THE DISCURSIVE APPARATUS BETWEEN HARAWAY AND FOUCAULT: LOCATING THE FORMAL FEATURES OF DISCURSIVE SPACE

SHIRSANKAR BASU

1. Introduction: Haraway's Post-Newtonian Subjectivity

Fostering a poststructuralist[1] feminist lens, conflating the "concerns of Marxist and socialist feminism"[2] with science and technology studies, Haraway's postmodern theorisation of cyborg and enunciation of the politics of production of subjectivity in relation to situated knowledge claims, mark a pioneering trend in the study of post-humanism that integrates the issues of epistemology with the ethical. That the politics of subjectivity as material, embodied, situated and extended, is convoluted...can be thought of as primal in the context of Haraway's critical envisioning of feminist science and technology studies. The critical envisioning is wherein the speaking subject speaks from a certain politics of location[3], so as to transgress the boundaries of normative truth claims

---

[1] Here it is important we cast a difference between the historic-politically loaded terms: postmodernism and post-structuralism. Although here in this paper the postmodern and the poststructuralist have been shown to be congruent and at times conflated, yet there is a subtle difference between the two. *The postmodern is generically understood as being incredulous towards all classical/modern meta-narratives with special emphasis on difference and incommensurabilities*. While post-structuralism indicates a critical departure from the Saussurian linguistic dimension of formal/ahistorical structuralism which ascribes to a scientific discipline, its status of science. According to the postcolonial theorist, cultural critic Robert Young, "*post-structuralism traces the trace of structuralism's difference from itself.*" See Robert Young, "Post-Structuralism : An Introduction," in *Untying the Text : A Post-Structuralist Reader*, ed. Robert Young, 1st ed. (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1981).

[2] See Peta Hinton, "'Situated Knowledges' and New Materialism(s): Rethinking a Politics of Location," *Women* 25, no. 1 (2014): 99–113, doi:10.1080/09574042.2014.901104. Through combining Marxist and Socialist concerns with the framework of scientificity, Haraway not only critiqued the demonological standpoint towards science and technology but put forward the theory of cyborgs, upholding a 'transgressive landscape', as a strategy to understand 'fragmented boundary identities'. Cyborgs in her writings stand for fractured-ness, partiality, and fluidity of queer/transgender identities.

[3] See Ibid., p. 100.

with a radical constructivism[4] and produce in turn a complex discourse. Emphasizing the 'politics of location' as a crucial tool for ('new materialist'/neo-materialist) Haraway's feminist inquiry and research, and arguing that this is combined with situated knowledge production, feminist scholar Peta Hinton describes Haraway's enunciation of feminist politics of location as an important feminist toolkit that serves as an epistemological and methodological requisite. Feminist politics of location indicates a phenomenological[5] specificity of the speaking subject; in which the speaking subject speaks from her phenomenological experiences, from the experiences of her lived embodiment. This, as regards politics of location, is what grounds the theory with an agentic gesture of self-representing political self-definition, turning the discursive space, into a complex realm of 'positionality'. Thus, these methods of complex discourse(s) analysis, in which the research, the researcher and the researched are situated with respect to each other in a heavily co-constitutive intertwinement, are what constitute the

---

[4] See Donna Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective," *Feminist Studies* 14, no. 3 (2006): 575, doi:10.2307/3178066. Also, see Kirsten Campbell, "The Promise of Feminist Reflexivities: Developing Donna Haraway's Project for Feminist Science Studies," *Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy* 19, no. 1 (2004): 162–82, doi:10.2979/hyp.2004.19.1.162., to understand Haraway's account of science studies as both feminist and constructivist based on the 'constructivist concept of reflexivity' and 'radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects'.

[5] Here, it is important to give justifications as to why I attribute salience on Haraway's phenomenological politics of location as to explicate the discursive apparatus between Haraway and Foucault while it is historically prominent that Foucault was one of the sharpest critics of phenomenology all through his life and philosophical career. It is true that Foucault vehemently tried to distance himself from the Huseerlian-Marxist (transcendental) traditions and Sartrean existential traditions of phenomenological thought. But, did Foucault find a way out of Hegelian phenomenology? The answer to this question is indeterminate. Foucault himself admitted that the Hegelianism and phenomenological thought substantially shaped his intellectual formation during his university level education, during early 1950s. Also, Foucault was very much, rather inseparably, part of the historical movement that re-launched Hegelian studies in France; that is, French Hegelianism during the period 1930s-1950s under the guiding light of Jean Wahl, Alexandre Kojève, Alexandre Koyré and Jean Hyppolite. It is the Hegelian 'constitution of the transcendental' that troubled Foucault so much that he devised the philosophical technique of problematization to depart from it, thereafter. One of Foucault's prominent comments on Hegel can be quoted from Foucault's 1981 publication "The Order of Discourse" in which he writes: "*But to make a real escape from Hegel presupposes an exact appreciation of what it costs to detach ourselves from him. It presupposes a knowledge of how close Hegel has come to us […] … he is waiting for us immobile and elsewhere.*" See Michel Foucault, "The Order of Discourse," in *Untying the Text : A Post-Structuralist Reader*, ed. Robert Young, First (Boston, London and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981)., p. 74. *Thus I argue that Foucault's relationship to phenomenology is troubled, a continuous, repeated "reversal of for and against", both a rupture and a continuity.* See Pierre Macherey, "Did Foucault Find a 'Way Out' of Hegel?," *Theory, Culture and Society*, 2022, doi:10.1177/02632764221084903.

schematic of discursive space(s)[6]. Although, at an initial glance, discursive space, having its roots in post-structuralist traditions of thought, doesn't appear to be formalizable, yet a deeper investigation of its methods of analysis, especially topological, suggests that it can have formalism in a post-Newtonian, non-Euclidean plane. Because according to Haraway's indication, discursive space has a post-Newtonian subjectivity[7]. Deconstructing the truth claims of scientific objectivity, carried forward by "scientistic, positivist" rationality, in traditional epistemologies of science studies, Haraway contended that "*radical historical specificity*", "*radical historical contingency*", "*embodied accounts of truth*" and "*collective historical subjectivity*" are those conceptual linkages that can be attributed to the process of constructive undoing (of objectivity), to this post-modernist deconstructive practice of analysis, so as to highlight a radical constructivist feminist reflexivity. That this post-Newtonian subjectivity can be upheld so as to undo the logic of very many repressive and oppressive social hypotheses pervading across science and technology studies, becomes particularly clear when Haraway argues,

> We unmasked the doctrines of objectivity because they threatened our budding
> sense of collective historical subjectivity and agency and our "embodied" accounts

---

[6] Let us first try to map the ontology of discursive space. The definition of discursive space has been straight away derived from the Foucault's post-positivist theorisation of discursive formation according to which a discursive space is based on the idea of a *'dispositif'* (it is a French neologism(dis + positive) which means a complex heterogeneous ensemble or a social apparatus or at times 'set-up'. We have borrowed the definition of discursive space from the famous collection of interviews on Foucault: 'Power/Knowledge' following which and echoing with Foucault, we propose that this idea of complex heterogeneous ensemble or apparatus is heterogeneously constituted of discourses, institutions, spatial architectural forms, regulatory power structures, disciplinary norms, physical laws, gender politics, administrative measures; natural and social scientific statements--- the conjunctures and conflicts between them; philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions--- in short, both the said; that is, the articulated content as much as the unsaid and the unarticulable. Such are the elements of discursive space. See Michel Foucault, "The Confession of the Flesh," in *Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (Pantheon Books. New York, 1980)., p. 194.

