

**THE SUPERNORMAL MEANS OF KNOWING :
A CRITICAL STUDY ON THE CONCEPT OF
ALAUKIKA PRATYAKṢA IN
NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY.**

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This is to certify that the dissertation entitled 'The Supernormal means of Knowing : A Critical Study on the Concept of Alaukika Pratyaksa in Nyaya Philosophy' submitted by Sri Bhupendra Chandra Das, Teacher Fellow, Deptt. of Philosophy, is the result of his research carried out under my supervision. The thesis has not been submitted for the award of any other degree of this or other University. I recommend the thesis for the submission for the Ph.D. degree (Arts) of the University of North Bengal.

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DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF MY DEPARTED
FATHER - DIGENDRA CHANDRA DAS
AND
MOTHER - PARUL DAS

CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	(i)
Acknowledgement	(ii)-(iii)
CHAPTER - I	
INTRODUCTION	1-23
The Status of Perception	2
Definition of Perception	3
Three Stages of Perception	12
Classification of Perception	15
Supernormal Perception	17
(<i>Alaukika Pratyakṣa</i>)	
Para-Psychology : Extra Sensory Perception	19
Notes and References	21.
CHAPTER - II	
THE CONCEPT OF <i>SĀMĀNYALAKṢAṆĀ PRATYAKṢA</i>	24-50
The Definition of <i>Sāmānyalakṣaṇā</i>	24
The Justification of <i>Sāmānyalakṣaṇā</i>	26
<i>Sāmānyalakṣaṇa</i> and Its Different types	33
The Possibility of <i>Sāmānyalakṣaṇā</i> through other senses	37
Nature of <i>Sāmānyalakṣaṇā</i>	38
The Necessity of Admitting <i>Sāmānyalakṣaṇā</i>	45
Notes and References	48

CHAPTER - III

THE CONCEPT OF <i>JÑĀNALAKṢAṆA PRATYAKṢA</i>	51-77
Significance of <i>Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa</i>	51
The Justification of <i>Jñānalakṣaṇā</i>	53
Refutation of the Perceptuality of 'Surabhi candanam' as both visual and alfactory	56
Refutation of the objection of the Vedantins	62
Some Problems Concerning <i>Jñānalakṣaṇā</i> <i>Pratyasatti</i> for Explaining the Perception of Negation.....	68
Navya-Naiyayika View on <i>Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa</i> ...	71
<i>Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa</i> in Jaina Philosophy	73
Notes and References	74

CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF <i>YOGAJA PRATYAKṢA</i>	78-119
Nature of <i>Yogaja Pratyakṣa</i>	78
Intuitive Knowledge (<i>Prātibhajñāna</i>)	82
Para-Psychology : Extra-Sensory Perception	86
Yogic Perception in Different Systems of Indian Philosophy..	90
Is Yogic Perception Valid ? A Critique of the Mimāṃsakas..	102
The Importance of Yoga Realised by the Contemporary Thinkers.	103
Notes and References	111

CHAPTER - V

SOME EVALUATIVE AND CONCLUSIVE REMARKS...	120-172
<i>SĀMĀNYALAKṢAṆA PRATYAKṢA</i>	120
<i>JÑĀNALAKṢAṆA PRATYAKṢA</i>	149
<i>YOGAJA PRATYAKṢA</i>	157
Extra-Sensory Perception	165
Notes and References	166
BIBLIOGRAPHY	173-179

PREFACE

The present dissertation 'The Super-normal Means of Knowing: A Critical Study on the Concept of *Alaukika Prataksa* in Nyāya Philosophy' is a humble attempt to show that there are some supernormal means of knowing an object. These super-normal means of knowing are called *alaukika pratyakṣa*. As the term '*alaukika*' is attached to the term '*pratyakṣa*', it has to be accepted as a form of perception. Though there are many works done by different scholars on the epistemological problems of Perception, Inference, Comparison and Verbal testimony, yet there are not much work on the *alaukika* aspect of *P:ratyakṣa*. Like other cases, many subtle problems may occur in one's mind regarding the meaning of the term *alaukika*, as to the problem of including this under the category of perception, lots of problems regarding the *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, *Jñānalakṣaṇā* and *Yogaja*. In each and every sub-type of this contains much philosophical problems if we look into the concept through the eye of logic. An effort has been made to remove these logical intricacies and to defend the Navya-Nyāya position. Some arguments are available in the texts after thorough interpretation, some are available in the commentarial literature like *Kiraṇāvalī*, *Dinakari*, *Ramarudri* etc., some are forwarded from my own judgement and common sense. Whatever I have tried to say to defend the Navya Nyāya standpoint may not be accepted by all. But I believe that the arguments, logical analysis and conclusion may seem to them cogent, interesting and convincing. If a single line of my dissertation becomes the cause of intellectual satisfaction of the readers and if it makes them ponder over these issues, I shall think my labour successful.

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Bhupendra Chandra Das

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CHAPTER - I

INTRODUCTION

Pramā :

An object is revealed through its cognition. Just as a lamp illuminates an object, the cognition also reveals an object. Hence, cognition plays a vital role in our daily life. A cognition which has, for its object, something which possesses the character which it (the cognition) has for its predicate, is a valid cognition, for example, the knowledge 'This is silver', in respect of silver. It is this veridical cognition (yathārtha *anubhava*) which is called *pramā* (valid knowledge)¹.

PRAMĀNA :

The instrument or means of valid cognition (*pramā*) is called *pramāna* (the source of knowledge). It is *pramākaraṇatva* (instrumental to *Pramā*) which is the common characteristics of *pramāna* (source of knowledge). *Pramā* arises from four kinds of *pramāna* viz., (1) perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference (*anumāna*), (3) comparison (*upamāna*), and (4) verbal testimony (*śabda*)² as accepted by Gautama, a noted Nyāya Philosopher. After-wards, other Nyāya and Navya-Nyāya Philosophers accepted these four *pramānas* of Gautama.

The Vaisesikas admit two *pramānas* : (i) Perception (*Pratyakṣa*), (2) Inference (*anumāna*). According to them, comparison (*upamāna*) and verbal testimony (*śabda*) can be included in the inference,^{2,1} and hence they are not separate sources of knowing.

The other Indian Schools of Philosophy accept from one to eight *Pramānas*.

The Buddhists accept perception and Inference only.

The Jainas, Yogas, Sāṁkhya and Rāmānuja generally accept perception, Inference and Testimony.

The Mimāṃsakas admit three to six *pramāṇas*: Jaimini admits three viz. Perception, Inference and Testimony. Apart from these three, Prabhākara accepts two more *pramāṇas*, viz., comparison (*Upamāna*) and prostulation (*Arthāpatti*). In addition to these, three *pramanas* of Jaimini and two *pramanas* of Prabhākara, Kumārila accepts one more *pramāṇa* i.e. Non-apprehension (*Anupalabdhi*). Thus, Kumārila and his followers accept six *pramanas*, namely, (i) Perception, (2) Inference (3) Comparison (4) Testimony (5) Presumption and (6) Non-apprehension, which are accepted by Vedānta also.

The Status of Perception :

Perception is the most fundamental and important source of the above kinds of sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) because it is the basis of all the other sources of knowledge since inference, comparison and verbal testimony depend upon perception.³ The *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gautama and Vātsyāyanas commentary on it shows that inference depends on perception. Gautama says, "Next, inference (*anumāna*) which is preceded by it (perception) is of three kinds, namely, that having the antecedent as the probans (*purvavat*), that having the consequent as the probans (*śeṣavat*) and that having the *vyāpti* (the relation of invariable concomitance) ascertained by general observation.⁴ The expression 'preceded by it' means preceded by perception. Commenting on this, Vātsyāyana says that preceded by it means the perception of the invariable relation between the probans and the probandum (*liṅga-liṅginoh sambandha-darśanam*) as well as the perception of the probans (*liṅga-darśana*). Comparison (*Upamāna*) is the instrument of the valid knowledge of an object derived through the perception of its similarity with another well-known (*prasiddha*) object.⁵ Verbal testimony also depends upon perception of words spoken or written by a 'trustworthy person' (*āpta*) who has direct awareness of an object.⁶ So all the other three sources of knowledge i.e. inference, comparison and verbal testimony depend upon perception. Again, perception is superior to all the other sources of knowledge because, if there arises any doubt regarding the authenticity of any other source of knowledge, then that source depends on perception. Even after knowing an object by testimony, one may want to know it by inference and even after knowing it by inference one wants to know it through perception.

On the other hand, although perception is, according to the Naiyāyikas, the basic source of knowledge, it is not self-evidently true. Perceptual error also may be occurred due to various reasons because our senses may be defective and conditions of perception may be insufficient etc.

Definition of Perception :

Perception has been defined in different ways by the different section of the Naiyāyikas. Regarding this definition there is a difference between old (*prācina*) and modern (*Navya*) Naiyāyikas. Gautama defines perception as the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact and which is not due to words 'invariably related' to the object (*avyabhicārin*) and is 'of a definite character (*vyavasāyātmaka*)' This definition of perception excludes divine and yogic perception which is not generated by the contact of the sense-organs with the objects. So Viśvanātha has defined perception as 'direct or immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition'⁸ (*Jñānakaraṇakam jñānam pratyakṣam*)⁹. This definition includes normal as well as supernormal perception.

Vātsyāyana raises a possible objection against the above definition. Mere sense-object contact cannot result in perception, for according to Gautama's own view, in the case of perception the self comes in contact with the mind, next the mind comes in contact with the sense and lastly the sense concerned comes in contact with the object perceived.⁹ In response to this Vātsyāyana says that Gautama defines perception by mentioning only its 'special cause' (*asādhāraṇa - kāraṇa*). The sūtra does not, therefore, exclude the contact of the self with the mind from the causes of perception. On the contrary, such a contact being a common cause of all forms of knowledge, perception cannot be defined as the knowledge derived from the contact of the self with the mind. Gautama uses the expression 'cognition produced by the contact of the sense-organs with the object' to exclude inference, comparison, testimony etc.¹⁰

Another objection is raised against this. If Gautama's purpose is to mention the special cause of perception, he should have also mentioned

the contact of the sense with mind. In the cases of perception through an 'external sense' (*vahirindriya*), the sense itself must come in contact with mind and such a contact too is one of the special causes of external perception. In reply to this objection, Vātsyāyanā says that the contact of the mind with the senses does not differ in the different cases of perceptual knowledge, but remains the same in every part of it.¹¹ Its implication is explained by Vācaspati Mīśra in the following way :

A perceptual knowledge is named after either its object or the sense concerned. When colour (*rūpa*) is perceived by the eyes, the perceptual knowledge is called 'knowledge of colour (*rūpa-jñāna*) or 'visual knowledge' (*cākṣuṣa-jñāna*). A thing is often named after its special cause. Thus, though the sprout has various causes it is named after its special causes, the seed. Similarly a perceptual knowledge is named after either the object or the sense in which inheres its special cause, namely, the sense-object contact. Though the contact of self with mind and the contact of mind with sense are causes of such. Perceptions, the pieces of perceptual knowledge are named neither after self nor after mind in which these contacts inhere. From this point of view the contact of self with mind is similar to that of mind with sense. That is why, like the contact of self with mind, the contact of mind with sense is not mentioned in the sūtra.

The Naiyāyika admits six senses (*indriyas*), namely, the five external senses - (1) visual (*cākṣuṣa*) (2) auditory (*śrotra*) (3) gustatory (*rasanā*) (4) olfactory (*ghrāṇa*) (5) touch (*tvak*)¹² and (6) one internal sense i.e., mind (*manas*). In the Nyāya-Sūtra No. 1.1.12 Gautama states only five external senses. Yet he accepts mind (*manas*) as a sense. The Vaiśeṣika also mentions these six senses.

Among the above five external senses, vision and touch are the means of perception of substance and quality. They are both *dravya-grāhaka* (i.e. capable of apprehending a substance). But taste, hearing (*śrotra*) and smell are means of perception of quality only. Thus, these three senses are *guṇa-grāhaka* only (i.e. capable of apprehending quality alone). Mind (*manas*) is also the means of perception of qualities like pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) etc. So this can also be taken in a *guṇa-grāhaka* sense.

The object (*artha*) in the above term means substance or physical object (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), e.g., colour (*rūpa*), any tangible quality (*sparsā*), savour (*rasa*), sound (*dhvani*) and odour (*gandha*) as well as internal object (*āntarika guṇa*) e.g., pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*) etc.

The word '*artha*' or object in the *sūtra* is used in the sense of only perceptible objects. There is no perception without a contact between such an object and the sense of only perceptible objects. There is no perception without a contact between such an object and the sense. The contact (*sannikarṣa*) existing in the definition means six kinds of contact. According to Uddyotakara, the sense-object contact is of six kinds, such as (1) conjunction (*saṁyoga*), (2) Inherence in what is conjoined (*saṁyukta-samavāya*) (3) Inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*), (4) inherence (*samavāya*) (5) inherence in the inhered (*samavetasamavāya*) and (6) adjunct-substantive relation (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya-bhāva*)¹³. In case of the perception of substance of an object (*dravya*) the sense-object contact is of the nature of conjunction (*saṁyoga*). Hence, in the visual and touch perception of a jar, the sense is conjoined with the object. Inherence in what is conjoined (*saṁyuktasamavāya*) is exemplified in the perception of a quality (*guṇa*) or action (*kriyā*), e.g., colour inheres in a substance and it is perceived when the visual organ comes in contact with that substance.

In the perception of 'universal inhering in quality and in movement' (*guṇagata* and *karmagata jāti*) the sense-object - contact is of the nature of inherence in what is inherent in the conjoined (*saṁyukta-samaveta-samavāya*). The visual perception of colourness (*rupatva*) is due to such a contact, for colourness as a universal inheres in a colour which again inheres in the jar and the jar is conjoined with the visual sense.

In the perception of sound the sense-object contact is of the nature of inherence (*samavāya*) because sound is a quality and it inheres in the substance *ākāśa* (and the auditory sense itself is of the nature of *ākāśa* i.e., the *ākāśa* enclosed by the ear canal).

In the perception of the universal soundness (*śabdatvajāti*), the sense-object - contact is of the nature of inherence in the inhered (*samaveta-samavāya*), for soundness inheres in sound which inheres in the auditory sense.

In the perception of inherence and non-existence (*abhāva*) the sense-object contact is of the nature of adjunct-substantive relation. None of the five forms of contact mentioned above is possible in the perception of these two and hence a special type of contact called *viśeṣanatā* or *viśeṣana-viśeṣyabhāva* is postulated here. But such a contact may have various specific forms like 'adjectival to what is conjoined with the eye' (*caṅṣuḥ-saṁyukta-viśeṣanatā*), which holds in the visual perception of the non-existence of the jar on the ground. It is the perception of the ground as qualified by the absence of the jar which is adjectival to the ground and the ground is conjoined with the eye.

Afterwards, Gaṅgeśa and others show various subtleties in their discussions regarding this view of the six forms of sense-object contact which produce the perceptual knowledge.

But God's perception is not due to sense-object - contact. The scripture says, "He sees without eyes and hears without ears".¹⁴ God's knowledge is omnipresent. His perceptual knowledge is not generated by any special cause. Yogic perception also is not due to sense-object-contact because *yogin* can perceive something through the yogic power (*yogaja dharmā*) in his self attained by constant practice of meditation but not through the sense-object contact. Therefore, the definition of perception in the sūtra does not cover the divine and yogic perception. For this reason Gautama's definition of perception is criticised as too narrow and Gaṅgeśa gives a different definition : perception is that 'knowledge which is not caused by the instrumentality of another knowledge (*jñānākaraṇakam-jñānam*)¹⁵. It covers both ordinary or temporal and divine, yogic, i.e. eternal perception. Neither of these forms of perception is due to the instrumentality of any other knowledge. Ordinary perception depends on the instrumentality of sense and divine perception is without any cause because it is eternal.

Gautama's *sūtra* is interpreted by Viśvanātha in the line of Gaṅgeśa. But Gautama defines only the ordinary or temporal (*janya*) form of perception and his definition is not intended to cover divine perception. It is evident from the fact that he mentions the perceptual knowledge first which is caused. There is no doubt that he takes God himself as a *pramāna*.¹⁶ Here *pramāṇa* means omniscience which implies that God always has the valid cognition of everything.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, the author of *Nyāya-mañjarī* has given an alternative explanation for the use of the *jñāna* in the *sūtra*. Here there is no intention to exclude pleasure and pain from perception. This possibility has been already excluded by the word '*vyavasāyātmaḥ*' (of a definite character). Gautama uses the word '*jñāna*' to indicate what is being qualified by the other expressions in the definition, which are all of the nature of adjectives.

Bhartrhari mentions in his *Vākyapadiya* that it is not possible to exist indeterminate perception which is unqualified. Vācaspati Miśra quotes two verses from the *Vākyapadiya* of Bhartrhari and points out that the word *avyapadeśya* (not due to words) in the present *sūtra* is intended to refute Bhartrhari's view. This word means "mere acquaintance" (*alocana*) i.e., indeterminate perception. The word *vyapadeśya* means a substantive as qualified by an attribute (*viśeṣana-viśiṣṭaviśeṣya*). The perception without a substantive attribute relation is *avyapadeśya*. This type of unqualified perception is the bare awareness of an object and so it is indeterminate. Hence, by *avyapadeśya* Gautama here indicates indeterminate perception.

In respect of the use of the expression 'not due to words' (*avyapadeśya*) Vātsyāyana has raised a problem with its probable solution. We know that words stand for objects and we have perceptual knowledge of the objects and our knowledge differs according to the difference of the objects of perception. Therefore, the nature of perception is determined by the nature of the objects. And since the words stand for objects, it is the words that determine the nature of perception. Thus, perceptual knowledge cannot be 'not due to words'.

In response to this objection, Vātsyāyana is of the opinion that the perceptual knowledge that is generated by the sense-object-contact is called

'not due to words' (*avyapadeśya*). It (*avyapadeśya*) signifies that the word naming an object is used only for the purpose of communication which is posterior to the perceptual knowledge of the object.¹⁷ As Jayanta observed there was a great deal of controversy regarding the exact significance of Gautama's use of the expression 'not due to words' (*avyapadeśya*) among the earlier Naiyāyikas themselves. According to Jayanta, when the knowledge is generated by the sense-object-contact and words (or sounds), it is verbal not perceptual. Gautama uses the word *avyapadeśya* to exclude such forms of knowledge from the perceptual.

In Gautama's definition of perception *avyabhicārin* means 'invariably related to the object' or non-erroneous. We have illusory perceptions of a snake in a rope and of silver in the shell. To exclude such forms of illusory perceptions from the category of valid perception, the word *avyabhicārin* is used. Vātsyāyana calls illusory perceptions as *vyabhicārin* or not invariably related to the object pointed to, and these are excluded from valid perception by the use of the word *avyabhicārin* in the *sūtra* to Vātsyāyana a right or *avyabhicārin* perception is the perception of an object as it actually is.

The word *vyavasāyātmaka* (of a definite character) is meant to exclude 'perception' in the form of doubt' (*sarṁsayātmakapratyakṣa*), which are not excluded by the word *avyabhicārin*. In other words, perceptual knowledge is known as *vyavasāyātmaka* in order to distinguish it from indecisive knowledge (*anavadhārañjñāna*). A right or *avyabhicārin* perception is the perception of an object as it really is. Doubtful perceptions also may be *avyabhicārin*. On perceiving the common characteristics of dust and smoke in a distant object, one has the doubt whether it is dust or it is smoke. If it is really dust, the perception is non-erroneous in its first part and if it is actually smoke, the perception is non-erroneous in its second part. As the object really is either dust or smoke, the perception is in fact invariably related to the object. According to Vātsyāyana, only the illusory perception of something as definitely something else is to be considered erroneous. Perception in the form of doubt being short of definite knowledge is not therefore excluded by the word *avyabhicārin*. Therefore, by using the expression *vyavasāyātmaka* (of a definite character) Gautama

excludes perception in the form of doubt.

According to Gaṅgeśa, Gautama's definition of perception involves the fallacies of too wide (*ativyāpti*) and too narrow (*avyāpti*). First, the definition covers perception and inference about the self, memory of the self, and any type of knowledge. The contact of the self and the mind is the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) of any knowledge. The self is the object and the mind is the sense-organ. The word '*artha*', in the definition means the object. Here, if there is knowledge of the object at a particular time, there occurs the fallacy of too wide in the case of the inferential knowledge of the self and in the case of the memory knowledge of the self. If '*artha*' signifies any object whatsoever, even then, there arises the fallacy of too wide definition in the case of any kind of knowledge. For instance, the inference 'The hill is fiery' would then also be a case of perception, for, in the second case, '*artha*' stands for any object and hence, in this case, if the self is taken as the object (*artha*), there would be contact of the sense (the mind) and the object (the self).

Thirdly, since God is omniscient, he does not perceive through the sense-organs. Thus, Gautama's definition does not apply to God's perception and so it includes the fallacy of too narrow.

Gaṅgeśa considers the following definition of perception : "Perception is non-erroneous immediate apprehensiveness" (*Satyatve sati sākṣātkāritvaṃpratyakṣam*). In this case, property of being apprehended directly (*sākṣātkāritva*) cannot be regarded as a generic attribute (*jāti*) like 'ghaṭatva', 'paṭatva' etc. for it has no universal accompanying mark (*sādhāraṇa anugata vyañjaka*) the knowledge of which is required for the knowledge of a generic essence or attribute. Though there is such a universal accompanying mark, there is still a fallacy, because in that case there would be no need to recognise the generic attribute of being apprehended directly (*sākṣātkāritva*) because accompanying mark can be treated as the characteristic of perception and as the cause of common behaviour (*anugatavyavahāra*).

Sākṣātkāritva can be regarded as an essential characteristic of perception because in any perceptual knowledge like visual perception there is an

apperception in the form : "I directly apprehend" (*sākṣāt karomi*) and therefore, *sākṣātkāritva* can be regarded as a *jāti*. A '*jāti*' is established through the knowledge of similarity or *anugatabuddhi* i.e., the successive awareness of a qualified one (*viśiṣṭabuddhi*) in which there is the absence of impediment (*bādhaka*), for instance, 'This is a dog' and so on. It cannot be said that the immediate apprehensiveness (*sākṣātkāritva*) is attained by sense-organ because this agreement involves the fallacy of mutual dependence. (*anyonyāśrayadoṣa*) as *sākṣātkāritva* (property existing in direct apprehension) the characteristic of perception relates to the sense-organ and the characteristic of sense-organ relates to perception. Besides, any sense-organ is imperceptible (*atindriya*) and so, merely inferable. Here, since direct apprehension (*sākṣātkāritva*) is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*) so knowledge of direct *sākṣātkāra* also is perceptual (*pratyakṣa*).

However, we can say that there can be a *jāti* without a common mark also. The mark may or may not be common to all members of the class. The dew-laps (*galakambala*) of the cows are not exactly similar, nevertheless the dew-lap is considered as the common mark (*vyañjaka*) of the universal 'cowness' (*gotva jāti*) and therefore the attribute of experiencing through the instruments like eyes, etc. is the mark of the universal *sākṣātkāritva*. The accompanying mark is not essential for each and every universal, e.g., the universal 'knowledgehood' (*jñānatva jāti*) has no such accompanying mark. Rather a *jāti* is said to be unestablished (*asiddha*) if there is an accompanying mark. A *jāti* is acknowledged for common behaviour, but if that is performed by the common mark, the recognition of the generic attribute (*jāti*) becomes useless.

Gaṅgeśa thinks that in the case of God's knowledge, indeterminate knowledge and yogic knowledge, the attribute of perception is established by the same arguments that prove the substantive possessing the attribute.

Immediate apprehension (*sākṣātkāritva*) is of two kinds: normal (*laukika*) and supernormal (*alaukika*). *Laukika pratyakṣa* is called *janya-pratyakṣa* i.e. non-eternal perception which is not due to *yogajasannikarṣa* or to *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* or again to *sāmānyalakṣaṇa- sannikarṣa*. The cause of the immediate apprehension of objects not present to the senses is of the three kinds, namely,

(1) contact through universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*), (2) contact through knowledge (*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*) and (3) contact through some yogic process (*yogaja sannikarṣa*). Normal perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*) has the object (*viśaya*) as its cause, the 'indriya' (the sense-organ) as its cause, and the causality of the 'indriya' as the causality limited or distinguished by the generic attribute of the sense-organ (*indriyatvāvacchinna kāraṇatā*).

In this way, the definition of perception as non-erroneous immediate apprehensiveness has been, to some extent, accepted by Gaṅgeśa.

Gaṅgeśa's own definition of perception is free from all defects found in other definitions of perception. His definition has been mentioned earlier.

Anumiti, *upamiti*, *śabda* and *smṛti* - all these are produced by the instrumentality of some kind of knowledge. Only *pratyakṣa* has no knowledge as its instrumental cause. A *karaṇa* is a *kāraṇa* (cause) which has some intermediate operation (*vyāpāra*). The sense-organ is the *karaṇa* i.e. the instrumental cause and the sense-object-contact is the *vyāpāra* i.e. intermediate cause in the case of perception. In the case of inferential knowledge, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the '*karaṇa*' and '*parāmarśā*' is the *vyāpāra*. In the case of '*upamiti*' the knowledge of similarity is the *karaṇa* and remembering the meaning of the analogical statement (*atideśavākyaṛthasmarana*) is the *vyāpāra*. In the case of testimonial knowledge (*śabdejñāna*), the knowledge of the a word (*padajñāna*) is the instrument (*karaṇa*) and the presence of the meaning of the word through the production of the word (*padajanyapadārthopasthiti*) or *smṛti* (memory) is the *vyāpāra*. The *karaṇa* of *smṛti* (memory) is previous awareness of the same (*pūrvānubhava*) and the *vyāpāra* of it is *saṁskāra*. Thus in all cases of knowledge other than the perceptual, the *karaṇa* is some kind of knowledge but the *karaṇa* of perception is no knowledge but it is the sense-organ. Therefore, perception is the knowledge which does not have another knowledge as its instrumental cause.

In the case of determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*), the knowledge of the qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇajñāna*) is the general cause, *kāraṇa*, not its instrumental ^{cau}*kāraṇa*. For instance, 'This is a man with a stick'

(*ayam dandipurusaḥ*). In this case, there is not only *viśeṣaṇajñāna* (i.e. the knowledge of the qualifier i.e. *danda*) but also *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣaṇajñāna* (i.e., the knowledge of the qualifier of the qualifier i.e. *dandatva*). Hence, it is argued, if *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇajñāna* is taken as a 'vyāpāra', then perception would no longer be *jñānākaraṇaka* and thus Gaṅgeśa's definition of perception would involve the fallacy of too narrow (*avyāpti*).

In response to this objection, Gaṅgeśa, would assert that the cause the determinate perception is *viśeṣaṇajñāna* and the *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇajñāna* is here a dispensable antecedent (*anyathāsiddha*). There is no justification for regarding *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣaṇajñāna* as the cause when there is the *viśeṣaṇajñāna* as the cause. Thus, the objection does not stand. After further serious examination of Gaṅgeśa's definition of perception, it will be clear that the definition would apply to all perceptions, and so, there would be no fallacy, either of 'too narrow' or 'too wide'. Therefore, Gaṅgeśa's definition of perception is justified.

Three stages of Perception :

According to the character of the the perceptual knowledge which arises from sense-object-contact normal perception is of two types : (1) *nirvikalpaka* or the indeterminate and (ii) *savikalpaka* or the determinate. To these two kinds of perception *pratyabhijñā* or recognition as a special form of determinate perception is added. Thus, according to the nature of perception, the Nyāya distinguishes between three steps or stages or modes of normal perception, viz., (i) the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) (2) the determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and (3) Recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). Thus, these three modes of perception show only the earlier and later stages or steps of perception. So perhaps it is right to call these as steps or modes instead of calling them as kinds of perception.

But on the other hand, supernormal perception has only one mode, namely, determinate (*savikalpaka*), that is, it is always determinate for, it gives us explicit and definite knowledge.

Determinate and Indeterminate Perception

Vācaspati Miśra proposes a difference of opinion from Vātsyāyana about the implication of the word *vyavasāyātmaka* in the *Nyāyasūtra*, 1.1.4. (for the definition of Perception). He points out that the word is used not to exclude perception in the form of doubt. Since the doubtful perceptions are invalid these are already excluded by the word *avyabhicārin*. The word *vyavasāyātmaka* means determinate perception and hence it is said that determinate perception also is valid. According to Vācaspati Miśra, the two words *avyapadeśya* and *vyavasāyātmaka* are applied not only for the definition but also for the classification of perception. The term *avyapadeśya* and the term *vyavasāyātmaka* indicate two steps or forms of perception, viz., indeterminate and determinate respectively.¹⁸ The remaining part of the *sūtra* gives the definition of perception. Such an interpretation may not be admitted because it does not agree with the interpretations of Vātsyāyana and Uddyotaka. The distinction between the indeterminate and determinate perception has not been explicitly mentioned by them. And it is not justified by anything in the *sūtra*.

According to Annambhatta, perceptual knowledge is of two kinds : (1) non-judgemental or indeterminate (2) judgemental or determinate. Out of them, knowledge without the predication of a character is non-judgemental and knowledge with the predication of character is determinate, for example, the cognitions, 'He is Dittha (name of a boy)', 'He is Brahman', 'He is black' etc.¹⁹ When we perceive the properties of an object, but do not relate them with the object in the subject-predicate form, perception is called indeterminate. And when we relate the perceived properties of an object with it in the subject-predicate form, perception is determinate.²⁰ Viśvanātha says, "The knowledge that is called indeterminate is considered to be beyond the senses."²¹ According to Viśvanātha, immediately after the conjunction of the eye etc. it is impossible to have a knowledge like, 'It is a jar', about something qualified or marked by jarhood etc. because the knowledge of the qualification 'jarhood' etc. is absent before it (i.e. conjunction of the eye and the jar etc.) and with regard to a qualified knowledge the knowledge of the qualification is a cause. So at first there arises a knowledge which does not comprehend the relation between a jar and jarhood. And this is indeterminate knowledge. And it is not perceptible (to the mind).²²

Gaṅgeśa avers that indeterminate perception is the perception of an object and its generic character as not related to each other²³ and determinate perception is one in which there is apprehension of an object and its generic character as related to each other.²⁴

In case of *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* (Indeterminate perception) *Nirvikalpaka* means that in which there is no '*vikalpa*'. Here '*vikalpa*' means characterised (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya*). So perception is indeterminate in the sense that its object is given simply as something or bare something which does not determine that it has such and such character. It is similar to the sort of knowledge which an infant or a deaf and dumb person is likely to have. On perceiving an object they recall the word naming it. But the perception of the object which precedes, is not due to that name. The perception of the object comes first and it is the cause of the recollection of the word naming it. Thus, it is required to accept a perception of the object unrelated to the word naming it and this perception is indeterminate. It is a pre-judgemental cognition. It cannot be directly known by an act of after cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) which constitutes the immediate knowledge of knowledge. It can be known indirectly by inference from the determinate knowledge.

Determinate cognition is defined in Tarkasaṅgraha as *saprakāra jñāna*. It is a cognition which has for its cognition an appellation, a name, a universal, a quality or a relation of character- characterised (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣya*). In other words, we know a thing a characterized by some attribute or attributes through the determinate perception. In its examples 'He is Dittha' the *vikalpa* is a name. In 'He is a Brahman' the *vikalpa* is universal. In 'He is black', the *vikalpa* is a quality. In the last form of judgement the attribute 'blackness' is taken as characterizing the object 'he (i.e. a man)' who is perceived. If we do not know an object and certain attributes previously as unrelated, it is logically impossible to know them as related. Thus, this type of primary stage of perception, that is, indeterminate perception as a pre-condition of determinate must be admitted.

Recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*)

According to the Naiyāyikas, there is another stage or mode of perception and it is called Recognition (*Pratyabhijñā*). Recognition means cognising a thing as that which was cognised before. According to Gautama, because of the recognition of an object by the other (i.e. the right) eye(which was) perceived by the left eye²⁵ in the form : I am now perceiving that which I perceived before. For instance, when perceiving a particular man, I cognise that he is the same Devadatta whom I had perceived before, I will have recognition of that particular man. Thus, to recognise means to cognise once again that which was already cognised. The Naiyāyikas hold that *Pratyabhijñā* (Recognition) is the conscious reference of a past and a present cognition to the same object. For example, 'I see a jar', recognise it as something that was perceived before, and say 'This is the same jar that I saw.'²⁶ Hence, determinate perception depends on indeterminate perception and recognition depends on determinate perception. Thus, here we find the three gradual stage of perception where indeterminate, determinate and recognition are the first, the second and the third stage respectively.

Classification of Perception

The Naiyāyikas take perception as a general name for all the true cognitions generated by sense-object contact and they classify different types of it. First, perception is of two types, as *laukika* or normal and *alaukika* or supernormal. The distinction depends on the way in which the senses come in contact with their objects. When there is the usual contact of the sense organ we have the *laukika* or normal perception. But in case of *alaukika* or supernormal perception the object is not ordinarily present to sense but is conveyed to sense through an unusual medium. We do not find the distinction between *laukika* or normal and *alaukika* or supernormal perception. But there are passing references to the supernormal form of perception in some of the earlier texts on Nyāya (particularly in Jayanta Bhatta's *Nyāyamañjari* and Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyavārtika-tatparyatikā*). Gopinath kaviraj states that there are passing references to these three types of unusual perception (i.e. *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *jñānalakṣaṇa* and *yogaja pratyakṣa*) in our period, notably in the *Nyāyamañjari* of Jayanta.²⁷

126681

10 AUG 1999

Raja Ramohanpur

Perhaps supernormal perception was not systematically distinguished until Gaṅgeśa. After the vigilant investigation of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy it becomes reasonably clear that supernormal perception was well known and regularly appealed to by our philosophers.²⁸ For instance, Anantalal Thakur reports that Sriharsa, the Advaitin, attributes the doctrine of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* (perception) to Vācaspati Miśra, even though Vācaspati had a different term for it (*sarvopasaṁhārahakavyāpti*)^{28.1} The same doctrine was interpreted by Vallava clearly. It was Gaṅgeśa, the founder of the New school of Nyāya, who, for the first time, in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* systematically distinguished between normal (*laukika*) and supernormal perception (*alaukika pratyakṣa*). Normal perception is generated by normal sense object contact (*laukika sannikarṣa*) and supernormal perception is generated by supernormal sense-object-contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*).

The contact (*sannikarṣa*) existing in the definition means six kinds of normal contact which have been discussed earlier. However, supernormal sense-object-contact is of three kinds : (1) *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* (2) *Jñānalakṣaṇa* and (3) *Yogaja*.

Normal perception is of two types, namely, (a) external (*vāhya*) and (b) internal (*āntara*) or mental (*mānasa*). From a part of Gautama's definition (*Indriyārtha-sannikarṣoṭpannam jñānamavyapadeśyamavyabhicari vyavasāyātmakam pratyakṣam* "Nyāyasūtra 1/1/4) namely '*Indriyārtha sannikarṣoṭpannam jñānam*' follows six kinds of normal perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*) i.e., five kinds of External perception (*Vāhyapratyakṣa*) and the only one Internal Perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*). Perception is external when it is caused by the contact of any one of the five external sense-organs with an external object. So, the sense (*indriya*) in the *indriyārtha-sannikarṣa* means five external sense-organs, e.g. vision (*cakṣu*), (ii) hearing (*śrotra*) (iii) smell (*ghrāṇa*), (iv) taste (*rasanā*) and (v) touch (*tvak*). One internal sense (*āntrika indriya*) or mind (*manas*) also is meant by the sense (*indriya*) through mind (*manas*) is not mentioned in the definition.

The five kinds of external perception are : (1) visual perception (*cākṣuṣa pratyakṣa*) (2) auditory perception (*śrautrapratyakṣa*), (3) Olfactory (*ghrāṇaja pratyakṣa*), (4) Taste perception (*rāsana pratyakṣa*) and (5) Touch perception

(*spārsāna pratyakṣa*). The Naiyāyika holds that each of the five external sense-organs is material and is composed of the same material element. The quality of that element is sensed by the concerned sense-organs.

When perception is produced by the contact of the internal sense-organ, that is, mind (*manas*) with the attributes of the self like pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duḥkha*), desire (*icchā*) etc., perception is internal (*āntara*). According to the Nyaya, mind (*manas*) is immaterial by nature and in all kinds of knowing, assistance and cooperation of mind (*manas*) is necessary.

Supernormal Perception (*Alaukika Pratyakṣa*) :

Supernormal (*alaukika*) perception is of three types : (1) *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa - Pratyakṣa* (2) *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* and (3) *Yogaja Pratyakṣa*.

Why Perception is called alaukika (supernormal) ?

At first one question may be raised : Why is this contact or perception is called *alaukika* or supernormal(?) The answer is as follows :

Sometimes we are in a position to admit such contact in which the object is not present to our senses or a particular sense-organ is not able to perceive the object ordinarily, i.e., an object may not be amenable to the particular organ through which it is comprehended. Such an object may not be produced or may not come in contact with a particular sense at the time of perception. In such cases there is necessity of a means which is of supernormal character. Thus, here sense-object contact is called, by the Navya-Naiyāyika (Neo-Logician) *alaukika* (supernormal).

