

CHAPTER - V

SOME EVALUATIVE AND CONCLUSIVE REMARKS

SĀMĀNYALAKṢANA PRATYAKṢA

Establishment of Sāmānya :

The Buddhist Philosophers like Shantaraksit (in *Tattvasaṅgraha*) and Pt. Ashok (in *Sāmānyadūṣaṅadika Prasāratā*) have rejected the hypothesis of universal (*sāmānya*) as argued for by the *Naiyāyika*. In support of the Buddhists, we may say that a universal is not a sense-datum. As its existence cannot be ascertained by perception or by any other means, it is non-existent like the so-called horns of a hare.

According to the Buddhists, even if a universal is the object of a judgement, it has only an imaginary being but not real existence. An inference or verbal knowledge cannot establish the reality of universals since they reveal imaginary objects but no real ones.

A universal is not different from an individual. For a universal is not to be cognised if an individual is not perceived. If an object is different from another object then the cognition of one does not entail that of another. For instance, a jar is different from a piece of cloth. The former is cognised independently of the latter. But a universal is never cognised if an individual is not cognised. Conversely an individual is not different from a universal.

If an individual is not apprehended then its universal would remain uncognised. Such a contention is hardly supportable since the suggestion that a universal abides in an individual can be contrarily argued.

If a universal wholly abides in a distinct individual then it abides there exhaustively and as such it should be exclusively perceived there. There is no change of cognising it at another locus. Again, if a universal abides in an individual partially then it does not exhaustively abide in an individual. In that case, how can we recognise an individual cow as such? Moreover, a universal is a partless whole. As such, it does not consist of parts. Thus, it is difficult to solve the problem of locating a universal in a proper locus since no appropriate locus is found.

Now, if existence is denied to the universals, how shall we explain a common idea, a concept, viz., a cow as referring to an individual? We may say that there are no universals which are objectively real. The concept 'cow' explains everything which the universal of cowness is supposed to do. According to the Buddhists, people ordinarily judge all members of a particular class, e.g., molasses, 'cow' etc. perform the same function. So they are to be taken as one. They hold further that they look alike i.e., their difference of form is negligible. So, there is no need to hold on to view of universals. And thus it is argued that a universal does not actually exist.¹

The arguments of the Buddhists are criticizable. If *sāmānya* (universal) does not exist, then the question arises how do we come to attain the knowledge of all the objects of the past, distant and future?

Without endorsing the concept of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* the causal *nexus* between knowledge, desire and volition cannot be established. At first we may attain the knowledge of a thing. This knowledge leads to desire at the next moment, and hence it should be admitted that the perception of the primary knowledge occurs at the third moment. In that case, however, the causal *nexus* between primary knowledge and desire remains unestablished. For causal relation implies that the two relata between which causal link is asserted should be perceived. Hence, it becomes imperative that the primary knowledge be presented through the knowledge of the universal. This is evidently a case for *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

A universal comprises within all individuals irrespective of time and space. Without knowing the individuals in their entirety the universal also cannot be known. This would result in the non-ascertainment of *vyāpti* between the two. Thus, the knowledge of all individuals is made possible by *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.

The Buddhists are of course correct in their position so far as their presuppositions are concerned. The Buddhists admit the theory of impermanence of entities and hence, they do not accept any entity that is permanent in its mode of being. They are in order in their non-accepting *sāmānya*. But the Naiyāyikas have no such ontological commitment. So they accept the *samanya* as a separate category and adjust their own position accordingly.

To illustrate the case of the Naiyāyikas a person saw an individual cow called *Dhawali* in the past. Later on he sees another individual cow *Kālinḍi* by name. Experience says that he remembers *Dhawali* which was seen before. We cannot explain the remembrance of *Dhawali* if no common property inheres in the two individual cows. We cannot remember an individual on encountering another individual entirely different from the first. As a person remembers an individual cow seen before on finding another individual cow different from the first; he remembers an individual cow seen earlier on finding another only because he has noticed a common property shared by both of them. So it is reasonable to hold that a common element (or universal) is grasped.^{1.1}

Naiyāyikas do not admit the Buddhist theory of *sāmānya* (i.e. nominalism). Accordingly to them, *sāmānya* or universal is real^{ḡt} subsists in *viśeṣa* which is its locus by virtue of the relation of *sāmānya*. *Sāmānya* is eternal and timeless being. Being eternal, it subsists in many (nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam-Siddhāntamuktāvalī on verse no. 8). The particular reveals the universal. All the universals (*sāmānya*) are said to be distinct realities which have spatial manifestations at different places at the same time.

But the Buddhists have an objection to this view. In his *Pramānavārtika*, Dharmakīrti says that if universals are eternal (*nitya*), these must always exist. Manhood is an objective universal. So it has to be related to the particular object as soon as a child is born and has to disappear from the spatial location at the very moment of the death of an old man. 'Manhood' cannot travel from one man to another man, because in that case the nature would not be of a man any longer; nor can it remain stationary for them. The latter man would not even be a man. But in response, the Naiyāyikas aver that this only proves that universals are not particulars. Buddhists also raise a question on the eternity of the universal. During the intermediate period, when a child is born and a man dies, where does the universal 'manhood' exist? Here *sāmānya* is not perceived to exist anywhere. To this the Naiyāyika's answer is that non-perception of anything does not imply its non-existence. During that intermediate period 'manhood' is not perceived because the 'man' who is the source of the universal 'manhood' is not present and this is the reason of the non-perception of the universal 'manhood'.

The Naiyāyikas aver that it is not the case that unless the particular exists, the universals cannot exist. The existence of universal does not depend on the particular. To be *sat* is its own nature. When there is the particular, the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) becomes apparent between the particular and the universal (*yadaiva vastu tadaiva gotvenābhisambandhate-Nyāya-Vārtika*). *Gotva* is eternal, *samavāya* relation is also eternal, but the particular cow is not eternal. It is one of the *relata* only. Thus, in the absence of a particular cow the relation between cowhood and the cow is not visible. Therefore, it is obvious from this that the relation between *sattva* and *asattva* can be interpreted only with the help of the particular.

According to the Naiyāyika, the real universal cannot be an aggregate of different essential properties, for a real universal should be unitary, simple, unanalysable (*akhaṇḍa*) eternal, timeless, indestructible and present in many through a single unitary relation called inherence (*samavāya*). The Naiyāyikas,

say that the universal 'swiper', nurse, cannot be real universals for the application of such general terms depended on some *upādhis*, that is, nominal properties are not objective universals. The relation which is essential for a real universal is *samavāya* relation. The *samavāya* relation exists in *dravya* (substance), *guṇa* (quality), and *karma* (action), that is, the blue particular is related to the blue thing, the action particular to the acting, i.e. moving object that instantiates it. This relation is described as a *yutasiddha* or inseparable. This inseparability is unidirectional. It is a permanent relation in which one of the *relata* cannot exist without the presence of the other, though the latter can continue without the former. The blue particular exists in the pot and when the pot continues to exist with another colour etc. the blue particular is destroyed.

Dinnāga points out that practically the objects are unique particulars which have infinite properties. These properties are not ontological. These properties do not exist in the object but superimposed by the mind or conceptually constructed. For example, a particular is recognised as blue only when it is excluded from non-blue things. Their act of exclusion is definitely a contribution of the mind which is called *kalpanā* or *vikalpa*.

According to the Buddhists, every object in a word has corresponding exclusion class and an object is presented before us through this mental representatives. The generic attribute or commonness of mental representation (i.e. the universal or *sāmānya*) is not connected with any real thing in the world which is full of only with particulars but this 'commonness' the world is conceived in our language thorough words or concepts.

In his *Nyāyamañjarī* Buddhist doctrine of *Sāmānya* has been refuted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. He argues that universal (*sāmānya*) cannot be constructed by our mind and it cannot be regarded as a *kalpanā*. These are directly presented to us. Our first cognition of a thing is not merely an apprehension of its unity but also its disjunctive feature. When we perceive something, its manifoldness is as such manifested to consciousness as its unitary character.¹² It is cognised

as a totality of many parts, qualities and aspects. The Buddhists say that the universal is a mere concept, but the 'real' is a unique particular. This is refuted by Jayanta and he avers that an object denoted by a word is real because it is the same object which is revealed by *Nirvikalpaka Pratyakṣa* also.²

Naiyāyikas also state that when we see cow somethings we also see cowhood inherent in it, although we may not at the same time see one as cow and the other as cowness. Both entities appear in our 'consciousness'.

This non-qualificative awareness is also in a sense inexpressible in language. It is supposed to be a reflex of the Buddhist thesis of the inexpressibility of the pure object of sense-perception. For in the linguistic expression of the awareness of the cow as a such, or the sun as such we do not say 'This has cowness' or 'This has sunhood'. Because these would be expression of very different cognitive episodes. The Naiyāyikas hold that these universals are unexpressed in the verbal representation of the awareness because if they are expressed, they also need another 'qualifier.'

Against the Naiyāyikas who are the realist, the Buddhist states that a cow is known from the fact that it is not a non-cow. If the specific individualization of a cow should require one common factor to hold them together, then these should require another and so on *ad infinitum*. So *sāmānya* can be admitted to exist as an entity. But it is only as a result of the impression of past experience of existence and non-existence that this notion is formed and transferred wrongly to increase the objects in number.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers opine that negation of non-cows is a negative perception (*abhāvātmake Pratyakṣa*) while the sameness perceived as cow is a positive perception (*bhāvātmake pratyakṣa*). The negative theory or the apoha theory of the Buddhists cannot explain the (*bhāvātmake pratyakṣa*) (positive perception). Therefore, *sāmānya* has to be accepted as a separate category. If *Sāmānya* is accepted the supernormal perception through *sāmānya*

(*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) will find its solid base. The negative perception i.e. the perception of non-cow is cow is a result of perception. That non-cow exists in a cow is known by virtue of the awareness of the inherent property of a cow which may be described as 'cowness' or universal. Hence, universal "cowness serves the basis of distinguishing it from the non-cow' class. Depending on these arguments it can be concluded that universal has to be accepted as a category of real but not unreal.

The Buddha Critique of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā* :

According to the Buddhists, the reality of an object is determined by its causal efficacy (*arthakriyā-kāritva*). All things which have causal efficacy are momentary in nature.

The Vaiśeṣikas argue that the meaning of the term 'sattva' (existence or being) seems to be vague to themselves. The term 'sattva' implies the association of an object with *sattā-sāmānya* or *jāti* and so it is eternal. It has been stated in the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* that the existence remains in the three - substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karma*) i.e. "*dravyāditrikastu sattā paratayocyate*". The existence remaining in the above three is called Pure *sattā* and that existing in any one of the three is called qualified *sattā* (*Viśuddha sattā*). If it is so, how an object possessing this eternal generic attribute can be momentary?

In reply the Buddhists point out that they do not accept that an object possessing *sattā-sāmānya* exist. If it is so, the existence would have to be admitted in substance, quality and action due to accepting *sattā-sāmānya* there. The Vaiśeṣikas are of the view that *Sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *Samavāya* do not possess existence or *sattā* because of the problem of infinite regress. If *sattā* or *sāmānya* is accepted in *sāmānya* or *Viśeṣa* etc., there would arise the question of accepting another *sāmānya* in it i.e., *Sāmānyatva*, *Viśeṣyatva* etc and in this way, the defect of *infinite regress* arises. In fact, the Vaiśeṣikas have

accepted *sāmānya* etc. ^{sat} as they are revealed as such, but this is not *Sāmānya* in the technical sense. If the Vaiśeṣikas accept *sattā* in the form of *astitva* in *sāmānya* etc. there would be *gaurava* in determining the criterion of apprehending the *sat* object. Moreover, another problem would arise. There would arise common apprehension (*anugatapratyaya*) in the substance etc. due to having the same *sattājāti* in them. But where there is no *sattājāti* as in *Sāmānya* etc., there would also arise the common apprehension,³ which is not desirable.