[7] Post-Newtonian subjectivity is best understood by the disruption of subject-object dichotomy; understood by the fact that object of knowledge is contingent upon the intervention of subject, in quantum physical sciences. It is linked to the enunciation of (Hiesenberg's) uncertainty principle, complementarity, and nonlocal causation that go on to develop the foundation of "social physics" in which theses of objectivity, determinism, and causality are relinquished to pave the way for subjectivity, indeterminism, uncertainty and probability. See E. Sam Overman, "Continuities in the Development of the Physical and Social Sciences: Principles of a New Social Physics," *Knowledge in Society* 2, no. 2 (1989): 80–93, doi:10.1007/BF02687222.

of truth, and we end up with one more excuse for not learning any post-Newtonian physics.[8]

2. Discursive Frameworks: Comments on the Methodological Tenability

2.1 Mind / Gender as Discursive Formations

The discursive/philosophical frameworks of this paper situate an intersectional hybrid between cognitive science, gender studies and Foucauldian epistemology which, we show in this paper is tenable and resistant to all kinds of polemical attacks.

The central argument or the *position of the paper* is described here as follows: Since gender studies and Foucauldian epistemology both are (1) *critical of representationalism*, or better put, critical of representationalist cognitivism, and since both are based on the concepts of (2) *radical embodiment* and (3) *discursive limits of Classical/Bivalent logic*, hence based on this commonality they can be merged under a new meta-theoretical rubric of cognitive science, keeping their internal differences in tact. The resultant science is what we would call Foucauldian scientificity. This Foucauldian scientificity is how the intersectional hybrid between cognitive science, gender studies and Foucauldian epistemology, can be established.

According to this intersectional hybrid, and because of its very logic of vagueness and heterogeneity planted at the heart of Foucauldian epistemology, mind and/or gender, as discursive formations, have been re-presented in this paper as the *Foucauldian oeuvre* which is "regarded neither as an immediate unity, nor as a certain unity, nor as a homogeneous unity."[9] Thus mind and/or gender, as effects of semantically indeterminate discourses, have been shown to be *not* pre-shaped by universal, transcendental, a priori conceptual categories. That is, mind and gender, as discursive formations, are shown to be defying the internally consistent unification frameworks of

---

[8] This excerpt indicates that Haraway's deconstruction of "hostile science" is immersed in a post-Newtonian subjectivity. See Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.", p. 578.

[9] See Michel Foucault, "Part II: The Discursive Regularities : The Unities of Discourse," in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, ed. Alan Sheridan Michel Foucault (London. New York: Routledge Classics, 1972), 23–33., p.27.

law-like generalizable universality. Here, the primary reason or impetus to club cognitive science, gender studies and Foucauldian epistemology, which otherwise appear "incommensurable" or "incompatible", comes from the discursive nature of Foucauldian epistemology in which Foucault departs from classical Cartesian and Aristotelian epistemology to analyse the episteme in terms of "the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices [...]."[10] And thereby, we argue that discursive spaces or discursive (spatial) formations, because of its inherent logic of vagueness, indeterminacies, contradictions, heterogeneities, non-unifications, and internal inconsistencies rooted at the idea of the 'death of the subject', or what we can better interpret as the "*decentering of subjectivity*", perhaps have formalism, or quasi formalism, in terms of the post-Newtonian and non-Euclidean topologies.

2.2 Comments on the Formal Features

Such formalism, or quasi formalism, is feasible because both Foucault's epistemology and gender studies are critical of classical cognitivist representationalism. Here we depart from the universalistic and dualistic ontological assumptions of Classical/Cognitivist representational (-ist) logic. Thus, as a result of this philosophical thought, the formal features of discursive space are chosen as follows: (1) Rejection of centered-ness. (For example: phallocentrism, male-centeredness, euro-centeredness, bio-centrism, phallo-logocentrism etc.); (2) Invalidity of the principle of explosion. (3) Non-normative logical pluralism (in the sense that there is more than one precisification of the concept of logical consequence). (4) Rejection of dualism/dichotomy/binaries; (5) Vagueness and Uncertainty; (6) Undecidability and/or partial decidability; (7) Dialectical Contradictions; (8) paraconsistencies. We have shown where in the discursive apparatus between Haraway and Foucault, the above-mentioned formal features are validated. Through showing how these formal features are validated, as a resultant theorization model, what we intend to underline is the possibilization of the

---

[10] See Michel Foucault, "Part IV: Archaeological Descriptions : Science and Knowledge," in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, ed. Alan Sheridan Michel Foucault (London. New York: Routledge Classics, 1972), 151–215., p. 211

Foucauldian maxim that human individual and her/her/their mind or gender are nothing but a social construction of, historically contingent and semantically indeterminate, discourse/power complex. I argue that these philosophical frameworks in which Haraway can be situated in relation to Foucault, is nothing but a discursive admixture of phenomenology, deconstruction, feminism, Foucauldian epistemology and the philosophy of cognitive science.

2.3 **"Threshold of Epistemologization"**

In this way we highlight that mind and/or gender as discursive formations; that is, the fact that *mind or gender can be situated as a discursive apparatus between Haraway and Foucault* in terms of all those above-mentioned non-classical formal features is highlighted here. As a result, we show how the "unity of objects of discourses" comes to be marked with an "internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence."[11] We, thereby, present a singular; in effect a *nominalist logic of epistemology*, sort of a *particular theory of language.* This singular-nominalist characterization of mind or gender has been shown in this paper in which the "analysis of the episteme" or the epistemological field neither does follow the Cartesian "way of reasoning" underlying the dualistic metaphysic; nor does follow the Aristotelian "precisely ordered mode of abstract thinking"[12] marked by the Aristotelian structural laws of human thought. To be little more precise, the epistemological field of such discursive apparatuses appear neither as "a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge" nor as "general stage of [abstract, ordered, systematic] reason" nor as a "certain structure of thought". But, *cross* the Foucauldian "*threshold of epistemologization*"[13]; in order to manifest itself in terms of a discursively totalizable field of knowledge that is never-total; that is, presenting the epistemic field as an "indefinite field of relations", as an "inexhaustible field" uniting the discursive practices of the discursive formations that ultimately resist

---

[11] See Michel Foucault, "2. The Discursive Regularities : Discursive Formations," in *Archaeology of Knowledge*, ed. Alan Sheridan Michel Foucault (Routledge Classics, 1972), 34–43., p. 36
[12] See Genevieve Lloyd, "Reason as Attainment : Descartes's Method," in *The Man of Reason : "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy*, ed. Genevieve Llyod (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1984), 39–50., p. 41
[13] See Foucault, "Part IV: Archaeological Descriptions : Science and Knowledge.", pp 210-211

finalization and completeness; are therefore marked with the *disruptions of the sovereign unity of the subjectivity*.