Any analytic mind would agree that the acceptance of these super-normal contacts indicates that even normal perception of a normal human being involves in some cases supernormal contacts although the perceiver is not aware of it.

According to the Naiyāyikas, the supernormal perception of a supernormal individual like a *yogin* is also as real as any other true perception. Such perception is called supernormal because these perceptions are above the normal perception of any ordinary man. It cannot be said that such perception does not exist and so unreal on the ground that such perception is above the accessibility of any normal person.

Now, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is the perception of whole class of objects through the generic property or essence (*sāmānya*) perceived in any member of that class. For instance, we can perceive the whole class of dogs through the generic property (*sāmānya*) "dogness" perceived in any dog which is a member of the class "the dog". *Jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is the perception of an object through a sense-organ which is not normally associated with it, but becomes supernormally associated with it, through a memory knowledge of the same perceived previously by another sense. Such perception is illustrated by an example, as, "I see a piece of fragrant sandal wood". Here the visual perception of fragrance of sandal wood is the case of *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa*, because normally the fragrance is perceived not by visual sense but by olfactory organ *Yogaja pratyakṣa* (yogic perception) is the intuitive perception of all objects of all times and places due to some yogic property or power in the self through the constant practice of meditation. Yogic perception is accepted by almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy except the Cārvāka and the Mimāṃsaka. Yoga is the cultural heritage of India. Its importance has been realised in different countries of the world.

It may be said that though Gautama does not speak of the three forms of supernormal sense-object contact (viz., *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, *jñāna-lakṣaṇa* and *yogaja*), yet these are implied by his use of the word *sannikarṣa* in the definition of perception. Besides, Gautama has to admit *jñānalakṣaṇa* for the following ground. The word *avyabhicārin* or non-illusory is used by him in the definition of perception. This signifies that he admits the possibility of illusory perception which is completely different from valid perception. In the case of illusory perception, there is no question of normal sense-object-contact, for the object perceived in illusion is not actually present there. Hence, we should admit that in the case of an illusory perception, there must be a supernormal sense-object-

contact which is found in the case of recollection of that object previously perceived elsewhere. This is nothing but the *jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa* of the later Naiyāyikas. Further, Gautama mentions, towards the end of the fourth *adhyāya*, the need of *yoga* etc. for one who wants to attain liberation (*Nyāya-sūtra*, 4.2. 46f). This is a proof that Gautama admits *yogaja sannikarṣa*.

Intuitive knowledge (Prātibhajñāna) :

Yogaja Pratyakṣa is included in a special faculty of mind called *Pratibhā*. The inadequacy of the intellectual power points to the existence of the world which is beyond the reach of our sense-organs. There is some faculty in a man that is capable of revealing that world. This faculty is known as *Pratibhā* (intuition or intuitive knowledge). *Pratibhā* (intuition) is one in its essence but it differs in kind. It is of two kinds : (i) first category and (2) second category.

(1) The first category of intuition is developed by a steady and continuous effort. The inner organ of a sage is capable of perceiving all knowable objects by the constant practice of meditation.

(2) The second is produced automatically by virtue of *Adrṣṭa* (unseen factors). Thus, *Yogaja pratyakṣa* (yogic perception) belongs to the first category of intuition (*pratibhā*), while the Extra-Sensory-Perception like telepathy, clairvoyance etc. belongs to the second.²⁹

Para Psychology : Extra-Sensory Perception

Para-psychology gives us informations of the phenomena beyond the ordinary empirical or physical phenomena. These phenomena cannot be explained by the ordinary natural laws. For such occurrences are felt directly by the psychical researches in their investigations or by media. These (Phenomena) are occurred in the field of knowledge like telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, psychokinesis and also in the field of action, as levitation and materialization and their validity can hardly be ignored. Or, in other words, psychical research shows that the above phenomena are not wishful thinking or imagination or

conjecture. These Extra-Sensory-Motor phenomena or Extra-Sensory perception of para-normal phenomena are called supernormal, psychical and physical phenomena. These phenomena have opened a new vista of human personality. Hence every advanced country feels itself innocent to set up a research branch for para- psychology. Or, the former may feel a necessity to set up the latter.

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20. Sarvam̄ hi savikalpakaṁ viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvena vastuṣu pravartate, *Tātparyatikā*, 1.1.4.

21. Jñānaṃ yannirvikalpākhyam tadatīndriyamiṣyate. *Bhāṣā-Paricchedaḥ* with *Siddhānta- Muktāvalī* (of Viśvanātha Nyāya-Pañcānana) - Ed. Pañcānan Bhattacharya, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, 1377 (Beng), Verse No. 58. p.276. .

22. Cakṣusaṃyogādyanantaram ghaṭa ityākāraḥ ghaṭatvādiviśiṣṭam jñānaṃ na sambhavati, pūrvam viśeṣanasya ghaṭtvāderjñānā bhāvād, viśiṣṭavuddhau viśeṣaṇa-jñānasya kāraṇatvāt. Tathāca prathamato ghaṭa - ghaṭvayorvaisiṣ- tyānavagāhyeva jñānaṃ jāyate, tadeva nirvikalpakaṃ. Tacca na pratyakṣam. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* under Verse No. 58. Ibid, pp. 277-278.

23. Tacca pratyakṣam dvididham nirvikalpakaṃ savikalpakañceti. Tacca nāmajātyādiyojanārahitaṃ vaiśiṣṭyānavagāhinisprakāraḥ nirvikalpakaṃ *Tattvacintāmaṇiḥ*, Pratyakṣakhandah, p. 809.

24. Savikalpakañcaviśiṣṭajñānaṃ yathā gaurayamiti Ibid, p.839.

25. Savya-drṣṭasya itareṇa Pratyabhijñānāt. *Nyāya-Sūtra* , 3.1.7.

26. Purvāparayorvijñānayorekaviṣaye pratisandhijñānaṃ pratyabhijñānaṃ, etc., *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana on Nyāyasūtras , 3.1.7 & 3.2.2.

27. Karl H. Potter - *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*, Volume II, p. 168, Matilal Banarsidass, Delhi-7, 1977.

28. Karl H. Potter - *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* , Volume II, p. 169, Matilal Banarsidass, Delhi-7, 1977.

28.1 Anantalal Thakur,

B 2589, p. 242, in Karl H. Potter(Ed), *Bibliography of Indian Philosophies* (Delhi : Matilal Banarasidass, 1970).

29. Gopinath Kaviraj : *Aspects of Indian Thought*, p.1, University of Burdwan, 1984.

CHAPTER - II

THE CONCEPT OF SĀMĀNYALAKṢAṆA PRATYAKṢA

The Definition of Sāmānyalakṣaṇa :

In order to understand the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti* we should know what *sāmānya* is. Generally, the *Naiyāyika* holds that *sāmānya* is a class - concept, class-essence or universal. It is the common characteristic of certain individuals which fall under the same class. A *padārtha* which is eternal, one and inhering in many things is called a *sāmānya* or a generic attribute. "*Nityatve sati anekasamavetatvaṁ*."¹ *Nityamekamanekānugataṁ Sāmānyam Tarkasamgraha, Karmādilakṣaṇa prakaraṇam*. Hoernle says, "The universal is a class character which is common to, or identical in, many objects whose membership of the class is thereby determined"^{1.1} The definition of *sāmānya* (*jāti*) or universal is stated in the *Nyāya-sūtra* by Gautama in the following way:

The universal is that entity which creates the concept of identity in our mind".² That is to say, it is the universal by the possession of which different individuals are referred to as belonging to one class. According to *Praśastapāda*, a famous *Vaiśeṣika* thinker, a *padārtha* which is eternal, one and inhering in many things is called a *sāmānya* or generic attribute.³ For example, 'manhood' (*manuṣyatva*) inheres in every individual of the class 'man'.

The word '*lakṣaṇa*' in the word *sāmānyalakṣaṇasannikarṣa* implies two meanings - *svarūpa* and *viṣaya* (object of knowledge). That whose nature is universal is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.⁴ And that which has got *sāmānya* (universal) as an object of knowledge is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. In this sense, it is the knowledge of *sāmānya* (*sāmānyajñāna*) which serves as *pratyāsatti* (contact). When we perceive, with normal contact, a pot present before us, we also perceive all the other pots of all times and spaces through super-normal contact. In such case, there is a relation technically called '*svasamba-ddhaviśeṣyakajñānaprakāribhūtadharmavatta*' between our eyes

and all the pots. This *sambandha* (relation) is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti*.⁵ Here the word 'sva' means sense-organ i.e. our eyes and any object presented to our eyes, i.e. any 'jar' of this world becomes the qualificand (*viśeṣya*). And the universal 'jarness' (*ghatatva*) has become a qualifier (*prakāribhūta*) in the knowledge of which the object 'jar' which is connected with our sense organ i.e. our eye is a qualificand (*svasambandhaviśeṣyakajñānaprakāribhūta*). In this jar (*ghata*) the object 'jar' which is connected with our sense organ i.e. our eye is a qualificand. (*svasambandhaviśeṣyakajñānaprakāribhūta*) In this jar (*ghata*) the universal jarness inheres as a qualifier (*prakāribhūta*). In this way, a property of being qualifier (*prakāribhūtadharmā*) is produced in the jar presented to our eyes. Thus, the jar becomes the said *dharmavat* (substratum of a property). In this case *sāmānya* implies not only the universal (*jāti*) but also the qualificand feature of the type mentioned above. Hence, in the case of the perception of a pot, potness (*ghatatva*) is the *sāmānya* (universal) but when the perception of the ground (*bhūtala*) containing a pot occurs in our mind, it is *ghatavattā* (locusness of a pot) or *ghata* (pot) which is the *sāmānya*. If the first definition is accepted, everybody would have knowledge concerning all smoke individuals, through the contact of smokeness which is eternal and inheres in all smoke - individuals. But in practical life this does not happen.^{5.1} So, a different type of definition is being introduced : *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* means the universal which has become a qualifier in the knowledge of which the object connected with sense organ is a qualificand (*Indriyasamvandhaviśeṣyaka*).^{5.2} In the case of the knowledge of a particular manifestation of smoke, the smoke has become a qualificand which is connected with sense organ. In this smoke the universal 'smokeness' inheres as a qualifier (*Prakāribhūta*). All the individual manifestations of smoke existing in past, distant, present and future can be perceived with the help of supernormal connection through smokeness existing in a particular smoke.⁶

But if the characteristic feature of the object related to the organs is regarded as the connection, then after one has mistaken a mass of dust as

smoke, one cannot have the knowledge of all smoke, because here there is no relation between the organs and smokeness. But, according to some Naiyāyikas (e.g., Viśvanātha Nyāyapancānana), though the mass of dust is connected with the organs, there is the knowledge that it is smoke, which has the dust as its object. Smokehood which is a feature in that knowledge is the contact (*sannikarṣa*). So, there is no obstacle of being supernormal perception of all smoke.

At present we have to find that the reality of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* as a type of perception depends on the direct knowledge of a class of things. Provided that there is any such knowledge, *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* will be a genuine type of perception. If we can perceive some individual object, then there is the presentation of a class of objects to which it belongs. So, the important question is : Is there any presentative or direct knowledge of a class of objects ? The *Naiyāyikas* demand that there is such a knowledge. We shall come to these later on. Now we can mention the following facts for the justification of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

The Justification of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* :

At first we know an individual as belonging to a certain class and at that time we know the universal underlying it. When we know the universal we can know the character or a group of characters which belongs to all the members of the class. Hence, to know the universal is to know all the individuals of that class, past, present and future as belonging to that universal. We know a cow as such means to know cowness which, again implies to know that it belongs, to all cows. For instance, we can state some particular cases, as,

X is mortal

Y is mortal

Z is mortal

..... and so on

And from these particular cases we can conclude that

All men are mortal.

Here, we somehow know that mortality is true of the class of men. In this case, a question arises: how do we know anything about the whole of a class of things from the observation of some of its members? Or, how do we get universal or general propositions from the observation of particular facts?

This is explicated by inductive inference in Western Logic.⁷ According to the Naiyāyikas, the knowledge of the class or the universal proposition is obtained by supernormal perception.

The Vedānta Philosophers advocate that a generalisation is the statement of an invariable relation between universals. And we can know it through the observation of their concomitance. So, the Universal or general proposition "All men are mortal" or 'whatever is smoky is fiery' is the expression of an invariable relation between manhood and mortality or smokeness and fireness". When in any particular instance it is known that manhood to be related to mortality or smokeness to fireness we have a knowledge of such universal propositions. Hence, the notion of generalisation as pointed out by the Vedāntins corresponds to "intuitive induction" in Western Logic.⁸ It is a process by means of which we understand a particular instance as exemplifying an abstract generalisation.

While the abstract principles of mathematics may be taken as statement of necessary relations between certain universal concepts, all our empirical generalisations are truths about classes of things. These are truths about any universal that has a denotative reference to a class of things. Such principles are supposed to be better called the necessary laws of thought. Provided that

the above cases are abstract generalisations exemplified in particular instances, it is beyond our realisation how they can be called "intuitive induction". Some Western logicians have called them so. If this induction means, - the immediate apprehension of an axiom by means of its exemplification in a particular instance, it must be admitted that there is no need for any induction or inference or reasoning in it. If there is an immediate knowledge of anything, there is no room for any inference or reasoning for it. A description of such knowledge as "intuitive induction" seems to be no less objectionable than a description of it as "perceptual inference". Provided that it is meant by "intuitive induction", the intuitive knowledge of a general principle through a particular instance, it should be clear that such instance is not the basis of an inference regarding the general principle. Here according to Dr. Stebbing, we should characterise our knowledge of the general principles of logic and mathematics as intuition than to call it an "intuitive induction", in order to avoid a possible misunderstanding.⁹

The abstract principles of logic and mathematics are different from the ordinary generalisations. Here, the former are truths about certain universal concepts, the latter are classes of objects. The propositions, 'all men are mortal' or 'all smoky objects are fiery' do not mean that there is a necessary relation between manhood and mortality, or between smokeness and fireness but they mean that mortality is true of the class of men or that all smokes are connected with fire. These propositions are empirical generalisations meaning thereby these are assertions about whole classes of things and these are arrived at from observation of particular instances. But now the question is : what is the true nature of the process of knowledge which is involved when we generalise from 'some' to all, in a reasonably proper way? Is it an induction ? It must be "Induction by simple Enumeration" or "perfect induction". A perfect induction is that in which from the consideration of each of the members of a limited class we pass to a generalisation concerning all the members of that class. When on examining every boy of a class one says, "all the boys of this class are intelligent", it is an instance of perfect induction. Here, Dr. Stabling says, 'Mr. Johnson has suggested the convenient name summary induction for this mode of inference, and that it is certainly a more appropriate name than "perfect induction". Both

the names are equally inappropriate, and that for the same reason. A summary of a number of observed facts is not an induction at all. To say this an induction is to misunderstand its epistemic character as inferential. When on examining every patient in a sick room a doctor says, "all the patients in this room have got headache" his judgement is not to be regarded as an inference or induction in any sense. This is a memory synthesis. It is same as the one we have when we understand the meaning of a sentence by a synthesis of its constituent words and their meanings. These meanings are determined by memory. So, our knowledge of a universal proposition like, 'all men are mortal' cannot be called a 'perfect induction' even if it were possible for us to verify all human beings. But this is not possible as a matter of fact. The class of men is an unlimited one and it has an infinite number of members. So to examine all men is not possible as a matter of fact.

Now let us consider whether "Induction by simple Enumeration" can supply us an empirical generalisation like 'all men are mortal'. Generalisation from a number of examined instances which do not constitute all the members of the given class is known as 'Induction by simple Enumeration'. This type of induction may be shown as under :

X, Y, Z are mortal

therefore, all men are mortal.

But it is not a valid form of inference. It does not follow the general rule of inference. We should not go beyond the evidence. For, in this inference the conclusion makes a statement about all men on the ground of what is observed in some men. If it would be a form of valid inference, it will make other argument of this form valid. In like manner, the forms of deductions guarantee the validity of a reasoning that may be put in any of those forms.

Here, we agree to the argument "All men are mortal" because X, Y, Z are mortal but we do not accept the argument, 'all men are black' because X, Y, Z are black. The examination of these two arguments will show the following distinction between them.

In the first case, mortality which is seen in some men is predicated of all men. In the second, blackness which is found in some men is predicated of all men. We notice 'X, Y, Z are mortal' not because they are X, Y, Z but because they are men. On the other hand, we find that X, Y, Z are black because they are X, Y, Z, not because they are men. Here mortality is related to the essential nature of X, Y, Z but the relation between blackness and X, Y, Z are not like that. The particular men like X, Y, Z possess a certain essential common nature (manhood) which is found in all men. We can put together all men into one class and exclude all other animals from that class with the help of that common nature.

So when we observe that mortality is related to the essential nature of some men, like we can say that all men must be mortal. But the second knowledge does not follow from the first. Just when we know that mortality is related to the essential nature of some men, we know that it is related to all men. It is a truth which is known directly or immediately, and for which we require no inference or reasoning. So our knowledge to the whole class is an intuitive knowledge of the class essence or the universal is not attained by inductive inference. The knowledge of the inductive inference depends on that of the class essence of the universal and so the former cannot be the ground of the latter. The universal, belonging to all members of a class, is either directly known or never known. We can find or discover the universal which is in things through observation and experiment on things. Universal is not a thing to be made or constructed out of them but it is already in them. If by observation and experiment we know that a universal is related to something, we know at once that all members of the class are related to that thing. The Naiyayika argue that it is the perception of the whole class as related to an attribute, and we can perceive the class essence simultaneously as related in the same way. The

Naiyāyikas call it *Alauḥka* or supernormal perception in order to distinguish it from normal perception. So, inductive inference as accepted in Western Philosophy may be similar to the Naiyāyikas' *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* perception in the sense of intuition of a universal or general proposition with the help of the knowledge of class essence or the universal.

If we go through the NavyaNyāya texts before Gaṅgeśa we find that the concept of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* comes in connection with the concept of *vyāpti* (universal concomitance). The main argument for the acceptance of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* before the period of Gaṅgeśa was such that inductive generalisation is possible by it. Again we find that there is a relation of universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) between all cases of relata, for instance, fire and smoke. But we cannot perceive all cases of smoke and fire and their co-existence by our ordinary sense organ. When we perceive a particular smoke, particular fire and their co-existence, we perceive simultaneously their corresponding essential common nature, i.e. smokeness, fireness etc. We can have the knowledge of all individuals containing the class-essence through these perceptions or perceived universals at the next moment. Here, the universal or the knowledge of it acts as the contact or relation (*Pratyāsatti*) which unites the sense organ and the objects or all individuals and this is called supernormal perception. This argument was put before Śriharṣa and it was not favourable to him. He does not investigate this elaborately. But Śriharṣa and Maṇikanṭha argue that the admission of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* would involve omniscience. It is argued that one may know a thing as knowable and there may be a universal concomitance between knowability and objectivity. And this would in its turn imply omniscience. So, we suppose that the problem of *vyāpti* encourage the NavyaNaiyāyikas to postulate *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

Maṇikanṭha rejects this concept because to him it is an inference and he asserts that the services of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is not necessary for the knowledge of all individuals but he opines that it can be considered as a case of inference.¹⁰

When we come to Gaṅgeśa we find a more concrete picture of the problem of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. In the *Vyāptivāda* section of *Tattvacintāmani*, Gaṅgeśa records different traditional definitions of *Vyāpti* and gives his own definition of it and then he discusses the problem of certainty of *Vyāpti*. He gives a passing reference to this concept (*Tattvacintāmani*, p. 187, 2-5). It formulates the basis of the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* section. If we go deep into Gaṅgeśa's text we find that many new problems have been evolved as a result of giving arguments and counter - arguments and the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* has been very useful for the satisfactory solution of the problems. Gaṅgeśa has elaborately presented the arguments of the opponents. He gives the opinions of both the parties admitting and rejecting *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* in the *pūrvapakṣa* section. At first he states the argument of the follower of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. And this argument coincides with the opponent argument given by Sriharṣa and Manikaṅṭha. Besides, Gaṅgeśa mentions another argument and this argument is supposed to have originated from some Navya - Naiyāyikas of the period before Gaṅgeśa. These arguments are as follows. We know that every synthetic knowledge (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) presupposes the previous knowledge of the determinant (*viśeṣaṇa*). The proposition 'there is fire on the hill' is synthetic in character and 'fire or fire-on-the-hill' acts as the determinant. So, it must be previously known. If the hill is not perceived at first, fire-on-the-hill cannot be known. Likewise when universal concomitance (*Vyāpti*) is established by the perception of probans and probandum, all members of the classes of probans and probandum are perceived through the medium of their respective class - essences or universals. And this shows the justification of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. But all these arguments were not sufficient to Gaṅgeśa. So he wants to justify *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* on the grounds as under : Such types of doubt about "whether all smoky objects are fiery" always occur at the time of assertion of *vyāpti*. No difficulty arises in the observed cases of instances but doubt arises regarding all other unobserved cases of smoke and fire which remains beyond the range of ordinary observation. Doubt implies that the object of it must be previously perceived. Here, the perception of all smokes is possible without any doubt because all cases of smoke are concomittant with all cases of fire. This is the

function of *samanyalakṣaṇa* as sought by Gangesa.^{10.1}

***Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* and its different types :**

Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa is of two kinds - *sāmānyasvarūpa* (that which is in the nature of *sāmānya*) and *sāmānyajñāna* (that in the form of knowledge of *sāmānya*). Some Naiyāyikas point out that it is the *sāmānyasvarūpa* which is the contact (*sannikarṣa*) and the others maintain that *sāmānyajñāna* (knowledge of *samanya*) is the contact. The *Naiyāyikas* who demand *sāmānyajñāna* as the contact have differences of opinion among themselves. One section of the *Naiyāyikas* (the old *Naiyāyikas*) advocates that it is the *sāmānyaprakāraṇa jñāna* (a knowledge in which universal has become a qualifier) is the contact. And the others are of the opinion that *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna* (i.e., a knowledge revealing universal as a content) is the contact. Those who support *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna* as the contact admit also the *sāmānyaprakāraṇajñāna* as the contact (*sannikarṣa*) because *sāmānyaprakāraṇa jñāna* is also called *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna*. Objectivity is of three types : *Prakāratā* (objectivity), *saṃsargatā* (character or attribute of relation) and *viśeṣyatā* (substantiality). So, *sāmānyaprakāraṇa jñāna*, is included in the *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna*, as a content of knowledge can be known as being a qualifier. If it is stated that *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna* is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*, then the three types of knowledge i.e., *sāmānyaprakāraṇa* (knowledge in which universal is a qualifier) *sāmānyasaṃsargaka* (knowledge in which universal acts as a relation) and *sāmānyaviśeṣyaka jñāna* (knowledge in which universal is a qualificand) are inevitably called the contacts. It may be stated truly that *sāmānyaviśayakanirvikalpaka jñāna* also is regarded as *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* because the *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna* is regarded as the contact (*sannikarṣa*). The *prācīna* (old) *Naiyāyikas* admit that it is the *sāmānyaprakāraṇa jñāna* which is the contact (*sannikarṣa*). And according to the *Neo-Naiyāyika* it is the *sāmānyaviśayaka jñāna* which is the contact. When we examine the meaning of the word '*lakṣaṇa*' in the term *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* we are acquainted with such kind of differences of opinion.

The word *sāmānya* has been used by Visvanātha in the non-technical sense in the following way : the common characteristics of all the individuals of similar type is called *sāmānya* (*samānānām bhāvaḥ sāmānyam*)¹¹. According to the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, *sāmānya* means a category (*padārtha*) which is eternal and inheres in many things. But here the word *sāmānya* does not mean this kind of *padārtha* or category only. Here the technical meaning of the word *sāmānya* is not implied, but non-technical meaning of it also is indicated. Hence, the meaning of the word *sāmānya* is the knowable (*jñāyamāna*) generic attribute inhering in many similar loci. There is no guarantee that this attribute must be a *sāmānya* (*jāti*) Some substances and some qualities also may be referred to as *sāmānya*. That attribute may not be eternal and may not inhere in many things. The actual locus of an attribute may be one or many in number. If that attribute is known by many loci, then that attribute should be known as *sāmānya*. A colour (*rūpa*) is located in a substance (*dravya*). If that colour which actually resides in a particular locus is erroneously known by another substance (*dravya*). A pot (*ghaṭa*) is a substance (*dravya*). Here if that pot is known through many loci, it will also be called *sāmānya*. As the word *sāmānya* is applied here in a non-technical sense, we should not think that *sāmānya* will not indicate *jāti* (universal) e.g., 'potness', 'smokeness' etc. The eternal attribute, 'potness', 'smokeness' etc. may be implied by the word *sāmānya* and the things like pot etc. and the qualities like colour etc. which are non eternal attributes are also referred to as *sāmānya* ; In this way the meaning of the word *sāmānya* has been used here.

When a pot is known to be existing on the ground through conjunction or in its two halves through inherence, there arises the knowledge of all grounds or all halves having that pot. With the help of this example we can realise that the transitory common feature also is the connection. In the supernormal perception the common feature (*sāmānya*) is the contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the substrata pot (e.g. smoke etc) through the relation of conjunction or inherence by which it is known. After the destruction of the pot one recollects the substratum having that pot but there would be no knowledge of all such substrata of pots

through the contact (*sannikarṣa*) based on a common feature because the common feature (potness) is absent at that time. On the other hand, if one has got the knowledge of a pot (the object of knowledge) which is connected with the organ, such knowledge may arise on the next day. Further, there is the common feature (potness) which is a feature (*prakāra*) in such knowledge, although there is no connection with the organ. So, it is the knowledge of the *sāmānya* (the common feature) which is the contact and not the *sāmānya* itself. Hence, in the word *sāmānyalakṣaṇa lakṣaṇa* implies an object of knowledge. Therefore, we can say, the knowledge of the *sāmānya* is the contact.

If, even without the conjunction of eye etc., there is the knowledge of the common feature (*sāmānya*), there might be ocular or any other perception of all pot etc. If we want to have perception through an external organ with the help of the contact of a *sāmānya* (common feature), there must be present the sum total of causes of the perception of that common feature (*sāmānya*) by the respective organ, in some object having that feature. The said sum total quoted above is the conjunction of the eye, the existence of light and so on. So, there is no such perception by the eye etc. in darkness etc.¹²

Here *sāmānya* which comes under the purview of our knowledge (*jñāyamāna sāmānya*) is the *sannikarṣa* (contact) because *sāmānya* itself has been stated as the contact. When knowledge is attained by the ordinary contact of sense organs with the locus of *sāmānya*, knowable universal (*jñāyamāna sāmānya*) or the knowledge of *sāmānya* will be the contact of our sense organs. Provided the knowledge of *sāmānya* is acquired by a means except *laukika sannikarṣa*, it will not be a contact of sense organs.

If our eyes are conjoined with a pot, we can attain the normal perceptual knowledge of that pot (*ghaṭa*) which is in the relation of inherence with potness (*ghaṭatva*). Here we can perceive all the other pots because to perceive one pot is to perceive potness in it and this 'potness' belongs to every member of the class of all pots. For, potness is inherently related to every pot (*sāmānya*

sambandha or the relation of inherence) and here we find the relation of *svaviṣayabhūtaghaṭatvasamavāya sambandha* (i.e. a relation of inherence through jariness remaining in the content of knowledge). That is to say, provided our visual organ is connected with a particular pot, the visual perception of all the other pots existing in past, distant, present and future is also possible in the way mentioned above. Here the distinction between the two kinds of perception is as follows : The perception of the pot connected with our eyes is called *laukika* (normal or ordinary) as it is produced by the normal contact. And the perception of all the other pots is called *alaukika* (supernormal) because it is produced by the *alaukika sannikarsa* (super-normal connection). This type of supernormal contact (*alaukika sannikarsa*) is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. And the perception (*pratyakṣa*) caused by this *sannikarṣa* is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. That potness (*ghaṭatva*) becomes a connection (*sannikarṣa*) because it inheres in all pots through the relation of inherence (*samavāya sambandha*) and the knowledge of potness exists in all pots through the relation of *svaviṣayabhūtaghaṭatvasamavāyasambandha* i.e. the relation of inherence of jariness existing in the individuals which becomes an object of knowledge. Again *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* may be illustrated in the following way:

Sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa is the perception of a whole class of objects through the generic property (*sāmānya*) perceived in any individual member of that class. Jayanta clearly describes the *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* kind of super normal perception explaining that it is accomplished through the internal organ.^{12.1} Thus, when we perceive something, e.g. a man, we take it as belonging to the class of men. To know that an individual belongs to the class of men is also to know all other members of the same class. But initially there should be a linkage between our senses and the external objects for normal (*laukika*) perception. When we perceive a man, we perceive the universal 'manhood' as its defining property. When we perceive the universal 'manhood' in the present 'man' there obtains a link between our sense organs and all the other men. Thus, the perception of one thing implies the perception of the generic attribute of that thing which exists in all other things of its class. Here, the man existing in

past, present, distant and future can be perceived by the extraordinary linkage through 'manhood' existing in a particular man.

The possibility of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* through other senses :

Sāmānyalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa i.e. the super normal perception through universal is possible through other senses also. This is shown by the following illustration.¹³

When we touch a table, we perceive its individual characteristic and its universal characteristic (tableness). We can perceive all the other tables because we have already perceived class essence 'tableness' which inheres in every member of the class of tables. Here the individual characteristic is only the characteristic of the table present before us. But the universal characteristic is not only that of the table before us but it belongs to all other tables of the past, present, future and the distant. It is possible because the perception of the universal characteristic present in a particular table causes a supernormal contact between the sense of touch and all the tables. So we can perceive all the tables.

In like manner, when we taste a bitter medicine we perceive its particular characteristics and universal characteristics as well. Its particular characteristics are the characteristics of the bitter medicine that we taste. Its universal characteristics (i.e. bitterness) perceived in the present bitter medicine not only belong to it but also it belongs to all bitter medicines. By perceiving *sāmānya* (bitterness) in the present bitter medicine we can know all the other bitter medicines because every bitter medicine belongs to the *sāmānya* (universal) 'bitterness'. This is so because perception of universal characteristic occurs a supernormal contact between our sense of taste and all bitter medicines and we perceive all bitter medicines.

Again on hearing some sound we perceive its individual characteristic as well as its universal characteristics, i.e. soundness. Its individual

characteristics are that which we hear. But its universal characteristics, i.e. soundness perceived in the present sound not only belongs to it but it also belongs to all sounds. By perceiving universal feature in the present sound we can know all sound because every sound has soundness as its universal characteristic. The universal characteristic, 'soundness' brings about the extraordinary contact between our auditory sense organ and all sounds and we perceive all sounds.

Similarly, when we smell some odour we perceive the individual characteristic and the universal characteristic (*sāmānya*). Its individual characteristic is only the characteristic that we smell. Its universal characteristic i.e. odourness (*gandhatva*) not only belongs to it but it belongs to all odours. By perceiving the generic essence, i.e. odourness in the present odour, we can perceive all odours because every odour has a generic attribute (*sāmānya*) i.e. odourness. The universal characteristic i.e. odourness present before us brings about a supernormal contact between our sense of smell and all odours and we perceive all odours.

Nature of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* :

It has been said earlier that the old Naiyāyikas calls *sānmānyajñāna prakāra* (*prakārajñāna*) (i.e. knowledge having universal as a qualifier) as the connection and according to the *Neo-Naiyāyikas*, *Sāmānyaviśayakajñāna* (knowledge having universal as a content) is the connection. Here *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is admitted by both of the Naiyāyikas in a different way. So, the consequences of these views also differ. The old view says that at first we perceive the jar present before us normally and then extraordinary perception of all the other jars is occurred. For as per this view *sāmānyaprakāra jñāna* i.e., visual perceptual knowledge qualified by jarness becomes the supernormal connection between our eyes and other jars. If there is no visual perception characterised by jarness at first, how is supernormal perception possible? Hence, at first there is visual perception characterised by jarness (*ghatātva*) out of normal contact (*laukikasannikarṣajanya*) and then

extraordinary perception of other jars is possible because of extraordinary contact or visual perception (*cākṣuṣapratyakṣarūpa*).

According to the Navya-Naiyāyikas (Neo-logicians) at the time of ordinary perception of a jar, extraordinary perception of other jars also is possible because, according to this view, *sāmānyaviśayakajñāna* i.e., *ghaṭatvaviśayakajñāna* (knowledge characterised by the object - jarness) is admitted as the connection (*sannikarṣa*). *Ghaṭatvaviśayakajñāna* becomes the supernormal connection in case of the perception of other jars. For this reason, supernormal perception occurs at the very moment of normal perception. Just after the contact between our eyes and a jar, there is an indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) of a jar, jarness and the relation called inherence (*samavāya*), existing between them. As the jarness (*ghaṭatva*) becomes the object of that indeterminate perception (*Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) as it is called *ghaṭatvaviśayaka jñāna*. When after the indeterminate perception, there is determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) of a jar connected with our eyes, extraordinary perception of other jars is there at that very moment since that indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) *ghaṭatvaviśayakajñāna* (knowledge characterised by the object jarness) becomes the connection (*sannikarṣa*). Thus, the ordinary perception of a jar connected with our eyes and the extraordinary perception of other jars are produced at the same time.

After having the indeterminate knowledge we have the perceptual knowledge of a jar caused by ordinary contact with our eyes and that of all other jars is caused by extraordinary contact in the form of the knowledge of jarness (*ghaṭajñānarūpa*). Though all the jars become the object of that perceptual knowledge, the perceptual knowledge of that jar is not of the same form. That knowledge is determinate in case of the jar before our eyes and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) in case of all the other jars. Just before the perception of a jar, present to our eyes the jar, jarness and their inherence becomes the three objects of the indeterminate perception (*nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*) which must be admitted. So, here we can familiar with jarness and

the relation of inherence between jar and jarness. Nevertheless, the indeterminate perception of all the jars except the one connected with our eyes must be admitted because the perception of a relation depends on the relata. So long as the relata i.e. the knowledge of the nature of all the other jars is not attained, the perception of the relation of the inherence of jarness and all the other jars except that present to our eyes is not possible. If we have no knowledge of the nature of all the other jars, the perception of the above relation is not possible. No knowledge can be called *savikalpaka* if it is not in a relation. Therefore, it is to be admitted that this perceptual cognition is known as *savikalpaka* in respect of the jar present to our visual organ and this cognition is attained by the ordinary contact. And the above cognition is *nirvikalpaka* in the context of all the other jars revealed to us through the *sāmānyajñāna* which is acquired by supernormal connection. However, the Modern Indian logicians are of the opinion that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti* and ordinary contact simultaneously produce a perceptual cognition of all the jars.

Here we shall have to concentrate our attention on another object. In case of ordinary contact or visual contact we admit counterpositive (*Pratīyogī*) and subjunct or co-positive (*anuyogī*) of relation. In like manner, we should admit counterpositive (*pratīyogī*) and co-positive (*anuyogī*) in case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, the extraordinary contact. Organs are the counterpositive of those relations in respect of visual contact etc. and the jar etc, the co-positive (*anuyogī*) become the object here. If *sāmānya* (universal) or knowledge of *sāmānya* (*sāmānyajñāna*) be referred to as a relation, the counterpositive of that relation will be the sense-organs and the substratum of the *sāmānya* will be the subjunct (*anuyogī*).

If *sāmānya* (universal) is called the contact then relation controlling counterpositiveness (*pratīyogitā*) existing in organs is *svaviṣayakajñānaviṣayaka-samyoga* (i.e. a contact having some knowledge of an object which becomes an object of jarness). Here, the word 'sva' implies 'jarness', the universal (*ghatvatvasāmānya*) *Svaviṣayakajñāna* implies

knowledge of jarness in a jar present to organs. The object of that knowledge is a jar. The connection (*saṃyoga*) of that jar exists in sense organs. Hence, the counterpositive of the relation of *ghaṭatvasāmānya* i.e. universal in the form of jarness becomes the sense organs. If the universals, jarness etc. are admitted as relation, the regulator (*niyāmaka*) or *anuyogitā* i.e. subjunctness will be inherence (*samavāya*). The substratum of the universals like jarness etc (*ghaṭatvādisāmānya*) is *anuyogī* or subjunct and the universal (*sāmānya*) exists in that *anuyogī* in the relation of inherence.

If *sāmānyajñāna* (the cognition of universal) is admitted to be a contact, then the regulator of *pratiyogitā* (counterpositiveness) will be *svaviṣayavatsaṃyoga*. The meaning of the word 'sva' is the cognition of jarness (*ghaṭatvajñāna*), the object of it is jarness, *svaviṣayavat* means the locus of the object of the cognition of jarness, i.e., the jar and the connection (*saṃyoga*) of the jar (*ghaṭa*) qualified with jarness exist in sense organs and thus the sense organs become the counterpositive. When the knowledge of universal (*sāmānyajñāna*) is said to be the contact, *svaviṣayasāmānyāśrayatā* would be the regulator (*niyāmaka*) of *anuyogitā* (subjunctness). The word 'sva' means the knowledge of jarness (*ghaṭatvajñāna*), its object (*viṣaya*) or *sāmānya* is jarness (*ghaṭatva*) and the character of its substratum (*āśrayatā*) exists in the jar.

