

NOTES AND REFERENCES

CHAPTER II

1. Freedom and Reason, p. 21.
2. Ibid., pp. 36-7.
3. The Language of Morals, p. 56.
4. One's reasons for doing something do not even have to be thought out before hand.
5. The Language of Morals, p. 48.
6. Ibid., p. 62.
7. Ibid., p. 51.
8. It is important to note that I am not suggesting that judgments of the form 'One ought to do so' are always decisive factors in establishing what reasons will be relevant in an argument. I think Hare's theory overrates their importance in this respect.

CHAPTER III

1. I am not ignoring borderline dispute. Here the disagreement can be resolved, either by means of further evidence or by some decision about the relevant criteria.
2. 'Moral Arguments', p. 502.
3. Ibid, p. 504.
4. Ibid, p. 507
5. I acknowledge a general debt to the point of view proposed in the article 'On Morality's Having a Point' by Morence and Phillips.

6. 'Moral Arguments', p. 510.
7. 'Moral Beliefs', p. 101.
8. 'Modern Moral Philosophy', p. 18.
9. e.g. 'Moral Arguments', p. 510.
10. 'Modern Moral Philosophy', p. 1.
11. The Varieties of Goodness, p. 1.
12. 'Moral Beliefs', p. 92.
13. Utilitarianism, p. 7.
14. If by 'good and harm', Mrs Foot means 'moral good and harm', then it is a triviality.
15. 'Moral Arguments', p. 510.
16. 'Some Developments in Wittgenstein's View of Ethics", p. 19.
17. 'Moral Arguments', p. 510.
18. 'Goodness and Choice', p. 47.
19. Ibid., p. 49.
20. Ibid., p. 52.
21. Ibid., p. 50.
22. Ibid., p. 50.
23. Ibid.
24. 'Goodness and Choice', p. 47.
25. See Nichomachean Ethics 1, VII, II.
26. Wittgenstein : A Memoir, pp. 67-8.

CHAPTER VIII

1. Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique* Vol. I trans. Hazel E. Barnes as *The Problem of Method*, London, 1964.
2. Francis Jeason, *Le Problems morale et la pensee de Sartre* Paris, 1947. Preface by Sartre. There is a discussion on this book in *Existential Philosophers*, edited by Schrader, McGraw Hill, 1967. I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Dr. P. Roy, my Supervisor, for providing me with this reference.
3. (a) Norman N. Greene, *Jean-Paul Sartre, The Existentialist Ethic*, University of Michigan Press, 1960.
- (b) Mary Warnock, *Existentialist Ethics*, London, 1967. Also her
- (c) *Ethics Since 1900*, Chapter Seven.
- (d) Sartre, *A Collection of Essays* ed. Edith Kern, Prentice-Hall, 1962. In a sense, Sartre's analysis never leaves the descriptive level to which alone judgments of truth and falsehood can be applied. It never prescribes "what ought to be". This fact seems to have led to the view that Sartre has no ethics. He regarded ethics as an idealist trickery.
4. Sartre, *Existentialism*, trans. Bernard Frechtman, New York, 1947.
5. Genet, the playwright, is often taken to exist authentically, while the waiter in the *Being and Nothingness*, is an example of bad faith. We have taken *Rocquetin of Nausea* as a presentation of Sartre's ethical ideal, though Greene does not approve it. Others take *Orestes of The Flies* as illustrating his ethical ideal. Probably the best source of Sartre's ethical views are his dramatic

works. The personage of Hoederer in *Dirty Hands* comes, for some writers, closest to being a representation of Sartre's moral out-look.

6. It is the attitude to human freedom and to human choice that the term 'existentialism' serves to mark off.
7. What Camus has described as "Revolt" and the "Absurd" is the same experience described by other thinkers but named differently. Sartre calls it "nausea", Heidegger calls it "dread". For Kierkegaard it is the action of "despair". Nietzsche calls it the life of "freedom", and Jaspers sees it in the solitude/communication of "authentic Existenz". In each case it is the same dialectical experience of the individual related to his world, and it is this way of existing, that is the rallying point of existential thought.
8. It is a kind of ad hominem rebuttal of Sartre's doctrine. So is also his relationship with Simone de Beauvoir.
9. A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk I, Part IV, Section VII, p. 269.
10. Ibid.
11. R.M. Hare, *The Language of Morals*, the chapter on Decisions of Principle. In his *Freedom and Reason*, p. 38, Hare refers in a foot note to Sartre's *Existentialism* and remarks, "Sartre himself is as much of a universalist as I am". Another reference to Sartre occurs on p. 48. *The Language of Morals* has no such reference.

12. In recent years, Sartre has turned more and more toward a kind of dialectical sociology that seems very remote from the individualism of his earlier moral theory. He now professes that the moral autonomy of the individual is qualified by the fact that he lives in an exploitative society. True moral freedom is now projected into a future that will not be realized until the dialectic of alienation has run its course, and of this future, Sartre says, we can know nothing. His present description of existentialism as an "enclave within Marxism" seems to exaggerate the degree to which his fundamental position has changed.

CHAPTER IX

1. For different ways in which moralists such as Hume, Kant, Moore and Prichard have subscribed to this, see R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals, pp. 29-31. Professor Popper, in The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. I, pp. 52 ff and p. 204, note 5 has a vigorous statement of the distinction.
2. Cf. S.E. Toulmin, The Place of Reason in Ethics, Stuart Hampshire, "Fallacies of Moral Philosophy", Mind, 1949.
3. Treatise on Human Nature, Book III, I, Section I.
4. MacIntyre brings out in detail the contrast between this often quoted passage in Hume and his usual practice in ethical argument. Hampshire thinks that Hume was concerned to bring out that moral arguments are not logically deductive arguments.

5. Metaphysic of Morals, Section 42.
6. Cf. C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, p. 26.
7. W. D. Falk, "Grading and Guiding", Mind, 1953.
8. "Fallacies of Moral Philosophy", Mind, October, 1949.
9. Cf. his The Philosophy of Science, p. 97. Also G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p. 121 on "inference ticket".
10. In The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, 1958) Toulmin prefers to speak of rules of argument or "warrants" rather than premisses. The relevant for our present discussion is that the apparent transition from fact to value is only purible because a value-loaded principle has been introduced somewhere.
11. Treatise, III, 1. Section 3.
12. Or they may be the standards looked on as obvious in the circles in which the speaker moves.
13. Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 147, remarks how evaluative meaning may be overlooked where standards are stable.
14. Hare, IM p 100 on "functional words".
15. In his inaugural lecture, Political Education, reprinted in Philosophy, Politics and Society, p. 2.
16. See William Faulkner's novel, Intruder in the Dust for the point that no men can cause worse grief than one clinging blindly to the vices of his ancestors.
17. Dorothy Emmet, Function, Purpose and Powers, Ch. III and IV.

18. R.B. Braithwaite in his "An Empiricist looks at Religious Belief" finds the exemplary use of stories to be one of the main characteristics of religious morality.
19. Metaphysic of Morals, Section 32.