AN ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO *NĀGĀRJUNA'S* OBJECTIONS AGAINST *HETVĀBHĀSA*

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Key Words: *Hetvābhāsa*, *pakṣa*, *pratijñā*, *kālātīta*.

INTRODUCTION:

The sixteen categories of *Nyāya* philosophy attempts to describe all the aspects of a right sort of theoretical enquiry. Put differently, *Nyāya* philosophy provides us with a methodology by which we can form right theses or doctrines about any field of study. Again, the *Naiyāyika-s* understand a right thesis as the one which corresponds to reality. Because *Nyāya* provides a methodology of enquiry about reality which has been employed by scholars of myriad fields to arrive at their theses, *Vātsyāyana* states that *Nyāya* is the lamp light to all studies. On contrary to *Nyāya* view, *Mādhyamika* thinkers believe that no right doctrine or thesis can be formed about ultimate reality. *Nāgārjuna* says that ' *Nāsti cha mama pratijñā*' which means I commit to no doctrine.[1] When *Nāgārjuna* asserts that I have no thesis, he means that he has no thesis about the ultimate reality. *Nāgārjuna* justifies worldly affairs, moral codes, four noble truths and the like from the perspective of conventional reality. Most traditional schools of academics in India have been dependent upon the method of investigation propounded by *Nyāya* philosophers. Therefore, *Nāgārjuna* attacks the *Nyāya* position that provides a methodology by which academicians forms views about reality. *Nāgārjuna's* position is that no doctrine about reality can be formed, that is why he attacks the methodology by which such doctrines are constructed. *Nāgārjuna* writes a book called *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* where he attempts to refute all the sixteen categories propounded by *Naiyāyika-s*.[2]

In this paper we will focus on a part of *Vaidalya-sūtra* concerning refutation of *hetvābhāsa* or faulty reason. *Nāgārjuna's* refutation of faulty reason carries special

importance because it pulls down the whole enterprise of inference. To explain, any enterprise of inference is bound to provide criterion for distinguishing right inferences from the wrong ones. *Hetvābhāsa* is that *padārtha* by which wrong inferences are identified, and the rest of the inferences are regarded as the right ones. Thus *Nāgārjuna's* attack on *hetvābhāsa* should be seen as an attack on the whole enterprise of inference. It would not be an over statement that the *Nyāya* methodology of investigation revolves around inference. Thus *Nāgārjuna's* refutation of *hetvābhāsa* is a big move towards destroying the *Nyāya* method of enquiry into the ultimate nature of reality.

AN OVERVIEW OF HETVĀBHĀSA:

Hetvābhāsa, which comes after *vitandā*, is the thirteenth category enumerated in the *Nyāya-sūtra*. The etymological meaning of the term *hetvābhāsa* suggests the nature of the category. We will begin by illustrating the etymological meaning of the term because it gives an outline to what *hetvābhāsa* is. The term *hetvābhāsa* may mean two different things. First, *hetvābhāsa* means a pseudo reason which appears to be an actual reason but is not an actual reason. Second, *hetvābhāsa* may also refers to an error possessing which a reason becomes a pseudo or faulty reason. The two meanings of the term *hetvābhāsa* are different; one stands for pseudo reason and the other one stands for error. However, the two meanings are very closely related to each other as a pseudo reason becomes pseudo by possessing one or more error. In *Navya-nyāya* a precise definition of error of a reason has been dealt with in magnificent details. We believe that a very rough rough sketch of that definition will provide clarification of the nature of *hetvābhāsa.* The idea is this. If a piece of veridical cognition impedes the emergence of an inferential cognition, then the object of that cognition is to be regarded as an error of the reason in question. To explain, the error of the reason is a fact, that is to say it is a truth or a part of reality, and it is not something fictional or illusory. A fact turns out to be an error with relation to a particular reason by virtue of preventing the inferential cognition which has the reason in question. Since we are able to conceive a relation between the error and the reason, the reason becomes faulty. For example, the cognition of the fact that fire is hot impedes the inferential cognitioin that fire is cold (since it is a