Thus, if *sāmānya* is regarded as contact and the cloud of dust (*dhūlipāṭala*) is known as smoke, then *svaviṣayajñānaviṣayasamāyoga* and inherence become the regulator (*niyāmaka*) of *Pratiyogitā* and *anuyogitā* respectively. The word 'sva' means the universal (*sāmānya*) 'smokeness' (*dhūmatvasāmānya*). *Svaviṣayakajñāna* implies the cognition of smokeness in the cloud of dust present to our sense organs. The object of that knowledge is the cloud of dust. It has a connection with our sense organs.

The universal (*sāmānya*) smokeness inheres in smoke. So, the regulator (*niyāmaka*) of *anuyogitā* or subjunctness is inherence.

The same case happens when we consider *sāmānyajñāna* (the cognition of universal) to be the connection (*sannikarṣa*). If *sāmānyajñāna* becomes the connection (*sannikarṣa*), the regulator (*niyāmaka*) of *pratiyogitā* i.e. counterpositiveness is *Svaviṣayavatsamīyoga* i.e. contact having object in the form of jarness. But if *sāmānyajñāna* becomes the connection (*sannikarṣa*) of mind i.e. internal sense, *svaviṣayavatsamīyoga* cannot be the criterion (*niyāmaka*) of the counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitā*). The relation which determines the counterpositiveness existing in mind is *svāśrayasamīyoga* i.e. the contact existing in the locus of jarness. Pleasure, pain etc. are the objects of mental perception. The knowledge of happiness and pain is the *sannikarṣa* of the supernormal perception of pleasure and pain. The counterpositive of that *sannikarṣa* is mind. The criterion (*niyāmaka*) of this counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitā*) is *svāśrayasamīyoga* (i.e. the contact existing in the locus of jarness). The word 'sva' implies the knowledge of happiness and pain. The substratum of that knowledge is self which has the contact with our mind. Thus, mind becomes the counter-positive in the relation of *svāśrayasamīyoga*.

It should be noted here that the follower of the first view calls the universal under the perview of our knowledge (*jñāyamāna sāmānya*) to be the contact (*sannikarṣa*). According to the second view, the qualificative cognition of *sāmānya* (*sāmānyaprakāraka jñāna*) is the contact and the third view says that the objective cognition of *sāmānya* is the contact. Among the three views the third view or the view of the Navya Naiyāyika is correct. To admit *sāmānya* as a contact causes a defect. When a non-eternal universal (*sāmānya*) is not present before us and we are mistaken for it (*sāmānya*), the supernormal perception of the substratum of the non-eternal universal is not possible, since the cause of that perception - *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* in the form of non-eternal *sāmānya* is not perceived at that moment. *Sāmānya* being non-eternal cannot exist for ever. The extra-ordinary perception of the real substratum of it will not be possible in the event of its absence due to false cognition. For this reason the acceptance of the knowable (*jñāyamāna sāmānya*) as a contact cannot be accepted.

If *sāmānyaprakāra jñāna* i.e. a cognition of universal as a qualifier is called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* then there arises another defect. The extraordinary perception evolved from the *sāmānyaviśeṣyakajñāna* (i.e. the cognition of universal as a qualifier) will not have any ground (*upapatti*). The supernormal perception of the substratum of *sāmānya* which comes after the *sāmānyaviśeṣyaka jñāna* (the knowledge of that universal which is produced by a qualificand) is based on experience (*anubhavasiddha*). If qualificative knowledge of *sāmānya* as a qualifier is accepted as a contact, then that type of supernormal perception is not possible. Hence, according to *Navya Naiyāyika*, *sāmānyaviśeṣyaka jñāna* is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

It has been stated by Visvanātha that the knowledge having the universal as content is called *Pratyāsatti*. The knowledgeness (property of being knowledge) having universal as content (*sāmānyaviśayakajñānatvam*) becomes the limiter of the *pratyāsatti*. It entails that the knowledge which comes through *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is of an object remaining immediately after indeterminate perception and recollective knowledge.¹⁴

In this context, the phrase '*Sāmānyaviśayakajñānam* (i.e. knowledge having *sāmānya* as its content) means knowledge of the universal which has become a qualificand by virtue of being connected with sense organ.¹⁵ According to a section of *Naiyāyikas*, mere knowledge of the universal which is common in the indeterminate perception and recollective knowledge becomes the *pratyāsatti*.¹⁶

The above mentioned view is not at all tenable. Because the knowledge of the universal cannot be apprehended at the stage of indeterminate perception. Moreover, in the case of memory the *sāmānya* cannot also be perceived because, the content of memory is very much difficult to ascertain whether it is true or not. The verifiability principle being not applicable to it fails to reveal the real nature of an object. That is why, it has been mentioned in the *Prabhā* that the knowledge of universal has to be ascertained in an object remaining

just after indeterminate stage i.e. *savikalpaka* stage and after the memory stage i.e. at the level of knowledge (*pramā*). Smṛti being not verifiable, cannot provide us the true knowledge of an object as per a section of philosophers.

Now, a question may be raised, if, on seeing a pot, or at the time of perceiving it we can know all the pots, then on perceiving a thing or at the time of perceiving it, we can know all the things. Or, in other words, the perception of all knowable objects are implied by the perception of anything of the world belonging to the class of knowables. So, we shall be omniscient. If *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is admitted, how the problem of being omniscience of all things will be solved? In reply to this question it can be said that we cannot be omniscient with the help of the cognition attained by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* (a contact in which universal becomes the nature) The particular knowledge of all things or *padārthas* is required for being omniscient. That kind of particular knowledge is not acquired by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. We may have the particular knowledge of the pot present before our eyes with the aid of normal contact (*laukika sannikarṣa*). But this type of knowledge of all the other pots is not possible by supernormal contact called *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. We can know the pot present before us in particular by normal perception. But such knowledge of other pots is not possible by supernormal perception in the form of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. Knowledge of specific feature of a thing is called particular knowledge. The knowledge of relation and relata are the requisite things for being full of specific feature (*viśiṣṭavaiśiṣṭyāvagāhī*). Here in case of the extraordinary perception of other pots although the relata, potness and the relation are known previously, the another type of relata being unknown will not be characterised by particular feature. Therefore, if that type of knowledge of all knowable objects (*prameya*) is not attained by *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* in the form of *prameyatva*, then how the objection of being omniscient will be raised? ¹⁷

The Necessity of Admitting of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* :

Now, the question is : we find that the pot in front of our eyes is known particularly but in case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* other pots are not known like the former. Here the knowledge of the former pot is called particular knowledge and that of the latter is called universal knowledge (*sāmānyalakṣaṇā*). If the objectivity of knowledge is not admitted in the same way in the same kind of knowledge, then why do we say that all the pots are the objects of knowledge ? That is to say, what is the necessity of admitting of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* ? That all the pots of all times and space are perceived at the time of seeing one pot is not accepted by experience (*anubhava*). With a view to justifying this imagination which is contradictory to experience and showing a connection between our sense-organ and the pots of the distant, the present, the past and the future, it seems non-sense to call knowable *sāmānya* (universal or *sāmānya* which comes under the purview of our knowledge) or knowledge of *sāmānya* to be a contact.

In response to the above question, the Naiyāyikas point out that some defects may occur if *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is not admitted. First, if someone finds the co-existence of smoke and fire in some places, he may have doubt that all the manifestations of smoke of the world are not universally related to fire. This doubt cannot be overcome if *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is not admitted. For, it is established that there are universal concomitance (*Vyāpti*) of fire in the perceived smoke. Here, there is no doubt of *vyāpti* between smoke and fire. Now we shall have to admit that there is a doubt of universal concomitance between the unknown smoke and fire. This doubt will be dispelled through the means of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. The case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* has been justified by the Naiyāyika in the following manner :

In respect of a visual perception of a number of cases, e.g. smoke is found to co-exist with fire. All cases of smoke and fire and their co-existence can never be covered through our sensuous perception. In our ordinary life we notice a number of cases, and on the basis of that we form the judgement that

wherever there is smoke, there is fire. It is considered as a type of perception which is pure and simple. Whatever it may be, the question arises : how can a universal concomitance (*vyāpti*) of smoke and fire be established on the datum of perception ? A sense-organ can never be related to all instances of smoke, fire and their co-existence. The difficulty is steered clear of by saying that when we perceive a particular instance of smoke and a particular case of fire and their co-existence, we also perceive their generic attributes i.e. 'smokeness', 'fireness', and the property of co-existence at that very moment. And it is only at the next moment that we perceive through the data of smokeness, fireness and the property of their co-existence all the individual instances respectively related to the above universals. Thus, the perceptual knowledge of the universal serves as the supernormal link through which all the unobserved instances of smoke, fire and their co-existence become amenable to the visual sense organ.¹⁸ Such is the way of justifying *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* which assists in ascertaining *vyāpti*.

Secondly, darkness (*tamaḥ*) is a perceptible thing . *Sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is necessary for perceiving this thing (*padārtha*). According to *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, absence in general (*sāmānyābhāva*) of all manifestations of fire is called *tamaḥ* (darkness). The perception of that thing called *tamaḥ* depends on the knowledge of all kinds of lights because of the cognition of counterpositive (*pratiyogī*) becomes a cause of the cognition of absence or non-existence (*abhāva*). Hence, at first the knowledge of all kinds of light or that of counter-positive (*pratiyogī*) is required for the perception of *tamaḥ*. But, how is the knowledge of all kinds of fire possible ? It is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* which can make this possible. We can know all the manifestations of fire after the perception of a particular fire by the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* contact (*sannikarṣa*) of the knowable (*jñāyamana*) lightness (*tejastva*) or the cognition of *sāmānya* and thus the perception of darkness which depends on the knowledge of the counterpositive of all the manifestations of light will occur immediately, provided we admit the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.¹⁹

Thirdly, it has been contended by some that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is a necessary condition for the perception of previous non-existence (*prāgabhāva*).²⁰ The ordinary perception of the counter-positive is not possible owing to the absence of a sense object contact. The counter positive (*pratiyogī*) may be known by another supernormal means of knowing called *jñānalakṣaṇa* : which is also not possible here. So *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* has to be admitted. Hence, when we perceive a pot we can perceive all other pots including the non-produced or even the damaged ones through the universal potness present in the perceived pot.

Fourthly, *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is a requisite for forming any negative judgement of perception.²¹ For instance, "This (horse) is not a cow", is a negative judgement of perception as there is an absence of cowness in the horse. But "absence of cowness in a horse" can be known by perceiving all cows. And all cows cannot be perceived ordinarily. We can perceive cow-universal (cowness) in an individual cow and the cowness is linked with all other cows. And through this link we can perceive all the cows. Thus, any negative judgement can be perceived through *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*.²²

Fifthly, we cannot explain the voluntary effort to attain pleasure without the help of *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. To desire for pleasure is somehow to know it as something to be, but not yet experienced. When we perceive one pleasure, we perceive all pleasures including the future pleasure through the generic property, 'pleasurability' present in the perceived pleasure.²³

Notes and References :

1. "Nityatve satyanekasamavetatvam" *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse No.8.
 - 1.1. Hoernle : "Concerning Universals", *Mind*, 1927, p.180.
2. "Samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ" - *Nyāyasūtra*, 2.2.69.
3. *Padārthadharmasamgraha* - Prasastapāda (Chowkhamba), p.311.
4. "Sāmānyam lakṣaṇam yasya ityarthah" - *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse 63.
5. Srimohan Bhattacharya and Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya : *Bhāratīya Darśana Koṣa*, Vol. I, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1978, p.180.
 - 5.1 Dr. Raghunath Ghosh - *The Justification of Inference* (A Navya Nyāya Approach), Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi, Varanasi, 1990, p.93.
 - 5.2 "Indriyasamvaddhaviśeṣyakajñānaprakāribhūtam vodhyam".
Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse No. 63.
6. "Tatra dhūmatvena sannikarṣeṇa dhūmā ityevaṁ rūpaṁ sakaldhūmaviṣayakam jñānam jāyate" - *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse 63.
7. J.S.Mill : *A System of Logic*, Ed. Routledge and Kegan Paul, Great Britain, 1973.
Stebbing : *Logic in Practice*, pp. 19-20.
8. Stebbing : *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p.243.
9. Dr. Stebbing : *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, pp. 90-97, 244.

10. Manikanṭha : *Nyāyaratna* with Dyutimalika commentary, of Nṛsīṃhayajvan, ed. V.S.Sastri and V.Krishnamacharya, Madras Govt. Oriental Series, Madras, 1953, p.64.
- 10.1 Gopikamohan Bhattacharya : *Navya-Nyāya - some Logical Problems in Historical Perspective*, Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, Delhi, 1978, pp. 58-59.
11. Parantu samānānām bhāvaḥ sāmānyam - *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on Verse no. 63.
12. Sā ca sāmāgrī cakṣuḥ-sāmyogāloka-sāmyogādikam.
Tenāndhakārādau cakṣurādinā tādrśam jñānam na jāyate -
Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse no. 64.
- 12.1, Karl H. Potter - *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Volume II, p.168.
13. L.P. N.Sinha : *Nyāya Theory of Perception*, Classical Publishing Co., New Delhi, 1983, p.108.
14. Sāmānyaviṣayakajñānatvaṃ pratyāsattitāvachhedakam ityārthaḥ. Tathā ca nirvikalpakottaram sāmānyakottaram ca sāmānyalakṣaṇajanyajñānameva tonmate iṣṭamiti bhāvaḥ." Prabhā commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse No. 64, *Kārikāvalī*, ed. Sri C. Shankarram Shastri, Choukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1988, p.464.
15. Indriyasambaddha viśeṣyakam sāmānyajñānamityārthaḥ yadvā sāmānyaviṣayakam jñānam ityārthaḥ. *Dinakari commentary* on Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse No. 64, Ibid, p.464.

16. Etanmate ca nirvikalpakasādhāraṇaṁ smaraṇasādhāraṇaṁ ca sāmānyajñānaṁ pratyāsattiḥ. Dinakari commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse No. 64, Ibid, p.465.
17. N.C.Goswami : *Tarkasaṁgraha*, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, p.276.
18. Gaṅgeśa : *Tattvacintāmani*, Anumāṅkhaṇḍa, Bibliotheca Indica Edition, 1910, p.251.
19. *Tarkasaṁgraha*, by Narayan Chandra Goswami, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, p.277.
20. Ibid.
21. Sunil Kumar Das : *The Nyāya Theory of Supernormal Perception*, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, 1988, p.29.
22. Vide my article "*Sāmānyalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa*", NORTH BENGAL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, Ed. Pabitra Kumar Roy, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, 1995, pp. 128-129.
23. *Tattacintāmani*, II, pp.283-90, Anumāna Khaṇḍa, Bibliotheca Indica Edition, 1910.

CHAPTER-III

THE CONCEPT OF *JÑĀNALAKṢAṆA PRATYAKṢA*

Significance of *Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* :

Now an effort will be made to give an account of the second type of supernormal perception called *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. The word *Jñānalakṣaṇa* means that it is the *jñāna* (i.e. cognition) which acts as the contact in this perception. Here *lakṣaṇa* means nature or *svarūpa*. The contact in which *jñāna* (knowledge) becomes an essence is called *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. This knowledge (*jñāna*) is in the form of memory. If the memory-knowledge of previously perceived object serves as the qualifier (i.e. *prakāra*) of the object present to our sense-organ then that kind of supernormal contact is called *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

Here the memory-knowledge (*smṛti*) or previous knowledge of the object concerned is the cause of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. On finding something when a person says, "I see a fragrant sandal wood", he has an immediate knowledge of its fragrance. In this case, the memory of our past experience of fragrance in the sandalwood through the olfactory organ acts as the contact between the present fragrance and the ocular organ. This is a famous example of *jñānalakṣaṇā*. The Naiyāyika points out that the seeing of 'fragrance' which is ordinarily perceived by olfactory organ cannot be explained without the help of *jñānalakṣaṇā*. So he is bound to accept the *jñānalakṣaṇā* as a *pratyāsatti*.

There is a clear distinction between the *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* and the *jñānalakṣaṇa*. In case of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* the knowledge of the universal or *sāmānya* leads to the perception of the individuals in which it inheres and in *jñānalakṣaṇā* a previous knowledge of the object concerned serves as the present perception of its own object.¹

It has been argued in the Prabhā commentary that there are two types of *viṣayatā* in the case of *jñānalakṣaṇā*. When we are apprehending a piece of sandalwood and its fragrance, the phenomenon of fragrance is perceived through the relation called extra-ordinary contentness (*alaukika viṣayatā sambandha*) through the medium of another knowledge i.e. the knowledge of a piece of sandal wood through the relation of contentness (*viṣayatā sambandha*). In other words, the ordinary relation called *viṣayatā* between self and the knowledge grasped earlier gives rise to the perceptual awareness of an object which is supernormal in character through the relation called supernormal contactness. It may be said that both the contacts i.e. *jñānalakṣaṇā* and *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, by virtue of being the form of knowledge give rise to two different types of activities, as the limiter of contactness (*pratyāsattitāvachhedaka*) is different in two cases. Though both of them seem to be the forms of knowledge, yet the results arising from them are completely different in character (*phalavaicitrya*). The knowledge of universal (*sāmānya*) leads to the knowledge of the individuals existing in different time and places, while the knowledge of a sandal wood can lead us to the knowledge of fragrance. In these cases, though the case is almost same, the effects are so. Hence, we have to accept two different cause-and-effect relations. in these two cases.²

It has been argued by Dinakara that the knowledge of fragrance in a piece of sandal wood is not possible due to the lack of contact of eye with the fragrance. The knowledge of fragrance is not also possible through *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* due to the absence of accessories connected with the collocation of causes behind the ordinary perception characterised by fragrance. In other words, if fragrance is taken as grasped by *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, we have to look for some assisting causes of the totality of causes of ordinary perception, which is not available here. Moreover, when the fragrance is taken, no other attributes existing in it are apprehended. From this, it is concluded that the knowledge of fragrance is not possible through *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. Hence, there is no other alternative than to accept *jñānalakṣaṇā* as a means of knowing it.³

The Justification of Jñānalakṣaṇā :

Śri Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, in his "*Jñānalakṣaṇa Vicārahasyam*" mentions four kinds of cases for the justification of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*. The cases are : (1) recognition (*pratyabhijñā*), (2) the perception of negation (*abhāva*), (3) the visual perception of fragrance' in a piece of sandal wood (*surabhi candanam*) and (4) apperception or the knowledge of knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*). These cases cannot be explained without the acceptance or service of *jñānalakṣaṇā*. These are being explained gradually in the following :

(1) Recognition (pratyabhijñā) : In the case of recognition like 'this is that Devadatta' the perception of the 'that' is perceived through it. Here, the present knowledge of the 'that' must be possible by *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* because the 'that' is not caused by the normal contact with our senses but 'this' can be perceived through the ordinary perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*).

(2) Perception of negation (abhāva) : In the case of the perception of negation of an object as, "There is negation of the jar on the ground' there is no sense-contact with the 'jar' which is the counterpositive or absentee or negatum (*pratiyogī*) of the negation. If an object has no contact with the sense, it cannot be an object of perception. Thus, there can be no perception of the counterpositive without *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*, the distinguishing character of the perception of negation. So, the Naiyāyika accepts this as an instance of *jñānalakṣaṇā*.

(3) Visual perception of 'fragrance' in a piece of sandal wood (*surabhi candanam*) : This type of the supernormal visual perception of the fragrant sandalwood has already been explained.

(4) The knowledge of knowledge (*anuvyavasāya*): In the case of the "knowledge of knowledge" (*anuvyavasāya*) e.g. "I know the pot" (*ghaṭam ahaṁ jānāmi* or *ahaṁ ghaṭajñānavān*) we have no ordinary contact of knowledge with the sense organ. Here the mind is in contact with the knowledge through the relation of *saṁyukta-*

samavāya i.e., conjoined inherence. But the mind has no ordinary contact with the pot yet it has become an object of perception. Hence, the perception of that object in the case of this *anuvyavasāya*' should be explicated by *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* (i.e. super normal connection through knowledge).

An objection may be raised here : knowledge (*jñāna*) cannot be regarded as a *sannikarṣa* or contact. A *sannikarṣa* or contact implies the relation between the sense-organ and its object. As knowledge exists in the self, it cannot stay in between the sense-organ and the object. In response to this objection, the Naiyāyika points that the word 'knowledge' means the relation of being the object of the memory-knowledge and this memory-knowledge inheres in the self which is in contact with the mind connected with the sense organ (*sva-samjukta manaḥ - samyuktātamamaveta-jñānaviṣayatvarūpa-sambandha*).

That there is the knowledge of fragrance in a sandal wood is known through *jñānalakṣaṇā* is evidenced from the following fact. If an individual finds a sandal wood or comes to know a sandal wood for the first time in his life, he has no previous experience about the concomitant 'of being a sandal wood' (*candanatva*) and 'being fragrant' (*saurabha*). Due to the lack of previous experience he will surely gather the knowledge of sandal wood alone, but not its fragrance. In the initial experience of sandal wood there is the lack of the knowledge of fragrance due to the absence of its previous knowledge. In other words, the knowledge of fragrance is not possible as *jñāna* does not work as a *sannikarṣa*. When an individual comes to know that a piece of sandal wood is fragrant', he will be in a position to know about the fragrance as soon as he perceives a piece of sandal wood, because *jñāna* which is very much present acts as a *sannikarṣa*. From this, it can easily be concluded that *jñāna* serves as a *sannikarṣa* in the case of cognitions as of the fragrance etc.

In the case of 'knowledge of knowledge' (*anuvyavasāya*) , "I know the pot' (a) the contact between the knowledge and the mind is normal and (b) the contact between the pot and the mind is supernormal (*svasamyuktātamamaveta-jñānaviṣayatvarūpa-sambandha*'). So the perception of knowledge is normal and

that of the pot is supernormal. In response to this objection the Naiyāyikas advocate that an object related to another object (*svasambandhikapadārtha*) cannot be known as separated from the 'relatum' (*sambandhi*). So, in respect of the perception of non-existence e.g. 'There is no pot on the ground', the apprehension of the pot', the counter correlative of which qualifies the non-existence is not possible without a supernormal sense-contact like *jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa*. In like manner, in the case of a 'desire, of an object related to another (*svasambandhikapadārtha*, e.g. I desire a pen), the perception of the object of desire is not possible without *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

Prābhākara Mimāṃsakas do not accept *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* on the basis of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*). They advocate that the knowledge in the form. 'This is that' is not called 'recognition'. Two pieces of knowledge are there, such as, (a) one of the 'this' (this is a case of perception) and (b) the other of the 'that' (that is a case of memory-knowledge). These two cognitions are evolved from their concerned causes (a) the knowledge of the 'this' is caused by sense-contact and the memory-knowledge of the 'that' is due to previous experience. Hence, there is no proper argument for accepting *jñānalakṣaṇā* or *upanitabhāna* in this case.⁴ The Naiyāyikas suppose that the above two distinct cognitions are one but not distinct as it (distinction) is not revealed. In response to this Prābhākaras point out that it is not the rule that there can be no normal perception of a related object without having its object. The proper rule is that there cannot be normal perception of a related object if there is no knowledge of the relatum. Therefore, though the knowledge of the non-existence of a pot depends upon the knowledge of the pot, we cannot admit that the object of the knowledge of the non-existence of the pot would be that pot. As there is the memory-knowledge of the pot, there is no question of accepting pot as the object of the knowledge of the non-existence.

Prābhākaras point out that knowledge is self-manifesting (*svapprakāśa*) and hence they do not admit apperception (*anuvyavasāya*) and therefore, there is no ground accepting *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* on the basis of *anuvyavasāya*. It has been said above that it is the knowledge which serves as the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. If knowledge alone serves as *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*, any person may attain

supernormal perception of any object with the help of any cognition. But this does not happen. So mere knowledge is not *sannikarṣa*. But when *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is occurred, the knowledge in a self which is connected with mind through sense organ is called the *sannikarṣa* here. When we acquire the knowledge of fragrance in a piece of sandal wood with the help of our eyes, the memory-knowledge of fragrance inheres in our selves which are connected with our minds conjoined with our eyes and that knowledge exists in the fragrance through the relation of contentness (*viśayatā*). Such knowledge (i.e. this type of knowledge of fragrance) inherent in self which is connected with mind which is again connected with eye is called *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

Refutation of the perceptuality of 'Surabhi candanam' as both visual and alfactory:

If someone admit that both qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) are the object of one single knowledge, we should present an example of knowledge in the form "fragrant sandal wood" to him because fragrance is not perceived through eyes and there is no power of an olfactory organ to perceive a substance (*dravya*). Therefore, to perceive fragrance or sandal wood with the aid of both the organs is not possible because it is very essential to perceive both the substrata for the apprehension of their relations or contacts. An opponent says that the single cognition, "fragrant sandal wood" comes from any of the two organs-visual organ and olfactory organ. It is supported in the following way with an instance of an apperception, such as, "A jar which was seen earlier is remembered now" and so it is said "This is that jar". Here since the knowledge of the 'this' is due to sense-contact, so it is a present knowledge. As the perceptual knowledge of the 'that' is generated by *sannikarṣa* or previous experience, so it is called past knowledge. In this direction some (the Prābhākara Mimāṃsakas) say that here two types of knowledge are there - one comes from visual organ (eye) and the other from olfactory organ (nose) and the objects of the cognitions are substance (*dravya*) and fragrance (*saurava*) respectively.

This type of support is not correct because knowledge is a composite whole , it has no part. If knowledge is connected with parts, it can be said that one part of it comes from visual organ(eye) and the other from olfactory organ (nose). So, if knowledge is partless, or it is produced from two sense-organs and if both fragrance and object (i.e. sandalwood) are the object of it, it is to be admitted that the perception of fragrance also is possible by visual organ or the object (i.e. sandal wood) will be perceived by olfactory organ also. For, a thing which is perceived by a particular sense-organ is the object applicable to apprehend it (i.e. sense organ) . Besides, we know that mind is atomic, so it cannot be connected with two sense-organs simultaneously.⁵ Therefore, practically, even without willing, we shall have to admit that at first we perceive the fragrance only by olfactory organ and we can know the sandal wood through the contact of eye with it afterwards. This rule is applied even for the knowledge of qualificand (*viśeṣya*). From this, it can be inferred that though “fragrant sandalwood” is a perceptual knowledge, yet it is the knowledge related to its qualificand or *viśeṣya* as its object (*viśeṣyaviṣayakajñāna*). In like manner, the knowledge in the form ‘two objects’ also is related to its qualificand as its object because it is also the knowledge related to qualificand (*viśeṣyajñāna*) though it is perceptual.

The phrase ‘being perceptual’ (*pratyakṣatve sati*) has been included in order to exclude the inferential cognitions. If it is argued that the substratum of the knowledge of the qualificand is taken as the nature of substance, the knowledge of it would arise even if qualifier is not there. By virtue of being a cause the qualifier gives rise to the knowledge of qualificand. As it is absent in this case, the knowledge of qualificand does not arise at all. It can not be said that the knowledge of the qualificand exists in the nature of an object, but it is called qualified. This phenomenon of qualifiedness (*viśiṣṭatā*) remains in an object which is different from its own essence as we find in the case of the knowledge of *danḍī* i.e. an individual having some stick. In this case, there is neither the knowledge of an individual nor the knowledge of the conjunction of the stick. But in this case an individual endowed with some extraneous character is referred to. ‘Being endowed with the stick’ (*danḍopasarjanatva*) is the differentiating factor of him from others. For this reason a qualifier is always called a

differentiator (*bhedaka*). By virtue of being qualificand the stick attached with the individual differentiates this particular individual from others. This is the essential difference between *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*. The same function of differentiation is done by the *Upalakṣaṇa* also, but this is not due to the prior awareness of it. In the case of the knowledge of *dandī* the knowledge of *danda* is a pre-requisite. In the same way, in the case of *jaṭābhistāpasam* (a saint is known by his clotted hair), the 'clotted hair' is the prerequisite of such awareness. In spite of this, this case is not same as the earlier one. Because, in this context, the clotted hair' (*jaṭā*) is not embedded in the word 'tāpasa' as we find in the case of 'dandī' in which the meaning of *danda* is inherent. As an individual with a stick is completely differentiated from another one without a stick an individual holding of stick is more, basic and the knowledge of 'stick' has become a pre-requisite. Hence, the knowledge in the form 'Dandī puruṣaḥ' is nothing but the result of the combination of two pieces of knowledge - *visesya* and *visesana*. In the same way, it can be said that the knowledge in the form - *Surabhi candanam* (sandal wood is fragrant) is the result of perception as it comes through *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*. Though sandal wood (*candanam*) is perceptually cognised, the fragrance, though not connected with our nose, comes to our awareness through the relation called *viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*. Hence, there is no question of accepting the knowledge of fragrance as an inferential one, as advocated by the opponents. And thus, the opponents' view that the perception of fragrant sandalwood is due to both the sense-organs - visual (eye) and olfactory (nose) has been refuted by Śrīdhara.⁶

What is the utility of accepting *jñānalakṣaṇa* as a *sannikarṣa*? In reply, it may be said that in the case of 'sandalwood is fragrant' (*surabhi candanam*), the visual perception is possible so far as the piece of sandal wood is concerned. After this, the phenomenon of fragrance is not capable of being known through the same visual sense-organ due to the absence of the eye with it. Though the fragrance is inherited with sandal wood which is again connected (conjoined) with sense organ, it cannot directly be apprehended through the visual organ due to the lack of *sannikarṣa* with it. Hence, the knowledge of fragrance is not known through direction visual perception, but through *jñānalakṣaṇā*.⁷

It may be argued why the fragrance is not apprehended through *saṃyukta-samavāya* type of ordinary *sannikarṣa* (*laukikasannikarṣa*). For, this type of *sannikarṣa* is enumerated as one of the six types as found in Nyāya. In reply, it may be said that when a jar is conjoined with the eye, the red-colour inhered in it is simultaneously perceived by the same sense-organ, there is no question of taking the help of memory. But in the present case though sandal wood is connected with the eye, the fragrance inhered in the sandal wood is not capable of being known simultaneously through the same sense organ due to the lack of the said *sannikarṣa*. From this it follows that though there is a character of *saṃyukta-samavāya*, it cannot be taken as a *sannikarṣa* due to the above mentioned difficulty.

If we do not admit this type of *sannikarṣa* or contact, visual perception of fragrance in a piece of sandal wood, that of silver etc. relating to some other place at the time of error, mental perception of external *vyavasāya* (i.e. knowledge) in *anuvayavasāya* (apperception or knowledge of knowledge) will not be occurred, because there is no contact of eyes with fragrance or silver relating to some other place and external objects for the mental perception of these things.⁸ Here the contact means the *hetu* or link or cause of the said mental perception. Though there is a relation called conjoined inherence between fragrance and visual organ, it cannot be regarded as a *sannikarṣa* (contact) which is a cause (*hetu*) of a perception. Hence, we should admit *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* for the exposition of the perceptions mentioned above. So it is said : *Surabhi candanamiti jñān^e sourabhasya bhānam katham syāt ?*⁹

Again, if *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is not admitted, how is the knowledge of fragrance in the perception like fragrant sandalwood possible ? Although the cognition of fragrance is attained by *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, yet the perception of fragrance will be possible by *jñānalakṣaṇa*¹⁰ In like manner, where a cloud of dust is known as smoke, the knowledge of the cloud of dust as smoke in *anuvayavasāya* (apperception i.e. the knowledge of knowledge) arises through the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* (the connection based on knowledge).

The theory of error propounded by the Naiyāyikas is called *anyathākhyāti-vāda* which is referred to by them for the substantiation of the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* and for the refutation of the prābhākara view. According to them, two pieces of knowledge alone cannot cause volition (*pravṛtti*). So, in the case of recognition and error, if one particular piece of determinate knowledge is not accepted, there can be no volition for picking up the object lying before one, e.g., a conch-shell (*śūkti*) which is falsely perceived as a piece of silver (*rajata*). Thus for the justification of the volition for picking up the object in the present case, *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* must be admitted. There can be no volition without the knowledge of the conduciveness to desired object (*iṣṭasādhanatājñāna*). Hence in the case of the illusory perception such as, 'This is silver', the inferential knowledge 'conduciveness to desired' as the following is to be accepted: This is a means to the attainment of my desired object on previous occasions. Such inferential knowledge is possible only for those who recognise *anyathākhyāti*. In the case of erroneous knowledge, the persons who do not admit one particular piece of determinate knowledge and yet, recognise two pieces of knowledge experiential and previous have no of silverhood in the object perceived and there can be no such inferential knowledge of *iṣṭasādhanatā* (i.e., Conduciveness to what is desired).

According to *prācīna* (ancient) *naiyāyikas*, determinate knowledge is the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* but the Neo-Naiyāyikas point out that either determinate or indeterminate knowledge may be regarded as the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. If indeterminate knowledge, the old Naiyāyikas advocate, is regarded as the *sannikarṣa*, then we shall have to admit the absurd position of the validity of indeterminate knowledge. But it is not possible. The cause of 'the perception of knowledge is the contact known as conjoined inherence with the mind' (*manaḥsamyuktasamavāya*). This contact is attended by the presence of all the conditions necessary for the manifestation of the object. But in the case of indeterminate knowledge there is no *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* as the condition for the manifestation of the object, although there is the normal contact called conjoined-inherence with the mind with that knowledge. Indeterminate knowledge being *nisprakāra* (unqualified) in character cannot be regarded as a *sannikarṣa*. But the

question is : if any kind of knowledge (determinate or indeterminate) is regarded as a *sannikarṣa*, then indeterminate knowledge also becomes a *sannikarṣa*. Therefore, it makes us bound to admit the perception of indeterminate knowledge which is absurd.

Those who believe that only *saprakāra jñāna* (determinate knowledge) is *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* accept that the apperception of such knowledge is always possible. If there is a knowledge without content i.e. *nisprakāra jñāna*, (indeterminate knowledge) the apperception of it is absurd in character. Therefore, the possibility of assuming it (i.e. *nisprakāra jñāna*) as an obstacle to the *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is irrelevant. For this reason *savikalpakajñāna* (i.e. determinate knowledge) is essential for *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* which leads to the law of parsimony (*lāghava*).¹¹

We know that memory-knowledge (*smṛti*) is regarded as the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* which is admitted by Raghunātha Śiromani. But, according to him, 'psychical trace' (*saṁskāra*) also is to be regarded as the *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*. It is not true that *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is always to be taken as a form of some knowledge but it can be said that *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* is something having some content (*saviṣayaka*) of its own. Desire (*icchā*), aversion (*dveṣa*), volition (*kṛti* or *prayatna*) fall under the pervue of *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* because they have some content.¹²

Hence, there are two views on the causality of *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa* (*upanaya*): (1) the causality in the form of knowledgehood (*jñānatvarūpenakāraṇata*) and (ii) the causality in the form of something having its content. (*saviṣayatvarūpena kāraṇata*). According to the first view knowledge alone is the *upanaya* (precondition). (*saviṣayatva-rūpena kāraṇata*). According to the second view, besides knowledge, desire, aversion, volition and psychical trace (*saṁskāra*) are *upanaya* (precondition). In respect of the internal perception (*mānasapratyakṣa*) of 'desire' in the form 'I desire a pot' (*ghaṭamahamicchāmi*) the requisite knowledge of the 'pot' related to desire is attained by *upanaya*.

According to the second view, just after the desire of a pot the internal perception in the form 'I desire a pot' is done and in that internal perception 'the prior desire of the pot' is the '*upanaya*' which causes the *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa (upanitabhāna)* of the 'pot' which is related to the 'desire'.

Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa also, like Raghunātha Śīromani, has regarded knowledge, desire, aversion, volition and psychological trace, all as *upanaya*, or precondition (*jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*).

A fallacy of variability (*vyabhicāradoṣa*) evolves from the recognition of two different kinds of causality for *upanitabhāna (jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa)*. This fallacy may be removed by applying the character of following immediately (*avyavahitottaratva*) to the differentiatum of effectuality (*kāryatāvachchedaka*).¹³ The causality of the reviver (*udvodhaka*) of the trace (*saṁskāra*) is included in the causality just as the *sāmānya* (the generic attribute) of *saṁskāra*. (*Saṁskāratva*). Hence *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is not possible because of unrevived psychological trace (*anudbhuta saṁskāra*).

The transcendental things (*padārthas*) like atom etc. may be the object of perception through *jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa*.

Refutation of the Objection of the Vedāntins :

The Vedāntins object to the Nyāya theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa*. They argue that the *jñānalakṣaṇa of the Naiyāyikas* is nothing but inference. According to the Nyāya theory, a man can perceive the fragrance of sandal wood by his sense of sight because he perceived previously the fragrance of it at another place. Here the Vedāntins hold that a man's previous knowledge of fragrance makes him possible to infer the unperceived fragrance of sandalwood. Thus the perception of smoke as related to fire in all cases can be inferred from a particular case of perception of smoke as related to fire. Therefore, there is no need of accepting the supernormal perception called *jñānalakṣaṇa* as propounded by the Naiyāyikas. Dharmarāja

Adhvarindra¹⁴ opines that *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* (acquired perception) consists of two acts of knowledge : perception and inference. perception in respect of that which is present before the sense, and inference in respect of that which was perceived in the past. In this way, Dharmarāja points out that the case 'The sandalwood is fragrant' is an example of two acts of knowledge : perception in respect of 'sandalwood', and inference in respect of 'fragrance'. But the transition from the perception of sandalwood' to the inference 'This is fragrant' is so swift and sudden that we think as if we 'see fragrance'.