The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers accept that *Sattā* or *Jāti* exists in different loci having same shape and size through the relation of inherence. Here, the Buddhists ask that if *sāmānya* exists in many things bearing same size, how do they admit *sāmānya* or *sattājāti* in different objects bearing different shapes and sizes like substance, quality and action and also between mustard seeds and mountain? *Sattā-Sāmānya*, the Vaiśeṣika believes, exists in substance etc. through the relation of inherence (*Samavāya*). If it is accepted, the Buddhists argue how the usage of differentiation between a man and a cow in the form - This is a cow and this is a man can be made. If it is mentioned that universals like humanity, cowness etc. pervading in a man and a cow are the causes of the usage of the differentiation between them, it is not tenable because the concept of universal as propounded by them is under consideration.⁴

The Buddhists ask whether the universal exists in all objects or in all individuals belonging to a particular class. In the former case, all objects would be of a same type due to the existence of same universal in them. If the universal 'humanity' existing in a human being remains in dog etc., the dog etc. would have to be considered as man due to having humanity in them, which is not possible. Moreover, it will go against the established thesis of the Naiyāyikas.⁵ If the latter is taken for consideration, it will also create some difficulties. That universal exists in all individuals belonging to the same class is admitted by Prasāstapāda.⁶ If this view is accepted, it will lead to some philosophical problems (difficulties) which are as under :

The universal 'jarness' does not exist in a piece of mud before the origination of a jar but it is produced just after the origination of the same. It is enquired by the Buddhists whether the universal jarness existing in a jar situated in other place is related to this jar existing in a different place or not. If it is so, whether this universal is related to a particular individual after coming from other places or without coming from there. In the case of former ^{the} the universal would have to be designated as substance as it possesses the action in the form of movement. In the latter, there would arise the difficulty in apprehending the relation. For, how can the relation of one object to another be established without accepting the action of movement.⁷

We cannot say that jarness etc. existing in a jar is related to a jar existing in another place through its self - extension. But self - extension is possible for an object having parts (*sāvayava*). Jarness etc. have no parts (*niravayava*); so the extension of it is not possible.⁸ If a jar is destroyed, the question arises : whether the jarness existing in it remains in it or goes elsewhere or is destroyed. Here the first alternative is not correct because the universal cannot exist without its substratum i.e. an individual. The second alternative also is not correct because if we accept the movement in universal then only an universal can go elsewhere and it would turn into a *dravya* or substance because of having movement or action in it.⁹

According to the Vaiśeṣika, universal exists in substance etc. through the relation of inherence. Being impressed by this the Buddhists argue that jarness existing in a jar remains in the ground because the lower part of the jar is connected with the upper surface of the ground. So, the ground is to be called a jar but it is not possible. Besides, jarness cannot pervade a jar existing on the ground without keeping it associated with the ground.

The Buddhists do not admit *Sāmānya* because of the defects mentioned above. They point out that *sattvā* is not in the form of *sāmānya* but in the form of causal efficacy (*artha-kriyā-Kāritva-rūpam*).

How is common knowledge (*anugatapratyaya*) among various individuals of the same possible of *sāmānya* is not accepted: According to the Buddhists, we cannot say that 'cow' is differentiated from other animals like horse etc. with the help of *sāmānya*. But 'cow' is known as distinct in terms of the knowledge of non-cow (*agovyāvṛtti*). In like manner a jar is distinct in terms of the knowledge of non-jar (*aghatavyāvṛtti*)¹⁰. This kind of negative way of knowing is called 'apoha'. A particular object can be differentiated from others (*svetaravyāvṛttirūpa*) by *Apoha*. The differentiation of a jar from other objects (*ghatetarabheda*) which remains in all individual jar^Δ may be shown as under : 'This is a jar but not cloth'.

Apoha differentiates a particular object from others, so it is called *anyāpoha*. According to Ratnakirti, the verbal usage of the sentence 'This is a cow' comes from the apprehension in the form 'This cow is different from non-cow' (*agovyāvṛtta*)¹¹. Therefore, the phenomenon of *anyāpoha* is the outcome (cause) of similar apprehension (*anugatapratyaya*) and so *sāmānya* is not required. That is to say, the similar apprehension of all individuals of the same class is found because of an object's unique character (*svalakṣaṇāt*) which is possible through its distinct nature from other things.

The theory of impermanance does not accept *sāmānya* or universal. The Buddhists point out that *sāmānya* or universal as defined by the Vaiśeṣikas comes under inference. So it does not come under real entity or *satvastu* but it is related with *kalpanā*. The word which is used to refer to some object becomes the conveyer of the same but it does not indicate reality. The real object is not revealed by words. The real water can serve our purpose but the word 'water' cannot do the same work. The reality does not exist in the word, it exists in the thing itself. The burning property exists in fire but not in the word fire'. The following usages will show that words cannot reveal the actual object. The use of 'dārāḥ' having plural form meaning only one wife while the term *sannagari* bearing singular suffix means six cities. Language cannot give us true picture

of reality because it is ambiguous¹². Thus, the Buddhists have established that like language *anyāpoha* etc. cannot provide us with the true picture of reality. However, they can give us knowledge of second order reality i.e. phenomenal reality (*Samvṛtisatyatā*) and therefore, they are nothing but inference or class perception (*sāmānyalakṣaṇā*). The Vaiśeṣika Philosophers react on the idea of *anyāpoha* of the Buddhists in the following way :

In an individual cow there is the difference of non-cow, nevertheless, it cannot serve the purpose of *anugata pratīti* i.e. similar cognition. Because, there cannot remain the difference of non-cow, provided that a cow is not definitely known earlier. If a cow is particularly known earlier, it is known being endowed with cowness which can alone be an object of similar cognition. Further, if this opinion is accepted, there would arise the defect of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) on account of the fact that a cow is known in terms of non-cow and again non-cow is known in terms of a cow. Therefore, the phenomenon of *anyāpoha* is not acceptable.¹³

A thing which exists only for a moment and is not revealed through language is *svalakṣaṇa* and so it is perceptual.¹⁴ The view of Sāyanamādhava is not acceptable and it is shown as under. If the same object is known in terms of language, that is, if a cow is known in terms of non-cow, it may include in *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* but not in *svalakṣaṇa* which is claimed by Sāyanamādhava. Besides, when a cow is known in terms of non-cow through the method of *apoha*, it is impossible to know within a moment which again points to the inferential character of the object but not perceptual or *svalakṣaṇa*. The words etc. are known as *samvṛti* by virtue of the fact that they cover (but not reveal) the true picture of reality, which has got a second order importance according to the Buddhists.

The Buddhists do not accept the above view because of the following grounds : if a cow is not definitely known there cannot remain the difference of

non-cow. But it cannot be admitted that when a cow is known, it is known being endowed with cowness. Here the Buddhists are of the opinion that a cow is known by virtue of its causal efficacy (*arthakriyā-kāritva*), not in terms of its universal. The phrase *Anugata Pratyaya* is related with a few individuals of the same kind. These individuals are known in terms of their causal efficacy. Thus, other objects denoted by the term 'non-cow' are also known through their different type of causal efficacy. When someone points out that a cow is different from non-cow, he expresses it with the help of the process of *anyāpoha*. But the primary knowledge of the 'cow' or 'non-cow' comes from their causal ^{eff}ficacies but not through the word 'cow' or 'non-cow'. Therefore, there is no necessity of accepting *sāmānya* because the purpose is served by *anugata pratyaya* as the method of *anyāpoha*.¹⁵

The Buddhists argue that causal efficacy does not exist in cowness etc. The terms 'cowness' etc. come under *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. The derivative meaning of the term *arthakriyākāritva* is the power or potency through which the necessity is accomplished. The capacity of accomplishing the activities like burning etc. is *arthakriyākāritva*. It alone (*arthakriyākāritva*) remains in the unique character of fire, but not in the universals like fireness etc. Because, the burning property exists in fire, but not in fireness.

According to the Naiyāyikas, this view is not tenable. The Naiyāyikas are of the opinion that *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* also possesses the capacity of accomplishing some end (*arthakriyākāritva*). When, it is said, 'cow should not be touched with feet' or 'cow should be respected' it is not applicable to a particular cow, but cow in general having the generic property, 'cowness'. They argue, if a qualificand being *svalakṣaṇa* becomes *arthakriyākāri*, the qualifier also which is *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* will become *arthakriyākāri* and so it has absolute reality (*paramārthasatyatā*).

This theory is not also justifiable. The Buddhists are very much consistent in their position. At first they are reluctant to accept the attribute like cowness etc. in a cow etc. According to them, if it is said 'cow should be respected', it is applicable to a particular cow. If it is admitted, it is nothing but to accept the same in all individual cases of cow. If there are thousand cows and every cow is unique in character, then there is no necessity of accepting a universal like cowness in it. The method of *apoha* is to be resorted to for *anugatapratyaya*. Each and every system of philosophy possesses its metaphysical pre-supposition. The Buddha philosophy begins with the idea of suffering (*duḥkha*) and non-eternity (*anityatā*). The Buddhists ontologically cannot admit anything having permanent character like universal etc. because they believe in the theory of momentariness. The Naiyāyikas do not agree to the same because of advocating a different set of metaphysical pressuppositions. It is found that both the systems are consistent provided their pressuppositions or philosophical scheme are investigated with a great care.

The Buddhists point out that the object of *Svalakṣaṇa*-nature bears only *paramārthasatyatā*. So *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* which is only imagination (*kalpanā*) cannot be considered as such and thus here we can logically admit *Samvrtisatyatā*.

Refutation of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness:

The Buddhist doctrine of momentariness has been refuted by the Naiyāyikas. In *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* Udayana has presented two verses. (Verse No. 16 and 17) for refuting this doctrine. The Buddhist view of momentariness is known as *Kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda* or *Kṣaṇikavāda*. This view is opposed to that of the Cārvākas. Haridāsa Bhaṭṭāchārya, a Naiyāyika states the *Kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda* to be the defining feature of the Buddhist point of view. The intention of this point of view is to generate the sense of detachment among the followers of Buddha.

The doctrine of momentariness can be said to have originated from the noble truths of Buddha. *Kṣaṇabhāṅgavāda* also is at once an ontological doctrine and the Buddhist theory of perception is mentioned in such a way to exemplify the ontological state of happenings. When we interpret the following example - "*ghataḥ kṣaṇika sattvāt*" it will be clear to us. the pot is momentary because it is the nature of it. The above quoted statement is an *anumāna vākya* (inferential proposition). It can be derived only if there is available such a *vyāpti* as, *yat sat tat kṣaṇikam* and instantiation of the *Vyāpti* may be had in the case of the cluster of cloud (*meghamālā*). So if the given argument is valid, the predication of the momentariness of things may be taken as established. The term '*sat*' used by the Buddhist has a different connotation from that of the Naiyāyikas.

