) in character cannot be regarded as a *sannikarṣa*. But the

question is : if any kind of knowledge (determinate or indeterminate) is regarded as a *sannikarṣa*, then indeterminate knowledge also becomes a *sannikarṣa*. Therefore, it makes us bound to admit the perception of indeterminate knowledge which is absurd.

Those who believe that only *saparakāra jñāna* (determinate knowledge) is *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* accept that the apperception of such knowledge is always possible. If there is a knowledge without content i.e. *nisprakāra jñāna*, (indeterminate knowledge) the apperception of it is absurd in character. Therefore, the possibility of assuming it (i.e. *nisprakāra jñāna*) as an obstacle to the *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is irrelevant. For this reason *savikalpakajñāna* (i.e. determinate knowledge) is essential for *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* which leads to the law of parsimony (*lāghava*).¹¹

We know that memory-knowledge (*smṛti*) is regarded as the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* which is admitted by Raghunātha Śīromani. But, according to him, 'psychical trace' (*saṁskāra*) also is to be regarded as the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. It is not true that *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is always to be taken as a form of some knowledge but it can be said that *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is something having some content (*saviṣayaka*) of its own. Desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), volition (*kṛti* or *prayatna*) fall under the perview of *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* because they have some content.¹²

Hence, there are two views on the causality of *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* (*upanaya*): (1) the causality in the form of knowledgehood (*jñānatvarūpenakāraṇata*) and (ii) the causality in the form of something having its content. (*saviṣayatvarūpena kāraṇata*). According to the first view knowledge alone is the *upanaya* (precondition). (*saviṣayatva-rūpena kāraṇata*). According to the second view, besides knowledge, desire, aversion, volition and psychical trace (*saṁskāra*) are *upanaya* (precondition). In respect of the internal perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*) of 'desire' in the form 'I desire a pot' (*ghaṭamahamicchāmi*) the requisite knowledge of the 'pot' related to desire is attained by *upanaya*.

According to the second view, just after the desire of a pot the internal perception in the form 'I desire a pot' is done and in that internal perception 'the prior desire of the pot' is the '*upanaya*' which causes the *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa (upanitabhāna)* of the 'pot' which is related to the 'desire'.

Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa also, like Raghunātha Śiromani, has regarded knowledge, desire, aversion, volition and psychological trace, all as *upanaya*, or precondition (*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*).

A fallacy of variability (*vyabhicāradoṣa*) evolves from the recognition of two different kinds of causality for *upanitabhāna (jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa)*. This fallacy may be removed by applying the character of following immediately (*avyavahitottaratva*) to the differentiatum of effectuality (*kāryatāvachchedaka*).¹³ The causality of the reviver (*udvodhaka*) of the trace (*saṁskāra*) is included in the causality just as the *sāmānya* (the generic attribute) of *saṁskāra*. (*Saṁskāratva*). Hence *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is not possible because of unrevived psychological trace (*anudbhuta saṁskāra*).

The transcendental things (*padārthas*) like atom etc. may be the object of perception through *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

Refutation of the Objection of the Vedāntins :

The Vedāntins object to the Nyāya theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa*. They argue that the *jñānalakṣaṇa of the Naiyāyikas* is nothing but inference. According to the Nyāya theory, a man can perceive the fragrance of sandal wood by his sense of sight because he perceived previously the fragrance of it at another place. Here the Vedāntins hold that a man's previous knowledge of fragrance makes him possible to infer the unperceived fragrance of sandalwood. Thus the perception of smoke as related to fire in all cases can be inferred from a particular case of perception of smoke as related to fire. Therefore, there is no need of accepting the supernormal perception called *jñānalakṣaṇa* as propounded by the Naiyāyikas. Dharmarāja

Adhvarindra¹⁴ opines that *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* (acquired perception) consists of two acts of knowledge : perception and inference. perception in respect of that which is present before the sense, and inference in respect of that which was perceived in the past. In this way, Dharmarāja points out that the case 'The sandalwood is fragrant' is an example of two acts of knowledge : perception in respect of 'sandalwood', and inference in respect of 'fragrance'. But the transition from the perception of sandalwood' to the inference 'This is fragrant' is so swift and sudden that we think as if we 'see fragrance'.