Now we can justify whether the judgement, "I see a piece of fragrant sandalwood' is a case of perception as held by the Naiyāyikas or a case of inference as urged by the Vedāntins. The above judgement is an another instance of "complication" as held by the Western Philosophers, e.g., Ward, Stout and Wundt. The said proposition is equivalent to "The sandalwood looks fragrant". The other examples of complication is as, "Ice looks cold", "The armour looks hard, smooth and cold". We may say that the *jñānalakṣaṇa* of the Naiyāyikas is similar to the visual perception of distance since the eyes have no independent means of apprehending those relations of surfaces and lines which presuppose the third dimension. We can say that there can be a visual perception of fragrance provided that there can be visual perception of distance, coldness, hardness etc. So, now we shall have to discuss the justification of (a) of distance (b) of coldness, hardness, etc. and (c) of fragrance.

In the first case, J.S.Mill opines that the perception of distance by the eye depends on the inference. Modern psychologists say that there is a perception of distance. With regard to the other cases, there is a difference of opinion among the philosophers both Indian and Western. According to the Vedāntins, all such cases are grounded on inference and the Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that they are genuine perceptions. With regard to the second group of cases, modern psychologists point out that they are one kind of perception for which they give the name of "complication" which differs from the ordinary perceptions. The Naiyāyikas declare for the third case that there is visual perception of fragrance.

But there is a distinction between perception and inference. perception is an immediate knowledge of objects or a knowledge of something which is not attained by any other knowledge. And inference is the indirect knowledge of something through the medium of some sign which is always related to it. There is an explication of some data in both the cases of perception and inference. A differentiation between a given and a suggested content is done in both the cases. In case of perception there is a synthesis of some sensuous elements and some non-sensuous presentations. These two elements are not kept distinct in the case of perception. Here, they become one whole. They may form parts of a complex object. The transition of consciousness from the one to the other is not possible here. We do not think of one independent of the other. The one immediately indicates the other and produces the knowledge of an object as one whole, of which they are the parts. Hence, in the case of a person's visual perception of a rose, the sensory element e.g., its colour immediately suggests its other qualities, i.e., its touch and smell, and the sensed and the presented elements cause the perception of the rose.

Inference gives us a knowledge of an object through the instrumentality of the knowledge of some other object which is uniformly related to the first object. Here, the second object suggests the first one through the uniform relation with them. And the suggestive object and the suggested object do not fuse into one whole as they do in case of perception. So, the distinction between the inference and the perception is as follows : perception is the integral immediate consciousness of an object. Inference is a multiple mediated consciousness of an object which may be expressed as this—therefore that .

We cannot accept the Advaitin's view that to recognise *jñānalakṣaṇa* as a form of perception is to ignore the distinction between perception and inference. When we express such judgements, as "ice looks cold", "the sandal looks fragrant", there is no transition of thought from ice to coldness or from the sandal to its fragrance. We do not argue, "since ice, therefore cold" "since sandal, therefore fragrant".

On the other hand, coldness or fragrance is a part of the presentation of the ice or the sandal. The above judgements may be expressed in another way as, "I see the cold ice" or the fragrant sandal", just as it is said, "we see the distant hill". When we infer fire from smoke, we have a transition of thought from smoke to fire as two distinct objects. Here we don't say, "I see the fiery smoke". Here we only think of the fire but it is not presented to us. Therefore, to admit *jñānalakṣaṇā* as a form of perception is not to obliterate the distinction between perception and inference.

In case of the visual perception of a rose or a stone or a block of ice, some tactual quality is present. But in case of visual perception of sandalwood, such presentation of fragrance is not there. Here it can be said that if the eye can present a tactual quality like softness or hardness or coldness (e.g. the judgements, 'the rose looks soft,' 'the stone looks hard' etc) which it is not fitted, by nature to perceive, it is not inherently impossible by the eye to perceive smell. So, we have to consider under what conditions perception takes place. After discovering these conditions, it will be found that, though perception and inference are two fundamentally distinct ways of knowing, yet psychologically it is impossible to distinguish between them.

In perception there is the union of certain sensuous elements with non-sensuous presentations into one whole. Here, the sensuous elements are the given and the non-sensuous elements are presented by the given. Generally, when there is either a natural or a habitual association between the sensuous and the non-sensuous elements, perception takes place. Here one element immediately calls up the other and the two are fused into one whole of presentation of some object. 'Natural association' means an association, in our minds, of one sense quality with such other sense qualities which are by nature, connected with it. Hence, we can say that this type of associations will be experienced by us very often and so it is rooted in our minds. We know that there are five senses and five respective sense qualities, e.g., smell, taste, colour, touch and sound. Remembering this sense qualities in the order quoted above, it can be said that there is a natural connection of that which preceds to those which succeed it, but not *vice-versa*. Hence, a smelling object possesses some taste, colour, touch and sound. But an object having sound like

space or air has no colour, taste and smell. Therefore, generally we can say that, to smell an object is to find and touch it. But to see or touch a thing is not to taste or smell it. Thus, a smell or taste sensation generally reminds us the colour and touch of a thing.

A 'habitual association', on the other hand, is the association in our minds of one sense quality with those which are not, by nature, connected with it. So, we experience it less frequently and in many cases, it is looser than a natural association.¹⁵ If a habitual association between them is one formed in our minds, one sense quality immediately calls up others and all of them are mixed up into one whole and the perception of one object is presented. Hence, there is no connection between sound and touch because sound is in space but no touch. In the like manner, touch has no natural connection with colour because there is touch in the air but no colour. In the same way, colour has no natural relation to taste and smell. Hence, colour is found in light but no taste and smell. So, we find that an association of colour with smell is looser than that of smell with colour, with which it has natural connection. Although the mere smell of kerosene immediately suggests its colour, the latter by itself cannot possibly suggest the former. But a habitual association between them may be established in our minds by continuous experiences of their uniform connection with one another and one sense quality may present another that is not generally connected with it. In this way, the tactual and visual qualities of a bell are presented by the sound of it and the auditory preception of a bell is presented by us. In the like manner, the sight of the bell presents its tactual and auditory qualities and a visual perception of it is possible by us. In this way, it seems our judgement, "I hear the bell", is presented in the another way as, "I see the bell".

A natural and a habitual association (the two alternative conditions of perception) between its two elements are grasped by an individual through repeated experiences of the wordly objects. A natural association between them does not mean that it is congenital. Therefore, the association is made in the mind of every person from his or her birth. If it were so, every child should have perceptions like any grown up man. A natural association has a basis in the constitution of things and it is

very often realised by the experiences of an individual. Hence, if both natural and habitual associations are formed by repeated experiences, two important results will be found : (1) It follows that under the same objective conditions, the knowledge of the same object may be a matter of perception or inference for different individuals, according as there is or is not a natural or a habitual association as the basis of their knowledge, (2) It follows that, under the same objective conditions, the knowledge of the same object may at first be a matter of inference and subsequently of perception and vice versa, for one and the same individual.

The knowledge of a rose which is seen is a perception for the person in whom the continuous experiences of roses have produced a natural or a habitual association between its colour and touch and smell. Under the same external conditions, the knowledge of the said rose will be an inference for another person. Here, for want of repeated experiences, the colour of the rose does not immediately remember its touch and smell but indicates them as distinct ideas or images on the ground of its similarity to the colour of roses. For example, we may refer to the difference between our knowledge of a new type of rose and that of the gardener by whom it is presented to us. An aged man who is familiar with armour may look it hard, smooth and cold. A baby may just imagine it to have these or other different qualities, e.g., tactual qualities.

The fragrance of sandalwood may be directly known from its visual organ by those who are closely familiar with it but for others its visual appearance may only be a sign from which its fragrance is inferred. If I go to a foreign country I can infer the distance and size of an object from its visual appearance. But a native of the country who is familiar with the environment has a perception of these from the same position, which is essentially visual. Anyway, if I stay there for some months and become familiar with the environment, I may have a visual perception of the same facts under the same objective conditions.

The above discussion leads us to conclude that there is no absolute line of demarcation which can be drawn between perception and inference. Sometimes the

knowledge of an object may be a perceptual one and it may be an inferential to another individual at other time i.e., we cannot say that under the same objective conditions the knowledge of an object must always be a perceptual for every individual and that it can never be otherwise. We cannot also say that such knowledge must always be an inferential for all individuals and that it can never be a perception. Therefore, we should conclude that it may be either, for different individuals, or for the same individual at different stages of his or her life, according to his or her or their mental equipment.

The answers which have been given to the two questions quoted above are justified because under certain conditions it is possible that there may be a presentation of fragrance through the visual sense-organ. If these conditions are fulfilled, we can attain an immediate knowledge of fragrance through the visual organ i.e. the eye. Therefore, the Vedāntins must admit that there can be a visual perception of fragrance, because they say that perception is an immediate knowledge of fragrance and it is not a knowledge achieved by sense stimulation. Thus, it is admitted that there can be a visual perception of fragrance and some western psychologists also believe that there is a visual perception of hardness, coldness, softness etc. However, as such perceptions are presented by sense-organs and as these sense organs cannot perceive their objects, we should call them supernormal and place them in a separate class called *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*.

Some Problems Concerning Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyāsatti for Explaining the Perception of Negation :

As we have already found, Harirāma has taken the aid of supernormal connection in case of perception of negation (*abhāva*). All Naiyāyikas admit that negation is invariably linked to a negatum (*pratiyogin*). Whenever a negation is known and explicated, it is determined by a negatum. So, when negation of a jar on the ground is perceived by us, the negatum, i.e., the jar is also perceived. That is to say, the content of perception is 'negation with negatum as an adjunct to it'.

Now, if we examine the situation, it will be seen that there are difficulties in its path. Because, in the absence of the negatum, the contact between it and the visual organ cannot be established. Hence, the Naiyāyika proposes that the negatum is presented to the sense through memory-knowledge and so, the contact between the negatum and the visual organ is said to be supernormal.

We should notice here that when the Naiyāyika says that the negatum appears as an adjunct to negation, the relation that subsists between the two is, in his opinion, one of *pratyogitā* only and not one of physical contact which determines the relation as a container and its contained (*ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva*). That is to say, in the case of negation of a jar, for example, the negation includes all jars past, present and future. But, none of the three categories, of jar are physically present when negation is felt. Hence the Naiyāyika admits that the relation between negation and its negatum is one of *pratyogitā* only and not of *ādhārādheyabhāva* (relation between substratum and superstratum).

The serious analysis of this view point of the Naiyāyika will show that the argument in favour of asserting supernormal contact named *jñānalakṣaṇa* is not convincing. The Naiyāyika accepts that the relation between the two, e.g., negation and its negatum, is not to be taken as *ādhārādheyabhāva* i.e. relation existing between substratum and superstratum and yet he points out that the negation will reveal as an adjunct to its negation in the perception of the latter. The position is anomalous and does not stand the test of criticism. If we say that the negatum and its negation are not related as *ādhāra* and *ādheya*, the implication is that they are dissociated from each other and in that case one cannot be described as an adjunct to the other. Further, in view of the fact that negation and its negatum cannot co-exist, it cannot be ascertained how the former will be perceived as an adjunct to the latter. It is, therefore, not realised, how from the Naiyāyika point of view the negatum would be presented through supernormal contact.

It is for this reason that our present ^{comme-} narrator, i.e., Gadadhara Bhattacharya does not agree with Harirāma when he requisitions the office of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti*

for explaining perception of negation. Rather, he thinks that the instance under review may be explained satisfactorily without the aid of any supernormal contact. He opines that negation is characterised by two properties, viz., absencehood (*abhāvatva*) and counter positiveness (*pratiyogitva*). The *abhāvatva* has been described by the Naiyāyika as *anuyogitva*. It is, therefore, quite understandable that in all cases of the knowledge of negation both these characters of negation viz., subjunctness (*anuyogitva*) and counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitva*) will be comprehended. Now, it is *pratiyogitva* which is explained by the appellation of the negatum and whenever we perceive a negation, we always comprehend and express it through the medium of the appellation of its negatum. It is not a fact that the negatum is presented in any way as an adjunct to negation in the case of its perception. It is, therefore, concluded that there is no valid ground for recognising *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti* in the case of perception of negation.

Next, we proceed to review the case of introspection for which also Harirāma has sought the aid of *jñānalakṣaṇa - pratyāsatti*. According to the Naiyāyika, introspection is the perception of knowledge which is not caused by external organ but happens to be purely a mental process. As the mind is the instrument of the knowledge which is comprehended in introspection, it cannot be the organ for revealing the content of the knowledge for which an external sense organ only operates. But, a question arises. The visual perception of a jar, for instance, is comprehended in a subsequent introspection. Here the jar enters into the content of introspection as an adjunct to the visual perception. So far as the visual perception is concerned, it is comprehended by the mind. That is to say, the mind is the instrument for the visual perception. But how can the content of the visual perception, namely, the jar, be comprehended by the mind? The difficulty is that the jar is not amenable to the mind which is, after all, an internal sense-organ. Harirāma thinks that the time of introspection by the mind it is the visual perception that will officiate as the contact between its own content, viz., the jar and the mind and certainly such contact cannot but be super normal.

We beg to submit that it is not necessary to requisition the office of supernormal contact in the case as described above. Like *pratiyogitva* as in the case of negation, *viṣayatā* also does not determine two relata as a container and its contained and as such, the content of visual perception in the case cited above cannot appear as an adjunct to the visual perception itself when it is comprehended in a subsequent introspection. Further, *viṣayatā* relates knowledge to objects which are not merely present, but past and future also. And, as such it is not possible to have the content of the visual perception as an adjunct to the content of introspection.

The commentator of the book *Jñānalakṣaṇa-*

Vicārahāsyam solves the difficulty in the following way :

Viṣayatā like *jñānatva* is a property of knowledge and as such, the mind can rightly be described as the organ that comprehends it. It is, therefore, quite in the fitness of things to suggest that the content of visual perception is comprehended by the mind. As we have explained in the case of negation, *viṣayatā* is invariably understood and communicated through the appellation of the *viṣayatā*. Thus, we conclude by saying that so far as introspection is concerned we need not seek the aid of any supernormal contact.

NAVYA-NAIYĀYIKA VIEW ON JÑĀNALAKṢĪNA PRATYAKṢĀ :

Gaṅgeśa and his followers, i.e., the Navya-Naiyāyikas think that when we see a piece of sandal-wood and feel that it is fragrant, we have not an internal perception of fragrant sandal through the *manas*, as Jayānta Bhaṭṭa thinks. But we have a distinctly visual perception of the fragrant sandal. But the question is : How can we have a visual perception of the fragrant sandal, because fragrance can never be an object of visual perception ? In response to this, Gaṅgeśa says that the visual perception of fragrant sandal is not a normal perception (*laukika pratyakṣa*) due to an ordinary contact (*laukika sannikarṣa*), but that it is a supernormal perception because of a supernormal contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*). There cannot be a normal contact of the

visual organ with the fragrance of the sandal, since smell is not an object of visual perception. But the fragrance of the sandal revived in memory by association produces a supernormal contact called *jñānalakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*, and through it constitutes the visual perception of the fragrant sandal. In this case, though there is normal contact of the visual organ with the sandal and hence, there is a direct visual perception of the sandal there is a supernormal contact through the idea of fragrance revived in memory by association, and in this way, there arises a visual perception of the fragrant sandal. Therefore, the Navya-Naiyāyikas differ from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, who holds that though the sandal is perceived by the visual organ, the fragrant sandal is not perceived by it but by the *manas*, when there is a visual perception of the sandal with a recollection of its fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ in the past.¹⁶

According to Vardhamāna, there is a difference between the visual perception of fragrant sandal and the olfactory perception of the fragrance of sandal. Sometimes we see a piece of sandal and at once perceive that it is fragrant. And sometimes we smell an odour and at once perceive that it is the fragrance of sandal. The former perception is produced by the visual organ in cooperation with the recollection of fragrance perceived by the olfactory organ on a previous occasion. And the latter perception is produced by the olfactory organ in cooperation with the recollection of sandal perceived by the visual organ in the past.¹⁷

According to both the earlier and later Naiyāyikas, the perception of fragrant sandal is a single unitary presentation, it is not a compound of presentative and representative elements but a presentation qualified by a representative process which is its immediate antecedent. The Naiyāyika does not admit a mixed mode of consciousness, which is admitted by the Advaita Vedānta. The Naiyāyika holds that there is no simultaneity of psychoses owing to the atomic nature of the *manas*. Further, he adds that there cannot be an intermixture of two heterogenous psychoses, for example, a presentative process and a representative process. This has been clearly averred by Udayana.¹⁸

Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa (Acquired Perception) in Jaina Philosophy :

According to Jaina Philosophy, the visual perception of fragrant sandalwood is a case of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* or acquired perception. The visual organ alone, i.e., eye cannot perceive the fragrant sandal, since fragrance cannot be apprehended by the visual organ. Even in cooperation with the recollection of fragrance, the visual organ cannot produce this perception, because, in that case, odour will be apprehended by the eye, which is not possible. One cannot perceive smell with the aid of visual sense. Therefore, we cannot perceive the fragrant sandal aided by the visual organ alone and it is not possible by the cooperation with the recollection of odour also.¹⁹ We are apprehended by the fragrant sandal after the operation of fragrance. From this it cannot be said that it is a simple psychosis of the nature of visual perception produced by the visual sense. In fact, it is a complex psychosis of presentative and representative process mixed up together. Here, it is a mixed form of consciousness made up of presentative and representative elements mechanically associated with each other. An integrative association of two coordinate and co-existent elements are found and the visual percept of the sandal and the idea of fragrance freely reproduced in memory. The apprehension of fragrant sandal is simply a sum of two distinct psychic entities, the present visual sensation of the sandal and an image of its fragrance reproduced from past experience by association and integrated together into a complex psychosis. Not only that; it involves a judgement and an inference. Though the sandal is perceived by the visual organ, and the fragrance is reproduced in memory by the law of association, the apprehension of the sandal as qualified by fragrance, or fragrant sandal, involves a process of judgement and inference. In this way, the Jaina thinks that there is a free association of ideas, judgement, and inference in the acquired perception of fragrant sandal. *Jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* or an acquired perception is rather an act of inference than perception, though it depends on both perception and recollection.²⁰ There is a similarity between this account of an acquired perception and the account of the associationist psychology of the west.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsattistu yadviṣayakam jñānam, tasyaiva pratyāsattiriti - *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, Verse No. 65.
2. Tathāca alaukika viṣayatāsamvandhena pratyakṣam prati viṣayatāsamvandhena jñānapratyāsatterhetuvāditi bhāvaḥ evamca ubhayoḥ pratyāsattyoḥ jñānasvarūpatve'pi phalavaicitryāt pratyāsattitāvachhedakasaṁvandhabhedena kāryakāraṇabhāvadvayam svikāryamiti nigudhābhiprāyaḥ. Prabhā commentary on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse No. 65. *Kārikavali*, Ed. Shri C. Shankarram Shastri, Choukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi - 110007, p. 467.
3. Candānakhandasya cākṣuṣe Jāyamāne upasthitasaurabhabhānam na syāt saurabhāmśe cakṣuḥsannikarṣābhāvādityarthaḥ. Saurabhatvaprakāra-kalaukikapratyakṣasāmagryāḥ sahakāriṇyā virahena saurabhatvasāmānyalakṣanayā'pi saurabhabhānam na sambhavatīti bhāvaḥ..... Jñānalakṣanayā jñānalakṣanayaiva. Tadānī saurabhatvāmśe dharmāntarasyāgrhita-tayā sāmānyalakṣanayā tadbhānānirvāhāditi bhāvaḥ. *Dinakarī commentary on Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on verse No. 65. Ibid, pp. 467-469.
4. Yattuso'yamiti pratyabhijñādikam dharmiviṣayakānubhavātma-katattāviṣayaka smaraṇātmakajñānadvayameva. Tattāsmaraṇam saṁskārādanubhavastu laukikasannikarṣādevotpadyata ityupanītabhāne mānābhāvaḥ. *Jñānalakṣanāvīcā-rarahasyam* of Śrī Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa : By Anantakumar Bhattacharyya, Ed. by Gopikamohan Bhattacharyya, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1958, pp. 11-12.
5. Yugapajñānānutpattirmanaso liṅgam. *Nyāyasūtra* - i.1.16.

6. Ye tu viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyayorekajñānāmbanātmāhuḥ, teṣāṃ surabhi candanamityatra kā vārtā ? Nahi cakṣurgandhaviśayaṃ na ca ghrāṇaṃ dravyamādatte. Ata eva na tābhyāṃ sambandhagrahaṇam, ubhayaśamvādhigrahaṇādhi-
natvātsamvādhigrahaṇasya. Yathā saṃskārendriyajanyaṃ pratyabhijñā-
pratyakṣamubhayakāraṇasāmarthyātpūrvāparakālavīśayam, evaṃ
cakṣurghrāṇābhyāṃ sambhūya janyamānamidaṃ kāraṇadvaya-
sāmarthyādubhayaviśayaṃ syādityeke samarthayanti.

Tadapi na sādhiyaḥ, nirbhāgatvāt. Yadi Jñānaṃ sabhāgam syāttadā
kaścidasyāṃśo ghrāṇena janyate kaściccakṣuṣetyupapadyate vyavasthā,
kintvidamekamakhaṇḍamubhābhyāṃ janitaṃ yadi gandhaṃ dravyaṃ
caḡrṇhāti, tadā gandhōpi cākṣuṣo dravyamapi ghrāṇagamyāṃ prasaktam,
tajanitajñānavīśayatvalakṣṇatvāttadindriya- grāhyatāyāḥ. Na
cāṇutvānmanaso yugapadubhayendriyādhiṣṭhānasambhavaḥ. Tasmād
ghrāṇena gandhe grhīte paścāttadgrahaṇasaḥakāriṇā cakṣuṣā
kevalaviśeṣyālamvanamevedaṃ viśeṣyajñānaṃ janyata
ityakāmenāpyabhyupagantavyam. Tathā ca satyanyeṣāmapī viśeṣyajñā-
nā nāmayaṃ nyāya upatiṣṭhate. Vivādā dhyāsitaṃ viśeṣyajñānaṃ
kevalaviśeṣyālamvanam pratyakṣatve sati viśeṣyajñānatvāt
surabhi candanamiti jñānavat. Pratyakṣatve satīti Laiṅgikajñānavyavaeche-
dārtham. Nanu yadi dravyasvarūpamātrameva viśeṣyajñānasyālamvanam,
asatyapi viśeṣaṇe tathā pratyayaḥ syāt. Atha viśeṣaṇasya janakatvānnya
tadabhāve viśeṣyajñānodayaḥ, tathāpi dravyarūpapratyayādasya na viśeṣaḥ,
viśayaviśeṣamantareṇa jñānasya viśeṣantarābhāvāt, na, anabhyupagamāt.
Na viśeṣyajñānasya dravyasvarūpamātramālamvanam vrūmaḥ, kintu viśiṣṭam.
Viśiṣṭatā ca svarūpātirekiṇyeva, yā daṇḍīti jñāne pratibhāsate. Na khalu tatra
puruṣamātrasya pratīrnāpi daṇḍasamyogitāmātrasya. Tatha ca daṇḍīti
pratītvāitaravilakṣaṇa eva puruṣaḥ saṃvedyate. Vailakṣaṇyaṃ cāsya
daṇḍopasarjanatvameva. Ata eva viśeṣaṇam vyavacchedakamiti gīyate. Daṇḍo
hi svopasarjanatāpratīpattīm puruṣe kurvan puruṣamitarasamād vyavacchinatti.

Ayameva cāsyopalakṣaṇādvīśeṣaḥ. Upalakṣaṇamapi vyavaechinatti na tu svopasarjanatāpratītihetuḥ. Nahi yathā daṇḍīti daṇḍopasarjanatā puruṣe pratīyate tathā jatābhistāpasa iti tāpase jaṭopasarjanatā, daṇḍopasarjanatā puruṣasya prādhānyaṁ vārthakriyāyamupabhogātīśayā'natīśayāpekṣayā. Nanvevaṁ tarhyāpekṣiko'yam viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvo na vāstavaḥ, kiṁ na dṛṣṭo bhavadbhiḥ karṭrkāraṇādivyavahāra āpekṣiko vāstavaśceti kṛtaṁ vistareṇa saṁgrahatīkāyāṁ. Nyāyakandalī, *Prasāstapādabhāṣya* with commentary Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara, Ed. Kshetresachandra Chattopadhyaya, Ganganatha Jha Granthamala, vol.I, Varanasi, 1963, pp. 276-279.

7. Candanakhaṇḍasya cākṣuṣāpratyakṣe jāyamāne'pi saurabhāṁśe cākṣuḥ-sannikarṣābhāvāt cākṣusaṁyukta samavāyasya saurabhe sannikarṣatvā sambhavāt tatra saurabhābhānaṁ na syādityarthaḥ - *Muktāvalīsaṁgraha* on Siddhāntamuktāvalī under Verse No. 65.
 8. Siddhāntamuktāvalī on Verse No. 65, See *Bhāsāparicchedaḥ* : Sri Pañcānan Bhaṭṭacharyya, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, 1377 (Bengali), p. 308.
 9. Surabhi candanamiti jñāne saurabhasya bhānaṁ kathaṁ syāt - Ibid.
 10. Yadyapi sāmānya-lakṣaṇayāpi Saurabhasya bhānaṁ sambhavati, tathāpi saurabhatvasya bhānaṁ jñānalakṣaṇayā - Ibid., P. 309 .
 11. Saprakāraḥ jñānopanāyakatāmate ca sarvatra mānasajñānabhānasambhavana jñānadyaviśayaka mānasasyāprasiddhyā tatsthaliya sāmagrīprati-vandhakatvākalpanena lāghavam.
- Harirāmatarkavāgīśa : *Jñānalakṣaṇāvicārahāsyam*, Ed. Gopikamohan Bhaṭṭacharyya, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1958, p. 99.
12. Ye tu tattadigocarasaṁskārādapi pratyabhijñādīkaṁ svīkurvate te saṁskārasādhāranyānurodhena jñānatvamanantarbhāvya tadviśayatāsālitve-naiva tadupanāyakatā ityāhuḥ , Ibid, pp. 48-49.

13. Uktalāghavena saṁskāratvena saṁskārasyaṅpyupanāya-katāsiddhau tajjanyopanītabhāne vyāvīcāravāraṅāyāvyaḥhitottaratvanivesāsyāvaśya-katvāt - Ibid, pp.106-107.
14. Surabhi candanamityādi - jñānamapi candanāṁśe aparokṣam. Saurabhāṁśe parokṣam, saurabhasya cakṣurindriyāyogyatayā yogyatva ghaṭitasya nirukta - lakṣaṅasyābhāvāt. Dharmarāja Advāraṅdra - *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, Ed. Panchanan Bhattacharyya, Chapter-1, (Pratyakṣa Parīcheda), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, pp.42-43.
15. Stout : *A Manual of Psychology*, pp. 102-103. And Bosanquet : *The Essentials of Logic*, p.31.
16. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (Viśvanātha) Javajis Edition, Bombay, 1916, pp. 283-284. *Dinakari* (Dinakara Bhaṭṭa) on *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, Bombay, 1916, pp. 283-284.
- Tarkāmṛta* (Jagadīśa), Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1921, Chapter IV, p. 14.
17. *Nyāyakusumāñjaliprakāśa* (Vardhamana) on *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Benares, 1912, p. 105.
18. *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (Udayana), Benares, 1912, p.104.
19. Na hi parimalamaranasavyapekṣam locanam surabhi candanamiti pratyayamutpādayati..... gandhasyāpi locanajñānaviṣayatvaprasaṅgāt. *Prameyakamalamārtanḍa* (Prabhācandra), Jāvāji's Edition, Bombay, 1912, p.150 and p. 143.
20. Gandhasmaraṅsahakārilocanavyāpārānantaram surabhi candanamiti pratyayapratīteḥ tanna pratyakṣeṅāsau pratyate. Ibid, p. 150.

CHAPTER - IV

THE CONCEPT OF YOGAJA PRATYAKṢA

Nature of *Yogaja Pratyakṣa* :

The word '*Yogaja*' comes from the word '*Yoga*'. So, at the outset we should concentrate on the meaning of the word '*Yoga*'. The word '*Yoga*' literally means 'union'. It is a spiritual union of the individual self with the universal one and is used in this sense particularly in the Vedānta. The *Gitā* defines *Yoga* as that state from which there is nothing higher or worth realizing. It indicates a place in which a person is never shaken even by the greatest pain. Patañjali points out that *Yoga* does not mean union but spiritual effort to attain perfection through the control of the body, senses and mind. And *Yoga* is defined as the cessation of the modifications of *citta* (*Yogascittavṛttinirodhaḥ*)'. One who follows the prescribed method of *Yoga* is generally called a *Yogin*.

The view of *Yogaja Pratyakṣa* is mentioned in Gautama's *Nyāya Sūtra* (3.2.43) and this theory is elaborated by Vātsyāyana² and Uddyotakara.³ In the *Nyāya Sūtra*, Gautama indicates *Ātman* as *Jñānavan* (the self as a knower). According to Naiyāyikas, the supernormal perception of an individual i.e. a *yogin* is also as real as any other perception. They call such a perception as supernormal one for, such perceptions are beyond the range of the normal perception. It cannot be said that such a perception does not exist and hence unreal on the ground that such a perception is above the accessibility of any ordinary person. The Naiyāyikas treat the description of a yogic perception to be true and try to give an independent interpretation of such perception.

Bhāsarvajña (a Naiyāyika) calls *Yogaja Pratyakṣa* as *Yogic phenomenon*.⁴ It is a direct perception of objects which are far away in space and time or of objects which are imperceptible (e.g. *paramāṇu* etc.)

It is stated that a *Yogin* can attain, through yogic practice of concentration known as *samprajñāta* yoga indescribable supernormal state or quality and with the incomprehensively powerful mind assisted by that supernormal quality he can have a supernormal perception of his own self, the selves of others and all the other things past, present, future and distant. That is to say, they can perceive the *subtlest* objects, the four kinds of atoms, the minds of others, air, space, time, either their attributes, *Karma* (action), *sāmānya* (universal), *viśeṣa* (particularity), *samavāya* (inherence), heaviness, elasticity etc., volition, indeterminate perception, psychological traces, *dharma*, *adharma* and all other things. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa describes yogic perception as the perception of subtle, hidden, remote, past and future objects and considers it to be the highest excellence of human perception.⁵ And he rejoins that the *yogins* perceive all objects in all places through a single cognition simultaneously.⁶ Here the supernormal state or quality of the mind acts as the super-normal sense - object contact (*alaukika sannikarṣa*). This type of sense object contact is called *Yogaja sannikarṣa* and the perception caused by this *sannikarṣa* is called *Yogaja Pratyakṣa*.⁷

Viśvanātha (a famous *Naiyāyika*) points out that there are two kinds of *yogins*: *Yukta* (conjoined) and *Yuñjāna* (occasionally conjoined).⁸ So *Yogaja Pratyakṣa* is also of two kinds : *Yukta Pratyakṣa* and *Yuñjāna Pratyakṣa*.⁹ A *Yuktayogin* is one who has attained spiritual perfection and such intuitive knowledge of all objects is constant and spontaneous to him. The perception of a *Yuktayogin* is called *Yukta Pratyakṣa*. The *yogins* acquire the power of perceiving all objects with their pure minds free from all taints and become one-pointed by constant concentration.^{9a}

A *yuñjāna yogin* is the man who is on the way to perfection and so he requires the help of concentration for occasional intuitive knowledge of things. That is to say, here a yogin requires *dhyāna*, *dhāraṇa* etc. as additional subsidiary factors for the supernormal perception.¹⁰ The perception of a *Yuñjāna yogin* is called *Yuñjāna Pratyakṣa*. The *Yuñjāna* type of a *Yogin* who has occasional flash regarding an object existing in past, present and future and regarding all imperceptible objects like space, atom etc. The *Yogin* is endowed with a mind having two types of properties - a particular method of thinking (*cintāviśeṣah*) and a power generated through the

practice of *yoga (yogābhyāsajaniṭāḥ)*. Both the methods are accessory to the attainment of transcendental perception.¹¹

The power of the sense-organs of the ordinary man like us is limited. The Naiyāyikas hold that there can be natural or inborn variation in the capacity of sense-organs. For example, the cat can perceive in darkness also and the vultures can see an object from a very far distance from the sky. And Sampāti, the king of vultures saw the daughter-in-law of Dasaratha (Sita) from a distance of a hundred *yojanas*.¹² But human eye cannot see after a certain distance. The superior quality of perception varies in degrees like the superior quality of the colour 'white, etc. A section of men attains the highest degree of perception if they develop in quality of the same. Those whose perception reaches the highest degree of perception are called sages. So we cannot deny the possibility of higher degree of functioning of the sense-organs of a living being. The most excellent perfection of perception is constituted by the apprehension of subtle, remote past and future objects.¹³

But the Mimāṃsakas like Kumārila etc. state that a man, possessed of superior power of vision perceives only visible objects. But nobody comes across such superiority of sense-perception apprehending the transcendental objects.

This type of criticism is not fair. It is true that though *dharma* is transcendental to normal sight, yet it is perceived by the sages or seers. We have seen above that though a very distant object and an object covered by darkness, are beyond the reach of our normal eyes, yet they are perceived by *Sampāti* and a cat respectively.¹⁴

In response to this sort of reply *Kumārila* may say that if a sage perceives a transcendental object then he should also perceive smell, taste etc. with his eyes. If someone imagines that an omniscient sage grasps every object of the universe by means of a single source of knowledge then he should admit that the sage perceives, taste, smell etc. with his visual organs. *Kumārila's* objection is not based on facts. The other sense-organs of the sage have super-excellent powers like the eyes. So,

the peculiar hypothesis that a sage perceives taste, etc. with eyes is not to be conjectured. The Mimāṃsakas may point out that the Naiyāyikas should not imagine that a sage perceives *dharma* with his eyes. In response to this the Naiyāyika says that *dharma* is not invisible like taste, etc. The argument of the Mimāṃsaka is based upon the misrepresentation of the above sentence. And it is known that taste and similar qualities other than colour are always imperceptible.

The Naiyāyika reacts on the Kumāṛila's arguments and contents that the latter *cannot say* from his experience that a sage though possessed of super-eyes, perceive *dharma*. For, *dharma* and the excellent power of the eyes of a sage are imperceptible to him. So, Kumāṛila should not point out that *dharma* is not an object which is capable of being perceived with eyes.

The knowledge of eternal *dharma* is only derived from the vedic injunction such as 'should sacrifice'*yajeta* etc. *Dharma* is the eternal fulfilment of duty. It has no limitation in past, present and future. It will be rash for us to think that *dharma* is perceived with our mortal eyes. But it is not at all difficult for the omniscient sages to perceive it.¹⁵

A sage intuits *dharma* with his internal organ through the practice of constant meditation on it. Likewise, a love-sick man beholds his beloved lady with the help of meditation alone.¹⁶

The justification of such intuition is that the internal organ is competent to comprehend all objects without an exception and there is no such thing in the universe which disturbs its penetration. There is a lot of examples to show that persons, have clear and vivid vision of objects which are beyond the reach of our sense-organs. Such visual perception is possible only through the constant practice of meditation.

We find that persons, affected by lust, or excessive grief, disease, insanity, a dream of thieves etc. possess clear, distinct, vivid vision of imaginary objects as if

they are in front of them.

Intuitive knowledge (*Prātibhajñāna*)

When we repeatedly concentrate upon an object, each act of concentration leaves an impression behind it. These impressions accumulate on our self. They constitute the permanent (stable) basis of our knowledge. They generate the highest form of knowledge provided they are arranged in a perfect order.^{16.1}

We can take an instance which shows the acquisition of proficiency in learning. A young student follows a prescribed course of discipline such as the strict observation of the vow of celibacy, the regular revision of the old subject matter learnt by him, etc. He acquires permanent impressions thereby. They become stable as they are and they help him to recall the matters read by him in memory with perfect facility.