3. Deconstructing Objectivity: Using situated knowledges

In her seminal paper, "Situated Knowledges", feminist scholar and science historian Donna Haraway claimed---"*feminist objectivity is situated knowledges*". And, employed '*discursive space(s)*' as an analytical tool, by giving a new (post-modern) paradigmatic model of science, that is contestable, and that which situates the "social constructionist arguments", used in social scientific studies, in the context of critiquing the concepts of "objectivity" in traditional scientific epistemologies. Application of such a situated cognition paradigm in understanding science thereby deconstructs[14] the normative truth claims (such as, scientific objectivity is disembodied) of traditional "*scientistic, positivist*" engagements and its binary oppositional frameworks (such as 'nature/culture'), and finally develops a "feminist critical empiricism" for a radical history of scientific investigations. For Haraway, the epistemological subject/knower of science, to which the object of knowledge is tied, is always constrained with the power regimes of racial and gendered subjectivity. The epistemological subject is always already tied to the myriad of power relations operating at the micro-level of society. Feminist critics of science have critiqued the object of knowledge in science as passive and inert, calling it fixed. Haraway posed this dream of objectivity as extremely dangerous since it seeks to strip agency from everyone and everything except the

---

[14] Here it is important to mention why I've invoked Derridean idea of deconstruction to flesh out the discursive apparatus between Haraway and Foucault. The reason is twofold. One reason is that Haraway herself quite boisterously speaks of the feminist deconstruction of positivist scientific truth and reason. And the second reason is historical. I argue that Haraway draws from both Derridean instinct of the decreative unmaking aspect of deconstruction and Foucault's "global rejection" of the language of classical Western scientific reason; which is in other words the "language of order" or the "language of the system of objectivity". Despite the fact there is historically prominent critical split between Foucault and Derrida, yet the truth is that Derridean deconstruction and Foucauldian epistemological discursivity, often cannot be separated in the history of post-structuralism. And, probably it is for this reason Haraway's post-Foucauldian frameworks are also informed of Derrida's deconstructive unmaking. It is true that Derrida retorted to Foucault's scheme of the "archaeology of silence" of madness as if Foucault had the "precomprehension of the concept of madness" but Derrida in no way denies that the objective of philosophy is to "*attempt to say the hyperbole*." And, it is in this sense perhaps Derrida's deconstruction can be conflated with Foucault's episteme. See Jacques Derrida, "Cogito and the History of Madness," in *Writing and Difference*, ed. Alan Bass (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1978), 36–77.

scientist. Hence, acknowledging such approaches are related more to the issues of (feminist) ethics and politics than epistemology, and in order to give her text a post-colonial positioning, Haraway argued in the paper that "*All knowledge*", in situated cognition paradigms, "*is understood as a condensed node in the agonistic power field*" which can be pitted against the doctrines of "*objective power*", in normative, "*masculinist*" scientific engagements that dismiss "embodied accounts of truths", "collective historical subjectivity", and "agency". Thus, "eschewing the *addictive narcotic of transcendental foundations*" in science, Haraway insists on uncertainties and undecidabilities (agonism as indicated by Haraway) of knowledge which constitute the discursive analytical framework, and integrate the scientific discourses of objectivity with its monstrous other---embodied, situated, implicated knowledge. That all knowledge systems are nothing but agonistic nodes within discursive power field is a statement that perfectly sits well with Foucault's power-knowledge complex and his poststructuralist frameworks that evade transcendentalism. Here, it can be shown that Haraway's stance is purely post-Foucauldian. By this she means that with the help of Foucauldian power-knowledge complex, one can show how epistemic structures are situated in relation to discursive bodies, historical moments/subjectivities and discursive practices. And, the poststructuralist formulation of 'knowledge-body-power-subjectivities' somehow evades the frameworks of transcendentalism. It is this "residual whiff of transcendentalism"[15] that both Foucault and Haraway try to avoid in their de/essentializing systems of thought and theory. This 'whiff of transcendentalism' is perhaps that which paves the way to essentialisms, and that, as thought by both Haraway and Foucault, which prevents the formal laws governing every scientific epistemology from intersecting with "vicissitudes of history".

4. Haraway's *Radical Constructivist* Analysis

Such analysis technique, in the form of a spatialization apparatus(eg: spatialization of language), mapped onto the conceptualisation of discursive space, in Haraway's

---

[15] See Maurice Blanchot, "Michel Foucault as I Imagine Him," in *Foucault/Blanchot* (New York: Zone Books, 1987)., p. 71.

language praxis, and in her feminist articulation, integrates the apparatuses of biotechnological sciences with that [dispositifs meaning 'apparatuses'] of human and social sciences, based on three precursory ideas: a) mind, brain and cognition are embodied; mind is extended into the world, situated in the environment from which we, humans, draw various affordances which ultimately differentially shape our lived social realities b) all truth claims are socially constructed c) all knowledge claims are situated and contingent. If these three precursory thoughts are to be mapped onto a feminist practice, then: (1.) delegitimization of 'universalizing tendencies' that appropriate biological naturalism of life among queer/trans/intersex subjects which completely avoids the culture-question and (2.) obscuring of "disembodied ambitions of cogito": these two points are found to be crucial. Here we see the first formal feature of discursive space finds its validation: Rejection of centered-ness; because, to tend to universalize is to totalize, and to totalize is to have a centre. Since, "scientistic, positivist" rationality always tends to universalize the materiality in natural sciences, and particularly binarizes the material-discursive socialization of queer/trans/intersex subjects with totalizing narrative(s)[16], it can be argued that such tendencies of binary constructivism are phallogocentric (phallo-logocentric). Because, they foster dualistic thinking that presupposes Man at the centre, presumes "Western" humanist ideals as putatively universal. This particular de-centering of Man in Haraway's discursive spaces again reconciles us with Foucault's insistence on the theoretical and philosophical rejection of the universalistic or foundationalistic meta-interpretations of Western humanist ideals[17] of modernity. That is, to indicate his nominalist avowal that "Man doesn't exist" or Man is promised to an imminent death as a face drawn in the sand near the edge of the sea.