substance). The fact itself cannot impede the inferential cognition; it does so as an object of cognition. So the inferential cognition is prevented from emerging by the cognition of a counter fact. This counter fact is regarded as an error and as a relation between the fact and the reason can be conceived, the reason becomes faulty. Now that there arise many problems in this definition of *hetvābhāsa,* the definition has been greatly modified. As this conception of pseudo reason is a later development in *Nyāya* tradition, we will not go into this modification. *Nāgārjuna*, being a predecessor of *Vātsyāyana*[3], was concerned with the old definition of pseudo reason. The old view of pseudo reason may be illustrated as follows.[4] In the definition of reason it is claimed that a reason is that which has *sādhya-sādhanatva*. In other words, the reason which has the capacity of establishing the target is to be considered as a genuine reason. Now the query is what constitutes the capacity of establishing a target. An answer to this question is to be found in the five *hetvābhāsa*. There are five properties of reason and if they exist in the reason and are known then that makes the reason capable of establishing the target. The *hetvābhāsa-s* are understood as the absence of knowledge of these five properties in the reason. Let us consider the five properties. First one is *pakṣa-sattva*. This is the property of being present in the subject of inference, that is *pakṣa*. In other words, the reason should reside in the *pakṣa*. If this property is absent from the reason or it is present but not known, then the reason is considered as *sādhyasama*. For, the target (*sādhya*) needs to be established in the *pakṣa* as much as the reason is required to be established in the *pakṣa*. Second one is *sapakṣa-sattva*. This is the property of being present in the *sapakṣa*. In other words, the reason should reside in the locus where the existence of the target is already confirmed. The absence of this property in the reason is regarded as *viruddha hetvābhāsa*. Third one is *vipakṣāsattva*. This is the property of being absent in the *vipakṣa*. To put it differently, the reason must not reside on the locus where the absence of the target is already confirmed. When a reason lacks this property, it is regarded as *savyabhicārī*. Fourth one is *asat-pratipakṣattva*. This is the property of not having a counter reason. The reason must not have a counter reason. A counter reason is that which establishes the absence of the target in the subject of inference. A reason

which has a counter reason is regarded as a faulty reason and the fault is called *sat-pratipakṣa*. The fifth property of a genuine reason is *abādhitatva*. When a source of knowledge except inference establishes the absence of target in the subject of inference, the reason is regarded as *bādhita*. So these are the five properties that makes a reason genuine and absence of anyone or more of these properties in a reason makes the reason a pseudo reason.

REFUTATIONS OF HETVĀBHĀSA:

First Objection:

VS-58[5] may be translated as follows: there are no pseudo reasons because there is neither similarity nor dissimilarity. To explain, the pseudo reason is considered as a reason because it is similar to a genuine reason in some aspects. But it is also pseudo because it is dissimilar to a genuine reason with respect to some essential aspects. In this *sūtra, Nāgārjuna* claims that neither similarity nor dissimilarity with the genuine reason is possible. What *Nāgārjuna* had in mind may be this. If a pseudo reason is similar to a genuine reason, then it could not be dissimilar to it. In so far as the pseudo reason be identical with the genuine reason, it cannot be considered as a pseudo reason. On the other hand, if the pseudo reason is dissimilar to the genuine reason, then it cannot have similarity with the genuine reason. In the absence of similarity, the reason cannot be regarded as a pseudo reason as well. Therefore, a pseudo reason can neither be similar nor dissimilar to a genuine reason, so it does not exist. In this argument it has been assumed that at the same time a thing cannot both be similar and dissimilar to another thing. It might be replied that this assumption is unwarranted. So the argument fails to establish its conclusion. But it may be responded on part of *Mādhyamika* thinkers that any non-reason could share some features with the genuine reason, but that does not lead us to call every non-reason a pseudo reason. The main difficulty is every non-reason is both similar and dissimilar to a genuine reason. Accordingly, there is nothing that could distinguishes a non-reason from a pseudo reason. Therefore, there are no pseudo reasons.