Now we can justify whether the judgement, "I see a piece of fragrant sandalwood' is a case of perception as held by the Naiyāyikas or a case of inference as urged by the Vedāntins. The above judgement is an another instance of "complication" as held by the Western Philosophers, e.g., Ward, Stout and Wundt. The said proposition is equivalent to "The sandalwood looks fragrant". The other examples of complication is as, "Ice looks cold", "The armour looks hard, smooth and cold". We may say that the *jñānalakṣaṇa* of the Naiyāyikas is similar to the visual perception of distance since the eyes have no independent means of apprehending those relations of surfaces and lines which presuppose the third dimension. We can say that there can be a visual perception of fragrance provided that there can be visual perception of distance, coldness, hardness etc. So, now we shall have to discuss the justification of (a) of distance (b) of coldness, hardness, etc. and (c) of fragrance.

In the first case, J.S.Mill opines that the perception of distance by the eye depends on the inference. Modern psychologists say that there is a perception of distance. With regard to the other cases, there is a difference of opinion among the philosophers both Indian and Western. According to the Vedāntins, all such cases are grounded on inference and the Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that they are genuine perceptions. With regard to the second group of cases, modern psychologists point out that they are one kind of perception for which they give the name of "complication" which differs from the ordinary perceptions. The Naiyāyikas declare for the third case that there is visual perception of fragrance.

But there is a distinction between perception and inference. perception is an immediate knowledge of objects or a knowledge of something which is not attained by any other knowledge. And inference is the indirect knowledge of something through the medium of some sign which is always related to it. There is an explication of some data in both the cases of perception and inference. A differentiation between a given and a suggested content is done in both the cases. In case of perception there is a synthesis of some sensuous elements and some non-sensuous presentations. These two elements are not kept distinct in the case of perception. Here, they become one whole. They may form parts of a complex object. The transition of consciousness from the one to the other is not possible here. We do not think of one independent of the other. The one immediately indicates the other and produces the knowledge of an object as one whole, of which they are the parts. Hence, in the case of a person's visual perception of a rose, the sensory element e.g., its colour immediately suggests its other qualities, i.e., its touch and smell, and the sensed and the presented elements cause the perception of the rose.

Inference gives us a knowledge of an object through the instrumentality of the knowledge of some other object which is uniformly related to the first object. Here, the second object suggests the first one through the uniform relation with them. And the suggestive object and the suggested object do not fuse into one whole as they do in case of perception. So, the distinction between the inference and the perception is as follows : perception is the integral immediate consciousness of an object. Inference is a multiple mediated consciousness of an object which may be expressed as this-
therefore-that .

We cannot accept the Advaitin's view that to recognise *jñānalakṣaṇa* as a form of perception is to ignore the distinction between perception and inference. When we express such judgements, as "ice looks cold", "the sandal looks fragrant", there is no transition of thought from ice to coldness or from the sandal to its fragrance. We do not argue, "since ice, therefore cold" "since sandal, therefore fragrant".

On the other hand, coldness or fragrance is a part of the presentation of the ice or the sandal. The above judgements may be expressed in another way as, "I see the cold ice" or the fragrant sandal", just as it is said, "we see the distant hill". When we infer fire from smoke, we have a transition of thought from smoke to fire as two distinct objects. Here we don't say, "I see the fiery smoke". Here we only think of the fire but it is not presented to us. Therefore, to admit *jñānalakṣaṇā* as a form of perception is not to obliterate the distinction between perception and inference.

In case of the visual perception of a rose or a stone or a block of ice, some tactual quality is present. But in case of visual perception of sandalwood, such presentation of fragrance is not there. Here it can be said that if the eye can present a tactual quality like softness or hardness or coldness (e.g. the judgements, 'the rose looks soft,' 'the stone looks hard' etc) which it is not fitted, by nature to perceive, it is not inherently impossible by the eye to perceive smell. So, we have to consider under what conditions perception takes place. After discovering these conditions, it will be found that, though perception and inference are two fundamentally distinct ways of knowing, yet psychologically it is impossible to distinguish between them.