---

[16] The idea of totalizing narratives echoes with the Lyotardian description of 'postmodern condition' that marks the end of modernity and its impossibility to continue with grand, totalizing social theories and narratives. However, Fredric Jameson in 1984, in his famous article: "Postmodernism or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism", argued that there's enough debate regarding how classical Marxism has always been regarded as grand, totalizing social theory, that is, as most inclusive social theory, whereas postmodernism has always been relativized, denigrated as a 'cultural logic of late capitalism' despite the fact that theoretical shift to postmodernism brought about sea change in the perspectivization of society, culture, theory, experience and subjectivity.

[17] See Nancy Fraser, "Michel Foucault: A 'Young Conservative'?," *Ethics* 96, no. 1 (1985): 165–84, doi:10.1086/292729.

This methodological scepticism here also questions what counts as nature along with questioning what counts as man. Just as nature is always "appropriated, preserved, enslaved, exalted or otherwise made flexible for disposal by culture", along the lines of capitalist colonialism, the productionist logic in the traditions of Western binary oppositions has always "resourced" sex for its representation as gender. Which Haraway described as a trap of "appropriationist logic of domination" built into the binary oppositions such as nature/culture and sex/gender. For Haraway, truth of these binaries is that these binary constructivisms are in reality co-constitutional.

Now, opposing the binary constructivism, deconstructing (constructively undoing) binary oppositional frameworks that go on to formulate the basic conceptual bedrock of natural sciences, Haraway using her radical constructivist approach, integrates the (feminist) politics of location with feminist politics of difference that forms the basis of situated cognitive subjectivity. But, questions that come across as important, here, are: (a) what is this politics of location? We have already spoken of (a). We shall now investigate: (b) how is this politics of location, as a "postmodern insistence", submerged in this politics of situated knowledge(s), and integrated with politics of difference?

5. Politics of Difference

In radical feminist terminologies, these differences are (mutual) non-dominant, non-hierarchical: the celebration of which leads to the gradual dismantling of 'the Master's house' which appropriates an exclusionary politics and an exploitative logic through applying the Master's tools. From this angle, it is clear that the celebration and acknowledgement of difference(s), through mutual interdependence and inter-subjectivity, go on to imply subverting the top-down power structure as exercised by capitalist patriarchy and mainstream feminism that reinforce sameness and homogeneity, as opposed to the allusions of heterogeneity, which are often employed in understanding community-building frameworks or collective kinship networks. Hence, celebration of differences speaks of multiplicity and pluralism as democratic agendas in order to accentuate diversity and inclusion in societies. Differences lead to multiplicity of opinions and acknowledgment of pluralism in practices of thought and production of

knowledge(s), through mutual inter-dependence and sharing. But, these difference(s) may also lead to othering, in the sense that it could be exclusionary as well. There could be very many processes of othering/otherisation in a society.

For example:

Case (1.): we can think of socially repressive hypotheses indicating processes of othering a black lesbian feminist woman in a social space administered by cisgendered White heterosexual feminist women; We can imagine another set of psychosocial processes driven by which a Black lesbian feminist woman situates herself in that space as the 'Other', to bridge between her personal and political;

Or,

Case (2.): another social situation wherein a transgendered feminist person* is regulated, controlled, belittled, and thus intellectually otherised, subalternised by a cisgendered lesbian woman.

Commonalities between these two cases are that all the situations have patterns of similar social processes of othering/otherisation, which are in turn processes of negating/excluding the 'other', perpetuated by processes of maintaining radical differences. So, in short what it reduces to is that processes of enculturating differences both include, by encouraging pluralism, diversity and inclusion, as well as exclude; that is, doesn't include 'others', by subjecting the system to power dominance relations; both inclusion and exclusion being true at the same time and space. And, here it leads to contradictions. We conclude that there are two premises: The first premise is where there is some evidence that says differences need to be enculturated, and celebrated so as to inculcate diversity and inclusion; the second premise claims difference accentuates othering/otherisation, a process of negation. Thus, the two premises contradict each other, in relation to politics of difference. Audre Lorde, underlining the creative function of differences in her seminal text: 'The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House', proclaims---

> Difference must not merely be tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic. Only then does the necessity for interdependency become unthreatening. Only within that interdependency of different strengths, acknowledged and equal, can the power to seek new ways of being in the world generate, as well as the courage and sustenance to act where there are no charters.[18]

Which implies understanding the culture of differences ought to be in terms a dialectic. Following the similar logic of dialectics, we can contend that Haraway's conceptualisation of cyborg is an exemplification of this irony to put 'incompatible things together', by upholding that the imagery of post-human cybernetic organisms, as a body-machine, as a hybridization of the natural, the social and the technological; and thus highlighted the need to be different to alter the then current face of feminism (second wave) immersed in technocratic capitalism and 'multinational systems of domination', in order to inculcate the practice of third wave feminism. The discursive apparatus between Haraway and Foucault that we are trying to construct here takes a turn and tries to highlight Foucault's avowed take with respect to differences. We would particularly cite Foucault's take vis-à-vis difference from his 1970 essay: 'Theatrum Philosophicum'. Writes Foucault:

> The freeing of difference requires thought without contradiction, without dialectics, without negation; thought that accepts divergence; affirmative thought whose instrument is disjunction; thought of the multiple—of the nomadic and dispersed multiplicity that is not limited or confined by the constraints of the same[19].

So, we see our formal system for discursive spatial fields of knowledge, also accommodates the fact that difference is not contradictory; To understand this we need to invest ourselves in the archaeology of the un-said propositions about Foucault-Hegel

---

[18] See Audre Lorde, "Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House.," in *Sister Outsider : Essays and Speeches by Audre Lorde.*, ed. Audre Lorde (Berkeley: Crossing Press, 1984)..

[19] See Michel Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in *Between Deleuze and Foucualt*, ed. Thomas Nail and Daniel W. Smith (Edinburgh University Press, 2016)., pp. 50-51

intersections. From the above excerpt it is clear that Foucault firmly believed that dialectics cannot liberate differences. Foucault here prioritizes the method of problematization instead of dialectics. Although, dialectics guarantee how differences can always be recaptured in the form of dialectic. Yet, Foucault was skeptical about this "dialectical sovereignty of the same" and thereby calls into question the "unchanging pedagogical origin of dialectics", about this "neurosis of dialectics"! Hence, he writes that difference in order to get liberated needs to be thought without contradiction, without dialectics, without negation, without rule of the negative, but with the thought of a "nomadic and dispersed multiplicity". So, in our queer feminist logical system, that we are terming as the 'Discursive Apparatus' between Haraway and Foucault: this fact of difference being thought both in relation and not in relation to contradiction, creates a moment of paraconsistency, and invalidates the principle of explosion. For in saying that difference is and is not contradictory, what we purportedly claim is that both the statements and their negation are true in our logical system.