Reply-

The objection articulated in VS-58 may be met by *Nyāya* thinkers as follows. At the first place, *Nyāya* thinkers will deny that two entities cannot be both similar and dissimilar at the same time. According to them an entity can be both similar with a reason in certain aspects and dissimilar in other aspects. Secondly, it has been urged by *Mādhyamika* thinkers that everything has some similarity with everything else which makes it impossible to distinguish a non-reason from a pseudo-reason. A pseudo reason has some similarities to the genuine reason, and a non-reason also has some similarities to the genuine reason. Likewise, a non-reason and a pseudo reason both shares some dissimilarities in some aspects with the genuine reason. The difficult question is: what does distinguish a pseudo reason from a non-reason? It may be answered on the part of *Nyāya* thinkers that to be a pseudo reason is to have at least one of the five essential characteristics of a genuine reason. On contrary, a non-reason which happens to be similar to a genuine reason, does not have any of five essential features of a genuine reason.

Second Objection:

VS-59 may be translated as follows: non-deviation is the locus of absence of deviation. According to the commentary[6] associated with this *sūtra*, the *sūtra* implies that *savyabhicāra* or deviation does not exist. The argument embedded may be illustrated as follows: a reason is either intrinsically deviating or happens to be accompanied by a deviation. There is no third possible alternative. Now if we consider the reason to be intrinsically deviating, then it cannot be regarded as a reason. Because non-deviation is an essential characteristic of reason, something intrinsically deviating cannot be regarded as a reason. On the other hand, if the reason is intrinsically non-deviating, then deviation cannot accompany it. Fire is intrinsically hot so cold cannot accompany it as hot and cold are two contradictory properties. Similarity, deviation and non-deviation are two contradictory properties so they cannot reside in the same reason. A property is intrinsic, according to *Mādhyamika* system, when it does not depend on causes and conditions for its existence.[7] Thus a reason is intrinsically non-deviating, its

non-deviation being independent cannot be destructed. Thus deviation cannot accompany the reason. Thus irrespective of whether deviation is regarded as an intrinsic property or a non-intrinsic property of the reason, it does not exist.

Reply:

The key idea in the above objection is that deviation is neither an intrinsic nor an extrinsic property of a reason. *Naiyāyika-s* maintain that deviation is not an intrinsic property of a pseudo reason, but rather an extrinsic properly of it. An extrinsic property of an entity is understood as that property which the entity has by virtue of its having a relation with some other entity. In short, all relational properties of an entity are extrinsic properties. Now we have to show that deviation is an extrinsic property of a pseudo reason. An entity can be counted as deviating only in relation to another entity. For example, fire is regarded as deviating in relation to smoke. But, fire is to be regarded as non-deviating in relation to temperature. Thus the alleged reason is said to be deviating or non-deviating only in relation to some particular *sādhya*. Thus there seems to be no difficulty in accepting that both deviation and non-deviation are extrinsic properties.

Third Objection:

In VS-60 *Nāgārjuna* anticipates an objection on part of the opponent. The opponent could argue that there are numerous examples of deviating reason. Take for instance this inference: space is eternal because it has bodilessness. The reason bodilessness is deviating in relation to eternity. Soul has bodilessness and it is eternal. However, action is non-eternal but it has bodilessness as well. Hence bodilessness is deviating in relation to eternity. Let us take another example of a deviating reason. Atoms are eternal since generality and particularity apply to them. In this inference, the reason is deviating. For generality and particularity apply to eternal entities such as soul as well as to non-eternal entities such as a pot.