Or, we know that gold acquires matchless beauty if it is slowly purified in a closed vessel. In like manner, the inner organ of a sage is capable of perceiving all knowable objects by the constant practice of meditation.^{16.2}

On the contrary, the inner organ of worldly men like ourselves is covered by the veil of passions and so we do not acquire the highest stage of knowledge, that is, omniscience. Any object is directly apprehended by the pure inner organ of the sages. The reason of this direct awareness lies in the fact that all the impurities of their mind are consumed by the daily practice of meditation. When the sages consume all the inner drosses and acquire high proficiency in the art of concentration by the constant practice of meditation, they attain the property of being omniscient.^{16.3}

Future events are foreseen sometimes by us. An illustration of the true judgement of foresight is that my brother will come tomorrow. This type of foresight is called as *Pratibhā Pramāna*. This kind of valid knowledge is not hallucinatory. It is not a doubt. It is not even negated by its contradictory judgement. Its source is not a

defective sense organ. Thus, it should be treated as a piece of valid knowledge.^{16.4}

Pratibhā Pramāṇa is one kind of Extra-Sensory perception. Its validity is doubted by the critics as it, according to them, is purely accidental and a possible event. In this connection, it is said that the knowledge in the form 'My brother will come tomorrow' is certain, though the object is totally accidental or unexpected.^{16.5}

This kind of valid knowledge (i.e. *prātibhā-jñāna*) is direct but not indirect. It may be objected that it cannot be direct since it is non-sensuous. This type of objection does not stand because the inner organ determines it. But, if the inner organ would independently grasp external objects, there would be no blind person in this world. The answer to this objection is that the external object which has been perceived with eyes is only intuited by the inner organ. Thus, the objection that there would be no blind person does not occur.

According to the critics, the direct awareness of a sage is not a perceptual one because it is not determined by a definite set of conditions like the normal perception. In response to this charge it is said that the transcendental knowledge of a sage is always perceptual. If it is not direct it is not the knowledge of a sage. Some opine that the knowledge of a sage is exactly the same derived from the scriptures. This implies that it cannot be direct.

Here another objection is that foresight is non-perceptual for perception refers only to a present object. Kumārila points out that an object which is present and comes in contact with our sense-organ is only perceived. Besides, perception differs from transcendental perception in the point that it apprehends a present object. Such an objection is not tenable. The objectors themselves have said in another place that an object with its future property is grasped. At the time of perceiving silver it is also perceived that it will last long. Thus, it is also established that the perception that my brother will come tomorrow presents a future object. Here the perception of an ordinary man refers to a future object; hence, the supernormal perception of a sage refers to

future *dharma*.

Therefore, the argument against omniscience offered by Kumārila is refuted.

Now, the question is : Is omniscience constituted by a single act of transcendental perception or by many acts of transcendental perception ? The first alternative is not possible since the incompatible objects like heat and cold are never present in a single act of consciousness. All the objects of the world are not also known by many acts of consciousness. These acts of consciousness cannot simultaneously arise because the internal organ, the instrument of consciousness is so small that it cannot simultaneously produce many acts of consciousness. If it produces them one after another, it will not be able to generate the direct awareness of all objects of the three worlds. How is such omniscience justifiable? In response to the objection it is argued that the sages will simultaneously perceive all the objects all over the world by a single act of perception. The argument against the copresence of the incompatible objects in one act of perception has no binding force since we may mention instances which show that we simultaneously feel heat and cold on some occasions. In winter a person who has descended the icy cold water of a lake up to his navel with the upper part of his body exposed to the very hot rays of the sun in a midday of the summer simultaneously feels heat and cold.

If the sages are pioneers to know the true nature of *dharma* from the Vedas then the well-established proposition that Vedas are the only source of *dharma* is never contradicted. It is the final argument of the objector, e.g. the Mimāṃsaka. A reply to the above objection is given below : There is a truth in the above objection that the sages are initiated into *dharma* by the Vedas. Later on when they attain the fruit of meditation the transcendental perception of *dharma* flashes in their mind. As a result of it, we can say that the ascertainment of the truth of the thesis that the Vedas are the only source of the *dharma* becomes doubtful or shaky. Besides, the eternal perception of *dharma* belongs to God and this perception is the source of *dharma*. God is the author of the Vedas for He perceives it (Veda). God's eternal perception is

already proved in Indian Tradition. If God's eternal perception is proved then the above thesis that the Vedas are the only source of *dharma* is not conclusively proved. Thus, the argument offered by the Mimāṃsakas, against the possibility of the transcendental perception of *dharma* by the sages, is not justifiable i.e. convincing. According to the Mimāṃsakas, perception arises only from the contact of the sense-organs with an existent object and *dharma* cannot be perceived by the sages since an existent object is only perceived.

Dharma is the merit arising from the performance of the acts directed by the *Sāstras* (scriptures). The view that the scriptures are the only source of *dharma* has been refuted by the following argument : Every word informs us only of known facts. The Vedas are nothing but the sum-total of words. So, they possess the character of words. Each of the words cannot give us a piece of knowledge of an object not known before. In other words, words do not denote novel objects. The Vedas which are words do not signify novel *dharma*. *Dharma* is grasped by some other means of proof. Thus, the Vedas are not only the source of *dharma*. A jar is a knowable object; so it is to be perceived by somebody in the universe. All these counter-arguments are easily available in order to silence the objectors.

Hence, the *sūtra* on perception, put forward by the Mimāṃsaka (i.e., *Jaimini*) thus interpreted, (i.e. meant for the refutation of transcendental perception) is really irrelevant.^{16,6}

The Naiyāyikas strongly justifies their inference about atoms by saying that *yogins* can perceive them. The Advaitins give less importance¹⁷ to this yogic perception as it is, according to them, not conducive to the higher pursuit of *Brahman*. Besides, they do not accept the possibility of external perception without sense activity.

Baṭṭas¹⁸ also deny the possibility of the Extra-Sensory perception.

The Indian Philosophers in general and the Nyāya Philosophers in particular

have accepted *Yogaja Pratyakṣa*.

Yogaja Pratyakṣa is accepted by some distinguished Buddhists¹⁹ like Dinnāga, Bharmakirti, and Dharmottara.

According to Dharmottara, there are three stages in *Yogaja Pratyakṣa*. At the first stage a *yogin* perceives the image of an object which is not vivid but has begun to be vivid. Here contemplation is in progress and is taking shape. At the second stage, the yogin in his contemplation perceives the object covered by a thin cloud. At the third stage, the *yogin* actually perceives an object vividly.

S. Radhakrishnan also accepts the supremacy of *Yogaja Pratyakṣa*. he says, "By constant practice of meditation a man may acquire supersensuous vision, and can apprehend all objects near and far, past and future, remote and hidden. This highest kind of insight has the immediacy of intuition. What is a miracle for us is a natural power of the sages. What seems to our bewildered eyes immeasurably complicated and subtle is revealed to the sages *sub specific simplicitatis*. Everything is transfigured. We have at the lowest level the simplicity of sense perception of concrete objects and at the highest yogic intuition."²⁰

PARA-PSYCHOLOGY : EXTRA SENSORY PERCEPTION

According to some philosophers and psychologists, *Yogaja Pratyakṣa* has been developed into Extra-Sensory Perception. This is justified by the researches conducted by some distinguished philosophers and psychologists at the psychological Research Society of England and at the Duke University, USA. The existence of a sixth sense or Extra-Sensory Perception is almost a certainty, not a conjecture or mere a delusion of the mind. Not less than one hundred scientists in many laboratories in the U.S.A, Canada and England, have been working for years on data supplied by men and women from all over the world in the field of psychokinesis, forecasts, telepathy, intuition, deep meditation and clairvoyance.²¹ The

experiments conducted at these institution establish the fact that the senses perceive the distant objects and actions without being in contact with them.²² They call this perception as Extra-Sensory Perception of para-normal phenomena. Hence Extra-Sensory Perception is a perception without any usual contact between the senses and the objects perceived. Slow knowledge in this area is probably due to the fact that we think that the real is supplied only by what our five senses perceive.

Quite many researchers now believe that in the near future man would surely be in possession of ESP with which he would be in contact with others around the globe instantly, would jump over time and space with a leap of the mind, would be able to move even distant things to desired places on mental command and would be able to know the past, future and present in any details he requires and would also be able to cure most diseases and ailments through the power of the mind. It looks strange to the extent of an impossibility but people had similar expression to make when Copernicus declared that the earth moves round the sun. There are persons, here and there, who can and do communicate by means other than five senses. Some examples of perception of para-normal phenomena are given below:

(a) Telepathy

Telepathy is a fact and there are people who can and do pick up information on remote and hidden objects, persons or events; that is, telepathy is communication between two minds without sensory channel of communication. For example, we meet a gifted person who tells us that the purpose for which we have visited him even though we have not told him anything about our purpose.

(b) Clairvoyance

Clairvoyance is the Extra-Sensory Perception to know objects or persons without the use of sense organs. One dreams of a high appointment, and the next day the dream is authenticated through a letter of appointment from an appropriate

authority.

(c) Pre-cognition

Pre-cognition is the knowledge of the occurrence of an event before it has really occurred. There are gifted persons who have semi-consciousness of the vision of an event which is still to happen, for instance, the assassination of a king.

(d) Psychokinesis

Psychokinesis is the Extra-Sensory Perception of an action at a distance. For instance, one dreams that one's enemy is piercing a knife in one's breast and in the morning one finds himself on the hospital bed for a cure of injury. Some people have the capacity to move or affect objects, even distant ones, without touching them. Felicia Praise of the staff of the Thermonides' Dream Laboratory in New York performs quite many feats in psychokinesis under controlled conditions.

In four areas-telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition and psychokinesis, ESP has been fairly well established and it has been shown that in ESP distance and time do not matter, people who believe in ESP do better in utilising the sixth sense, people who feel close to each other communicate better and more easily, shock events such as accidents and disasters are reported more easily and very correctly than happy ones and ESP is more effective in changed states of consciousness such as relaxation, hypnosis and sleep.

Re-incarnation is not a matter of doubt now. Not in hundreds but in thousands people have talked about their previous birth and details given by them have been confirmed on verification. Experience after death have been narrated by such persons, mostly ladies who come to life after having been dead for a few hours ranging from two to fourteen. And there are cases who have reported out of body experiences also. Experienced meditators often report feeling "oneness with the universe". They

feel as if their minds encompass the whole universe. Mind can and does travel leaving the body behind. Many people can locate lost articles in their dreams.

It is believed that every one has some ESP power (Psi Power). It is not as yet known what this power is and how it works but it is a known fact that quite many people had been using it for long years, especially in India.

In Canada pre-cognition ability of a handful of men is being used in detective work. One of the pre-cognitionists has correctly nabbed thousands of criminals. Psychic Gerald Goiset (Netherlands) is another known pre-cognitionist.²³

Mind has great powers and these can be utilised for ESP in many ways. Indian *Yogins* have often displayed the use of this power. Psi presents hints of universal unity. Individual consciousness is a part of universal consciousness we all share. This was told to Arjuna by Lord Krishna thousands of years ago. Each of us is a part of every one and every thing in the universe. Post Francis Thompson rightly puts in "Thou canst not stir a flower without troubling a star".

There is world out side and there is a world inside. The inner world if explored deeply and continuously makes a man know the source of his origin, his being a part of cosmos and also of his destination. In the process the mind acquires abilities like telepathy, precognition, psychokinesis, clairvoyance, intuition and many more. Human mind can truly travel through space, heal illness and fore-tell the future.

Nevertheless, there is no proof in every case that the perception of objects in Extra-Sensory Perception is a reality. But this cannot be rejected as a downright deception. Therefore, Extra-Sensory Perception is a topic of research for examining its authenticity. Hence we have to examine whether Yogic perception has really been developed into Extra-Sensory Perception or not.

YOGIC PERCEPTION IN DIFFERENT SYSTEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Yogic perception is accepted by almost all the systems of Indian philosophy except the Cārvāka and the Mimāṃsaka. Now we shall explain different views on this perception and try to highlight some affinities in different systems so far as Yogic perception is concerned. It has been done only to show that the Nyāya theory of Yogic perception has been subscribed by other systems. And an attempt will be made to make some remarks on the synthetic view of Yogic perception as found in different systems.

YOGIC PERCEPTION IN VAIŚEṢIKA PHILOSOPHY :

According to Praśastapāda, a Vaiśeṣika thinker, Yogic perception is divided into two kinds: Ecstatic (*Yukta*) and non-ecstatic (*Viyukta*) perception. For him, the definition of the first one is as follows:

Ecstatic perception is a perception of the essential nature of their own selves, other selves, ether (*ākāśa*), space, time, atoms, air and *manas*, and of the qualities, actions, generalities, particularities and inherence remaining in them by the *Yogins* in ecstasy through minds aided by merits born of meditation. The *Yogins* perceive these objects through their internal organs (*manas*) strengthened and perfected by merits because of the practice of meditation.²⁴ He says that, a *yukta-yogin* has non-erroneous knowledge of everything through the instrumentality of the mind with the help of supernormal Yogic power. Praśastapāda defines non-ecstatic perception (*viyukta pratyakṣa*) as perception of subtle, hidden, and remote objects through the four-fold contact of the sense-organs with these objects, contact of the sense-organs with *manas*, and contact of *manas* with self, by the *Yogins*, who have fallen out of ecstasy through the supernormal power produced by special merit due to meditation.²⁵ Sridhara avers that a *yukta-yogin* remains in the state of *samādhi*, but a *viyukta-yogin* because of having excessive supernormal power as a result of abundance of Yogic practice, has intuitive vision of everything, even of the insensible objects, despite his

not being in the state of *samādhi*.²⁶

Udayana asserts that ecstatic perception (*yukta pratyakṣa*) is a mental perception. And he avers that the *Yogins* in a state of trance perceive supersensible objects through the *manas* aided by a special merit born out of meditation. They acquire trance or ecstasy by withdrawing the *manas* from the sense organ and focussing it on the supersensible objects which are to be intuited, according to Udayana. They continuously think of them without any disturbance for a long time every day and achieve an intuition of them. Udayana also advocates that *viyukta pratyakṣa* (non-ecstatic perception) is a sensory perception of subtle, hidden and remote objects through the sense-organs whose powers are enhanced by a special merit produced by meditation. A special merit (*dharma*) is produced by constant practice of concentration of mind and meditation. Various types of mental concentration cause various types of supernatural powers. The sense-organs become more acute and powerful by them and operate on those objects which are not ordinarily within their range of knowledge. In case of *viyukta pratyakṣa* the obstructions to the function of the sense-organs are removed and they are brought under control by the *Yogins*. The objects are perceived through the sensory contact.²⁷

We can regard the indeterminate perception of the bare nature of substances etc. as the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), substances etc. as objects (*prameya*), the self as the knower (*pramātā*), and the knowledge of substances, etc. as valid knowledge (*pramā*) as said by *Prasastapāda*. The right determinate cognition of an object is described as valid knowledge by Udayana.²⁸

Here *Prasastapāda* regards right, indeterminate, nameless knowledge due to the contact of the sense-organs with the objects, contact of *manas* with the sense-organs, and contact of *manas* with the self, as the means of valid perception (*pramāṇa*), substances, etc., as objects (*prameya*), self as the knower (*pramātā*) and the knowledge of acceptability, avoidability and neutrality as the result of valid perception (*pramā*).²⁹ The validity of yogic perception to a special merit (*dharma*) produced by meditation is attributed by Udayana and he regards it as the result of perception which

is a *pramāṇa* due to its being immediate knowledge.³⁰ Here it is said that he does not regard it as valid, for it is the consequence of concentration of mind and of the practice of meditation because constant thinking of a beloved woman creates the false hallucination of her, and because mere concentration and meditation without the help of merit (*dharma*) produced by the practice of *yoga* do not yield valid *yogaja pratyakṣa* (yogic perception).³¹

YOGIC PERCEPTION IN BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

The Buddhist also believes in yogic perception. Dharmakīrti defines yogic perception as the knowledge of a *yogin*, which is generated by the excellence of meditation on the ultimate truth or the transcendent reality. The knowledge of the *yogin* he observes, results from the 'culmination of the excellences' (*Prakarṣa-paryanta*) of deep meditation on the 'objects' as they are in reality (*Bhūtārtha*).³² The word '*bhūtārtha*' means objects as they are in reality i.e. the four noble truths (*āryasatya*).

A *yogin* possesses the culmination of the excellences of deep meditation on the real nature of objects.

The word *yoga* means absorption (*samādhi*). A *yogin* must acquire the capacity for absorption. The knowledge of the *yogin* is the knowledge of such persons. In this way, an infallible light i.e. knowledge is produced in such persons through the power of absorption. Such knowledge reveals quite correctly the nature of all the objects of past, present and future.

Dharmottara explains the definition of yogic perception thus. The four noble truths are: (i) There is suffering (ii) It has a cause (iii) There is cessation of it. (iv) There is a way leading to the cessation of suffering.³³ The constant practice of meditation on these truths produces a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge of them. When the meditation reaches the highest stage of

excellence, it produces the most distinct intuition of them. The object of meditation is most distinctly manifested in consciousness as if it were a fruit on the palm of one's hand. The yogic perception is indeterminate intuition of an object present 'here and now'. It is devoid of mental construction or determinations which are capable of being related to words. Meditation produces determinate perception until it has reached the highest degree of perfection. *Yoga* is trance. The mind becomes one with its object at the time of *samādhi*. A *yogin* is a person in trance (*samādhi*). His intuition of the ontological truths is yogic perception. Since the object is known through a valid means, it leads him to a fruitful action. Yogic intuition is valid because it is in harmony with its object and because it leads to fruitful action.³⁴ Hence, though the Buddhists do not believe in God, the permanent self and the permanent world, they believe in yogic perception and its validity. Dharmakīrti regards the object of yogic perception as real.

YOGIC PERCEPTION IN SĀMĀKHYA PHILOSOPHY

According to Sāmkhya philosophy, yogic perception is a mental and supernormal perception.³⁵ This theory corresponds to ecstatic perception mentioned earlier. Here the past is present as merged in the material cause and the future also is present potentially in the material cause. The present is the actual manifestation of a physical thing.³⁶ Yogic perception knows the past and future objects because they exist at present in a condition and because the *yogins* have a supernormal power attained by the practice of *yoga*. All objects in all times and in all places are known by yogic perception because of the relation to *Prakṛti* through the *manas* which acquires excellence due to a special merit (*dharma*) created by yogic practice.³⁷ Aniruddha points out that there is a difference between the yogic perception and the ordinary perception. The former is produced by the mind and the latter by the external sense organs. A *yogin* acquires peculiar powers through the constant practice of meditation. Such *yogins* can perceive all objects of all times and places through the connection of his mind with *Prakṛti*, the ultimate ground of all existence.³⁸

YOGIC PERCEPTION IN YOGA PHILOSOPHY

All orthodox systems of Indian philosophy except the Mimāṃsā believes in the validity of yogic perception. According to *Yoga* Philosopher, the past and the future are present in a physical substance in some condition and can be cognized by yogic perception. The present alone is real. Temporal order is the construction of our intellect. There can be no aggregate of moments in reality. Thus, the *yogins* can know the past and the future from the present states of things by concentrating their minds on them and completely withdrawing them from other objects. Besides, the *Yoga* believes that all objects are in the nature of all other objects so that all other objects are known through the concentration on any object.³⁹ Concentration on conditions. (*avasthā*), characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) and attributes of physical objects which are modifications of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* leads to the yogic perception of the past and the present.⁴⁰

Vijñānabhikṣu thinks that the mind of the *yogin* achieves a peculiar power (*atīśaya*) in his self through the constant practice of meditation. This power consists in its all pervasiveness or its power of acting on all objects due to the complete suppression of the inertia (*tamas*) of the mind which stands as an obstacle to the path of its acting on them. The *Yogin's* mind can come into contact with subtle, hidden and distant objects because of having such peculiar power. And this type of perception of things by a *yogin* is known as yogic perception. The *tamas* (inertia) of the mind is given up sometimes by the power (*dharma*) attained by the practice of *yoga* as in yogic perception and sometimes by the contact of sense-organs with their objects like in ordinary sense-perception.⁴¹

Concentration of pure *sattva* of mind on subtle, hidden and remote objects gives rise to an immediate knowledge of them.⁴² Pure *sattva* of mind is attained by the practice of *yoga* which removes the taints of love, hatred, egoism, nescience, and delusion, and decreases *rajas* and *tamas* to extreme limit. *Rajas*

makes the mind restless. *Tamas* obstructs knowledge and produces ignorance. The *yogins* can perceive all objects through *prātibhajñāna*.⁴³ It is the state prior to discriminating knowledge of the self as distinct from *Prakṛti* and mind body complex. It is called redeeming (*taraka*) knowledge because it is the prior state of discriminating knowledge which causes release.⁴⁴ Subtle, hidden, remote, past and future objects, supernatural sounds, touches, sights, tastes and odours are perceived by *Prātibhajñāna*.⁴⁵ Concentration on the present moment and the order of moments yields discriminating knowledge of the self.⁴⁶

The *yoga* regards the mind as pervasive (*vibhu*) that perceives all objects when its *rajas* and *tamas* are removed completely and when the sense-organs are completely controlled by the self and cannot obstruct its knowledge.⁴⁷ The *yoga* conceives both self and mind (*citta*) as pervasive but the Nyaya-*vaiśeṣika* regards the self as pervasive (*vibhu*) and mind (*manas*) as atomic. The validity of yogic perception is due to a special merit produced by the practice of *yoga*.

'*Yoga* 'consists in restraining all modifications of the *citta* or mind (*Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ*). According to Vyasa, the mind has five stages: (*bhūmis*), namely, (a) *Kṣipta* (distracted), (b) *Mūḍha* (forgetful), (c) *Vikṣipta* (occasionally steady or restless) (d) *Ekāgra* (one-pointed) and (e) *Niruddha* (restrained).⁴⁸ At the first stage, the mind being overpowered by energy (*rajas*) becomes extremely unsteady and constantly flits from one object to another. At the second stage, the mind is overpowered by inertia (*tamas*) and sinks into listlessness, drowsiness, and deep sleep. At the third stage, the mind, though unsteady for the most part, becomes occasionally steady when it avoids painful things and is temporarily absorbed in pleasurable objects. At the fourth stage, the mind is withdrawn from all other objects and concentrated on one object, either material and mental, and assumes an unflickering and unwavering attitude with regard to that object owing to the predominance of essence or purity (*sattva*). At the last stage, all the mental functions are arrested and the mind retains only the potencies of its functions. The first three stages are not at all conducive to

yoga. On the other hand, the last two stages are conducive to it. At the fourth stage, the mind falls into conscious ecstasy (*samprajñāta samādhi*). At last, the mind reaches the highest stage of supra-conscious ecstasy (*Asamprajñāta samādhi*).

The mental functions can be arrested by constant practice of concentration and abstraction and extirpation of passion for objects of enjoyment. Trance or ecstasy (*samādhi*) is the ultimate result of the long and arduous processes of (i) perfect posture of the body (*āsana*), (ii) the regulation of breathing (*prāṇāyāma*) (iii) the withdrawal of the mind from the distracting influences (*pratyāhāra*) (iv) the fixation of the mind on certain parts of the body (*dhāraṇā*) ; (v) the constant meditation on the same object (*dhyāna*) . And when the mind by deep concentration on an object is transformed into it and feels at one with it, that condition of the mind is called trance or ecstasy (*samādhi*).

This ecstasy is of two types : (i) conscious ecstasy (*samprajñāta samādhi*) and (ii) supra-conscious ecstasy (*asamprajñāta samādhi*) . In the first case, the object of concentration alone is directly known by the mind and it has no consciousness of anything else. And in the second, nothing is known at all; subject becomes one with the object.

There are four kinds of *samprajñāta samādhi* according to the nature of the object of concentration, such as , *vitarka*, *vicāra*, *sānanda* and *sāsmīta*.⁴⁹

(i) In case of *vitarka samādhi*, the mind concentrates upon the gross objects, (2) when the mind concentrates upon the subtle things, e.g., atoms *tanmātras* etc., there is *vicāra samādhi*. (3) *Sānanda samādhi* is the determinate state of mind when by deep concentration it becomes identified with the gross sense organs, the essence of which is *sattva* owing to their power of manifesting object. (4) *Sāsmīta samādhi* is that state of the mind in which it concentrates upon the ego.

As a result of the mind's concentration upon various types of objects at the different stages of *samprajñāta samādhi*, different miraculous powers are achieved, such as powers of thought reading, clairaudience, clairvoyance, understanding the language of the animals, knowledge of the past and the future, that of the distant and subtle things and the like and the knowledge of the self.

The *Yoga* prescribes the methods by which a *yogin* can perceive his self, his mind (*citta*) and others' mind. Patañjali holds that habitual concentration of the mind on the self isolated from experience generates the intuition of the self. Because such experience is originated from the self and also from the wrong identification of self and mind which are as a matter of fact different from one another.⁵⁰ Vyasa avers that the self knows the mental mode in which it is reflected and that the mental mode does not know the self as its object, since the knower cannot know itself⁵¹. Patañjali asserts that habitual concentration of the mind on the heart yields the intuition of the pure mind.⁵² The *heart* is the seat of the mind (*citta*). Patañjali avers that habitual concentration of the mind on any organic expression of another person's mind yields the intuition of it devoid of the knowledge of its objects.⁵³

YOGIC PERCEPTION IN THE ADVAITA VEDANTA

Sadānanda *Yogīndra* accepted Patañjali's classification of *samādhi*. He divides *samādhi* mainly into two kinds (i) *Samprajñāta samādhi* or *Savikalpa samādhi* and (ii) *Asamprajñāta samādhi* or *Nirvikalpa samādhi*.⁵⁴ He like *Vijñānabhikṣu*, divides the former, again, into six kinds: (i) *Savitarka samādhi* (ii) *Nirvitarka samādhi* (iii) *Savicāra samādhi* (iv) *Nirvacāra samādhi* (v) *Sānada samādhi* (vi) *Sāsmīta samādhi*. Thus *Sadānanda Yogīndra* has incorporated the *Patañjala* system of *yoga*-practice into the Vedāntic culture.

The Advaita Vedānta generally recognizes only two kinds of *samādhi*. (i) *Samprajñāta samādhi* or *savikalpa samādhi* and (ii) *Asamprajñāta samādhi* or *Nirvakalpa samādhi*. Mahādeva Saraswati Muni divides *samādhi* into these

two kinds . He defines *samprajñāta samādhi* as an unbroken stream of mental functions having for their object the pure consciousness (*Brahman*) without the distinction of subject and object. In this stage the mental modes are not entirely destroyed, they have for their object *Brahman* or pure consciousness and are transformed into it. In it the consciousness of subject and object drops off altogether, but the mental modes remain concentrated on and transformed into pure consciousness, it is the result of the utmost perfection of the practice of concentration. Mahādeva Saraswati Muni defines *Asamprajñāta samādhi* as the complete suppression of all mental functions (*Sarvadhīnirodha*) on the suppression of the effects of *Samprajñāta samādhi* . He explains it as the transformation of the mind into the form of *Brahman* or pure consciousness without the medium of mental modes which are entirely destroyed.⁵⁵

According to Sadānanda, there are two types of *samādhi*: (i) *Savikalpa samādhi* and (ii) *Nirvikalpa samādhi*. He defines the former as the mental mode which has for its object *Brahman* or pure consciousness into which it is transformed and in which the distinction of the knower, the known, and the knowledge is not destroyed. In this case, there is consciousness of identity (the pure self) through the medium of mental modes in spite of the consciousness of duality of subject and object. He defines the latter as the mental mode which has for its object *Brahman* or pure consciousness into which it is transformed , and with which it is more completely identified and in this stage, though this is a mental mode which is transformed into *Brahman* or pure consciousness, there is no consciousness of the mental mode, but only the consciousness of pure *Brahman*.⁵⁶

Sadānanda thinks that there are mental modes in both determinate and indeterminate ecstasy. But in indeterminate ecstasy, though there are mental modes, there is not consciousness of them. In *Savikalpa samādhi* (determinate ecstasy), according to Sadānanda, there is the consciousness of Identity (*Brahman*) together with the consciousness of duality

of subject and object. But in *Nirvikalpa samādhi* (indeterminate ecstasy), there is the pure consciousness of Identity (*Brahman*) without the consciousness of duality of subject and object. He points out that, in the highest stage of *Nirvikalpa samādhi* (indeterminate ecstasy) all the mental modes and their subconscious impressions are destroyed and there remains only the pure absolute consciousness and bliss. It is the pure, absolute, transcendental consciousness free from all empirical modes and determinations and devoid of all consciousness of relativity. This state of ecstasy alone should properly be called *Nirvikalpa samādhi* (indeterminate ecstasy). All the other kinds of ecstasy in which there is empirical consciousness revealed through mental modes should be called determinate ecstasy (*Savikalpa samādhi*).

YOGIC PERCEPTION IN THE VIŚIṢṬĀDVAITA VEDĀNTA

Veṅkaṭaṇātha, a Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedāntist defines perception as immediate knowledge. According to him, immediate knowledge means distinct and vivid manifestation of an object in consciousness. Here vividness implies the power of manifesting an object with its individuality and uniqueness. Immediate knowledge, he says, is of two types: (i) eternal and (ii) Non-eternal. Divine perception is eternal immediate knowledge. Human perception is non-eternal immediate knowledge. Again human perception is non-yogic perception. When an excellent merit (*dharma*) is produced in the self of a person through the constant practice of *yoga*, there is yogic perception. It may be ecstatic or non-ecstatic. Ecstatic perception is generated by the internal organ (*manas*) only. Non-ecstatic perception is gathered by the external sense-organs also.⁵⁷ The special merit is produced by the practice of *yoga* and austerities. The intuition of sages (*ārṣajñāna*) also generated through austerities is produced by excellent merit, and as a result, included in yogic perception. Śrīnivāsa also includes *ārṣajñāna* in yogic perception.

Yogic perception which reveals supersensible objects is independent of

physical sense-organs but dependent of spiritual sense-organs, because we find in the *Srimad Bhagavadgītā* that Arjuna could see Sri Krishna's cosmic form (*Viśvarūpa Darśana*) through the spiritual eye (*divya*) granted by Sri Krishna.⁵⁸ According to Veṅkaṭanātha, none of the yogic perception, divine perception and perception of the released souls are dependent on sense-organs.⁵⁹

Here, there is an objection that, though yogic perception may cognize subtle, hidden and remote objects because they exist at the present time and because the sense-organs are strengthened and purified by the practice of *yoga*, it cannot cognize past objects. Veṅkaṭanātha adds that yogic perception can cognize past objects even as recognitive perception cognizes the past condition of a non-existent object. When a subconscious impression (*saṃskāra*) is related to recognition to the prior condition of an object, an unseen agency (*adr̥ṣṭa*), for example, a special merit (*dharma*) produced by the practice of *yoga* may be said to relate *Yogaja pratyakṣa* (Yogic perception) to a past object as well as a future object. The Navya Nyāya accepts a supernormal yogic contact (*yogaja sannikarṣa*) to account for the yogic perception of past and future objects. The Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta does not believe in such a supernormal contact.⁶⁰

YOGIC PERCEPTION IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY

The Jaina philosophers do not believe in God. But they believe in permanent self and the permanent world. The Jaina recognizes five kinds of knowledge : (i) *Mati* (ii) *Śruta* (iii) *Avadhi* (iv) *Manahparyāya* and (v) *Kevala*. The knowledge attained by the external sense-organs and *manas* is called Mati. Śruta is testimony about the reality of an entity due to the destruction or subsidence of *Karma*-Particles which veil the self. *Avadhi* is the immediate knowledge of distant objects because of the same cause. This is clairvoyance, clairaudience, and the like. *Manahparyāya* is the immediate knowledge of other persons minds (*manas*). *Kevala* is omniscience due to the complete destruction of *Karma*-particles. This description of the various kinds of knowledge is given by Pūjyapāda.⁶¹

Avadhi, *Manahparyāya*, and *Kevala* are supernormal perceptions. *Avadhi* is immediate knowledge of distant objects by the self independently of the external sense-organs and *manas*. *Manahparyāya* is immediate knowledge of others' minds (*manas*) independently of the external sense-organs and *manas* due to the subsidence of *karma*-particles and to the purity of the self. *Kevala-jñāna* is the highest immediate knowledge of all objects due to the subsidence of the *karma*-particles which produce delusion, which counter knowledge and perception and which produce obstacles to knowledge. It is omniscience.

IS YOGIC PERCEPTION VALID ? A CRITIQUE OF THE MIMĀMSAKS.

The Mimāmsaka has a strong objection against the possibility of yogic perception. He holds that even if it were possible, it would be illusory. The perception of a *yogin* is said to be the consequence of the constant practice of meditation. Here, there is a flash of presentative intuition, as the result of meditation. This doctrine of intuition, the Mimāmsaka says, is peculiar to Indian thinkers. But though the cognition produced by the constant meditation is manifested as a distinct presentative cognition, does it cognize a thing as apprehended in the past or more than that? If it apprehends exactly the same thing as apprehended in the past, then the cognition generated by intense meditation is nothing but memory. But, according to the Mimāmsaka, memory is invalid. And if it apprehends more than that which was perceived in the past, then it is illusory since it apprehends something which has no real existence. Thus the Mimāmsaka concludes that if super-normal perception called yogic perception is possible at all, it is invalid.

More grounds forwarded by the Mimāmsaka for not accepting a yogic perception are as under:

- (a) Sense organs have limitations.
- (b) Though it is pointed out that by practice the power of functioning

of a particular sense-organ can be increased, it cannot be said that a *yogin* can see anything and everything by his eyes. In fact, the eyes cannot reveal sound and ears cannot reveal colour.^{61.1}

(c) Although the power of functioning of senses is increased by practice, still it has limitation. One can jump over a wall by the regular practice but how can one jump over an ocean or the Himalayas.^{61.2}

(d) *Dharma* is known from the vedice text only. It can never be the object of perception.^{61.3}

The Importance of Yoga Realised by the Contemporary Thinkers :

The importance of *yoga* is not limited in classical systems only. Its importance has been realised by the contemporary thinkers like Sri Aurobindo, Swami Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore even in this modern age. The experimental side of *Yoga* has been shown by them. That *Yoga* is efficacious to lead a perfect life, practical and spiritual, has been highlighted by them, which presupposes its eternal value. Hence, a few words have been offered from the standpoint of Sri Aurobindo, Swami Vivekananda and Rabindranath Tagore.


SRI AUROBINDO

We have already given an account of intuition or intuitive knowledge (*prātibhājñāna*) which is accepted by the Nyāya, the yoga etc. i.e. almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy except the Cārvākaka and the Mimāṃsakas. Sri Aurobindo proceeds one step further. According to Sri Aurobindo, intuitive mind becomes *overmind* and then *overmind* is transformed into *supermind* through the constant practice of *yoga*.


In 'The Life Divine' Sri Aurobindo says that mind is an instrument of

ignorance. To him first, human mind, properly speaking, is sense-mind which is under the pull of vital aspects of being. Secondly, mind is only a link in the evolutionary ladder. Thirdly, higher reaches of mind reveals newer dimensions of consciousness.⁶²

Matter, life, mind are evolutes of the involved facets of the Unitary Reality called *Saccidānanda*. Sri Aurobindo takes it axiomatically granted that 'what is involved must evolve'. This ontological ladder can be viewed in the two fold manner:



(B) Involutionary Process




(A) and (B) comprise the double movement up and down the ontological ladder.⁶³

As temporal change is real, all the objects consisting of matter, life and

mind are real. Sri Aurobindo accepts the view of the Upanisad that the whole universe is covered by consciousness and hence it is real as *Saccidānanda*. Matter is, according to him, a covered sat element of Brahman. In the same way, life is the non-manifested form of the cit element of Brahman and mind is an inferior manifestation of supermind existing in each and every man. The position of *caityapurusa* in human personality is nuclear and hence it is always surrounded by the physical self (*annamayakoṣa*), vital self (*prāṇamayakoṣa*) and mental self (*manomayakoṣa*). The *caityapurusa* functions being guided by them, but not independently. The mind given by nature is the inferior manifestation of the super mind, but this position of mind can be changed through *yoga*. Through this yogic process, the *caityapurusa* is brought forward and the physical, vital and mental selves get transformed. At this stage, the supramental consciousness is an individual freed from all faults like desire etc. can serve as the guide rendering the physical self etc. enlightened. As Matter, Life and Mind are the lower manifestation of *saccidānanda*; they are real but not false. At this stage a man possesses supermind through which he can know Matter, Life and Mind are the non-manifested forms of *Sat*, *Cit* and *Supermind* of Brahman respectively. Through this supermind an individual can know that like *Saccidānanda* the world-phenomenon consisting of Matter, Life and Mind is real. Supermind which is completely free from ignorance first descends to overmind where there is separateness. Overmind is a separating line between knowledge and ignorance. From the overmind ignorance begins and hence it is the origin of multiplicity. As this is the stage nearer to supermind, the ignorance is less.

Evolution is nothing but the explicit manifestation of the implicit. Evolution presupposes involution.⁶⁴ Matter evolves life, because life is involved in matter. In the same way, life evolves mind, because mind is concealed in life. Evolution is the process through which every level from lower to higher is supramentalised. Let us explain the whole thing with the help of a diagram:



In short, Sri Aurobindo uses the term 'evolution' in his own yogic way. It is the discloser of the involved Reality. As mind is 'the instrument of ignorance', reason is not excepted. But it bears a promise of opening up to higher potentialities of ontological consciousness. For Sri Aurobindo evolution is the evolution of consciousness, it is being freed of more and more, made more and more unitive as it progresses in the scale. In the lower hemisphere matter, life, mind are transformed images of the coordinates of the higher hemisphere. But only psyche is the untransformed factor and it guarantees the journey upto *Saccidānanda* through supramental transformation of the mind and its operations. The stages between Mind and supermind are transformed stages of the mind till the final transformation.