The Naiyāyika states that existence has been assimilated with *jāti*. That is *sattā-sāmānyayogitvam sattam*. So it is clear that the Buddhists cannot admit this definition of *sat* as given by the Naiyāyikas. According to the Naiyāyikas, *sāmānya* or *jāti* is a kind of *nitya padārtha* which is opposed by the Buddhists. On the other hand, the Buddhist view is that the mark of *sat* is causal efficiency or *arthakriyākāritva*. A pot may be said to be *sat* because one can bring water in it and the bringing of water is the *arthakriyākāritva* which marks the pot as

sat.

The Naiyāyikas argue that the property of *arthakriyākāritva* cannot be said to be present in the *ghaṭa*. The two contrary properties of *karṭṛtva* and *akarṭṛtva* are simultaneously present in the *ghaṭaḥ*. Let us suppose that the Naiyāyikas might say that a pot has to be causally efficient in ten different situations. Now the causal efficiency of the pot may be manifested all at once or in succession. If the case of successive manifestation of causal efficiency is true, then the other nine causal efficiency remain unrealized when the pot is casually efficient. Thus, the contraries of *karṭṛtva* and *akarṭṛtva* together qualify a form, that is, if both has and has not the capacity to produce its effects - it has the capacity in so far as it is now producing (present) effects, and it has not the capacity in so far as it is not now producing its (past and future) effects. If the pot has the causal efficiencies all at once, then for the rest of its duration as the pot, it remains devoid of *arthakriyākāritva* and it ceases to be a pot at all.

The Naiyāyikas might point to the fact that the Buddhist criterion of *arthakriyākāritva* fails to have its own purpose. They do not consider the *karṭṛtva* and *akarṭṛtva* as contrary properties. They regard them as a disposition which is manifested at different times according to the necessity and situation. Here the clue to their argument is that if *karṭṛtva* and *akarṭṛtva* are contraries, then the criterion of *arthakriyā-kāritva* does not work. But if these two properties are considered as dispositions, then the momentary nature of the pot need not be supposed. The Naiyāyikas have a doubt regarding *sattva* in the inference *ghaṭaḥ kṣanīkaḥ sattvāt* as a real *vyāpti*. If it is not a real *vyāpti*, then it is not an inference. And if it is not an inference, then the question of establishing *vyāpti* does not arise at all.

The nature of an object is admitted as it is actually observed to be. The production of new prototypes, one after another in different moments is inferred by the observation of a continuous process of growth and decay only in the case of the objects which are actually observed to have continuous growth and

decay, as, for example, in the case of body etc. On the other hand, such production of new prototypes is denied in the case of objects where continuous growth and decay are not observed as, e.g., in the *ghataḥ* (jar) etc. Thus, according to Udayanācārya, the doctrine of momentariness cannot be accepted unless and until it is justified by means of inference.^{15.1}

The Naiyāyika further shows that *kṣaṇabhanga vāda* cannot be established by means of perception also. In this connection, Udayana presents the verse no. 16 (*Nyāyakusumāñjali*) to show that in perceptual experience, *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* are so interrelated that one cannot be had without the other. According to the Buddhists, perception is only *nirvikalpaka* but *savikalpaka* cannot be said to be a perception, it comes under inference. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas states that perception is of two types *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka* and there cannot be any *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* without there being *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* in other words, both are interrelated. Thus, if anything is *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*, it is needless to say, that thing has already been known by *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. Udayana points out that with the help of perception we can know only that 'It is *ghataḥ*', that 'It is blue', but we cannot know that it is momentary. *Kṣaṇikatva* cannot be known through perception though it is true that the knowledge of *kṣaṇika* is attained by *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*. According to the Buddhists, the bare particulars, the point instant is known in *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. And by imposing *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* to the bare particulars by means of *kalpanā* (i.e inference or *savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) the object is known, so it is unreal. Momentariness cannot even be determined by determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*) and to them as *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka* are interrelated, so momentariness cannot be the object of *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* also. Thus Udayanācārya holds that *kṣaṇikatva* cannot be known by means of perception.

In this way, the Naiyāyikas have established the view that the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness cannot be proved either by means of perception or by inference.

Again, the fact of re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*) cannot be explained if the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness is admitted. For example, the seed perceived once in some place may be perceived on another occasion in some other place and may be recognised as 'this is the same seed that was perceived previously. This type of recognition proves that the seed is a permanent object and so the inference seeking to prove momentariness would be contradicted by perception.

The Buddhist may argue that recognition is not really knowing the same object again but only a complete prototype of it. Because, in the case of the perception of the flame of a lamp which, though different in every moment, is cognised to be one and the same. But this is not logical, because there is no ground to prove a rule that recognition invariably refers to a different but similar object and never to the same one.

Besides recollection or recognition presupposes a permanent knower who perceives an object, receives the impression from that object. And he (knower) recollects or recognises the same later on. Here the problem is : if all the objects are momentary, the knower becomes different in each moment, recollection or re-cognition is not possible. But recollection or recognition is admitted by the Buddhist also.

Again, if we admit the doctrine of momentariness, then the relation between cause and effect cannot be explained. According to the Naiyāyika (and the other opponents of the above doctrine), if we analyse the process of causal relation, we find that an object called a *kāraṇa* becomes the cause of an effect being present even at the time of the origination of the effect. For example, a jar (*ghaṭa*) cannot be produced if a little quantity of cause of the jar, is not present at the time of production of a *ghaṭa*. But, according to the doctrine of momentariness, this clay, the cause of *ghaṭa* (mentioned above) that was present just before the production of the jar (*ghaṭa*) becomes destroyed at the time of the production of the jar (*ghaṭa*) and hence the object called *kāraṇa* (said amount

of clay) cannot be present at the moment of the production of the cause. Here we know that if the cause is absent at the very moment of the production of the effect, the effect would not be produced. Therefore, the general rule of the theory of causality is violated in the doctrine of momentariness. Thus, this view is not accepted.

The last objection against the doctrine of momentariness is as follows:

If *kṣāṇabhāṅgavāda* is admitted then the state of the liberated person and the unliberated will remain unexplained because the man who is bound in this world of suffering can attain liberation (*mokṣa*) if he follows the prescribed method of it. The question of attaining *mokṣa* (liberation) does not arise in the case of a person who is not bound (i.e. liberated). Therefore, bondage (*vandhana*) and liberation (*mokṣa*) will be performed in a same locus or *adhikaraṇa* (i.e. a person) this is the general principle. Now, if a person before liberation and the person after liberation remain in the same *adhikaraṇa* (locus), then the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣāṇabhāṅgavāda*) cannot be admitted.^{15.2}

Due to this theory of momentariness, body i.e. every man etc. must be momentary. Again, they accept that causing injury to someone is a kind of sin and the doer also must enjoy the result of his deed. But this view cannot be taken for granted if body is regarded as self. As, from the Buddhist point of view, body is everchanging, the body of each moment is different from one another. Now, if self is nothing but the body itself, we have to admit different selves for different moments. If it be the case, the agent which causes injury becomes different ^{from} that which enjoys the result of demerit produced for causing injury. Because, the moment of committing sin is different from the moment of enjoying the result. Therefore, the body also becomes different at every moment. Thus, there arises the difficulty that actual agent of sin cannot be the enjoyer of his deed. Similarly, the agent who does not commit any demerit would become the enjoyer of such activity. In this way, there arises two types of difficulties in the law of *karma* known as '*Kṛtahāna* and *akṛtābhyāgama*.

But as a matter of fact the agent of the above action cannot be completely changed or he cannot be a new person because the said agent (i.e. the doer of causing injury to someone) remains the same one for he himself is the soul which is eternal in nature. His body may change gradually according to his age. As he is a man, he possesses the universal (*sāmānya*) 'manhood' as pointed out by the Naiyāyika.

Thus, we cannot accept the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇikavāda*) of the Buddhists due to the reason mentioned above.

**Some problems of *Sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, *Jñānalakṣaṇā*,
Kṣaṇā^{bh} *āṅgavāda*, *Svalakṣaṇa-vāda* and their probable solutions.**

The arguments of the Buddhists cannot be accepted by the Naiyāyikas due to having a different set of presuppositions. The main presuppositions of the Buddhists are the doctrine of momentariness, theory of *śūnyavāda*, the concept of unique character (*svalakṣaṇa*) etc.

Now we shall explain these presuppositions briefly and critically.

According to the doctrine of momentariness, whatever is existent (*sat*) is momentary (*Kṣaṇika*). Here 'existent' means 'capable of fulfilling some purpose (*arthakriyākāritva*) or producing some effect. Or in other words, the mark of *sat* is causal efficacy or *arthakriyākāritva*. That which produces some effect is existent (*sat*). For instance, a seed may be said to be *sat* because it produces a sprout and producing a sprout is the *arthakriyākāritva* (of the seed) which marks the seed as *sat*.

Nāgārjuna wants to show that ultimate reality cannot be described either in positive and negative terms. It cannot have any characteristic, since it is inexpressible in our finite language. Not only ultimate reality, but also the

phenomenal world cannot be described, because none of the categories we use in describing the world has its own nature or character (*sarvam svalakṣaṇam*). If it is proved that everything has its relative existence, then nothing can have its own nature. If everything is devoid of its own nature and character, and so it is void, and there is nothing that is not void, then the absolute reality must be the void. If everything in the world is essentially void, the world itself is void. What we see then is only an appearance of the void, the Absolute. Appearance is the empirical truth (*samvṛtisatya*) and the void is the ultimate or Absolute truth (*paramārthika satya*).

Nothing can categorically be said about this world and the world after. It is devoid of all characterization, all determinations. It is the void (*śūnya*).

Svalakṣaṇa as a point instant, discrete particular characterizes the ontology of the Buddhist thought and the awareness of that point instant marks the theory of knowledge. The ontological presupposition of the Buddhist is that only the point instant, *svalakṣaṇas* are real, and *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is the *kalpanā* imposed upon *svalakṣaṇa* and so *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is not real. Perception gives us the awareness of *svalakṣaṇa*.

The perceptual object (*svalakṣaṇa*) must be devoid of all sorts of conceptual contents because this conceptual content presents the object as associated with *vague verbal* expressions and exists only in the subjective form. Awareness of *svalakṣaṇa* could then be a kind of pure sensation; it is a bare particular, a piece of cognition, by which the object is revealed only in its simple and pure nature, bare of all attitudes and associations. Therefore, *svalakṣaṇa* is a pure sensation alone. *Svalakṣaṇa* is an essence or an entity which is unique, which is shared by nothing else, which is the thing in itself. It exists for a single moment (*kṣaṇa*), it has no extension in space, no duration in time, it is similar to nothing, it is unique. It is transcendent reality because it cannot be realised in a definite representation. It is absolute reality, 'thing in itself' which underlies every efficient empirical reality.

Therefore, according to the Buddhists, there is no *nityadravya* (eternal substances) because *nityadravya* is permanent, unchangeable etc. but according to the doctrine of momentariness (*kṣāṇikavāda*), nothing is permanent, all things are every-changing.

The above three presuppositions of the Buddhists (i.e. *kṣāṇikavāda*, *śūnyavāda* and *svalakṣaṇa-vāda*) are denied by the Naiyāyikas because their presuppositions are different in nature.