As shown above the reasons bodilessness and generality-particularity are claimed to be deviating in relation to eternity. This may be counted as a proof for existence of deviation. Now in VS-61 *Nāgārjuna* argues that bodilessness which is there

in space is different from bodilessness of action. For, the former is deemed as non-originated while the later is deemed as originated. Since bodilessness is different in action and in space, it should not be regarded as deviating. Deviation can exist only under the supposition that the thing that deviates should remain unaltered. On the same line of argument generality and particularity can be shown to be different in atoms and pots. The crux of the above argument is that no reason can be deviating because every reason is different as they are accompanied by different properties. Moreover, a reason is different from another as an individual and every individual is unique.

Reply:

Nyāya thinkers might respond to this objection by rejecting the presumption that every reason is unique. Even though every reason is different as an individual, those individual reasons could exemplify the same universal. Accordingly, due to their participation in the same universal[8], the different individual reasons can be regarded as one reason which can remain same in different subjects of inference. Consider the kitchen where fire accompanies smoke as opposed to another place red hot iron where fire does not accompany smoke. In both cases though fires as individual are different, the two cases of fire is same because they exemplifying the one universal fireness and this makes the deviation under question possible. In addition to that if every reason is considered as wholly different and distinct from every other reason, then not only deviation but also inference would become impossible. But, the argument which *Nāgārjuna* is advancing here is arguably a sort of inference, so it will become impossible as well.

Fourth Objection:

VS-62 asserts that pseudo reasons cannot exist because of momentariness. *Nāgārjuna* gives here a general argument against pseudo reason. At the first moment a thesis or *pratijñā* is stated and in the subsequent moment a reason or *hetu* is stated. The *hetu* is put forward in order to justify the *pratijñā*. The whole point of advancing a *hetu* is to justify the *pratijñā*. Now that everything is momentary, *pratijñā* is also momentary.

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Given its momentariness the *pratijñā* gets destroyed when the *hetu* is stated. In the absence of *pratijñā*, advancement of *hetu* is pointless. More importantly, a *padārtha* becomes a *hetu* only in relation to a *pratijñā*. Without the *pratijñā*, the reason cannot be regarded as a reason as it cannot have a relation with a non-existent thesis. The argument from momentariness shows that reason does not exist. Pseudo reason is regarded as that which is both similar and dissimilar to a reason. Since a reason does not exist, it is not possible for any entity to be similar or dissimilar with a reason. Accordingly, a pseudo reason does not exist as well.

Reply:

Nyāya thinkers admit that a piece of cognition except *apekṣābuddhi* stays in existence only for two moments. Say at the first moment arises a piece of cognition about thesis arises and it continues to exist at the second moment and it gets destroyed at the third moment. Thus the cognition of thesis lasts only for two moments. And if the cognition of reason arises at the second moment, then the pieces of cognition of thesis and the reason could be simultaneous. In that case the reason can serve as a justification for the thesis. However, this objection applies as much to inference for oneself as to inference for others. In case of inference for others, the objection becomes stronger. For, the reason is expressed in a sentence. Being a sentence, it is a sound and it arises after the destruction of the sentence about thesis. Moreover, the sentence of reason cannot justify the sentence of thesis unless the other sentences that is *avayava-s* of the inference are rendered. But, when the other sentences like example etc are rendered the sentence of thesis gets destroyed. As a result, the reason fails to justify the thesis. We find a solution to this problem in the discussion about *āsatti* in the book titled *Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvali*. It is to be borne in mind that the same problem arises in connection to many levels. At the most basic level the problem is about explaining how one gets to know a word or *pada*. For example, consider the word 'pot' in which the letters 'p', 'o' and 't' are uttered in a sequence. They come one after another, so when 'o' comes into existence 'p' gets destroyed. Similarly, when 't' comes into existence 'o' gets destroyed. Thus we are not grasping the three letters simultaneously yet we understand the word