In perception there is the union of certain sensuous elements with non-sensuous presentations into one whole. Here, the sensuous elements are the given and the non-sensuous elements are presented by the given. Generally, when there is either a natural or a habitual association between the sensuous and the non-sensuous elements, perception takes place. Here one element immediately calls up the other and the two are fused into one whole of presentation of some object. 'Natural association' means an association, in our minds, of one sense quality with such other sense qualities which are by nature, connected with it. Hence, we can say that this type of associations will be experienced by us very often and so it is rooted in our minds. We know that there are five senses and five respective sense qualities, e.g., smell, taste, colour, touch and sound. Remembering this sense qualities in the order quoted above, it can be said that there is a natural connection of that which precedes to those which succeed it, but not *vice-versa*. Hence, a smelling object possesses some taste, colour, touch and sound. But an object having sound like

space or air has no colour, taste and smell. Therefore, generally we can say that, to smell an object is to find and touch it. But to see or touch a thing is not to taste or smell it. Thus, a smell or taste sensation generally reminds us the colour and touch of a thing.

A 'habitual association', on the other hand, is the association in our minds of one sense quality with those which are not, by nature, connected with it. So, we experience it less frequently and in many cases, it is looser than a natural association.¹⁵ If a habitual association between them is one formed in our minds, one sense quality immediately calls up others and all of them are mixed up into one whole and the perception of one object is presented. Hence, there is no connection between sound and touch because sound is in space but no touch. In the like manner, touch has no natural connection with colour because there is touch in the air but no colour. In the same way, colour has no natural relation to taste and smell. Hence, colour is found in light but no taste and smell. So, we find that an association of colour with smell is looser than that of smell with colour, with which it has natural connection. Although the mere smell of kerosene immediately suggests its colour, the latter by itself cannot possibly suggest the former. But a habitual association between them may be established in our minds by continuous experiences of their uniform connection with one another and one sense quality may present another that is not generally connected with it. In this way, the tactual and visual qualities of a bell are presented by the sound of it and the auditory preception of a bell is presented by us. In the like manner, the sight of the bell presents its tactual and auditory qualities and a visual perception of it is possible by us. In this way, it seems our judgement, "I hear the bell", is presented in the another way as, "I see the bell".

A natural and a habitual association (the two alternative conditions of perception) between its two elements are grasped by an individual through repeated experiences of the wordly objects. A natural association between them does not mean that it is congenital. Therefore, the association is made in the mind of every person from his or her birth. If it were so, every child should have perceptions like any grown up man. A natural association has a basis in the constitution of things and it is

very often realised by the experiences of an individual. Hence, if both natural and habitual associations are formed by repeated experiences, two important results will be found : (1) It follows that under the same objective conditions, the knowledge of the same object may be a matter of perception or inference for different individuals, according as there is or is not a natural or a habitual association as the basis of their knowledge, (2) It follows that, under the same objective conditions, the knowledge of the same object may at first be a matter of inference and subsequently of perception and vice versa, for one and the same individual.

The knowledge of a rose which is seen is a perception for the person in whom the continuous experiences of roses have produced a natural or a habitual association between its colour and touch and smell. Under the same external conditions, the knowledge of the said rose will be an inference for another person. Here, for want of repeated experiences, the colour of the rose does not immediately remember its touch and smell but indicates them as distinct ideas or images on the ground of its similarity to the colour of roses. For example, we may refer to the difference between our knowledge of a new type of rose and that of the gardener by whom it is presented to us. An aged man who is familiar with armour may look it hard, smooth and cold. A baby may just imagine it to have these or other different qualities, e.g., tactual qualities.

The fragrance of sandalwood may be directly known from its visual organ by those who are closely familiar with it but for others its visual appearance may only be a sign from which its fragrance is inferred. If I go to a foreign country I can infer the distance and size of an object from its visual appearance. But a native of the country who is familiar with the environment has a perception of these from the same position, which is essentially visual. Anyway, if I stay there for some months and become familiar with the environment, I may have a visual perception of the same facts under the same objective conditions.