The Buddhists suppose that they are correct so far as their presuppositions are concerned. The Naiyāyikas have accepted seven categories in the real world. Other than these there is nothing. They have developed their philosophical point of view after keeping these categorical scheme in their mind. Under these categories there is no provision of denying the existence of the eternal substances. So far as my knowledge goes, there is no necessity of such denial. Buddhists, on the other hand, have to accept the *svalakṣaṇa* character of an object due to having a specific type of ontological presuppositions like the law of momentariness. If something is momentary in character it has to be taken as having unique character and having absolute reality. The non momentary objects are taken as having second order reality (*samvṛtisatyatā*) because they are not real. That which is not ultimately real is accepted as having covered reality only for the sake of philosophising and philosophical discourse. In this way, the Advaitins have developed a special type of logic after keeping their acceptance of monistic reality (i.e. *Brahman*) in view. The Sāṃkhians have put forth their philosophical conclusions in such a way so that their dualistic reality (i.e. *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*) is protected. If we judge each and every system in this way, it will seem to be consistent. As ontological presuppositions are different in each system, its philosophy, will be in conformity with main tenets. Hence no system is said to be wrong or inconsistent. What is correct in the framework of Buddhist philosophy is wrong in Nyāya system. In the same way, the apparent correct position of Nyāya system may seem to be wrong to the Advaitins. In this way, each and every system can

be justified. In spite of this some philosophical problems can be raised from our common sense level.

It has already been stated that the knowledge of all smokes and fires existing in different times and spaces through the universals - smokeness and fireness. The definition of *Sāmānya* as given in Nyāya is as follows: *Nityatve sati anekasamavetatvam* (i.e. that which, being eternal, is inhered with all the individual of the same class is called *sāmānya*). If this be the case, what will be the status of the *Upādhis* which are not taken as *sāmānyas* as per definition? The property existing in single individual like moonness, sunness etc. and the acquired properties like fatherhood, teacherhood etc can be described as *Upādhi* as in the previous case the adjunct '*anekasamavetatva*' does not exist and in the latter the adjunct *nityatva* does not exist. How can we know the properties of a teacher or a father existing in future? Through *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* it is not possible, because the fatherness or teacherness is not a possible, because the fatherness or teacherness is not a *sāmānya*. In reply, it can be said that the internal qualities of a teacher or father can be known through *Jñānalakṣaṇā* but not *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*. As the fragrance of a sandalwood is known through *jñānalakṣaṇā*, the affection etc existing in a father is known from father.

Now if we admit the doctrine of momentariness an objection may be raised herein below :

When someone wants to know whether an object, e.g. a seed has *arthakriyākāritva* (causal efficacy) or not, e.g. whether a seed produces a sprout or not, the knower and the seed, the object would be destroyed at the next moment of his wanting. That is to say, both the knower and the seed, the object become completely new things. Hence, when we want to verify *arthakriyākāritva* or causal efficiency of an object, the object becomes *asat* or non-existent at the moment of verifying its causal efficacy. But according to the doctrine of momentariness, whatever is *arthakriyākāri* (or causally efficient) is *sat* (existent) and whatever is *sat* (existent) is *kṣanika* (momentary). All things which have

causal efficacy are momentary in nature. But in the above example we find that whatever is *arthakriyākāri* or causally efficient is *asat* or non-existent. Therefore, the doctrine of momentariness is not justifiable.

To the Buddhist each and everything of this world is momentary. Hence, they have admitted the existence of an entity for a moment only which means the object is essentially unique (*svalakṣaṇa*) in character. That which is dependent on *kalpanā* or mental construction is not perceptual knowledge (*pratyakṣa*), for it is not connected with *arthakriyākāritva* i.e. causal efficacy. According to Dharmakīrti, the momentary object free from mental ascription and non-erroneous is called perceptual knowledge. (*tatra kalpanāpodham abhrāntam pratyakṣam*). This knowledge is alone real and the non-perceptual object manifested through descriptions is called unreal as it covers (*samvṛti*) the true nature of an object.

Svalakṣaṇa is a direct awareness while knowledge by ascription or *kalpanā* is mediate. A particular that cannot be described in terms of predicate is a *svalakṣaṇa* which cannot be said to be a content of mind. When some name etc. are imposed on some object it becomes a different. Hence the object which is known through *kalpanā* is not the previously real which remained for a moment. Though we cannot be said to know the exact nature of that object through it, we can have an idea of it and hence it has a second order reality. That which is expressed through language is not real (*sat vastu*) as they are nothing but mental construction. To them the object itself can serve our purpose (*arthakriyākāri*) but not the language through which it is expressed. By virtue of being a mental construction *Kalpanā* cannot reveal the ultimately real nature of an object and hence it has been considered as an unreal entity.

The above arguments of the Buddhists cannot be accepted due to the following reasons. First, the object which is known through language etc is not the earlier real entity existed for a moment. It cannot be denied that through language some idea of reality can be gathered. Hence, it cannot be described

as unreal. If it fails to provide the idea of an object, it would not be accepted as a form of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). As it is already accepted as a *pramāṇa* it has to be taken as conveyer of valid cognition and hence the unreality of such cognition cannot be accepted.

Secondly, it has already been said that a *svalakṣaṇa* entity remaining for a moment is free from *Kalpanā* or mental ascription and non-erroneous. As the Buddhists believe that an entity of perceptual cognition exists for a moment, it is very difficult to establish that a *svalakṣaṇa* object has got causal efficacy. To judge causal efficacy of a *svalakṣaṇa* object, more than one moment is essential, which is not permissible in Buddhism. Moreover, the same difficulty would stand on the way of considering *svalakṣaṇa* as non-erroneous.

Thirdly, the term non-erroneous (*abhrānta*) in connection with a *svalakṣaṇa* entity is unnecessary. For a *svalakṣaṇa* object being a bare sensation the truth and falsity of it cannot be judged within a moment. To determine truth and falsity of something the extrinsic validity (*parataḥ prāmāṇya*) is essential. For this, the momentary character of an object will be lost.

Due to having the above mentioned problems the Buddhist theory of *svalakṣaṇa* cannot be accepted. One solution could be given if some yogic power is accepted at the time of perception. The essential nature of an object and its causal efficacy can simultaneously be known within a moment as there arises a light produced through power of absorption (*samādhi*) to the true nature of an object. Hence, to protect the Buddhist theory of perception the role of *yoga* must be accepted. From this, it has to be accepted that the Buddhist also have accepted *yoga* as a means of knowing as in Nyāya. This view of the Buddhist is evidenced from the acceptance of *samyak samādhi* as one of the eight fold path (*astāṅgikamārga*).

The Naiyāyika's Response to the Non-acceptance of Sāmānyalakṣaṇā by the Vedāntins and the Mimāṃsakas.

The *Advaita Vedāntins* rule out all the arguments of the *Naiyāyikas* in favour of the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*.¹⁶ This is shown as follows :

The *Nyaya* argument in favour of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is given below:

Sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa is needed for perceiving any universal proposition, e.g., "All cases of smoke are cases of fire". This universal proposition is essential for inference e.g., inferring fire from perceiving smoke. So *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is essential for inference, such as, inference of fire from the perception of smoke.

The *Advaita Vedāntin* holds that there is no need of universal proposition e.g., "All cases of smoke are cases of fire", for the inference of fire from the perception of smoke. This argument goes against the *Nyāya* argument. If universal proposition is not essential for this inference or any other inference, then there is no need to accept *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa*.

According to the *Advaita Vedāntin*, we need to know the following things for inference:

- a) two universals - 'smokeness' and 'fireness';
- b) the relation between 'smokeness' and 'fireness'.

The *Advaitins* point out that when we perceive an instance of smoke and then we perceive fire, we perceive these two particulars 'smoke' and 'fire' - not only as particulars, but we also perceive these two particulars 'smoke' and 'fire' which are characterised under two universals - 'smokeness' and 'fireness' respectively. And we perceive the relation between them. So, afterwards, when we perceive 'smoke' possessing the generic attribute 'smokeness', we remember its relation with the generic attribute 'fireness' and infer the presence of fire there.

The Mimāṃsakas and the Vedāntins do not accept *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* as a form of super-normal perception. For, though there is absence of perception of all cases of smoke and fire, there is no harm. The invariable concomitance of smoke with fire can be ascertained through the cognition of smoke characterised by smokeness with fire characterised by fireness. For, the knowledge of qualifier is the cause of the qualified cognition (*visiṣṭajñāna*). Though there is the absence of all the cases of smoke and fire, yet the invariable concomitance between them can be ascertained due to the knowledge of coexistence along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation. Hence, there is no necessity of admitting *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*¹⁷.

It has been stated in the *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* by Salikanātha that the invariable relation between smoke and fire is ascertained through the observation of the one (i.e. smoke) and recollection of its invariable relation (*niyamah*) with the fire. Initially the invariable relation between smoke and fire is ascertained through their perception and afterwards the absence of *Upādhi* (limiting adjunct) is ascertained through the repeated observation of them. Hence, there is no question of accepting *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* to establish an invariable relation between all cases of smoke and fire.¹⁸

As each and every action is accomplished easily without accepting *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, there is no necessity of accepting the same due to absence of relevant proof and logical cumbrousness. There is no necessity of knowing all cases of smoke and fire in terms of smokeness and fireness. For, if invariable relation is ascertained) in terms of smokenss in known or familiar cases of smoke, there is no scope of doubt of deviation (*vyabhicārasāṃkā*) concerning smoke as there is empediment of doubt of deviation due to the special observation of *Vyāpti* existing in smoke characterised by smokeness.¹⁹

The above-mentioned view is not tenable. For, if the knowledge of *Vyāpti* regarding all individual manifestations of smoke and fire as a whole is not attained, there would arise the doubt of deviation (*vyabhicārasāṃkā*) leading to

the impossibility of inferential cognition (*anumiti*). *Anumāna* or inference has to be accepted as a means of valid cognition as this means is frequently used by people in this world. For this the supernormal contact called *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* through which all individual manifestation of *Vyāpya* and *Vyāpaka* are said to be present has to be accepted. With the help of this contact all individuals of a particular class are known and due to this the knowledge of *Vyāpti* is attained.²⁰

It may be argued that if such supernormal connection is accepted there would arise contingency of being omniscient for all beings as they would be able to know all individuals at a time through this *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.²¹

In response to the above, the Naiyāyikas might argue in the following manner. How do the *Pūrvapakṣins* (Vedāntins) know about the fact of our omniscience. For, omniscience is a phenomenon which the Vedāntins are not capable to understand. Because, one who knows the fact of omniscience of others should be omniscient. If one is not omniscient how does one understand others omniscient character? If one is omniscient, on the other hand, how is this fact of omniscience known due to the non-acceptance of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*.²²

The Naiyāyikas argue that the question of being omniscient does not arise here. If all the objects of this world are known in terms of *prameyatva* (knowability), there is the chance of being omniscient. But if the objects are known in terms of jarness (*ghaṭatva*), clothness (*paṭatva*) etc., all objects are not known due to the absence of them and hence there is no question of being omniscient.²³

The Advaitins do not accept *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* or *Jāti* as a category of real and hence they do not accept *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* as a super-normal means of knowing. Dharmarāj Adhvarindra in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* has said that *jātitva* (universalness) and *Upādhitva* (limiting adjunctness) cannot be taken as reals as this existence cannot be proved by any *pramāṇa*. These two are nothing but

sounds having no corresponding objects, as *pramāṇas* fail to ascertain there.²⁴ From the above discussion, it may be concluded that the *jātitva* and *upādhitva* cannot be provable entities and hence they are *aprāmāṇika* (not capable of being proved) i.e. unreal.

