

CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

Pramā :

An object is revealed through its cognition. Just as a lamp illuminates an object, the cognition also reveals an object. Hence, cognition plays a vital role in our daily life. A cognition which has, for its object, something which possesses the character which it (the cognition) has for its predicate, is a valid cognition, for example, the knowledge 'This is silver', in respect of silver. It is this veridical cognition (yathārtha *anubhava*) which is called *pramā* (valid knowledge)¹.

PRAMĀNA :

The instrument or means of valid cognition (*pramā*) is called *pramāna* (the source of knowledge). It is *pramākaraṇatva* (instrumental to *Pramā*) which is the common characteristics of *pramāna* (source of knowledge). *Pramā* arises from four kinds of *pramāna* viz., (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference (*anumāna*), (3) comparison (*upamāna*), and (4) verbal testimony (*śabda*)² as accepted by Gautama, a noted Nyāya Philosopher. After-wards, other Nyāya and Navya-Nyāya Philosophers accepted these four *pramānas* of Gautama.

The Vaisesikas admit two *pramānas* : (i) Perception (*Pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference (*anumāna*). According to them, comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) can be included in the inference,^{2,1} and hence they are not separate sources of knowing.

The other Indian Schools of Philosophy accept from one to eight *Pramānas*.

The Buddhists accept perception and Inference only.

The Jainas, Yogas, Sāṃkhya and Rāmānuja generally accept perception, Inference and Testimony.

The Mimāṃsakas admit three to six *pramāṇas*: Jaimini admits three viz. Perception, Inference and Testimony. Apart from these three, Prabhākara accepts two more *pramāṇas*, viz., comparison (*Upamāna*) and prostulation (*Arthāpatti*). In addition to these, three *pramanas* of Jaimini and two *pramanas* of Prabhākara, Kumārila accepts one more *pramāṇa* i.e. Non-apprehension (*Anupalabdhi*). Thus, Kumārila and his followers accept six *pramanas*, namely, (i) Perception, (2) Inference (3) Comparison (4) Testimony (5) Presumption and (6) Non-apprehension, which are accepted by Vedānta also.

The Status of Perception :

Perception is the most fundamental and important source of the above kinds of sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) because it is the basis of all the other sources of knowledge since inference, comparison and verbal testimony depend upon perception.³ The *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama and Vātsyāyanas commentary on it shows that inference depends on perception. Gautama says, "Next, inference (*anumāna*) which is preceded by it (perception) is of three kinds, namely, that having the antecedent as the probans (*purvavat*), that having the consequent as the probans (*śeṣavat*) and that having the *vyāpti* (the relation of invariable concomitance) ascertained by general observation.⁴ The expression 'preceded by it' means preceded by perception. Commenting on this, Vātsyāyana says that preceded by it means the perception of the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum (*liṅga-liṅginoh sambandha-darśanam*) as well as the perception of the probans (*liṅga-darśana*). Comparison (*Upamāna*) is the instrument of the valid knowledge of an object derived through the perception of its similarity with another well-known (*prasiddha*) object.⁵ Verbal testimony also depends upon perception of words spoken or written by a 'trustworthy person' (*āpta*) who has direct awareness of an object.⁶ So all the other three sources of knowledge i.e. inference, comparison and verbal testimony depend upon perception. Again, perception is superior to all the other sources of knowledge because, if there arises any doubt regarding the authenticity of any other source of knowledge, then that source depends on perception. Even after knowing an object by testimony, one may want to know it by inference and even after knowing it by inference one wants to know it through perception.

On the other hand, although perception is, according to the Naiyāyikas, the basic source of knowledge, it is not self-evidently true. Perceptual error also may be occurred due to various reasons because our senses may be defective and conditions of perception may be insufficient etc.

Definition of Perception :

Perception has been defined in different ways by the different section of the Naiyāyikas. Regarding this definition there is a difference between old (*prācina*) and modern (*Navya*) Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines perception as the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact and which is not due to words 'invariably related' to the object (*avyabhicārin*) and is 'of a definite character (*vyavasāyātmaka*)'. This definition of perception excludes divine and yogic perception which is not generated by the contact of the sense-organs with the objects. So Viśvanātha has defined perception as 'direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition'⁸ (*Jñānakaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*)⁹. This definition includes normal as well as supernormal perception.