The above discussion leads us to conclude that there is no absolute line of demarcation which can be drawn between perception and inference. Sometimes the

knowledge of an object may be a perceptual one and it may be an inferential to another individual at other time i.e., we cannot say that under the same objective conditions the knowledge of an object must always be a perceptual for every individual and that it can never be otherwise. We cannot also say that such knowledge must always be an inferential for all individuals and that it can never be a perception. Therefore, we should conclude that it may be either, for different individuals, or for the same individual at different stages of his or her life, according to his or her or their mental equipment.

The answers which have been given to the two questions quoted above are justified because under certain conditions it is possible that there may be a presentation of fragrance through the visual sense-organ. If these conditions are fulfilled, we can attain an immediate knowledge of fragrance through the visual organ i.e. the eye. Therefore, the Vedāntins must admit that there can be a visual perception of fragrance, because they say that perception is an immediate knowledge of fragrance and it is not a knowledge achieved by sense stimulation. Thus, it is admitted that there can be a visual perception of fragrance and some western psychologists also believe that there is a visual perception of hardness, coldness, softness etc. However, as such perceptions are presented by sense-organs and as these sense organs cannot perceive their objects, we should call them supernormal and place them in a separate class called *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*.

Some Problems Concerning Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyāsatti for Explaining the Perception of Negation :

As we have already found, Harirāma has taken the aid of supernormal connection in case of perception of negation (*abhāva*). All Naiyāyikas admit that negation is invariably linked to a negatum (*pratiyogin*). Whenever a negation is known and explicated, it is determined by a negatum. So, when negation of a jar on the ground is perceived by us, the negatum, i.e., the jar is also perceived. That is to say, the content of perception is 'negation with negatum as an adjunct to it'.

Now, if we examine the situation, it will be seen that there are difficulties in its path. Because, in the absence of the negatum, the contact between it and the visual organ cannot be established. Hence, the Naiyāyika proposes that the negatum is presented to the sense through memory-knowledge and so, the contact between the negatum and the visual organ is said to be supernormal.

We should notice here that when the Naiyāyika says that the negatum appears as an adjunct to negation, the relation that subsists between the two is, in his opinion, one of *pratyogitā* only and not one of physical contact which determines the relation as a container and its contained (*ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva*). That is to say, in the case of negation of a jar, for example, the negation includes all jars past, present and future. But, none of the three categories, of jar are physically present when negation is felt. Hence the Naiyāyika admits that the relation between negation and its negatum is one of *pratyogitā* only and not of *ādhārādheyabhāva* (relation between substratum and superstratum).

The serious analysis of this view point of the Naiyāyika will show that the argument in favour of asserting supernormal contact named *jñānalakṣaṇa* is not convincing. The Naiyāyika accepts that the relation between the two, e.g., negation and its negatum, is not to be taken as *ādhārādheyabhāva* i.e. relation existing between substratum and superstratum and yet he points out that the negation will reveal as an adjunct to its negation in the perception of the latter. The position is anomalous and does not stand the test of criticism. If we say that the negatum and its negation are not related as *ādhāra* and *ādheya*, the implication is that they are dissociated from each other and in that case one cannot be described as an adjunct to the other. Further, in view of the fact that negation and its negatum cannot co-exist, it cannot be ascertained how the former will be perceived as an adjunct to the latter. It is, therefore, not realised, how from the Naiyāyika point of view the negatum would be presented through supernormal contact.

It is for this reason that our present ^{comme-} narrator, i.e., Gadadhara Bhattacharya does not agree with Harirāma when he requisitions the office of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti*

for explaining perception of negation. Rather, he thinks that the instance under review may be explained satisfactorily without the aid of any supernormal contact. He opines that negation is characterised by two properties, viz., absencehood (*abhāvatva*) and counter positiveness (*pratiyogitva*). The *abhāvatva* has been described by the Naiyāyika as *anuyogitva*. It is, therefore, quite understandable that in all cases of the knowledge of negation both these characters of negation viz., subjunctness (*anuyogitva*) and counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitva*) will be comprehended. Now, it is *pratiyogitva* which is explained by the appellation of the negatum and whenever we perceive a negation, we always comprehend and express it through the medium of the appellation of its negatum. It is not a fact that the negatum is presented in any way as an adjunct to negation in the case of its perception. It is, therefore, concluded that there is no valid ground for recognising *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti* in the case of perception of negation.