It may be argued that the *jātitva* and *Upādhitva* which have been accepted as not provable (*aprāmāṇika*) is not correct. Because their existence can be proved with the help of determinate perception (*savikalpaka pratyakṣa*). In determinate perception the qualificand (*viśeṣya*), qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and their relation become the content of knowledge. In the determinate knowledge in the form. 'This is a jar' (again *ghaṭaḥ*) the qualificand is 'jar', qualifier is jar-ness (*ghaṭatva*) and their relation. In this case the determinate knowledge grasps *ghaṭatva* as a qualifier. In the same way, the determinate knowledge like 'This is mediate' 'This is immediate' can grasp the universals like mediateness (*parokṣatva*) and immediateness (*aparokṣatva*) as its qualifier. Therefore, the determinate perception alone can prove *ghaṭatva* etc as universals. This view is also not correct. For, a determinate knowledge can reveal the qualifier and qualificand, but it cannot prove this qualifier as a *jāti*. The entity which is not a *jāti* may become qualifier and qualificand. With the help of the knowledge of common attributes between two or more than two objects (*anugatapratīti*), the common properties in the qualificand can be established, but from this it does not prove that the common properties are *jāti*.

Again the opponents have come forward to argue that perception may not be a proof for the existence of universal (*jāti*), but inference (*anumāna*) may accomplish the same. First, through the perception of similar properties among different objects the perception of similarity is possible. After this the inference in the form. "The properties like fingerness etc. are universals (*jāti*), as there are general properties excepting *Upādhis* (*anṅulitvādikāṃ jātiḥ upādhibhinnatve sati sāmānyadharmatvāt*) can be drawn. In spite of this, the common properties like fingerness etc. cannot be proved *jāti*. In this inference the minor term (*Pakṣa*) is 'the properties like fingerness etc' (*anṅulatvādidharma*), middle term (*hetu*) is

'being the property of common attribute' (*sāmānyadharmatva*) which is free from *upādhi* (*upādhibhinnatva*), the probandum (*Sādhya*) is *jātitva* (universalhood). According to the Nyāya, the universal is co-existent with eternity (*nityatva*) and residing in many through the relation and *samavāya*.

But according to the Vedāntins, no object accepting the *Brahman* is eternal and hence there is no inference (*anumāna*). To them, probandum is not familiar in any locus. An individual who knows probandum as existing may infer about the existence of *Sādhya* in a different place. In fact, the Vedantins do not know *Sādhya* as existing. Hence, it is not possible for him to draw inference. Moreover, if *Sādhya* is absurd, ascertainment of *Vyāpti* between a *Hetu* and a *Sādhya* is not possible and hence, the *hetu* given in the previous inference is a pseudo-one and hence there is the fallacy called *Vyāpyatvāsiddha*.²⁵

The previous inferential argument is fallacious in another way which is indicated by the term '*samavāyasiddhya*' in the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*. The previous syllogism is defective as there is no mark of *samavāya* and there is no proof for the existence of it. As the Advaitins do not admit inherence (*samavāya*), the properties like jarness etc. does not exist in many objects through the relation of inherence (*anekasamavetatva*). To the Advaitins all objects excepting *Brahman* is transitory and hence the properties like jarness etc. are transitory, but not eternal. In jarness etc there is no eternality and existence through inherence in many objects of the same class. In this case of syllogistic argument there is the absence of *Sādhya* in the minor term i.e. jarness etc. and hence there as the fallacy called *Vādhita*, the definition of which runs as follows.

When the absence of *Sādhya* in a *Pakṣa* is ascertained through other *Pramāṇa*, it is called *Vādhita*. Due to these reasons the Advaitins do not accept universal as a category of real which ultimately suggests that the supernormal connection through universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇā*) is not possible.²⁶

The above-mentioned view may be refuted by the Naiyāyikas in the following way. To an Advaitin only one entity i.e. *Brahman* is real, but others are false. Hence, to them, all objects other than the *Brahman* are false. As the properties like jarness etc. fall under the category of unreal, they are false. But the Naiyāyikas have accepted seven categories constituting the real world. Hence, the properties like jarness etc. are real as they are under the category of *sāmānya*. To them, the property existing in many individuals and eternal is called *sāmānya* (*Nityatve sati anekasamavetaṁ sāmānyam*) As they accept inherence (*sāmānya*) as an eternal relation (*ayutasiddha*), there is no problem of accepting the properties as *sāmānya*. But the Advaitins cannot accept this due to having different set of presupposition. In order to prove that the *Brahman* alone is real and eternal it is not possible for the Advaitins to admit another eternal substance and hence they do not accept *sāmānya* as well as *samavāya*. All these arguments will fall flat upon others who hold a realistic view like Naiyāyikas etc. The Naiyāyikas have accepted a separate category called *sāmānya* through which we have the cognition of similar objects (*anugatapratīti*). To them, *sāmānya* like jarness etc, though its locus i.e. a jar is destroyed, remain in tact they are eternal in character. Through the supernormal connection of *sāmānya* all other members containing this can be apprehended immediately. Hence, *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* is an inevitable means of knowing.

Thus, it can be concluded that without the admission of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā*, the ascertainment of *vyāpti* (which is the ground of inference) between the two concerned groups of individuals is not possible. So the theory of *sāmānyalakṣaṇā* must be admitted.

JÑĀNALAKṢAṆĀ PRATYAKṢĀ

**Refutation of the Charges Against the Supernormality of the
Jñānalakṣaṇā and the Sāmānalakṣaṇā.**

According to Nikunja Behari Banerjee, both *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* and *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* are related to *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* (determinate perception) and these are connected with sense organ and object, that is, sense object contact is necessary in both the cases. Therefore, these should not be called as *alaukika pratyakṣa* or supernormal perception but as *laukika pratyakṣa* or normal perception. He says, "..... *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* like *sāmānyalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is organically related to some *savikalpaka pratyakṣa* or other and as such is *laukika* (normal) instead of being *alaukika* (supernormal)".²⁷

Here raises a question : Is there a justification of Dr. Banerjee's view ? Our answer is in the negative because of the following grounds :

(i) There is no supporting Nyāya evidence which contains the instances of *alaukika pratyakṣa* those are devoid of the stages of *savikalpaka* and *nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa*. Here what the Nyāya states is that the contact (*sannikarṣa*) between the sense-organ (*indriya*) and the object is *alaukika* (supernormal), not *laukika* or normal. Therefore, Dr. Banerjee's view is not justifiable.

(ii) Dr. Banerjee holds that, if a type of *pratyakṣa* is related to determinate perception it must be a *laukika* one but not *alaukika*. To be *alaukika*, in the case of perception, does not mean that it (perception) has no determinate stage of perception. We suppose, according to Dr. Banerjee, that if a mode of perception is related to determinate perception as one of its stages, it cannot be *alaukika pratyakṣa* (supernormal perception) which is regarded by him as the presupposition of his argument.

(iii) When all individual cases of fire and smoke are known through the universals like fireness and smokeness, the fireness or smokeness serves as a contact for knowing all fires and smokes. Between fireness and smokeness and all individuals of smoke and fire cannot be regarded as an ordinary one as we find in the case of jar etc. and hence it is called *alaukika*. In the case of

ĵñānalakṣaṇa also the contact between eye and sandalwood is an ordinary one, but not between eye and fragrance as it is beyond the power of eye to discover 'fragrance'. Hence, the contact between eye and fragrance gathered through sandalwood is an extraordinary one.

The Response to the Vedāntin's Objection against the Anyathākhyativāda.

The Naiyāyikas explain illusion with the help of the theory of *ĵñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* (Acquired Perception). The illusory silver is perceived because it is presented through our previous knowledge of silver as seen at some other time and place. But the Vedāntins object to the Nyāya theory of *ĵñānalakṣaṇa*. They argue that to recognise *ĵñānalakṣaṇa* as a type of genuine perception is to reduce ordinary inference to perception. If the fragrance of sandalwood be perceived because we have a previous knowledge of it as connected with sandalwood, then in the inference of fire from smoke, the fire may be said to be perceived since we have also a previous knowledge of it as related to smoke. There is nothing to distinguish between the two cases. In the one we have a perception of sandalwood and previous knowledge of its relation to fragrance. In the other, we have a perception of smoke and a similar knowledge of its relation to fire. Hence, if the fragrance be in supernormal contact with sense and so perceived, there may be such a supernormal perception of fire and, for the matter of fact, of all objects of inference. So the Vedāntins hold that our knowledge of the fragrance of sandalwood, seen at distance, is due to inference and not any supernormal perception like the Naiyāyika's *ĵñānalakṣaṇa*.²⁸

The objection raised by the Vedāntins, is not tenable for the following reasons :

According to the Naiyāyika, the theory of illusion, viz. the theory of

Anyathākhyāti cannot be explained if the supernormal perception called *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is not accepted. But the Advaita Vedantins hold a different theory of illusion, known as *Anirvacaniya Khyātivāda*. According to them, the nature of the object of illusory knowledge is indescribable, it is neither real nor unreal, nor both real and unreal. As in the case of snake-rope illusion, where one mistakenly perceives a snake in a piece of rope, the snake cannot be taken as either real or unreal, it is something the nature of which is indescribable. The false appearance of a piece of rope as a snake is due to ignorance (*avidyā*). Similarly, *Brahman*, the non-dual absolute pure consciousness appears as the world of multiplicity due to *Māyā*, the cosmic principle of illusion, which is also indescribable by nature.

Thus, if the Vedāntins accept the Nyāya theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* then their theory of *Anirvacaniyakhyāti* will not be established, for the theory of *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is consistent with the theory of *anyathākhyāti* which goes against the *Anirvacaniyakhyātivāda*. In other words, if *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is not accepted, the theory of *Anyathākhyāti* cannot be explained due to the reasons already mentioned in the chapter III.

When someone attains the knowledge of fragrance from sandalwood, knowledge of cold from ice, the knowledge of heat from fire, these are not at all inferential. Because, the fact of being fragrant or being cold or hot is incorporated in the very connotation of the terms 'sandal' 'ice' or 'cold'. In these cases, we do not get any new information. As soon as we remember the words ice, fire etc., it gives rise to the knowledge of fragrance, cold, heat etc. If an attempt is made to infer the coldness of ice or heat of fire, it will lead us to the fallacy called *siddhasādhana* (i.e., establishment of the fact which is already established).

In this case one suggestion may be borne in mind that if one has a strong desire to infer (*sisādhayisā*), one is allowed to do so even though there is *siddhi*. But it is a case of inference which is deliberately done. In the same way,

if someone desires to infer coldness from ice etc., he is allowed to do so out of *sisādhayisa* but not necessity.

***Jñānalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa* and *icchājanya Anumāna* (Intentional Inference)**

If the view of the Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas are reviewed carefully, the following problems may be raised.

First, in the case of *Surabhi Candanam* (i.e. sandalwood is fragrant) the knowledge of fragrance is not a new information to the knower. He can get the idea of fragrance after knowing the sandalwood. In other words, the property of being fragrant is included in the idea of a sandal wood. There is not a case of sandalwood which is not fragrant. Hence, the idea of fragrance constitutes the connotation of the term.