Vātsyāyana raises a possible objection against the above definition. Mere sense-object contact cannot result in perception, for according to Gautama's own view, in the case of perception the self comes in contact with the mind, next the mind comes in contact with the sense and lastly the sense concerned comes in contact with the object perceived.⁹ In response to this Vātsyāyana says that Gautama defines perception by mentioning only its 'special cause' (*asādhāraṇa - kāraṇa*). The sūtra does not, therefore, exclude the contact of the self with the mind from the causes of perception. On the contrary, such a contact being a common cause of all forms of knowledge, perception cannot be defined as the knowledge derived from the contact of the self with the mind. Gautama uses the expression 'cognition produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the object' to exclude inference, comparison, testimony etc.¹⁰

Another objection is raised against this. If Gautama's purpose is to mention the special cause of perception, he should have also mentioned

the contact of the sense with mind. In the cases of perception through an 'external sense' (*vahirindriya*), the sense itself must come in contact with mind and such a contact too is one of the special causes of external perception. In reply to this objection, Vātsyāyanā says that the contact of the mind with the senses does not differ in the different cases of perceptual knowledge, but remains the same in every part of it.¹¹ Its implication is explained by Vācaspati Mīśra in the following way :

A perceptual knowledge is named after either its object or the sense concerned. When colour (*rūpa*) is perceived by the eyes, the perceptual knowledge is called 'knowledge of colour (*rūpa-jñāna*) or 'visual knowledge' (*cākṣuṣa-jñāna*). A thing is often named after its special cause. Thus, though the sprout has various causes it is named after its special causes, the seed. Similarly a perceptual knowledge is named after either the object or the sense in which inheres its special cause, namely, the sense-object contact. Though the contact of self with mind and the contact of mind with sense are causes of such. Perceptions, the pieces of perceptual knowledge are named neither after self nor after mind in which these contacts inhere. From this point of view the contact of self with mind is similar to that of mind with sense. That is why, like the contact of self with mind, the contact of mind with sense is not mentioned in the sūtra.

The Naiyāyika admits six senses (*indriyas*), namely, the five external senses - (1) visual (*cākṣuṣa*) (2) auditory (*śrotra*) (3) gustatory (*rasanā*) (4) olfactory (*ghrāṇa*) (5) touch (*tvak*)¹² and (6) one internal sense i.e., mind (*manas*). In the Nyāya-Sūtra No. 1.1.12 Gautama states only five external senses. Yet he accepts mind (*manas*) as a sense. The Vaiśeṣika also mentions these six senses.

Among the above five external senses, vision and touch are the means of perception of substance and quality. They are both *dravya-grāhaka* (i.e. capable of apprehending a substance). But taste, hearing (*śrotra*) and smell are means of perception of quality only. Thus, these three senses are *guṇa-grāhaka* only (i.e. capable of apprehending quality alone). Mind (*manas*) is also the means of perception of qualities like pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) etc. So this can also be taken in a *guṇa-grāhaka* sense.

The object (*artha*) in the above term means substance or physical object (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), e.g., colour (*rūpa*), any tangible quality (*sparsā*), savour (*rasa*), sound (*dhvani*) and odour (*gandha*) as well as internal object (*āntarika guṇa*) e.g., pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) etc.

The word '*artha*' or object in the *sūtra* is used in the sense of only perceptible objects. There is no perception without a contact between such an object and the sense of only perceptible objects. There is no perception without a contact between such an object and the sense. The contact (*sannikarṣa*) existing in the definition means six kinds of contact. According to Uddyotakara, the sense-object contact is of six kinds, such as (1) conjunction (*saṁyoga*), (2) Inherence in what is conjoined (*saṁyukta-samavāya*) (3) Inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*), (4) inherence (*samavāya*) (5) inherence in the inhered (*samavetasamavāya*) and (6) adjunct-substantive relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-bhāva*)¹³. In case of the perception of substance of an object (*dravya*) the sense-object contact is of the nature of conjunction (*saṁyoga*). Hence, in the visual and touch perception of a jar, the sense is conjoined with the object. Inherence in what is conjoined (*saṁyuktasamavāya*) is exemplified in the perception of a quality (*guṇa*) or action (*kriyā*), e.g., colour inheres in a substance and it is perceived when the visual organ comes in contact with that substance.

In the perception of 'universal inhering in quality and in movement' (*guṇagata* and *karmagata jāti*) the sense-object - contact is of the nature of inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*). The visual perception of colourness (*rupatva*) is due to such a contact, for colourness as a universal inheres in a colour which again inheres in the jar and the jar is conjoined with the visual sense.

In the perception of sound the sense-object contact is of the nature of inherence (*samavāya*) because sound is a quality and it inheres in the substance *ākāśa* (and the auditory sense itself is of the nature of *ākāśa* i.e., the *ākāśa* enclosed by the ear canal).