6. The Psychological and the Political

We know that psychological milieu often intersects with the theoretical milieu and theoretical milieu or space often relates to the political milieu, especially according to post-structuralist, post-modernist formulations. So, let us now analyse the inter-relations between the psychological and the political. Questions that come across as important, here, are: how does one bridge between the personal, the psychological and the political? This is best understood when we look through how, arguing from a feminist politics of location, through the problematization of knowledge production and acquisition procedures in relation to power dynamics, Haraway reads into the equality versus difference debates in feminist political practices regarding science and technology studies and sets her focus on politics of difference(s); that is, on the multiplicity of cultural and sexual differences between "compulsory heterosexuals" and queer/trans/intersex communities. What are worth investigating here is: (a) How is

situated knowledge production associated with 'situated embodiment' of women*[20] subjects and their celebration of differences? (b) How is situated cognitive subjectivity conceptually linked to the practice of acknowledging, enculturating and celebrating embodied differences, particularly understood in terms of a metaphorical representation of the discursive foundation of transgendered embodiment? What is important to note, here, is that these areas of logical argumentation are again mired in (dialectical) contradiction(s). On the one hand, there's acknowledgement of the fact, through reconfiguring subjectivity, that identity of women can't be cognized in a straightforward, linear manner; that is, it has some nonlinear elements in it. On the other, at the same time, something of this same identity is linearly drawn in terms of a self-reflexive psychological process of self-identification, in order to ground the subject's political aspirations and accountability. This becomes clear when we see the feminist scholar Peta Hinton's argument:

> Reading this 'problem of difference' into a politics of location, the key issue that emerges here is that its reconfiguring of subjectivity disrupts the capacity to secure the identity of a woman in any straightforward manner, while at the same time, it requires something of this identity in order to ground its political aspirations... in signalling the multiplicity of identities inherent in the category 'woman', but also... in opening to question the production of embodied difference by acknowledging materiality's entangled engagements as suggestive of the complicated production of any identity.[21]

This argument clearly speaks for a vision which understands the "production of embodied difference" and that of categorically complicated multiplicity in theorising the identity category of women*. So, what is the politics of this vision, here?

---

[20] The asterisk '*' indicates an anti-essentialist conceptualization of the category of woman, encompassing both biological and cultural women. This way of indicating or rethinking the category of woman is borrowed from the gender theorist/philosopher Judith Butler's acclaimed work: 'Gender Trouble'.
[21] See Hinton, "'Situated Knowledges' and New Materialism(s): Rethinking a Politics of Location.", p. 101.

7. Politics of Vision: Formation of Feminist Objectivity

Now, to know how politics of difference is associated with politics of situated knowledge(s), we need to delve into the politics of vision through the understanding of how embodied differences relate to the deconstruction of subject-object dichotomy and its concerning objectivity, and how we can rework-reconfigure objectivity into a subjectivity produced through the lines of subjectification constituted of the subject's phenomenological experiences or their* lived social-material realities. To enunciate, what becomes additionally necessary is the understanding of a politics of vision; that is, of the conflict between vision from below / 'view from below'/ bottom up vision and the top-down vision / 'view from above' and the central question is which view to adopt as to be more politically correct. That is, which view is to be more regarded as an ethically, politically correct feminist practice of thinking: A 'view from above' that appropriates top-down power structure that radical feminists often critique; or, a 'view from below' that upholds the vantage point of the subjugated, structured through the apparatuses of gender-race-nation-class-sexuality in the Western context, or through the apparatuses of caste-class-gender-nation-sexuality-religion in the south Asian context.

Now, if we place the 'view from below' and situate the caste-class-gender-sexuality-religion apparatus in social-historical context(s), the textual space will take a discursive shift towards the perspectivization of the politics of intersectionality in Trans*[22]/queer/Kothi/Hijra plane. Discussing geometric foundation of this intersectionality could be another broader area of research. But, let's not digress.

Let us think more about Haraway's understanding of vision in terms of its 'embodied nature', and her reclaiming of the primate visual sensory system that comes with a critical intervention of ---a scientistic, masculinist gaze, the 'God's eyeview', the 'god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere': that is, "a way of being everywhere while denying the need to be anywhere". This is specially applied in modern visualisation

---

[22] Here the use of asterisk '*' indicates the inclusion of all transgendered identity categories that can come under the umbrella of Trans*.

technologies from scanning electron microscopes, to magnetic resonance imaging applied as neuroimaging technologies. Haraway's critique of this scientistic gaze, emanating from a 'cannibaleye', in natural science and biotechnological studies, tied to "militarism, capitalism, colonialism, and male supremacy", appears to be informed by Foucault's critique of biopolitical techno-apparatuses reinforcing 'medical gaze' upon the speaking subjects in medical clinics as applied in his discursive analytical inquiry of clinical positivism. Here, Haraway, in this case drawing her political, philosophical lineage from Foucault, actually applies Foucault's analytical technique of associating 'medical gaze' with 'objectivization of the speaking subject' in showing and signifying how scientistic gaze; that is, a 'conquering gaze' happens to be associated with phallogocentric universalization of 'objectivity' in scientifically, technologically modern societies that is foundationally built upon racism, male-dominance, militarism, patriarchy, and trans misogyny. She holds that within this scientistic gaze are inscribed several "marked bodies" or what we can call marginal individuals which make the unmarked category of Man and White assume power over these discursively marginal bodies. Haraway maintained that, coming from a feminist location, we all will turn into cyborgs in future; that is, she predicted that a time will come when the human race will turn into a bunch of body-machines, *post-human* human-computer interfacial creatures. Haraway argues:

> I would like to insist on the embodied nature of all vision ... This is the gaze that mythically inscribes all the marked bodies; that makes unmarked category claim the power to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping representation. This gaze signifies the unmarked positions of Man and White, one of the many nasty tones of the word "objectivity" to feminist ears.[23]

Thus problematizing vision in modern scientific and technological societies, Haraway indoctrinates the 'embodied objectivity' as the 'new materialist' feminist objectivity which is understood in terms of production, acquisition, distribution of situated

---

[23] See Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.", p. 581

knowledges. That is, despite deconstructing objectivity, and reconfiguring it into a subjectivity, Haraway did not repudiate universality or objectivity, rather contended that we can mould our 'stereoscopic vision' so that the discursive deconstruction of objectivity can be reformulated into the idea of a feminist objectivity, and proclaims,

> I would like a doctrine of embodied objectivity that accommodates paradoxical and critical feminist science projects: Feminist objectivity quite simply means situated knowledges.[24]

Haraway adds that this 'feminist objectivity' is all about 'limited location' and 'situated knowledges' and not about the 'false vision' of "transcendence and splitting of subject and object". Rather, much like all the fragmented and porous boundaries of many other binaries such as public/private, personal/political, theory/practice etc., the two poles of binary constructivism—subject/object---too mutually co-determine, co-constitute each other, in order to produce multidimensional social-cultural-political subjectivities. These are not split into binary oppositions.