Considering this aspect the Advaitins might argue that the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of *Pramāṇasāmplava* i.e. an object might be proved as existing with the help of more than one *pramāṇa* unlike *Pramāṇavyavasthā* according to which the existence of an object is proved with the help of single *Pramāṇa*. According to the theory of *Pramāṇa Sāmplava* the fire which is perceived may also be known through inference. An object is not necessarily be having a dubious character for applying inference. A syllosistic argument may also be applied if the object is not ascertained totally but in dubious character²⁹. In case of *jñānalakṣaṇā* the application of inference is not totally prohibited by this theory of *Pramāṇasāmplava*. Though fragrance is known after analysing the concept of sandalwood yet it may be treated as a result of inferential cognition if the inferer thinks so. In Nyāya some freedom is given to the desire of the speaker (*vivakṣā*). If this point of the Naiyāyikas is taken for accepted, there is the scope of applying inference in the case of the knowledge of fragrance.

Though intentional inference (*icchājanya anumāna*) of an agent is not totally out of place here, the role of perception cannot be ignored. If something is known through perception, inference, by virtue of its intentional character becomes secondary. It is true that the Navya Naiyāyaikas have given much importance on *vivakṣā* i.e. will to say. Let us put forth some cases where we find a knowledge produced through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanyajñāna*). One is allowed to say - *Sthālī pacati* (he cooks with clay - pot) with the nominative case-ending to the pot instead of the correct expression *sthālyā pacati* with the instrumental case-ending with the word - *sthāli* if one so desires.

Apart from these there are a few cases where we find knowledge attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) as in the case of *Pakṣatā*. If someone bears a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayisā*), he can infer in spite of having *siddhi* (*siṣādhayisāsattve'numitirbhavatyeva*). That a cloth is completely different from a jar is completely known from perception and hence there is not at all any necessity to infer a cloth as distinct from a jar. In spite of this one is found to infer - 'It (i.e. a cloth) is endowed with the mutual absence of a jar, as it has got clothness' (*ghaṭānyanyābhāvavān paṭatvāt*). All these cases are supportable as an individual desires to do so and hence the role of *icchājanyatva* in the attainment of knowledge cannot be denied.

Though the inferential knowledge caused by some desire is not totally neglected, it should clearly be ^{borne} in mind that *icchājanya anumāna* dependent on an individual's will is not a compulsory phenomenon. It is normally done when the truth is already known through some other means like perception etc. There are many cases where we can apply inference 'alone' due to their impossibility of knowing through perception etc.

When the phenomenon of being fragrant is known from the sandalwood, it is mainly perceptual due to the non-separability of the acquired two pieces of

knowledge - *saurabhatva* and *candanatva*. As soon as the sandalwood is known, it is known as fragrant simultaneously without giving scope for inference. In spite of this if an individual has a strong desire of inferring (*siṣādhayisā*) the fragrance of the sandal wood, it is permissible, though not absolutely essential.

Establishment of the Perceptuality of *Jñānalakṣaṇa* as Denied by the Advaitins.

The Advaitins have interpreted *jñānalakṣaṇa* as a form of inference, but not supernormal perception as accepted by the Naiyāyikas. On this one comment can be made, when we come to know of the fragrance of a sandal wood, it is a case of inference. In the same way, it can be said that taste of a fruit is inferred on the strength of a particular colour (*Rūpāt rasanumānam*) which is described as *Sāmānyatodrṣṭa* inference. But a time comes when we know of the fragrance or taste of a fruit as soon as we know of the sandalwood and a fruit possessing a particular colour. Though these are taken as cases of inference initially, they can be known through *jñānalakṣaṇā* in the habituated state (*abhyāsadaśā*). It is true that when we infer *rasa* from a particular *rūpa*, when coldness is inferred from the ice, these are no more the result of inference afterwards, but the result of *jñānalakṣaṇā*. When we are habituated in our everyday life, something is known from something is known from something 'spontaneously' without taking recourse to the form of inference. When water is seen it gives rise to the knowledge of its capability of quenching thirst spontaneously as we are habituated in getting water when felt thirsty. Though initially there was inferential procedure, yet afterwards they are known on the basis of habit. Hence, it is taken as a case of *jñānalakṣaṇā* in which we do not take care of the intricacies of inferential procedure.

The Vedāntins do not admit the supernormal connection called *jñānalakṣaṇā*. In the case of illusory cognition of silver in shell there is, they opine, the perception of silver as they admit the existence of the indescribable silver in this case. In the case of knowledge 'sandal wood is fragrant' we admit

the apperception in the form - 'I recollect fragrance' (Saurabham smarāmi) and hence it cannot be the cause of perception. So for the sake of the law of parsimony (*lāghava*) it is better to take defects as the cause of the origination of the knowledge of the indescribable silver. Hence, the silverness etc. has to be accepted as the effect of the defect. So, there is no proof of the super normal contact called *jñānalakṣaṇā*.³⁰

The above-mentioned view is not tenable. For to the older Naiyāyikas the knowledge of the silver is attained through the supernormal contact called *jñānalakṣaṇā*. If there is no *jñānalakṣaṇā*, the knowledge in the form - 'sandal wood is fragrant' would be attained with the help of the knowledge of a piece of sandalwood attained through eye. As there is no normal contact with the fragrance or the property of being fragrant, the knowledge of sandalwood has to be taken as a contact.³¹

A section of philosopher does not accept *jñānalakṣaṇā* as a perception. To them the fragrance of a sandal wood is always inferential. In the same way, when it is said 'Ice looks cold,' 'Fire looks hot' it is merely a case of inference. We have added various arguments in denying the inferentiality of such cases earlier. Apart from those arguments we can add a new one. To Nyāya such cases are not inferential due to having *vādhita hetvābhāsa*. If it be taken as inferential, it becomes fallacious. And fallacious inference is not real inference. According to Nyāya, when the absence of a *sādhyā* is known through some other *pramāṇa*, it is called *vādhita* (*yasya sādhyābhāvaḥ pramāṇāntareṇa niscitaḥ sa vādhitaḥ*). In these cases the coolness of ice and hotness of fire are already proved by perception which is accepted as a *pramāṇa*. If they are taken as inference, they would involve fallacy called *vādhita*. In order to avoid this it is better to accept *jñānalakṣaṇā* as a form of perception.

Therefore, in conclusion we can point out that the theory of illusion, that is, the theory of *anyāthākhyāti* cannot be explained if the supernormal perception

called *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* is not accepted. Hence, the *jñānalakṣaṇa pratyakṣa* should be admitted.

YOGAJA PRATYAKṢA

Some Problems on the Justifiability of Yogaja Pratyakṣa and Pratibhā.

A problem could be raised on the justifiability of the transcendental perception, (*yogaja pratyakṣa*) rather one could describe it as a metaphysical experience but not epistemological in the true sense of the term. Though it is a kind of direct knowledge, yet we may consider whether it is really a case of perception or not. One could know some object existing in remote future or in remote place transcendently. It is very difficult to verify the truth, hence the question of transcendental knowledge is not beyond question. As such knowledge is purely personal, secret and non-communicable, one may challenge the truth of the same. If this be the case, the perceptuality of such knowledge is very difficult to establish as the principle of verifiability fails here. If somehow it is taken as perception by virtue of being a direct awareness, by which definition it can be taken as perceptual? The standard definition which is given in Nyāya is as follows :

The knowledge which arises out of the contact of the sense-organ with an object is called perception (*indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam pratyakṣam*). For being a perceptual knowledge there should be a contact between a sense-organ and an object. In this particular case mind acts as a sense-organ and an object. In this particular case mind acts as a sense-organ and object existing in remote time and place is taken as *artha*. The question remains unsolved regarding the contact between them. As such contact is not easily conceivable the question of its validity may crop up. If this contact is

beyond the range of our intelligence or direct awareness, it may not be accepted as perception. It is quite rational to describe it something belonging to metaphysical world.

In reply to such criticism one point could be forwarded in favour of the perceptuality of transcendental knowledge. In broader sense perception should be taken as a direct awareness (*sāksāt patīti*). This directness (*sāksāttva*) may be defined as something not arising from the instrumentality of other knowledge (*jñānākaraṇakam jñānam*). If this broader definition of perception is taken into account, the transcendental knowledge should be put under this due to having the form of direct or immediate apprehension (*aparokṣānubhūti*). Though this feeling is non-communicable, secret and personal, yet it cannot be denied as an experience. It is not also correct to say that the impersonal and communicable knowledge is always perceptual. We can know many things intuitively in our daily life but these are not always communicable. From this it is not proved that our experience is not true or direct. Hence, the reality of transcendental perception occupies a place in Indian epistemology.

It may be argued that yogic experience is beyond the reach of ordinary human being. Now the question is : How is it accepted by the Naiyāyikas as a form of supernormal perception ?

In reply, it can be said that there are many things in the world, which are not capable of being known by ordinary sense-organ.

The inadequacy of the intellectual power points to the existence of the world which is beyond the reach of sense-organs. There is some faculty in a man that is capable of revealing that world. This faculty is known as *Pratibha* (intuition)³² This point will find justification in the fact that there are many things like God, self etc. which cannot be known through sense-organs but the existence of them is already accepted in Indian Tradition. *Pratibhā* is a flash of light which reveals the objects. The light is the wisdom characterised by

immediacy and freshness'.³³ Besides, it has been described as 'supersensuous and ^{supra-rational} ~~suprarational~~ apperception'.³⁴ As this suprasensuous knowledge has no spatio-temporal limit, it is considered as transcendental having capacity of revealing past, present and future by a single flash.³⁵

The English rendering of the term '*Rs'* is seer which means one who sees past, present and future through one's transcendental vision. He can know the truth manifested in all objects. That is to say, '*Rs'* is described as *Kabi* in the Upanisad, which means *krāntadarsī* or omniscient i.e. knower of all objects existing in the past, present and future.

There is a sharp distinction between poetic intuition or *pratibhā* operating in the case of attaining a property generated through *yoga* (*yogaja dharma*) and normal intuition or that operating in ordinary behaviour. It is known from the fact that the former is mysterious while the latter is not. Had *Pratibhā* been same in both cases there would have no difference between them. Hence, the difference at least in the degree of *Pratibhā* is to be admitted. In the case of the former the degree of *Pratibhā* is stronger than the latter.

It has been said that *Pratibhā* is one in its essence, but differing in kind according as (i) it is developed by a steady and continuous effort or (ii) produced automatically by virtue of *Adrṣṭa* (unseen factors). Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj does not want to give much importance on this type of *Pratibhā* because in the case of aesthetic it can give temporary spiritual pleasure to one individual. That is why, his stress is laid on that *Pratibhā* which can give rise to a permanent vision and which can make a man *yogin*. According to Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj, telepathy etc. (Extra-Sensory Perception) are included under the second category of intuition while the supreme wisdom of the saints belongs to the first one.³⁶ Therefore, yogic perception (*Yogaja Pratyakṣa*) will belong to the first category of intuition. Hence, telepathic knowledge is not produced from *yoga* (i.e. *yogaja*). And poetic intuition also will not be regarded as normal intuition.