An individual will harmonise two hemispheres, one consisting of Matter, Life and Mind accepted by the Materialists, but denied by the ascetics and another having *Sat*, *Cit* and Supermind of *Brahman* accepted by the ascetics but denied by the materialists. In this age each and every member of a society will realise this harmony resulting in the age of divine or spirit which is the ultimate goal of society. In this way, society will turn into a divine one where each and every member possesses divine body. It has been stated earlier that a man can make his body divine after bringing the *Caitya Puruṣa* in front through some Yogic process. How can all the members of the society know this truth? The man who has realised the truth, can, Sri Aurobindo suggests, communicate it to others. But another problem will crop up in this case. As the common people have got ordinary minds influenced by physical and vital selves, they cannot take the image of the divine though they may have faith in the teachings of the man having Supermind. To prepare to make them accept the divine image the subjectivism of the mental self of a man is highly essential. This subjectivism of the mental self is possible only by awakening and bringing forward

the *caitya puruṣa* which can master and enlighten the physical, vital and mental selves, When this becomes possible through some Yogic process, a man can realise the divine image and the Age of superman begins. Predictions about the coming of the subjective age is possible , since the social change has been accepted as temporal one. According to the principle, "That which occurs in course of time is subject to change", the coming of the subjective age can be foretold. For one may have the knowledge of present, past and future objects through supernormal perception (*Alaukika Pratyakṣa*). The past existence of the symbolic age and the coming of the subjective age in future are transcendently perceived by Sri Aurobindo.⁶⁵The symbolic age is one of the five cycles of society as described by Sri Aurobindo. In this age each and every object was looked upon as a symbol of the Divine. Sri Aurobindo has accepted a man's transcendence to the Super Man. For Sri Aurobindo an individual attains a new life by way of the attainment of the Divine Mind (Super Mind) and Divine body. Sri Aurobindo has put forth a yogic process through which an individual can be transformed to the Super man. For Sri Aurobindo, the body given by nature is in a particular order and it can be changed through the change of mind through *yoga*.

Sri Aurobindo believes that after the realisation of the Divine, the phenomenon world including our body etc. is not illusory as accepted by the Advaitins. All these are as true as the Divine. He believes in the philosophy of harmony as he thinks that there is a harmony between the view of the materialists and ascetics. An individual who is performing this worldly activities is at the same time related to the Divinity and hence there is no liberation in the sense of *kaivalya* i.e. isolation.

SWAMI VIVEKANANDA

According to Swami Vivekananda, *yoga* can destroy sin that is around a man. Knowledge becomes purified and liberation is directly attained. Knowledge comes from *yoga* and knowledge again helps the *yogin* . He who combines in

himself both *yoga* and knowledge, the Lord is pleased with him. Those who practice *Mahāyoga* either once a day or twice a day or thrice or always, are known as gods by others. *Yoga* has two parts, One is known as *Abhāva* and the other *Mahāyoga*. Where one's self is meditated upon as zero and bereft of quality, that is called *Abhāva*. That in which one sees the self as field of bliss and bereft of all impurities, and one with God, is called *Mahāyoga*. Each and every *yogin* realises his self. The other *Yogas* that we read and hear of, do not deserve to be ranked with the excellent *Mahāyoga* in which the *Yogin* finds himself and the whole universe as God. This is the highest of all *Yogas*.

Yama, Niyama, Āsana, Prāṇāyāma, Pratyāhāra, Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna and *Samādhi* are the steps in *Rāja-Yoga*. Here, non-injury, truthfulness, non-convetousness, chastity, not receiving anything from another are called *Yama*. This purifies the mind, the *citta*. There is virtue higher than non-injury. In truth everything is established and through truth everything is attained.

The following help to success in *Yoga* and are called *Niyama* or regular habits and observances : (i) *Tapas*, austerity, (ii) *Svādhyāya*, study (iii) *santoṣa*, contentment (iv) *Śauca*, purity and (v) *Īsvara-praṇidhāna*, worshipping God.

The next is *Āsana*(posture). The only thing to understand about it is leaving the body free, holding the chest, shoulders, and head straight.

Then comes *Prāṇāyāma*, *prāṇa* means the vital forces in one's own body, *Āyāma* means controlling them. So *Prāṇāyāma* is the regulation of breath. There are three sorts of *Prāṇāyāma*, the very simple, the middle and the very high. *Prāṇāyāma* is divided into three parts : filling, restraining and emptying. When we begin to inhale air for twelve seconds, it is the lowest *Prāṇāyāma*. When we begin with twenty-four seconds, it is the middle *Prāṇāyāma*. That *Prāṇāyāma* is the best which begins with thirty-six seconds. In the lowest kind of *Prāṇāyāma* there is perspiration. In the medium kind, there is quivering of the body and in the highest *Prāṇāyāma*, there is levitation of body and influx of great bliss.

There is a *Mantra* called the Gayatri. It is a very holy verse of the Vedas. We meditate on the glory of that Being who has produced this universe; may He enlighten our minds. "Om is joined to it at the beginning and the end. In one Prāṇāyāma one should repeat three Gayatris. Prāṇāyāma is divided into Recaka (rejecting, exhaling). Puraka (inhaling) and Kumbhaka (restraining, stationary).

The *Indriyas*, the sense organs are acting outwards and coming in contact with external objects. Bringing them under the control of the will is what is called *Pratyāhāra* or gathering towards oneself.

Fixing the mind on the lotus of the heart or on the centre of the head is what is called *Dhāraṇā*. Limited to one spot, making that spot the base, a particular kind of mental waves rises, these are not swallowed up by other kinds of waves, but by degrees become prominent, while all the other recede and finally disappear. Next the multiplicity of these waves gives place to unity and one wave only is left in the mind. This is *Dhyāna*, meditation.

When no basis is necessary, when the whole of the mind has become one wave, one-formedness, it is called *Samādhi*. Bereft of all help from places and centres, only the meaning of the thought is present. If the mind can be fixed on the centre for twelve seconds it will be a *Dhāraṇā*, twelve such *Dhāraṇās* will be a *Dhyāna*, and twelve such *Dhyānas* will be a *Samādhi*.⁶⁵

RABINDRANATH TAGORE

Rabindranath is of the opinion that human character has two different aspects: on one side a man is in search of satisfaction within this worldly object and it is due to his animal nature. On the other hand, he longs for something which does not come under the purview of this worldly object. That

which leads us to the world of sacrifice or renunciation is called humanity or the religion of man. In our human body there is a man who, after surpassing the individuality or individual man, reaches to the Universal Man. Though his multicellular body is born and it dies, his ^ultipersonal (*Sarvajanin*) humanity is eternal. Through his attraction a man can bring universality in Infinite.⁶⁷ Like bird, man is also a kind of *Dwija* or twice born. A bird is born first in the form of egg and afterwards in the form of living bird, a man is born in his animal man and afterwards he attains through the help of his surplus power the universal manhood.

Rabindranath has also accepted some 'surplus power' in mind as well as in other sense-organs. When he interprets the Upanisadic *Mantra* '*Manaso mano yad*' (i.e. it is the mind of the mind) he has pointed out that the first 'mind' stands for the 'surplus power' existing in mind and hence there is no tautology. Though this power exists in each and every sense-organ the mind is the first whose transformation becomes necessary initially. It is otherwise called by Tagore as *Dvijatvaprāpti* (i.e. attainment of universal manhood which has been described as rebirth of a man).

Rabindranath has accepted a man's transcendence to the universal man. He has described this as rebirth. For Rabindranath a man's rebirth (*Dvijatvaprāpti*) is possible through his dwelling in the boundless realm of the surplus existing in mind etc.

Through *sādhana* one may be able to realise the universal man but Rabindranath has not mentioned any particular process through which our mind is eligible for the realisation of the universal man.

Rabindranath also believes in the philosophy of harmony as he thinks that in an individual there is a *Viśva* i.e. the whole world and *Viśeṣatva* (individuality).

Notes and References :

1. 'Yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ' - Pātañjal Yoga-sūtra, 1/2.
2. Vātsyāyana- Nyāya-Bhāṣya (3,2,40)
3. Uddotakara- Nyāya-Vārtika (3.2.40-1)
4. Bhāsarvajña- Nyāyasāra, Trivandrum sanskrit Series, No. CIX, p.16.
5. Darśanasya paro'tisayaḥ aūkṣma- vyavahita- viprakṛṣṭa-bhūta-bhaviṣyad-ādi-
viṣaya-ivam Nyāyamañjarī, (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), Vizianagram sanskrit series, Benares,
1895, p:103.
6. Yugapad ekaiva buddha sarvatra sarvān arthān draṅkṣyanti yoginaḥ. *Ibid*, p.107.
7. Sunil Kumar Das: *The Nyāya Theory of Supernormal Perception*, Sanskrit Pustak
Bhandar, calcutta, 1988, p.51.
8. Bhāṣā-Paricchedaḥ, Verse No. 65.
9. S. C. Chatterjee- *The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge*, 1978, Calcutta university press,
pp.227-228.
- 9 a. Nyāyamañjarī (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa) Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895,
P106.
10. Cintāsaḥakṛtaḥ-aparaḥ. Cintā anya dhyānaṁ dhāraṇā ca. Kiraṇāvalī on
Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Samsthān, Varanasi, 1972, p.216.
11. Cintāviśeṣayogābhyāsajanita- dharmaviśeṣobhayasahakṛtamanasā Yuñjānasya
ākāśaparamāṇvā-disakalapadārthaviṣayakamānasapratyakṣaṁ bhavātīyarthāḥ.
Prabhā commentry on Verse No. 65, *Kārikāvalī* with Muktāvalī, Ed. Sri c. Sankarram

Shastri, Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1988, p. 470.

12. Sampātināmā Ca gr̥dhrarājo Yojanaśata-vyavahitamapi daśarathanandana-sundarīm dadarśeti śrūyate rāmāyaṇe... *Nyāyamañjarī*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit series office, Benares, 1936, p.95.

13. Darśanasya ca parōtisayaḥ sūkṣmavyavahitaviprakṛṣṭabhūta-bhaviṣyadādiviṣayatvam, Ibid, p.96.

14. Yato yadyapi nāsmadādinayana-viṣayo dharmah tathāpi yogīndriya-gamyo bhaviṣyati, tathāki yojana-śatavyavahitamandhakārāntaritaṁ vā nāsmadādilocanago caratāmupayāti sampāti-vṛṣadamśa dr̥so'stu Viṣayo bhavatyeva, Ibid, p.96.

15. Nanu kartavyatārūpaḥ trikālasarpa-varjitaḥ. Cakṣurviṣayatāmeti dharmā ityati-sāhasam. Satyam sāhasametatye mama vā carmacakṣuṣaḥ. Na tyeṣa durgamaḥ panthā yoginām sarvadarśinām. Ibid. p.96.

16. Manaḥkaraṇakam̐ jñānam bhāvanābhyāsasambhavam. Bhavati Dhyāyatām dharme Kāntādāviva Kāminām. Ibid. p.97.

16.1 Tatra Kevalamabhyāsātprakṣaye Kaphamedasoḥ.

Śarīralāghavam labdhvā laṅghayanti yothocitam.

Iha vijñānanyastu saṁskāro vyavatiṣṭhate.

Kramopacīyamāno'sau parātīsayakāraṇam.

The *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa Ed. Pt. Sri Sūrya Nārāyaṇa śukla, The chowkhamba Sanskrit series office, Benares city, 1936, p.97.

16.2 Yathānuvākagrahaṇe Saṁsthā'bhyasanakalpitah.

Sthiraḥ karoti Saṁskāraḥ pāṭhasmṛtyādipāṭavam.

Yathā vā puṭapākena śodhyamānam śānaiḥ śānaiḥ.

Hemaṇṣpratīkāśam tadyāti kalyānatām parām.

Ibid.

16.3 Tathaiva bhāvanābhyāsād yogināmapi mānasam.

Jñāne sakalavijñeyasākṣātkāre Kṣamaṁ bhavet.

Asmadādesca rāgādimalābaraṇadhūsam.

Mano na labhate jñānaprakarṣapadavīm parām.

Pratyūhabhāvanā'bhyāsakṣapitāśeṣakalmavam.

Yoginām tu manaḥ śuddham kamivārtham na paśyati.

Yathāca teṣām rāgādi pramāṇamavakalpate.

Tathā'pavargacintāyām vistareṇābhīdhāsyate.

Tadevaṁ kṣīṇadosānām dhyānāvahitacetasām.

Nirmalam sarvaviṣayam jñānam bhavati yoginām.

Ibid. p.98.

16.4 Api cānāgatam jñānamasmadāderapi kā cit.

Pramāṇam prātibham śvo me bhrāta aganteti drśyate.

Nānārthajam na samīdigdham na bādhaividhurīkṛtam .

Na duṣṭakāraṇam ceti pramāṇamidamiṣyatām.

Ibid.

16.5 Ka cidvādhakayogaścedastu tasyāpramāṇatā

Yatrāparedyurabhyeti bhrātā tatra Kimucyatām.

Kākatāliyamiti cenna pramāṇapradarsitam.

Vastu tat Kākatāliyamiti bhavitumarhati.

Ibid.

16.6 The *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Ed. Pt. Sri Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit series Office, Benares City, 1936, pp. 98-100.

17. *Advaitabrahmasiddhi*, pp. 294 and 300 (calcutta University, 1932).

18. *Mānameyodaya*, (Trivandrum) 1912, p.70.

19. Umesha Mishra : *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol.1, Allahabad, 1957, pp. 425-50.

20. S. Radhakrisnan : *Indian Philosophy*, Vol, II London, 1962, p.68.

21. T.R. Sharma- Extra-sensory Perception, *Darshana International*, Vol, xxxv, January, 1995, No.1.

22. The Psychological Research society of England (of which Professor C.D. Broad was President for a number of Years) and Duke University, U.S.A. have conducted several experiments to tackle the problems of Extra-sensory Perception (E.S.P and Telekinesis Motion at a distance without visible physical conduct): L.P. N. Sinha : *Indian and Western Philosophy*, Classical Publishing Company, New Delhi, 1984, p.60.

23. T.R. Sharma -Extra-Sensory, Perception, *Darshana International*, Vol. xxxv, January, 1995, no.1.

24. Asmadviśiṣṭānām tu yoginām yuktānām yogajadharmānugrhitena manasā svātmāntarākāśa-dikkālaparamāṇuvāyu- manassu tatsamavetaḡaṇa-karmasāmānyaviśeṣeṣu samavāye cāvitatam svarūpadarśanam utpadyate. *Prasāstapādabhāṣyam*, Gaṅgā-nātha-Jhā Granthamālā, vol.1, Ed. Kshetresachandra Chattopadhyaya, Prasāstapāda bhāṣya(padārthadharmasamgraha) with commentary, *Nyāyakandali* of Śrīdhara-bhatta, Varanasi, 1963 ,pp.464-465.

25. Viyuktānām punas-catustaya-sannikarṣād yogaja-dharmā-nugraha-sāmarthyāt sūkṣma-vyavahita-viprakṛṣtesu pratyakṣam utpadyate. *Ibid*, p.465.

26. Yuktānām Samādhyavasthitānām yogaja dharmānugrhitena manasā svātmani, svātmāntareṣu svātmana ātmāntareṣu parakīyeṣu, ākāśe diśikālevāyau paramāṇumānassu tat samaveteṣu guṇādiṣu samavāye cāvitatamavi-paryastam svarūpadarśanam bhavati..., Atyantayogābhyāso pacitadhar-māṭisāya asamādhyāvasthitā api ye atindriyam paśyantite. viyuktah... Śrīdhara: *Nyāyakandali*, *Ibid*, pp. 465 -466.

27. Tatra yuktāndriyebhyaḡ pratyākṛtya sāksātkarttavastunyāda-r^ena mano vidhāyā pravartamā-nacintasantānaḡ, viyuktastva-tyantābhyāseṇa paramavaśīkāmāpannavigatā varanaḡ. sarvataḡ pradyotamanaso niravaśeṣitābhyāsaḡ. *Kiraṇāvalī* (Udayana) Benares, Samvat, 1941, PP. 284-285.

28. Pramitir dravyādi viśayam jñānam samyak niścayaḡ. *Ibid*, P. 287.

29. Tatra sāmānyaviśeṣeṣu svarūpā-locanamātram pratyakṣam pramāṇam, prameyā dravyādayaḡ, padārthāḡ, pramā-tātmā, pramitirdravyādiviśayam jñānam. Prasāstapādabhāṣya with commentary *Nyāyakandati* of Śrīdharabhāṭṭa, Gaṅgānātha- Jhā-granthamālā, vol.1 Ed. Kshetresachandra Chattopadhyaya, Varanasi, 1963. p.471.

And also *Kiraṇāvalī* (Udayana), Benares, Samvat, 1941, p.289.

30. Yoginām anubhavo dharmajat-vātpramā, sāksātkāritvāt pratyakṣaphalam. *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (Udayana), Benares, 1912, Chapter V. p.147.

31. Dharmā-nanūgrhīta-bhāvanā-mātra-prabhvastu (anubhavaḥ) na pramā. Ibid, *Kiraṇāvālī*, (Udayana), Benares, Samvat, 1941, P. 284.
32. Bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-Prakarṣa-paryantajam yogijñānaṁ iti. *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti), Vinitadeva's *Nyāyabindu-tīkā*-Ed. Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyāya, Indian studies: Past and Present, Calcutta, Sūtra no.i/10, p. 107.
33. Jadunath Sinha- *History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, Sinha Publishing House, Calcutta-26, p.281.
34. *Nyāyabindutīkā* (Vinitadeva) on *Nyāyabindu* (Dharmakīrti), Kāśī Sanskrit Series, Benares, p.15.
35. Yogi-pratyakṣam tvabāhyam alaukikamca. *Sāṁkhyasūtra-vṛtti* (Aniruddha) on *Sāṁkhyapravacanasūtra* (Kapila), 1/90, Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta), 1888.
36. Naṣṭamapi svakāraṇe līnam bhūtatenāsti, bhaviṣyadapi svakāraṇe nāgatatenāsti *Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti* (Aniruddha) on *Sāṁkhyapravacanasūtra*(Kapila), Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta), p.49.
37. Ibid i, 91.
38. *Sāṁkhyasūtravṛttih*, i,90.
39. Sarvaṁ sarvātmakam. *Vyāsa's bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra*, iii/14 Benares, 1911.
40. Pariṇāma-traya-sāmyamād atītā-nāgata-jñānam. *Yogasūtra*, iii, 16. *Vyāsa's bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra*, III/16, IV/12-13, Benares, 1911.
41. *Sāṁkhya-pravacana-bhāṣyam*, i,91.
42. *Yogasūtra* (patañjali), iii/25, Benares, 1911,

43. Prātibhādvā sarvam, *Yogasūtra*, iii/34 .
44. Prātibham nāma tārakam, tad vivekajasya jñānasya pūrva-rūpaṁ, tenaiva sarvaṁ eva jānāti yogi. *Vyāsa's bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra*, iii/33 Benares, 1911.
45. *yogasūtra*, *Vyāsa's bhāṣya*, iii/36, Benares, 1911
46. Ibid, iii,52.
47. Ibid, iv, 17.
48. *Vyāsa's bhāṣya* on *yogasūtra* i,1, *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion* (S.N.Das Gupta), Kegan Paul, London, p.95.
49. *Yogasūtram*, 13 and *Bhāṣyam* thereon.
50. Sattva-puruṣayor-atyantā-saṅkīrṇayoḥ pratyaya-viśeṣo bhogaḥ parārthatvāt svārtha saṁyamāt puruṣa-jñānam. *Yogasūtra* (Patañjali), iii/35, Benares, 1911,
51. Na ca Puruṣa-pratyayena buddhi-sattvātmanā puruṣo dr̥śyate puruṣa eva, pratyayaṁ svātmāvalam̐banam̐ paśyati. *Vyāsa's bhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra*, iii/35, Benares, 1911.
52. Hr̥daye citta-saṁvit , *Yogasūtra* (patañjali), iii/34 Benares, 1911, *Vyāsa's Bhāṣya on Yogasūtra*, iii,34.
53. Pratyayasya paracitta-jñānam. na ca tat sālambanam̐ tasyāviṣayi-bhūatvāt. *Yogasūtra* (Patañjali), iii/19-20, Benares, 1911,
54. Samādhistu dvididhaḥ savikalpako nirvikalpakaśceti. *Vedāntasārah* of Sadānanda Yogīndra, trans (in Bengali) by Kālivara Vedāntavāgisa, pp.189-90.
55. *Advaitacintākaustubha* (Mahādevananda Sarasvati), Bibliotheca Indica (calcutta) 1901, pp.398-9.

56. *Vedāntasāra* (Sadānanda), Jacob's edition, Bombay, 1925, p.457.
57. Yogipratyakṣam prakṛṣṭ-ādrṣṭa viśeṣajam tad yuktāvasthāyām manomātra-janyam viyuktā-vasthāyām tu bāhyendriya-janyamapi. *Nyāyaparisuddhi* (Venkṭanātha) Chowkhamha Sanskrit series (Varanasi), No,249, p.72.
58. Na tu mām śakyase draṣṭuma-nenaiva svacaṅsuṣā. Divyam dadāmi te cakṣuḥ paśyame yoga maiśvaram. *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā*, Ed. Jagadish Chandra Ghosh, 8/11, p. 364, Presidency Library, Calcutta.
59. *Nyāyaparisuddhi* (Venkṭanātha), Chowkhamba Sanskrit series (Varanasi), No. 249, p.75.
60. *Nyāyaparisuddhi* (Venkṭanātha), Chowkhamba Sanskrit series (Varanasi), p.655.
- Sarvārthasiddhi* (Venkṭanātha), a commentary on Tattvamuktākālāpa, Benares, 1909, p.655.
61. *Sarvārthasiddhi* (Puṅgyapāda) on Tattvādhigamasūtra(Umāsvāmi), i/9 Kolahpur, sāka, 1839.
- 61.1 Yatrāpi atīśayo drṣṭaḥ sa svārthānātilaṅghanāt. Dūrasūksmādirṣṭau syāna rūpe śrotavṛtīṭā *Śloka-vārtika* (Śiva), Codanāsūtra, Verse No. 114.
- 61.2 Abhyāso'pi kriyamāṇo nātyantamapūrvamatisāyamāvahati laṅghanābhyāsavat, yo'pi hi pratidinamananyakarmā laṅghanamabhyasyati so'pi katipayapada-parimitamavanitalamabhilaṅghayati na tu parvatam amvudhim veti. *Nyāyamāñjarī*, Ed. Pandit Sri Sūrya Nārāyaṇa śukla, the Chowkhaba Sanskrit series office, Benares city, 1936, p.97.
- 61.3. Dharmastu cakṣuso na viśaya eva. Ibid, p.96.
62. Sri Aurobindo : *The Life Divine*, p. 162, Book I, 1970.

63. Ibid (1st three chapters).

64. Thakur Jayadeva Singh : *Western and Indian Philosophy of Evolution*, p. 106.

65. Sri Aurobindo: *Human Cycle* - . Chapter on cycles of society.

66. *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, Mayavati Memorial Edition, volume I, Advaita Ashram, Calcutta, 1995, pp.189-192.

67. Rabindranath Tagore : *Manusera Dharma* (in Bengali), Introduction, Visvabharati, 1972.

CHAPTER - V

SOME EVALUATIVE AND CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

SĀMĀNYALAKṢANA PRATYAKṢA

Establishment of Sāmānya :

The Buddhist Philosophers like Shantaraksit (in *Tattvasaṅgraha*) and Pt. Ashok (in *Sāmānyadūṣaṇadika Prasāratā*) have rejected the hypothesis of universal (*sāmānya*) as argued for by the *Naiyāyika*. In support of the Buddhists, we may say that a universal is not a sense-datum. As its existence cannot be ascertained by perception or by any other means, it is non-existent like the so-called horns of a hare.

According to the Buddhists, even if a universal is the object of a judgement, it has only an imaginary being but not real existence. An inference or verbal knowledge cannot establish the reality of universals since they reveal imaginary objects but no real ones.

A universal is not different from an individual. For a universal is not to be cognised if an individual is not perceived. If an object is different from another object then the cognition of one does not entail that of another. For instance, a jar is different from a piece of cloth. The former is cognised independently of the latter. But a universal is never cognised if an individual is not cognised. Conversely an individual is not different from a universal.

If an individual is not apprehended then its universal would remain uncognised. Such a contention is hardly supportable since the suggestion that a universal abides in an individual can be contrarily argued.

If a universal wholly abides in a distinct individual then it abides there exhaustively and as such it should be exclusively perceived there. There is no change of cognising it at another locus. Again, if a universal abides in an individual partially then it does not exhaustively abide in an individual. In that case, how can we recognise an individual cow as such? Moreover, a universal is a partless whole. As such, it does not consist of parts. Thus, it is difficult to solve the problem of locating a universal in a proper locus since no appropriate locus is found.

Now, if existence is denied to the universals, how shall we explain a common idea, a concept, viz., a cow as referring to an individual? We may say that there are no universals which are objectively real. The concept 'cow' explains everything which the universal of cowness is supposed to do. According to the Buddhists, people ordinarily judge all members of a particular class, e.g., molasses, 'cow' etc. perform the same function. So they are to be taken as one. They hold further that they look alike i.e., their difference of form is negligible. So, there is no need to hold on to view of universals. And thus it is argued that a universal does not actually exist.¹

The arguments of the Buddhists are criticizable. If *sāmānya* (universal) does not exist, then the question arises how do we come to attain the knowledge of all the objects of the past, distant and future?

Without endorsing the concept of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* the causal *nexus* between knowledge, desire and volition cannot be established. At first we may attain the knowledge of a thing. This knowledge leads to desire at the next moment, and hence it should be admitted that the perception of the primary knowledge occurs at the third moment. In that case, however, the causal *nexus* between primary knowledge and desire remains unestablished. For causal relation implies that the two relata between which causal link is asserted should be perceived. Hence, it becomes imperative that the primary knowledge be presented through the knowledge of the universal. This is evidently a case for *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

A universal comprises within all individuals irrespective of time and space. Without knowing the individuals in their entirety the universal also cannot be known. This would result in the non-ascertainment of *vyāpti* between the two. Thus, the knowledge of all individuals is made possible by *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

The Buddhists are of course correct in their position so far as their presuppositions are concerned. The Buddhists admit the theory of impermanence of entities and hence, they do not accept any entity that is permanent in its mode of being. They are in order in their non-accepting *sāmānya*. But the Naiyāyikas have no such ontological commitment. So they accept the *samanya* as a separate category and adjust their own position accordingly.

To illustrate the case of the Naiyāyikas a person saw an individual cow called *Dhavalī* in the past. Later on he sees another individual cow *Kālīndī* by name. Experience says that he remembers *Dhavalī* which was seen before. We cannot explain the remembrance of *Dhavalī* if no common property inheres in the two individual cows. We cannot remember an individual on encountering another individual entirely different from the first. As a person remembers an individual cow seen before on finding another individual cow different from the first; he remembers an individual cow seen earlier on finding another only because he has noticed a common property shared by both of them. So it is reasonable to hold that a common element (or universal) is grasped.^{1.1}

Naiyāyikas do not admit the Buddhist theory of *sāmānya* (i.e. nominalism). Accordingly to them, *sāmānya* or universal is real^{स्व} subsists in *viśeṣa* which is its locus by virtue of the relation of *sāmānya*. *Sāmānya* is eternal and timeless being. Being eternal, it subsists in many (nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam-Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse no. 8). The particular reveals the universal. All the universals (*sāmānya*) are said to be distinct realities which have spatial manifestations at different places at the same time.

But the Buddhists have an objection to this view. In his *Pramānavārtika*, Dharmakīrti says that if universals are eternal (*nitya*), these must always exist. Manhood is an objective universal. So it has to be related to the particular object as soon as a child is born and has to disappear from the spatial location at the very moment of the death of an old man. 'Manhood' cannot travel from one man to another man, because in that case the nature would not be of a man any longer; nor can it remain stationary for them. The latter man would not even be a man. But in response, the Naiyāyikas aver that this only proves that universals are not particulars. Buddhists also raise a question on the eternity of the universal. During the intermediate period, when a child is born and a man dies, where does the universal 'manhood' exist? Here *sāmānya* is not perceived to exist anywhere. To this the Naiyāyika's answer is that non-perception of anything does not imply its non-existence. During that intermediate period 'manhood' is not perceived because the 'man' who is the source of the universal 'manhood' is not present and this is the reason of the non-perception of the universal 'manhood'.

The Naiyāyikas aver that it is not the case that unless the particular exists, the universals cannot exist. The existence of universal does not depend on the particular. To be *sat* is its own nature. When there is the particular, the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) becomes apparent between the particular and the universal (*yadaiva vastu tadaiva gotvenābhisambandhate-Nyāya-Vārtika*). *Gotva* is eternal, *samavāya* relation is also eternal, but the particular cow is not eternal. It is one of the *relata* only. Thus, in the absence of a particular cow the relation between cowhood and the cow is not visible. Therefore, it is obvious from this that the relation between *sattva* and *asattva* can be interpreted only with the help of the particular.

According to the Naiyāyika, the real universal cannot be an aggregate of different essential properties, for a real universal should be unitary, simple, unanalysable (*akhaṇḍa*) eternal, timeless, indestructible and present in many through a single unitary relation called inherence (*samavāya*). The Naiyāyikas,

say that the universal 'swiper', nurse, cannot be real universals for the application of such general terms depended on some *upādhis*, that is, nominal properties are not objective universals. The relation which is essential for a real universal is *samavāya* relation. The *samavāya* relation exists in *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), and *karma* (action), that is, the blue particular is related to the blue thing, the action particular to the acting, i.e. moving object that instantiates it. This relation is described as a *yutasiddha* or inseparable. This inseparability is unidirectional. It is a permanent relation in which one of the *relata* cannot exist without the presence of the other, though the latter can continue without the former. The blue particular exists in the pot and when the pot continues to exist with another colour etc. the blue particular is destroyed.

Dinnāga points out that practically the objects are unique particulars which have infinite properties. These properties are not ontological. These properties do not exist in the object but superimposed by the mind or conceptually constructed. For example, a particular is recognised as blue only when it is excluded from non-blue things. Their act of exclusion is definitely a contribution of the mind which is called *kalpanā* or *vikalpa*.

According to the Buddhists, every object in a word has corresponding exclusion class and an object is presented before us through this mental representatives. The generic attribute or commonness of mental representation (i.e. the universal or *sāmānya*) is not connected with any real thing in the world which is full of only with particulars but this 'commonness' the world is conceived in our language thorough words or concepts.

In his *Nyāyamañjarī* Buddhist doctrine of *Sāmānya* has been refuted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. He argues that universal (*sāmānya*) cannot be constructed by our mind and it cannot be regarded as a *kalpanā*. These are directly presented to us. Our first cognition of a thing is not merely an apprehension of its unity but also its disjunctive feature. When we perceive something, its manifoldness is as such manifested to consciousness as its unitary character.¹² It is cognised

as a totality of many parts, qualities and aspects. The Buddhists say that the universal is a mere concept, but the 'real' is a unique particular. This is refuted by Jayanta and he avers that an object denoted by a word is real because it is the same object which is revealed by *Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa* also.²

Naiyāyikas also state that when we see a cow something we also see cowhood inherent in it, although we may not at the same time see one as cow and the other as cowness. Both entities appear in our 'consciousness'.

This non-qualificative awareness is also in a sense inexpressible in language. It is supposed to be a reflex of the Buddhist thesis of the inexpressibility of the pure object of sense-perception. For in the linguistic expression of the awareness of the cow as such, or the sun as such we do not say 'This has cowness' or 'This has sunhood'. Because these would be expressions of very different cognitive episodes. The Naiyāyikas hold that these universals are unexpressed in the verbal representation of the awareness because if they are expressed, they also need another 'qualifier.'

Against the Naiyāyikas who are the realists, the Buddhist states that a cow is known from the fact that it is not a non-cow. If the specific individualization of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and so on *ad infinitum*. So *sāmānya* can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impression of past experience of existence and non-existence that this notion is formed and transferred wrongly to increase the objects in number.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers opine that negation of non-cows is a negative perception (*abhāvātmake Pratyakṣa*) while the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception (*bhāvātmake pratyakṣa*). The negative theory or the apoha theory of the Buddhists cannot explain the (*bhāvātmake pratyakṣa*) (positive perception). Therefore, *sāmānya* has to be accepted as a separate category. If *Sāmānya* is accepted the supernormal perception through *sāmānya*

(*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) will find its solid base. The negative perception i.e. the perception of non-cow is cow is a result of perception. That non-cow exists in a cow is known by virtue of the awareness of the inherent property of a cow which may be described as 'cowness' or universal. Hence, universal "cowness serves the basis of distinguishing it from the non-cow' class. Depending on these arguments it can be concluded that universal has to be accepted as a category of real but not unreal.

The Buddha Critique of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* :

According to the Buddhists, the reality of an object is determined by its causal efficacy (*arthakriyā-kāritva*). All things which have causal efficacy are momentary in nature.

The Vaiśeṣikas argue that the meaning of the term 'sattva' (existence or being) seems to be vague to themselves. The term 'sattva' implies the association of an object with *sattā-sāmānya* or *jāti* and so it is eternal. It has been stated in the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* that the existence remains in the three - substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*) i.e. "*dravyāditrikastu sattā paratayocyate*". The existence remaining in the above three is called Pure *sattā* and that existing in any one of the three is called qualified *sattā* (*Viśuddha sattā*). If it is so, how an object possessing this eternal generic attribute can be momentary?

In reply the Buddhists point out that they do not accept that an object possessing *sattā-sāmānya* exist. If it is so, the existence would have to be admitted in substance, quality and action due to accepting *sattā-sāmānya* there. The Vaiśeṣikas are of the view that *Sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *Samavāya* do not possess existence or *sattā* because of the problem of infinite regress. If *sattā* or *sāmānya* is accepted in *sāmānya* or *Viśeṣa* etc., there would arise the question of accepting another *sāmānya* in it i.e., *Sāmānyatva*, *Viśeṣyatva* etc and in this way, the defect of *infinite regress* arises. In fact, the Vaiśeṣikas have

accepted *sāmānya* etc. ^{sat} as they are revealed as such, but this is not *Sāmānya* in the technical sense. If the Vaiśeṣikas accept *sattā* in the form of *astitva* in *sāmānya* etc. there would be *gaurava* in determining the criterion of apprehending the *sat* object. Moreover, another problem would arise. There would arise common apprehension (*anugatapratyaya*) in the substance etc. due to having the same *sattājāti* in them. But where there is no *sattājāti* as in *Sāmānya* etc., there would also arise the common apprehension,³ which is not desirable.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers accept that *Sattā* or *Jāti* exists in different loci having same shape and size through the relation of inherence. Here, the Buddhists ask that if *sāmānya* exists in many things bearing same size, how do they admit *sāmānya* or *sattājāti* in different objects bearing different shapes and sizes like substance, quality and action and also between mustard seeds and mountain? *Sattā-Sāmānya*, the Vaiśeṣika believes, exists in substance etc. through the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*). If it is accepted, the Buddhists argue how the usage of differentiation between a man and a cow in the form - This is a cow and this is a man can be made. If it is mentioned that universals like humanity, cowness etc. pervading in a man and a cow are the causes of the usage of the differentiation between them, it is not tenable because the concept of universal as propounded by them is under consideration.⁴

The Buddhists ask whether the universal exists in all objects or in all individuals belonging to a particular class. In the former case, all objects would be of a same type due to the existence of same universal in them. If the universal 'humanity' existing in a human being remains in dog etc., the dog etc. would have to be considered as man due to having humanity in them, which is not possible. Moreover, it will go against the established thesis of the Naiyāyikas.⁵ If the latter is taken for consideration, it will also create some difficulties. That universal exists in all individuals belonging to the same class is admitted by Prasāstapāda.⁶ If this view is accepted, it will lead to some philosophical problems (difficulties) which are as under :

The universal 'jarness' does not exist in a piece of mud before the origination of a jar but it is produced just after the origination of the same. It is enquired by the Buddhists whether the universal jarness existing in a jar situated in other place is related to this jar existing in a different place or not. If it is so, whether this universal is related to a particular individual after coming from other places or without coming from there. In the case of former ^{the} the universal would have to be designated as substance as it possesses the action in the form of movement. In the latter, there would arise the difficulty in apprehending the relation. For, how can the relation of one object to another be established without accepting the action of movement.⁷

We cannot say that jarness etc. existing in a jar is related to a jar existing in another place through its self - extension. But self - extension is possible for an object having parts (*sāvayava*). Jarness etc. have no parts (*niravayava*); so the extension of it is not possible.⁸ If a jar is destroyed, the question arises : whether the jarness existing in it remains in it or goes elsewhere or is destroyed. Here the first alternative is not correct because the universal cannot exist without its substratum i.e. an individual. The second alternative also is not correct because if we accept the movement in universal then only an universal can go elsewhere and it would turn into a *dravya* or substance because of having movement or action in it.⁹

According to the Vaiśeṣika, universal exists in substance etc. through the relation of inherence. Being impressed by this the Buddhists argue that jarness existing in a jar remains in the ground because the lower part of the jar is connected with the upper surface of the ground. So, the ground is to be called a jar but it is not possible. Besides, jarness cannot pervade a jar existing on the ground without keeping it associated with the ground.