'pot' very well. The *Nyāya* solution to this problem is that after we hear the last letter, namely, 't' we recollect the three letters 'p', 'o' and 't' at once. Hearing each letter produces separate impressions, and those impressions collectively gives rise to memory of the three letters at once. Moreover, hearing the last letter 't' plays the role of an activator or *udvodhaka*, and it activates the impressions to produce memory. Thus one grasps three letters simultaneously through memory. This solution also applies to the problem at a different level with regard to comprehending a sentence. Hearing each word of a sentence creates separate impressions and the ultimate word in the sentence activates those other impressions to produce memory of all the words at once. It must be noted here that many different impressions produce one piece of memory. The *avayava-s* are sentences and five *avayava-s* all together makes one long sentence. We understand this long sentence in the above procedure. Thus we have the in one piece of cognition all the five parts of an inference at once and the problem mentioned does not arise.

Fifth Objection:

In VS-64, *Nāgārjuna* advances an argument against *viruddha* and *prakaraṇasama hetvābhāsa*. Before stating the argument, we want to say something about *viruddha* and *prakaraṇasama hetvābhāsa*. *Viruddha* is that reason which contradicts the very thesis that it has been employed to establish. Take for example the inference, 'word is eternal since it is originated'. In this inference the reason is origination and the target is eternity. However, the reason is such that instead of establishing the target it establishes the absence of the target. For, if something is originated, then it must be non-eternal. So the reason proves the contrary thesis of the thesis to establish which it has been advanced. The *prakaraṇasama hetvābhāsa* takes place when there are two different reasons such that one establishes the *sādhya* in the *pakṣa* while the other reason establishes the absence of *sādhya* in the *pakṣa*. The two reasons are considered as *prakaraṇasama* given that they are equally plausible. It may be objected that the two reasons cannot be equally plausible for they establish contrary theses. It has to be the case that one of the two reasons is more plausible. It could be

replied that the plausibility of a reason depends on the knower, so both the reasons can appear as equally plausible.

Nāgārjuna refutes *prakaraṇasama* and *viruddha* with one argument which is rendered in VS-64. He argues that both of these pseudo reasons comprise of a form of contradiction. Because contradiction is not possible, *virdudha* and *prakaraṇasama*, which involve contradiction, are not possible as well. First consider the *viruddha*. The inference, for example, would be sound is eternal since it is originated. Here the thesis and reason are claimed to be contradictory. But the precondition for a contradiction is that the things that are contradictory must co-exist. Since everything is momentary, the thesis ceases to exist when the reason comes into being. Thus there can be no contradiction between the thesis and the reason; consequently, there is no *virruddha hetvābhāsa*. Now let us consider *prakaraṇasama*. Here we have two different inferences which puts forward contradictory theses. However, the two inferences are such that one follows the other in course of time. Given the momentariness of everything, when the second inference is uttered, the first one goes out of existence. As a result, a contradiction cannot obtain between the two theses.

Reply: the previous reply also applies to this objection.

A Note on Kālātīta:

We would like to explain the nature of the pseudo reason *kālātīta* as it provides a background for explaining *Nāgārjuna's* objections against the same. *Kālātīta* could be understood as a reason which has been uttered at a wrong time. The right time to utter a reason is immediately after the utterance of the *pratijñā* or thesis. If the reason is uttered at any other time, it is counted as *kālātīta*. However, the above understanding of *kālātīta* is unacceptable for the following reasons. First, unless a reason lacks atleast one of the five essential characteristics of a genuine reason, it cannot be regarded as a pseudo reason. The timing of uttering a reason is not included among the essential characteristics of a genuine reason. Accordingly, just because a reason has been uttered at a wrong time, it cannot be regarded as a pseudo reason. Second, there is a *nigrahasthāna* known

as *aprāptakāla* which obtains when a reason is uttered at a wrong time. If we understand *kālātīta* as a mistimed reason, then we would commit the fallacy of repetition. For, *kālātīta* would be a repetition of *aprāptakāla*. So we have to understand *Kālātīta* in another way which is as follows. *Kālātīta* is that reason which attempts to establish such a thesis which have already been refuted by a stronger *pramāṇa*. Consider the inference, 'Ice is hot because it is a substance'. The thesis that ice is hot has already been refuted by perception of ice as cold. Perception is a stronger *pramāṇa* than inference because inference requires perception and not the vice versa. In a nutshell, *kālātīta* is a reason which is uttered when its thesis has already been refuted. Thus the fault in the thesis is that it is late; if it were uttered before the refutation had taken place then the fault would not have occurred. The point seems to be that if the inference involved takes place before the refutation then the error does not happen but if the inference comes after the refutation, the error happens.