A question may be raised below :

A yogin possesses a property generated through yoga (*yogaja dharma*) in his own self but this property does not exist in other objects. If this property is not related to other objects, how will it be a contact generated through yoga (*yogaja sannikarṣa*)? In reply, it is stated that the relation through which the yogic property (*yogaja dharma*) becomes the contact for the perception of all objects is called that of *svāśraya-samānakālikatva*. Here the word 'sva' means *yogaja dharma* (property generated through yoga), the locus (*āśraya*) of that property is the self of the *yogin* and the contemporary or *samānakālika* of his self is all objects of the world. As the yogic power acts as the sense contact with all objects through the relation of *svāśrayasamāna kālikatva*, so *yogaja pratyakṣa* of all objects is possible by a *yogin*.³⁷

Here in the phrase 'all objects of the world', 'all objects' are supposed to mean the objects which exist at the time of his perceiving (i.e. from his yogic perfection to his death). In this case, it may not be clear to an opponent, how will a *yogin* perceive the past and future objects? For in case of past and future objects, there is no relation of *svāśrayasamānakālikatva* which acts as the contact. This relation is applicable only to the contemporary objects of the concerned *yogin*. Hence, this relation cannot give a satisfactory answer to the above question.

In response to the above question we can say that time is the cause of the notion of priority and posteriority. Time is one. Nevertheless, it gives rise to the application of terms such as a moment (a day, a month etc.) owing to its different limiting adjuncts (past, present or future)³⁸. It is the cause of things that are produced and is considered to be the substratum of the universe. So, when a *yogin* perceives things of this universe he can perceive things not only of his contemporary period but also of the past, present and future because time is one and the substratum of the universe. Thus, the Naiyāyika proves that all

things of all times are perceived by a perfect *yogin* through the relation of *svāśraya samāna Kālikatva*.^{38.1}

The Naiyāyika's Response to the Objections Forwarded by the Mimāṃsakas for not Accepting a Yogic Perception.

In response to the objections forwarded by the Mimāṃsakas for not accepting a yogic perception the Naiyāyikas meet the objections one by one.^{38.2}

The response to the first objection that senses have limitations is already given by the Naiyāyikas vide page no. 80.

The second objection of the Mimāṃsakas is that it cannot be explained that a *yogin* can see anything and everything by his eyes though the power of the senses can be increased by practice. In fact, ears cannot reveal colour and the eyes cannot reveal sound. The answer of this objection also is already given vide page no. 80 and 81.

The third objection is as follows; By practice one can jump over a wall but how can one jump over the Himalayas or an ocean? With regard to this objection, the Naiyāyikas point out that if the opponents find our above answers regarding the operation of external senses as unsatisfactory to common sense, we would opine that the *yogins* would see anything and everything by mind, which is the internal sense. This is possible by the practice of meditation. There is nothing which cannot be the object of mind.

The fourth objection is that *Dharma* which is known from the vedic text only can never be the object of perception. In reply to this objection it is said that *dharma*, though *atindriya*, can be the object of mental perception, let it not be the object of eyes but there is no hindrance, with respect to its being the object of mind, since there is nothing which cannot be the object of mind.³⁹

It is fact that by practice, one can jump over a wall but not a mountain or ocean since it is a property of the body and body consists of Kapha, fat etc.⁴⁰ By practice a person brings a balance of these properties and makes his body comparatively lighter and so he can achieve the power of jumping over a certain height. But in each case, there is a limitation due to the properties of the body. But there is no such impediment with regard to a cognition caused by mind, because it is already stated that a *yogin* can acquire such a capacity of mind through the constant practice of dhyāna, dhāraṇā etc.

The mind of an average man is affected by the dirt namely *rāga*, *dveṣa* etc. and hence it cannot overcome a certain range or limit, and so we are not *yogins*.⁴¹ *Rāga*, *dveṣa* etc. are the products of ignorance (*mithyā jñāna*). A cognition in which 'a' is cognised as 'b' and not as 'a' is called ignorance. By constant and rigorous practice of yoga the *yogins* can attain a stage in which they cognise 'a' as 'a' and not as 'b'. When they are in this stage there^{i s} nothing[^] which they cannot perceive.⁴²

Both the Naiyāyikas and the Mimāṃsakas take the Vedic knowledge or text as authoritative and there is clear expression of a yogic realisation in the vedic literature. Then the question arises : why the Mimāṃsakas do not want to accept any yogic perception?

According to Jaimini, perhaps *dharma* is *atindriya* and is cognised by vedic injunction only. It can never be the object of perception and all the other sources of valid knowledge except vedic injunctions are inactive or non-functioning in case of *dharma*. Now if this stand of Jaimini is to be accepted then there is no other alternative to the Mimāṃsakas than to deny the reality of yogic perception. If they admit the reality of yogic perception then *dharma* becomes directly the object of perception, which will contradict Jaimini's statement. This goes against the thesis of the Mimāṃsakas and hence they do not accept yogic perception.

Now if a deduction is a logical one, then it does not matter much whether same deduction contradicts someone's statement or not. The Naiyāyikas argue in this way. Therefore, even though the acceptance of a yogic perception goes against Jaimini, one has to accept it because it is established by expressions of such experiences of sages or *yogins*.

If the Mimāṃsakas argue that it is accepted that *yogins* can realise anything and everything simultaneously, then they become the knower of all things (*sarvajña*). So how will they show the difference between *yogins* and Naiyāyikas' *Īśvara* who is also omniscient?⁴³

In reply the Naiyāyika says that the very definition of *Īśvara* or God would distinguish a *yogin* from God. According to Nyāya, the definition of God is as follows : God is the substratum of permanent or eternal cognition. On the other hand, a *yogin* is the substratum of an acquired or produced cognition.⁴⁴

But Jayanta Bhatta points out for the sake of argument that the Naiyāyika does not know whether the Mimāṃsaka cannot perceive *dharma*. Both of them do not know that others cannot perceive *dharma*. Even then, if the Mimāṃsaka avers that he knows that there is no perceiver of *dharma*, then he himself is a *yogin* because he perceives everyone's perception, that Naiyāyikas do not perceive *dharma*.⁴⁵

Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no argument which can refute the thesis of the Naiyāyikas regarding the acceptance of the reality of yogic perception.⁴⁶

It has already been discussed that the Mimāṃsakas has a strong objection against the reality of yogic perception. To them if yogic perception apprehends exactly the same thing in the past, the cognition generated by intense meditation is nothing but memory which is nothing but invalid. If it apprehends more than

that which was perceived in the past, it is illusory because what is apprehended has no existence.

In response to the above mentioned objection, it can be said that we can perceive the past through yogic perception, but it is not only a recollective knowledge. It may be said that memory is nothing but generated by impression of a particular entity alone ⁴⁷ The impression of an object existing in the past can give rise to memory of the object if it (i.e. impression) is generated through experience. That which is not at all experienced cannot be the object of memory. In the case of yogic perception not only the previously experience objects comes to our awareness but the objects not experienced earlier are also apprehended by us. The historical facts in which our normal sense-organs cannot reveal may be revealed to us by our super-normal means of knowing i.e. transcendental perception. Should we call it mere memory? Obviously not. For, many incidents occurred in the remote past in our life or in the life of somebody else may come to our awareness through the flash attained during meditation. The value of such experience cannot be ignored merely by saying that it comes under memory and hence invalid. It is not also fair to say that if something more than memory is apprehended during meditation is nothing but invalid. There are many saints (even in this modern age) who have experienced many past and future events through yoga. It is not also correct to say that sense-organs have limitation. For, the sense-organs which we possess can reveal only those objects that are in proximity with them. This is true in the case of external perception which is normal one. But behind each and every sense organ there is a power which is described by Sri Aurobindo and Rabindranath as *Rtacit* and *surplus* respectively. This power cannot be shown, but have to be experienced. The Upanisadic seers have referred to this power as '*S'rotrasya s'rotram manaso mano yad*' (ear of the ear and mind of the mind). The first '*s'rotra*' (ear) refers to our normal ear while another '*s'rotra*' stands for that power which can take us to the supernormal world which is beyond the reach of our ordinary sense organs. If the 'surplus' or 'power' existing in each and every sense organ is generated through meditation, one can have an infallible experience of something existing in the remote past and remote future.

An ordinary sense organ like eye can reveal colour existing in past and future, but not sounds. In the same way ear can reveal those existing in past and future, but not colour. In this way, the 'surplus' power existing in a sense organ can reveal the objects existing in past and future having the particular quality.

Extra-Sensory Perception :

The Philosophers and Psychologists of the Psychological Research Society of England and that of the Duke University, U.S.A. hold that *Yogaja Pratyakṣa* has been developed into Extra-Sensory Perception. Now the question is : whether it may be called development or downfall? A *Yukta yogin* can perceive all things at all times and a *Yuñjana yogin* also can perceive all objects with the help of concentration. But in case of Extra-Sensory Perception a man possesses a particular property which is not a property generated through *yoga (yogaja dharma)*, e.g., in case of telepathy, a gifted person has a power to know other's thought and desires but he may not possess other power like that of a seer.

On the other hand, a *yogin* can perceive all things of all times and places - past, present, subtle, distant and future through *yogaja dharma* which inheres in his own self. That is to say, generally, all instances of Extra-Sensory Perception, i.e. telepathy, clairvoyance, pre-cognition, psycho-kinesis etc. are included in the yogic perception. So, it can be said that Extra-Sensory Perception is lower than yogic perception in respect of category. Hence Extra-Sensory Perception is not *yogaja pratyakṣa*. For, a *yogin* acquires *yogaja dharma* in his own self through the regular and sincere practice of eightfold means of *yoga*. This power enables him to perceive all things at any moment. Perhaps this type of property (*yogaja dharma*) does not exist in a gifted person in case of telepathy or other person having the power of clairvoyance or pre-cognition or psycho-kinesis. So why should we say that *yogaja pratyakṣa* has been

developed into Extra-Sensory Perception? Hence, there is no question of development of *yogaja pratyakṣa* into Extra-Sensory Perception.

Thus, we can conclude that *yogaja pratyakṣa* is beyond the range of human intellect. It is believed to be true on the basis of Verbal Testimony (*śabda-pramāṇa*) and as it is accepted by a good many philosophers. Its truth can be verified only by the practice of *yoga*. Extra-Sensory Perception is lower type of perception than yogic perception.⁴⁸

NOTES AND REFERENCES :

1. Janaki Ballabha Bhattacharyya (Tr. into English), - Jayanta Bhatta's *Nyāya-Maṅjarī*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi-7, Vol.I, 1978, p.627.

1.1 Vide my article "*Sāmānyalakṣaṇa Pratyakṣa*", *NORTH BENGAL STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY*, Edited by Dr. Pabitra Kumar Roy, Department of Philosophy, University of North Bengal, 1995, pp. 129-132.

1.2. Tasmādvīśeṣavadapratyākhyeyam sāmānyam, viśeṣavatpratyakṣatvātsāmānyasya kaḥ kalpanārthaḥ, yadi hi kāryānumeyam sāmānyam kalpayem tat evamanuyujemahi kāryasyāpyanyathā siddheḥ kim tatkalpanayeti.

- *Nyāyamaṅjarī* of Jayanta Bhatta, Ed. Pandit Śrī Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares, 1936, p.286..

2. Yadi ca nāma nirvikalpakena sarvātmanā vastu puṇaḥ paricchindanti vikalpāntarāṇi vaiphalyamaśnu vīrankimetāvātā tesāmaprati yamānārthagrāhitā kalpayitum śakyate - The *Nyāyamaṅjarī* of Jayanta Bhatta, Ed. Pandit Śrī Sūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Benares, 1936, p.288

3. Śāyanamādhava : *Sarvādarsāna-saṁgrahaḥ*. Bauddhadarsāna. Henceforth, *Bauddhadarsāna*.