The Buddhists do not admit *Sāmānya* because of the defects mentioned above. They point out that *sattvā* is not in the form of *sāmānya* but in the form of causal efficacy (*artha-kriyā-Kāritva-rūpam*).

How is common knowledge (*anugatapratyaya*) among various individuals of the same possible of *sāmānya* is not accepted: According to the Buddhists, we cannot say that 'cow' is differentiated from other animals like horse etc. with the help of *sāmānya*. But 'cow' is known as distinct in terms of the knowledge of non-cow (*agovyāvṛtti*). In like manner a jar is distinct in terms of the knowledge of non-jar (*aghatavyāvṛtti*)¹⁰. This kind of negative way of knowing is called 'apoha'. A particular object can be differentiated from others (*svetaravyāvṛttirūpa*) by *Apoha*. The differentiation of a jar from other objects (*ghatetarabheda*) which remains in all individual jar^Δ may be shown as under : 'This is a jar but not cloth'.

Apoha differentiates a particular object from others, so it is called *anyāpoha*. According to Ratnakirti, the verbal usage of the sentence 'This is a cow' comes from the apprehension in the form 'This cow is different from non-cow' (*agovyāvṛtta*)¹¹. Therefore, the phenomenon of *anyāpoha* is the outcome (cause) of similar apprehension (*anugatapratyaya*) and so *sāmānya* is not required. That is to say, the similar apprehension of all individuals of the same class is found because of an object's unique character (*svalakṣaṇāt*) which is possible through its distinct nature from other things.

The theory of impermanance does not accept *sāmānya* or universal. The Buddhists point out that *sāmānya* or universal as defined by the Vaiśeṣikas comes under inference. So it does not come under real entity or *satvastu* but it is related with *kalpanā*. The word which is used to refer to some object becomes the conveyer of the same but it does not indicate reality. The real object is not revealed by words. The real water can serve our purpose but the word 'water' cannot do the same work. The reality does not exist in the word, it exists in the thing itself. The burning property exists in fire but not in the word fire'. The following usages will show that words cannot reveal the actual object. The use of 'dārāḥ' having plural form meaning only one wife while the term *sannagari* bearing singular suffix means six cities. Language cannot give us true picture

of reality because it is ambiguous¹². Thus, the Buddhists have established that like language *anyāpoha* etc. cannot provide us with the true picture of reality. However, they can give us knowledge of second order reality i.e. phenomenal reality (*Samvṛtisatyatā*) and therefore, they are nothing but inference or class perception (*sāmānyalakṣaṇā*). The Vaiśeṣika Philosophers react on the idea of *anyāpoha* of the Buddhists in the following way :

In an individual cow there is the difference of non-cow, nevertheless, it cannot serve the purpose of *anugata pratīti* i.e. similar cognition. Because, there cannot remain the difference of non-cow, provided that a cow is not definitely known earlier. If a cow is particularly known earlier, it is known being endowed with cowness which can alone be an object of similar cognition. Further, if this opinion is accepted, there would arise the defect of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) on account of the fact that a cow is known in terms of non-cow and again non-cow is known in terms of a cow. Therefore, the phenomenon of *anyāpoha* is not acceptable.¹³

A thing which exists only for a moment and is not revealed through language is *svalakṣaṇa* and so it is perceptual.¹⁴ The view of Sāyanamādhava is not acceptable and it is shown as under. If the same object is known in terms of language, that is, if a cow is known in terms of non-cow, it may include in *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* but not in *svalakṣaṇa* which is claimed by Sāyanamādhava. Besides, when a cow is known in terms of non-cow through the method of *apoha*, it is impossible to know within a moment which again points to the inferential character of the object but not perceptual or *svalakṣaṇa*. The words etc. are known as *samvṛti* by virtue of the fact that they cover (but not reveal) the true picture of reality, which has got a second order importance according to the Buddhists.

The Buddhists do not accept the above view because of the following grounds : if a cow is not definitely known there cannot remain the difference of

non-cow. But it cannot be admitted that when a cow is known, it is known being endowed with cowness. Here the Buddhists are of the opinion that a cow is known by virtue of its causal efficacy (*arthakriyā-kāritva*), not in terms of its universal. The phrase *Anugata Pratyaya* is related with a few individuals of the same kind. These individuals are known in terms of their causal efficacy. Thus, other objects denoted by the term 'non-cow' are also known through their different type of causal efficacy. When someone points out that a cow is different from non-cow, he expresses it with the help of the process of *anyāpoha*. But the primary knowledge of the 'cow' or 'non-cow' comes from their causal ⁺efficacies but not through the word 'cow' or 'non-cow'. Therefore, there is no necessity of accepting *sāmānya* because the purpose is served by *anugata pratyaya* as the method of *anyāpoha*.¹⁵

The Buddhists argue that causal efficacy does not exist in cowness etc. The terms 'cowness' etc. come under *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. The derivative meaning of the term *arthakriyākāritva* is the power or potency through which the necessity is accomplished. The capacity of accomplishing the activities like burning etc. is *arthakriyākāritva*. It alone (*arthakriyākāritva*) remains in the unique character of fire, but not in the universals like fireness etc. Because, the burning property exists in fire, but not in fireness.

According to the Naiyāyikas, this view is not tenable. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* also possesses the capacity of accomplishing some end (*arthakriyākāritva*). When, it is said, 'cow should not be touched with feet' or 'cow should be respected' it is not applicable to a particular cow, but cow in general having the generic property, 'cowness'. They argue, if a qualificand being *svalakṣaṇa* becomes *arthakriyākāri*, the qualifier also which is *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* will become *arthakriyākāri* and so it has absolute reality (*paramārthasatyatā*).

This theory is not also justifiable. The Buddhists are very much consistent in their position. At first they are reluctant to accept the attribute like cowness etc. in a cow etc. According to them, if it is said 'cow should be respected', it is applicable to a particular cow. If it is admitted, it is nothing but to accept the same in all individual cases of cow. If there are thousand cows and every cow is unique in character, then there is no necessity of accepting a universal like cowness in it. The method of *apoha* is to be resorted to for *anugatapratyaya*. Each and every system of philosophy possesses its metaphysical pre-supposition. The Buddha philosophy begins with the idea of suffering (*duḥkha*) and non-eternity (*anityatā*). The Buddhists ontologically cannot admit anything having permanent character like universal etc. because they believe in the theory of momentariness. The Naiyāyikas do not agree to the same because of advocating a different set of metaphysical pressuppositions. It is found that both the systems are consistent provided their pressuppositions or philosophical scheme are investigated with a great care.

The Buddhists point out that the object of *Svalakṣaṇa*-nature bears only *paramārthasatyatā*. So *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* which is only imagination (*kalpanā*) cannot be considered as such and thus here we can logically admit *Samvrtisatyatā*.

Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness:

The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness has been refuted by the Naiyāyikas. In *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* Udayana has presented two verses. (Verse No. 16 and 17) for refuting this doctrine. The Buddhist view of momentariness is known as *Kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda* or *Kṣaṇikavāda*. This view is opposed to that of the Cārvākas. Haridāsa Bhaṭṭāchārya, a Naiyāyika states the *Kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda* to be the defining feature of the Buddhist point of view. The intention of this point of view is to generate the sense of detachment among the followers of Buddha.

The doctrine of momentariness can be said to have originated from the noble truths of Buddha. *Kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda* also is at once an ontological doctrine and the Buddhist theory of perception is mentioned in such a way to exemplify the ontological state of happenings. When we interpret the following example - "*ghataḥ kṣaṇika sattvāt*" it will be clear to us. the pot is momentary because it is the nature of it. The above quoted statement is an *anumāna vākya* (inferential proposition). It can be derived only if there is available such a *vyāpti* as, *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam* and instantiation of the *Vyāpti* may be had in the case of the cluster of cloud (*meghamālā*). So if the given argument is valid, the predication of the momentariness of things may be taken as established. The term '*sat*' used by the Buddhist has a different connotation from that of the Naiyāyikas.

The Naiyāyika states that existence has been assimilated with *jāti*. That is *sattā-sāmānyayogitvam sattam*. So it is clear that the Buddhists cannot admit this definition of *sat* as given by the Naiyāyikas. According to the Naiyāyikas, *sāmānya* or *jāti* is a kind of *nitya padārtha* which is opposed by the Buddhists. On the other hand, the Buddhist view is that the mark of *sat* is causal efficiency or *arthakriyākāritva*. A pot may be said to be *sat* because one can bring water in it and the bringing of water is the *arthakriyākāritva* which marks the pot as

sat.

The Naiyāyikas argue that the property of *arthakriyākāritva* cannot be said to be present in the *ghaṭa*. The two contrary properties of *karṭṛtva* and *akarṭṛtva* are simultaneously present in the *ghaṭaḥ*. Let us suppose that the Naiyāyikas might say that a pot has to be causally efficient in ten different situations. Now the causal efficiency of the pot may be manifested all at once or in succession. If the case of successive manifestation of causal efficiency is true, then the other nine causal efficiency remain unrealized when the pot is casually efficient. Thus, the contraries of *karṭṛtva* and *akarṭṛtva* together qualify a form, that is, if both has and has not the capacity to produce its effects - it has the capacity in so far as it is now producing (present) effects, and it has not the capacity in so far as it is not now producing its (past and future) effects. If the pot has the causal efficiencies all at once, then for the rest of its duration as the pot, it remains devoid of *arthakriyākāritva* and it ceases to be a pot at all.

The Naiyāyikas might point to the fact that the Buddhist criterion of *arthakriyākāritva* fails to have its own purpose. They do not consider the *karṭṛtva* and *akarṭṛtva* as contrary properties. They regard them as a disposition which is manifested at different times according to the necessity and situation. Here the clue to their argument is that if *karṭṛtva* and *akarṭṛtva* are contraries, then the criterion of *arthakriyā-kāritva* does not work. But if these two properties are considered as dispositions, then the momentary nature of the pot need not be supposed. The Naiyāyikas have a doubt regarding *sattva* in the inference *ghaṭaḥ kṣanīkaḥ sattvāt* as a real *vyāpti*. If it is not a real *vyāpti*, then it is not an inference. And if it is not an inference, then the question of establishing *vyāpti* does not arise at all.

The nature of an object is admitted as it is actually observed to be. The production of new prototypes, one after another in different moments is inferred by the observation of a continuous process of growth and decay only in the case of the objects which are actually observed to have continuous growth and

decay, as, for example, in the case of body etc. On the other hand, such production of new prototypes is denied in the case of objects where continuous growth and decay are not observed as, e.g., in the *ghataḥ* (jar) etc. Thus, according to Udayanācārya, the doctrine of momentariness cannot be accepted unless and until it is justified by means of inference.^{15.1}

The Naiyāyika further shows that *kṣaṇabhanga vāda* cannot be established by means of perception also. In this connection, Udayana presents the verse no. 16 (*Nyāyakusumāñjali*) to show that in perceptual experience, *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* are so interrelated that one cannot be had without the other. According to the Buddhists, perception is only *nirvikalpaka* but *savikalpaka* cannot be said to be a perception, it comes under inference. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas states that perception is of two types *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* and there cannot be any *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* without there being *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* in other words, both are interrelated. Thus, if anything is *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*, it is needless to say, that thing has already been known by *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. Udayana points out that with the help of perception we can know only that 'It is *ghataḥ*', that 'It is blue', but we cannot know that it is momentary. *Kṣanikatva* cannot be known through perception though it is true that the knowledge of *kṣaṇika* is attained by *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. According to the Buddhists, the bare particulars, the point instant is known in *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. And by imposing *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* to the bare particulars by means of *kalpanā* (i.e inference or *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) the object is known, so it is unreal. Momentariness cannot even be determined by determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and to them as *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* are interrelated, so momentariness cannot be the object of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* also. Thus Udayanācārya holds that *kṣanikatva* cannot be known by means of perception.

In this way, the Naiyāyikas have established the view that the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness cannot be proved either by means of perception or by inference.

Again, the fact of re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) cannot be explained if the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is admitted. For example, the seed perceived once in some place may be perceived on another occasion in some other place and may be recognised as 'this is the same seed that was perceived previously. This type of recognition proves that the seed is a permanent object and so the inference seeking to prove momentariness would be contradicted by perception.

The Buddhist may argue that recognition is not really knowing the same object again but only a complete prototype of it. Because, in the case of the perception of the flame of a lamp which, though different in every moment, is cognised to be one and the same. But this is not logical, because there is no ground to prove a rule that recognition invariably refers to a different but similar object and never to the same one.

Besides recollection or recognition presupposes a permanent knower who perceives an object, receives the impression from that object. And he (knower) recollects or recognises the same later on. Here the problem is : if all the objects are momentary, the knower becomes different in each moment, recollection or re-cognition is not possible. But recollection or recognition is admitted by the Buddhist also.

Again, if we admit the doctrine of momentariness, then the relation between cause and effect cannot be explained. According to the Naiyāyika (and the other opponents of the above doctrine), if we analyse the process of causal relation, we find that an object called a *kāraṇa* becomes the cause of an effect being present even at the time of the origination of the effect. For example, a jar (*ghaṭa*) cannot be produced if a little quality of cause of the jar, is not present at the time of production of a *ghaṭa*. But, according to the doctrine of momentariness, this clay, the cause of *ghaṭa* (mentioned above) that was present just before the production of the jar (*ghaṭa*) becomes destroyed at the time of the production of the jar (*ghaṭa*) and hence the object called *kāraṇa* (said amount

of clay) cannot be present at the moment of the production of the cause. Here we know that if the cause is absent at the very moment of the production of the effect, the effect would not be produced. Therefore, the general rule of the theory of causality is violated in the doctrine of momentariness. Thus, this view is not accepted.

The last objection against the doctrine of momentariness is as follows:

If *kṣāṇabhāṅgavāda* is admitted then the state of the liberated person and the unliberated will remain unexplained because the man who is bound in this world of suffering can attain liberation (*mokṣa*) if he follows the prescribed method of it. The question of attaining *mokṣa* (liberation) does not arise in the case of a person who is not bound (i.e. liberated). Therefore, bondage (*vandhana*) and liberation (*mokṣa*) will be performed in a same locus or *adhikaraṇa* (i.e. a person) this is the general principle. Now, if a person before liberation and the person after liberation remain in the same *adhikaraṇa* (locus), then the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣāṇabhāṅgavāda*) cannot be admitted.^{15.2}

Due to this theory of momentariness, body i.e. every man etc. must be momentary. Again, they accept that causing injury to someone is a kind of sin and the doer also must enjoy the result of his deed. But this view cannot be taken for granted if body is regarded as self. As, from the Buddhist point of view, body is everchanging, the body of each moment is different from one another. Now, if self is nothing but the body itself, we have to admit different selves for different moments. If it be the case, the agent which causes injury becomes different ^{from} that which enjoys the result of demerit produced for causing injury. Because, the moment of committing sin is different from the moment of enjoying the result. Therefore, the body also becomes different at every moment. Thus, there arises the difficulty that actual agent of sin cannot be the enjoyer of his deed. Similarly, the agent who does not commit any demerit would become the enjoyer of such activity. In this way, there arises two types of difficulties in the law of *karma* known as '*Kṛtahāna* and *akṛtābhyāgama*.

But as a matter of fact the agent of the above action cannot be completely changed or he cannot be a new person because the said agent (i.e. the doer of causing injury to someone) remains the same one for he himself is the soul which is eternal in nature. His body may change gradually according to his age. As he is a man, he possesses the universal (*sāmānya*) 'manhood' as pointed out by the Naiyāyika.

Thus, we cannot accept the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) of the Buddhists due to the reason mentioned above.

**Some problems of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, *Jñānalakṣaṇā*,
Kṣaṇā^{bh} *āṅgavāda*, *Svalakṣaṇa-vāda* and their probable solutions.**

The arguments of the Buddhists cannot be accepted by the Naiyāyikas due to having a different set of presuppositions. The main presuppositions of the Buddhists are the doctrine of momentariness, theory of *śūnyavāda*, the concept of unique character (*svalakṣaṇa*) etc.

Now we shall explain these presuppositions briefly and critically.

According to the doctrine of momentariness, whatever is existent (*sat*) is momentary (*Kṣaṇika*). Here 'existent' means 'capable of fulfilling some purpose (*arthakriyākāritva*) or producing some effect. Or in other words, the mark of *sat* is causal efficacy or *arthakriyākāritva*. That which produces some effect is existent (*sat*). For instance, a seed may be said to be *sat* because it produces a sprout and producing a sprout is the *arthakriyākāritva* (of the seed) which marks the seed as *sat*.

Nāgārjuna wants to show that ultimate reality cannot be described either in positive and negative terms. It cannot have any characteristic, since it is inexpressible in our finite language. Not only ultimate reality, but also the

phenomenal world cannot be described, because none of the categories we use in describing the world has its own nature or character (*sarvam svalakṣaṇam*). If it is proved that everything has its relative existence, then nothing can have its own nature. If everything is devoid of its own nature and character, and so it is void, and there is nothing that is not void, then the absolute reality must be the void. If everything in the world is essentially void, the world itself is void. What we see then is only an appearance of the void, the Absolute. Appearance is the empirical truth (*samvṛtisatya*) and the void is the ultimate or Absolute truth (*paramārthika satya*).

Nothing can categorically be said about this world and the world after. It is devoid of all characterization, all determinations. It is the void (*śūnya*).

Svalakṣaṇa as a point instant, discrete particular characterizes the ontology of the Buddhist thought and the awareness of that point instant marks the theory of knowledge. The ontological presupposition of the Buddhist is that only the point instant, *svalakṣaṇas* are real, and *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is the *kalpanā* imposed upon *svalakṣaṇa* and so *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is not real. Perception gives us the awareness of *svalakṣaṇa*.

The perceptual object (*svalakṣaṇa*) must be devoid of all sorts of conceptual contents because this conceptual content presents the object as associated with *vague verbal* expressions and exists only in the subjective form. Awareness of *svalakṣaṇa* could then be a kind of pure sensation; it is a bare particular, a piece of cognition, by which the object is revealed only in its simple and pure nature, bare of all attitudes and associations. Therefore, *svalakṣaṇa* is a pure sensation alone. *Svalakṣaṇa* is an essence or an entity which is unique, which is shared by nothing else, which is the thing in itself. It exists for a single moment (*kṣaṇa*), it has no extension in space, no duration in time, it is similar to nothing, it is unique. It is transcendent reality because it cannot be realised in a definite representation. It is absolute reality, 'thing in itself' which underlies every efficient empirical reality.

Therefore, according to the Buddhists, there is no *nityadravya* (eternal substances) because *nityadravya* is permanent, unchangeable etc. but according to the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣāṇikavāda*), nothing is permanent, all things are every-changing.

The above three presuppositions of the Buddhists (i.e. *kṣāṇikavāda*, *śūnyavāda* and *svalakṣaṇa-vāda*) are denied by the Naiyāyikas because their presuppositions are different in nature.

The Buddhists suppose that they are correct so far as their presuppositions are concerned. The Naiyāyikas have accepted seven categories in the real world. Other than these there is nothing. They have developed their philosophical point of view after keeping these categorical scheme in their mind. Under these categories there is no provision of denying the existence of the eternal substances. So far as my knowledge goes, there is no necessity of such denial. Buddhists, on the other hand, have to accept the *svalakṣaṇa* character of an object due to having a specific type of ontological presuppositions like the law of momentariness. If something is momentary in character it has to be taken as having unique character and having absolute reality. The non momentary objects are taken as having second order reality (*samvṛtisatyatā*) because they are not real. That which is not ultimately real is accepted as having covered reality only for the sake of philosophising and philosophical discourse. In this way, the Advaitins have developed a special type of logic after keeping their acceptance of monistic reality (i.e. *Brahman*) in view. The Sāṃkhians have put forth their philosophical conclusions in such a way so that their dualistic reality (i.e. *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*) is protected. If we judge each and every system in this way, it will seem to be consistent. As ontological presuppositions are different in each system, its philosophy, will be in conformity with main tenets. Hence no system is said to be wrong or inconsistent. What is correct in the framework of Buddhistic philosophy is wrong in Nyāya system. In the same way, the apparent correct position of Nyāya system may seem to be wrong to the Advaitins. In this way, each and every system can

be justified. In spite of this some philosophical problems can be raised from our common sense level.

It has already been stated that the knowledge of all smokes and fires existing in different times and spaces through the universals - smokeness and fireness. The definition of *Sāmānya* as given in Nyāya is as follows: *Nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam* (i.e. that which, being eternal, is inhered with all the individual of the same class is called *sāmānya*). If this be the case, what will be the status of the *Upādhis* which are not taken as *sāmānyas* as per definition? The property existing in single individual like moonness, sunness etc. and the acquired properties like fatherhood, teacherhood etc can be described as *Upādhi* as in the previous case the adjunct '*anekasamavetatva*' does not exist and in the latter the adjunct *nityatva* does not exist. How can we know the properties of a teacher or a father existing in future? Through *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* it is not possible, because the fatherness or teacherness is not a possible, because the fatherness or teacherness is not a *sāmānya*. In reply, it can be said that the internal qualities of a teacher or father can be known through *Jñānalakṣaṇā* but not *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. As the fragrance of a sandalwood is known through *jñānalakṣaṇā*, the affection etc existing in a father is known from father.

Now if we admit the doctrine of momentariness an objection may be raised herein below :

When someone wants to know whether an object, e.g. a seed has *arthakriyākāritva* (causal efficacy) or not, e.g. whether a seed produces a sprout or not, the knower and the seed, the object would be destroyed at the next moment of his wanting. That is to say, both the knower and the seed, the object become completely new things. Hence, when we want to verify *arthakriyākāritva* or causal efficiency of an object, the object becomes *asat* or non-existent at the moment of verifying its causal efficacy. But according to the doctrine of momentariness, whatever is *arthakriyākāri* (or causally efficient) is *sat* (existent) and whatever is *sat* (existent) is *kṣanika* (momentary). All things which have

causal efficacy are momentary in nature. But in the above example we find that whatever is *arthakriyākāri* or causally efficient is *asat* or non-existent. Therefore, the doctrine of momentariness is not justifiable.

To the Buddhist each and everything of this world is momentary. Hence, they have admitted the existence of an entity for a moment only which means the object is essentially unique (*svalakṣaṇa*) in character. That which is dependent on *kalpanā* or mental construction is not perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), for it is not connected with *arthakriyākāritva* i.e. causal efficacy. According to Dharmakīrti, the momentary object free from mental ascription and non-erroneous is called perceptual knowledge. (*tatra kalpanāpodham abhāntam pratyakṣam*). This knowledge is alone real and the non-perceptual object manifested through descriptions is called unreal as it covers (*samvṛti*) the true nature of an object.

Svalakṣaṇa is a direct awareness while knowledge by ascription or *kalpanā* is mediate. A particular that cannot be described in terms of predicate is a *svalakṣaṇa* which cannot be said to be a content of mind. When some name etc. are imposed on some object it becomes a different. Hence the object which is known through *kalpanā* is not the previously real which remained for a moment. Though we cannot be said to know the exact nature of that object through it, we can have an idea of it and hence it has a second order reality. That which is expressed through language is not real (*sat vastu*) as they are nothing but mental construction. To them the object itself can serve our purpose (*arthakriyākāri*) but not the language through which it is expressed. By virtue of being a mental construction *Kalpanā* cannot reveal the ultimately real nature of an object and hence it has been considered as an unreal entity.

The above arguments of the Buddhists cannot be accepted due to the following reasons. First, the object which is known through language etc is not the earlier real entity existed for a moment. It cannot be denied that through language some idea of reality can be gathered. Hence, it cannot be described

as unreal. If it fails to provide the idea of an object, it would not be accepted as a form of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). As it is already accepted as a *pramāṇa* it has to be taken as conveyer of valid cognition and hence the unreality of such cognition cannot be accepted.

Secondly, it has already been said that a *svalakṣaṇa* entity remaining for a moment is free from *Kalpanā* or mental ascription and non-erroneous. As the Buddhists believe that an entity of perceptual cognition exists for a moment, it is very difficult to establish that a *svalakṣaṇa* object has got causal efficacy. To judge causal efficacy of a *svalakṣaṇa* object, more than one moment is essential, which is not permissible in Buddhism. Moreover, the same difficulty would stand on the way of considering *svalakṣaṇa* as non-erroneous.

Thirdly, the term non-erroneous (*abhrānta*) in connection with a *svalakṣaṇa* entity is unnecessary. For a *svalakṣaṇa* object being a bare sensation the truth and falsity of it cannot be judged within a moment. To determine truth and falsity of something the extrinsic validity (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*) is essential. For this, the momentary character of an object will be lost.

Due to having the above mentioned problems the Buddhist theory of *svalakṣaṇa* cannot be accepted. One solution could be given if some yogic power is accepted at the time of perception. The essential nature of an object and its causal efficacy can simultaneously be known within a moment as there arises a light produced through power of absorption (*samādhi*) to the true nature of an object. Hence, to protect the Buddhist theory of perception the role of *yoga* must be accepted. From this, it has to be accepted that the Buddhist also have accepted *yoga* as a means of knowing as in Nyāya. This view of the Buddhist is evidenced from the acceptance of *samyak samādhi* as one of the eight fold path (*aṣṭāṅgikamārga*).

The Naiyāyika's Response to the Non-acceptance of Sāmānyalakṣaṇā by the Vedāntins and the Mimāṃsakas.

The *Advaita Vedāntins* rule out all the arguments of the *Naiyāyikas* in favour of the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*.¹⁶ This is shown as follows :

The *Nyaya* argument in favour of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is given below:

Sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa is needed for perceiving any universal proposition, e.g., "All cases of smoke are cases of fire". This universal proposition is essential for inference e.g., inferring fire from perceiving smoke. So *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is essential for inference, such as, inference of fire from the perception of smoke.

The *Advaita Vedāntin* holds that there is no need of universal proposition e.g., "All cases of smoke are cases of fire", for the inference of fire from the perception of smoke. This argument goes against the *Nyāya* argument. If universal proposition is not essential for this inference or any other inference, then there is no need to accept *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*.

According to the *Advaita Vedāntin*, we need to know the following things for inference:

- a) two universals - 'smokeness' and 'fireness';
- b) the relation between 'smokeness' and 'fireness'.

The *Advaitins* point out that when we perceive an instance of smoke and then we perceive fire, we perceive these two particulars 'smoke' and 'fire' - not only as particulars, but we also perceive these two particulars 'smoke' and 'fire' which are characterised under two universals - 'smokeness' and 'fireness' respectively. And we perceive the relation between them. So, afterwards, when we perceive 'smoke' possessing the generic attribute 'smokeness', we remember its relation with the generic attribute 'fireness' and infer the presence of fire there.

The Mimāṃsakas and the Vedāntins do not accept *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* as a form of super-normal perception. For, though there is absence of perception of all cases of smoke and fire, there is no harm. The invariable concomitance of smoke with fire can be ascertained through the cognition of smoke characterised by smokeness with fire characterised by fireness. For, the knowledge of qualifier is the cause of the qualified cognition (*visiṣṭajñāna*). Though there is the absence of all the cases of smoke and fire, yet the invariable concomitance between them can be ascertained due to the knowledge of coexistence along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation. Hence, there is no necessity of admitting *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*¹⁷.

It has been stated in the *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* by Salikanātha that the invariable relation between smoke and fire is ascertained through the observation of the one (i.e. smoke) and recollection of its invariable relation (*niyamah*) with the fire. Initially the invariable relation between smoke and fire is ascertained through their perception and afterwards the absence of *Upādhi* (limiting adjunct) is ascertained through the repeated observation of them. Hence, there is no question of accepting *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* to establish an invariable relation between all cases of smoke and fire.¹⁸

As each and every action is accomplished easily without accepting *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, there is no necessity of accepting the same due to absence of relevant proof and logical cumbrousness. There is no necessity of knowing all cases of smoke and fire in terms of smokeness and fireness. For, if invariable relation is ascertained) in terms of smokenss in known or familiar cases of smoke, there is no scope of doubt of deviation (*vyabhicārasāṃkā*) concerning smoke as there is empediment of doubt of deviation due to the special observation of *Vyāpti* existing in smoke characterised by smokeness.¹⁹

The above-mentioned view is not tenable. For, if the knowledge of *Vyāpti* regarding all individual manifestations of smoke and fire as a whole is not attained, there would arise the doubt of deviation (*vyabhicārasāṃkā*) leading to

the impossibility of inferential cognition (*anumiti*). *Anumāna* or inference has to be accepted as a means of valid cognition as this means is frequently used by people in this world. For this the supernormal contact called *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* through which all individual manifestation of *Vyāpya* and *Vyāpaka* are said to be present has to be accepted. With the help of this contact all individuals of a particular class are known and due to this the knowledge of *Vyāpti* is attained.²⁰

It may be argued that if such supernormal connection is accepted there would arise contingency of being omniscient for all beings as they would be able to know all individuals at a time through this *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.²¹

In response to the above, the Naiyāyikas might argue in the following manner. How do the *Pūrvapakṣins* (Vedāntins) know about the fact of our omniscience. For, omniscience is a phenomenon which the Vedāntins are not capable to understand. Because, one who knows the fact of omniscience of others should be omniscient. If one is not omniscient how does one understand others omniscient character? If one is omniscient, on the other hand, how is this fact of omniscience known due to the non-acceptance of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.²²

The Naiyāyikas argue that the question of being omniscient does not arise here. If all the objects of this world are known in terms of *prameyatva* (knowability), there is the chance of being omniscient. But if the objects are known in terms of jarness (*ghaṭatva*), clothness (*paṭatva*) etc., all objects are not known due to the absence of them and hence there is no question of being omniscient.²³

The Advaitins do not accept *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* or *Jāti* as a category of real and hence they do not accept *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* as a super-normal means of knowing. Dharmarāj Adhvarindra in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has said that *jātitva* (universalness) and *Upādhitva* (limiting adjunctness) cannot be taken as reals as this existence cannot be proved by any *pramāṇa*. These two are nothing but

sounds having no corresponding objects, as *pramāṇas* fail to ascertain there.²⁴ From the above discussion, it may be concluded that the *jātitva* and *upādhitva* cannot be provable entities and hence they are *aprāmāṇika* (not capable of being proved) i.e. unreal.

It may be argued that the *jātitva* and *Upādhitva* which have been accepted as not provable (*aprāmāṇika*) is not correct. Because their existence can be proved with the help of determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*). In determinate perception the qualificand (*viśeṣya*), qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and their relation become the content of knowledge. In the determinate knowledge in the form. 'This is a jar' (again *ghaṭaḥ*) the qualificand is 'jar', qualifier is jar-ness (*ghaṭatva*) and their relation. In this case the determinate knowledge grasps *ghaṭatva* as a qualifier. In the same way, the determinate knowledge like 'This is mediate' 'This is immediate' can grasp the universals like mediateness (*parokṣatva*) and immediateness (*aparokṣatva*) as its qualifier. Therefore, the determinate perception alone can prove *ghaṭatva* etc as universals. This view is also not correct. For, a determinate knowledge can reveal the qualifier and qualificand, but it cannot prove this qualifier as a *jāti*. The entity which is not a *jāti* may become qualifier and qualificand. With the help of the knowledge of common attributes between two or more than two objects (*anugatapratīti*), the common properties in the qualificand can be established, but from this it does not prove that the common properties are *jāti*.

Again the opponents have come forward to argue that perception may not be a proof for the existence of universal (*jāti*), but inference (*anumāna*) may accomplish the same. First, through the perception of similar properties among different objects the perception of similarity is possible. After this the inference in the form. "The properties like fingerness etc. are universals (*jāti*), as there are general properties excepting *Upādhis* (*anṅulitvādikāṃ jātiḥ upādhibhinnatve sati sāmānyadharmatvāt*) can be drawn. In spite of this, the common properties like fingerness etc. cannot be proved *jāti*. In this inference the minor term (*Pakṣa*) is 'the properties like fingerness etc' (*anṅulatvādidharma*), middle term (*hetu*) is

'being the property of common attribute' (*sāmānyadharmatva*) which is free from *upādhi* (*upādhibhinnatva*), the probandum (*Sādhya*) is *jātitva* (universalhood). According to the Nyāya, the universal is co-existent with eternity (*nityatva*) and residing in many through the relation and *samavāya*.

But according to the Vedāntins, no object accepting the *Brahman* is eternal and hence there is no inference (*anumāna*). To them, probandum is not familiar in any locus. An individual who knows probandum as existing may infer about the existence of *Sādhya* in a different place. In fact, the Vedantins do not know *Sādhya* as existing. Hence, it is not possible for him to draw inference. Moreover, if *Sādhya* is absurd, ascertainment of *Vyāpti* between a *Hetu* and a *Sādhya* is not possible and hence, the *hetu* given in the previous inference is a pseudo-one and hence there is the fallacy called *Vyāpyatvāsiddha*.²⁵

The previous inferential argument is fallacious in another way which is indicated by the term '*samavāyasiddhya*' in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. The previous syllogism is defective as there is no mark of *samavāya* and there is no proof for the existence of it. As the Advaitins do not admit inherence (*samavāya*), the properties like jarness etc. does not exist in many objects through the relation of inherence (*anekasamavetatva*). To the Advaitins all objects excepting *Brahman* is transitory and hence the properties like jarness etc. are transitory, but not eternal. In jarness etc there is no eternality and existence through inherence in many objects of the same class. In this case of syllogistic argument there is the absence of *Sādhya* in the minor term i.e. jarness etc. and hence there as the fallacy called *Vādhita*, the definition of which runs as follows.

When the absence of *Sādhya* in a *Pakṣa* is ascertained through other *Pramāṇa*, it is called *Vādhita*. Due to these reasons the Advaitins do not accept universal as a category of real which ultimately suggests that the supernormal connection through universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇā*) is not possible.²⁶

The above-mentioned view may be refuted by the Naiyāyikas in the following way. To an Advaitin only one entity i.e. *Brahman* is real, but others are false. Hence, to them, all objects other than the *Brahman* are false. As the properties like jarness etc. fall under the category of unreal, they are false. But the Naiyāyikas have accepted seven categories constituting the real world. Hence, the properties like jarness etc. are real as they are under the category of *sāmānya*. To them, the property existing in many individuals and eternal is called *sāmānya* (*Nityatve sati anekasamavetaṁ sāmānyam*) As they accept inherence (*sāmānya*) as an eternal relation (*ayutasiddha*), there is no problem of accepting the properties as *sāmānya*. But the Advaitins cannot accept this due to having different set of presupposition. In order to prove that the *Brahman* alone is real and eternal it is not possible for the Advaitins to admit another eternal substance and hence they do not accept *sāmānya* as well as *samavāya*. All these arguments will fall flat upon others who hold a realistic view like Naiyāyikas etc. The Naiyāyikas have accepted a separate category called *sāmānya* through which we have the cognition of similar objects (*anugatapratīti*). To them, *sāmānya* like jarness etc, though its locus i.e. a jar is destroyed, remain in tact they are eternal in character. Through the supernormal connection of *sāmānya* all other members containing this can be apprehended immediately. Hence, *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is an inevitable means of knowing.

Thus, it can be concluded that without the admission of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, the ascertainment of *vyāpti* (which is the ground of inference) between the two concerned groups of individuals is not possible. So the theory of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* must be admitted.

JÑĀNALAKṢAṆĀ PRATYAKṢĀ

**Refutation of the Charges Against the Supernormality of the
Jñānalakṣaṇā and the Sāmānalakṣaṇā.**

According to Nikunja Behari Banerjee, both *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* are related to *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* (determinate perception) and these are connected with sense organ and object, that is, sense object contact is necessary in both the cases. Therefore, these should not be called as *alaukika pratyakṣa* or supernormal perception but as *laukika pratyakṣa* or normal perception. He says, "..... *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* like *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is organically related to some *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* or other and as such is *laukika* (normal) instead of being *alaukika* (supernormal)".²⁷

Here raises a question : Is there a justification of Dr. Banerjee's view ? Our answer is in the negative because of the following grounds :

(i) There is no supporting Nyāya evidence which contains the instances of *alaukika pratyakṣa* those are devoid of the stages of *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. Here what the Nyāya states is that the contact (*sannikarṣa*) between the sense-organ (*indriya*) and the object is *alaukika* (supernormal), not *laukika* or normal. Therefore, Dr. Banerjee's view is not justifiable.

(ii) Dr. Banerjee holds that, if a type of *pratyakṣa* is related to determinate perception it must be a *laukika* one but not *alaukika*. To be *alaukika*, in the case of perception, does not mean that it (perception) has no determinate stage of perception. We suppose, according to Dr. Banerjee, that if a mode of perception is related to determinate perception as one of its stages, it cannot be *alaukika pratyakṣa* (supernormal perception) which is regarded by him as the presupposition of his argument.