8. *Post-Human* Turn in Haraway: Enunciating Cyborg Feminism

Let us now come to the part of discourse dealing with Haraway's coinage of post-humanism through her theorisation of cyborg myth; that is, to how she precisified the conceptualisation of 'what counts as nature', as something uncertain, through her post-human critical thought, upholding cyborgs as a cybernetic hybrid of man and machine, a body-machine, a mythical creature that subverts the hegemonisation of an "original unity", an "essential unity", and a "fullness" that are often contextualised in relation to the "phallic mother". Haraway, in her post-modernist method of critiquing scientistic positivism, denounces the concepts such as "organic whole", "fullness", "essential unity", and insists that it is partial perspectives that give us the vision to see the lines of fractures. Interestingly, these lines of fractures or fragmentation of the subject in Haraway are the lines of subjectification or moments of dispersion in Foucault, which can be visualised both in terms of a complex discourse analysis as to produce subjectivity

---

[24] Ibid.

or in conceptualising identities as contradictory, and therefore fractured. Combining her feminist political location of affirming the 'connection of pleasure between human and other living creatures', with the argument that knowledge is situated, Haraway deconstructed the regular notion of nature, proclaimed that truth doesn't have any unconditioned, transcendental universal nature; rather, all truths are socially constructed. Here again, Haraway's stance reminds us how Foucault, performing the role of a genealogist, documented "the contingency of historical constructions of truth and identity through the construction of alternative truths and explication of 'subjugated knowledges'"[25]. That truth(s) must insist on a rhetorical nature opposing a phallo-logocentric universalization, must critique the biopolitical apparatuses linking social structures and the nation-state, is to be settled through a "dialectical progeny", and this is what constitutes the foundation of Haraway's discursive space in which understanding social constructionist arguments is a central feature. In Cyborg Manifesto, Haraway expressed it in explicit terms that Foucauldian biopolitics is a "flaccid pre-monition" of the advent of 'cyborg politics' in late twentieth century, and conceptualised her concepts of "techno-biopower" from tenets of biopower, and "informatics of domination" from the tenets of repressed/subjugated knowledges. Haraway speaks of embracing her non-human 'other'; that is, animals, and of embracing her post-human 'other'; that is, machines, in order to counter-hegemonize the practices of modern societies. Her methodology of queering the textual space, and in the end, speaking of a 'feminist critical empiricism' is evident in the way she disrupts/transgresses the boundary between human-animal and human-machine binaries, in how she rejects holism and in how she contests binary oppositional frameworks constituting practices of thinking perpetuated by modern scientific culture. Haraway apprehends that late twentieth century scientific fraternity would place the Man and White at the centre of human history that will appropriate hegemonic tools of oppression perpetrated by the enmeshed web of colonialism and 'patriarchal capitalism'. Problematising the production of machines by

---

[25] See M.E.Bailey, "Foucauldian Feminism : Contesting Bodies, Sexuality and Identity," in *Up Against Foucault : Explorations of Some Tensions between Foucault and Feminism*, ed. Caroline Ramazanoglu (London. New York: Routledge, 1993)., p. 103.

these "biological-determinist" cultures of late twentieth century scientific fraternity who would be universalizing Man as nature, Haraway contends that these scientific cultures would appropriate masculinist "ubiquity and spirituality" of the Father; she critiques that these machines don't have any agency, can never be the 'man', a 'self-moving', 'autonomous' entity, an 'author himself' but can only do a mockery or a caricature of that 'masculinist reproductive dream'. Haraway proclaimed that 'single vision produces worse illusions', and single-axis-thinking is never really sufficient to decode into the 'political ambit' of 'domination and possibilities unimaginable from the other vantage point'. Hence, what is called for is an abstract *trans-thinking* through which the perspectival politics of 'cyborg world' can be made to appear twofold. One, in which the cyborg world talk about the 'technological apocalypse' and the appropriation of women's bodies in masculinist orgy of war'; and the other perspective, in which the cyborg world is all about 'lived social and bodily realities' of people inhabiting a space of 'joint kinship' or a 'political kinship' with animals and machines, and about transgressing the boundaries between these categories. Enunciating more on the "leaky distinction", causing boundaries between physical and non-physical, to be *porous*, Haraway argues:

> The second leaky distinction was between animal-human (organism) and machine. ... There was always the spectre of ghost in the machine ... But, basically machines were not self-moving, self-designing, autonomous. They could not achieve man's dreams, only mock it. They were not man, an author himself, but only a caricature of that masculinist reproductive dream.[26]

Implying that these dreams of man making machines, and improvising machine's 'cannibaleye' which has a capacity to see everything from nowhere, are pre-discursive, Haraway claims that the discursive foundation of her postmodernist feminist objectivity lies in situated knowledges. Interestingly, this feminist objectivity, in Haraway's vision, is formed through deconstructing the objectivity of traditional positivist scientific

---

[26] See Donna Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s," in *The Postmodern Turn : New Perspectives on Social Theory*, ed. Steven Seidman, 1st ed. (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1994). p. 86

inquiries and reworking that into a subjectivity; -- a situated, embodied, extended subjectivity of agents which are body-machines; that is, cyborgs. Which, for Haraway, becomes the 'new materialist' feminist objectivity. Needless to say that the queering in her textual space lies in her forming the discursive space, that deals with subversive politics of cyborg ontology, in which such non-disaggregrating intersectional dimensions as gender, race, nation, class, and sexuality begin to slide in "slippery ambiguities". So, again, here, the discursive space speaks of imprecision, uncertainty and vagueness. If we investigate the historical-genealogical backdrop of Cyborg Manifesto, it reveals that it was already in Haraway's feminist cognition that "textualisation of everything in post-structuralist, post-modernist theory has been damned by Marxists and socialist-feminists", yet she goes on to meta-theoretically conceptualise the perspectivally futurist world of cyborgs, clearly suggesting that the scientific discourse on cyborg politics would potentially revamp and extend the culture of socialist-feminism, by its tropological figuration. This argument becomes clear in the following excerpt:

> Textualization of everything in post-structuralist, post-modernist theory has been damned by Marxists and socialist-feminists for its utopian disregard for the lived relations of domination ... It is certainly true that post-modernist strategies, like my cyborg myth, subvert myriad organic wholes ... In short, the certainty of what counts as nature... The transcendent authorization of interpretation is lost, and with it the ontology grounding "Western" epistemology.[27]