4. *Ibid.*
5. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* - 1, 2, 3.
6. *Bauddhadarsana*
7. *Ibid*
8. *Ibid*
9. *Ibid*
10. *Ibid*
11. Vivṛti (by Panchanan Shastri) on *Bauddhadarsana*, Sarvadarsanasamgraha, p. 69, Calcutta, 1401 (B.S.).
12. Rahul Sankrityayan : *Darshan Digdarshan*, Vol.2, Calcutta, pp.255-256.
13. Dasani on *Bauddhadarsana*, pp. 69-70, Calcutta, 1401 (B.S.).
14. *Nyāyabindu*, Pratyakṣa Chapter.
15. Dasani on *Bauddhadarsana*, pp. 73-74, Calcutta, 1401 (B.S.).
- 15.1 Vinā tena na tatsiddhirnādhyakṣam niscayam vinā. *Nyāyakusumāñjali* of Udayanācārya (Bengali). Ed. Srimohan Bhattachārya. West Bengal State Book Board, Calcutta, 1995, Verse No. 16. p.92.
- 15.2 Sri Bidhubhusan Bhattacharya - *kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda* (in Bengali), Sanskrit College Research Series, Book No. 101, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1975, p.72.
16. Madhusudana Sarasvati - *Advaitasiddhi*, Ed. by Harihar Sastri, December, 1993, pp. 137-39, 337-43.
17. *Mīmāṃsakairvedāntibhiscaśāmānyalakṣaṇa - jñānalakṣaṇa -*

yoranabhupagamāt tadbhedena dvididham̄ pratyakṣamapi nāsthiyate. Tanmate sakaladhūmānām̄ sakalavanhīnān̄ca pratyakṣābhāve' pi na Kācid dhāniḥ, viśiṣṭajñānam̄ prati viśeṣajñānasya kāraṇatayā dhūmatvajñānena vanhitvajñānena ca vanhitvaviśiṣṭavanherdhūmatvaviśiṣṭasya dhūmasya ca jñānasadbhāvāt tenaiva vanhinirūpitā vyāptirdhūme grahitum̄ śakyate saha cārjñānād vyabhicārajñānābhāvācca vyāpterūpgraha iti sakala dhūmānām̄ sakalavanhīnān̄cānupasthitāvapi na kācidanupattiriti sāmānyalakṣaṇākhyāyāḥ pratyāsatteraṅgikāro vyarthaḥ.

Shyampada Mishra - *Sāmānyalakṣaṇanirāśah* - a paper published in *Our Heritage* (Special Number) - 150th Anniversary volume. Ed. Bishnupada Bhattacharya. Sanskrit College, Calcutta, years 1824-1974, p.73.

18. "Iha tu sambandhaniyamasmarāṇameka deśadarśanañcānubhavakāraṇamastīti yathā pratītiranubhūtirūpatevāśrayitumucite" ti ca.

Tantrarahasye' pyuktam̄ 'ataḥ prāthamikam̄ pratyakṣameva dhūmāgamyoḥ sambandhaniyame pramāṇam̄ bhuyodarśanena pascāt tasya nirūpādhikatvaniscaya' iti. [Pramāṇa paḥ] etena sakaladhūmajñānam̄ sakalavanhījñānān̄ca sambandhaniyame nāvāśyamapekṣitamiti pratipādayatā sāmānyalakṣaṇā na svīkṛteti sūcyate. Ibid. p.75.

19. Atrocitate , sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsatteranaṅgikāre'pi sakalavyavasthopapattau mānābhāvāt gauravācca nāsti sāmānyalakṣaṇānāmapratyāsattiyantaram. Tathāhi dhūmatvena sakaladhūmopasthitervanhitvena sakala vanhyupasthitervāśyakatā nāsti. Yadi dhūmatvena prasiddhadhūme vyāptiniscayaḥ syātarhi dhūmadharmika-vyabhicārasaṁśayasyāvākāśonāsti tatra dhūmatvena dhūmanisthavyāptiniścayasya viśeṣadarśanatayā saṁśayaprativandhakatvāt. Ibid. p.79

20. Naiyāyikāḥ sakalavyaktyupasamhāreṇa vyāptijñānam̄ vinā kkcacidvyabhicāraśaṅkāyāmanumiti na syāt, bhavati ca lokānāmanumityā vyavahārah. Sa ca sakalavyāpyānam̄, vyapakānāncopasthitimūlaka iti

sāmānyalakṣaṇāpratyāsattiravaśyaṃ svīkāryā, tayā ca pratyāsattiyā tattajjātiyāḥ sarvāḥ vyaktayah grhyante, tena ca sarvopasāmhāreṇa vyāptijñānaṃ sidhyatītyucyate. *Ibid.* p.75.

21. Tathāhi evaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇāsvīkāre sarvapadārthānāṃ sarveṣāṃ jñānasambhavāt sarveṣāṃ sarvajñatvāpattiḥ syāt. *Ibid.* p.75.

22. Tatra yadi naiyāyikairanyairvā evamucyate-purvoktarītyā asmanmatopari yat sarvajñatvamāpādyate bhavatā taccāpādanāṃ durghaṭameva, yasmād yonyasya sarvajñatvamāpādayati sa sarvjñō na vā? Yadi sa na sarvajñastarhi Kathamanyasya tathātvamāpādayitum śaknyāt. Atha yadi sa sarvjñāḥ syāttarhi tasya sarvajñatvaṃ Kathaṃ lavdham, tanmate sāmānyalakṣaṇyā asvīkāraditi. *Ibid.* pp. 75-76.

23. na ca prameyatvena sarveṣāṃ padārthānāṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇayā jñānasambhave'pi ghaṭatvāditattad viśeṣarūpeṇa sakalapadārtha jñānasambhavānna sarvajñatvāpattiriti vācyam. *Ibid.* p.76.

24. Jātit vopādhitva-paribhāṣāyāḥ sakalpramāṇāgocaratayā prāmāṇikatvāt. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*. Pratyakṣa pariccheda. p. 44. Ed. Sri Panchanan Bhattacharya, 1377 (B.S.), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta.

25. Ghaṭōyamityādipratyakṣaṃ hi ghaṭatvādisadbhāve mānam, na tu tasya jātitve'pi, Jātitvarūpasādhyāprasidhau tat sādhyakānumānasyāpyanavakāśāt, samavāyāsiddhyā brahmakhilaprapaṅcānitya ta yā ca nityatva-samavetatva - ghaṭitajātitvasya ghaṭatvāvasiddhesca. *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*. *Ibid.*

26. Vivṛti of *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*. (Perception Chapter), Ed. Panchanan Bhattacharya, 1377 (B.S.), Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, pp. 45-47.

27. Nikunja Vihari Banerjee - *The Spirit of Indian Philosophy*, p. 63.

28. *Advaitasiddhi*.

With the commentary - Bālabodhinī . By. M.M.DR. Yogendranath Bagchi, Ed. By Dr. Sitansusekhar Bagchi, Vol.I, Tara Publications, 1971, pp. 334-335.

29. Na nirnite arthe nyāya pravartate, api tu samsāyite'rthe Vātsyāyana bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtra No. 1.1.1.

30. Tathāhi sūktāvidam rajatamiti bhramasthale'bhinavānirvācyarajatotpatti-svikārād rajatasya pratyaksopapattih.

Kinca 'Surabhi candana' mityādi jñānasthale saurabham smarāmītyā-dyanuvyavasāyasya svikārādupanayādeḥ pratyakṣahetutve mānābhāvāt. Ataeva doṣaṇāmanirvācyarajatatvādyutpattau hetutvaṁ lāghavād, rajatavādinaiva doṣakāryatāsvikārāceti jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣe nāsti pramāṇam. Ibid. pp. 73-74. (Vide Ref. No. 17 for ibid)

31. Tatra prācinai naiyāyikāih rajatādyamse jñānam jñānalakṣaṇasannikarṣa-janyam,

Evam jñānalakṣaṇānāṅgikāre jñātasya surabhicandanakhaṇḍasya cakṣuṣā surabhi candanamiti jñānam na syāt saurabhāṁse saurabhatvāṁse vā pratyāsatte rabhāvāt atastatra tajjñānameva. pratyāsatti"riti collekhāt. Ibid. pp. 73-75. (Vide Ref. No. 17)

32. Gopinath Kaviraj : *Aspects of Indian Thought*, p.1, University of Burdwan, 1984, Henceforth, Indian Thought.

33, *Ibid*.

34. *Indian Thought*, p.1.

35. *Ibid*, p.2.

36. *Ibid*, p.1.

37. N.C.Goswami : *Tarkasamgraha*, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta, p.283.

38. *Bhāsā - Paricchedah*, Verse No. 46.

38.1 Vide my article, 'Yogaja Pratyakṣa : Some Reflections', *The Visva-Bhārati Journal of Philosophy*. Volume XXXII, No. 2, 1997, Department of Philosophy and Religion, Visva-Bharati.

39. Manah karānakam jñānam bhāvanā bhāyāsasambhavam.

Bhavati dhyāyatām dharme kāntādāviva kāmīnām.

The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa. Edited by Pnadi ŚrīSūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla, Jaya Krishna Das Haridas Gupta, The Chowkhamba Sanskrit, Series Office, Benares City, 1936, p.97.

40. Laṅghanam dehadharmatvāt kaphajādyādīsambhavāt.

Mā gātprakarṣam, jñāne tu tasya kaḥ prativandhakah.

Ibid. p. 97.

41. Asmadādeśca rāgādimalāvaraṇadhūsam.

Mano na labhate jñānaprakarṣapadavīm parām.

Ibid. p.98.

42. Pratyūhabhāvanā'bhyāsakṣapitāseṣakalmaṣam.

Yoginām tu manah suddham kāmivārtham na paśyati.

Ibid. p. 98.

43. Nanvekena jñānena sarvānarthāḥ bhūta bhāviṇaḥ parokṣānapi paśyanto
yoginaḥ kathamākhilatrailokyāvṛttāntadarsīnaḥ sakalajagadgurorī-
śvarādvisiṣyeraṇ.

Ibid., 99.

44. Asti viśeṣaḥ īśvarasya tathāvidham nityameva jñānam yoginām tu
yogabhāvanābhyāsa prabhavamiti. *Ibid.* p.99.

45. Matpratyakṣam akṣamam dharmagrahane iti bhavān na jānīte
tvatpratyakṣamapi na dharmagrāhīti nāham jāne, anyasya pratyakṣamīdr-

śamevetyubhāvapyāvāṃ na jānīvahe.

Tvayā tu yadi sarveṣāṃ pratyakṣāṃ, jñātamidr̥śam.

Tarhi tvameva yogīti yogino dvekṣi kim vṛthā.

Ibid. p.95.

46. Tadevaṃ kṣīṇadoṣāṇāṃ dhyānā-vahitacetasāṃ.

Nirmalāṃ sarvaviṣayāṃ jñānaṃ bhavati yogināṃ.

Ibid. p.98.

47. Saṃskāramātrajanyam jñānam smṛtiḥ - *Tarkasaṃgraha, Sutra No.35.*

48. Vide my article, "Yogaja Pratyakṣa : Some Reflections". *The Visva-Bharati Journal of Philosophy*. Volume XXXII, No.2, 1997, Department of Philosophy, and Religion, Visva-Bharati.