(iii) When all individual cases of fire and smoke are known through the universals like fireness and smokeness, the fireness or smokeness serves as a contact for knowing all fires and smokes. Between fireness and smokeness and all individuals of smoke and fire cannot be regarded as an ordinary one as we find in the case of jar etc. and hence it is called *alaukika*. In the case of

jñānalakṣaṇa also the contact between eye and sandalwood is an ordinary one, but not between eye and fragrance as it is beyond the power of eye to discover 'fragrance'. Hence, the contact between eye and fragrance gathered through sandalwood is an extraordinary one.

The Response to the Vedāntin's Objection against the Anyathākhyativāda.

The Naiyāyikas explain illusion with the help of the theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* (Acquired Perception). The illusory silver is perceived because it is presented through our previous knowledge of silver as seen at some other time and place. But the Vedāntins object to the Nyāya theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa*. They argue that to recognise *jñānalakṣaṇa* as a type of genuine perception is to reduce ordinary inference to perception. If the fragrance of sandalwood be perceived because we have a previous knowledge of it as connected with sandalwood, then in the inference of fire from smoke, the fire may be said to be perceived since we have also a previous knowledge of it as related to smoke. There is nothing to distinguish between the two cases. In the one we have a perception of sandalwood and previous knowledge of its relation to fragrance. In the other, we have a perception of smoke and a similar knowledge of its relation to fire. Hence, if the fragrance be in supernormal contact with sense and so perceived, there may be such a supernormal perception of fire and, for the matter of fact, of all objects of inference. So the Vedāntins hold that our knowledge of the fragrance of sandalwood, seen at distance, is due to inference and not any supernormal perception like the Naiyāyika's *jñānalakṣaṇa*.²⁸

The objection raised by the Vedāntins, is not tenable for the following reasons :

According to the Naiyāyika, the theory of illusion, viz. the theory of

Anyathākhyāti cannot be explained if the supernormal perception called *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is not accepted. But the Advaita Vedantins hold a different theory of illusion, known as *Anirvacaniya Khyātivāda*. According to them, the nature of the object of illusory knowledge is indescribable, it is neither real nor unreal, nor both real and unreal. As in the case of snake-rope illusion, where one mistakenly perceives a snake in a piece of rope, the snake cannot be taken as either real or unreal, it is something the nature of which is indescribable. The false appearance of a piece of rope as a snake is due to ignorance (*avidyā*). Similarly, *Brahman*, the non-dual absolute pure consciousness appears as the world of multiplicity due to *Māyā*, the cosmic principle of illusion, which is also indescribable by nature.

Thus, if the Vedāntins accept the Nyāya theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* then their theory of *Anirvacaniyakhyāti* will not be established, for the theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is consistent with the theory of *anyathākhyāti* which goes against the *Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda*. In other words, if *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is not accepted, the theory of *Anyathākhyāti* cannot be explained due to the reasons already mentioned in the chapter III.

When someone attains the knowledge of fragrance from sandalwood, knowledge of cold from ice, the knowledge of heat from fire, these are not at all inferential. Because, the fact of being fragrant or being cold or hot is incorporated in the very connotation of the terms 'sandal' 'ice' or 'cold'. In these cases, we do not get any new information. As soon as we remember the words ice, fire etc., it gives rise to the knowledge of fragrance, cold, heat etc. If an attempt is made to infer the coldness of ice or heat of fire, it will lead us to the fallacy called *siddhasādhana* (i.e., establishment of the fact which is already established).

In this case one suggestion may be borne in mind that if one has a strong desire to infer (*sisādhayisā*), one is allowed to do so even though there is *siddhi*. But it is a case of inference which is deliberately done. In the same way,

if someone desires to infer coldness from ice etc., he is allowed to do so out of *sisādhayisa* but not necessity.

***Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* and *icchājanya Anumāna* (Intentional Inference)**

If the view of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas are reviewed carefully, the following problems may be raised.

First, in the case of *Surabhi Candanam* (i.e. sandalwood is fragrant) the knowledge of fragrance is not a new information to the knower. He can get the idea of fragrance after knowing the sandalwood. In other words, the property of being fragrant is included in the idea of a sandal wood. There is not a case of sandalwood which is not fragrant. Hence, the idea of fragrance constitutes the connotation of the term.

Considering this aspect the Advaitins might argue that the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of *Pramāṇasāmplava* i.e. an object might be proved as existing with the help of more than one *pramāṇa* unlike *Pramāṇavyavasthā* according to which the existence of an object is proved with the help of single *Pramāṇa*. According to the theory of *Pramāṇa Sāmplava* the fire which is perceived may also be known through inference. An object is not necessarily be having a dubious character for applying inference. A syllosistic argument may also be applied if the object is not ascertained totally but in dubious character²⁹. In case of *jñānalakṣaṇā* the application of inference is not totally prohibited by this theory of *Pramāṇasāmplava*. Though fragrance is known after analysing the concept of sandalwood yet it may be treated as a result of inferential cognition if the inferer thinks so. In Nyāya some freedom is given to the desire of the speaker (*vivakṣā*). If this point of the Naiyāyikas is taken for accepted, there is the scope of applying inference in the case of the knowledge of fragrance.

Though intentional inference (*icchājanya anumāna*) of an agent is not totally out of place here, the role of perception cannot be ignored. If something is known through perception, inference, by virtue of its intentional character becomes secondary. It is true that the Navya Naiyāyaikas have given much importance on *vivakṣā* i.e. will to say. Let us put forth some cases where we find a knowledge produced through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanyajñāna*). One is allowed to say - *Sthālī pacati* (he cooks with clay - pot) with the nominative case-ending to the pot instead of the correct expression *sthālyā pacati* with the instrumental case-ending with the word - *sthāli* if one so desires.

Apart from these there are a few cases where we find knowledge attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) as in the case of *Pakṣatā*. If someone bears a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayisā*), he can infer in spite of having *siddhi* (*siṣādhayisāsattve'numitirbhavatyeva*). That a cloth is completely different from a jar is completely known from perception and hence there is not at all any necessity to infer a cloth as distinct from a jar. In spite of this one is found to infer - 'It (i.e. a cloth) is endowed with the mutual absence of a jar, as it has got clothness' (*ghaṭānyanyābhāvavān paṭatvāt*). All these cases are supportable as an individual desires to do so and hence the role of *icchājanyatva* in the attainment of knowledge cannot be denied.

Though the inferential knowledge caused by some desire is not totally neglected, it should clearly be ^{borne} in mind that *icchājanya anumāna* dependent on an individual's will is not a compulsory phenomenon. It is normally done when the truth is already known through some other means like perception etc. There are many cases where we can apply inference 'alone' due to their impossibility of knowing through perception etc.

When the phenomenon of being fragrant is known from the sandalwood, it is mainly perceptual due to the non-separability of the acquired two pieces of

knowledge - *saurabhatva* and *candanatva*. As soon as the sandalwood is known, it is known as fragrant simultaneously without giving scope for inference. In spite of this if an individual has a strong desire of inferring (*siṣādhayisā*) the fragrance of the sandal wood, it is permissible, though not absolutely essential.

Establishment of the Perceptuality of *Jñānalakṣaṇa* as Denied by the Advaitins.

The Advaitins have interpreted *jñānalakṣaṇa* as a form of inference, but not supernormal perception as accepted by the Naiyāyikas. On this one comment can be made, when we come to know of the fragrance of a sandal wood, it is a case of inference. In the same way, it can be said that taste of a fruit is inferred on the strength of a particular colour (*Rūpāt rasanumānam*) which is described as *Sāmānyatodrṣṭa* inference. But a time comes when we know of the fragrance or taste of a fruit as soon as we know of the sandalwood and a fruit possessing a particular colour. Though these are taken as cases of inference initially, they can be known through *jñānalakṣaṇā* in the habituated state (*abhyāsadaśā*). It is true that when we infer *rasa* from a particular *rūpa*, when coldness is inferred from the ice, these are no more the result of inference afterwards, but the result of *jñānalakṣaṇā*. When we are habituated in our everyday life, something is known from something is known from something 'spontaneously' without taking recourse to the form of inference. When water is seen it gives rise to the knowledge of its capability of quenching thirst spontaneously as we are habituated in getting water when felt thirsty. Though initially there was inferential procedure, yet afterwards they are known on the basis of habit. Hence, it is taken as a case of *jñānalakṣaṇā* in which we do not take care of the intricacies of inferential procedure.

The Vedāntins do not admit the supernormal connection called *jñānalakṣaṇā*. In the case of illusory cognition of silver in shell there is, they opine, the perception of silver as they admit the existence of the indescribable silver in this case. In the case of knowledge 'sandal wood is fragrant' we admit

the apperception in the form - 'I recollect fragrance' (Saurabham smarāmi) and hence it cannot be the cause of perception. So for the sake of the law of parsimony (*lāghava*) it is better to take defects as the cause of the origination of the knowledge of the indescribable silver. Hence, the silverness etc. has to be accepted as the effect of the defect. So, there is no proof of the super normal contact called *jñānalakṣaṇā*.³⁰

The above-mentioned view is not tenable. For to the older Naiyāyikas the knowledge of the silver is attained through the supernormal contact called *jñānalakṣaṇā*. If there is no *jñānalakṣaṇā*, the knowledge in the form - 'sandal wood is fragrant' would be attained with the help of the knowledge of a piece of sandalwood attained through eye. As there is no normal contact with the fragrance or the property of being fragrant, the knowledge of sandalwood has to be taken as a contact.³¹

A section of philosopher does not accept *jñānalakṣaṇā* as a perception. To them the fragrance of a sandal wood is always inferential. In the same way, when it is said 'Ice looks cold,' 'Fire looks hot' it is merely a case of inference. We have added various arguments in denying the inferentiality of such cases earlier. Apart from those arguments we can add a new one. To Nyāya such cases are not inferential due to having *vādhita hetvābhāsa*. If it be taken as inferential, it becomes fallacious. And fallacious inference is not real inference. According to Nyāya, when the absence of a *sādhyā* is known through some other *pramāṇa*, it is called *vādhita (yasya sādhyābhāvaḥ pramāṇāntareṇa niscitaḥ sa vādhitaḥ)*. In these cases the coolness of ice and hotness of fire are already proved by perception which is accepted as a *pramāṇa*. If they are taken as inference, they would involve fallacy called *vādhita*. In order to avoid this it is better to accept *jñānalakṣaṇā* as a form of perception.

Therefore, in conclusion we can point out that the theory of illusion, that is, the theory of *anyāthākhyāti* cannot be explained if the supernormal perception

called *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is not accepted. Hence, the *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* should be admitted.

YOGAJA PRATYAKṢA

Some Problems on the Justifiability of Yogaja Pratyakṣa and Pratibhā.

A problem could be raised on the justifiability of the transcendental perception, (*yogaja pratyakṣa*) rather one could describe it as a metaphysical experience but not epistemological in the true sense of the term. Though it is a kind of direct knowledge, yet we may consider whether it is really a case of perception or not. One could know some object existing in remote future or in remote place transcendently. It is very difficult to verify the truth, hence the question of transcendental knowledge is not beyond question. As such knowledge is purely personal, secret and non-communicable, one may challenge the truth of the same. If this be the case, the perceptuality of such knowledge is very difficult to establish as the principle of verifiability fails here. If somehow it is taken as perception by virtue of being a direct awareness, by which definition it can be taken as perceptual? The standard definition which is given in Nyāya is as follows :

The knowledge which arises out of the contact of the sense-organ with an object is called perception (*indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam pratyakṣam*). For being a perceptual knowledge there should be a contact between a sense-organ and an object. In this particular case mind acts as a sense-organ and an object. In this particular case mind acts as a sense-organ and object existing in remote time and place is taken as *artha*. The question remains unsolved regarding the contact between them. As such contact is not easily conceivable the question of its validity may crop up. If this contact is

beyond the range of our intelligence or direct awareness, it may not be accepted as perception. It is quite rational to describe it something belonging to metaphysical world.

In reply to such criticism one point could be forwarded in favour of the perceptuality of transcendental knowledge. In broader sense perception should be taken as a direct awareness (*sāksāt patīti*). This directness (*sāksāttva*) may be defined as something not arising from the instrumentality of other knowledge (*jñānākaraṇakam jñānam*). If this broader definition of perception is taken into account, the transcendental knowledge should be put under this due to having the form of direct or immediate apprehension (*aparokṣānubhūti*). Though this feeling is non-communicable, secret and personal, yet it cannot be denied as an experience. It is not also correct to say that the impersonal and communicable knowledge is always perceptual. We can know many things intuitively in our daily life but these are not always communicable. From this it is not proved that our experience is not true or direct. Hence, the reality of transcendental perception occupies a place in Indian epistemology.

It may be argued that yogic experience is beyond the reach of ordinary human being. Now the question is : How is it accepted by the Naiyāyikas as a form of supernormal perception ?

In reply, it can be said that there are many things in the world, which are not capable of being known by ordinary sense-organ.

The inadequacy of the intellectual power points to the existence of the world which is beyond the reach of sense-organs. There is some faculty in a man that is capable of revealing that world. This faculty is known as *Pratibha* (intuition)³² This point will find justification in the fact that there are many things like God, self etc. which cannot be known through sense-organs but the existence of them is already accepted in Indian Tradition. *Pratibhā* is a flash of light which reveals the objects. The light is the wisdom characterised by

immediacy and freshness'.³³ Besides, it has been described as 'supersensuous and ^{supra-rational} ~~suprarational~~ apperception'.³⁴ As this suprasensuous knowledge has no spatio-temporal limit, it is considered as transcendental having capacity of revealing past, present and future by a single flash.³⁵

The English rendering of the term '*Rs'* is seer which means one who sees past, present and future through one's transcendental vision. He can know the truth manifested in all objects. That is to say, '*Rs'* is described as *Kabi* in the Upanisad, which means *krāntadarsī* or omniscient i.e. knower of all objects existing in the past, present and future.

There is a sharp distinction between poetic intuition or *pratibhā* operating in the case of attaining a property generated through *yoga* (*yogaja dharma*) and normal intuition or that operating in ordinary behaviour. It is known from the fact that the former is mysterious while the latter is not. Had *Pratibhā* been same in both cases there would have no difference between them. Hence, the difference at least in the degree of *Pratibhā* is to be admitted. In the case of the former the degree of *Pratibhā* is stronger than the latter.

It has been said that *Pratibhā* is one in its essence, but differing in kind according as (i) it is developed by a steady and continuous effort or (ii) produced automatically by virtue of *Adrṣṭa* (unseen factors). Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj does not want to give much importance on this type of *Pratibhā* because in the case of aesthetic it can give temporary spiritual pleasure to one individual. That is why, his stress is laid on that *Pratibhā* which can give rise to a permanent vision and which can make a man *yogin*. According to Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj, telepathy etc. (Extra-Sensory Perception) are included under the second category of intuition while the supreme wisdom of the saints belongs to the first one.³⁶ Therefore, yogic perception (*Yogaja Pratyakṣa*) will belong to the first category of intuition. Hence, telepathic knowledge is not produced from *yoga* (i.e. *yogaja*). And poetic intuition also will not be regarded as normal intuition.

A question may be raised below :

A yogin possesses a property generated through yoga (*yogaja dharma*) in his own self but this property does not exist in other objects. If this property is not related to other objects, how will it be a contact generated through yoga (*yogaja sannikarṣa*)? In reply, it is stated that the relation through which the yogic property (*yogaja dharma*) becomes the contact for the perception of all objects is called that of *svāśraya-samānakālikatva*. Here the word 'sva' means *yogaja dharma* (property generated through yoga), the locus (*āśraya*) of that property is the self of the *yogin* and the contemporary or *samānakālika* of his self is all objects of the world. As the yogic power acts as the sense contact with all objects through the relation of *svāśrayasamāna kālikatva*, so *yogaja pratyakṣa* of all objects is possible by a *yogin*.³⁷

Here in the phrase 'all objects of the world', 'all objects' are supposed to mean the objects which exist at the time of his perceiving (i.e. from his yogic perfection to his death). In this case, it may not be clear to an opponent, how will a *yogin* perceive the past and future objects? For in case of past and future objects, there is no relation of *svāśrayasamānakālikatva* which acts as the contact. This relation is applicable only to the contemporary objects of the concerned *yogin*. Hence, this relation cannot give a satisfactory answer to the above question.

In response to the above question we can say that time is the cause of the notion of priority and posteriority. Time is one. Nevertheless, it gives rise to the application of terms such as a moment (a day, a month etc.) owing to its different limiting adjuncts (past, present or future)³⁸. It is the cause of things that are produced and is considered to be the substratum of the universe. So, when a *yogin* perceives things of this universe he can perceive things not only of his contemporary period but also of the past, present and future because time is one and the substratum of the universe. Thus, the Naiyāyika proves that all

things of all times are perceived by a perfect *yogin* through the relation of *svāśraya samāna Kālikatva*.^{38.1}

The Naiyāyika's Response to the Objections Forwarded by the Mimāṃsakas for not Accepting a Yogic Perception.

In response to the objections forwarded by the Mimāṃsakas for not accepting a yogic perception the Naiyāyikas meet the objections one by one.^{38.2}

The response to the first objection that senses have limitations is already given by the Naiyāyikas vide page no. 80.

The second objection of the Mimāṃsakas is that it cannot be explained that a *yogin* can see anything and everything by his eyes though the power of the senses can be increased by practice. In fact, ears cannot reveal colour and the eyes cannot reveal sound. The answer of this objection also is already given vide page no. 80 and 81.

The third objection is as follows; By practice one can jump over a wall but how can one jump over the Himalayas or an ocean? With regard to this objection, the Naiyāyikas point out that if the opponents find our above answers regarding the operation of external senses as unsatisfactory to common sense, we would opine that the *yogins* would see anything and everything by mind, which is the internal sense. This is possible by the practice of meditation. There is nothing which cannot be the object of mind.

The fourth objection is that *Dharma* which is known from the vedic text only can never be the object of perception. In reply to this objection it is said that *dharma*, though *atindriya*, can be the object of mental perception, let it not be the object of eyes but there is no hindrance, with respect to its being the object of mind, since there is nothing which cannot be the object of mind.³⁹

It is fact that by practice, one can jump over a wall but not a mountain or ocean since it is a property of the body and body consists of Kapha, fat etc.⁴⁰ By practice a person brings a balance of these properties and makes his body comparatively lighter and so he can achieve the power of jumping over a certain height. But in each case, there is a limitation due to the properties of the body. But there is no such impediment with regard to a cognition caused by mind, because it is already stated that a *yogin* can acquire such a capacity of mind through the constant practice of dhyāna, dhāraṇā etc.

The mind of an average man is affected by the dirt namely *rāga*, *dveṣa* etc. and hence it cannot overcome a certain range or limit, and so we are not *yogins*.⁴¹ *Rāga*, *dveṣa* etc. are the products of ignorance (*mithyā jñāna*). A cognition in which 'a' is cognised as 'b' and not as 'a' is called ignorance. By constant and rigorous practice of yoga the *yogins* can attain a stage in which they cognise 'a' as 'a' and not as 'b'. When they are in this stage there^{is} nothing[^] which they cannot perceive.⁴²

Both the Naiyāyikas and the Mimāṃsakas take the Vedic knowledge or text as authoritative and there is clear expression of a yogic realisation in the vedic literature. Then the question arises : why the Mimāṃsakas do not want to accept any yogic perception?

According to Jaimini, perhaps *dharma* is *atindriya* and is cognised by vedic injunction only. It can never be the object of perception and all the other sources of valid knowledge except vedic injunctions are inactive or non-functioning in case of *dharma*. Now if this stand of Jaimini is to be accepted then there is no other alternative to the Mimāṃsakas than to deny the reality of yogic perception. If they admit the reality of yogic perception then *dharma* becomes directly the object of perception, which will contradict Jaimini's statement. This goes against the thesis of the Mimāṃsakas and hence they do not accept yogic perception.

Now if a deduction is a logical one, then it does not matter much whether same deduction contradicts someone's statement or not. The Naiyāyikas argue in this way. Therefore, even though the acceptance of a yogic perception goes against Jaimini, one has to accept it because it is established by expressions of such experiences of sages or *yogins*.

If the Mimāṃsakas argue that it is accepted that *yogins* can realise anything and everything simultaneously, then they become the knower of all things (*sarvajña*). So how will they show the difference between *yogins* and Naiyāyikas' *Īsvara* who is also omniscient?⁴³

In reply the Naiyāyika says that the very definition of *Īsvara* or God would distinguish a *yogin* from God. According to Nyāya, the definition of God is as follows : God is the substratum of permanent or eternal cognition. On the other hand, a *yogin* is the substratum of an acquired or produced cognition.⁴⁴

But Jayanta Bhatta points out for the sake of argument that the Naiyāyika does not know whether the Mimāṃsaka cannot perceive *dharma*. Both of them do not know that others cannot perceive *dharma*. Even then, if the Mimāṃsaka avers that he knows that there is no perceiver of *dharma*, then he himself is a *yogin* because he perceives everyone's perception, that Naiyāyikas do not perceive *dharma*.⁴⁵

Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no argument which can refute the thesis of the Naiyāyikas regarding the acceptance of the reality of yogic perception.⁴⁶

It has already been discussed that the Mimāṃsakas has a strong objection against the reality of yogic perception. To them if yogic perception apprehends exactly the same thing in the past, the cognition generated by intense meditation is nothing but memory which is nothing but invalid. If it apprehends more than

that which was perceived in the past, it is illusory because what is apprehended has no existence.

In response to the above mentioned objection, it can be said that we can perceive the past through yogic perception, but it is not only a recollective knowledge. It may be said that memory is nothing but generated by impression of a particular entity alone ⁴⁷ The impression of an object existing in the past can give rise to memory of the object if it (i.e. impression) is generated through experience. That which is not at all experienced cannot be the object of memory. In the case of yogic perception not only the previously experience objects comes to our awareness but the objects not experienced earlier are also apprehended by us. The historical facts in which our normal sense-organs cannot reveal may be revealed to us by our super-normal means of knowing i.e. transcendental perception. Should we call it mere memory? Obviously not. For, many incidents occurred in the remote past in our life or in the life of somebody else may come to our awareness through the flash attained during meditation. The value of such experience cannot be ignored merely by saying that it comes under memory and hence invalid. It is not also fair to say that if something more than memory is apprehended during meditation is nothing but invalid. There are many saints (even in this modern age) who have experienced many past and future events through yoga. It is not also correct to say that sense-organs have limitation. For, the sense-organs which we possess can reveal only those objects that are in proximity with them. This is true in the case of external perception which is normal one. But behind each and every sense organ there is a power which is described by Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath as *Rtacit* and *surplus* respectively. This power cannot be shown, but have to be experienced. The Upanisadic seers have referred to this power as '*S'rotrasya s'rotram manaso mano yad*' (ear of the ear and mind of the mind). The first '*s'rotra*' (ear) refers to our normal ear while another '*s'rotra*' stands for that power which can take us to the supernormal world which is beyond the reach of our ordinary sense organs. If the 'surplus' or 'power' existing in each and every sense organ is generated through meditation, one can have an infallible experience of something existing in the remote past and remote future.

An ordinary sense organ like eye can reveal colour existing in past and future, but not sounds. In the same way ear can reveal those existing in past and future, but not colour. In this way, the 'surplus' power existing in a sense organ can reveal the objects existing in past and future having the particular quality.

Extra-Sensory Perception :

The Philosophers and Psychologists of the Psychological Research Society of England and that of the Duke University, U.S.A. hold that *Yogaja Pratyakṣa* has been developed into Extra-Sensory Perception. Now the question is : whether it may be called development or downfall? A *Yukta yogin* can perceive all things at all times and a *Yuñjana yogin* also can perceive all objects with the help of concentration. But in case of Extra-Sensory Perception a man possesses a particular property which is not a property generated through *yoga (yogaja dharma)*, e.g., in case of telepathy, a gifted person has a power to know other's thought and desires but he may not possess other power like that of a seer.

On the other hand, a *yogin* can perceive all things of all times and places - past, present, subtle, distant and future through *yogaja dharma* which inheres in his own self. That is to say, generally, all instances of Extra-Sensory Perception, i.e. telepathy, clairvoyance, pre-cognition, psycho-kinesis etc. are included in the yogic perception. So, it can be said that Extra-Sensory Perception is lower than yogic perception in respect of category. Hence Extra-Sensory Perception is not *yogaja pratyakṣa*. For, a *yogin* acquires *yogaja dharma* in his own self through the regular and sincere practice of eightfold means of *yoga*. This power enables him to perceive all things at any moment. Perhaps this type of property (*yogaja dharma*) does not exist in a gifted person in case of telepathy or other person having the power of clairvoyance or pre-cognition or psycho-kinesis. So why should we say that *yogaja pratyakṣa* has been

developed into Extra-Sensory Perception? Hence, there is no question of development of *yogaja pratyakṣa* into Extra-Sensory Perception.

Thus, we can conclude that *yogaja pratyakṣa* is beyond the range of human intellect. It is believed to be true on the basis of Verbal Testimony (*śabda-pramāṇa*) and as it is accepted by a good many philosophers. Its truth can be verified only by the practice of *yoga*. Extra-Sensory Perception is lower type of perception than yogic perception.⁴⁸

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1. Janaki Ballabha Bhattacharyya (Tr. into English), - Jayanta Bhatta's *Nyāya-Maṅjarī*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi-7, Vol.I, 1978, p.627.

1.1 Vide my article "*Sāmānyalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa*", *NORTH BENGAL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY*, Edited by Dr. Pabitra Kumar Roy, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, 1995, pp. 129-132.

1.2. Tasmādvīśeṣavadapratyākhyeyam sāmānyam, viśeṣavatpratyakṣatvātsāmānyasya kaḥ kalpanārthaḥ, yadi hi kāryānumeyam sāmānyam kalpayem tat evamanuyujyemahi kāryasyāpyanyathā siddheḥ kim tatkalanayeti.

- *Nyāyamaṅjarī* of Jayanta Bhatta, Ed. Pandit Śrī Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares, 1936, p.286..

2. Yadi ca nāma nirvikalpakena sarvātmanā vastu puṇaḥ paricchindanti vikalpāntarāṇi vaiphalyamaśnu vīrankimetāvātā tesāmaprati yamānārthagrāhitā kalpayitum śakyate - The *Nyāyamaṅjarī* of Jayanta Bhatta, Ed. Pandit Śrī Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares, 1936, p.288

3. Śāyanamādhava : *Sarvādarsāna-saṁgrahaḥ*. Bauddhadarsāna. Henceforth, *Bauddhadarsāna*.

4. *Ibid.*
5. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* - 1, 2, 3.
6. *Bauddhadarsana*
7. *Ibid*
8. *Ibid*
9. *Ibid*
10. *Ibid*
11. Vivṛti (by Panchanan Shastri) on *Bauddhadarsana*, Sarvadarsanasamgraha, p. 69, Calcutta, 1401 (B.S.).
12. Rahul Sankrityayan : *Darshan Digdarshan*, Vol.2, Calcutta, pp.255-256.
13. Dasani on *Bauddhadarsana*, pp. 69-70, Calcutta, 1401 (B.S.).
14. *Nyāyabindu*, Pratyakṣa Chapter.
15. Dasani on *Bauddhadarsana*, pp. 73-74, Calcutta, 1401 (B.S.).
- 15.1 Vinā tena na tatsiddhirnādhyakṣam niscayam vinā. *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayanācārya (Bengali). Ed. Srimohan Bhattachārya. West Bengal State Book Board, Calcutta, 1995, Verse No. 16. p.92.
- 15.2 Sri Bidhubhusan Bhattacharya - *kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda* (in Bengali), Sanskrit College Research Series, Book No. 101, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1975, p.72.
16. Madhusudana Sarasvati - *Advaitasiddhi*, Ed. by Harihar Sastri, December, 1993, pp. 137-39, 337-43.
17. Mīmāṃsakairvedāntibhiscaśāmānyalakṣaṇa - jñānalakṣaṇa -

yoranabhupagamāt tadbhedena dvididham̐ pratyakṣamapi nāsthiyate. Tanmate sakaladhūmānām̐ sakalavanhīnān̐ca pratyakṣābhāve' pi na Kācid dhāniḥ, viśiṣṭajñānam̐ prati viśeṣajñānasya kāraṇatayā dhūmatvajñānena vanhitvajñānena ca vanhitvaviśiṣṭavanherdhūmatvaviśiṣṭasya dhūmasya ca jñānasadbhāvāt tenaiva vanhinirūpitā vyāptirdhūme grahitum̐ śakyate saha cārjñānād vyabhicārajñānābhāvācca vyāpterūpgraha iti sakala dhūmānām̐ sakalavanhīnān̐cānupasthitāvapi na kācidanupattiriti sāmānyalakṣaṇākhyāyāḥ pratyāsatteraṅgikāro vyarthaḥ.

Shyampada Mishra - *Sāmānyalakṣaṇānirāśah* - a paper published in *Our Heritage* (Special Number) - 150th Anniversary volume. Ed. Bishnupada Bhattacharya. Sanskrit College, Calcutta, years 1824-1974, p.73.

18. "Iha tu sambandhaniyamasmarāṇameka deśadarśanañcānubhavakāraṇamastīti yathā pratītiranubhūtirūpatevāśrayitumucite" ti ca.

Tantrarahasye' pyuktam̐ 'ataḥ prāthamikam̐ pratyakṣameva dhūmāgamyoḥ sambandhaniyame pramāṇam̐ bhuyodarśanena pascāt tasya nirūpādhikatvaniscaya' iti. [Pramāṇa paḥ] etena sakaladhūmajñānam̐ sakalavanhījñānān̐ca sambandhaniyame nāvāśyamapekṣitamiti pratipādayatā sāmānyalakṣaṇā na svīkṛteti sūcyate. Ibid. p.75.

19. Atrocitate , sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsatteranaṅgikāre'pi sakalavyavasthopapattau mānābhāvāt gauravācca nāsti sāmānyalakṣaṇānāmapratyāsattiyantaram. Tathāhi dhūmatvena sakaladhūmopasthitervanhitvena sakala vanhyupasthitervāśyakatā nāsti. Yadi dhūmatvena prasiddhadhūme vyāptiniscayaḥ syātarhi dhūmadharmika-vyabhicārasaṁśayasyāvākāśonāsti tatra dhūmatvena dhūmanisthavyāptiniścayasya viśeṣadarśanatayā saṁśayaprativandhakatvāt. Ibid. p.79

20. Naiyāyikāḥ sakalavyaktyupasaṁhāreṇa vyāptijñānam̐ vinā kacidvyabhicāraśaṁkāyāmanumiti na syāt, bhavati ca lokānāmanumityā vyavahārah. Sa ca sakalavyāpyānam̐, vyapakānāncopasthitimūlaka iti

sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsattiravaśyam svikāryā, tayā ca pratyāsattiyā tattajjātiyāḥ sarvāḥ vyaktayah grhyante, tena ca sarvopasāmhāreṇa vyāptijñānaṁ sidhyatītyucyate. *Ibid.* p.75.

21. Tathāhi evaṁ sāmānyalakṣaṇāsvikāre sarvapadārthānāṁ sarveṣāṁ jñānasambhavāt sarveṣāṁ sarvajñatvāpattiḥ syāt. *Ibid.* p.75.

22. Tatra yadi naiyāyikairanyairvā evamucyate-purvoktaritā asmanmatopari yat sarvajñatvamāpādyate bhavatā taccāpādanaṁ durghaṭameva, yasmād yonyasya sarvajñatvamāpādayati sa sarvjñō na vā? Yadi sa na sarvajñastarhi Kathamanyasya tathātvamāpādayitum śaknyāt. Atha yadi sa sarvjñāḥ syātarhi tasya sarvajñatvaṁ Kathaṁ lavdham, tanmate sāmānyalakṣaṇyā asvikārāditi. *Ibid.* pp. 75-76.

23. na ca prameyatvena sarveṣāṁ padārthānāṁ sāmānyalakṣaṇayā jñānasambhave'pi ghaṭatvāditattad viśeṣarūpeṇa sakalapadārtha jñānasambhavānna sarvajñatvāpattiriti vācyam. *Ibid.* p.76.

24. Jātit vopādhitva-paribhāṣāyāḥ sakalpramāṇāgocaratayā prāmāṇikatvāt. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*. Pratyakṣa pariccheda. p. 44. Ed. Sri Panchanan Bhattacharya, 1377 (B.S.), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta.

25. Ghaṭōyamityādipratyakṣam hi ghaṭatvādisadbhāve mānam, na tu tasya jātitve'pi, Jātitvarūpasādhyāprasidhau tat sādhyakānumānasyāpyanavakāśāt, samavāyāsiddhyā brahmakhilaprapaṅcānitya ta yā ca nityatva-samavetatva - ghaṭitajātitvasya ghaṭatvāvasiddhesca. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*. *Ibid.*

26. Vivṛti of *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*. (Perception Chapter), Ed. Panchanan Bhattacharya, 1377 (B.S.), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, pp. 45-47.

27. Nikunja Vihari Banerjee - *The Spirit of Indian Philosophy*, p. 63.

28. *Advaitasiddhi*.

With the commentary - Bālabodhinī . By. M.M.DR. Yogendranath Bagchi, Ed. By Dr. Sitansusekhar Bagchi, Vol.I, Tara Publications, 1971, pp. 334-335.

29. Na nirnite arthe nyāya pravartate, api tu saṁśayite'rthe Vātsyāyana bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra No. 1.1.1.

30. Tathāhi sūktāvidam rajatamiti bhramasthale'bhinavānirvācyarajatotpatti-svikārād rajatasya pratyaksopapattih.

Kiñca 'Surabhi candana' mityādi jñānasthale saurabham smarāmītyā-dyanuvyavasāyasya svikārādupanayādeḥ pratyakṣahetutve māñabhāvāt. Ataeva doṣaṅāmanirvācyarajatatvādyutpattau hetutvaṁ lāghavād, rajatavādinaiva doṣakāryatāsvikārāceti jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣe nāsti pramāṇam. Ibid. pp. 73-74. (Vide Ref. No. 17 for ibid)

31. Tatra prācinai naiyāyikāih rajatādyamse jñānam jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa-janyam,

Evam jñānalakṣaṇāṅgikāre jñātasya surabhicandanakhaṇḍasya cakṣuṣā surabhi candanamiti jñānam na syāt saurabhāṁse saurabhatvāṁse vā pratyāsatte rabhāvāt atastatra tajjñānameva. pratyāsatti"riti collekhāt. Ibid. pp. 73-75. (Vide Ref. No. 17)

32. Gopinath Kaviraj : *Aspects of Indian Thought*, p.1, University of Burdwan, 1984, Henceforth, Indian Thought.

33, *Ibid*.

34. *Indian Thought*, p.1.

35. *Ibid*, p.2.

36. *Ibid*, p.1.

37. N.C.Goswami : *Tarkasamgraha*, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, p.283.

38. *Bhāsā - Paricchedah*, Verse No. 46.

38.1 Vide my article, 'Yogaja Pratyakṣa : Some Reflections', *The Visva-Bhārati Journal of Philosophy*. Volume XXXII, No. 2, 1997, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Visva-Bharati.

39. Manah karānakam jñānam bhāvanā bhāyāsasambhavam.

Bhavati dhyāyatām dharme kāntādāviva kāmīnām.

The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Edited by Pnadi Śrī Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, Jaya Krishna Das Haridas Gupta, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit, Series Office, Benares City, 1936, p.97.

40. Laṅghanam dehadharmatvāt kaphajādyādīsambhavāt.

Mā gātprakarṣam, jñāne tu tasya kaḥ prativandhakah.

Ibid. p. 97.

41. Asmadādeśca rāgādimalāvaraṇadhūsam.

Mano na labhate jñānaprakarṣapadavīm parām.

Ibid. p.98.

42. Pratyūhabhāvanā'bhyāsakṣapitāseṣakalmaṣam.

Yoginām tu manah suddham kāmivārtham na paśyati.

Ibid. p. 98.

43. Nanvekena jñānena sarvānarthāḥ bhūta bhāviṇaḥ parokṣānapi paśyanto
yoginaḥ katham akhilatrailokyavṛttāntadarsīnaḥ sakalajagadgurorī-
śvarādvisiṣyeraṇ.

Ibid., 99.

44. Asti viśeṣaḥ īśvarasya tathāvidham nityameva jñānam yoginām tu
yogabhāvanābhyāsa prabhavamiti. *Ibid.* p.99.

45. Matpratyakṣam akṣamam dharmagrahane iti bhavān na jānīte
tvatpratyakṣamapi na dharmagrāhīti nāham jāne, anyasya pratyakṣamīdr-

śamevetyubhāvapyāvāṁ na jānīvahe.

Tvayā tu yadi sarveṣāṁ pratyakṣāṁ, jñātamidrśam.

Tarhi tvameva yogīti yogino dvekṣi kim vṛthā.

Ibid. p.95.

46. Tadevaṁ kṣīṇadoṣāṅāṁ dhyānā-vahitacetāsām.

Nirmalāṁ sarvaviṣayāṁ jñānaṁ bhavati yoginām.

Ibid. p.98.

47. Saṁskāramātrajanyam jñānam smṛtiḥ - *Tarkasaṁgraha, Sutra No.35.*

48. Vide my article, "Yogaja Pratyakṣa : Some Reflections". *The Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*. Volume XXXII, No.2, 1997, Department of Philosophy, and Religion, Visva-Bharati.

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