In the perception of the universal soundness (*śabdatvajāti*), the sense-object - contact is of the nature of inherence in the inhered (*samaveta-samavāya*), for soundness inheres in sound which inheres in the auditory sense.

In the perception of inherence and non-existence (*abhāva*) the sense-object contact is of the nature of adjunct-substantive relation. None of the five forms of contact mentioned above is possible in the perception of these two and hence a special type of contact called *viśeṣanatā* or *viśeṣana-viśeṣyabhāva* is postulated here. But such a contact may have various specific forms like 'adjectival to what is conjoined with the eye' (*caḥṣuh-saṁyukta-viśeṣanatā*), which holds in the visual perception of the non-existence of the jar on the ground. It is the perception of the ground as qualified by the absence of the jar which is adjectival to the ground and the ground is conjoined with the eye.

Afterwards, Gaṅgeśa and others show various subtleties in their discussions regarding this view of the six forms of sense-object contact which produce the perceptual knowledge.

But God's perception is not due to sense-object - contact. The scripture says, "He sees without eyes and hears without ears".¹⁴ God's knowledge is omnipresent. His perceptual knowledge is not generated by any special cause. Yogic perception also is not due to sense-object-contact because *yogin* can perceive something through the yogic power (*yogaja dharma*) in his self attained by constant practice of meditation but not through the sense-object contact. Therefore, the definition of perception in the sūtra does not cover the divine and yogic perception. For this reason Gautama's definition of perception is criticised as too narrow and Gaṅgeśa gives a different definition : perception is that 'knowledge which is not caused by the instrumentality of another knowledge (*jñānākaraṇakam-jñānam*)¹⁵. It covers both ordinary or temporal and divine, yogic, i.e. eternal perception. Neither of these forms of perception is due to the instrumentality of any other knowledge. Ordinary perception depends on the instrumentality of sense and divine perception is without any cause because it is eternal.

Gautama's *sūtra* is interpreted by Viśvanātha in the line of Gaṅgeśa. But Gautama defines only the ordinary or temporal (*janya*) form of perception and his definition is not intended to cover divine perception. It is evident from the fact that he mentions the perceptual knowledge first which is caused. There is no doubt that he takes God himself as a *pramāna*.¹⁶ Here *pramāṇa* means omniscience which implies that God always has the valid cognition of everything.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the author of *Nyāya-mañjarī* has given an alternative explanation for the use of the *jñāna* in the *sūtra*. Here there is no intention to exclude pleasure and pain from perception. This possibility has been already excluded by the word '*vyavasāyātmaḥ*' (of a definite character). Gautama uses the word '*jñāna*' to indicate what is being qualified by the other expressions in the definition, which are all of the nature of adjectives.

Bhartrhari mentions in his *Vākyapadiya* that it is not possible to exist indeterminate perception which is unqualified. Vācaspati Miśra quotes two verses from the *Vākyapadiya* of Bhartrhari and points out that the word *avyapadeśya* (not due to words) in the present *sūtra* is intended to refute Bhartrhari's view. This word means "mere acquaintance" (*alocana*) i.e., indeterminate perception. The word *vyapadeśya* means a substantive as qualified by an attribute (*viśeṣana-viśiṣṭaviśeṣya*). The perception without a substantive attribute relation is *avyapadeśya*. This type of unqualified perception is the bare awareness of an object and so it is indeterminate. Hence, by *avyapadeśya* Gautama here indicates indeterminate perception.

In respect of the use of the expression 'not due to words' (*avyapadeśya*) Vātsyāyana has raised a problem with its probable solution. We know that words stand for objects and we have perceptual knowledge of the objects and our knowledge differs according to the difference of the objects of perception. Therefore, the nature of perception is determined by the nature of the objects. And since the words stand for objects, it is the words that determine the nature of perception. Thus, perceptual knowledge cannot be 'not due to words'.

In response to this objection, Vātsyāyana is of the opinion that the perceptual knowledge that is generated by the sense-object-contact is called

'not due to words' (*avyapadeśya*). It (*avyapadeśya*) signifies that the word naming an object is used only for the purpose of communication which is posterior to the perceptual knowledge of the object.¹⁷ As Jayanta observed there was a great deal of controversy regarding the exact significance of Gautama's use of the expression 'not due to words' (*avyapadeśya*) among the earlier Naiyāyikas themselves. According to Jayanta, when the knowledge is generated by the sense-object-contact and words (or sounds), it is verbal not perceptual. Gautama uses the word *avyapadeśya* to exclude such forms of knowledge from the perceptual.