9. Politics of *Radical Embodiment*

We will then come to the 'politics of embodiment' to analyze Haraway's discursive space which is primarily, radically contingent upon the historical-genealogical foundation of sexed bodies, following the lines of discourse in Foucault's analysis of his deployment of sexuality in relation to the objectification of bodies. This gets increasingly clear in the chapter: 'Scientia Sexualis' in '*History of Sexuality volume 1*' where

---

[27] Ibid., pp. 87-88

Foucault clearly explicates how bodies, and pleasures in relation to bodies, are socially shaped, controlled by normative gazes, policed by state apparatuses, and thereby disrupt the boundaries between the permitted and the forbidden: which finally get transformed into a discourse. Taking Foucault completely on board, Haraway cognized that the politics of subversive bodies of social identities belonging to trans*/queer/intersex spectrum is such that these bodies are often subjected to the application of various soft and hard (bio)medical technologies, and in the end, this radical body modification indicates that these subversive bodies are discursively constituted. Which is the legit reason why they*—these subversive bodies---can be conceptualised as cyborgs; that is, body-machine hybrids of natural, biological, social and technological. Enunciating more on the nineteenth century discourse on the 'interplay of truth and sex', and the 'sexual embodiment' especially in relation to Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Greco-Roman cultures, and Arabo-Moslem societies, Foucault crafted his discursive power-knowledge-space triad vis-à-vis pleasures, "aberrations, perversions, exceptional oddities, pathological abatements, and morbid aggravations" somewhat as follows:

> In the erotic art, truth is drawn from pleasure itself, understood as a practice and accumulated as experience; pleasure is not considered in relation to an absolute law of the permitted and the forbidden, nor by reference to a criterion of utility, but first and foremost in relation to itself; it is experienced as pleasure, evaluated in terms of its intensity, its specific quality, its duration, its reverberations in the body and the soul. Moreover, this knowledge must be deflected back into the sexual practice itself, in order to shape it as though from within and amplify its effects.[28]

Now, in order to analyze the enunciation of Haraway's feminist philosophy of body[29], in her post-modernist, deconstructionist accounts, we probably need to understand: How Haraway cognized the body materiality—the body politics—of

---

[28] See the chapter 'Scientia Sexualis' from Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: The Will To Knowledge* (Penguin Books, 1976)., p. 57.

[29] Haraway's feminist philosophy of body is best understood through her politics of embodiment in Cyborg Manifesto where she 'constantly evokes dualisms and contradictions', claiming that dualisms like materialism/idealism, rationalism/empiricism, public/private etc. mutually determine each other and are ontologically porous. Hence, her political stance in her theorisation is to merge the opposites and blurs the boundaries between them; which is how she transcends dualisms in her work.

cyborgs in her act of creating/crafting a mythical, cybernetic creature? How did she, as a woman, integrate a theory of feminist consciousness, of speaking from lived experiences, into her practice of feminist writing? How did she transgress the boundaries of dualisms, accept vagueness through the production of subjectivity both in logic and language, and give way to a resolution through dialectical contradictions? How does she critique essentialist accounts of science and instead uphold arguments of social constructionism especially in relation to race and gender? How does she critique species-hierarchy and replace the semiotics of representationalism[30] by recourses to linguistic vagueness? How does she cognize 'politics of embodiment' in relation to the sexed bodies, and machines that are post-gender creatures? Haraway's feminist philosophy of body, in relation to all these questions, becomes clear when she argues in Cyborg Manifesto, that "the cyborg is not subject to Foucault's biopolitics" but rather "the cyborg simulates politics" and writes that cyborg is *not* the signification of an essentialist 'unitary identity'; rather cyborg is always contingent on a never-ending framework of 'antagonistic dualisms'; cyborg machination is, holds Haraway, not an 'it' to be dominated; rather cyborg machines are our cognitive-epistemic processes and an aspect of embodiment :

> There are several consequences ... A cyborg body is not innocent; ... it does not seek unitary identity and so generate antagonistic dualisms without end (or until the world ends); it takes irony for granted... One is too few, and two is only one possibility. Intense pleasure in skill, machine skill, ceases to be a sin, but an aspect of embodiment ... Cyborgs might consider more seriously the partial, fluid, sometimes aspect of sex and sexual embodiment.[31]

---

[30] Critique of the *semiotics of representationalism* often refers to Haraway's use of diffraction as a dispersive tool of feminist inquiry into the material-semiotic reality of technoscience studies. This also pertains to Haraway's social criticism of science using semiotic/semiological tools to justify species hierarchy. See Iris Van Der Tuin, "Diffraction as a Methodology for Feminist Onto-Epistemology: On Encountering Chantal Chawaf and Posthuman Interpellation," *Parallax* 20, no. 3 (2014): 231–44, doi:10.1080/13534645.2014.927631.

[31] See Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s.", p. 146

To sum up, Haraway's poststructuralist feminist lens to see through social-political identities as contradictory, partial, fluid, fragmented and fractured, unfolding the genealogization of subversive bodies, race, gender and the State, across feminist theories, has undoubtedly a postmodernist feminist objectivity that reflects itself in the theorisation of cyborg politics. Haraway contended that the cyborg politics in science and technological studies accentuate the proliferation of cyborg world, in spite of the fact that universalizing, totalizing narratives in relation to that tradition of scientistic objectification among positivist inquiries have always undervalued women and their agentic subjectivity. Here, the term 'women' both include biological women, and transgendered women as well as other transsexual subjects, who have always otherwise been depicted by traditional positivist scientific investigations, as going through gender identity disorder because of having been treated with cross-sex hormones.

10. "Boundary Breakdowns": Haraway's Commitment to Vagueness

 Haraway's deconstruction of binary constructivism(s), her critique of biological naturalism of life, accentuated through biopolitical technologies in "Western" science and politics, her contention that nature should not be appropriated "as a resource for the productions of culture" in technologically mediated societies, and her analysis of the traditions of "reproduction of self from the reflections of the other",... are all historically contingent upon her act of re-visioning nature as a topos, her re-working of nature and culture, and also upon her ontological commitment to "boundary breakdowns" that rendered the cognitive-political-scientific analysis of cyborg theory, feasible. Such understanding of breakdown of the determinate boundaries between human-animal, human-machine, public-private, theory-practice, sex-gender, male-female, masculine-feminine etc are the reflections of her belief in being-in-the-world and her stance of interpretative phenomenological analysis, and her commitment to the analysis of vague objects and vague identities. That cyborg world has a resolute commitment towards partiality, ironic political myths, intimacy, perversity of perspectives, towards oppositionality and utopia, actually reflects Haraway's commitment towards vagueness both in naturality and language which corroborate "the commonly definition of a vague