Next, we proceed to review the case of introspection for which also Harirāma has sought the aid of *jñānalakṣaṇa - pratyāsatti*. According to the Naiyāyika, introspection is the perception of knowledge which is not caused by external organ but happens to be purely a mental process. As the mind is the instrument of the knowledge which is comprehended in introspection, it cannot be the organ for revealing the content of the knowledge for which an external sense organ only operates. But, a question arises. The visual perception of a jar, for instance, is comprehended in a subsequent introspection. Here the jar enters into the content of introspection as an adjunct to the visual perception. So far as the visual perception is concerned, it is comprehended by the mind. That is to say, the mind is the instrument for the visual perception. But how can the content of the visual perception, namely, the jar, be comprehended by the mind? The difficulty is that the jar is not amenable to the mind which is, after all, an internal sense-organ. Harirāma thinks that the time of introspection by the mind it is the visual perception that will officiate as the contact between its own content, viz., the jar and the mind and certainly such contact cannot but be super normal.

We beg to submit that it is not necessary to requisition the office of supernormal contact in the case as described above. Like *pratiyogitva* as in the case of negation, *viṣayatā* also does not determine two relata as a container and its contained and as such, the content of visual perception in the case cited above cannot appear as an adjunct to the visual perception itself when it is comprehended in a subsequent introspection. Further, *viṣayatā* relates knowledge to objects which are not merely present, but past and future also. And, as such it is not possible to have the content of the visual perception as an adjunct to the content of introspection.

The commentator of the book *Jñānalakṣaṇa-*

Vicārahāsyam solves the difficulty in the following way :

Viṣayatā like *jñānatva* is a property of knowledge and as such, the mind can rightly be described as the organ that comprehends it. It is, therefore, quite in the fitness of things to suggest that the content of visual perception is comprehended by the mind. As we have explained in the case of negation, *viṣayatā* is invariably understood and communicated through the appellation of the *viṣayatā*. Thus, we conclude by saying that so far as introspection is concerned we need not seek the aid of any supernormal contact.

NAVYA-NAIYĀYIKA VIEW ON JÑĀNALAKṢṆA PRATYAKṢA :

Gaṅgeśa and his followers, i.e., the Navya-Naiyāyikas think that when we see a piece of sandal-wood and feel that it is fragrant, we have not an internal perception of fragrant sandal through the *manas*, as Jayānta Bhaṭṭa thinks. But we have a distinctly visual perception of the fragrant sandal. But the question is : How can we have a visual perception of the fragrant sandal, because fragrance can never be an object of visual perception ? In response to this, Gaṅgeśa says that the visual perception of fragrant sandal is not a normal perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*) due to an ordinary contact (*laukika sannikarṣa*), but that it is a supernormal perception because of a supernormal contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*). There cannot be a normal contact of the

visual organ with the fragrance of the sandal, since smell is not an object of visual perception. But the fragrance of the sandal revived in memory by association produces a supernormal contact called *jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*, and through it constitutes the visual perception of the fragrant sandal. In this case, though there is normal contact of the visual organ with the sandal and hence, there is a direct visual perception of the sandal there is a supernormal contact through the idea of fragrance revived in memory by association, and in this way, there arises a visual perception of the fragrant sandal. Therefore, the Navya-Naiyāyikas differ from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who holds that though the sandal is perceived by the visual organ, the fragrant sandal is not perceived by it but by the *manas*, when there is a visual perception of the sandal with a recollection of its fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ in the past.¹⁶

According to Vardhamāna, there is a difference between the visual perception of fragrant sandal and the olfactory perception of the fragrance of sandal. Sometimes we see a piece of sandal and at once perceive that it is fragrant. And sometimes we smell an odour and at once perceive that it is the fragrance of sandal. The former perception is produced by the visual organ in cooperation with the recollection of fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ on a previous occasion. And the latter perception is produced by the olfactory organ in cooperation with the recollection of sandal perceived by the visual organ in the past.¹⁷