In Gautama's definition of perception *avyabhicārin* means 'invariably related to the object' or non-erroneous. We have illusory perceptions of a snake in a rope and of silver in the shell. To exclude such forms of illusory perceptions from the category of valid perception, the word *avyabhicārin* is used. Vātsyāyana calls illusory perceptions as *vyabhicārin* or not invariably related to the object pointed to, and these are excluded from valid perception by the use of the word *avyabhicārin* in the *sūtra* to Vātsyāyana a right or *avyabhicārin* perception is the perception of an object as it actually is.

The word *vyavasāyātmaka* (of a definite character) is meant to exclude 'perception' in the form of doubt' (*sarṁsayātmakapratyakṣa*), which are not excluded by the word *avyabhicārin*. In other words, perceptual knowledge is known as *vyavasāyātmaka* in order to distinguish it from indecisive knowledge (*anavadhārañjñāna*). A right or *avyabhicārin* perception is the perception of an object as it really is. Doubtful perceptions also may be *avyabhicārin*. On perceiving the common characteristics of dust and smoke in a distant object, one has the doubt whether it is dust or it is smoke. If it is really dust, the perception is non-erroneous in its first part and if it is actually smoke, the perception is non-erroneous in its second part. As the object really is either dust or smoke, the perception is in fact invariably related to the object. According to Vātsyāyana, only the illusory perception of something as definitely something else is to be considered erroneous. Perception in the form of doubt being short of definite knowledge is not therefore excluded by the word *avyabhicārin*. Therefore, by using the expression *vyavasāyātmaka* (of a definite character) Gautama

excludes perception in the form of doubt.

According to Gaṅgeśa, Gautama's definition of perception involves the fallacies of too wide (*ativyāpti*) and too narrow (*avyāpti*). First, the definition covers perception and inference about the self, memory of the self, and any type of knowledge. The contact of the self and the mind is the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) of any knowledge. The self is the object and the mind is the sense-organ. The word '*artha*', in the definition means the object. Here, if there is knowledge of the object at a particular time, there occurs the fallacy of too wide in the case of the inferential knowledge of the self and in the case of the memory knowledge of the self. If '*artha*' signifies any object whatsoever, even then, there arises the fallacy of too wide definition in the case of any kind of knowledge. For instance, the inference 'The hill is fiery' would then also be a case of perception, for, in the second case, '*artha*' stands for any object and hence, in this case, if the self is taken as the object (*artha*), there would be contact of the sense (the mind) and the object (the self).

Thirdly, since God is omniscient, he does not perceive through the sense-organs. Thus, Gautama's definition does not apply to God's perception and so it includes the fallacy of too narrow .

Gaṅgeśa considers the following definition of perception : "Perception is non-erroneous immediate apprehensiveness" (*Satyatve sati sākṣātkāritvaṃpratyakṣam*). In this case, property of being apprehended directly (*sākṣātkāritva*) cannot be regarded as a generic attribute (*jāti*) like 'ghaṭatva', 'paṭatva' etc. for it has no universal accompanying mark (*sādhāraṇa anugata vyañjaka*) the knowledge of which is required for the knowledge of a generic essence or attribute. Though there is such a universal accompanying mark, there is still a fallacy, because in that case there would be no need to recognise the generic attribute of being apprehended directly (*sākṣātkāritva*) because accompanying mark can be treated as the characteristic of perception and as the cause of common behaviour (*anugatavyavahāra*).

Sākṣātkāritva can be regarded as an essential characteristic of perception because in any perceptual knowledge like visual perception there is an

apperception in the form : "I directly apprehend" (*sākṣāt karomi*) and therefore, *sākṣātkāritva* can be regarded as a *jāti*. A '*jāti*' is established through the knowledge of similarity or *anugatabuddhi* i.e., the successive awareness of a qualified one (*viśiṣṭabuddhi*) in which there is the absence of impediment (*bādhaka*), for instance, 'This is a dog' and so on. It cannot be said that the immediate apprehensiveness (*sākṣātkāritva*) is attained by sense-organ because this agreement involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. (*anyonyāśrayadoṣa*) as *sākṣātkāritva* (property existing in direct apprehension) the characteristic of perception relates to the sense-organ and the characteristic of sense-organ relates to perception. Besides, any sense-organ is imperceptible (*atindriya*) and so, merely inferable. Here, since direct apprehension (*sākṣātkāritva*) is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) so knowledge of direct *sākṣātkāra* also is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*).