Objection against Kālātīta:

Nāgārjuna objects against *kālātīta* in VS-66 and VS-67. *Nāgārjuna's* argument is as follows. Since past time does not exist, the *kālātīta* or mistimed reason does not exist as well. Before the mistimed reason is uttered, the thesis gets refuted. Thus a reason when uttered cannot be regarded as *kālātīta* unless its thesis got refuted in a past time. Now the objection is that the pseudo reason named *kālātīta* does not exist because past refutation does not exist. Past refutation could not exist because past time does not exist. To support the claim that past does not exist, *Nāgārjuna* argues in the following manner; he presents a dilemma that past, present and future are either related with each other or are unrelated. They cannot be related with each other because relation presupposes co-existence. But past, present and future do not co-exist, hence they cannot have a relation. On the other hand, if past, present and future are regarded as unrelated then change would be impossible. For there shall be no connection among past, present and future. As a result, there shall be no connection among my past body, my present body and my future body. Accordingly, the endurance of my body (and likewise other bodies) over time and

its change would be impossible. In addition to this, *Nāgārjuna* claims that past and future do not exist. Of the three periods of time present alone is existent.

Nāgārjuna anticipates a reply on the part of the opponents which is in order. Each language has some words that serves to refer to past, present and future time. If there were no past time, then the words referring to past would turn out to be meaningless. Since we hold those words to be meaningful, there is past time which is being referred by words referring to past. To this objection *Nāgārjuna* replies that the present is constituted of a very thin moment. One moment is so small that it is not possible to ascertain it. Put differently, the present time which consists of a present moment cannot be ascertained. Since it cannot be ascertained, it cannot be referred to by words. Moreover, if present time cannot be ascertained then past and future cannot be ascertained as well. For, past and future are understood only if we can understand present time that serves to distinguish past time from future time. Now that we cannot ascertain past time in actuality, what we refer to by words is a conventionally real past.

Reply:

The above objection would be met by denying that past time does not exist. *Nyāya* thinkers would embrace the first horn of the dilemma and claim that past, present and future are related. The objection that a relation requires co-existent entities and past, present and future are not co-existent can also be met. It is simply denied that a relation presupposes the coexistence of related entities. For, there are some examples which exhibits that an existent entity can have a relation to a non-existent entity. First, I know with certainty that I will die in future. My future death does not exist now. However, a piece of cognition must have a relation with its content. Otherwise, any piece of cognition would be about anything whatsoever. Now I have a piece of cognition that I will die. Even though the cognition exists at present, my death does not exist at present. This implies that the cognition which is now existent have a relation with the death which is now non-existent. Therefore, it becomes evident that an existent entity can have relation with a non-existent entity.[9] Second, there is a necessary relation between cause and effect. This is to say that a particular effect such as curd is invariably produced by a

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particular cause milk. A clothe cannot be produced out of milk. Therefore, milk and curd have necessary relation of causality. However, the existence of milk precedes the existence of curd, they do not co-exist. There is a relation of causality between milk and curd when the milk is there and the curd is yet to arise. It exhibits that the existent milk can have a relation with the curd that is now non-existent and will come into existence in the future.[10] It may be retorted on the part of *Nāgārjuna* that both the examples presumes the existence of a future time. For the relations given as examples are between an existent cognition and future content which is now non-existent and between an existent cause and its future effect which is now non-existent. Since the second objection, which is based on thinness of present moment, refutes future time, our examples being guilty of presuming the existence of future time get refuted as well.