According to both the earlier and later Naiyāyikas, the perception of fragrant sandal is a single unitary presentation, it is not a compound of presentative and representative elements but a presentation qualified by a representative process which is its immediate antecedent. The Naiyāyika does not admit a mixed mode of consciousness, which is admitted by the Advaita Vedānta. The Naiyāyika holds that there is no simultaneity of psychoses owing to the atomic nature of the *manas*. Further, he adds that there cannot be an intermixture of two heterogenous psychoses, for example, a presentative process and a representative process. This has been clearly averred by Udayana.¹⁸

Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa (Acquired Perception) in Jaina Philosophy :

According to Jaina Philosophy, the visual perception of fragrant sandalwood is a case of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* or acquired perception. The visual organ alone, i.e., eye cannot perceive the fragrant sandal, since fragrance cannot be apprehended by the visual organ. Even in cooperation with the recollection of fragrance, the visual organ cannot produce this perception, because, in that case, odour will be apprehended by the eye, which is not possible. One cannot perceive smell with the aid of visual sense. Therefore, we cannot perceive the fragrant sandal aided by the visual organ alone and it is not possible by the cooperation with the recollection of odour also.¹⁹ We are apprehended by the fragrant sandal after the operation of fragrance. From this it cannot be said that it is a simple psychosis of the nature of visual perception produced by the visual sense. In fact, it is a complex psychosis of presentative and representative process mixed up together. Here, it is a mixed form of consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements mechanically associated with each other. An integrative association of two coordinate and co-existent elements are found and the visual percept of the sandal and the idea of fragrance freely reproduced in memory. The apprehension of fragrant sandal is simply a sum of two distinct psychic entities, the present visual sensation of the sandal and an image of its fragrance reproduced from past experience by association and integrated together into a complex psychosis. Not only that; it involves a judgement and an inference. Though the sandal is perceived by the visual organ, and the fragrance is reproduced in memory by the law of association, the apprehension of the sandal as qualified by fragrance, or fragrant sandal, involves a process of judgement and inference. In this way, the Jaina thinks that there is a free association of ideas, judgement, and inference in the acquired perception of fragrant sandal. *Jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* or an acquired perception is rather an act of inference than perception, though it depends on both perception and recollection.²⁰ There is a similarity between this account of an acquired perception and the account of the associationist psychology of the west.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsattistu yadvīṣayakam jñānam, tasyaiva pratyāsattiriti - *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, Verse No. 65.
2. Tathāca alaukika viṣayatāsamvādhena pratyakṣam prati viṣayatāsamvādhena jñānapratyāsatterhetuvāditi bhāvaḥ evamca ubhayoḥ pratyāsattyoḥ jñānasvarūpatve'pi phalavaicitryāt pratyāsattitāvachchedakasaṁvādhābhedaṇa kāryakāraṇabhāvadvayam svikāryamiti nigudhābhiprāyaḥ. Prabhā commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse No. 65. *Kārikavālī*, Ed. Shri C. Shankarram Shastri, Choukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi - 110007, p. 467.
3. Candānakhaṇḍasya cākṣuṣe Jāyamāne upasthitasaurabhabhānam na syāt saurabhāmsē cakṣuḥsannikarṣābhāvādityarthaḥ. Saurabhatvaprakāra-kalaukikapratyakṣasāmagryāḥ sahakāriṇyā virahena saurabhatvasāmānyalakṣanayā'pi saurabhabhānam na sambhavatīti bhāvaḥ..... Jñānalakṣanayā jñānalakṣanayaiva. Tadānī saurabhatvāmsē dharmāntarasyāgrhīta-tayā sāmānyalakṣanayā tadbhānānirvāhāditi bhāvaḥ. *Dinakarī commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse No. 65. Ibid, pp. 467-469.
4. Yattuso'yamiti pratyabhijñādikam dharmiviṣayakānubhavātma-katattāviṣayaka smaraṇātma-kajñānadvayameva. Tattāsmaraṇam saṁskārādanubhavastu laukikasannikarṣādevotpadyata ityupanītabhāne mānābhāvaḥ. *Jñānalakṣanāvīcā-rarahasyam* of Śrī Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa : By Anantakumar Bhattacharyya, Ed. by Gopikamohan Bhattacharyya, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1958, pp. 11-12.
5. Yugapajñānānutpattirmanaso liṅgam. *Nyāyasūtra* - i.1.16.