However, we can say that there can be a *jāti* without a common mark also. The mark may or may not be common to all members of the class. The dew-laps (*galakambala*) of the cows are not exactly similar, nevertheless the dew-lap is considered as the common mark (*vyāñjaka*) of the universal 'cowness' (*gotva jāti*) and therefore the attribute of experiencing through the instruments like eyes, etc. is the mark of the universal *sākṣātkāritva*. The accompanying mark is not essential for each and every universal, e.g., the universal 'knowledgehood' (*jñānatva jāti*) has no such accompanying mark. Rather a *jāti* is said to be unestablished (*asiddha*) if there is an accompanying mark. A *jāti* is acknowledged for common behaviour, but if that is performed by the common mark, the recognition of the generic attribute (*jāti*) becomes useless.

Gaṅgeśa thinks that in the case of God's knowledge, indeterminate knowledge and yogic knowledge, the attribute of perception is established by the same arguments that prove the substantive possessing the attribute.

Immediate apprehension (*sākṣātkāritva*) is of two kinds: normal (*laukika*) and supernormal (*alaukika*). *Laukika pratyakṣa* is called *janya-pratyakṣa* i.e. non-eternal perception which is not due to *yogajasannikarṣa* or to *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* or again to *sāmānyalakṣaṇa- sannikarṣa*. The cause of the immediate apprehension of objects not present to the senses is of the three kinds, namely,

(1) contact through universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*), (2) contact through knowledge (*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*) and (3) contact through some yogic process (*yogaja sannikarṣa*). Normal perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*) has the object (*viśaya*) as its cause, the 'indriya' (the sense-organ) as its cause, and the causality of the 'indriya' as the causality limited or distinguished by the generic attribute of the sense-organ (*indriyatvāvacchinna kāraṇatā*).

In this way, the definition of perception as non-erroneous immediate apprehensiveness has been, to some extent, accepted by Gaṅgeśa.

Gaṅgeśa's own definition of perception is free from all defects found in other definitions of perception. His definition has been mentioned earlier.

Anumiti, *upamiti*, *śabda* and *smṛti* - all these are produced by the instrumentality of some kind of knowledge. Only *pratyakṣa* has no knowledge as its instrumental cause. A *karaṇa* is a *kāraṇa* (cause) which has some intermediate operation (*vyāpāra*). The sense-organ is the *karaṇa* i.e. the instrumental cause and the sense-object-contact is the *vyāpāra* i.e. intermediate cause in the case of perception. In the case of inferential knowledge, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the '*karaṇa*' and '*parāmarśa*' is the *vyāpāra*. In the case of '*upamiti*' the knowledge of similarity is the *karaṇa* and remembering the meaning of the analogical statement (*atideśavākyaṛthasmarana*) is the *vyāpāra*. In the case of testimonial knowledge (*śabdejñāna*), the knowledge of the a word (*padajñāna*) is the instrument (*karaṇa*) and the presence of the meaning of the word through the production of the word (*padajanyapadārthopasthiti*) or *smṛti* (memory) is the *vyāpāra*. The *karaṇa* of *smṛti* (memory) is previous awareness of the same (*pūrvānubhava*) and the *vyāpāra* of it is *saṁskāra*. Thus in all cases of knowledge other than the perceptual, the *karaṇa* is some kind of knowledge but the *karaṇa* of perception is no knowledge but it is the sense-organ. Therefore, perception is the knowledge which does not have another knowledge as its instrumental cause.

In the case of determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*), the knowledge of the qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇajñāna*) is the general cause, *kāraṇa*, not its instrumental ^{cau}*kāraṇa*. For instance, 'This is a man with a stick'

(*ayam dandipurusaḥ*). In this case, there is not only *viśeṣaṇajñāna* (i.e. the knowledge of the qualifier i.e. *danda*) but also *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣaṇajñāna* (i.e., the knowledge of the qualifier of the qualifier i.e. *dandatva*). Hence, it is argued, if *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇajñāna* is taken as a 'vyāpāra', then perception would no longer be *jñānākaraṇaka* and thus Gaṅgeśa's definition of perception would involve the fallacy of too narrow (*avyāpti*).

In response to this objection, Gaṅgeśa, would assert that the cause the determinate perception is *viśeṣaṇajñāna* and the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇajñāna* is here a dispensable antecedent (*anyathāsiddha*). There is no justification for regarding *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇajñāna* as the cause when there is the *viśeṣaṇajñāna* as the cause. Thus, the objection does not stand. After further serious examination of Gaṅgeśa's definition of perception, it will be clear that the definition would apply to all perceptions, and so, there would be no fallacy, either of 'too narrow' or 'too wide'. Therefore, Gaṅgeśa's definition of perception is justified.