296

property that a vague property neither definitely applies nor definitely fails to apply to an object."[32] This argument in relation to the vague property of cyborg world becomes clear as and when Haraway writes in '*Haraway Reader*', that :

> The cyborg is resolutely committed to partiality, irony, intimacy and perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely without innocence. No longer structured by the polarity of public and private, the cyborg defines a technological polis defined partly on a revolution of social relations in the oikos, the household. Nature and culture are reworked; the one can no longer be the resource for appropriation or incorporation by the other. The relationships for forming wholes from parts, including those of polarity and hierarchical domination, are at issue in the cyborg world.[33]

Haraway's ontological commitment towards vagueness becomes clear again when, arguing that, "writing is pre-eminently the technology of cyborgs", she holds in *Haraway Reader* that cyborg politics should be best understood as a "struggle for language and the struggle against perfect communication"[34]; that is, a struggle "against one code that translates all meaning perfectly"[35]. Needless to say that the existence of such a code, engraved as a semiotic technology, in writing that translates all meanings perfectly is often interpreted as the "central dogma of phallogocentrism"[36].

11. Conclusion

So, we see a distinct feature of the category of the indeterminate that, having a positive status, pervades across our attempts to construct a formal logical space that we call the 'discursive apparatus' between Haraway and Foucault. We contend that both Haraway

---

[32] See Amita Chatterjee, "Vague Objects and Vague Identity," in *Understanding Vagueness* (New Delhi: PRAGATI PUBLICATIONS, 1994). We argue that along with mountains as real world compositionally vague objects, mind and/or gender as 'discursive formations', too, are compositionally vague.

[33] See Haraway, "A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s.", p. 84

[34] See Donna Haraway, "A MANIFESTO FOR CYBORGS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIALIST FEMINISM IN THE 1980s," in *The Haraway Reader* (NEW YORK AND LONDON: ROUTLEDGE, 2004)., p. 34

[35] Ibid., p. 34.

[36] Ibid.., p. 34.

and Foucault are concerned with many ways of constructing or figuring the indeterminate: One is the aspect of psychological indeterminacy, which is neither the belief that P nor the belief that Not-P; and the other aspect is that of semantic indeterminacy which is neither the meaning of P nor the meaning of Not-P. This particularly reminds us of the places in Foucault's epistemic-logical system wherein we find the examples of ambiguous *propositions or statements*. We need to revisit the selected interview collections: 'Power/Knowledge', citing which we can uphold Foucault's infamous utterance that discourses historically create, produce or fabricate certain "effects of truths" which are evaluated to be neither true nor false[37]. Hence to break away from formal structuralizations, or formalisms, Haraway's theorisation of cyborg feminist epistemology actually implies formation of a discursive space(s) that transgresses all dogmatic beliefs in science and technology studies by a 'perverse shift of perspectives' that can enable readers to contest for meanings. I contend such techniques of problematisations have a bearing on Foucauldian critical-immanent problematisation of power relationships across several social-cultural-political institutions, and on Foucault's topological rendering of power as micro-physical. Just as Hegelian dialectical contradictions were initially assumed not to be formalizable, and then, later on, got formalised as dialectical logic, I contend here that discursive space also is formalizable in terms of alternative axiom systems or through some deviant techniques of axiomatizations applying non-classical logic that is a radical departure from Aristotelian syllogistic logic. Here, our text conclusively turns a discursive shift to myriads of questions.

When we talk about transgressing the binary constructivism of bi-valued logic, that is often based on the Law of Non-contradiction (LNC), what sort of axiomatizations, what sort of semiotic technologies would we choose for representing the spectrum? What kind

---

[37] Foucault writes: "Now I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity or truth and that which comes under some category, but in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false." See Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power : Interviewers: Alessandro Fontana, Pasquale Pasquino.," in *Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, New York, 1980)., p. 118.

of formal logical apparatuses would we choose for establishing the foundations of our logic? Perhaps, the formalization of Foucauldian discourse/episteme departing from the classical Newtonian, involves the multivalued logic, or rather a plurality of very many logics disrupting the traditional positivist approaches. Since, traditional positivist approaches are often based on a universal logic or a universal concept of logic; hence the standard observation in discursive space formalization is: That there would be an overlapping networks of logics in terms of a 'later Wittgensteinian family resemblance of disparate logics', so as to ensure the material-semiotic fluidity of Haraway's discursive space of cyborg philosophy where "all knowledge is a condensed node in an agonistic power field". These 'agonistic' interpretations of power/knowledge complex refer to the oppositional, confrontational consciousness coded by Haraway in cyborg politics. Hence, according to Foucault's and Haraway's 'enunciative politics': perhaps there would be a plurality of logics, a non-normative logical pluralism constituted of: (1) logics of vagueness, (2) paraconsistent logic, and (3) quantum fuzzy logic to logically represent three queer social situations in the same order: (1). representing a spectrum, such as a social identity spectrum, where boundaries of binary opposites are blurred by a truth-value gap? (2). representing dialectical contradictions or dialethias that are double truths? (3). representing quantum entanglements, disrupting the bi-valued-ness of binary opposites, respectively? Important question is whether it should be a discrete spectrum or a continuous spectrum where values on the scale are correlated with events mapped onto social-political contexts represented by some statistical model or graph theoretic model, cast as a problem of decision making in social situations Now, the relation between situated cognitive subjectivity and non-Euclidean geometry is best understood when Haraway in the introduction chapter : 'A Kinship of Feminist Figurations' in Haraway Reader, tropologically speaks of "remold[ing] kin links"[38], that is, remodelling the kinship structures in society through a metaplasmic cohabitation of the world, with a defined aim to build collective political kinship networks across the "contingent

---

[38] See Donna Haraway, "INTRODUCTION: A KINSHIP OF FEMINIST FIGURATIONS," in *The Haraway Reader*, ed. Donna Haraway (New York and London: Routledge, 2004)., p. 2

foundations" of her "queer family of feminists, anti-racists, scientists, scholars, genetically engineered lab rodents, cyborgs, dogs, dog people, vampires, modest witnesses, writers, molecules, and living and stuffed apes"[39]. The discursive procedures of knowledge productions through "cosmic correspondences" among all these forms of beings talk about such a being-in-the-world view that Haraway contends is traceable only in Post-Newtonian, non-Euclidean geometries. Thus, beginning from the discursive frameworks to the conclusion, what I intend to argue in this paper that the formalizability of discursive spatial formations; that is, formalization of mind as a discursive apparatus between Haraway and Foucault, involves the resuscitation of the discursive subjectivity in terms of the post-Newtonian and non-Euclidean topologies which situate a radical departure, from the classical Newtonian/deterministic worldview, imagining the human history through the model of discursive contingency.

---

[39] Ibid., p. 3