6. Ye tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayorekajñānāmbanātmāhuḥ, teṣāṃ surabhi candanamityatra kā vārtā ? Nahi cakṣurgandhaviśayaṃ na ca ghrāṇaṃ dravyamādatte. Ata eva na tābhyāṃ sambandhagrahaṇam, ubhayaśamvādhigrahaṇādhi-
natvātsamvādhigrahaṇasya. Yathā saṃskārendriyajanyaṃ pratyabhijñā-
pratyakṣamubhayakāraṇasāmarthyātpūrvāparakālavīśayam, evaṃ
cakṣurghrāṇābhyāṃ sambhūya janyamānamidaṃ kāraṇadvaya-
sāmarthyādubhayaviśayaṃ syādityeke samarthayanti.

Tadapi na sādhiyaḥ, nirbhāgatvāt. Yadi Jñānaṃ sabhāgam syāttadā
kaścidasyāṃśo ghrāṇena janyate kaściccakṣuṣetyupapadyate vyavasthā,
kintvidamekamakhaṇḍamubhābhyāṃ janitaṃ yadi gandhaṃ dravyaṃ
caḡrṇhāti, tadā gandhōpi cākṣuṣo dravyamapi ghrāṇagamyāṃ prasaktam,
tajanitajñānavīśayatvalakṣṇatvāttadindriya- grāhyatāyāḥ. Na
cāṇutvānmanaso yugapadubhayendriyādhiṣṭhānasambhavaḥ. Tasmād
ghrāṇena gandhe grhīte paścāttadgrahaṇasaḥakāriṇā cakṣuṣā
kevalaviśeṣyālamvanamevedaṃ viśeṣyajñānaṃ janyata
ityakāmenāpyabhyupagantavyam. Tathā ca satyanyeṣāmapī viśeṣyajñā-
nānāmayaṃ nyāya upatiṣṭhate. Vivādādhyāsitaṃ viśeṣyajñānaṃ
kevalaviśeṣyālamvanam pratyakṣatve sati viśeṣyajñānatvāt
surabhi candanamiti jñānavat. Pratyakṣatve satīti Laiṅgikajñānavyavaeche-
dārtham. Nanu yadi dravyasvarūpamātrameva viśeṣyajñānasyālamvanam,
asatyapi viśeṣaṇe tathā pratyayaḥ syāt. Atha viśeṣaṇasya janakatvānnya
tadabhāve viśeṣyajñānodayaḥ, tathāpi dravyarūpapratyayādasya na viśeṣaḥ,
viśayaviśeṣamantareṇa jñānasya viśeṣantarābhāvāt, na, anabhyupagamāt.
Na viśeṣyajñānasya dravyasvarūpamātramālamvanam vrūmaḥ, kintu viśiṣṭam.
Viśiṣṭatā ca svarūpātirekiṇyeva, yā daṇḍīti jñāne pratibhāsate. Na khalu tatra
puruṣamātrasya pratīrnāpi daṇḍasamyogitāmātrasya. Tatha ca daṇḍīti
pratītvāitaravilakṣaṇa eva puruṣaḥ saṃvedyate. Vailakṣaṇyaṃ cāsya
daṇḍopasarjanatvameva. Ata eva viśeṣaṇam vyavacchedakamiti gīyate. Daṇḍo
hi svopasarjanatāpratīpattim puruṣe kurvan puruṣamitarasamād vyavacchinatti.