Three stages of Perception :

According to the character of the the perceptual knowledge which arises from sense-object-contact normal perception is of two types : (1) *nirvikalpaka* or the indeterminate and (ii) *savikalpaka* or the determinate. To these two kinds of perception *pratyabhijñā* or recognition as a special form of determinate perception is added. Thus, according to the nature of perception, the Nyāya distinguishes between three steps or stages or modes of normal perception, viz., (i) the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) (2) the determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and (3) Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Thus, these three modes of perception show only the earlier and later stages or steps of perception. So perhaps it is right to call these as steps or modes instead of calling them as kinds of perception.

But on the other hand, supernormal perception has only one mode, namely, determinate (*savikalpaka*), that is, it is always determinate for, it gives us explicit and definite knowledge.

Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

Vācaspati Miśra proposes a difference of opinion from Vātsyāyana about the implication of the word *vyavasāyātmaka* in the *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.4. (for the definition of Perception). He points out that the word is used not to exclude perception in the form of doubt. Since the doubtful perceptions are invalid these are already excluded by the word *avyabhicārin*. The word *vyavasāyātmaka* means determinate perception and hence it is said that determinate perception also is valid. According to Vācaspati Miśra, the two words *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka* are applied not only for the definition but also for the classification of perception. The term *avyapadeśya* and the term *vyavasāyātmaka* indicate two steps or forms of perception, viz., indeterminate and determinate respectively.¹⁸ The remaining part of the *sūtra* gives the definition of perception. Such an interpretation may not be admitted because it does not agree with the interpretations of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotaka. The distinction between the indeterminate and determinate perception has not been explicitly mentioned by them. And it is not justified by anything in the *sūtra*.

According to Annambhatta, perceptual knowledge is of two kinds : (1) non-judgemental or indeterminate (2) judgemental or determinate. Out of them, knowledge without the predication of a character is non-judgemental and knowledge with the predication of character is determinate, for example, the cognitions, 'He is Dittha (name of a boy)', 'He is Brahman', 'He is black' etc.¹⁹ When we perceive the properties of an object, but do not relate them with the object in the subject-predicate form, perception is called indeterminate. And when we relate the perceived properties of an object with it in the subject-predicate form, perception is determinate.²⁰ Viśvanātha says, "The knowledge that is called indeterminate is considered to be beyond the senses."²¹ According to Viśvanātha, immediately after the conjunction of the eye etc. it is impossible to have a knowledge like, 'It is a jar', about something qualified or marked by jarhood etc. because the knowledge of the qualification 'jarhood' etc. is absent before it (i.e. conjunction of the eye and the jar etc.) and with regard to a qualified knowledge the knowledge of the qualification is a cause. So at first there arises a knowledge which does not comprehend the relation between a jar and jarhood. And this is indeterminate knowledge. And it is not perceptible (to the mind).²²

Gaṅgeśa avers that indeterminate perception is the perception of an object and its generic character as not related to each other²³ and determinate perception is one in which there is apprehension of an object and its generic character as related to each other.²⁴

In case of *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (Indeterminate perception) *Nirvikalpaka* means that in which there is no '*vikalpa*'. Here '*vikalpa*' means characterised (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya*). So perception is indeterminate in the sense that its object is given simply as something or bare something which does not determine that it has such and such character. It is similar to the sort of knowledge which an infant or a deaf and dumb person is likely to have. On perceiving an object they recall the word naming it. But the perception of the object which precedes, is not due to that name. The perception of the object comes first and it is the cause of the recollection of the word naming it. Thus, it is required to accept a perception of the object unrelated to the word naming it and this perception is indeterminate. It is a pre-judgemental cognition. It cannot be directly known by an act of after cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) which constitutes the immediate knowledge of knowledge. It can be known indirectly by inference from the determinate knowledge.

Determinate cognition is defined in Tarkasaṅgraha as *saprakāra jñāna*. It is a cognition which has for its cognition an appellation, a name, a universal, a quality or a relation of character- characterised (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya*). In other words, we know a thing a characterized by some attribute or attributes through the determinate perception. In its examples 'He is Dittha' the *vikalpa* is a name. In 'He is a Brahman' the *vikalpa* is universal. In 'He is black', the *vikalpa* is a quality. In the last form of judgement the attribute 'blackness' is taken as characterizing the object 'he (i.e. a man)' who is perceived. If we do not know an object and certain attributes previously as unrelated, it is logically impossible to know them as related. Thus, this type of primary stage of perception, that is, indeterminate perception as a pre-condition of determinate must be admitted.

Recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*)

According to the Naiyāyikas, there is another stage or mode of perception and it is called Recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*). Recognition means cognising a thing as that which was cognised before. According to Gautama, because of the recognition of an object by the other (i.e. the right) eye(which was) perceived by the left eye²⁵ in the form : I am now perceiving that which I perceived before. For instance, when perceiving a particular man, I cognise that he is the same Devadatta whom I had perceived before, I will have recognition of that particular man. Thus, to recognise means to cognise once again that which was already cognised. The Naiyāyikas hold that *Pratyabhijñā* (Recognition) is the conscious reference of a past and a present cognition to the same object. For example, 'I see a jar', recognise it as something that was perceived before, and say 'This is the same jar that I saw.'²⁶ Hence, determinate perception depends on indeterminate perception and recognition depends on determinate perception. Thus, here we find the three gradual stage of perception where indeterminate, determinate and recognition are the first, the second and the third stage respectively.

Classification of Perception

The Naiyāyikas take perception as a general name for all the true cognitions generated by sense-object contact and they classify different types of it. First, perception is of two types, as *laukika* or normal and *alaukika* or supernormal. The distinction depends on the way in which the senses come in contact with their objects. When there is the usual contact of the sense organ we have the *laukika* or normal perception. But in case of *alaukika* or supernormal perception the object is not ordinarily present to sense but is conveyed to sense through an unusual medium. We do not find the distinction between *laukika* or normal and *alaukika* or supernormal perception. But there are passing references to the supernormal form of perception in some of the earlier texts on Nyāya (particularly in Jayanta Bhatta's *Nyāyamañjari* and Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyavārtika-tatparyatikā*). Gopinath kaviraj states that there are passing references to these three types of unusual perception (i.e. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *jñānalakṣaṇa* and *yogaja pratyakṣa*) in our period, notably in the *Nyāyamañjari* of Jayanta.²⁷

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Perhaps supernormal perception was not systematically distinguished until Gaṅgeśa. After the vigilant investigation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy it becomes reasonably clear that supernormal perception was well known and regularly appealed to by our philosophers.²⁸ For instance, Anantalal Thakur reports that Sriharsa, the Advaitin, attributes the doctrine of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* (perception) to Vācaspati Miśra, even though Vācaspati had a different term for it (*sarvopasaṁhāravāpti*)^{28.1} The same doctrine was interpreted by Vallava clearly. It was Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the New school of Nyāya, who, for the first time, in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* systematically distinguished between normal (*laukika*) and supernormal perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*). Normal perception is generated by normal sense object contact (*laukika sannikarṣa*) and supernormal perception is generated by supernormal sense-object-contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*).

The contact (*sannikarṣa*) existing in the definition means six kinds of normal contact which have been discussed earlier. However, supernormal sense-object-contact is of three kinds : (1) *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (2) *Jñānalakṣaṇa* and (3) *Yogaja*.

Normal perception is of two types, namely, (a) external (*vāhya*) and (b) internal (*āntara*) or mental (*mānasa*). From a part of Gautama's definition (*Indriyārtha-sannikarṣoṭpannam jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicari vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam* "Nyāyasūtra 1/1/4) namely '*Indriyārtha sannikarṣoṭpannam jñānam*' follows six kinds of normal perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*) i.e., five kinds of External perception (*Vāhyapratyakṣa*) and the only one Internal Perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*). Perception is external when it is caused by the contact of any one of the five external sense-organs with an external object. So, the sense (*indriya*) in the *indriyārtha-sannikarṣa* means five external sense-organs, e.g. vision (*cakṣu*), (ii) hearing (*śrotra*) (iii) smell (*ghrāṇa*), (iv) taste (*rasanā*) and (v) touch (*tvak*). One internal sense (*āntrika indriya*) or mind (*manas*) also is meant by the sense (*indriya*) through mind (*manas*) is not mentioned in the definition.

The five kinds of external perception are : (1) visual perception (*cākṣuṣa pratyakṣa*) (2) auditory perception (*śrautrapratyakṣa*), (3) Olfactory (*ghrāṇaja pratyakṣa*), (4) Taste perception (*rāsana pratyakṣa*) and (5) Touch perception

(*spārsāna pratyakṣa*). The Naiyāyika holds that each of the five external sense-organs is material and is composed of the same material element. The quality of that element is sensed by the concerned sense-organs.

When perception is produced by the contact of the internal sense-organ, that is, mind (*manas*) with the attributes of the self like pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*) etc., perception is internal (*āntara*). According to the Nyaya, mind (*manas*) is immaterial by nature and in all kinds of knowing, assistance and cooperation of mind (*manas*) is necessary.

Supernormal Perception (*Alaukika Pratyakṣa*) :

Supernormal (*alaukika*) perception is of three types : (1) *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa - Pratyakṣa* (2) *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* and (3) *Yogaja Pratyakṣa*.

Why Perception is called alaukika (supernormal) ?