The Nyaya View of Time:

We want to illustrate the *Nyāya* notion of time[11] by which we will try to find out a possible reply to *Nāgārjuna's* objection. *Nyāya* thinkers presents a dilemma that the property of begin past, present or future are either intrinsic or extrinsic properties of time. If the property of being present is intrinsic to time, then it might have either of the two consequences. Either time which is now present was not future and will not be past as intrinsic property of time can never leave it, or else a portion of time is always past, present and future at once. However, this is not the way time is. The same portion of time is referred to as future, present and past from different reference points. Time's being future etc are always due to its relation with something else. Accordingly, they are not permanent properties of time. It follows that the properties of being present, past or future are extrinsic properties of time. On the *Nyāya* view time is counted as a substance. Moreover, it is a one single substance so there are not many times. In time the properties of past, present etc are produced because time comes into connection with other entities. By virtue of being conjoined with these entities, one time seems to have many parts such as moments, minutes, days, past and future etc. The movements of sun, moon etc. are entities which come into relation with the time because of which time appears to be divided into parts. The prior absence of a movement of an entity gets related to the one-

time substance and time is regarded as future in relation to that prior absence. When the same movements get related to time, time is regarded as present with reference to that movement. Destructive absence of that movement comes into relation with time which makes us regard the portion of time as future. Here it could be objected that the above notion of parts of time is circular. For, prior absence cannot be defined without referring to time. The *Nyāya* philosophers define prior absence as that which has no origination but has destruction. Now the question arises as to what origination is. Origination is that which comes into being immediately after sufficient conditions obtains. However, the term 'after' refers to a time sequence which cannot be established without establishment of parts of time. This is the circularity. In order to avoid this difficulty, the *Nyāya* thinkers may define present time in another way. An action that qualifies time with reference to that very action that qualified time is regarded as present. For example, time which is in relation with an action like cooking is called present only with reference to that action. And the whole time period in which the process of making food goes on is regarded as present. The action of cooking is regarded as the *upādhi* of present time. However, the cooking is not the *upādhi* of future or past rather the actions that occurred at past is the *upādhi* of past time. Likewise, the action which shall occur in the future is regarded as the *upādhi* of future time. Hence the *Nyāya* philosophers enabled themselves to avoid defining future and past in terms of prior and destructive absence respectively. As a result, the accusation of circularity is avoided. However, it invites even greater difficulties. The present time is defined in terms of action operating at present. But without a definition of present time, the notion of present action is unintelligible. Similarity, past actions and future actions cannot be identified without a prior identification of past and future time. Thus in this way parts of time cannot be defined. We will return then to try to define past and future in terms of prior and destructive absence. However, it will be argued that we would not define prior and destructive absence in terms of causation. In this manner we can avoid bringing in time phrases into our definition. Prior absence accounts for usages such as 'out of these threads a clothe is going to come into existence'; and destructive absence accounts for the usage like 'this

clothe is destroyed'. The clear difference of these usages cannot be made intelligible without the notion of prior and destructive absence. Lastly, the *Nyāya* definition is dependent on usage or the ways in which we happen to cognize things. For, usage is passive, it is received not invented. Unless you can show contrary usage, the validity of the previous usage retains. It is the base on which the whole *Nyāya* system is being built. Usage is nothing but an indication of the structure of knowledge that mirrors the structure of reality.