Ayameva cāsyopalakṣaṇādvīśeṣaḥ. Upalakṣaṇamapi vyavaechinatti na tu svopasarjanatāpratītihetuḥ. Nahi yathā daṇḍīti daṇḍopasarjanatā puruṣe pratīyate tathā jatābhistāpasa iti tāpase jaṭopasarjanatā, daṇḍopasarjanatā puruṣasya prādhānyaṁ vārthakriyāyamupabhogātīśayā'natīśayāpekṣayā. Nanvevaṁ tarhyāpekṣiko'yam viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo na vāstavaḥ, kiṁ na dṛṣṭo bhavadbhiḥ karṭrkāraṇādivyavahāra āpekṣiko vāstavaśceti kṛtaṁ vistareṇa saṁgrahatīkāyām. Nyāyakandalī, *Prasāstapādabhāṣya* with commentary Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara, Ed. Kshetresachandra Chattopadhyaya, Ganganatha Jha Granthamala, vol.I, Varanasi, 1963, pp. 276-279.

7. Candanakhaṇḍasya cākṣuṣāpratyakṣe jāyamāne'pi saurabhāṁśe cākṣuḥ-sannikarṣābhāvāt cākṣusaṁyukta samavāyasya saurabhe sannikarṣatvā sambhavāt tatra saurabhābhānaṁ na syādityarthaḥ - *Muktāvalīsaṁgraha* on Siddhāntamuktāvalī under Verse No. 65.
 8. Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse No. 65, See *Bhāsāparicchedaḥ* : Sri Pañcānan Bhaṭṭacharyya, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, 1377 (Bengali), p. 308.
 9. Surabhi candanamiti jñāne saurabhasya bhānaṁ kathaṁ syāt - Ibid.
 10. Yadyapi sāmānya-lakṣaṇayāpi Saurabhasya bhānaṁ sambhavati, tathāpi saurabhatvasya bhānaṁ jñānalakṣaṇayā - Ibid., P. 309 .
 11. Saprakāraḥ jñānopanāyakatāmate ca sarvatra mānasajñānabhānasambhavana jñānadyaviśayaka mānasasyāprasiddhyā tatsthaliya sāmagrīprati-vandhakatvākalpanena lāghavam.
- Harirāmatarkavāgīśa : *Jñānalakṣaṇāvicārahāsyam*, Ed. Gopikamohan Bhaṭṭacharyya, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1958, p. 99.
12. Ye tu tattadigocarasaṁskārādapi pratyabhijñādīkaṁ svīkurvate te saṁskārasādhāranyānurodhena jñānatvamanantarbhāvya tadviśayatāsālitve-naiva tadupanāyakatā ityāhuḥ , Ibid, pp. 48-49.

13. Uktalāghavena saṁskāratvena saṁskārasyaṅpyupanāya-katāsiddhau tajjanyopanītabhāne vyāvīcāravāraṅāyāvyaḥhitottaratvanivesāsyāvaśya-katvāt - Ibid, pp.106-107.
14. Surabhi candanamityādi - jñānamapi candanāṁśe aparokṣam. Saurabhāṁśe parokṣam, saurabhasya cakṣurindriyāyogyatayā yogyatva ghaṭitasya nirukta - lakṣaṅasyābhāvāt. Dharmarāja Advāraṅdra - *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, Ed. Panchanan Bhattacharyya, Chapter-1, (Pratyakṣa Parīcheda), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, pp.42-43.
15. Stout : *A Manual of Psychology*, pp. 102-103. And Bosanquet : *The Essentials of Logic*, p.31.
16. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (Viśvanātha) Javajis Edition, Bombay, 1916, pp. 283-284. *Dinakari* (Dinakara Bhaṭṭa) on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, Bombay, 1916, pp. 283-284.
- Tarkāmṛta* (Jagadīśa), Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1921, Chapter IV, p. 14.
17. *Nyāyakusumāñjaliprakāśa* (Vardhamana) on *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Benares, 1912, p. 105.
18. *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (Udayana), Benares, 1912, p.104.
19. Na hi parimalamaranasavyapekṣam locanam surabhi candanamiti pratyayamutpādayati..... gandhasyāpi locanajñānaviṣayatvaprasaṅgāt. *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa* (Prabhācandra), Jāvāji's Edition, Bombay, 1912, p.150 and p. 143.
20. Gandhasmaraṅsahakārilocanavyāpārānantaram surabhi candanamiti pratyayapratīteḥ tanna pratyakṣeṅāsau pratyate. Ibid, p.150.