At first one question may be raised : Why is this contact or perception is called *alaukika* or supernormal(?) The answer is as follows :

Sometimes we are in a position to admit such contact in which the object is not present to our senses or a particular sense-organ is not able to perceive the object ordinarily, i.e., an object may not be amenable to the particular organ through which it is comprehended. Such an object may not be produced or may not come in contact with a particular sense at the time of perception. In such cases there is necessity of a means which is of supernormal character. Thus, here sense-object contact is called, by the Navya-Naiyāyika (Neo-Logician) *alaukika* (supernormal).

Any analytic mind would agree that the acceptance of these super-normal contacts indicates that even normal perception of a normal human being involves in some cases supernormal contacts although the perceiver is not aware of it.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the supernormal perception of a supernormal individual like a *yogin* is also as real as any other true perception. Such perception is called supernormal because these perceptions are above the normal perception of any ordinary man. It cannot be said that such perception does not exist and so unreal on the ground that such perception is above the accessibility of any normal person.

Now, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is the perception of whole class of objects through the generic property or essence (*sāmānya*) perceived in any member of that class. For instance, we can perceive the whole class of dogs through the generic property (*sāmānya*) "dogness" perceived in any dog which is a member of the class "the dog". *Jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is the perception of an object through a sense-organ which is not normally associated with it, but becomes supernormally associated with it, through a memory knowledge of the same perceived previously by another sense. Such perception is illustrated by an example, as, "I see a piece of fragrant sandal wood". Here the visual perception of fragrance of sandal wood is the case of *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa*, because normally the fragrance is perceived not by visual sense but by olfactory organ *Yogaja pratyakṣa* (yogic perception) is the intuitive perception of all objects of all times and places due to some yogic property or power in the self through the constant practice of meditation. Yogic perception is accepted by almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy except the Cārvāka and the Mimāṃsaka. Yoga is the cultural heritage of India. Its importance has been realised in different countries of the world.

It may be said that though Gautama does not speak of the three forms of supernormal sense-object contact (viz., *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* and *yogaja*), yet these are implied by his use of the word *sannikarṣa* in the definition of perception. Besides, Gautama has to admit *jñānalakṣaṇa* for the following ground. The word *avyabhicārin* or non-illusory is used by him in the definition of perception. This signifies that he admits the possibility of illusory perception which is completely different from valid perception. In the case of illusory perception, there is no question of normal sense-object-contact, for the object perceived in illusion is not actually present there. Hence, we should admit that in the case of an illusory perception, there must be a supernormal sense-object-

contact which is found in the case of recollection of that object previously perceived elsewhere. This is nothing but the *jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa* of the later Naiyāyikas. Further, Gautama mentions, towards the end of the fourth *adhyāya*, the need of *yoga* etc. for one who wants to attain liberation (*Nyāya-sūtra*, 4.2. 46f). This is a proof that Gautama admits *yogaja sannikarṣa*.

Intuitive knowledge (Prātibhajñāna) :

Yogaja Pratyakṣa is included in a special faculty ^{of} mind called *Pratibhā*. the inadequacy of the intellectual power points to the existence of the world which is beyond the reach of our sense-organs. There is some faculty in a man that is capable of revealing that world. This faculty is known as *Pratibhā* (intuition or intuitive knowledge). *Pratibhā* (intuition) is one in its essence but it differs in kind. It is of two kinds : (i) first category and (2) second category.

(1) The first category of intuition is developed by a steady and continuous effort. The inner organ of a sage is capable of perceiving all knowable objects by the constant practice of meditation.

(2) The second is produced automatically by virtue of *Adrṣṭa* (unseen factors). Thus, *Yogaja pratyakṣa* (yogic perception) belongs to the first category of intuition (*pratibhā*), while the Extra-Sensory-Perception like telepathy, clairvoyance etc. belongs to the second.²⁹

Para Psychology : Extra-Sensory Perception

Para-psychology gives us informations of the phenomena beyond the ordinary empirical or physical phenomena. These phenomena cannot be explained by the ordinary natural laws. For such occurrences are felt directly by the psychical researches in their investigations or by media. These (Phenomena) are occurred in the field of knowledge like telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, psychokinesis and also in the field of action, as levitation and materialization and their validity can hardly be ignored. Or, in other words, psychical research shows that the above phenomena are not wishful thinking or imagination or

conjecture. These Extra-Sensory-Motor phenomena or Extra-Sensory perception of para-normal phenomena are called supernormal, psychical and physical phenomena. These phenomena have opened a new vista of human personality. Hence every advanced country feels itself innocent to set up a research branch for para- psychology. Or, the former may feel a necessity to set up the latter.

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