CONCLUDING REMARKS:

First, in VS we do not find any refutation of the pseudo reason *sādhya-sama*. In order to see the reason behind leaving *sādhya-sama*, we first have to see what *sādhya-sama* is. The *sādhya* or target is that entity whose existence is to be proved in the subject of inference or *pakṣa*. A reason is that which is characterized by the *vyāpti* of the target and the reason should be known to be already existent in the *pakṣa*. With the assistance of such a reason, the existence of target can be proved in the *pakṣa*. When the reason becomes similar to the target in a particular aspect, the fallacy committed is *sādhyasama*,. The aspect in which reason is similar is that both are required to be proved in the *pakṣa*. So, the criteria of *pakṣa-sattva,* which means the reason should reside in the *pakṣa,* is not satisfied. Thus *sādhyasama* is an impediment to inference and is regarded as a fallacy. For example, one infers that darkness is a substance since it has movement like a horse. The reason of this inference is movement but movement like substance-ness is not yet established in the *pakṣa* darkness. The movement is not known to have the characteristic of *pakṣa-sattva*, so the reason is regarded as fallacious. *Nāgārjuna* omits refuting *sādhyasama*; the reason behind the omission could be this. *Nāgārjuna* has already refuted the notion of similarity. This fallacy essentially involves the notion of similarity as it claims the similarity between the reason and the target. As a result, this fallacy should be understood as being refuted.

Second, one observation is that *Nāgārjuna's* refutation of pseudo reason can be directed against reason as well. The arguments rendered in VS-61, VS-62, and VS-64 all refute pseudo reason as well as genuine reason. They should be counted as objections against

reason in general. Moreover, any attempt to refute pseudo reason obscures the distinction between pseudo and genuine reason. When pseudo reason cannot be distinguished from genuine reason, reason cannot be regarded as a support inferential cognition. It follows that refutation of pseudo reason refutes the veracity of inferential cognition as such.

Third, the replies I have given on the part of *Nyāya* thinkers might sometimes look trivial. This is because the replies commit the *Naiyāyikas* in accepting an entity or belief that *Mādhyamika* does not endorse. But the problem is as the *Mādhyamika* does not admit any thesis, it is impossible to satisfy him with any reply. For, every reply consists of admittance of some thesis. For instance, the replies with regard to VS-59 and VS-61 consists of accepting the existence of extrinsic properties and universals respectively. However, the *Mādhyamika* would not accept their existence and thus the replies are never going to satisfy them. Therefore, the most substantial way to reply them is to criticize them. But, as they do not hold any view it is also not possible to criticize them. However, considering their 'no doctrine' thesis, the legitimacy of their participation in a debate may be questioned.

1   Nāgārjuna's Vigrahavyāvartanī -29

2   Some important works on Vaidalysutra.

   a. Tola, F., & Dragonetti, C. (1995). *Nāgārjuna's Refutation of Logic (Nyāya)* (No. 24). Motilal Banarsidass Publisher.

   b. Westerhoff, Jan (2018) *Crushing the Categories (Vaidalyaprakarana).* Simon and Schuster,

   c. Mohanta, Dilip Kumar. (2009). *Studies in Vaidalya-sūtra of Nāgārjuna.* Center of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Utkal Universityeswar. Bhubaneswar.

3   *Vātsyāyana*, according to Pt. Haraprasad Shastri lived in the 3rd century AD while *Nāgārjuna* lived in the 2nd century AD.

4   Tarkavagisa, Phanibhusana. (1981) *Nyāya-sūtra* with *Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya*. (Vol-1, Sutra no.1/2/4 pg-388) Translated into Bengali with His Own Commentary. West Bengal, Paschimbanga-Rajya-Pustak-Parshad,

5   VS stands for-*s Vaidalya-sūtra* throughout the paper.

6   *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*

7   Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 15/2

8   *Hetutāvacchedaka.* It may either be a *jāti* or an *updāhi.*

9   This example is taken from: Tarkavagisa, Phanibhusana. (1930) *Nyāya-Sūtra* with *Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya* (Vol-4, Sutra- 4/1/49, pg-294)

10   The interested reader may note that this is the core claim of *ārambhavāda* that a non-existent effect can have a relation with an existent effect. A detailed defense of this view can be found in: Tarkavagisa, Phanibhusana. (1981) *Nyāya-sūtra* with *Vātsyāyana-Bhāṣya.* vol-4 pg. 289

11   *Upaṣkāra on vaiśeṣika-darśana,* sutra-2/2/8